1. business and industrial
2. energy
3. nuclear power

NURIS 2015
1st INRAG Conference on Nuclear Risk
Vienna, Austria
True Lessons Learned
from Fukushima Accident
to be Shared Internationally
April 16, 2015
Satoshi Sato
Tokyo, Japan
[email protected]
TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Administration
Office, Immediately After Earthquake.
2
TEPCO Fukushima Daini NPP
In The Middle Of Tsunami
3
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1
At The Moment of Hydrogen Explosion
4
Evacuation Of Children
5
Evacuation From A Hospital
6
Rescued Dogs
7
Evacuee Reception Center
8
Evacuee Reception Center
9
Nuclear, The Energy for The Bright Future
Hungry Dogs Wondering
10
Around Evacuated Town
Radioactive Plume Pathways
Prepared by Prof. Hayakawa, Gunma Univ.
11
Anti-Nuclear
Campaign In Tokyo
12
Blocked Access
To Restricted Zone
13
Typical Evacuee Camp
14
Politicians In Evacuee Camp During Election Campaign
15
Temporarily Accumulated Radioactive Waste
In Plastic Bags
16
Hidden Facts Behind Official Statements
Official Statements:
• Tsunami Caused Accident.
• No Earthquake Damage With Any SafetyRelated Component Has Been Confirmed.
• All Residents Evacuated With No Acute
Radiological Effect.
These statements are not wrong, but might have
capped many important facts that should have
attracted more attentions…
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Man-made Accident
• Improper Design Bases and Siting Criteria
 Earthquake, Tsunami
 Groundwater Level, Population Distribution
• Hidden Design Flaws




Physical Separation for Fire/Flood Protection
Single Failure Vulnerability
Fail-Safe Design Principle
Significant Deviations From Original Guidelines
• Unlearned Lessons
 Three Mile Island
 Chernobyl
18
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 Turbine Bldg. Basement
M/C (A)
P/C (A)
M/C (C)
XFMR
6900V/480V
P/C (B)
P/C (C)
22m
P/C (D)
M/C (B)
M/C (D)
34m
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SBO
• LOOP
• Loss of EDGs
• Loss of DC Power
• Loss of UPS
• All simultaneously!
480VAC
Power Center
EDG-1B
LP FDW
Heaters
Tb. Lub Oil
Reservoir
Battery Room
Rｘ. Feedwater Pumps
125VDC
Recharger
A
B
C
UPS Panel
125VDC
MCC for
MOVs
24VDC 125VDC
Recharger Dist. Pnl.
EDG-1A
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 Tb. Bldg. & Control Bldg.
Basement – Equipment Layout
A
B
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Earthquake Damages/Impacts
• Loss of off-site power due to isolated on-site
transformers tripped by Sudden Pressure Relays.
• Severely damaged LP Turbine rotors, fortunately
resulting no turbine-missile accident.
• Cracked on-site roads prohibited/delayed deployment
of a firetruck.
• Frequent/prolonged aftershocks interrupted emergency
responses.
• Many fine cracks on Reactor/Turbine Bldgs. allowing
ground water seepage at 400 tons per day.
21
Unsafe/Struggled Evacuation
Unexpected heavy traffic jam:
• No traffic information available to guide safe evacuation.
• Sharp edged cracks resulted in burst tires, abandoned
cars along narrow dark crooked roads.
• Drivers fear shortage of gas, forming long waiting lines
to gas stations where only manual pumps are available
due to power outage.
• 3 large hospitals with 700 patients within 5km radius.
22
23
Apr. 21, 2011
Some Potentially Important Facts
with Less or No Attention Paid
• Dynamic Effect of Tsunami
 Inconsistent Behavior.
 Not Just Flooding. Significant Dynamic Impacts.
 Unprotected Discharge Outlet Directly Hit. Breakwater Not
Effective.
 Many Manhole Covers Blown Into Air, Leaving Dangerous
Pitfalls.
 Potential Hydrodynamic Impact to Other Equipment Not
Assessed. (Main Condenser, Rad-waste Systems)
• Hydrogen Explosions
 Not Just On The Refueling Floors.
