1. law, govt and politics
2. law enforcement
3. police

Combating Terrorism: Approximating The Operational And Intelligence
Vulnerability Of The Nigerian Police Force, 1999-2010
Dr. Nwanolue, B.O.G, FRHD1
Mr. Victor Chidubem Iwuoha2*
1Senior
Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Anambra State University, Igbariam Campus, Nigeria
of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria
* Email: [email protected]
2Department
Abstract
Variously, tangible efforts have been invested by the Nigerian Police towards combating internal terrorism. Yet,
adequate security of lives and properties has remained elusive. This study adopts qualitative descriptive mechanism.
We argue that the Nigerian Police has not been able to effectively guarantee the security of lives and properties of
Nigerians. Major institutional, operational and intelligence limitations are at the root of the security crisis in Nigeria.
On these grounds, we submit therefore, that the government should fundamentally equip the Police Force, and
provide intelligence architectures, so as to better reposition the Force towards effective securitization.
Keywords: Police, Security, Intelligence, Arms Tracking, Terrorism, Bombs, Corruption, Conflicts
Introduction
One important lesson one can learn from Maslow’s hierarchy of need is the ultimate importance attached to the issue of
security. Other principal philosophers of antiquity, including Hobbes had also stressed the vitality of security and its centrality in the
purpose of government. Hence, the need for governance to guarantee objective and subjective security, or root out real hazards as well
as conditions stimulating paranoia and other kinds of irrational fear amongst the populace it struck a social contract with. In this
direction, the Nigerian state through its constitution made provision for the creation of the Nigerian Police Force.
Section 214(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria states that “There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria, which shall be known
as the Nigerian Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the federation
or any part thereof. By this establishment, the Nigeria Police Force becomes the primary law enforcement agency responsible for
maintaining law and order in the country. It therefore plays the prime role of ensuring internal security of the nation. Part of this
internal security purpose is the containment of illegal arms, which in itself dangerously undermines the safety of the country,
especially when wielded by outlaws. However, too many criticisms have trailed the force, especially in its contribution to the
deteriorating security system of the country. For instance, Onu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu stated this about the Force:
Another way of explaining the problem of inefficient security system is the
police force itself. These include indiscipline, poor training, lack of
expertise in specialized field, poor pay, illiteracy, and lack of willingness to
learn. It also includes lack of patriotism, lack of regard for dignity of labour
and blind eye to what is obtainable in developed countries of the world. The
problem of corruption and dishonesty is an acceptable tradition (Onu and
Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2007).
Particularly, the disruption of Nigeria’s 50th Independence Anniversary on October 1, 2010 by the shelling of Movement for
the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND); the shattering of Nigeria’s Force Headquarters in Abuja, on the 16th of June, 2011; and the
dismantling of the United Nations House, Abuja, on the 26th of August, 2011, both by the explosives of Boko Haram Islamic sect,
among other numerous cases, climaxes the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian Police Force. In all, over 100 explosives have been
detonated so far by illegally armed groups and persons in Nigeria between 1999 and 2011, with innumerable thousands of important
lives blown off in the process (Vanguard, July 8, 2011). Therefore, this study seeks to link between the Nigeria Police operational and
intelligence capacity and the steady expansion of the activities of illegally armed groups and persons in the country.
The Problematic of Non-Implementation of Arms Tracking System in Nigeria
The security dilemma pervading the Nigerian state can easily be calculated upon the operational and intelligence limitation of
the Nigerian police force. In simple trace, the Nigerian Police leadership has not been able to implement the law, stipulated in the
Article 5 of the Code of Conduct of the ECOWAS Moratorium, which among other things includes ‘the registration and control of the
movement and use of legitimate arms stock’ (ECOWAS, 1998). The import of the exercise, as Diarra noted, is to introduce a sort of
“identity card” for weapons, by identifying them with a number on their bodies in order to make them easier to trace, either when they
are taken from one country to another or when they are sold or borrowed (Diarra, 2005). Hence, it is a sort of solid identifiable label
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or tag on all legitimate weapons been imported or legitimately produced in Nigeria with an accompanying central office file. This
Register, compiled and maintained at the local level, not only contains details of the identity of the weapons (registration number, date
of manufacture, terms of acquisition, etc.), but also “tracks” them when they circulate (transfer following the death of the owner, sale,
loan, theft etc.). Moreover, marking requirements are also included in both the Firearms Protocol within the UN Convention on
Transnational Organized Crime of 2001, as well as the OAS Conventions (Cukier and Chapdelaine, 2001). Also, in 2005, Nigeria
further adopted the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (Erlandsson
and Weitsch, 2008). But there has not been any responsible effort taken to this effect. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, people do not get
penalized or questioned for not implementing the law. The problem with this inaction, however, is that there are but little, or even
empty, intelligence on the totality of legal weapons accumulated in the country over period. Nigeria imports arms from a number of
sources including; United States: US-cartridges of about USD 246,007 between 1999 and 2002; UK: shotguns, cartridges and parts of
about USD 90,953 between 1999 and 2002; Italy: revolvers and shotguns of about USD 49,074 in 2001; Germany: revolvers/pistols,
about USD 13,062 in 1999 (Cross, Catherine and Mclean, 2004). Several thousands of AK-47s has also been fabricated by the
Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) located in Kaduna. In all these, there are no comprehensive and reliable
documentation on the stockpiles of the Nigerian armory, as well as importations and local production of legitimate arms in the country
(Hazen and Horner, 2007). The point being made here is that most weapons that have now become illegal were once legal in the time
of their importation or use by the security agencies and other legally authorized persons. Cukier and Chapdelaine further stated that:
Unlike illicit drugs which are illegal from production, through distribution
and consumption, virtually every illegal weapon which is misused began as
a legal commodity. They may be diverted from licit to illicit markets
through a variety of means including: theft, illegal sales, reactivation etc.
Thus, the emphasis that both domestic and international efforts to regulate
firearms and reduce illicit trafficking and misuse rest on the ability to track
individual firearms. Firearm manufacturers often serve both commercial
and military markets and so the issue of marking is of interest to both those
concerned with preventing crime and those focused on monitoring the
sources of illegal weapons (Cukier and Chapdelaine, 2001).
