Study Guide 2015 28 – 31 May United Nations Security Council I Chair: Alessandra Pozzi CO-Chair: Oscar Santiago http://pimun.epanu.org/ Disclaimer and additional information: The guides supplied in no way represent conclusive research. Thus In the interest of a fruitful debate all delegates are invited to look to the sources for further research supplied in the guides, just like own sources. Further all information placed in the guides was gathered by the respective Dais teams. In the light of this, PIMUN 2015 renounces all responsibility for the content of these “study guides”. The deadline for the Position Papers is the 22th of May 23:59 (UTC+01:00). If submitted after this date the Position Paper will NOT be eligible for Position Paper awards. In order to make sure a Position Paper will be considered the document name should be: “Country Name”_”committee abbreviation as seen on the Study Guides”_PositionPaper_PIMUN2015 An example would be: FRANCE_UNESCO_POSITIONPAPER_PIMUN2015 The Position Papers can be uploaded to: http://pimun.epanu.org/ For further questions please contact: [email protected] Table of Contents Welcoming Letter from the Chair……………………………………………………………………2 Introduction to the Committee………………………………………………………………………..4 Topic A: Addressing and counteracting the destabilizing effects that the situation in Libya has on the Sahel region.……………………………………………………………………………………...6 I. Historical Background………………………………………………………………………..6 II. Legal Outer Space Framework……………………………………………………………....7 III. The Right of Sabotage………………………………………………………………………...6 IV. UN Secretary General Report................................................................................................10 Caption.........................................................................................................................10 Throwback Revolution..................................................................................................10 Chronology...................................................................................................................11 2014-2015 and the Geneva Talks.................................................................................13 V. Neighbouring Countires..........................................................................................................14 VI. The Rise of the ISIS.................................................................................................................16 VII. Conclusion and Recommendations........................................................................................17 VIII. Question a Resolurtion Must Answer....................................................................................19 IX. Bibliography.............................................................................................................................20 X. Further Research.....................................................................................................................21 Welcoming Letter from the Chair Honorable delegates, I welcome you to the Security Council in this year’s Paris International Model United Nations. Along with my co-chair, Alessandra, we will strive to make this a fun, rewarding and memorable experience for you. The solutions we think of during the conference will help us later on constructing a better and fairer world, both here at home and abroad. As for myself, I was born and raised in Bogotá, Colombia, and am currently studying my Bachelor in Philosophy and Political Science at the Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg in Germany. My love for MUN dates back five years, time in which I have participated on several conferences in Colombia and Europe. To describe my chairing style, I believe participants must be allowed to develop freely. A chair’s task is to simply moderate debate, only directly intervening in a substantial discussion if absolutely critical. However, I also work to uphold the Rules of Procedure to the best of my ability, for I place a big value in the strategic use delegates make of the RoP during committee sessions (besides this, I am a pretty chilled and nice guy). I very much look forward to meeting you all in Paris. Best regards, Oscar Santiago Vargas Guevara 1 Introduction to the Committee The United Nations Security Council is one of the six main organs of the United Nations. The Council currently consists of 15 Members. Five of them are recognized as “Permanent Members” of the Council. These are: the Peoples’ Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as well as the United States of America (in the MUN context they are often referred to as the “P5”). The other 10 seats are granted to different UN Member States on rotational basis, with observance of the official UN internal regional division, and for a 2-year long term of office. The Security Council is so designed as to function continuously. For that reason, a representative of each Member of the Council has to be present at the UN (and also the Council’s) Headquarters in New York at all times. The Security Council is a sui generis body with its main goal being maintenance of international peace and security. If a threat to the international peace and security is determined by the Council would, it would usually act as follows: When peaceful means are still considered as possibly sufficient to bring an end to the crisis at hand: set forth principles for an agreement; undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases; dispatch a mission; appoint special envoys; or Request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute. When the crisis leads to hostilities, the Council may: issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict; Dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought. In the last resort the Council may authorize: economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans; severance of diplomatic relations; blockade; Collective military action. 