 More Leak-paths. More Vulnerable.
24
Before Tsunami
At The Moment Of Tsunami
H = V2/(2g)
V = 10m/s ➡ H = 5m
V = 30m/s ➡ H = 45m
5m above
Sea Level ?
Unit 4 Rx. Bldg.
56m above Sea
Level
Unit 4 Tb. Bldg.
36m above Sea
Level
Tsunami velocity (10m/s) estimated based on water
depth does not agree with a basic physics rule??
26
After Tsunami
Intake Screen
Units Washed
Away.
Unprotected Discharge Outlet
Directly Hit By Tsunami.
27
Implication to Other NPPs
28
Water-Drip-Marks:
Evidence of Significant Steam
Condensation On the Ceiling, Followed by Hydrogen Explosion
Which Dispersed Insulation Powder on 4th Floor of Reactor Bldg.
29
Crashed Ventilation Duct Near The Ceiling of 4th Floor of
Rx. Bldg.: An Evidence of Significant Upward Load
Suggesting A Large Explosion Underneath.
30
Exploded Ventilation Duct to Main Stack:
An Evidence of Another Explosion.
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Natural-Nuclear Combined Disaster
• More Than Just A Nuclear Disaster
 Rescue And Evacuation Plan Challenged
 Sheltering Strategy Not Effective
• More Than Just An Natural Disaster
 Rescue Efforts For Potential Survivors Terminated In
Early Stage
 Restoration Activities Not Efficient
 Less Places To Accept More Evacuees
 Intact Structure, But Not Usable
 Prolonged/Permanent/Irreversible Impacts
 Large Amount Of Contaminated Debris
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Mar. 29, 2012
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Last Defenses
• How Useful Is Emergency Preparedness?
 How Accurate Is Evacuation Time Estimate?
 What Does Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Mean?
• How Helpful Is Nuclear Liability?
 Total Cost Estimate ~ US$ 200B (by US-NAS)
 Image/Reputation Losses Alone of Fukushima-Scale
Accident in France ~ € 166B (US$ 215B) (by IRSN)
 National Budget > US$ 200B:
Only 20 Countries In The World.
 National Budget < US$ 200B:
14 Out Of 30 Nuclear Operating Countries.
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Beyond EPZ
• 16 km:
• 80 km:
Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ
Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ
Realities Beyond EPZ
• EPZ Is Not An Impact Boundary
• Many Local “Hot Spots” Outside EPZ
• Highly Radioactive Sewage Sludge and
Incinerator Ash
35
Ditches Are Typical
Local “Hot Spots”
Off-Scale
> 5mR/h (50μSv/h)
Oct. 9, 2011
3636
Sewage Treatment System Of Yokohama City
Sewage Discharged =
602,860,000 m3/year
Original Sewage Containing Undetectable Level (< 1Bq/kg)
Volume Reduction
1/100
Originally Undetectable Level Is
Now Detectable Through A Series
Of Volume Reduction Processes
Volume Reduction
1/40,000
Water Containing
Decant Residue
5,480,000 m3/year
Sludge
Radioactivity
Sludge Sedimentation
Volume
Reduction
Concentrated
Organic Matter
Decomposed
Dewatered Incinerated
37
Yokohama (300km from Daiichi NPP)
• 13,000Bq/kg detected on 5/19/2011
• 3 containers of incinerator ash per day
Incinerator
Ash
Unit
Amount
Annually
Generated
Baked
Sewage
Sludge
Incineration Ash
Primary Ash
Fly Ash
Noncombustible
Waste
Industry
Waste
Total
Ton
Radioactivity
(First Year)
Cumulative
(7 years)
• Nearly 1 TBq in 170,000 tons of radioactive waste generated in 7
years in Yokohama, 300 km away from Fukushima Daiichi NPP.
Unit
Amount
Annually
Generated
Radioactivity
(First Year)
Cumulative
(7 years)
Ton
Baked
Sewage
Sludge
Incineration Ash
Primary Ash
Fly Ash
Noncombustible
Waste
Industry
Waste
Total
Psychological Perspectives
• What Do “Limits”, “Thresholds”, and “Criteria”
Mean to The Public?
