1. No category

Reformed Epistemology and Christian Apologetics
Author(s): Michael Sudduth
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Religious Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Sep., 2003), pp. 299-321
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Religious Studies 39, 299-321
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412503006553
(? 2003 Cambridge University
Press
Printed in the United Kingdom
Reformed epistemology and
Christian apologetics
MICHAEL
SUDDUTH
Saint Michael's College, 1Winooski Park, Box #3 99, Colchester, Vermont 05439
It is a widely held viewpoint in Christian apologetics that in addition
Abstract:
to defending Christian theism against objections (negative apologetics), apologists
should also present arguments in support of the truth of theism and Christianity
(positive apologetics). In contemporary philosophy of religion, the Reformed
epistemology movement has often been criticized on the grounds that it falls
considerably short of satisfying the positive side of this two-tiered approach to
Christian apologetics. Reformed epistemology is said to constitute or entail an
inadequate apologetic methodology since it rejects positive apologetics or at least
favours negative over positive apologetics. In this paper I argue that this common
objection fails on two grounds. First, while the arguments of Reformed epistemology
are relevant and useful to apologetics, neither Reformed epistemology nor its
epistemological project should be identified with a distinct school ormethod of
apologetics. Secondly, while certain claims of Reformed epistemology seem to imply
a rejection of positive apologetics, or at least a preference for negative or positive
apologetics, I argue that no such conclusion follows. In fact, although unimpressed
by particular versions of natural theology and positive apologetics, Reformed
epistemologists have provided criticisms of each that can constructively shape future
approaches to the apologetic employment of natural theology and Christian
evidences.
of the frequent
One
done
very
little
to promote
theism or Christian
even
Various
stronger
writers
theism
criticism
have
failing
the agenda
in particular
of Reformed
negative
to provide
reasons
is true, so-called
been
that the distinctive
apologetic,
the positive
is that
it has
for supposing
that
epistemology
of offering
is that it has actually
claimed
ology restrict it to amere
the faith but
criticisms
positive
opposed
features
to such
epistem
objections
to faith typically
An
a project.
of Reformed
simply answering
backing
apologetics.
against
associated
with natural theology and Christian evidences. Reformed epistemology is thus
seen as constituting
getics.
Owing
or entailing
to the widely
held
a weak
or inadequate
importance
form of Christian
of Christian
apologetics
apolo
among
299
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300
SUDDUTH
MICHAEL
Christian theologians and philosophers, this criticism indicates a potentially
serious liabilityof Reformed epistemology. As James Sennett has noted,' the legit
if any, of natural
imate place,
serious
theology
for the advocate
problems
In this paper
Iwant
of Reformed
one of the more
epistemology'.'
this common
to examine
remains
and apologetics
and
criticism
longstanding
of
Reformed epistemology. After briefly outlining the distinction between positive
and negative
Iwill
apologetics,
clarify
of Reformed
the nature
epistemology
and
what relationship, if any, ithas toChristian apologetics, especially positive apolo
getics. Iwill argue thatReformed epistemology does not constitute a school of
sort of philosophical
it does entail a particular
though
apologetics,
argumentation
which is useful to apologetics. While this argumentation does not in itself entail
positive apologetics, neither does it entail a rejection of positive apologetics.
Iwill
Moreover,
show
that several
alleged
arguments
with Reformed
associated
epistemology for rejecting positive apologetics or preferring negative over posi
what
resolving
In this way
are inadequate.
tive apologetics
Sennett
and others
I hope
to make
considered
have
some progress
toward
of the more
serious
one
problems for theReformed epistemologist.
and positive
Negative
It has been
between
objections
theistic
to
is roughly
and Christian
and the presentation
apologetics)
(negative
of religion
The distinction
apologetics.2
that defend
of arguments
the presentation
against
and positive
negative
in the philosophy
in literature
commonplace
between
distinguish
apologetics
belief
of arguments
that
provide support for the truthof theistic and Christian belief (positive apologetics).
To clarify
ful to consider
and
cutting
the concept
reason
reason
not provide
reasons
defeater)
or one
belief,
case,
grounds
though,
to
presentation
theism
and
of defeaters
rebutting
defeaters
with
that provide
can
reasons
that p is an
is an overriding
either
initial belief
the initial belief
i.e. do
acquires
(rebutting
(undercutting
initial
for giving up one's
the same degree
therefore
and Christian
(e.g.
of defeaters,
that p.4 In each case one
one's
reasons
the belief with
theistic
of a belief
that p are inadequate,
in some way. One
for holding
one acquires
Christianity
against
status
defeater
for the belief
beliefs
incompatible
or at least no longer holding
Objections
various
something
loses one's
In each
defeater).
one's
a condition
speaking,
some belief
against
of some belief
sort of support
for modifying
for accepting
defeater
not-p. An undercutting
that the grounds
the appropriate
reasons
epistemic
under
between
are at least two kinds
There
A rebutting
for supposing
for supposing
acquires
or warrant).'
and undercutting.
rebutting
overriding
is, broadly
the positive
it is help
apologetics,
the distinction
especially
A defeater
that undermines
justification,
and positive
negative
of defeaters,
defeaters.
rebutting
or circumstance
rationality,
between
the distinction
be
construed
belief. Among
for supposing
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of firmness.
as
the
these
are
that there
is no
Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
from the alleged
God. Arguments
are two such
Unlike
Feuerbachian
rebutting
belief
defeaters,
and Freudian
projection
undercutting
defeaters
to the truth of theism
as opposed
in God,
positive
there are also a variety
But
examples.
for example,
of theism
incoherence
of undercutting
attack
of evil
defeaters,
of religious
theories
putative
belief.
grounds
for
defeat
the
itself. Since defeaters
both sorts of defeaters
status of their target beliefs,
epistemic
and the problem
will provide
reasons for supposing that theistic belief lacks positive epistemic status.
But defeaters
can be defeated
to Christian
the connection
positive
the alleged
reasons
against
for supposing
fence against
could
the original
also rebut
then a rebutting
hence
not-p
who
simply
theism
that p.5 One who
for supposing
is engaging
theism
against
is no God)
(there
will be a reason
attempts
or Christian
some argument
is equivalent
to arguing
theism
However,
is a rebutting
de
one
de
that not-p. But
for supposing
that not not-p,
to rebut a rebutting
attempts
since a rebutter against
is a God).
for p (there
defeater
(or undercutting)
in negative
is engaging
do not
free-will
for supposing
apologetics
a rebutting
to undercut
belief
against
in positive
a rebut
or undercutting
argument
If a defeater
defeater.
defeaters
involve presenting
defeater would
p, itwill be a reason
defeater-defeater
a reason
defeater
and
that there is no God. Plantinga's
rebutting
some proposition
lies
negative
presents
of evil is such a defeater-defeater.
the logical problem
feater against
If someone
of the atheological
that the premises
the conclusion
support
and herein
rebutting
by either rebutting
a rebutting
To undercut
defeater.
adequately
one can respond
theism,
between
of how
belief can be defeated.
theistic and Christian
ting defeater
defeater-defeaters),
The distinction
from a consideration
emerges
apologetics
against
(by so-called
apologetics.
apologetics
But one
against
by showing
that
is not a good argument.
Now Reformed epistemology has frequently been criticized on the grounds
that it favours
'Jerusalem
osophers
or is exclusively
and Athens
to note
committed
revisited',6
this apparent
to negative
George
liability of Reformed
In his paper
apologetics.
was
Mavrodes
one
of the first phil
epistemology.
According
to
Mavrodes, negative apologetics does not provide us with reasons for supposing
that theistic belief
is true. It only makes
but this is a very weak
sort of rationality
that attaches
that they are true. Mavrodes
rational
Christians
in this stronger
meet
theistic belief
of rational belief.
sense
to beliefs when
argues
It stands
of
'insufficient
evidence'
permissible,
in contrast
we have good
that not only might
sense, but the task of Christian
the charge
epistemically
to a stronger
reasons
we want
apologetics
for God
to suppose
our beliefs
requires
head-on
to be
that
by pro
viding evidence. Reformed epistemology, he argues, does not provide us with the
resources for this task. Similarly, in Gary Gutting's fictitious dialogue between
a Calvinist and Catholic,7 theCalvinist, who represents the Plantingian Reformed
epistemologist, accepts negative apologetics but iswholly opposed to positive
apologetics. As inMavrodes's paper, Gutting's dialogue distinguishes between
a weakly
rational belief whose
denial
is also rational and a strongly
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rational belief
301
302
MICHAEL
SUDDUTH
whose denial isnot rational. In the dialogue, negative apologetics establishes only
to believe,
the right or permission
and for this reason
it establishes
the rationality
of theistic belief inonly aweak sense. Positive apologetics, on theother hand, estab
lishes
(if successful)
what
a person
ought
and so establishes
to believe,
the ration
ality of theistic belief in a strong sense. The Catholic interlocutor suggests that
one of themajor difficulties with Plantinga's religious epistemology is its failure
the rationality
to establish
of theistic
and Christian
belief
in this stronger
sense.