2 The Security Council can issue a Resolution (a legally binding document) or a Presidential Statement (a legally non-binding document). In order to react and authorize measures against a “threat to international peace and security”, nine affirmative votes of the Council’s Members are needed, including affirmative votes of all its Permanent Members. However, should there be 14 votes in favor but 1 vote against cast by a Permanent Member (so called “veto”), the draft Resolution at hand would fail. For more information on the Security Council see, inter alia: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ 3 Topic A: Addressing and counteracting the destabilizing effects that the situation in Libya has on the Sahel region Limiting the militarization of space in regard to the right of sabotage With Military capacities of countries increasing, many have the technology, or the possibility to attain it, to pose a direct threat to satellites. The current framework allows the so-called right of sabotage where satellites can be shot down by their respective operators. It is upon the delegates to discuss the negative effects of the framework and how it could be adapted to today’s world to counteract Star Wars. I. Historical Background On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union placed Sputnik-I, the first artificial satellite into orbit, launching mankind into Space Age. Since then, several countries have launched and developed ambitious space programs, delving deeper and deeper in the mysteries of the universe. The United States and the U.S.S.R/Russia have been the leading figures in this process, although every year more and more countries set their eyes to the stars, even unlikely players, such as Ecuador and Romania. Space exploration has soared since 1957. Four years later, Russian astronaut Yuri Gagarin became the first human to see Earth from its orbit, and on 1969, the United States Apollo 11 mission landed on the moon. Since then, nine space stations have been built and occupied by astronauts of different countries, and the International Space Station –a sixteen-nation joint endeavor– currently serves as a laboratory for microgravity experiments in several scientific fields. Manned space vehicles, such as the Space Shuttle, which ended operations on 2011, and the Russian Soyuz, still active, have made regular flights between Earth and low Earth orbit. The development of satellites has also become a central part of space exploration “The satellite industry is the largest sector of commercial space activities today. Orbiting satellites, for example, facilitate communication 4 between distant points on Earth. However, space has also become an important military tool. Satellites have become the eyes, ears and nerves of today’s military forces.” (Wolff 6) Although the value of these strides in outer space exploration for the development of science and technology is undeniable, several analysts prefer to understand the space race as inseparable from geopolitical aims, particularly the arms race between the two superpowers during the Cold War (Mushkat 113). At the core of this debate lies the potential dual-use of space objects and technologies, which could be used for either peaceful purposes or advanced warfare. This is particularly the case with technologies that can be used interchangeably for space launch vehicles and for ballistic missiles. The Global Positioning System (GPS) , on the other hand, is used for the guidance of many precision weapons, but also for various civilian consumer applications, blurring the lines between the civilian and military purposes of satellites (Wolff 6). II. Legal Outer Space Framework Throughout the second half of the XX century, the international community has strived to limit the militarization of Outer Space and to restrict activities to peaceful uses. The United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), established in 1958 by General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), has been chiefly responsible for the development and codification of international law on Outer Space affairs. The most important instruments of law that emerged during the last five decades through the work of COPUOS are listed below. 1945 Charter of the United Nations: In 1959, the legal subcommittee of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space issued a report stating that the UN Charter and the Statute of the ICJ were not limited to the confines of the Earth, extending its jurisdiction to Outer Space affairs. The UN Charter establishes the basic principles of state sovereignty, non-aggression, and the right to self-defense, among others. 1967 Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies: The Outer Space Treaty (OST) prohibits the testing of weapons, the storage of mass destruction weapons, the holding of military maneuvers, or the establishment of military bases in space. The Treaty does not contemplate the transit of nuclear weapons through space or nuclear 5 weapons launched from Earth to destroy incoming missiles, as originally permitted in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (Wolff 7). 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space: The Rescue Agreement provides that States shall take all necessary measures to assist astronauts in distress and promptly return them to the launching State. 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects: The Liability Convention provides that a launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space. The convention also provides procedures for the settlement of claims for damages. 