The implementation of this marking standard by the Police and other security agencies would have enabled the identification of
the point of departure (local station where the arms are assigned) of most of the various illegal arms used by illegally armed groups
and persons, who normally obtain these weapons by fowl means, from assorted legitimate sources. With this information, there could
have been an effective checkmating and control of legal arms traded or given out, as sympathetic support to a cause or belief by
official sources, to several illegally armed groups and person in the country. Therefore, the mere warning issued by the former
Inspector General of Police, Mike Okiro during a meeting with Mobile Police Force Squadron (PMF) Commanders, in Abuja, that
policemen whose guns attached to them are stolen or nowhere to be found will be held responsible and face stiffer punishments (Daily
Trust, December 11, 2008) is never sufficient. This is because the uncontrollable penchant for illegal sales by serving and retired
security personnel poses a major concern with regard to the circulation of illegal weapons. This problem was publicly acknowledged
by President Obasanjo in December 2002, when he stated that “the majority of small arms and light weapons circulating in Nigeria
were either sold or rented out by, or stolen from, the country’s security agencies” (Ginifer and Ismail, 2005). Obasanjo further stated
that, “Most of the ammunition we have found in wrong hands have come from security agencies…the police, the military…Only
recently, we found that 3000 rounds of ammunition were sold here in Abuja by the police and in 10s by the military (Erlandsson and
Weitsch, 2008). In fact, this shows that security officials have lost quantum of their weapons through theft and sabotage. Security
officials have provided weapons to ethnic militias in their home areas, with one customs official claiming the donation of 16 G3 rifles
as his “contribution to the Niger Delta cause” (Ebo, 2006). To give vent to this thrust, a content analysis of about 11 national dailies
that featured on the International Firearms Injury Prevention and Policy daily gun policy review confirmed that over 15 army officers
and about 30 police officers has been involved in the sale of hundreds of AK-47s and Machine Guns to rebels between 2007 and
2010[13] Some of these sales were reported to have taken place in the police station. An important illegal trade of all history was the
sale of over 7,000 military weapons belonging to the Nigerian armory to a militant group, Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta (MEND) by Major Sulaiman Alabi Akubo and five other soldiers, which fetched them a windfall of over N100 million
and a reprisal of life imprisonment (The Punch, November 28, 2008; Leadership, November 19, 2008; Voice of America, November
19, 2008).
A survey of an armed group members conducted in Bayelsa state also revealed that the majority of respondents received
assistance from the police (30.4 per cent), the mobile police (14.7 per cent), and the military (24.5 per cent) in obtaining small arms
(Isumonah., Tantua and James, 2006). Beside this, there is also some evidence of diversion or recycling of weapons from
decommissioning exercises into the illegal trade. Soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions have also sold small arms in the
black market, providing ‘a ready source of assault weapons’ for the Nigerian population, and in addition provided training to
militants. Thus, the armed groups in the Delta have displayed “superior strategies and tactics using better training and organization”
(Hazen and Horner, 2007). All these speaks for the absence of attention focused on ways of tracing and preventing weapons that
moves from legal to illegal users which is mainly controllable through effective tracking of legal weapons. This can only be made
possibly through effective arms marking scheme.
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More disturbing, however, is the fact that these legitimate weapons being traded often ends up in the illicit arms market where
they are further resold to other dangerous users. This trend has not been impeded by the police over the years. Also, local blacksmiths
that couples other illegal weapons which flood the illicit markets have not been effectively checkmated by the police. Several hidden
places in Nigeria have been doted as sites of local fabrication of these illicit arms. Hazen and Horner further stated that “production
techniques applied in local productions is mainly rudimentary. No machines are used in the production process. Vises, steel saws,
manual drills, and files are employed in the fabrication process, with small makeshift furnaces used to heat the metals” (Hazen and
Horner, 2007). This fabrication of craft weapons usually takes place in producers’ homes or backyards. In addition to production of
craft arms, these blacksmiths often produce other tools, such as hunting traps, gardening implements, and machetes. And the materials
used in the process are all sourced locally. Table 1 depicts that there is still an uninterrupted illegal craft production of small arms in
Awka, the capital city of Anambra state. While table 2 shows few other manufacturers of illegal arms that the police were able to
arrest between 2006 and 2010. It is quite odd that only a few of these illegal productions have been interrupted by the police from the
available records. This is because, until several years ago, craft producers had marked their weapons with numbers and
symbols of recognition. These identifying marks were used by police to trace weapons used in crimes. This led to the
prosecution of craft producers whose weapons had been implicated in criminal activities, and consequently a halt to the
practice of marking. Currently, craft weapons are not marked with individual identifiers (Hazen and Horner, 2007). And this
makes it very difficult for the police to trace. Therefore, these productions have continued to thrive. The significance of the
local production of illegal weapons can be observed in table 2, where the data presented indicates that border security agents
confiscated very small quantities of arms each year, but by contrast large numbers of rounds of ammunition. While this would be
expected, as more ammunition is required than weapons, the number of weapons according to the table is disproportionately small
compared to the amount of ammunition seized. This gross discrepancy in the balance of the flow of illegal weapons in favour of
ammunition over firearms clearly suggests that local productions have considerably been filling the gap of most of the demands for
illegal firearms by illegally armed groups and persons. Since perhaps, local fabricators lacked relevant technology for making more
ammunition.
A respondent had claimed in December 2003 that every village in Nigeria had between 20 to 100 AK-47 assault rifles in its
community armouries (Yacubu, 2005; WAC Global Services, cited in Hazen and Horner 2007). For instance, in Warri, an oil-rich
town in the Delta, youths have openly hawked pistols and automatic rifles referred to by local dealers as ‘pure water’. Pistols can be
much cheaper. The high cost of purchasing an AK-47 in the Delta suggests that there is scarcity value. In Nigerian price terms, a
double-barreled shotgun costs between 50,000 and 65,000 naira, a single-barreled shotgun between 25,000 and 30,000 naira; the price
of pistols ranges between 3,000 and 7,000 naira, depending on the model, the seller and the place of sale. A suspect arrested in
September 2001 by the Plateau state police for unlawful possession of firearms admitted that two of the weapons in his possession had
been purchased two years previously for 55,000 and 75,000 naira (Yacubu, 2005). Some informants suggested that prices rises during
escalation of conflicts (Ojudu, 2007). A number of towns are known for the availability of weapons, including Asaba, Benin City,
Aba, Onitsha, Enugu, Owerri, Awka, and Port Harcourt (Small Arms Survey, 2007a). However, table 3 below shows a nosedive in
price index of illegal weapons traded in the illicit markets in Nigeria between 2003 and 2007. This suggests that more illicit guns are
made available to the illicit markets during this period.