A more recent expression of this apologetic disappointment in Reformed
epistemology is found in Gary Habermas's contributions to the Zondervan
Counterpoints Series book, Five Views on Apologetics, edited by Steven B. Cowan
In his response
and Stanley N. Gundry.
to Kelly Clark's presentation
of Reformed
epistemology (in the same book), Habermas argues thatReformed epistemology
faces a serious quandary, for the Reformed epistemologist stands 'between the
Scylla of avoiding
ologist's
and evidence
arguments
of fideism
Charybdis
'.8While
of negative
employment
in order to justify their system,
in the Reformed
the value
recognizing
Habermas
apologetics,
and the
epistem
of what
is critical
he
calls the 'Reformedepistemologist's apologetic strategy'. He writes:
Clark does encourage negative apologetics, and his colleagues at Calvin have done an
excellent job arguing that crucial Christian doctrines can be defended against objections.
is the positive
But where
.... My
defense?
concern
at this point,
is that
however,
the
efforts of Reformed epistemologists have not, tomy knowledge, moved very far in
the direction of actually establishing the truth of Christian theism.... Maybe there is
a sense
in which
scholars
these
the positive
think
move
cannot
be made
well.
Or
maybe some of them are not very interested in this step. In any case, I thinkMavrodes
is right about
the ambivalent
status
of positive
in Reformed
apologetics
thought.
But without it, Iwonder how Reformed epistemologists establish Christian theism
in terms of their apologetic methodology.9
of Mavrodes,
The criticisms
at least ambivalent
position
think that the arguments
Christian
This
apologetics.
positive
accentuated
in Habermas's
book, Reformed
of apologetics.
to measure
deficiency
critique
As such, Reformed
to the demands
of Reformed
is being
treated
epistemology
its
for the ration
a case
up
in his paper
since,
epistemology
these
namely
and Mavrodes
Gutting
entail
epistemology
apparent
epistemology,
apologetics.
too weak
to what
each point
and Habermas
flaw in Reformed
of Reformed
Five Views
or school
regarding
in a sense
in God
ality of belief
Gutting,
as a basic
thinkers and others perceive
and
of
is
epistemology
throughout
as a distinct
appears
the
method
to be wholly
inadequate.
The project
of Reformed
But are the preceding
accurate?
ology
More
generally,
and the dichotomy
epistemology
closely
what
between
allied criticisms
is the connection
negative
of Reformed
between
and positive
epistemology
Reformed
apologetics?
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epistem
To answer
Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
these
it will
questions,
ponents
be necessary
of Reformed
to the project
Reformed
to consider
of the essential
I will
epistemology.
as exemplified
epistemology
some
in the work
outline
com
three
of the movement's
tiers of
principal
representatives:Alvin Plantinga,William Alston, and Nicholas Wolterstorff.
The critique of evidentialism
In his seminal
a detailed
evidential
it, is a conclusion
propositional
evidence
or unreasonable,
While
since
argument
by arguing
existence
of God,
the evidentialist
the concept
within
focuses
has no good
reason
to undercut
tempts
incoherent
monsense,
on
of classical
for theism.
attempted
the rather
everyday
beliefs
implausible
are not
rational
to undercut
various
to show
i.e. as a matter
intellectual
any
that
where
of being
He
duties.
at
in
that (1) is grounded
by arguing
which
this
for the
proofs
(i) and attempts
that (i) is true, especially
foundationalism,
and has
(i) if there
is irrational
deontologically,
objection
to theistic be
evidence
have
to suppose
is construed
or unreasonable,
then theistic belief
propositional
rights or not violating
the evidentialist
the epistemology
for theism,
instead
developed
from two premises:
the truth of (2) by adducing
against
Plantinga
intellectual
is irrational
derived
the Enlightenment
of rationality
one's
',1"Plantinga
belief. This objection
(2) there is no sufficient
and
theists
many
belief
to theistic
objection
explains
lief, as Plantinga
is no sufficient
that theistic
of the claim
critique
the so-called
in God
'Reason and belief
1983 essay
is both
self-referentially
of our com
implication
that most
or justified.
In the absence
of self
referentially coherent criteria for proper basicality that exclude theistic belief,
the evidentialist
reason
does not have
for affirming
Plantinga
where,
Plantinga
has
as well
entism,
In all these
that evidentialism
need
or any form of foundationalism
examined
as various
cases
case for (1).Hence,
Plantinga
he has no good
is irrational or unreasonable.
of course,
has recognized,
foundationalism
classical
a very strong
that theistic belief
the attempt
extensions
analogical
argues
to ground
that attempts
not be rooted
for that matter.
evidentialism
of classical
to support
in
Else
in coher
evidentialism.
an evidentialist
requirement for theistic belief is unsuccessful."
The defence of the proper basicality
to this critique
Corresponding
of theistic
basicality
belief.
The
thesis
of evidentialism
is the defence of the proper
of evidentialism
critiques
serve not merely
to
undercut objections to the rationality of theistic belief, but also objections to the
rationality
of properly
basic
theistic belief can be rational
theistic
belief.
(or possess
Hence,
some positive
they purport
epistemic
to show
status)
that
for some
people in the appropriate circumstances, even if the person lacks propositional
evidence
While
belief
or an argument
Plantinga
in several
in support
has developed
papers,
his most
of the truth of her theistic belief.
this defence
complete
of the proper
version
basicality
of this defence
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of theistic
is featured
303
304
MICHAEL
SUDDUTH
in his more recent,Warranted Christian Belief [hereafterWCB]. As the title im
plies, Plantinga aims to defend not merely theistic belief but more specifically
Christian
beliefs,
I shall focus here on theistic
though
belief. He aims
to defend
such beliefs against a variety of objections to their positive epistemic status,
what Plantinga calls de jure objections. (De jure objections are distinguished
from defacto objections that concern the truth of theistic belief). Plantinga pres
ents
a model
of how
belief
theistic
can possess
a number
of positive
epis
temic statuses (e.g. deontological justification, internal and external rationality,
and warrant)
ment.
without
the belief
being
to this model,
According
based
on propositional
we have been
created with
or argu
evidence
a disposition
to form
various theistic beliefs in a broad range ofwidely realized experiential conditions.
Plantinga argues that thismodel is epistemically possible (i.e. consistent with
what
the evidence
and several
accepted
of the more
by most
of
in the discussion)
the participants
a model
to such
objections
prominent
are ultimately
unsuccessful.
Although Plantinga defends the deontological rationality of theistic belief in
WCB, his main
rant, as Plantinga
explained
or quality
of which
A belief
enough
is a defence
in the book
focus
is warranted
of warranted
in his two prior Warrant
is sufficient
to transform
if it is produced
just
theistic
volumes,
belief. War
is that property
true belief
into knowledge.
faculties
by cognitive
functioning
properly in a congenial environment according to a design plan successfully
aimed
at truth. Plantinga
amounts
belief
that such
maintains
assumes
that theism
belief,
at least when
shows
that if theism
product
held
is false, then
of properly
tive dysfunction
when
functioning
account
belief
cannot
Plantinga,
depend
in a basic way.
spends
presuppositions.
be divorced
of religious
not constitute
of Freud's
of course,
Hence,
theistic
objection)
toMarx).
attributes
defeaters
In each
belief).
actual
defeaters
case,
own
examining
belief will be the
at something
of cogni
By contrast,
Plantinga
iswarranted,
draws
attention
defeaters
a variety
to theistic
believers.
belief.
to theistic
of warrant.12
of potential
belief will
belief.
Hence,
potential
theistic
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Such
So Plantinga
undercutting
of evil, projection
that these
even
to how
on distinctly
depends
status of theistic
account
other
or the product
to theistic
(e.g. problem
he argues
for most
if one
Plantinga
the best sort of de jure objection
or successful
to theistic belief
only
belief
questions
that the warranted
into Plantinga's
is worked
that Plantinga
from the de facto objection
recognizes
force
precisely,
aimed
faculties
epistemological
the latter part of his book
and rebutting
More
it is likely that basic
It is here
on there being no genuine
a condition
carry
How
is false, then it is likely that theistic
is true, then it is likely that theistic
the answer we give to particular
metaphysical
will
to theistic
iswarranted.
belief
lacks warrant.
cognitive
(e.g. the view Plantinga
that if theism
held
an objection
is false. If theism
in a basic way,
than truth (e.g. Plantinga's
argues
to the idea that theistic
to an objection
ever, Plantinga
already
sort of de jure objection
that the best
argues
theories
defeaters
belief
do
can be
Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
in a basic way,
warranted
wide
range of criticisms
Alston
Like Plantinga,
even
has presented
ism.13 In his book Perceiving
of a detailed
does
awareness
of 'experiential
of criticisms
a variety
of the nature
of God'. Alston
of theistic
in the context
beliefs.
('Justifi
sense). He
truth-conducive
and epistemological
begins
evidential
against
such a critique
justification
is taken in a non-deontological,
of an analysis
this by way
is aware of a
adult believer who
God,"4 he develops
of the immediate
defence
in this context
cation'
for the mature
his theistic beliefs.
against
implications
that there is some
by showing
thing appropriately designated 'experiential awareness of God' that engenders
beliefs
that God
is doing
or that God
has
to the effect
forgiving,
loving),
-what
power)
Alston
of God, howbeit
ate or non-inferential
the experiential
found
in sensory
to consciousness).
