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Analytic Narratives:
Research Methods in Economic History, Political Economy and
Development
Syllabus
Professor: Mark Koyama
E-mail: [email protected] Monday: 1.30–4.20 pm Office Hrs: Wednesday 2–3
pm Carow Hall. Fairfax Campus;
This course is an advanced graduate course in economics. This course is designed to help
students carry out research using the analytical narratives approach—a combination
of economic theory, narrative, and empirical evidence that is distinct from standard
approaches in applied economics. The aim of the course is to provide graduate students
with the tools to conduct their own research. I interpret the concept of analytical
narratives broadly and we will explore a range of approaches (including more conventional
empirical papers in economic history, political economy and development. This course is
particularly relevant for students interested in pursing research in economic history, new
institutional economics, development economics and political economy.
For many graduate students (including myself), the hardest part of a PhD is the transition
from consuming research to producing it. This course is aimed at helping you bridge that
gap.
I have taught this class for the past two years and it was largely successful. However,
based on suggestions from students last year I have modified the structure of the course
somewhat. I have also overhauled the reading list.
We will also examine some other topics where this approach has been useful in generating
new insights. For example: How did states emerge? Why can political order breakdown?
How do religious or cultural values interact with economic incentives? We will combine
insights from theoretical models with empirical and historical case studies. We will apply
them to topics in economic development and economic history.
While the original aim of the course was to try to write papers in the analytical narrative
tradition, I have expanded the scope of the course to include papers which use empirical
methods more extensively. Those who are still unsure of what an analytical narrative is
can refer to:
• Avner Greif, Cliometrics after 40 years, The American Economic Review 87, Nr. 2
1997;
• Robert H. Bates et al., editors, Analytic Narratives Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1998;
• R.H. Bates et al., The Analytical Narrative Project 2000.1
1
Also see reviews of this volume J. Elster, Rational choice history: A case of excessive ambition 2000 and
Peter Boettke, Book Review of Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry
1
I was taught that good theorists should read empirical papers in order to know the
stylized facts about the world that their models should seek to explain and that good
empiricists should read papers in economic theory so that they really understand the
models that they purport to be testing. Similarly, I argue that to write papers in the
analytical narrative style we both have to read papers that use more sophisticated models
and econometrics and ask ourselves if there exists data or theory that we can use to
improve our arguments.
I intend to teach the “tools” required to follow this course as I go. These include
some modeling approaches, and some topics that you might run into on a course in
applied econometrics (identification, IVs, regression discontinuity analysis etc.). The most
accessible and useful book on these empirical techniques is
• Josh Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Mastering ’Metrics: The Path from Cause to
Effect Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014
The list of readings that I refer to is very extensive. However, many of these papers
will be familiar to you from other courses either in development, economic history or
institutional economics. I require you to read the required readings in order to come to
class and it is these papers that I will focus on. The background readings are there to
help you in your research and things I think you should have read. One feature of this
course is that I try to focus on recent papers rather than classics in order to help you
get to the research frontier. The frequent presentation assignments are one way I try to
ensure that everyone keeps up as best they can with the readings.
Although many of the examples I study come from economic history, this is not an economic
history class per se. Students no background in history should be able to catch-up relatively
quickly. There are numerous general introductions to European economic history.2
Readings
Each week there will be several required readings. There will be an essential set of
readings (denoted by key readings) which I expect you all to complete before each seminar
and a set of background readings. The main purpose of the background readings is to
provide you with further references that will be useful when it comes to writing your
papers. Starred readings will be assigned for student presentations.
Weingast, Analytical Narratives,Constitutional Political Economy, 11 (2000): 377-379. Book Review of Robert
Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry Weingast, Analytical Narratives,,
Constitutional Political Economy 11 2000. The difference between the analytical narratives approach and the
cliometric approach is captured by comparing D.N. McCloskey, The achievements of the cliometric school,
The Journal of Economic History 38, Nr. 1 1978 and Greif, Cliometrics after 40 years.
2
For example Gregory Clark, Farewell to Alms Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2007; Rondo Cameron and Larry Neal, A Concise Economic History of the World from Paleolithic Times to the
Present, 4th edition New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; Nathan Rosenberg and Jr. L.E. Birdzell,
How the West Grew Rich, the economic transformation of the industrial world New York, U.S.A: Basic Books,
1986; Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 1973.