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies: The Moon Treaty reaffirms and elaborates on many of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty as applied to the moon and other celestial bodies. These bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and the resources within them are the common heritage of mankind. As such, any possible future exploitation of its resources needs to be regulated by an international regime, once such exploitation becomes scientifically feasible. III. The Right of Sabotage Under the current legal framework, the operating country of a satellite keeps the right to dispose of the object in any way, for as long as these actions do not directly affect another country’s civilians or infrastructure within Earth’s atmosphere. Operating countries may shoot down dysfunctional or old satellites under their possession without any international legal repercussions. This is the denominated right of sabotage. The main negative consequence of destroying a satellite is the production of big amounts of space debris. Orbital debris is defined as “all the man-made objects in orbit about the Earth, which no longer serve a useful purpose. Derelict spacecraft and upper stages of launch vehicles, carriers for multiple payloads, debris intentionally released during spacecraft separation from its launch vehicle” (NASA), or, in this case, the remnants of a shot down satellite are all examples of orbital debris. Satellites and spacecraft are in general able to withstand the collision of particles smaller than 1 cm, and although the collision with larger objects is unlikely. There is, however, still 6 significant danger. In 2009, for example, an operational U.S. Iridium satellite collided with a derelict Russian Cosmos satellite. Particularly worrying for the international community was the intentional destruction on January 11, 2007 of China’s Fengyun-1C weather satellite via an anti-satellite (ASAT) device launched by the Chinese. China’s action was criticized by several other satellite-operating nations on two accounts: (1) China’s incursion into ASAT systems may be interpreted as a threat to peace in outer space, since these technology could also be used to shoot down other nations’ satellites, in itself an act of war. Chinese authorities have dismissed these criticisms and have restated their commitment to uphold peace in outer space. (2) The debris cloud produced by the collision extended between 125 to 2292 miles of altitude, encompassing the entirety of low Earth orbit. The International Space Stations, along with other satellites in the lower orbit, were put in harm’s way. Both the intentional destruction of the Chinese satellite and the accidental collision of American and Russian communication satellites in 2009 currently represent one third of all catalogued orbital debris (NASA). There is currently no international treaty that handles orbital debris. However, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) was created by the world’s leading space agencies to address orbital debris issues and to encourage operations in Earth orbit that limit the growth of space debris. Additionally, the orbital debris has been a topic of assessment and discussion in the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS. Both IADC and COPUOS have published orbital debris mitigation guidelines. « As United Nations and international efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the political and institutional crisis in Libya accelerated during the reporting period, the overall security in the country continued to deteriorate sharply. » 7 IV. UN Secretary General Report to the UNSC, February 2015 Caption The fall of Qadhafi’s regime and his death did not bring stability to Libya – the country is experiencing strong separatist movements backed by militias of different allegiances and rising influence of Al-Qaeda in the region. The new government is not in a position to impose a solution. Meanwhile, the Sahel region depends on Libya’s situation. If it fails to restore the governmental influence and improve the economy, it will intensify the instability that is gathering in the region, creating a serious threat to international peace and security. Therefore, delegates should access the situation at hand and try to find ways of improving it. Throwback to the Revolution Today, Libya’s deteriorating internal conflict may be nearing a dramatic turning point. Qadhafi’s bloody end and the collapse of Libya’s police and armed forces left in its wake an armed population with 42 years’ worth of pent-up grievances. His longstanding divide-and-rule strategy set communities against one other, each vying for a share of resources and the regime’s favour. In order to better grasp the depth and emergency of Libya’s situation, let us take a look at recent events (BBC World News). Chronology 2014 – April 2015 8 June 2014 - Prime Minister Maiteg resigns after Supreme Court rules his appointment illegal. New Parliament chosen in elections marred by a low turn-out attributed to security fears and boycotts; Islamists suffer heavy defeat. Fighting breaks out between forces loyal to outgoing GNC and new parliament. July 2014 UN staff pull out, embassies shut, foreigners evacuated as security situation deteriorates. Tripoli international airport put out of action by fighting. Ansar al-Sharia seizes control of most of Benghazi. October 2014 - UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visits to continue UN-brokered talks between the new parliament and government based in Tobruk and Islamist Libya Dawn militias holding Tripoli. UN says 100,000s displaced by clashes. Islamic State extremist militia seizes control of port of Derna in eastern Libya. December 2014 - After recapturing most of Benghazi in October, the Army launches offensive to recapture Derna and push Libya Dawn out of western Libya. January 2015 - Libyan army and Tripoli-based militia alliance declare partial ceasefire after UNsponsored talks in Geneva. Islamist militants kill nine people in gun and bomb attack on Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli. February 2015 - Libya's internationally-recognised government revokes law that barred officials