Alston
MP produces
- is immediate,
beliefs
sensory perceptual
that
So it is
refers to it as mystical
itsM-beliefs
so if they are justified
manner,
(e.g.
(e.g. goodness,
features
generic
non-sensory.
to the subject
property
argues
of something
(MP). Like sense perception,
perception
also
of the essential
(e.g. the direct presentation
a kind of perception
perceivable
Alston
calls M-beliefs.
of God exhibits many
awareness
perception
in relation
something
some
in an immedi
- like
their justification
not based on argument
or propositional
evidence.
An
doxastic
established
objections
to this proposal.
set of dispositions
But then what
of MP. And
is true of all socially
in any socially
reasons
to suppose
cent until proven
established
But
to all socially
established
suppose
that MP
is unreliable,
doxastic
outputs
as justified.
objections
In this way, Alston may
doxastic
we
be viewed
justification
Doxastic
practices
are 'inno
belief
established
doxastic
prac
acceptability
that
there are reasons
to regard
considers
Alston
it as reliable
to
and its
an array of potential
that they are unsuccessful.
as making
of theistic
a sufficient
Unless
are reasonable
Naturally,
to
we have
of rational
practices.
will also be true
that it is rational
unless
is a socially
a condition
and
shared
circumstances.
practices
for he argues
is unreliable.
satisfy
of a socially
under particular
practice
ifMP
as a
several potential
is like sense perception
doxastic
of MP and argues
to the reliability
the immediate
doxastic
then,
it will
contends,
beliefs
argument,
that the practice
guilty'.
MP
in that it consists
established
to Alston's
for regarding MP
as his answering
to Alston,
establishment,
to form and maintain
engage
tice, as Alston
as well
According
this is central
is his case
argument
practice,
of our cognitive
other aspects
apply
in Alston's
element
important
socially
a contribution
by establishing
to the defence
of
a kind of parity be
tween theistic belief and other aspects of our cognitive establishment, principally
sensory perception. Moreover, while Alston does not claim to show conclusively
that theistic
presenting
proposal
beliefs
grounded
an argument
is plausible
in MP
are prima
for this nonetheless,
on the face of it (especially
MP and sense perception),
(2) objections
facie immediately
mainly
justified,
on the grounds
given
to the proposal
the similarities
can be met,
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he is
that (i) the
between
and
(3)MP
305
306
MICHAEL
SUDDUTH
has non-trivial 'significant self-support' (i.e. featureswithin MP that reinforce its
being reliable, e.g. internal coherence). Also, while Alston does not claim to show
that MP
is a reliable doxastic
essential
good arguments
practice,
it being
against
facie justified.
prima
doxastic
So, in Alston
practice
In the absence
the
that there are no
and
reasons
to
to accept MP as reliable and its outputs
as
reliable.
rational
the contrary, we are practically
to show that MP satisfies
he does claim
of a full-blown
characteristics
of overriding
of the proper
the defence
basicality
thesis
is
closely connected tomore positive arguments in support of the positive epis
temic
status
of theistic
arguments
belief.15 But positive
are also developed
by
Wolterstorff and Plantinga.
case for the proper basicality
Positive
In his
1983 article,
Wolterstorff
Nicholas
',16
dations?
of basic
for the rationality
the plausibility
of reasons
plausibility
for supposing
cast
in terms of epistemic
the Lockean
beliefs
innocent
a criterion
mulates
roughly
stated,
proven
of
permits
rationally
justified
us to hold
a belief
unless
refrain from holding
tified in holding
('eluctable'
role, not merely
to have. Wolterstorff
requirements
have
sees
this criterion
to beliefs
people
criterion,
theistic
belief
to
that we could
reasons
Reasons
jus
for
play
a person
capturing
Since
for
reasons
has but reasons
as appropriately
hold
He
are rationally
manner.'7
rational belief.
for deontologically
The
to have adequate
a person
to consider
adequate
them), we
in an unreliable
reasons
that there are cases where
to suppose
we
them unless we either have or ought
a rationality-removing
normative
that basis.
reference
a general
innocent.
proven
in
all rooted
derives
on
as he calls
beliefs
that they are false or formed
supposing
with
as historically
Reid: we ought
until
and
of its
of rationality.
challenge
responsibilities,
of Thomas
not guilty
specifically,
cri
does
on the basis
criterion
and
belief
the belief. More
cease holding
ought
guilty,
an alternate
Like Alston, Wolterstorff
on the work
based
until
is rational
belief
obligations,
the
the truth of evidentialism
and plausible
of rationality.
conception
of rationality
principle
duties,
in
does
by examining
that criterion. Wolterstorff
against
thinks of the evidentialist
Like Plantinga, Wolterstorff
and a case
as Plantinga
can,
foun
that one can assess
or one can formulate
that theistic
of a specific
the conditions
notes
evidentialism
to argue against
situated
no
of evidentialism
One
evaluate
for evidentialism,
is thereby
reasons
satisfying
in two ways.
critically
if it has
rational
in God. Wolterstorff
and test evidentialism
terion of rationality
the latter. He
present
in God',
be
a critique
developed
belief
of evidentialism
and belief
'Reason
'Can belief
and Plantinga
thesis: Wolterstorif
in God
the
it is reasonable
in a basic way
that belief,
but do not have, nor ought to have, adequate reasons for surrendering
evi
theistic belief is - at least for these people - rational and justified without
dence. The articulation
that theistic
of theistic
belief
of a criterion
satisfies
for rational belief
this criterion
contributes
and reasons
to a case
belief.
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for supposing
for the rationality
Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
Plantinga,
also, despite
belief against
of theistic
evidentialist
found
in Plantinga's
several
important
teleological,
for and against
to such
other minds
arguments
The
These
in other minds
of rationality
concept
drawn,
are the objec
neither
for God's
existence
they succeed
theistic
predates
between
But with
in God
belief
and fail
and
Plantinga's
in God. But, as
is also rational.'9
Plantinga's
of the
analysis
deontological
and
rationality
more
that distinction
for the rationality
and
belief
to support
then so is belief
is rational,
status.
the case
to arguments
the arguments
As proofs,
is rational. Hence,
epistemic
has made
Plantinga
that while
parity between
and the distinction
sorts of positive
(cosmological,
respect
are designed
in God and Other Minds
argument
existence
argues
structure.
considerations
inminds
belief
claims,
examines
Arguments
is a dialectical
there
that if belief
Plantinga
other
Hence,
argument
are far from conclusive,
formidable.
have a similar dialectical
in other minds.
contention
very
of the rationality
In this book, Plantinga
the same with
Plantinga
theistic
parity
God's
against
and then does
in other minds.
belief
in similar ways.
belief
for and
arguments
in God and other minds
for belief
tions
1967 God and Other Minds."8
and ontological),
in support
in the now well-known
first evident
basic
of properly
has also argued
objections,
This was
belief.
of the defence
his emphasis
of theistic
clearly
belief more
specific.According toPlantinga,most contemporary believers are deontologically
in holding
justified
respect
show
their central
to the central beliefs
iswarranted,
that theistic belief
not do without
beliefs. And
in WCB,
the same
is true. But since
so does
thing
is true with
has not tried to do is
Plantinga
which
something
that theism
showing
scope of his project
theistic
of Christianity.20 What
Plantinga
thinks he can
the
the latter falls outside
the former.
The relationship between Reformed epistemology and apologetics
How
then shall we characterize
the project
of Reformed
and
epistemology
its relationship toChristian apologetics?
In the first place,
it is clear that the project
of Reformed
as out
epistemology
lined above is not concerned with demonstrating, proving, or otherwise estab
lishing
the truth of theism or Christianity.
the Reformed
defined
epistemology
argument:
(1) the critique
thesis, and
(3) with
some
of evidentialism,
restriction,
tiers of the project
of Reformed
statuses
epistemic
of no small philosophical
project
of Reformed
their implications
More
generally,
as the aim
the works
that have
three
noted
tiers of
of the proper basicality
of the positive
embedded
are important
epistemology
significance.
have
in support
belief. Of course,
and
epistemology
examine
we
(2) the defence
arguments
temic status of theistic and Christian
of positive
we
When
movement,
analyses
for theistic
epis
in each of these
of a variety
belief,
a point
then, we can describe
to clarify5 and defend
the
a variety
of
epistemic propositions, specifically propositions about the epistemic status of
theistic
and Christian
belief,
as opposed
to the truth of such beliefs. Moreover,
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307
308
MICHAEL
SUDDUTH
even when we consider themore limited attempt of Reformed epistemology to
provide positive arguments in support of the positive epistemic status of theistic
belief
tomerely
(as opposed
defending
such a claim against
the goals
objections),
remain carefully fitted to the contours of an on-going project in the epistemology
of religious belief.21
we
Hence,
can
formulate
in a general
way
the epistemological
project
of
Reformed epistemology as follows:
RE
epistemology
Reformed
aims
and - with
to clarify, defend,
qualification - positively support a range of second-order claims
about the positive epistemic status of theistic and Christian belief.
Is Reformed epistemology a school of or distinct viewpoint in apologetics?