2
• Students are expected to read and be able to discuss all of the starred readings
during class. Each week two students will be assigned a paper to discuss. I expect
you to prepare some simple slides in order to discuss each paper (bring these to
class on a flash drive, uploaded upon to the class dropbox folder, and emailed to
me). All slides will be made available on the class dropbox folder so that everyone
can benefit from them.
• This combined with a class room research presentation at the end of the semester
determines 40 % of the grade.
• Each student will produce a 20-25 page paper by the end of the semester. This
determines the remaining 60 % of the grade.
• I strongly recommend all students attend the Public Choice Seminar each week as
this is where many relevant empirical papers are presented.
The class with consist of a mixture of student presentation and discussion of papers and
formal lectures. I may add and remove readings throughout the semester.
Presentations
Each week a student will be assigned to present several papers. This involves writing
slides and presenting the paper for around 10-15 minutes in order to set up the class
discussion. These slides should be uploaded to the class dropbox folder. They should
summarize the paper and include the most important results, tables or graphs. Model
your slides after the discussant slides you see at conferences like EHA or AEA meetings.
You can use powerpoint but I recommend you eventually invest time in Latex and Beamer
as this has become the industry standard for younger economists.
The Paper
Each student has to produce a research paper for this course. Ideally this paper should
be written specifically for this course in conjunction with advice and comments from me.
In practice, it is sometimes the case that students develop for this course a paper that
they have already been working on or that they have written for another class. If this is
the case then the student has to discuss this with me and show me the state of the paper
at the beginning of the semester. I’ll agree to allowing the student to use the paper for
this course if they can convince me that it is of sufficient interest and promise.
The paper can be on any topic but it needs to be approved by me. I suggest that students
attempt to integrate either a formal or a verbal model into their analysis.
I suggest that students write papers in Latex. Again this has become the industry
standard. It looks more professional than Word and it is better suited for typesetting
equations.
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1
Readings
1.1
Institutions: January 26 th
Institutions have become the dominant explanation of the wealth and poverty of nations
in the past fifteen years. This is largely due to the work of Daron Acemoglu and James
Robinson formalizing, testing, and integrating into the development literature the insights
of Douglass North. You should be familiar with the Northian definition of institutions as
‘rules of the game’.
There are two themes I will focus on. The first is the issue of institutional persistence.
That is, how is it that some institutions like the African slave trade or the Peruvian mita
have a persistence effect on economic outcomes that lasts for centuries? A second issue
is that of institutional change. Does successful institutional change have to be sudden or
gradual? Can forced institutional changes be beneficial?
Required reading
• Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, The Rise of Europe: Atlantic
Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, American Economic Review 95,
Nr. 3 June 2005
• Nathan Nunn, The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol 123, Nr. 1 2008
• Melissa Dell, The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita, Econometrica, Econometric
Society 78, Nr. 6 November 2010*
• Suresh Naidu and Noam Yuchtman, Coercive Contract Enforcement: Law and
the Labor Market in Nineteenth Century Industrial Britain, American Economic
Review 103, Nr. 1 February 2013*
• Daron Acemoglu et al., The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution,
American Economic Review 101, Nr. 7 December 2011*
• Ruixue Jia, The Legacies of Forced Freedom: China’s Treaty Ports, Review of Economics
and Statistics 96, Nr. 596–608 2014
Background reading
• Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England, Journal
of Economic History 49 1989
• Kenneth L. Sokoloff and Stanley L. Engerman, History Lessons: Institutions, Factor
Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 14, Nr. 3 2000
• Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History New York, U.S.A: Norton,
1981
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No Presentation
1.2
Human capital and Growth February 2nd
Human capital is the most important alternative explanation for divergence growth
patterns to institutions. The background reading here is unified growth theory. This is
an important field in economic growth. I have assigned both the original Galor and Weil
paper and more recent surveys of the theory.
From the perspective of unified growth theory, we ask what changes in the stock or
growth rate of human capital can help account for the origins of economic growth in
north-western Europe. To do this we focus on research that has indicated the importance
of the printing press, Protestantism, and other investments in human capital. We then
go on to discuss the interaction between institutions and human capital.