The Problematic of Weak Internal Policing
An important area where the police have not effectively performed towards the containment of the sources of illegal arms is in
the area of weak internal policing. The point being made here is that illegal arms are not mostly used or fired from their very sources,
whether smuggled or locally manufactured. Illegally armed groups and persons normally move these weapons from one place to the
other in order to make meaningful use of them. Therefore, the porousness of the Nigerian roads caused by weak internal policing
facilitates this movement. This, in essence, sustains the linkage between the sources and the consumers. However, some factors are
responsible for this, among which are inadequate distribution of police stations in the country, poor motivation of police officers, and
insufficient weapons and intelligence equipments.
For instance, a police reform proposal put up by the former Minister of Police Affairs, General David Jemibewon
recommended that police deployment needs to take into consideration some important factors including, political settings, population,
crime-rate and land mass. According to this proposal, the police formations in divisional, area, state, zonal and force headquarters
should be aligned to correspond with local government, senatorial districts, states, the six geo-political zones and the federal
government as they presently exist. A police post was recommended at the ward level and about three to five police posts to constitute
a police station (Thisday, February 9, 2002). The problem with this formation however, is that in the end, there are several
incongruities in the distribution of the police offices across the country. For instance, the allocation of about 204 Village Posts to
Bayelsa state of about 1.7 million population, and only 1 Village Post to Abia state with well over 2.8 million population, is
absolutely unacceptable. And in reality, as Nigeria is presently constituted, there may not be a ‘hot crime zone’ per se, as everywhere
constitutes potential insecurity. Table 4 below clearly highlights this incongruity and inconsistency. Of course, this explains why
various localities are not effectively policed thereby giving cover to local manufacturers of illegal weapons. Again, a comparism of
2006 and 2007 figures shows a downward trend especially in numbers of Village Posts where internal surveillance is needed most. In
the end, both the local producers and the consumers of illegal weapons are not interrupted. But more disappointing is the fact that
those constables who mount on the highways lacked important surveillance equipment with which to detect arms while in transit.
Only appropriate intelligence facilities can help in an effective way to identify the groups and individuals that are engaged in the
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manufacture, sale, storage, transfer, possession and distribution of these illegal weapons. This calls for sophisticated intelligence
equipment such as electronic communication facilities, bomb detectors, scanners, digital fingerprinting machines, radios, intercoms,
computers and more importantly the Close Circuit Television (CCTV).
In fact, there is no reason why Nigerian police should not have the CCTV in each station or even adequate weapons detectors
spread on the highways in order to effectively monitor movement of illegal weapons and concealed bombs. In Nigeria, there are too
many checkpoints though, but the mobile police men on duty have never been on top of the situation because they lacked important
surveillance equipment.
The Corruptive Tendencies Sweeping off the Nigerian Police Force
Most alarming is the custom of settlement which has overtaken the actual place of thorough searching. In this regard, several
persons have lost their lives for refusal to part with the contentious ’20 naira’ compulsory settlement fee. For instance, among many
other cases, innocent pilgrims coming home from a pilgrimage were indiscriminately shot dead in Anambra state, after a protracted
argument on why someone coming from a religious purification should not offend his God by giving 20 naira bribe. Also, another
husband and wife lost their lives in Anambra state over this issue of 20 naira (Onu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2007). And regrettably,
no effective measures have been taken so far to salvage the mobile police men from extorting 20 naira from vehicles on the highway.
It gets so worst that when they collect they give change.
The long term implication of this operational misconduct is that as the motorists cue compulsorily for the informal daily
contribution, the day to day socio-economic life of our cities are indirectly disrupted and at the same time, motorists held bound in
such gridlock run the risk of being cheap targets for intentional or inadvertent terrorist attacks. Moreover, in most cases, those
motorists and commuters delayed are unavoidably led into night journey where there are life threatening risks of accident and armed
robbery attacks. The deployment of mobile drive-through vehicle scanners could have been mitigated these risks and as well decipher
the contents of vehicles plying the roads from safe distances and alerts triggered for appropriate counter-terrorism action whenever
necessary. In all, the actual function of containing the movements and flows of illegal weapons is not achieved. Hence, the police
have not done much in containing the movement of these illicit weapons. Table 5 show the little police was able to seize between
2000 and 2010. This figure shown is a pittance when compared to the over three million illegal weapons still circulating in Nigeria
today. Perhaps, one should blame the weak police structure for this. Nigerian police personnel are poorly remunerated. An agency that
handles such enormous task of internal peace and security of lives and properties of citizens should never be subjected to miserable
conditions if they must carry out their functions effectively. Table 6 shows the breakdown of salaries of Nigerian police officers.
The Operational Capacity and Vulnerability of the Force
Beside the issue of motivation, however, the police have always resorted to curative than preventive measures in an effort to
contain the circulation of illegal arms in the country. Most often, the police open fire on armed groups and persons when they are in
action without doing much to contain the routes through which such weapons are transmitted and exchanged. And in most cases, the
police have not been succeeding. In fact, in most of these confrontations, as the tolls of armed persons shot down are being counted,
so as that of the police officers as well as other unsuspecting innocent but ill fated citizens, who lost their lives along the line are being
counted. The difference, perhaps, is that in the case of the later, the issue of paying enormous sacrifice for the nation is mostly
chanted, even ignorantly celebrated. This is mainly because the force itself lacked sufficient sophisticated weapons to effectively
confront some of these illegally armed groups. Table 7 depicts the quantum and the level of sophistication of stockpiles of the
Nigerian Police Force. This number of weapons can hardly be sufficient for use for over 450,000 officers of the police force. And
definitely, many of these numbers above may not actually be in usable condition. However, only about 40,000 (forty thousand) pieces
of AK-47 riffles with 20,000,000 (twenty million) rounds of 7.65x 39mm ammunition; 10,000 pieces of Pistol Beretta with two
million rounds of .9mm and other ammunition, totaling about 80,000 Guns, 32 Million Bullets were later procured in 2007 by the
Nigerian Police due to the April General Elections as stated by the then Inspector of Police, Mr. Sunday Ehindero (Daily Champion,
March 7, 2007).
The Impact on Security of Lives and Properties
Of course, the consequential impact of these security leakages and inadequacies on effective containment of local production
and internal movement of illegal weapons is multi-layered. First, the activities of the various armed groups have well spread beyond
their usual coverage, spreading to various parts of the country uninterruptedly. The following tables 8 and 9 shows the progressive
expansion of the militant groups in the Niger Delta and a rise in the diversity of their attacks respectively.