Christian apologetics, of course, is concerned with defending Christian belief,
and
this
is typically
to involve
taken
defending
the
truth
and
rationality
of
Christian belief. And here it seems easy to see Reformed epistemology engaged
in the same
against
project
of Christian
the truth of Christian
epistemology
as well
belief,
But different
belief.
on how exactly
views
different
for Reformed
as apologetics,
the rationality
defending
the faith should
is interested
as answering
of apologetics
schools
be defended.
in
objections
So, if one
have
identifies
the project of Reformed epistemology with apologetics, one is likely to see the
arguments
of Reformed
apologetics.
But
for supposing
since
as constitutive
epistemology
the arguments
considered
or Christian
that theistic
belief
of a distinct
above
school
do not address
is true, as an apologetic
of
reasons
method
Reformed epistemology would not include any positive apologetics. And this
rendersReformed epistemology vulnerable to the negative assessment examined
earlier. With
Habermas,
'fulfil a crucial
we will have
how Reformed
to wonder
of apologetic
component
methodology
epistemologists
in favour
-arguing
of
Christianity'.22
But the argument
It is true that some of the goals of Reformed
is unsound.
here
epistemology
are the goals of apologetics,
epistemology
is itself a distinct
between
The similarities
has not
are implicated
not depend
of which
in general
of apologetics
4-Runner
to transport me
on the part of my Toyota
goal or another,
the success
the alleged
is no more
truck. Quite
but it hardly
follows
from the
The
it
belief.
Like
and value of the project
does
and Christian
the positive
epistemic
'failure' of Reformed
of a genuine
to the moon
stem
also explains why
epistemology
the truth of the beliefs
on establishing
that Reformed
of apologetics.
in the task of apologetics.
for the truth of theistic
epistemology,
it aims to discuss. Hence,
as amethod
Toyota
interest of Reformed
follow
or school
and apologetics
questions
on evidence
focused
not
methodology
epistemology
epistemological
other projects
it does
Reformed
fact that epistemological
distinctly
apologetic
but
status
epistemology
failure than the 'failure' of my
is indicative
trivially, any project will
that the project
has
of a genuine
fail to achieve
failure
some
'failed' or is 'deficient'
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Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
in any relevant
Habermas
unless
sense,
a viable
interplanetary
transportation.
Suppose,
to offer a complete
that we
then,
concede
to be, a complete
an epistemological
in support
getics
Christian
ect that has
and defence
implications
formed epistemology
Reformed
an inadequate
positive
may
form of Christian
It is
in apolo
of theistic
is an epistemological
this. The complaint
form of apologetics,
either
be, not that
may
that it entails
but
a rejection
by entailing
a preference
and
proj
the critic of Re
Of course,
apologetics.
or at least by showing
apologetics
status
epistemic
apologetics,
of apologetics
can be deployed
epistemology
concede
of
or methodology.
package,
of the positive
very well
of
critiques
is not, nor pur
epistemology
of which
is an inadequate
school
package
package.
viewpoint,
for Christian
epistemology
regard as unsound
that Reformed
the arguments
it can
resolve before
a complete
that it is a distinct
In this case, Reformed
belief.
as supplying
apologetic
apologetic
project,
apologetic
I think we must
that presuppose
epistemology
or that it purports
its goal.
must
epistemology
package '.23But this is a
that Toyota must
to NASA,
alternative
in reaching
that Reformed
a complete
an array of 'problems'
lot like identifying
be considered
Reformed
it fails or is deficient
of 'problems'
'before it can be considered
resolve
ports
of course
a variety
articulates
for negative
of
over positive
apologetics.
What,
tive/positive
here
is the connection
then,
if we
apologetics
examine
between
dichotomy?
the relationship
Reformed
I think we can begin
between
and the nega
epistemology
positive
to see the connections
epistemic
status
and de
featers according to Reformed epistemology. Although Reformed epistemology
maintains
that reasons
epistemic
status,
are not needed
it has
rather
for theistic
held
consistently
to possess
belief
that reasons
positive
remove
can
or
negatively affect positive epistemic status. In other words, properly basic theistic
can be defeated
beliefs
by way of defeaters.
what we can call a no-defeater
ND
Given
any person
formulation
ality, as well
cation
as epistemic
it appears
epistemology
epistemic
respect
such
desiderata
external
rationality
that the conjunction
epistemic
defeater
to deontological
as Alstonian
maintains
status:
belief T has positive
S, S's theistic
will be true with
and Plantingian
Now
So Reformed
for positive
if S does not have an undefeated
status only
This
condition
for T.24
and internal
truth-conducive
ration
justifi
and warrant.
of RE and ND
entails
either
negative
or positive apologetics, given that:
PFD
A person
believes
S* who
is engaging
in the project
that there is some prima
outlined
facie (rebutting
in RE
or undercutting)
defeater against theistic belief.
Take
the situation
support
where
the contention
the project
that theistic
of Reformed
belief
epistemology
is rational.
aims
In this case,
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to show or
one aims
to
309
310
MICHAEL
SUDDUTH
show or establish that the conditions for rationality obtain with respect to belief
of any undefeated
is the absence
but one of these conditions
in God,
defeaters
against theistic belief. So, it looks like dialectically establishing the rationality of
theistic belief requires providing good reasons for supposing that prima facie de
featers
for theistic
belief
take the case of the be
For instance,
can be defeated.
liever being deontologically rational in holding theistic belief. If a no-defeater
condition is imposed upon being within one's intellectual rights (as Reformed
epistemologists maintain), then showing that some believers arewithin their in
rights in believing
tellectual
in God
from evil, Freudian
argument
ence
of theism,
then
it will be quite
showing
requires
theories,
projection
the like. If these prima
and
to maintain
difficult
or potential
that putative
there will be a need
featers can be defeated.25 Hence,
from the incoher
arguments
facie defeaters
be defeated,
cannot
that anyone
dialectically
de
the atheological
to address
is within
his
intellectual rights in believing inGod.
take the case where
Now
ing the rationality
belief
in God
is not rational. The atheist
since
belief. Now
theistic
the epistemic
to undercut
have
on some
the positive
belief,
rationality
of theistic belief. Since one of the two premises
the Reformed
reason
strong
belief,
to suppose
reasons
defeater
that there
against
of such a defeater
contention
or agnostic's
is a
theistic
a defeater-defeater
require producing
the atheist
that grounds
the defeater
against
will
the
is ND,
to be the premise
either
the existence
for affirming
of these options
Both
status
against
in the argument
to show
is no undefeated
that there
or that the atheist's
are inadequate.
belief
of ND. One will have
against
epistemic
argument
the target will have
accepts,
epistemologist
the consequent
that denies
defeater
alleged
the atheist's
of theistic
which
of ND and the
is rational. The
that t:heistic belief
this is a case of defending
one will
that theistic
objection
take the conjunction
for denying
in turn be based
will
of the consequent
is that of defend
project
epistemology
against
objector may
as grounds
denial of its consequent
denial
the Reformed
of belief
that theistic
is unreasonable.
It should be fairly clear that while
the Reformed
commit
necessarily
the contention
epistemic
can view
suggested
that itwould
We
apologetics.
belief,
that theistic
a correlated
is not
a reason
defeater)
(rebutting
of this paper,
or one
defeater).
that rebutting
objection
to hold B (at least
to continue
one
rational.
or undercutting)
(rebutting
either because
of conviction),
featers entail a certain kind of dejure
belief
for a belief B, one has acquired
a defeater
that B is false
that, given ND,
theistic belief grounds
no longer be rational
in the first section
above
against
of any
it does not
apologetics,
noted
namely
that B is true (undercutting
for supposing
or positive
this as an implication
the same degree
for believing
reasons
to theistic
If one has acquired
for supposing
not with
to positive
that there are defeaters
objection
Indeed, we
defeater.
him
of RE, ND, and PFD commits
the conjunction
to either negative
epistemologist
loses one's
acquires
We
grounds
overriding
see here
a point
and undercutting
to theistic belief.26 Because
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de
of this
Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
'epistemic
to both
of defeaters,
implication'
why Reformed
is false must
be eliminated.
ality of theistic
belief
such defeaters
crucial
the truth, as well
theistic
against
as the
that theism
threaten
belief
the ration
defending
the truth of theism
defending
defeat
becomes
belief. This explains
for supposing
is (or can be) rational. Hence,
requires
But one may
defeaters
Rebutting
that theistic belief
defeaters.
of theistic
in defending
is interested
epistemology
of such defeaters
the rationality
of theistic belief. Given ND and RE, reasons
rationality,
the claim
the defeat
and defending
supporting
against
rebutting
in either negative
by engaging
or
positive apologetics (orboth).27
The compatibility
positive
of Reformed
and
epistemology
apologetics
The basic
question,
is whether
then,
or claims
the project
of Reformed
epistemology are logically inconsistent with positive apologetics, or whether
Reformed epistemology has reason to prefer negative over positive apologetics.
Since
for the existence
arguments
I will
tive apologetics,
ments,
though
of God
carry out
will
the considerations
a paradigmatic
represent
the discussion
with
to arguments
also apply
case of posi
to theistic
reference
argu
for the truth of
specifically Christian beliefs.