• Sascha O. Becker and Ludger Woessmann, Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital
Theory of Protestant Economic History, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, Nr. 2
May 2009*
• Francesco Acunto, Innovation and Investment: The Role of Basic Education September 2014
• Jeremiah E. Dittmar, Information Technology and Economic Change: The Impact of
The Printing Press, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, Nr. 3 2011*
• Jared Rubin, Printing and Protestants: Reforming the Economics of the Reformation,
Review of Economics and Statistics Forthcoming
• Oded Galor, Omer Moav and Dietrich Vollrath, Inequality in Landownership, the
Emergence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence,
Review of Economic Studies 76, Nr. 1 2009
• Felipe Valencia Caicedo, The Mission: Human Capital Transmission, Economic
Persistence and Cultre in South America November 2014
• Mara P. Squicciarini and Nico Voigtländer, Human Capital and Industrialization:
Evidence from the Age of Enlightenment 2014*
Background reading
• Oded Galor and David N. Weil, Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian
Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond, American Economic Review 90
2000
• Oded Galor, From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory, in: Philippe Aghion
and Steven Durlauf, editors, Handbook of Economic Growth Elsevier, 2005
• Oded Galor, Unified Growth Theory Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2011
Assigned Papers for Presentations:
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• Orges Begiri—Galor et al. (2009)
• John McDhubhain—Caicedo (2014)
1.3
Culture and Persistence: February 9th
Culture is an increasingly important topic in economic development and economic history.
Defining culture is difficult as is distinguishing culture from institutions. The definition
of institutions proposed by Greif (2006) encompasses cultural beliefs. Cultural values
can help to explain why institutions are persistent. The papers by Voighander and Both,
Alesina et al and Grosjean all provide evidence of remarkable cultural persistence.
Why do cultural values persist? One possibility is inter-generational persistence as
emphasized by Tabellini and in the theoretical work of Bisin and Verdier.
• Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth, Persecution Perpetuated: The Medieval
Origins of Anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany, Quarterly Journal of Economics 127,
Nr. 3 2012*
• Guido Tabellini, The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 123, Nr. 3 August 2008*
• Pauline Grosjean and Rose Khattar, It’s Raining Men! Hallelujah?, Discussion Papers
2014-29 School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, June 2014
• Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano and Nathan Nunn, On the Origins of Gender Roles:
Women and the Plough, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, Nr. 2 2013*
• Sara Lowes et al., The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the
Kuba Kingdom March 2014*
• Pauline Grosjean, A History of Violence: The Culture of Honor as a Determinant
of Homicide in the US South, Discussion Papers 2011-13 School of Economics, The
University of New South Wales, December 2011 Matthias Doepke and Fabrizio
Zilibotti, Occupational Choice and the Spirit of Capitalism, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 123, Nr. 2 05 2008
• Jean-Paul Carvalho and Mark Koyama, Resisting Education 2013
Background reading
• Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier, The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the
Dynamics of Preferences, Journal of Economic Theory 97, Nr. 2 April 2001
Assigned Papers for Presentations:
• Scott Drylie–Grosjean
• Trey Dudley—Grosjean and Khattar (2014)
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1.4
State Origins: February 16th
This week we shift our attention to the state. How did the first states arise? We discuss
several theories that have been proposed and ask what consequences did the emergence
of the state have historically? Can we explain geographical variation in the character of
historical or modern states?
Key readings:
• Robert C. Allen, Agriculture and the Origins of the State in Ancient Egypt, Explorations in Economic History 34, Nr. 2 April 1997
• Boaz Moselle and Benjamin Polak, A Model of a Predatory State, Journal of Law,
Economics, & Organization 17, Nr. 1 2001*
• Matthew Baker, Erwin Bulte and Jacob Weisdorf, The origins of governments: from
anarchy to hierarchy, Journal of Institutional Economics 6, Nr. 02 June 2010*
• Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav and Zvika Neeman, Geography, Transparency and
Institutions, CEPR Discussion Papers 9625 C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, September
2013*
• Jeanet Sinding Bentzen, Nicolai Kaarsen and Asger Moll Wingender, Irrigation
and Autocracy, Discussion Papers 12-06 University of Copenhagen. Department of
Economics, July 2012*
• Jacob Gerner Hariri, The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood, American Political
Science Review 106 8 2012
Background
• Robert L. Carneiro, A Theory of the Origin of the State, Science 169, Nr. 3947 1970
• Yoram Barzel, A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of
the State Cambridge, UK: CUP, 2002
• Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1957
Assigned Papers for Presentations:
• Orges Begiri—Hariri
1.5
Geography and Climate: February 23rd
A recent literature has established how important geography and climate is for explaining
variation in economic outcomes both historically and in contemporary developing countries.