Bad Governance, Excruciating Poverty, as Trigger Effects
The situation even becomes worst when added to the fact that there are too many disarticulating variables in the Nigerian
system that could as well prompt people to take up arms. This is because from all indications, the Nigerian project has not been well
executed over the past one decade or so. Ikejiani-Clark complain bitterly that Nigeria is deeply in trouble, and elsewhere worries that
“poor leadership has contributed to a situation where Nigeria ranks amongst the poorest in the world in terms of human capital
developments, resulting to frustration and instability, with militants agitating and invading the territorial space of Niger Delta”
(Ikejiani-Clark, 2007).. She eventually concludes that “Nigeria itself is a contradiction…” in the sense that she suffers dangerous lack
amidst plentitude of natural gifting (Ikejiani-Clark and Ezeh, 2008). An Action Congress governorship candidate in Oyo state in 2007
election, Prof. Taoheed Adedoja once noted that the future of an average Nigerian youth appears helplessly gloomy and blank (The
Nigerian Tribune, May 8, 2008). If indeed as the National Bureau of Statistics (2010) summated, that the percentage of the
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employable age but unemployed persons in Nigeria alone are well over 20% in 2009, of the estimated 149 million population, then
there is a serious trouble in the country. Therefore, The Nation, summarizes that:
Today, Nigeria’s democracy is the antithesis of every creed, every
principles and every tenet of the universe. It is the travesty of incompetent
and visionless governments nationwide backed by a power greedy but
empty party and supported by compromised security and defense forces.
That should worry the most patience and enduring of souls (The Nation,
June 27, 2011. p. 1).
Though, our effort here is not to embark on a lengthy examination of literature but to simply establish one point. That is, that
lack, destitution, politics of exclusion and its accompanying frustrations has become a difficult phenomenon that can never be easily
disentangled or distillated from the Nigerian system. Hence, it is our utmost contention that in spite of this numerous internal
contradictions, the government has on top maintained a too porous, loose and permeable security details. The outcome of this reality
is an overwhelming hike in criminality and an upsurge in the expansion and intensity of the activities of illegally armed groups and
persons which have ensured in the period of the study. Table 10 shows an upward trend in armed robbery activities between 2002 and
2007, while table 11 displays a considerable rise in kidnapping in Nigeria between 2002 and 2007. Both cases involve use of illegal
weapons.
Approximating the Impacts on Internecine Conflicts
More to this is the high scale of ethnic/communal violence in the country. Bishop Mathew Kuka, in Onu and BiereenuNnabugwu noted that “It is the federal and state government and their policies of alienation that have led to the resuscitation of latent
communal identities as a tool for bargaining with a hostile and alien state. It is here that we can locate the source of crises that befell
our communities across the land” (Onu, and Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2007). Hence, the plethora of ethno-religious militias such as
MASSOB, MOSOP, AREWA, OPC, HISBA, Egbesu Boys etc. has used illegal weapons to promulgate these crises. But more
importantly, however, this study is particularly concerned that almost all of these clashes have been mostly fought with locally
fabricated firearms (Hazen and Horner, 2007). The impact of these illegal weapons has been an unacceptable loss of lives of innocent
citizens. Thus, over 100, 000 lives have been lost to internecine violence in Nigeria since 1999 (Agboton-Johnson, Ebo and Mazal,
2004).
The Rising Bomb Attacks, Acts of Terrorism
In another aspect, the unhindered availability of illegal weapons has largely contributed to a rise in intensity of the attacks of
illegally armed groups in the country. The most dreaded of these attacks is the incessant use of explosives and grenade launchers to
blow up the country and its people. This act is the hallmark of terrorism and is mostly perpetrated by the Movement of the
Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and the Boko Haram Islamic sect, located in the Northern part of the country. Though, the
bombing trend is not new in Nigeria but our utmost concern is that such awful and dangerous act has progressively become more
incessant, calamitous, and disastrous in recent times especially within the period of study. Table 12 confirms that the bomb tradition is
not new in Nigeria, but has become increasingly more incessant and lethal within the period of study. The above statistics do not only
threaten the national security in a dangerous way but has also shown that the nation is unwontedly but gradually falling to the status of
a failed state. On the rising bomb acclimatization in the country, former Inspector General of Police, Mr. Sunday Ehindero lamented:
This is an ugly trend that must be swiftly tackled with all seriousness. That
was how terrorism started in the Middle East; it is a trend that must not be
allowed… Before now, the nation was only experiencing robbery, which
later developed into kidnapping and now bomb blast. Just like kidnapping
became a difficult menace to handle, my fear is that, if not properly
checked, bombing may become another phenomenon that will be difficult
to combat (The Nation, June 27, 2011. p. 1).
We are not joining the debate though, but an important factor here is that the government and its ‘security system’ are on the
weak side. A police officer has succinctly captured the vulnerability of members of the force. He had this to say:
Our lives are no longer safe in the performance of our lawful duties.
Whether it is the broad day light or at night, you have to be praying to
God to save your life as you put on the uniform and set out for work.
Being a police man has become a danger in itself, because apart from
the fact that you are not loved by the members of the society, the Boko
Haram and armed robbers are waiting for you out there to put you out
of circulation. The worst part is that we do not even have the required
weapons to confront them. And our men are dying like chicken
everyday in large numbers. It is a sad development (Daily Sun,
December 8, 2011. p. 7).
Of a truth the activities of Boko Haram had taken its toll on the Nigerian Police force. According to the data gathered on
death benefits paid by various insurance firms to families of the deceased at the Force Headquaters, Abuja; as much as 602 police
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officers and men were killed in just 5 months in the country, between May and September 2011. The details are as follows: May –
156; June – 143; August – 122; September – 119 and November – 62 (Daily Sun, December 8, 2011. p. 7).
Conclusion
The study examined the operational and intelligence vulnerability of the Nigerian Police Force. The Nigerian Police has not
been able to effectively conquer the emerging security threats in the country. More importantly, the Nigeria Police which has the key
responsibility of maintaining internal peace and security in the country, lacked sufficient weaponry and necessary surveillance
equipment to execute their job effectively. Besides the observed poor remuneration, contributing immensely to the chronic
institutional corruption, there is a lopsided structure in the distribution of police stations, and in effect police personnel across the
country. All these, therefore, form the bases for the expansion of the activities of unauthorized armed groups and persons in the
country. On these grounds, we submit therefore, that the government should fundamentally equip the Police Force, and provide
intelligence architectures, so as to better reposition the Force towards effective securitization.