The proper basicality
The proper
from PBT a negative
come
in God,
to believe
theistic
in that case
theistic
as for the positive
one might
conclude
easily
in apologetics
as to how
are superfluous
arguments
to PBT,
as well
epis
to derive
attempt
According
belief
arguments
as well
to Reformed
arguments
theology.
theistic
But
belief.
of theistic
that the implementation
PBT] is central
that a few related
for holding
of theistic
status
epistemic
theology
[hereafter,
on natural
verdict
are unnecessary
arguments
At best,
thesis
so it is not surprising
temology,
we
thesis and natural
basicality
is contrary
to how
are in fact justified.
such beliefs
to the psychological
and epistemic
dimensions of religious belief.
The first thing to note here
in holding
rational
for showing
quired
a theistic
is that PBT is a thesis about
belief,
if PBT ruled out, the necessity
justified
in theistic
It is crucial
in a person's
implicated
follow
to distinguish
that theistic
between
some positive
arguments
in God,
arguments
are not needed
is not thereby
that are implicated
status and the conditions
because
or for such a belief
less for showing
re
it to be true.
at the level of being
arguments
the conditions
epistemic
for being
or for that matter
less showing
use of theistic
that this is the case.28 Simply
for belief
is justified, much
of theistic
the apologetic
belief possessing
in showing
are not needed
belief
belief,
the conditions
is permitted
is rational, much
that theistic belief
So even
ruled out.
not what
or useful
theistic
to be justified,
for showing
that theistic belief
arguments
it does not
that theistic
is true, both of which
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311
312
MICHAEL
SUDDUTH
are important to Christian apologetics.29Also, even if theistic arguments were
not necessary
for rational belief
belief
in the rationality
might
play a higher-level
in God,
of one's
they might
still be necessary
in God. That
belief
In fact, itmight
function.
for rational
is to say, theistic
be argued
arguments
that all such higher
level epistemic beliefs require evidential support.30Since Reformed epistemology
aims to support and defend such higher-level beliefs, theistic arguments could
make an important contribution here.
But
secondly,
it is no claim
of Reformed
epistemology
that theistic
belief
is
basic for everyone in just any circumstance. Proper basicality is circumstance and
person relative. For instance, only some people have non-sensory perceptual ex
of God
periences
that would
Or, to draw on Plantinga's
Plantinga
is clear
basic
ground
model,
while
that the disposition
in mystical
theistic beliefs
everyone may
possess
to form various
perception.
a sensus divinitatis,
theistic
beliefs
in widely
realized circumstances is not always triggered due tomalfunction or impedance
of the sensus
beliefs
And we
divinitatis.31
have
so the conditions
can be defeated,
seen how
already
even properly
to generate
that suffice
basic
such beliefs may
not suffice to sustain them given the acquisition of defeaters. Lastly, perhaps
for some people theistic beliefs are both experientially and evidentially grounded,
such
that their theistic
multiple
beliefs
grounds.32 Multiple
to sustaining
tinctions
beliefs
theistic
even
sources
thesis
basicality
or based
be especially
on
relevant
Given
of defeaters.
use of theistic
the apologetic
if the proper
by multiple
of this sort might
the acquisition
given
and qualifications,
superfluous,
are sustained
support
these dis
is far from
arguments
is true.
The strongproper basicality thesis
A more
case against
plausible
is suggested
guments
by a stronger
places.33 In 'The Reformed
belief
in God'
to natural
ments
.
is the view
This version
dard version
a person who
says that one element
or proper way
(1980), and
in the Reformed
does not
on the basis
arguments.
of theistic
such arguments
an improper way
in apologetics
to believe
question,
way? While
objection
on argu
imply that theistic
wrong with
is in a basic way, which
or defective
If this is true, then
as proposed
The
in holding
implies
theistic belief
that the use of
it appears
for belief
grounds
idea is
in God
endorses
in God.
though,
exactly would
in God
improper,
in
than the stan
and stronger
version
ar
offers
'Reason and
but rather that there is something
to believe
incorrect,
non-basic
different
above. The stronger
superfluous,
that there is something
here. What
theology'
holds his theistic belief on the basis of such arguments.
that the correct
A crucial
of theistic
employment
of PBT that Plantinga
that 'belief in God ought not to be based
of PBT is noticeably
considered
are simply
arguments
to natural
objection
(1983), Plantinga
theology
the apologetic
formulation
is how
be wrong
it is possible
exactly we
with
should
a person
to construe
who
construe
holds
the normativity
theistic
the normativity
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belief
in a
in question
Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
I think it ismore
deontologically,
in terms of the normativity
argument
could be with
a person
of arguments
while
defect. More
precisely,
ties were
her epistemic
we
WCB would
then she would
theistic
truth-aimed
theistic
is there any reason
articulated
to suppose
true. The
include God's
reasons
theistic beliefs. However,
and sustaining
It is hard
an exclusively
specifying
simply
God planned
do not
we actually
it. In that case,
theistic
come
typically
beliefs.
at least on the partial basis of evidential
the design
belief,
natural
theology',
gree of warrant;
holding
So, we
taining
and
Plantinga
but
theistic belief
should
that people
plan
cannot
I think Plantinga
admits
do hold
agree
that theistic
that in a fully rational
Plantinga's
noetic
here.
arguments
plan must
strong proper
structure,
here
belief.
But
of their theistic
There
grounds
is no obvi
for holding
In 'The prospects
can increase
have
basicality
or a noetic
in
that people
considerations.
some
considerations.
in
does
is likely the way
of theistic
at least in part of the basis of propositional
understand
It can't
be held with
one: how we,
of evidential
specify multiple
design
beliefs
likely respond
often
would
if so, the cognitive
as how we
formation.
beliefs may
of the sole grounds
beliefs
reason why
that if theism
have a theistic belief
is an empirical
will
and
formation
be held very firmly. Plantinga
it is plausible
theistic
about Him
as specific
belief
do form theistic
Plantinga
are thinking
is likely
there is for the design
argument
in God on the basis
to suppose
the sort of
of belief
would
as basic
surely
ous
But
for suppos
he presents
only shows
anything
the issue
though,
to belief
this is so if we
Perhaps
theistic un
reasons
model
of theistic
of belief,
beliefs may
in which
to hold
design-plan
basic mode
and non-basic
that the way
fact, come
properly,
plan makes
the argument
to see what
of degree
be considerations
little firmness
dicate
in
the right sort
malfunction.
for processes
not necessarily
provision,
form such beliefs.
plan
at least given
us to form true beliefs
provision
is true, then it is likely that our cognitive
would
design
presents
to that model,
According
presents
basicality
desiring
and thus making
to Him,
include
forming
or mal
are functioning
that the design
is true, then the proper
that will
disorder
the cognitive
of cognitive
In WCB, Plantinga
above?
ing that if theism
our duties
in a non
is this line of argument?
how plausible
First,
facul
in a basic way.
take this to imply that both
are indications
belief
cognitive
that Plantinga
belief
theistic belief,
One might
circumstances.
and non-basic
specification
with
faculties
cognitive
sort of
theistic belief
sort of cognitive
to lend itself to this sort of argument.
relevant
of experiential
relevant
accepted
of theistic
that
of some
theistic belief
in accordance
then the person will hold a firm, basic,
belief
hold
to some
belief
The model
persons.
seem
if a person's
so is indicative
that doing
Plantinga's
concede
theistic belief on the basis
rights in holding
is subject
i.e. not forming
for human
function.35 One may
be that a person who
then, would
to construe
say that if the person's
could
properly,
basic or inferential manner
function,
and plausible
of proper
also maintaining
functioning
The argument,
plan
accurate
specifications
for
evidence.36
thesis as main
structure
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for
the de
in which
at
313
314
MICHAEL
SUDDUTH
least the sensus divinitatis and other relevant faculties are functioning properly,
inference will not be the sole source
structure,
theistic
of warrant
belief will not be based
for theistic belief.
solely on the basis
In such a noetic
of argument
or evi
dence. Clearly this doesn't eliminate theistic arguments. Itonly clarifies the limits
of their epistemic function. Christian apologetics can proceed with the recog
nition
of this epistemological
truth. There
is no reason why
the apologist
is forced
to construe the presentation of theistic arguments as recommending such argu
ments
of
to the unbeliever
theistic
grounds
as the sole grounds
arguments
on which
to belief
not
even
should
be
construed
believe
as a recommendation
in God.
as refutations
of agnosticism
in God, perhaps
stimulating
easily be construed
obstacles
need
a person
In fact, the offering
for theistic belief.
The
arguments
and atheism
or assisting
of
can just as
aimed
at removing
the deliverances
of the
sensus divinitatis.