From the point of view of establishing casual effects geography and weather are attractive
variables because they are exogenous.
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The most interesting papers in this literature look at the interaction between climatic
or weather shocks and institutions. Weather shocks can be used to shed light on the
robustness of institutions in the premodern world.
• Ola Olsson and Gustav Hansson, Country size and the rule of law: Resuscitating
Montesquieu, European Economic Review 55, Nr. 5 2011*
• Diego Comin, William Easterly and Erick Gong, Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 BC?, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2, Nr. 3 July
2010
• Nathan Nunn and Diego Puga, Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa,
The Review of Economics and Statistics 94, Nr. 1 February 2012*
• Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, The Potato’s Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence From A Historical Experiment, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126,
Nr. 2 2011
• Ruixue Jia, Weather Shocks, Sweet Potatoes and Peasant Revolts in Historical China,
Economic Journal Forthcoming 2013*
• Ruben Durante, Risk, Cooperation and the Economic Origins of Social Trust: an
Empirical Investigation, MPRA Paper 25887 University Library of Munich, Germany,
October 2009*
• James Fenske and Namrata Kala, Climate, Ecosystem Reslience and the Slave Trade
January 2013
Background readings:
• Jared M. Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1999
• Eric Jones, The European Miracle, 3rd edition Cambridge, U.K.: CUP, 2003
• Scott99
Assigned Papers for Presentations:
• Megan Teague–Fenske and Kala, Climate, Ecosystem Reslience and the Slave Trade
• Zhilong Ge—Durante (2009)
1.6
State Capacity: March 2nd
The concept state capacity originates in the literature in historical sociology (Tilly, 1990).
A recent literature has emphasized the importance of state capacity for understanding
modern development outcomes. This literature builds on the observation that the poorest
individuals in the world tend to live in failed states such as the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Haiti, Somalia, Sudan etc. All rich world countries from the USA to Sweden or
Japan (barring the oil states) have both flourishing market economies and significant
states.
8
The literature tends to distinguish between two measures of state capacity: fiscal capacity
and administrative capacity. We will briefly review the theoretical literature on state
capacity but our main focus will be on the empirical and historical papers. These papers
document that the origins of modern economic growth in Europe were accompanied by
investments in state capacity. These increases in state capacity in the European story
went hand-in-hand with improvements in the functioning of the market. We explore why
this was the case.
Key readings:
• Valerie Bockstette, Areendam Chanda and Louis Putterman, States and Markets:
The Advantage of an Early Start, Journal of Economic Growth 7, Nr. 4 December
2002
• Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights,
Taxation, and Politics, American Economic Review 99, Nr. 4 September 2009*
• Mark Dincecco and Mauricio Prado, Warfare, fiscal capacity, and performance,
Journal of Economic Growth 17, Nr. 3 September 2012
¸
Pamuk, Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe:
• Kivanc Karaman and Sevket
The Interaction between Warfare, Economic Structure and Political Regime, American
Political Science Review 107, Nr. 3 2013*
• Mark Dincecco and Gabriel Katz, State Capacity and Long-Run Performance, MPRA
Paper 38299 University Library of Munich, Germany, April 2012
• Gary W. Cox, Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast, The Violence Trap: A PoliticalEconomic Approach to the Problems of Development Working Paper August 2013*
• James Fenske, Ecology, trade and states in pre-colonial Africa, MPRA Paper 27203
University Library of Munich, Germany, December 2010
• Nicola Gennaioli and Ilia Rainer, The modern impact of precolonial centralization
in Africa, Journal of Economic Growth 12, Nr. 3 September 2007
Background readings:
• Patrick K. O’Brien, The nature and historical evolution of an exceptional fiscal state
and its possible significance for the precocious commercialization and industrialization of the British economy from Cromwell to Nelson, The Economic History Review
2011
• Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, Pillars of Prosperity Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2011 Chapter 1
• Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social
Orders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009
• Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order London: Profile Books Ltd., 2011
9
• Joel Mokyr and John V. C. Nye, Distribution Coalitions, the Industrial Revolution,
and the Origins of Economics Growth in Britain, Southern Economic Journal 74, Nr. 1
July 2007
Assigned Papers for Presentations:
• Xuhao Pan–Fenske
• Scot Drylie—Cox et al. (2013)
1.7
Origins of Economic Growth in Britain March 16th
Why did the industrial revolution happen in Britain? This is a massive topic. The leading
explanations in the modern literature are those associated with Allen (2009), Mokyr (2009),
and McCloskey (2010). In this class we will focus on the institutional story as outlined
by Douglass North and Barry Weingast in conjunction with more recent challenges and
reformulations of it (notably Bogart and Richardson (2009); Mokyr and Nye (2007); Bogart
and Richardson (2012). I will hopefully have a survey article ready for you to read for
class!
• Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England, Journal
of Economic History 49 1989*
• Patrick K. O’Brien, The nature and historical evolution of an exceptional fiscal state
and its possible significance for the precocious commercialization and industrialization of the British economy from Cromwell to Nelson, The Economic History Review
2011
• John Brewer, The Sinews of Power Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1988
• Daniel Bogart and Gary Richardson, Property Rights and Parliament in Industrializing Britain, Journal of Law & Economics 2012
• Dan Bogart and Gary Richardson, Making property productive: reorganizing rights
to real and equitable estates in Britain, 1660–1830, European Review of Economic
History 13, Nr. 01 April 2009
• Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving
Federalism and Economic Development, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11, Nr. 1 April 1995*
• Joel Mokyr and John V. C. Nye, Distribution Coalitions, the Industrial Revolution,
and the Origins of Economics Growth in Britain, Southern Economic Journal 74, Nr. 1
July 2007*
• Mark Koyama, Centralization and Decentralization in the British Industrial Revolution, Rough Draft 2015.*
Background readings:
• Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009
10
• Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social
Orders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009
Assigned Papers for Presentations:
• Fernando Arteaga Bogart and Richardson
1.8
Conflict and State Development: March 23rd
Key readings:
• Nicola Gennaioli and Hans-Joachim Voth, State Capacity and Military Conflict,
Technical report memo, 2013*
• Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth, The Three Horsemen of Riches: Plague,
War, and Urbanization in early modern Europe, Review of Economic Studies 80 2013*
• Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth, Gifts of Mars: Warfare and Europe’s Early
Rise to Riches, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, Nr. 4 2013*
• James Fenske and Namrata Kala, 1807: Economics shocks, conflict and the slave
trade July 2014
• Timothy J. Besley and Marta Reynal-Querol, The Legacy of Historical Conflict:
Evidence from Africa, CEPR Discussion Papers 8850 C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers,
February 2012
• Philip T. Hoffman, Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World?, The Journal
of Economic History 72, Nr. 03 September 2012
• Mark Dincecco and Mauricio Prado, Warfare, fiscal capacity, and performance,
Journal of Economic Growth 17, Nr. 3 September 2012
• Mark Dincecco and Gabriel Katz, State Capacity and Long-Run Performance, MPRA
Paper 38299 University Library of Munich, Germany, April 2012
Background readings:
• Frederic C. Lane, Economic Consequences of Organized Violence, The Journal of
Economic History 18, Nr. 4 1958
• Richard Bean, War and the Birth of the Nation State, The Journal of Economic
History 33 1973
Assigned Papers for Presentations:
• Xuhao Pan–Hoffman
• John MacDhubhain–Besley and Reynal-Querol
11
1.9
Persecutions, State-Building, and Rule of Law: March 30th
Premodern states persecuted minorities and dissidents. Modern states in developed
countries are committed (in principle if not in practice) to a liberal conception of the rule
of law which is intended to protect minorities and dissidents (at least within limits). I am
interested in how this transition took place. Thus I have written several papers on the
causes of persecutions in premodern Europe. I have also explored the consequences of
persecutions in premodern China. This class will review the literature on the causes and
consequences of persecutions and seek to explain why persecutions declined in Europe
during the transition to modernity.
