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Study Guide
2015
28 – 31 May
General Assembly of the United Nations
Disarmament and International Security – First Committee
Chair: JULIA VALLAURI
CO-Chair: BRAHADEESH SRINAVAN
http://pimun.epanu.org/
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Table of Contents
Letter from the Chair: .................................................................................................................. 1
Subject A: ...................................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction: ........................................................................................................................................... 2
Recent conflicts: ...................................................................................................................................... 3
Suggested reading: .................................................................................................................................. 4
Subject B:....................................................................................................................................... 5
Introduction: ........................................................................................................................................... 5
Issues ........................................................................................................................................................ 5
Suggested Reading: ................................................................................................................................. 6
Letter from the Chair:
Greetings Delegates!
Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped, cannot be checked -– that
we are destined to live in a world where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools
of destruction. Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of weapons is
inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that their use is inevitable.
We will be addressing two important agendas in the committee. One with regards to the long term
effects of supplying arms for peace enforcing wherein we tackle the uncomfortable question of ‘is
it viable to make war for peace’? The topic above is a very precarious one owing to its two-pronged
nature of utility and destruction in equal measures. In view of the agenda which we plan to address,
the assembly is required to deliberate over the long term effects of providing arms and equipment
to state and non-state actors, thus creating the hazardous problem of having the same weapons
used at a later stage against the original supplier. This issue has gained frequency over the past
several decades, sparkling new tensions and producing instability. Delegates should deliberate and
decide on whether this practice is defendable in the long-term. If it is, what are the checks and
balances which need to be put in place to prevent weapons designated for peaceful purposes falling
into the hands of non-state actors? And if not, what is the best recourse to find an alternative which
makes sure that the final aim of aiding needful and deserving parties in a conflict?
The second agenda concerns the integration of new technologies and scientific advancements to
improve international security and assure disarmament. Technology leaves little room for errors.
So how should the international community harness it to check the spread of weapons and assure
disarmament? Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In
a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear
attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these advanced weapons. Testing has continued.
Black market trade in weapons’ secrets and arms materials abound. The technology to build
advanced arms has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal weapons. Our efforts to
contain these dangers are centred on a global non-proliferation and disarmament regime, but as
more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the centre cannot hold.
I look forward to a healthy and solution-oriented committee where delegates discuss, deliberate
and dissect the fine issues presented with a view to ensure global peace and stability.
Regards,
Brahadeesh Srinivasan
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Subject A:
‘The long term effects of supplying arms for peace enforcing’
Introduction:
The need for supplying arms for peace arises only when there are armed conflicts or the intention
is to possibly prevent the same. With regard to armed conflict, under International Humanitarian
Law, there are only two kinds of Armed Conflict- International and Non-International.
International Armed Conflicts are those in which all the belligerents (parties involved) are states.
These conflicts are categorized as such when two or more internationally recognized nation-states
are in an armed conflict with each other. The two World Wars and subsequent inter-state armed
conflict are fit examples for the same.
Non-International Armed Conflicts are rather more complicated, as they can have a combination
of state actors and non-governmental forces as belligerents, or multiple armed non-governmental
forces as belligerents. Non-International Armed Conflicts provide a very gray area to define
their constituents in a permanent and universally-recognized manner owing to their subjective and
complicated nature.
Legally speaking, only these two types of armed conflict can exist, however they shift almost
fluidly from one to the other. To put things into urgent perspective, International Armed
Conflicts provide ample ground for ceasefires and political solutions due to vast bilateral and
multilateral international frameworks which can effectively deal with recognized states in a
conflict. However, these conflicts are faced with the grave danger of turning into NonInternational Armed Conflicts where there is no agreement under international law and agencies
to recognize the belligerents in a consensual manner.
It is important to know this simply because if it is a case of supply of arms during a conflict itself,
a party cannot do so without actually taking sides.
However, the primary issue we look to address in committee is the post conflict scenario, wherein
arms and troops are essential to help maintain the peace that has been established. The problems
arising out of the supply of arms are essentially this:
1. Misuse of the arms supplied:
The arms supplied may be used by the procuring state/non state actor(s) to enforce their
will without question. It has grave human rights and sovereignty implications.