Secondly,
we
Suppose
the initial argument
though,
that a person
agreed
of the problem
The obvious
whose
a person who
with
relevant
hold a firm basic
tioning properly would
belief. What
theistic
belief,
is malfunction
ambiguity.
faculties were
cognitive
theistic
holds
is that there
entailment
a crucial
contains
above
func
is the locus
exactly
in a non-basic
but
way?
in the person's
somewhere
noetic establishment. There is something defective about the person's cognitive
is the defect
life. But
If I am walking
way?
the defect. The best situation,
defect
in question
even
in the neighborhood.
if doing
In fact, given
it looks
is good
like there
on inferential
is healed,
as this mechanism
the cognitive
formation,
design
plan
the noetic
less than optimal
modes
argued,
damaged,
reasoning
cognitive
if it turned
such
belief
out
of the noetic
effects
the Reformed
for theistic
regeneration
by spiritual
basic mode
especially
with
become
respect
relevant.
of basic
requiring
partial
such
time
or faith. Even
of theistic
theistic
faculty or set of faculties
to theistic
And
in a
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belief.
as Plantinga
belief
causally
if
belief
are by-and-large
that humans
to
of its conse
at least until
beliefs,
of sin
tradition
theological
by sin. One
of the sensus divintitas,
formation
some
doctrine
that the faculty
that another
faculty F (such as
or sustaining
of sin suggest
situation,
iswrong
defects.
for generating
an exclusively
specified
effects
of theistic
perhaps
cognitive
belief-producing
is compromised
to the operation
be damage
may
dependence
has
reason within
of God
wrong with my
that something
responsible
the Reformed
that our knowledge
suppose
is causally
that
given
the physical
be not to have
said about
in a
that I have some
As a result of F's malfunctioning,
that malfunctions.
other faculty or set of faculties
belief.
theistic
is held
belief
the crutches,
so is an indication
be that there is some basic
Itmay
the sensus divintitas)
were
theistic
free. But there is nothing
similar could
Something
belief? Or
theistic
this is an indication
of course, would
and thus to be crutch
relying on the crutches,
Other
of which
on crutches,
I have
quences
a non-basic
defect. But there is nothing wrong with my using
physical
theistic
holds
fact in consequence
some other
is the defect
non-basic
the fact that the person
formation
generated
or
Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
sustained
theistic
it is likely that God would
belief,
plan. This
of the design
that inferential
implies
as at least part of our post-lapsarian
of theistic
getic employment
reasoning
cognitive
these as part
adopted
can easily be construed
plan. Once
design
would
arguments
have
the apolo
again,
with
be consistent
the underlying
epistemology of theistic belief.
The dialecticalforce
if we
Even
thesis
of theistic arguments
ral theology,
is nothing
that there
agree
itself that is incompatible
there may
with
very well
to the proper
intrinsic
and apologetic
epistemic
be objections
basicality
functions
to the apologetic
of natu
use of natural
theology that, while not entailed by Reformed epistemology, are nonetheless
consistent
it. Space
with
here. However,
bilities
constraints
tinent. They both concern
prohibit
of closely
a couple
the full array of possi
considering
are particularly
related objections
force of theistic
the dialectical
arguments,
per
something
of particular significance in apologetics.
is, first, the view
There
theistic
are logically
arguments
apologist
may
prove more
of course,
ologists,
that theistic
invalid or lack cogency,
have been
critical
of the logical
for instance,
criticisms
in God and Other Minds. With
Plantinga
in fact succeed
finally, while
theologian's
to rigorous
argument
is ineffective
theology
obvious
of stating
ways
weapon,
'."
it do
that the teleological
agrees
powerful
arguments.
arguments
to the cosmological
of natural
Plantinga
most
epistem
force of theistic
'none of the more
by the
Reformed
theistic
reference
'this piece
argument,
'.38And
is the natural
case
paradigm
concludes,
As for the ontological
ment
subjected
If
arguments.
their employment
than victorious.
embarrassing
Plantinga,
of Aquinas,
are just not good
arguments
argu
'it suffers from a crucial
and crippling deficiency'.39 Hence, this argument 'seems no more successful
than the cosmological
a satisfactory
provide
to believe
While
negative,
a rather
question
answer
0 His
arguments'.
the conclusion
to the question
final verdict
that natural
with which
seems
we began:
de
does not
theology
Is it rational
in God?'4'
Plantinga's
wholly
with
and ontological
'it is hard to avoid
cisively negative:
Plantinga
stringent
certain
on natural
verdict
conception
lofty claims
in God and Other Minds
theology
has since pointed
out that at the time he was working
of natural
for natural
appears
theology.42 He was
theology,
critiquing
into
calling
the idea that theistic
arguments constitute conclusive, coercive, certain, or logical demonstrations pro
ceeding
among
from premises
that are self-evident
all rational people.43 Theistic
but this is a far cry from an outright
or to which
arguments
rejection
there is universal
are ineffective
of theistic
assent
in this sense only,
arguments
as such.
It is
clearly compatible with affirming the existence of good probabilistic theistic ar
guments.While we might suppose that theistic arguments of this sort could never
independently generate enough warrant for knowledge, they could still make
some
contribution
to the positive
epistemic
status
of theistic
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belief,
and
they
315
316
SUDDUTH
MICHAEL
in
remain dialectically useful to Christian apologetics.44 Moreover,
would
'Christian
dorses
of positive
the project
theistic
at the end of the 20th
philosophy
waiting
host of good
and pro
in penetrating
to be developed
en
explicitly
'There are really a whole
apologetics:
all patiently
arguments,
Plantinga
century',
found detail. This is one areawhere contemporary Christian philosophers have
a great deal of work
on
the ontological
entitled
his lecture
ment,46
in addition
to do.'45 Indeed,
and his more
argument
'Two dozen
positive
to Plantinga's
recent
argu
lays out just
arguments'
(or so) theistic
work
defeated
naturalism
how fruitful Plantinga regards the prospects for the development of theistic
arguments.47Therefore, Plantinga's criticisms of theistic arguments should not
be construed
as undermining
but rather as shaping
apologetics,
positive
it in a
constructively criticalmanner.48
A second
objection
about
that raises concern
the dialectical
of the
effectiveness
arguments relates to the highly subjective determinants of evidence assessment,
for instance
of our passions
the implications
for how we view evidence.
that fail to recognize
should
'49It follows
people will disagree
Clark says here applies
to weigh
are asked
against
against
logical
between
considerations
and bad states
point will hold
a casual
glimpse
What
are unlikely
in our
by
rational
individuals
but
to evaluate
at the literature will
consensus.
theistic
each
and metaphysical
arguments.
basicality
of epistemological
show a significant
goods,
as judgements
over against
be weighted
of the proper
on
the
In fact,
thesis. Here
arguments,
divergence
but
of opinion
in
even among Christians.
of God or arguments
with
as well
on the very sort of moral
a variety
of theism
typically depend
range of possible
of
evidence
judgements
in the defence
defences
But
assessments.
for here
of theism
of affairs,
assessments
also for the defence
are asked
to meet
states
of affairs should
this shows us is that whether
for the existence
of evidence
elements
a postulated
and bad
of such arguments,
the evaluation
consider
from evil. These
often depend
implicated
also individuals
that
judgements
and equally
apologetics,
in support
evidence
of affairs,
good
other. Such judgements
Clark's
to negative
not
argument
states
of good
about how good
divergent
to theistic belief. The same sort of subjective
the atheological
relations
commitments
the weight
from it are conditioned
of God,
nature
the subjective
into play here. For instance,
a conception
'are inextricably
as evidence,
that follow
for the existence
equally
evidence,
defeaters
alleged
will come
that counts
apolo
on these matters.
I think Clark is correct about
what
Clark writes,
that people will have widely
of the evidence
as to the strength
to positive
approaches
and will. Our fundamental
to it, and the inferences
attach
our commitments.
with
'Our believings',
emotions,
of the evidence....
shape our assessment
we
this.
our passions,
with
entwined
commitments
to the Five Views book discussed
his dissatisfaction
earlier, Kelly Clark indicates
getics
and pre-theoretical
In his contributions
we
are attempting
against
The
objections
lesson
to construct
arguments
to theism our best efforts
to be learned here
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is that there
Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
evidentialism
apologetic
or proven
strated
fate of nearly
jective
that thinks
to the satisfaction
every dialectical
factors
of all rational
interlocutors.
this is not
But
is needed
of a certain
ourselves
can be logically
demon
But such
is the
to refuse
a reason
of the limits of such engagements
them. What
influence
that theism
engagement.
but an indication
engagement,
to disabuse
silver bullets. We will need
are no apologetic
naive
and how
is an approach
sub
to positive
(and
negative) apologetics that is, we might say, presuppositionally sensitive, that
is sensitive
apologetics,
none
in which
to the way
But we
dividuals.
have
much
the factors Clark
no good
less a reason
not
that would
reason
to refuse engaging
over positive
negative
in positive
all philosophical
bringing
justify
in
cites do affect particular
to prefer
here
at least
apologetics,
to a
argumentation
screeching halt.50
Conclusion
Is Reformed
epistemology
entails
an inadequate
ology
is fundamentally
belief, not a distinct
Reformed
a multi-tiered
school
status
epistemic
the relationship
between
ing that putative
to support
to theistic
defeaters
as a project
and defend
But
belief.
and defeaters,
rationality
a variety
of religious
in epistemology,
of claims
this very project,
is also concerned
can be defeated.
belief
epistem
in the epistemology
Secondly,
of theistic
that it is or
the grounds
I think not. First, Reformed
project
of apologetics.
aims
epistemology
the positive
on
rightly criticized
form of apologetics?
about
owing
with
Hence,
to
show
Reformed
epistemology entails apologetically useful arguments, arguments for and in de
fence of the positive
status
epistemic
of the truth of theism.
defence
straightforward
reasons
ferring negative
to positive
the apologetic
use
internal
I have
Third,
to Reformed
apologetics
of theistic
of theistic
belief,
argued
And
as arguments
that some
in
of the more
for excluding
or pre
good arguments
against
epistemology
do not constitute
arguments.
