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James Capp PATNET 2015 A tall tale of performance? Market reform narratives in US public higher education policy Introduction Telling the story of public policy complexity is not nearly as easy as telling the story of governmental waste or how to run government more like a business. In the United States, public colleges and universities—as well as their associated state systems of higher education—operate within the same complex environments as many other implementers of public policy (Kukla-‐Acevedo, Streams, and Toma 2012). Legislative bodies have created bureaucratic institutions to develop methodical regulations and budgetary infrastructures within which higher education policy is implemented. Just like other highly technical public institutions, such as health care management or environmental regulatory agencies, these institutions are expensive to operate and are therefore constant targets for improvement in terms of efficiency. Similarly, the public continues to expect higher quality outcomes—e.g. increased graduate employment placements—and higher levels of outputs—e.g. increased degree productivity (Nwosu and Koller 2014). These demands of more efficiency alongside more efficacy are oftentimes competing in nature, making the implementation of public higher education policy as complex as the enforcement of Medicare distribution or water quality management. It is therefore incredibly tempting to develop policy narratives to simplify the story of public policy. In particular, market reform narratives tell the complex story in very brief—albeit compelling—ways. If the citizenry were to hold governments more accountable, then governments would duteously produce more for less – like a Capp 2 taxpayer-‐funded corner dollar store with everyday savings. A conflict arises with the increased expectation that governments simultaneously improve the quality of program production while they increase the number of programs they offer (Rochefort and Cobb 1993). As a result of these conflicting pressures, the conclusion of many public policy makers, both inside and out of the context of higher education, is to find ways to reform public organizations (in this case state universities and colleges) to run them more like businesses (Rutherford 2014). In order to attend to the aforementioned competing value dilemma, legislative bodies and governing boards are creating performance-‐based funding (PBF) models, which are rapidly becoming the de facto vehicles for the allocation of new money in public systems of higher education throughout the US (NCSL 2015). These market-‐based models are impacting both two-‐year and four-‐year colleges and universities in states across the nation, with thirty four states currently employing or in the process of developing performance-‐based funding models. Proponents of PBF initiatives skillfully employ market reform narratives in an attempt to influence the public policy process. This paper attempts to address whether or not market reform narratives play a meaningful role in policy implementation, using US public higher education policy as a case study. In order to do so, I will review the broader policy narrative literature to offer more thorough understanding of the normative pushes we see periodically develop across the nation. Those trendy conceptualizations are referred to here as “market reform narratives,” meaning stories that tell of the need for governmental entities to change Capp 3 their ways in accordance with the for-‐profit world. One popular method of studying these phenomena is the extraordinarily simple but thoughtful lens of the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF). Using this tool, I offer an analysis of market reform narratives in the very specific context of PBF for public colleges and universities, clearly showcasing that market reform narratives, regardless of the role they play in the direction of policy conversations, are far too simplified to accurately depict the complex mechanisms involved with implementing higher education policy in the US. Policy Narratives Compelling stories influence the opinions of stakeholders throughout the public policy process, with policy narratives potentially driving the development and continual refinement of legislation and regulation (Shanahan, McBeth, and Hathaway 2011). Narratives are incredibly powerful tools that can be wielded by ideological leaders who wish to establish underlying biases amongst policy makers in favor of or in opposition to specific political issues. At the same time, stakeholders can spot check policy narratives for authenticity and reliability by establishing a forum in which democratic participants can acknowledge the existence of narratives and contribute to the re-‐conceptualization of particular narratives (Hampton 2009). In a world where policy deliberation occurs within the comment sections of YouTube, researchers are optimistic that public discourse can develop and actually engage practical policy issues (Deschamps 2014). Stakeholders from any arena can interact with the narrative and decide whether or not it is reliable. By bringing together competing parties that disagree on the version of events that best describes policy problems and solutions, narratives can actually serve as practical Capp 4 tools for improving the process of policy formulation. In terms of the concept of policy feedback and market reform narratives, this means that policy implementers can readily respond to the constant give-‐and-‐take of the politics of efficiency and efficacy (Soss and Moynihan 2014). Policy narratives are thus malleable, but stakeholders must proactively engage the issue