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Prognostic Analysis” in J. Onuoha and C.J. Nwanegbo (eds.) Theory and Practice of Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria.
Enugu: Quintagon Publishers. p. 219.
Small Arms Survey (2007a) Security Agencies, Small Arms, and Violence in Nigeria. Switzerland: Small Arms Survey.
Yacubu, J.G. (2005) “Cooperation Among Armed Forces and Security Forces in Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms” in A.
Ayissi, and S. Ibrahima, (eds.) Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the
Training of Armed and Security Forces. Geneva & Switzerland: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).
The Punch, November 28, 2008.
Thisday, February 9, 2002.
The Nigerian Tribune, May 8, 2008.
The Nation, May 27, 2008. p. 13
The Nation, June 27, 2011. p. 1
Vanguard, July 8, 2011.
6
Voice of America, November 19, 2008.
Table 1: Craft-Produced Small Arms in Awka
Weapon
Features
Pocket single-short
Approximately 13 cm long; steel
handguns
muzzle to wooden stock; extremely
rudimentary hammer requiring cocking;
effective only at a distance of 1–2 m;
uses single shotgun cartridge
Four-short revolver
Available in manual and automatic
configurations
Eight-short revolver
Available in manual and automatic
configurations
Single barrel shortgun
Breech-loading; safety cocking
mechanism
Horizontal doubleBreech-loading; one trigger for each
Barrel shortgun
barrel; safety cocking mechanism
Vertical doubleBarrel shortgun
Automatic configuration firing both
rounds without need for cocking;
breech-loading
Source: Hazen, J.M., and Horner, J. (2007).
Ammunition
Various calibers of
Shortgun cartridge
Cost
NGN 4,000/
USD 32
9 mm, 7.5 mm, or
8.5 mm
9 mm, 7.5 mm, or
8.5 mm
Various calibers of
shotgun cartridge
Various calibers of
shotgun cartridge
NGN 8,000/
USD 64
NGN 12,000/
USD 96
NGN 10,000–
11,000/USD 80–88
NGN 25,000–
30,000/USD 200–
240
NGN 45,000/
USD 360
Various calibers of
shotgun cartridge
Table 2: Cases of Arrested Illegal Local Arms Producers Across Nigeria Between 2006 and Sept. 2011
Date of Arrest
Name of manufacture(s)
Factory site
Illegal weapons produced
Soloman Akpus, and his master, Egato, Nasarawa
Seven
locally
manufactured
Mgbebe
pistols and 17 live ammunition
April 10,2006
Mr. Cyprian Okeke, 57 years old, Udi LGA, Enugu state
together with Obinna Eze, 22 years
old, and Sunday Ude, 20 years
June 3, 2007
Ahmadu Magaji
Pandogari Village, Rafi LGA, 40 pistols
Niger state
October 24, 2007
Mr. Saliu
Katam Village, Akko LGA, Gombe state
March 2, 2009
Baushe Makeri
Kotorkoshi
Village
in 11 guns
Bungudu, Zamfara state
April 19, 2009
Malam Bala Joji, 83 years
Kano
Several weapons
April 12, 2010
Abdussamad
Barkin Akawa, Dadin Kowa, explosives
Jos South LGA
October 17, 2010
Solomon Mantep, Dorcas
Kuru, Jos South LGA
Three pistols, seven multipurpose
Habila and Jummai Gyang.
guns, AK47 bayonet, three hand
drilling machines, a filling
machine and live ammunition
September 21, 2011
Paul Odunze, and Nwanne Ifiodu Umudioka, Dunukofia
100 bags of live cartridge,
(arms convener/driver)
L.G.A, Anambra State
15 pump actions, 12 double Barrel
guns
Sources: Compiled from, Thisday, May 15, 2006; Thisday, June 4, 2007; Daily Champion, October 25, 2007; Daily Trust, April 21, 2009;
Leadership, March 4, 2009; Weekly Trust, November 20, 2010. Radio Nigeria, September 22, 2011.
Table 3: Reported Prices of AK-47 Assault Rifles in Nigeria, 2003–2007
Date of Purchase
Price*Price*
Late 2003
USD 1,700
December 2004
USD 1,000
May 2005
USD 300
November 2006
USD 1,000–1,500
December 2006
USD 1,500–2,500
March 2007
USD 400
Source: Hazen, J.M., and Horner, J. (2007). * Prices vary depending on whether the weapon is new or used.
Table 4: Total Number of Police Area Commands, Divisions, Stations, Posts and Village Posts, 2006-2007
2006
States
No. of Area
Commands
2007
No. of
Divisions
Abia
Adamawa
A/Ibom
Anambra
2
3
3
3
29
24
32
34
No. of
Police
Stations
22
65
41
52
Bauchi
3
24
38
No. of
Police
Posts
32
102
Na
43
99
No. of No of Area No. of
Police
Village Commands Divisions Stations
Posts
1
2
29
22
199
3
24
65
Na
3
32
41
132
3
34
52
55
3
24
38
No. of
Police
Posts
32
102
Na
43
99
No. of
Village
Posts
7
1
199
Na
132
55
Bayelsa
Benue
Borno
C/River
Delta
Ebonyi
Edo
Ekiti
Enugu
Gombe
Imo
Jigawa
Kaduna
Kano
Katsina
Kebbi
Kogi
Kwara
Lagos
Nasarawa
Niger
Ogun
Ondo
Osun
Oyo
Plateau
Rivers
Sokoto
Taraba
Yobe
Zamfara
FCT/Abuja
Railways
PAP
Airport
Total
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
5
3
8
3
4
5
3
3
4
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
5
2
1
126
10
28
37
23
33
13
29
20
23
29
30
27
36
67
Na
24
32
46
na
17
36
31
31
33
47
25
38
26
17
18
36
16
9
7
3
1,040
19
37
42
55
67
29
31
21
6
34
63
27
59
17
38
9
123
7
128
317
60
25
36
47
50
101
34
3
71
19
35
11
30
7
Na
1,576
30
137
100
23
Na
10
43
54
50
74
38
120
105
104
103
133
79
85
78
118
115
65
26
32
47
174
63
44
123
70
62
44
Na
4
2
2,631
204
61
178
103
100
69
151
Na
79
129
134
179
202
45
3
na
137
141
298
45
171
10
93
170
130
256
103
75
33
20
136
7
44
20
6
3,919
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
5
3
8
4
3
5
3
4
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
5
2
1
126
28
10
37
23
33
13
29
20
23
29
30
27
36
67
Na
24
32
46
na
36
17
31
31
47
33
25
38
26
17
18
36
16
9
7
3
1,040
37
19
42
55
67
29
31
6
21
34
63
27
59
17
38
9
123
7
128
60
39
25
36
50
47
101
34
3
71
19
35
11
30
7
Na
1,598
137
36
100
23
Na
10
43
54
50
74
38
120
105
104
103
133
79
85
78
118
115
65
26
32
47
174
63
44
123
70
62
44
Na
4
2
2,634
204
61
179
103
100
69
151
Na
79
129
134
179
202
45
3
na
137
141
298
45
171
10
93
170
130
256
103
75
33
20
136
7
44
20
6
3,820
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008:114). Note: na= not available
Table 5: Small arms seized by police, 2000–2010
Year
No. of arms seized
2000-2001
1,941
2002
3,150
2003
3,451
2007
About 2,098
2010
over 1,283
Source: Vanguard, July 7, 2004; Thisday, February 14, 2007; Leadership, July 5, 2010.