Key readings:
• Edward L. Glaeser, The Political Economy of Hatred, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 120, Nr. 1 January 2005
• Paul R. Gregory, Philipp J.H. Schröder and Konstantin Sonin, Rational dictators
and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin’s archives, Journal of Comparative
Economics 39, Nr. 1 March 2011
• R. Warren Anderson, Noel D. Johnson and Mark Koyama, From the Persecuting to
the Protective State? Jewish Expulsions and Weather Shocks, 1100–1800 February
2013*
• Noel D. Johnson and Mark Koyama, Legal Centralization and the Birth of the Secular
State, Journal of Comparative Economics 41, Nr. 4 2013
• Noel D. Johnson and Mark Koyama, Taxes, lawyers, and the decline of witch trials
in France, Journal of Law and Economics 57 2014
• Mark Koyama, The political economy of expulsion: The regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England, Constitutional Political Economy 21, Nr. 4 December
2010
• Jordi Vidal-Robert, War and Inquisition: Repression in Early Modern Spain, Technical
report 119 Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy, February 2013
• Jordi Vidal-Robert, Long-run effects of the Spanish Inquisition March 2014
• Roland Benabou, Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni, Forbidden Fruits: The Political
Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth December 2013*
• Mark Koyama and Melanie Meng Xue, The Literary Inquisition: Human Capital
Accumulation and the Persecution of Intellectuals in Imperial China, Memo, January
2015.
• Zhilong Ge—Benabou et al. (2013)
• Megan Teague Jordi Vidal-Robert, Long-run effects of the Spanish Inquisition March
2014
12
1.10
Europe Verses China April 6
Why did modern economic growth begin in Europe rather than in China? This is one of
the biggest questions in economic history. China was undoubtedly more advantaged than
Europe economically in 1000 AD. By 1800 western Europe was certainly ahead of China.
But the question of when and why Europe overtook China is a controversial one that
remains unresolved. We will focus our attention on institutional factors and see what
part they played in explaining the Great Divergence.
• Carol H. Shiue and Wolfgang Keller, Markets in China and Europe on the Eve of
the Industrial Revolution, American Economic Review 97, Nr. 4 September 2007*
• Avner Greif and Guido Tabellini, The Clan and the City: Sustaining Cooperation
in China and Europe, Working Paper 445 IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for
Economic Research), 2012*
• Chiu Yu Ko, Mark Koyama and Tuan-Hwee Sng, Unified China; Divided Europe
January 2014*
• Avner Greif, Murat Iyigun and Diego L. Sasson Social Institutions and Economic
Growth: Why England and Not China Became the First Modern Economy (2012)
Background readings:
• Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, China, Europe and the making of the modern
world economy Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000
• Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R Bin Wong, Before and Beyond Divergence Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2011
• Fernando Arteaga — Greif and Tabellini
• Trey Dudley— Avner Greif, Murat Iyigun and Diego L. Sasson
Religion, Religious Organizations and Religious Development April
13th
What is the economics of religion? How does the economics of religion explain the success
of strict religions? Why does strictness change over time? Why do religious groups
splinter? What explains the emergence of new religions? How do religious choices affect
economic outcomes?
• Laurence R. Iannaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults,
Communes, and Other Collectives, Journal of Political Economy 100, Nr. 2 April 1992*
• Jean-Paul Carvalho and Mark Koyama, Development and Religious Polarization:
The Emergence of Reform and Ultra-Orthodox Judaism, Economics Series Working
Papers 560 University of Oxford, Department of Economics, 2011
• Laurence R. Iannaccone, Introduction to the Economics of Religion, Journal of
Economic Literature 36, Nr. 3 September 1998
13
• Metin M. Co¸sgel, Thomas J. Miceli and Jared Rubin, The Political Economy of Mass
Printing: Legitimacy and technological change in the Ottoman Empire, Journal of
Comparative Economics Forthcoming 2012*
• Jared Rubin, Institutions, the Rise of Commerce and the Persistence of Laws:
Interest Restrictions in Islam and Christianity, Economic Journal 121, Nr. 557
December 2011*
• Gary Richardson and Michael McBride, Religion, Longevity, and Cooperation: The
Case of the Craft Guild., Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 71, Nr. 2
2009
• Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin, Rituals or Good Works: Social Signalling Religious
Organizations 2014
• Ying Bai and James Kung, DIFFUSING KNOWLEDGE WHILE SPREADING GOD’S
MESSAGE: PROTESTANTISM AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN CHINA, 1840–
1920, Journal of the European Economic Association Forthcoming 2014*
Assigned Papers for Presentations:
• Trey Dudley—Bai and Kung
• Erez Cramer —Richardson and McBride
1.11
Student Research Presentations: April 20th
1.12
Student Research Presentations: April 27th
1.13
Feedback on Research Papers: May 4th
References
Acemoglu, Daron et al.: The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution, American Economic
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