or else these narratives will become the dominant background noise that directs the future conversation regarding policy problems and solutions. Policy narratives often revolve around the “right” way to proceed in an intractable policy conflict. Jones, McBeth, and Shanahan (2011) conducted an analysis of narratives in which they found that “the winning side developed a victory narrative, had solutions, used themselves as a hero, as well as diffused benefits and concentrated costs when promoting their own policy” (476). Policy makers can therefore craft market reform narratives that put themselves on a pedestal as the protector of taxpayer savings and conservator of accountability. This persuasive argument is difficult to engage, as the losing side is inevitably labeled as capitulating to bureaucratic fat-‐cats who favor unrestricted governmental waste. Policy implementers are then forced into the position of justifying their every action in order to assure the citizenry that accountability measures are important to their organizations and employees. As a narrative, the general concept of accountability is largely accepted by the public as an ideal to be valued and promoted, while the specific market reforms that accompany improved accountability are more controversial. For example, university employees in general may embrace accountability, but performance-‐
Capp 5 based funding (PBF) is “potentially fraught with tension” (Frolich 2011). As a result, market reform narratives tell the story of ways in which citizens can rein in the runaway bureaucracy – and all of its excessive costs. This simplified dichotomy of “market versus state” leads to an overly simplified conceptualization of policy problems, and accordingly, public policy solutions (Howlett 2014). Narratives inevitably sum up all the environmental context of a public policy into a neat, albeit convincing, story. In order to become a compelling story, situational details are overlooked or dumbed down for public consumption. Narrative Policy Framework NPF itself can be guilty of oversimplifying the complex narratives that it analyzes. The framework merges the post-‐positivist perspective with the positivist approach -‐-‐ towards measuring our very much subjective reality. Public policy researchers are notably skeptical of positivist/empirical analyses, with Jones and McBeth (2010) arguing that the dominance of the post-‐positivism perspective in the policy narrative literature is largely due to the unavoidable bias we suffer while studying societal issues and the associated policy solutions and political implications. Jones and McBeth go to the extent of claiming that, in “mainstream public policy literature the vast majority of narrative scholarship has been in the poststructural tradition, while only a slight minority of narrative research adheres to structuralism.” Perhaps the most persuasive argument Jones and McBeth make is that the use of empirical methods “is argued to unfairly exclude marginalized groups -‐-‐ perhaps deliberately so” (333). This is an important distinction when studying Capp 6 policy narratives through the lens of market reform narratives, which, as value-‐
laden policy tools, add fuel to the fire of privatization in the name of efficiency – potentially subverting more socially progressive forms of public policy. Public institutions traditionally strive to fulfill very different objectives than those of the corporate world, with a focus on social justice and fairness, among a number of other broad goals (Vandenabeele 2007). If the attention of policy drifts from the focus on equity, then market reform narratives – with their resulting quantifiable targets and emphases on dollar amounts spent by the taxpayer – could be used to marginalize particular socioeconomic populations. Researchers can use NPF as a tool to give a descriptive look into the public policy process. From agenda setting to the ways in which assessment circles back to formulation and implementation, NPF gives policy analysts and researchers the opportunity to explain how certain processes within public administration develop and interact with political and social actors. For example, the NPF literature analyzes the roles that narratives play in policy stalemate, policy change, and policy learning—and the ways that coalitions can come together to direct narratives to impact these outcomes (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, and Lane 2013). Market reform narratives in public higher education policy, as outlined in the forthcoming section, can substantially impact policy decisions – and NPF may be able to shed light on the specific ways in which they accomplish this task. Market Reform Narratives in Performance-‐Based Funding In the US, the use of PBF has primarily been limited to supplemental incentive programs – meaning that the base budget is typically only partially at risk Capp 7 and public institutions compete for a proportionately smaller set of funds by achieving special targets for performance indicators (Jongbloed and Vossensteyn 2010). These indicators are largely representative of the aforementioned competing values of efficiency and efficacy, with a focus on institutions improving their productivity in terms of student outputs while simultaneously spending less money to accomplish this ambitious task. Jongbloed and Vossensteyn elaborate how, fortunately, the market reform narrative driving PBF policy development has thus engaged in a soft roll-‐out, giving colleges and universities the opportunity to join the conversation as stakeholders in the development of specific policies. In the meantime, these soft roll-‐outs enable market reformers to tell the story of themselves as heroes of the war without offering context regarding the size of the battle they have completed. They move forward with the narrative of winning all the glory (of more drastic accountability measures) while receiving relatively limited pushback from stakeholders at colleges and universities. While PBF is often termed as an “innovation,” this spin on the narrative is actually part of the market reform narrative itself. South Carolina launched an initial version of its PBF in the 1970s, with a 1996 re-‐launch of the program in the form of “Mission Resource Requirement.” The South Carolina Commission on Higher Education (2014) summarizes the gradual devolution from PBF into across-‐the-‐