as well
the apparent
dialectical
weak
nesses of natural theology pointed out by Reformed epistemologists are not suf
to undermine
ficient
shape
that project
positive
apologetics,
in a constructive
but
way. Hence,
they can and should
Reformed
be used
epistemology
to
has no
intrinsic or principled objection to those schools of Christian apologetics that
make
use
of theistic
arguments
or Christian
evidences,
nor
should
Reformed
epistemology be contrasted with such schools of apologetics. I thinkwe must
conclude
that the widespread
reports
of the death
of natural
theology
Reformed epistemologists have indeed been greatly exaggerated.5'
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among
317
318
MICHAEL
SUDDUTH
Notes
i. James Sennett
review of Faith and Reason
Epistemology,
by Dewey
2. Alvin Plantinga
'Jerusalem
Dame,
Hoitenga,
'Foundations
and Athens
IN: University
from Plato
to Plantinga:
An Introduction
to Reformed
New York Press, 1991), 203; Gary Gutting
reason',
Faith and Philosophy,
the conditions
cognizer
are experiences
has special
epistemic
they obtain. By contrast,
environment
instance,
internalist
type defeaters.
see my
defeaters,
for revising
(Dordrecht:
Epistemic
defeaters
involve
Kluwer,
1999); William
and the evidential
in G. Bruntrup
Alston
as argument
In the present
'Internalism
See John Pollock Contemporary
between
between
that p. Consequently,
that it includes
the premises
in idem
view
that attack a
and the conclusion
of an argument.
and
Here
one gets
that p is defeated
the belief
I am using
as one might
defeaters,
a proposal
of Theism
reasons
the premises
at least one of the reasons
In this paper
defeaters.
reason-defeating
defeat:
(Savage, MD: Rowman
for one of the reasons
can call these reason-defeating
in
and externalist
in epistemology',
Theories of Knowledge
holding
For
that prevent
359--360.
distinguished
a rebutter
to continue
or not
the subject's
reflection.
internalist
of internalist
that attack
that it is not rational
upon
(eds) The Rationality
1986), 38-39. But there are also reasons
such a way
the
context, we are interested
and externalism
Press, 2000),
q for some belief
since
Press, 1989), 191-192; Alvin Plantinga Warranted
the connection
that attack
defeater
facts about
between
significance
forms, John Pollock
and reasons
(rebutters)
accessible
and R. Tacelli
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
of defeaters
of certain
on the distinction
(New York, NY: Oxford University
Belief
(undercutters).
q for the belief
'undercutting
in such a
defeater'
as two ways
the distinction
in
that p.
in which
or reason could be inadequate.
a ground
5. One might
not-p',
Faith and
reflection whether
that there can be true propositions
as knowledge.
from counting
evidentialism',
the obtaining
maintain
For further discussion
'Proper basicality
is an internalist
Littlefield,
way
of
on faith and
for apologetics',
i.e. can tell just upon
these are not mentally
of knowledge
classical
Justification
conclusion
We
a dialogue
'An apology
the defeater
to such conditions,
situation, where
accounts
true beliefs
over all justified
Christian
Paul Griffiths
(Notre
Jr, Faith and Reason
(Albany, NY: State University
and the Calvinist:
or other beliefs,
access
externalist
or cognitive
defeasibility
4. Thinking
Epistemology
'The Catholic
2 (1985), 236-256;
Hoitenga,
5 (1988), 399-420.
Philosophy,
3. Where
(eds) Faith and Rationality
1983), 192-218, 197; Dewey
Press,
to Reformed
3 (1986), 313; George Mavrodes
and N. Wolterstorff
in A. Plantinga
of Notre Dame
An Introduction
11 (1994), 347.
and Philosophy,
a reply', Faith and Philosophy,
of theism:
revisited',
to Plantinga:
from Plato
Jr,Faith
that if a rebutting
suppose
a rebutting
defeater-defeater
defeater
reason q for supposing
against p is 'an overriding
be an overriding
this defeater would
against
reason
that
for supposing
that
that it is not the case that <q is an overriding reason for supposing not-p>. But then my contention
that not not-p would be unclear at best. One
thereby acquires an overriding reason for supposing
one
this is to think of a rebutting
way of resolving
reasons for holding
supposing
the conclusion
thereby acquire
for supposing
defeater
a rebutting
not-p,
6. Mavrodes
7. Gutting
the conclusion
and Athens
'Jerusalem
on Christian
reasons
of the rebutting
to overriding
forms that present
is properly
q for
reasons
a rebutting
there is a sense
in which
defeater
one does
that it is not the case that <q is an overriding
reasons
overriding
as opposed
be cleared up on the latter
such a defeater
form. Of course,
argument
that not-p,
can equally
as argument
against
for supposing
If one acquires
for supposing
that neutralize
defeater
argument
in Steven
B. Cowan
that the conclusion
the defeating
power
reason
of a rebutting
of the reasons
'An evidentialist's
Apologetics
revisited'.
response',
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan,
2000),
and Stanley N. Gundry
(eds) Five Views
294.
9. Ibid., 296-297.
io. Alvin Plantinga
'Reason and belief
ii. See Alvin Plantinga
Wainwright
of Religion
q
form.
and the Calvinist'.
'The Catholic
8. Gary Habermas
defeaters
is false, one has acquired
argument
that supported
reasons
overriding
not-p>.
the problem
defeater-defeater
of the defeating
as the belief
defeater
that not-p. But
Ifwe are thinking of rebutting
account.
against
the belief
'Coherentism
(eds) Rationality,
in God',
in Plantinga
and the evidentialist
Religious
Belief
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
and Moral
Press,
and Wolterstorff
objection
Faith and Rationality,
to belief
Commitment:
in God',
New Essays
1986), 109-138; Plantinga Warranted
102-105.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
16-93.
in R. Audi and W.
in the Philosophy
Christian
Belief,
Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
12. For a detailed
the Philosophy
13. See William
of this and its implications
discussion
character
internalist
and evidentialist
of Religion,
Wolterstorff
(eds) Rationality
in the regulation
of God',
PA: Temple
1991), 6-49.
University
Alston
University
15. Alston
Press,
Perceiving
of belief',
International
'The
Journal for
inM. Hester
God: The Epistemology
J. van der Hoeven,
in H. Hart,
(Lanham, PA: University
Tradition
in the Calvinian
135-170 and idem 'Knowledge
14.William
see my
of evidentialism,
defeaters',
45 (1999), 167-187.
'The role of reason
Alston
for the critique
of Plantingian
implications
(ed.) Faith, Reason,
of Religious
and N.
Press of America,
and Skepticism
1982),
(Philadelphia,
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Experience
Press, 1991).
by way of personal
confirmed
not merely
to defend
the prima
(27May
correspondence
facie immediate
that in Perceiving
2002)
God he intends
of theistic belief but to argue
justification
in support
of this proposal.
16. See Nicholas
'Can belief
Wolterstorff
Faith and Rationality,
Wolterstorff
17. The actual
has a couple
formulation
up his belief, but is justified
cease holding
the belief. See Wolterstorff
21. Nicholas
in God be rational?',
'Can belief
reason
to give
in his belief. And
reason
it is
to
163-169.
Justification
in God (Ithaca, NY:
of Belief
inWarranted
summary
Christian
Belief, 69-70.
177-178, 203-204.
defends
the modest
character
is not', Perspectives,
epistemology
22. Habermas
and
Press, 1967, repr. 1ggo).
Wolterstoff
Reformed
justified
to think that he has an adequate
obliged
A Study of the Rational
God and Other Minds:
19. See Plantinga's
20. Ibid., 99-102,
in Plantinga
has adequate
this fact, he is rationally
that the subject not be rationally
Cornell University
If a person
of other qualifications.
in not recognizing
also necessary
18. Alvin Plantinga
if it has no foundations?',
in God be rational
135-186.
'An evidentialist's
response',
of the claims of Reformed
epistemology
in 'What
7 (1992), 14-16.
301.
23. Ibid., 300.
24. This sort of formulation
belief
in God',
is suggested
if it has no foundations?',
Historical
more
164-172; Alston
of ND
consideration
evidentialist
implications
of internalist
defeat'.
25. More
facie defeater D against
the connection
between
Perceiving
epistemologists.
in Reformed
See Plantinga
ch. 1i;Wolterstorff
Belief,
'Can belief
Press, 1996), 267-268,
see my
epistemology,
and
defeaters',
'Reason and
in God be rational
God, 79, 159, 189-194; C. Stephen
(Oxford: Clarendon
of Plantingian
one must
technically,
Christian
the Jesus of Faith
Christ and
detailed
by several Reformed
idem Warranted
82-87;
Evans The
293-295,
'The internalist
306. For a
character
and the evidential
'Proper basicality
first show that there are reasons, Q, such that, even if S acquired
theistic belief T, S would remain rational in holding T if S acquired
Q and D). Secondly, one would have to show that such conditions
and
significance
a prima
Q (and saw
are plausibly
instantiated.