2. Proliferation of arms supplied:
The arms may fall into the hands of social evils and violent non-state actors (terrorists).
Such a scenario is a dangerous one as arms proliferation may abet violent non-state
activities.
3. Re-sale of arms:
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Another possible problem is the resale of the arms that are supplied. Once again, this leads
to well funded organized crime units procuring arms and also leads to terrorists procuring
the same. It results in pumping huge amounts of unaccounted capital into terror networks.
Keeping this in mind, the following important questions must be addressed:
1. Is supplying arms justified for enforcing and ensuring peace? If so, at what cost is it
justified?
2. Are there any possible measures in place to ensure the arms remain with the intended and
are used for the intended purposes? How effective is their implementation?
3. What other solutions are there to enforce peace if not the supply of arms?
Recent conflicts:
Syrian crisis:
During the Syria crisis, the United States of America, along with her NATO allies carried out a
full-fledged military intervention. Airstrikes were carried out and arms were supplied to the Free
Syrian Army (rebel forces). Sophisticated arms and weapons training were also given to members
of the FSA.
Russia however remained steadfast in their support for the government of Syria, insisting that the
intervention in Syria was unlawful and unnecessary. The Russian and Chinese sides refused to
recognize the FSA as a legitimate voice of the Syrian people which is reminiscent of the nuances
of having non-state actors in a conflict.
At the end of all this, the Syrian nation was left ravaged, its people worst affected and lots of the
arms supplied unaccounted for.
With the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) growing in power, these unaccounted arms present a
major problem. Also, there is the question of trained members of the FSA defecting to the ranks
of the ISIL along with the arms and weaponry provided to them. Some countries have voiced
concerns over providing arms to the FSA owing to its unclear future.
Ukraine-Crimea crisis:
Yet another case of Russia against the world, in this case though, it is the Russian government that
has supplied arms, troops and aid to the cause of the rebels. Russia categorically denies their
involvement. Weaponry being provided is usually unmarked and disguised.
As a result of this conflict, Russia has been subject to various trade embargos and sanctions by the
western powers. The most disturbing event during the conflict was the shooting down of a
passenger airplane resulting in the death of innocent civilians.
Again, with Russia’s history of keeping poor records of their weapons, one can expect a sizable
chunk of arms from this conflict to be unaccounted for as well. Russia unilaterally recognizes the
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rebels in Eastern Ukraine as state-actors and is trying to accord them a constitutionally recognized
position within Ukraine.
Recently, several think-tanks, politicians, military experts and diplomats called out to the United
States of America to provide arms, ammunition and training to the forces of the Ukrainian army.
The US currently provides non-lethal support to the Ukrainian government. In the event of the
shaky ceasefires breaking down and the US finally giving in to this request of the Ukrainian
government for supply of arms, what it does it spell for regional stability?
UN peacekeeping operations:
There are currently 16 UN peacekeeping missions that are ongoing, with 9 of them in the African
continent, 3 in the Middle East, 2 in Europe and one each in Haiti and India-Pakistan.
The US alone has roughly misplaced $500 Million worth of arms, spread across the arms supplied
to Afghanistan to Iraq. Russia is no better, with reports and rumours suggesting that they have
misplaced nuclear warheads and nuclear capable missiles!
That said, it is safe to assume every nation that has ever supplied arms for enforcing peace or
otherwise has ALWAYS come up short when they bothered to check. This problem persists simply
because there is no way to track the arms or ensure they are used for the intended purposes. This
also depends on the nature of the relationship between the supplier and receiver. The parties are
allied at times and enemies at other times, e.g. US and Iran before and after 1979. Some countries
have even adopted a policy of transfer of responsibility, wherein they supply the arms and absolve
themselves of all related responsibility.
In essence, these are the issues that the committee needs to address.
Please note that this is STRICTLY just to brief you on the issue and cannot be the full extent of
your preparation.
Suggested reading:
UNSC resolution 2117 (2013), Arms trade treaty (ATT), UN Peacekeeping mission reports,
research by think tanks and agencies, scholarly articles.