board cuts as a result of the Great Recession. In the midst of unprecedented budgetary reductions due to limited public funding, PBF in South Carolina deteriorated to “need-‐based” funding for public institutions (4). The state’s Commission on Higher Education cites the volatility of PBF to explain its demise. Capp 8 Even though the state is currently considering yet another revitalized launch of PBF (termed in the state as “allocation-‐based funding” or ABF), the Commission highlights the importance of predictability as a necessary component of any future funding models (6). Predictability is not a term typically associated with market reform narratives and is actually more often connected to reliable government services, so South Carolina exists as a model PBF that failed. The state does not fully embrace the market reform narrative because the innovation story does not thrive in a state where the model is viewed as outdated and unsuccessful. In contrast, Tennessee’s system operates entirely off PBF, and policy makers are proud to be innovative, as the first state in the nation to transform from a growth-‐based enrollment funding model to a 100% outcomes-‐based model (Tennessee Higher Education Commission 2010). The state’s leaders tout the uniqueness of the model as evidence of its success, citing that the “design, utilizing outcomes and an institution-‐specific weighting structure, is unique in higher education finance policy.” In the same document, the system’s administrators claim to both “jettison” and “completely replace” (emphasis theirs) the previous model. Clearly, innovative reform is the driving narrative in Tennessee. The Story of Florida Given the growing popularity of PBF and the possibility that performance is quickly becoming the dominant narrative in public higher education policy, questions are being asked regarding the appropriateness of specific performance indicators (McLendon and Hearn 2013). Similarly, researchers are acknowledging the interconnectedness of particular performance indicators and the possibility that Capp 9 PBF policies will give too much weight to any single indicator, which cannot possibly “signal performance of multiple actors and multiple institutions that themselves interact in complex ways” (Kukla-‐Acevedo, Streams, and Toma 2012, 14). This summarizes the limitations of PBF as a market reform narrative, attempting to wholly represent the broad story of accountability with broad generalizations. One signal may be insufficient to craft an entire complex policy, but indicators showcase how narratives can become powerful enough to influence policy outcomes. Florida is still developing its relatively new initiative that exists as an integrated supplemental-‐base funding model, mixing new performance incentive dollars with reallocated base funds from each institution in the system (State University System of Florida Board of Governors, 2014). This state can serve as a rich case study, with an influx of narrative fueling the development of this nascent PBF initiative. Using Jones and McBeth (2010) as a guide for an analysis of the market reform narratives engrained in PBF initiatives, researchers can begin to offer a more developed qualitative picture of the extent to which these narratives influence policy. Jones and McBeth outline their framework according to literary terminology: setting/context, plot, characters, moral (policy solutions). Using language from the policy makers themselves to analyze these two PBF case studies will offer practical details and implications of market reform narratives. In terms of setting/context, Florida is a very mixed political environment with very different concentrations of cultural and socioeconomic demographics scattered throughout the state. The PBF language cites as a guiding principle the system’s commitment to use only “a few clear, simple metrics” in order to “acknowledge the Capp 10 unique mission of the different institutions,” which it claims is a result of “numerous reasons (university age, student demographics, regional location, funding, etc.).” Accordingly, two out of the ten metrics in the PBF model are unique to each institution – with one metric assigned by the state system governing board and one metric assigned by each university’s own governing board. The state system claims “these 2 metrics focused on areas of improvement or the specific mission of the university.” The story is that Florida is very diverse with several institutions that do not fit into a single mold. The implication of a fair battleground on which the state universities will operate infiltrates the narrative – with the setting/context in this case study being reflective of a free, competitive market. Nevertheless, the complexity of the setting is oversimplified in descriptions of the system. The plot of PBF market reform narratives tells the story for workforce development. In Florida, Governor Rick Scott was elected on a singular platform of job production; his first campaign slogan in 2010 was “Let’s Get to Work,” in which he promised to create 700,000 new private sector jobs over seven years, and he followed this with his 2014 “Let’s Keep Working” campaign (Putney 2014). The plot of this narrative begins with the platform of Scott to create jobs, with the establishment of PBF serving as the middle of the story, and with the conclusion being that “today’s students have the opportunity to succeed in tomorrow’s workforce” and that these students are trained and competitive “for careers in high-‐