26. Plantinga
that in some cases atheologians
has suggested
to be against
objections
the truth or rationality
Belief, 464. The confusion
is likely the result of a lack of clarity about
here
truth, and positive
defeaters,
is necessary
one's
for any person
in RE, which
seeks
in 'The internalist
S* who
can possess
character
to a defeater-defeater
requirement
not engage
in apologetics
roughly,
if a person
epistemic
It is important
proving,
of a defeater-defeater
(negative
form of apologetics
or positive)
in the project
between
defeat',
S actually
(negative
in RE. Clearly
in the project
outlined
this status. However,
defeaters',
and
'Proper
that theistic belief
acquires
for
or positive)
a defeater
is subject
for his
status of S's belief at time tn+, will depend on
to distinguish
between
this defeater-defeater
or otherwise
against
I argued
in the activity of
articulated
engaging
of Plantingian
implications
of internalist
and the activity of showing,
the existence
their
Christian
for the truth of theism)
that theistic belief can possess
the claim
significance
of a defeater-defeater.
the relations
S to engage
evidence
status without
epistemic
theistic belief at time t1, then the positive
exhibiting
is that some
and evidentialist
requirement:
for a person
less produce
accepts ND and engages
positive
to show and defend
and the evidential
the acquisition
(much
to be justified. My argument
theistic belief
basicality
that it is necessary
theistic belief against objections
S's theistic belief
they intend
status.
epistemic
27. It should be clear that I am not arguing
defending
are not clear about whether
of theistic belief. See Plantinga, Warranted
dialectically
some prima
to acquire
establishing
facie defeater.
a defeater-defeater.
or
In short, one need
Hence,
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the positive
319
320
MICHAEL
SUDDUTH
epistemic
status of theistic belief does not depend
defending
claims
to the effect
on negative
apologetics,
that theistic belief has positive
epistemic
even
if supporting
status does depend
or
on negative
apologetics.
28. For this distinction,
see Plantinga
rational?',
157; Alston
Perceiving
Habermas's
critique
of Reformed
evidentialist's
29. Although
response',
not accepted
availability
in support
actually have
this evidence
on the notion
proper
is rationally
rationality
of God
and sensible
basic.
would
It isworth
for the rationality
of theistic belief.
pointing
argument
for the
for the existence
such arguments
to his early parity argument
with Reformed
epistemology,
International
evidentialism',
to
that theistic belief
of other minds. While
essential
in
and idem
14 (1995), 107-121. If one were
on there being arguments
for the existence
theistic
(eds) Readings
1989), 426-437,
lovanovich,
out that Plantinga's
depends
they are nonetheless
and higher-level
'Toward a sensible
and W. Wainwright
Topoi,
is the
that a person
be part of the case showing
and its logical consistency
of this argument
foundationalism
see my
Journal for Philosophy
37 (1995), 25-44.
of Religion,
31. Plantinga Warranted
Christian
emphasizes
214-216.
Belief,
in which
the variety of ways
theology, may
operate
formulation
from Plato
L. Zagzebski
to Plantinga,
(ed.) Rational
of Notre Dame
Perceiving
Press, 1993), 49; Patrick Lee
'A cumulative
in ibid., 142; and Feinberg
recognized
'Natural
to Reformed
Responses
of religious
and to contribute
belief,
including
to the positive
God, 289-307.
has been
John Zeis
183, 209, 220-222;
Faith: Catholic
or grounds
psychologically
in this paragraph
discussed
sources
multiple
to sustain
together
status of theistic belief. See Alston
epistemic
33. The strong
University
'An
for proper basicality
Brace
evidentialism',
existence
that are at least as strong as arguments
natural
in God be
220. A part of
See Habermas
if it is not required
"', inW. Rowe
in God and Other Minds
logical demonstrations,
Reason
evidence
for God's
as properly
of theistic belief
'Alstonian
even
2nd edn (New York, NY: Harcourt
inferentiality,
30. For a development
this distinction.
or base his belief on it. See Stephen Wykstra
fall short of being
32. Alston
conflates
'Can belief
the Jesus of Faith,
there is the idea that a criterion
of " needing
then arguments
accepted
71-73; Wolterstorff
Christ and
of the truth of the belief,
himself
of Religion,
'Externalism,
epistemology
by Plantinga,
evidentalism:
take this view,
in God',
294.
of evidence
the Philosophy
'Reason and belief
God, 71; Evans Historical
case apologist's
response',
and
in
reformed?',
Epistemology
'Evidentialisrn,
Faith
by Hoitenga
theology:
IN:
(Notre Dame,
and faith and reason',
Plantinga,
in Cowan
and Gundry
Five Views,
302, 304.
34. Plantinga
or revealing
in God,
believe
else;
Belief,
these lines is suggested
noetic
structure;
structure'.
in God as basic
takes belief
in his noetic
in God
is to take belief
in personal
this interpretation
'Prospects
of Religion
for natural
quite
as basic'
theology',
to natural
objection
15 (1980), 49-63.
by his associating
'ought'
'As these
He then elaborates:
is not thereby violating
any epistemic
the reverse. The correct or proper way
('Reason
correspondence
from natural
and belief
theology
in God',
to
or anywhere
72, cf. 73). Plantinga
(16 July 2001).
in J.Tomberlin
CA: Ridgeview,
(Atascadero,
'Reformed
Association,
they thought, was not on the basis of arguments
36. Alvin Plantinga
Philosophy
Philosophical
and a 'well-formed
see things, one who
a defect
the correct way
confirmed
Catholic
the 'ought' here along
'rightness',
thinkers
Reformed
duties
construed
'correctness',
71; cf. 72-73. Cf. Alvin Plantinga
of the American
Proceedings
35. That Plantinga
with
in God',
'Reason and belief
theology',
(ed.) Philosophical
1991), 311-312. See also
Perspectives
idem Warranted
5:
Christian
179, no. 16.
37. Plantinga
God and Other Minds,
25.
38. Ibid., 64.
39. Ibid., 268.
40. Ibid., iii.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., ix-x.; cf. idem Warranted
43. Plantinga
makes
York, NY: Harcourt
twentieth
Eerdmans,
century',
this point
Brace
Craig has pointed
Belief, 69-70.
'Belief in God', in R. Boylan
Jovanovich,
in J. Sennett
1998), 339-340;
Christian
in his
1992), 389-406;
(ed.) The Analytic
and idem 'The prospects
this out in 'Classical
apologetics',
(ed.) Introduction
idem 'Christian philosophy
Theist: An Alvin Plantinga
for natural
in Cowan
(Grand Rapids, MI:
recently William
Five Views, 45-48.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
(New
at the end of the
Reader
theology'. More
and Gundry
to Philosophy
Lane
Reformed epistemology and Christian apologetics
44. Plantinga
has recently
quite properly
they may move
closer
fence-sitters
can reveal interesting
a reply to Richard
the firmness
Swinburne',
of belief
philosophical
47. Plantinga
and Alston
but he uses
epistemologists
epistemologist's
Perceiving
October
concur.
closing
'the ontological
and Proper function
Belief
argument
argument
in J.Tomberlin
227-240. Plantinga's
provides
as good
for any important
and P. van Inwagen
at the 33rd Annual
(or so) theistic arguments'
lecture notes
23-25, 1986. Plantinga's
it to critique
referees
in Cowan
'Reformed
(eds)
Philosophy
for this talk are available
epistemology
and Gundry
in Cowan
response',
that Clark uses
this argument
some approaches
to positive
Clark introduces
to thank Dewey
See Kelly Clark
remarks',
epistemologist's
to suggest
the considerations
anonymous
'Self-Profile',
Christian
apologetics',
Five Views, 273, 365-366,
and idem
372-373,
God, 270, 289.
'A reformed
50. I do not mean
339.
1985), 71.
'Two dozen
College,
evidence:
at: <http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/Theisticarguments.html>.
on the internet
48. Other Reformed
49. Kelly Clark
his lecture
atWheaton
'A reformed
Reidel,
and they
and public
1974), 213-221; idem Warrant
should be noted:
Alvin Plantinga
(Dordrecht:
delivered
Conference
century',
Press,
of God as does any serious philosophical
conclusion';
Alvin Plantinga
in other ways;
reached
as defeater-defeaters;
'Rationality
Press, 1993), ch. 12; idem Warranted
argument
they can be extremely
belief
37 (2001), 217.
(Oxford: Clarendon
of the ontological
for the existence
grounds
Studies,
and support
can
I doubt
in faith (as traditionally
involved
Alvin Plantinga
connections';
Religious
of Necessity
they think are appropriate.
they can function
belief;
at the end of the twentieth
(New York, NY: Oxford University
assessment
to Christian
and important
'Christian philosophy
46. Idem The Nature
51. Iwish
to warrant
'on my view, Christians
evidences:
belief
that they have no use at all. On the contrary;
follow
but it doesn't
to Christian
respect
for the truth of Christian
and in at least four different ways. They can confirm
useful,
45. Idem
this with
are sufficient
that these arguments
understood)
explained
offer any arguments
Hoitenga,
apologetics.
at least entail a preference
Kelly Clark, David Matheson,
for this journal for comments
and Gundry
to oppose
Five Views, 85.
positive
apologetics
But one might
for negative
JillMaria
as such,
suppose
over positive
Sudduth,
on earlier drafts of this paper.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
that
apologetics.
and two
321