Table 6: Salaries of the Nigerian Police Officers Per Month and Per Year
S/No
Rank
Salary per month
Salary per annum
$ Equivalent per month
$ Equivalent per annum
1
CP
#39,649.00k
#475,788.00k
$287.3
$3447.6
2
DC
#34,993.00k
#419,916.00k
$253.5
$3042
3
AC
#31,605.00k
#379,260.00k
$229
$2748
4
CSP
28,801.00k
#345,612.00k
$208.7
$2504.4
5
SP
26,197.00k
#314,364.00k
$189.8
$2277.6
6
DSP
#22,565.00k
#270,780.00k
$163.5
$1962
7
ASP
#19,594.00k
#235,128.00k
$141.9
$1702.8
8
INSPR
13,002.00k
#156,024.00k
$94.2
$1130.4
9
SGT
#8,370.00k
#100,440.00k
$60.6
$727.2
10
CPL
#7,104.00k
#85,248.00k
$51.4
$616.6
11
PC
#6,455.00k
#77,460.00k
$46.7
$560.4
8
Source: Afe Babalola, in the Nigerian Tribune, December 17, 2001.
Table 7: Nigerian Police Force Small Arms and Ammunition
Types of arms
Present holdings
Estimated Additional Requirements over
the next five years
510,500
Rifles (various models):
65,000
K2; FWC; SMG Model 12; SMG Beretta;
Sterling; Beretta; pump-action shotgun; submachine gun; AK-47
Pistols (various models):
8,524
20,000
Revolver 38 mm; revolver chief special shot;
Browning 9 mm; revolver 38 mm chief long;
Browning DA; Browning 32mm;
Beretta 9 mm
Ammunition:
(Rounds)
(Rounds)
5.56 mm for rifles
65,000
5,000,000
9 mm for rifles
434,000
100,000
Source: Small Arms Survey (2007a) Security Agencies, Small Arms, and Violence in Nigeria. Switzerland: Small Arms Survey.
Table 8: Profiles of the Armed Groups in the Niger Delta
Name
Year formed
Membership
Sources of Weapons/
Funding/Support
Stockpiles
The Bush Boys
1999
Over 3,000
Purchases from illegal arms dealers
Politicians and Chiefs of the
Okrika community, including
former governor Ada George
and Chief Sergeant Awuse, the
Rivers state 2007
gubernatorial candidate
Deebam (aka. Klansmen
1991
3,000 in Tombia,
Purchases from illegal arms dealers
Sir Celestine Omehia, Kenneth
Konfraternity (KK)
Degema LGA; 2,500
Kobani; and Chief Fred Barivale
in Bukuma, Degema
Kpakol, chairman of Gokana
LGA; and 6,000 in
LGA.
Port Harcourt
Deewell
Late 1990s
Over 4,000 members
Purchases from illegal arms dealers
Allegedly Rotimi Amaechi, Sir
Celestine Omehia; Gabriel
Pidomson Jr. etc.
Icelander (also known as
Created by the
10,000 members in
AK-47s, 7 general purpose
Allegedly from Governor
Germans and NDVS
Rivers State
Rivers and Bayelsa
machine guns, 8 other
Peter Odili and Transport
Government in
states (A PDP family)
machine guns, locally made
Minister Dr Abiye Sekibo
craft pistols, and both 7.62
Mid-2000
mm and 5.56 mm
ammunition; AMD 65s; 12
59/M66s; and several Type
65-1s, Beretta BM59s, FN
FALs, and AK-47s.
MEND (Movement for
January 2006
Over 2,000 fighters
AK-47s or their
Mainly self sufficient
the Emancipation of
derivatives, RPGs, and
the Niger Delta)
UK 59 Rachot machine
guns
NDPVF (Niger Delta
2003
About 5,000 members
Proceeds from illegal oil
Peoples Volunteer Force)
bunkering
NDSF (Niger Delta
2004
About 60 members
RPGs and dynamite at its
Allegedly funded by the Action
disposal, as well as Russian- Congress governorship candidate
Strike Force)
(but with other
Supports numbers
made AK-47s, or variants of for Rivers state in the April 2007
Over 600)
the AK,
elections Prince Tonye Princewill
and PK machine guns.
and others.
The Outlaws
2004
4,000 throughout
RPGs, sub-machine guns,
Allegedly PDP Rivers
and AK-47 derivatives
Rivers state
State
Source: Adapted from Hazen, J.M., and Horner, J. (2007) “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in
Perspective” in Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 20. Switzerland.
Table 9: Activities of Various Militant Groups Operating in Niger Delta from January 2006-July 2009.