demand areas” (Davis 2014). The plot conceptualizes students as products in the market reform narrative—a device in the heroic tale of establishing PBF. Once again, the narrative strives for a simple formula-‐like “accountability equals jobs” plot, Capp 11 which overlooks the historical context of higher education as a tool for personal fulfillment and professional exploration – not necessarily limited to this plot of jobs. The list of characters in the narrative includes the public policy leaders serving as protagonists, the proponents of the former funding models serving as villains, and the taxpayers serving as victims. As noted above in the valiant nature of the plot, Governor Scott leads the team of heroes. A press release on the successful disbursement of the first round of PBF dollars continually recognizes the governor throughout the document. He is the individual who signed the “historic” budget, literally using the word “champion.” Scott is also referred to as “our Governor,” who gives “support” and worked together with legislative leaders to develop policy that “makes sense.” Marshall Criser III, the chancellor of the system, even goes as far as to say “The System is better off because of their leadership.” As the hero, it is the responsibility of the governor to take aim at those who support taxpayer waste and the formerly unaccountable and outdated funding model. The problematic nature of identifying a single person or entity as a hero is that it overlooks the important roles that stakeholders play throughout the implementation of policy. The heroes should not be singular. The narrative ignores faculty, students, and others who work together to implement a system of creating new knowledge and serving the public. The state released a “frequently asked question” document that targets those unnamed villains who propose “waiting to implement performance funding until additional resources are provided” (State University System of Florida Board of Governors, 2014). These labeled villains apparently recognize the complexity of the system. At one point, the system acknowledges military students or students who Capp 12 work full-‐time and “may need longer to complete” their educational programs, implying that the villains argue that universities with high percentages of these students are uniquely disadvantaged in the PBF model. Instead, the system argues, “it is misleading to say that because a student is working or is a veteran, she or he is less likely to persist and complete college.” Who is making this misleading claim that the system preempts? Those individuals who acknowledge the complexity of the situation are creating a disservice to “stakeholders,” who are specifically mentioned as “parents” who “expect the best no matter the funding levels.” This particular statement emphasizes the shortcoming of building a simple narrative. The villains are unnamed and resistant to change, but the heroic governor will champion on behalf of the victims – the taxpayers – regardless of resources or complexity. Finally, the moral (policy solution) of the narrative is the accountability that a market reform such as PBF provides to the citizenry. PBF works to promote excellence through incentivizing universities to perform, much like a corporate model. According to the narrative, PBF directly influences policy outcomes by making university administrations and faculties are “utilizing funds in a manner that ensures a university is performing at the highest levels.” The overall impact to the higher education system in Florida is yet to be measured. An analysis of ways in which PBF directly and indirectly influences actors and decision making in the state system would better describe the moral of the story. Conclusions and Future Research Implications The context of higher education offers specific examples regarding how the field of public administration acknowledges and functions in conjunction with Capp 13 market reform narratives. The story of PBF throughout the states influences stakeholders but the extent to which its associated market reform narratives directly influence policy outcomes should be subject to future inquiry. Regardless of the ways and extent of market reform narratives interact with the public policy sphere, the opportunity to improve narratives exists. Public stakeholders can engage these narratives and shape them according to their own values. Complexity should be acknowledged and incorporated into the story in order to better represent the context of higher education. Wallner (2008) encourages “policy scholars to look beyond performance, effectiveness, and efficiency to examine the role that legitimacy plays in the successes or failures of public policies and the governments who create them” (437). Are market reform narratives truly representative of the complicated situations that they strive to describe? The findings of this analysis are mixed, as innovation and efficiency are positive attributes that should be incorporated into narratives – but they should not completely engulf concepts like the engagement of public stakeholders, which legitimizes policy narratives. 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