• How Helpful Are Science and Education?
• Unreasonable Rumor or Logical Psychology?
• What Does Forced Evacuation Mean?
40
Clearance Level
•
•
•
•
1999
2004
2005
2011
1,000 Bq/kg
800 Bq/kg
100 Bq/kg, IAEA level adopted
8,000 Bq/kg
• US-EPA (green-field release): 4mrem/yr = 7.4Bq/kg
• As of 3/30/2015, greater than 15Bq/kg is regularly
detected and even greater than 50Bq/kg is not unusual
at any waste incinerator in Tokyo.
41
Criteria for Cs-137
Bq/kg
500
Temporary Limit for Vegetable
Radioactive
Waste
100
Clearance Level for Concrete Debris
Generated at Decommissioning Plants
Non-Radioactive
Waste
42
Criteria for Cs-137
Bq/kg
200
Temporary Limit for Drinking Water
Radioactive
Effluent
90
Limit for Nuclear Plant Effluent
General Industry
Effluent
10
WHO Limit for Drinking Water
43
If fish with Cs levels 1Bq/kg, 10Bq/kg, and
100Bq/kg are not traded at the same price at the
market, is this an unreasonable discrimination?
44
We would like to
serve our customers
with the best fish we
can find every day.
Choosing safe, fresh, and contaminationfree fish and farm produce for the family
is a simple natural psychology.
45
Young Fukushima women leaving hometowns
46
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Sociological Impact:
More Than Radiological Effects
• Irreversible Community Disruption




Deteriorating Hygienic Condition
Damaged Infrastructure
Abandoned Resident Houses, Stores, Office Buildings
Residual Radioactivity. Minor Level Of Radioactive
Contamination Fallout/Re-Suspension Still Cycling
 No/Few Young Women And Children
 No School, No Hospital
• Issues to Belong to New Communities
 Complex Status of Accident Victims
 Compensation: Nuclear vs. Non-nuclear
 Transient: Crowed traffic, hospitals. Inflation triggered by “rich
nuclear victims” distressing original residents and other victims.
48
Sociological Issues To Develop Good
Relationship with New Communities
•
Victim Status:
Tsunami, Earthquake, Nuclear
•
Residential Background:
•
Occupation:
•
Family Member:
Infant/Children, Middle-Aged, Old, Handicapped,
and any combination
•
Gender:
Male, Female
•
Loss:
Properties, Business, Family Member(s)
•
Evacuation Status: Temporary, Voluntary, Permanent
•
Compensation/Benefit Status:
Medical Treatment
•
Frictions with Original Residents and Among Different Victim
Statuses
Pre-nuclear, “New Comer”
Nuclear-related, Non-nuclear
Tax Relief, Free Education,
49
You have been well
paid before
accident, and are
paid a lot of
compensation again
after accident.
Lucky guys!
Hospitals, stores
restaurants,
roads are all
crowded with
you guys.
Get out here now
and go back to
your own place.
I lost whole
family and house
after Tsunami and
am paid very little
to restart my life.
You have a nice
family to live with.
Tsunami Victims
No more
sympathy.
We all know you
are complaining
more to be paid
more.
Original Residents
You enjoy all
benefits of our
place without
paying.
We can no longer
afford to buy houses
because price went
up so quickly after
you guys moved in
here!
What can
I say?
Nuclear Victims
50
Mar. 29, 2012
51
Jul. 1, 201252
Dec. 24, 2012
53
It is eventually
a matter of
money, isn’t it?
Minister,
Of course not.
If so, why so many
evacuees chose to
commit suicide?
54
“Nuclear-related Death”
Over 1,000 Evacuees Died From Mental Degradation
and Depression After Extended Evacuation Life
55
4 Years Later… Is Fukushima Situation
Getting Better And More Predictable?
• Unreliable Decommissioning Roadmap
• Volume Of Contaminated Water Still Growing
• Contaminated Groundwater Still Not Isolated
• Little Regulator Involvement
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