Date
Incident
Location
Casualty
Jan. 11, 2006
Attack on Royal Dutch/shell’s oil facilities
Offshore field
4 foreign workers
Rivers State
kidnapped
Jan. 11, 2006
Explosion on major crude oil pipeline operated by
Forcados, Delta
9
Royal Dutch/Shell
Jan. 15, 2006
Royal Dutch/Shell facilities was attacked by MEND
Port Harcourt
17 soldiers killed
May 10, 2006
An executive with US based oil company,Baker Hughes
Port Harcourt
1 death occured
was shot and killed
June 2, 2006
A Norwegian offshore rig was attacked
Port Harcourt
16 crew members
Aug. 21, 2006
Sept. 12, 2006
Oct. 2, 2006
Oct. 2, 2006
Oct. 3, 2006
Clash between MEND and security agencies
Militants attacked Chevron offshore oil field
MEND fighters attack Nigerian soldiers patrol boat
A Nigerian/Royal Dutch Shell convoy was attacked
Western oil workers taken hostage
Bayelsa
Delta
offshore
Port Harcourt
Bayelsa
Oct. 4, 2006
Nov. 22, 2006
Nigerian soldiers stormed a militant camp
Clash between Nigerian soldiers and some militants When
soldiers stormed a militant camp to rescue Kidnapped oil
workers
Kidnap of foreign oil workers
Rivers
Rivers
Dec. 7, 2006
Dec. 21, 2006
Jan. 16, 2007
March 4, 2007
May 1, 2007
May 3, 2007
May 4, 2007
May 7, 2007
Obagi pumping station attacked
Militants attacked an oil vessel near Bonny Island
Major spill at a pipeline feeding the Bonny export terminal
due to sabotage
Six expatriate workers from an offshore facility
Owned by Chevron were seized
MEND fighters seized eight foreign oil workers from an
offshore vessel
Saipen site was attacked causing shuts in production
Protests caused Chevron to shut down the Abiteye flow
station that feeds Escravos export terminal
May 8, 2007
Three major oil pipelines (one in Brass and two
In the Akasa area) run by Agip were attacked
May 10, 2007
Protesters occupied the Bomu pipeline system Causing Shell
shut-in production feeding Bonny Light export route
May 16, 2007
Gunmen attacked the country home of the Vice President
(now President Goodluck Jonathan)
May 28, 2007
Protests at Bomu pipeline system made Shell to
Shut-in production through its Nembe Creek trunk
June 14, 2007
Gunmen stormed the Ogainbiri flow station operated by
Eni Petroleum
June 18, 2007
Militants overran the Chevron-Eni Abiteye flow station
causing shut-in crude oil production
Aug. 3, 2007
Militants attacked Port Harcourt city destroying some public
properties such as the NNPC mega filling station and radio
station
Sept. 20, 2007
Gunmen claiming to be MEND kidnapped 11 Members of
the ruling PDP
Oct. 20, 2007
MEND attacked a Columbian oil worker
Oct. 26, 2007
Six oil workers attacked
Oct. 30, 2007
Naval warship, NNS Obula, deployed to rescue the EA
Field belonging to Shell was attacked
Oct. 31, 2007
MEND attacked a naval officer
Nov. 12, 2007
35 militants engaged naval officers manning the
Qua Iboe terminal of EXXON Mobil
Nov. 15, 2007
MEND attacked Shell facility
Nov. 25, 2007
JTF clashed with MEND near a natural gas facility of Shell
Dec. 4, 2007
MEND attacked Exxon Mobil
Dec. 31, 2007
Militants invaded two police stations at Trans Amadi and
Borokiri
Jan. 11, 2008
Petroleum tanker ship was attacked at the Nigerian Ports
Authority by Freedom Freelance Fighters (FFF) of MEND
Feb. 3, 2008
MEND attacked a military house boat stationed
At the Shell Petroleum Tara manifold
Feb. 11, 2008
Gunmen attacked a supply vessel belonging to Total Oil
Nig Ltd. MV Patience at Buoy 35
Feb. 11, 2008
Militants attacked a naval gunboat belonging to the
Pathfinder Naval escorting NLNG boats
From Port Harcourt at Bonny
March 19,
Exchange of fire between militants and oil Industry security
2008
ship
March 21, 2008 MEND attacked naval ship causing explosion
April 2, 2008
Two oil flow station belonging to Agip Oil Company
located offshore Forcados were blown off
April 13, 2008
Agip vessels bombed
kidnapped
10 MEND fighters killed
1 worker killed
10 soldiers killed
Some officials wounded
7 Western oil workers
Taken hostage
9 soldiers were killed
1 soldier died
Rivers
4 foreign oil workers
Kidnapped
Delta
3 guards killed
Bonny Island, RiversRivers
Funiwa, Delta
6 oil woekers kidnapped
Rivers
8 foreign oil workers
Held hostage
Several oil workers
Wounded
-
Okono/Okpoh
Abiteye, Delta
State
Brass/Akasa,
Bayelsa State
Bomu, Rivers
-
Ogbia, Bayelsa
-
Bomu, Rivers
-
Ogainbiri, Delta
24 workers taken hostage
Port Harcourt
30 innocent citizens
died in the attack
30 innocent citizens
died in the attack
Port Harcourt
Southern Ondo
State
Offshore, Rivers
Rivers
Iboe, Akwa Ibom
Rivers
Soku, Rivers
Rivers
Port Harcourt
Port Harcourt
Tara Manifold
Bayelsa
Kalaibama, link
Bonny island
Rivers
11 persons kidnapped
1 death
Six oil workers kidnapped
1 death and five others
Sustained serious injury
1 naval officer killed
A pregnant woman Killed
and 25 persons wounded
1 killed
4 police men and 11
Others lost their lives
2 persons injured
2 killed
4 people killed
Rivers
-
Rivers
Rivers
-
Forcados, Rivers
10 naval officers died and
Some militants
10
April 15, 2008
April 19, 2008
April 21, 2008
April 24, 2008
May 2, 2008
May 13, 2008
May 26, 2008
June 9-10,
2008
June 19, 2008
June 20, 2008
June 28, 2008
July 16, 2008
Jul. 24/26, 2008
July 28, 2008
Aug. 8, 2008
Serial attacks launched on pipeline belonging to NNPC
MEND fighters crippled Shell Adamakri crude flow station
MEND in ‘Operation Cyclone’ attacked two Major pipelines
of Shell Soku-Buguma and Buguma-Aklakri
MEND sabotage a major oil pipeline of Shell at Kula
Bayesa State Shell facility attacked, key facilities damaged
Chevron oil vessel hijacked
Assault on Rivers State Shell pipeline, forcing Closure
Clashes between security forces and militants
Delta/Edo
Adamakri
6 people killed
10 killed in the clash
Rivers
Bayelsa
Kula, Rivers
Rivers
Delta
6 expatriates kidnapped
5 persons kidnapped
8 hostages taken
6 militants and 29 soldiers
reportedly died
Over 100 deaths
-
MEND struck Shell’s Bonga facility on deep Offshore field
Rivers
Chevron facility attacked by militants
Rivers
Clashes between militants and soldiers
Delta
Clashes between militants and security forces
Rivers/Bayelsa
Foreign oil workers attacked and kidnapped
Rivers
Two major attacks on Shell oil pipelines
Militants attacked Ondo State Oil Producing Development
Ileje, Ondo
Commission (OSOPADEC) and 4 others
Aug. 12, 2008
Militants destroyed oil gas pipeline in Rivers State
Rivers
Aug. 19, 2008
Oil pipeline destroyed in Delta State
Delta
Aug. 24, 2008
Oil vessel at Bonny Island, Rivers hijacked
Rivers
Aug. 30, 2008
Militants and security forces clashed
Rivers
Sep.13-15,
Kula oil platform operated by Chevron and Alakri, and
Rivers
2008
flow station operated by Shell were attacked
July 12, 2009
MEND attacked Atlas Cove Jetty with caliber machine guns
Lagos
4 Naval officers
Source: November 2008 Report of Technical Committee on Niger Delta (See also Newswatch, May 4, 2009, Vol. 49 No. 18; Vanguard,
July 15, 2009).