Accepted Sources: UN news agency, Reuters
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Subject B:
‘Integration of new technologies and scientific advancements to improve international
security’
Introduction:
The development in the defence and security sector has always been linked closely with the
evolution of mankind throughout the ages. With the discovery of new sciences, there has always
been the emergence of new weapons as well. In the current world, the need for defence and security
sector development is looked upon by governments as an activity akin to any life process in the
body. Every nation has a defence program, irrespective of its current status internationally.
This said, one must recognize the fact that developments in these sectors range from improved
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to increased cyber security and
encryption/decryption techniques.
How technology can aid in the disarmament process is a discussion that does not really have
precedent. Technological advancement leaves little scope for human error or inaction. It is one
agenda which we, as a committee, have to interpret and deliberate upon.
Issues
The most important issues that need to be considered are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
The direct influence of improved weapons/war machines towards disarmament,
negative or positive.
Exploring avenues other than mutually assured destruction (MAD) that ensure nonuse/promote simultaneous disarmament.
Addressing the aspect of security developments/improvements ranging from
increased and more efficient airport security to better encryption techniques for the
protection of electronic data.
Keeping this in mind, the following important questions must be addressed:
1. How do we form a precedent for something as dynamic and ever-changing as technological
development?
2. How do we enforce the said precedent when development is non-uniform across the various
countries?
3. Should the UN have a separate organization to oversee and maintain scientific
advancements and technological developments in the security and defence sector?
Cyber warfare:
During the past five years, the world has witnessed an escalation in the number of cyber-attacks in
the context of regional or local disputes. When peacekeeping operations began in Kosovo, NATO
and Serbian hackers attacked back and forth attempting to control each other’s electronic
resources.
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The same has occurred during the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the India-Pakistan disagreement over
Kashmir, and between Chinese and American hackers during the accidental bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the May 2001 downed spy-plane incident.
Of late viruses to attack computers containing sensitive data are appearing. Stuxnet, DuQu, Flame:
Weapons systems that are infiltrators, spies, data collectors. Stuxnet was an infrastructuresabotaging computer that targeted Iran's nuclear program. DuQu looks for information that could
be useful in attacking industrial control systems. The Flame program is designed more for data
collection than system destruction. Its intended targets were primarily Middle Eastern countries.
With time, technology and the ability to develop new weapons have grown exponentially. These
viruses are the pioneers of this field, and surely more are yet to come.
Global intelligence agencies are setting up separate desks to deal with cyber-security threats.
Chemical & Biological warfare:
The international community banned the use of chemical and biological weapons after World War
1 and reinforced the ban in 1972 and 1993 by prohibiting their development, stockpiling and
transfer. Advances in science and technology raise concerns that restraints on their use may be
ignored or eroded. Today’s advances in life sciences and biotechnology, as well as changes in the
security environment, have increased concern that long-standing restraints on the use of chemical
and biological weapons may be ignored or eroded.
The misuse of science or of scientific achievements to create weapons that poison and spread
disease has always provoked alarm and abhorrence in the public mind. The ICRC summed up the
public horror at the use of such weapons in its appeal in February 1918, calling them “barbarous
inventions” that can “only be called criminal”. For centuries there have been taboos against such
weapons, but the use of poisonous gas in World War I led to the first international agreement – the
1925 Geneva Protocol – banning asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and bacteriological
methods of warfare.
Despite the huge loss of life and destructiveness of World War II, and the crimes committed against
humanity, the main belligerents did not use chemical or biological weapons against each other.
That may have been due to a fear of reprisals using similar weapons, but the 1925 Geneva Protocol
had nevertheless established a new and clear norm in international law.
The Protocol has been respected in nearly all of the hundreds of armed conflicts that have taken
place since 1925. The handful of well-known and high-profile violations have provoked
widespread international condemnation and in some cases criminal prosecutions.
Suggested Reading:
ICRC reports, 69th UN assembly Thematic Debate, International Law research guides. Office of
Disarmament website, UN GA resolutions.
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