Table 10: Armed Robbery Statistics Classified into Various Offences/Involvement 2002-2007
Year
Robbery Cases
Persons
Persons
Persons/
Civilians
Armed
Armed
Cases Pending
Reported to the Arrested
the
Prosecuted Cases
Killed by
Robbers
Robbers
Investigation
Police
Awaiting Armed
Killed by
Injured
trial
robbers
police
By police
2002
2,968
2,907
353
817
371
317
99
1,708
2003
2,949
3,814
1,026
1,048
335
544
190
1,525
2004
3,184
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
2005
2,325
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
2006
2,916
2,946
135
303
233
329
28
1,208
2007
2,506
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008:122). Note: na= not available
Table 11: Cases of Missing Persons/Kidnappings, 2002-2007
Year
Number of Missing
Number of Persons
Number of Persons
Persons
Traced
not Traced
2002
1,334
886
448
2003
1,273
772
451
2004
1,316
548
768
2005
1,080
575
505
2006
1,374
931
443
2007
867
446
421
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008:134-136).
Table 12: Chronicles of Bomb blasts in Nigeria Since 1986
Date
Incidence/Target
Group Responsible
Victims/Damages
October 19, 1986
Letter bomb
Dele Giwa lost his dear life
March 31, 1995
Lauch of Miriam Abacha’s
family support program
January 18, 1996
Darbur Hotel, Kaduna state
Bagauda Kaliho (press man) died
April 25, 1996
Air Force Base, Ikeja, Lagos
January 20, 1996
Aminu Kano International Airport
Olushola Omoshola (CSO) and
Nelson Gbolahor Kasim died
December 16
Colonel Buba Marwa Convoy
December 18, 1996
Lagos state Task Force bus
April 22, 1997
Evans square, Lagos state
3 died and several injuries
May 13, 1997
Fed. Min. of Works, Ibadan
December 13, 1997
Nnamdi Azikiwe Int. Airport
Lt. Gen. Oladipo Diya escapes death
11
January 20, 2002
Ikeja Military Cantonement, Lagos state
600 persons died
May 28, 2005
Residence of Ikono Head of
Council Area, Ikono, Akwa Ibom state
November 25, 2006
PDP Secretariat, Bayelsa state
Building destroyed
November 28, 2006
Owan East LGA, Edo state
Godwin Aigbekhai died
December 5, 2006
Then Governor Goodluck Jonathan
-
December 11, 2006
December 23, 2006
March 18, 2009
July 12, 2009
December 22, 2009
April 11, 2010
March 16, 2010
May 2, 2010
May 3, 2010
October 1, 2010
December 27, 2010
December 24, 2010
December 31, 2010
April 7, 2011
April 8, 2011
April 15, 2011
April 21, 2011
April 25, 2011
April 27, 2011
May 28, 2011
May 29, 2011
June 11, 2011
June 16, 2011
Campeign Office, Bayelsa
Ndudi Elumelu Campeign office, Delta
Government house, Port Harcourt
A farm in Ikeja Military cantonment
Atlas Cove Jetty oil Facility, Lagos
Letter bomb targeted to Superscreen
Television
Dandin Kowa, Jos, Plateau state
Near the arena of Post Amnesty Dialogue
organized by Vanguard, Warri, Delta state
Close to Dep. Gov. Peremobowei
Ebebi, Bayelsa
Mechanic workshop, Warri
Close to Eagles square, on independence
Barkin Ladi, outskirts of Jos
Jos city
Mogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja
Polling booth, Unguwar Doki, Maiduguri
INEC Office, Suleja
Maiduguri Council Office of INEC
Bomb makers died, Kaduna
Tudu Palace Hotel and Kano motor
park, Maiduguri
Bomb averted, INEC office, Oron, A/Ibom
Mammy market,
Shandawanka Barracks, Bauchi
Zuba, outskirts of Kubua, Abuja
Bomb averted, United Methodist
Church, Bauchi
National Force Headquarters, Abuja
MEND
MEND
Bomb maker
MEND
A student blown to pieces
five
Chopped off both hands
of Abdulsalam Mohammed
1 killed
-
-
MEND
Boko Haram
Boko Haram
Boko Haram
Boko Haram
Boko Haram
12 died, 36 injured
30 died
4 died
More than 10 injured
11 youth corps members died
2 died
-
Boko Haram
13 died, 40 injured
Boko Haram
Boko Haram
14 killed, 8 lose limbs
-
Boko Haram
Dambowa, Maidugri
Boko Haram
13 died, many people injured,
over 70 cars burnt
3 died
July 10, 2001
All Christian Fellowship Centre, Suleja
Boko Haram
3 persons critically injured
August 26, 2011
United Nations House, Abuja
Boko Haram
25 persons died, over 100 injured
September 11, 2011
Twin bomb exploded at Obelende, Jos
Fulani men
none
October 10, 2011
Twin bomb exploded at Maiduguri
Boko Haram
3 soldiers, one killed, a van burnt
June 16, 2011
Source: Adapted from Vanguard, July 8, 2011; Vanguard, July 11, 2011; Vanguard, August 27, 2011. The Punch, September 12, 2011.
The Nation, October 11, 2011.
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