from the Gaddafi era from holding political posts. The Italian embassy in Tripoli - the last European embassy in the city - is closed and its staff repatriated due to security concerns. Egyptian jets bomb Islamic State targets in Libya, a day after the group there released a video showing the beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians. Over six months of fighting between two Parliaments, their respective Governments and allied militias have led to the brink of all-out war. The most likely medium-term prospect “is not one side’s triumph, but that rival local warlords and radical groups will proliferate, what remains of state institutions will collapse, financial reserves (based on oil and gas revenues and spent on food 9 and refined fuel imports) will be depleted, and hardship for ordinary Libyans will increase exponentially”. To this day, the UN Secretary General reports that armed hostilities spread to the country’s northwest, the eastern oil crescent area and to the southern region. In the east, fighting intensified in Benghazi, causing the breakdown of much of the city’s public services, resulting in severe shortages in the supply of food and medicine. The continued indiscriminate shelling and use of air assets against targets in heavily populated areas and strategic installations across the country underscores the growing plight of the civilian population and the systematic destruction of much of the country’s vital infrastructure. The closure of much of Libyan airspace to commercial flights, combined with an escalation in fighting across different parts of the country and diminished State capacity to provide basic services, aggravated the humanitarian crisis triggered over the summer months by the outbreak of violence in July 2014 and the gradual breakdown of law and order across the country. A video released by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) showing the mass beheading of 21 men in February, reportedly near Sirte, preceded by a spate of terrorist attacks targeting public buildings and foreign embassies, including those of Algeria, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, underscored the consolidation of power by extremist and terror-linked groups in the east and their increased visibility in other areas. 2014-2015 and the Geneva Talks under impulse of UN Special Representative B. Leon 10 Four years since the start of the revolution on 17 February 2011, the country’s faltering political process has brought Libya dangerously close to complete civil war. The continued presence and consolidation of parallel executive and legislative bodies has contributed to the further weakening of the Libyan State and its social fabric. 2014 has seen violence increase again, with multiple bombardment and attacks on civilian infrastructure. At least 1,000 Libyans have died, many of them non-combatants; and internally displaced persons have increased from 100,000 to 400,000. The fledging post-Qadhafi state is dramatic: basic goods and fuel are in short supply; in some urban areas people do not have reliable access to communications or electricity and are using firewood for cooking. The likelihood of major militia offensives in cities like Benghazi raises the spectre of humanitarian disaster. Libya also faces the prospect of insolvency within the next few years as a result of falling oil revenue and faltering economic governance. As the crisis has deepened, the positions of the rival camps have hardened, and their rhetoric has become more incendiary. Libyans, who united to overthrow Qadhafi in 2011, vow for support from regional patrons by casting their dispute in terms of Islamism and anti-Islamism or revolution and counter-revolution. The conflict’s reality, however, is a much more complex, multi-layered struggle over the nation’s political and economic structure that has no military solution. A negotiated resolution is the only way forward, but the window is closing fast. The two rounds of talks the UN hosted in Geneva over January 2015 mark a breakthrough: for the first time since September 2014, representatives of factions comprising the two main rival blocs met and tentatively agreed to a new framework that will at least extend the talks. The talks’ chief success so far has been to bring individuals representing a wide array of Libyan factions together, as inclusiveness is the only viable basis for a sustainable solution. Personalities loosely associated with the two camps have also attended, but as individuals. Neither camp’s purported representatives could be said to have gone to Geneva with the genuine blessing of its official institutions (parliament or government). Additionally, some members view the UN initiative to bring other parties, such as municipal councils, to the table as an affront to their 11 legitimacy; senior HoR members have said they will oppose any deal that puts in question the body’s authority. The road is long, and there will be setbacks, for example if parties refuse to participate or pull out; the General National Council (GNC) in Tripoli only belatedly agreed to participate in the talks, while the Tobruk-based House of Representative (HoR) announced it was suspending its participation in them on 23 February. Yet, this is the only political game in town and the only hope that a breakdown into open warfare can be avoided. V. Neighbouring countries Neighbours are deeply involved in the crisis but also deeply divided. Egypt, Chad and Niger are in favour of the current House of Representatives; Sudan leans toward the GNC; Algeria and Tunisia are neutral and try to broker negotiations. Qatar and Turkey are closer to the GNC, though Ankara has publicly called on all sides to negotiate. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have helped the rebels politically and militarily. Tunisia and Algeria are working in tandem for a negotiated solution (Algeria’s own considerations are largely driven by concern about securing its border with Libya and opposition to a new international military intervention, championed by France in southern Libya). All claim to want to assist the UN’s efforts in Geneva. It is commonly argued that a unified Libyan government, envisioned as a broad tent that would exclude Islamic radicals, would be most effective in combatting terrorism, to which Cairo is sensitive after IS killed 21 of its citizens in mid-February. The conflict has left Libya’s security institutions with little or no capacity to secure the country’s borders, giving rise to increased opportunities for the movement of extremist groups, transnational organized crime and illegal smuggling of migrants. Fighting between Libyan factions has also 12 sparked several incidents at or close to border crossing points, most notably attacks on the Ras Jdair border area between Libya and Tunisia. Gaddafi’s Libya was a bastion of stability in a volatile region. Its borders were relatively wellcontrolled and Gaddafi could turn into a constructive actor in peace agreements in Mali and Niger. Libya not only provided much needed foreign direct investment to neighbouring Sahel countries, but was also a source of employment for people from nearby and faraway African countries. A joint Arab and Sahel agenda for Libya is hence not likely to materialise soon. While the neighbours all have legitimate security concerns about the chaos and the opportunities it affords radical groups (whether pre-existing or new, such as Ansar Sharia or emerging IS-affiliated ones), many have traditional allies in Libya that are as likely to manipulate them (and powers further afield) as they are to be influenced by them. Moreover, for some Gulf states in particular, the approach has little to do with direct security threats, but more with ideology and regional rifts, notably over what role Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood will play in Libya and whether they will use its wealth to support like-minded movements elsewhere. The international community has to apply a regional focus that goes beyond narrow counterterrorism efforts and works with different types of actors to restore local governance structures and offers livelihood opportunities. Without such a focus, the armed Islamist forces expelled from Northern Mali will establish new rear-guard bases elsewhere, including in the Southern Libyan region of Fezzan. Without a new approach, current stabilization efforts will not be sustainable. The international community will put out a fire one place, only for it to reignite elsewhere in the region until the process has gone full circle and goes back to where it first started. VI. The rise of ISIS 13 Already attested by the rise of radical groups – with the beheading of 21 Egyptians and deadly bombings by the Libyan franchise of the Islamic State (IS), extremist groups will find fertile ground, while regional involvement – evidenced by retaliatory Egyptian airstrikes – will increase. ISIS first announced its presence in Libya is October 2014, when a video appeared online showing a large group of militants in Derna pledging their allegiance to ISIS’ leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi. ISIS is allegedly responsible for over 15 terrorist attacks in the past 6 months. The city has a long history of Islamist radicalism: marginalized during the Gadhafi era, it contributed more foreign fighters per capita to al Qaeda in Iraq than any other town in the Middle East. It has also provided scores of fighters for ISIS in Syria. VII. Conclusion and Recommendations In truth, the most and the least promising features of post-Qadhafi Libya stem from a single reality. Because the country lacks a fully functioning state, effective army or police, local actors – notables, civilian and military councils, revolutionary brigades – have stepped in to provide safety, mediate disputes and impose ceasefires. It is past time to reverse the tide, reform army and police and establish structures of a functioning state that can ensure implementation of ceasefire agreements and tackle root causes of conflict. 14 Actors with a stake in Libya’s future should seize on the UN’s January diplomatic breakthrough in Geneva that points to a possible peaceful way out; but to get a deal between Libyan factions – the best base from which to counter jihadist – they must take more decisive and focused supportive action than they yet have. To succeed, according to the ICG, diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict need a push from the “P3+5”, the countries and international institutions most involved to date: three Security Council permanent members – the UK, U.S. and France – plus Germany, Italy, Spain, the EU and the UN itself. The P3+5 face a choice in how to deal with boycotters and other potential spoilers. They can continue to opt for the ambiguity in their current course: supporting the House of Representatives’ legitimacy claim; sending strong signals they disapprove of its actions; but doing nothing about it. The current ambiguity reflects genuine differences among the Security Council’s five permanent members, hence what can be achieved through the UN. Russia and to some extent France are signalling they would block any sanctions, particularly on General Haftar, that could undermine the HoR camp; the U.S. and UK have indicat- ed to the HoR that their support is contingent on more inclusive, de-escalatory be- haviour; China has avoided taking a position. What can be done internationally will thus necessarily be limited; for now, efforts should focus on building on the UN talks and strengthening existing instruments to contain the conflict. The International Crisis Group, leading think tank of the field, recommends to following to the Security Council: “Insist on participation in the UN-led negotiations and on behaviour on the ground, notably adherence to ceasefires and calls to de-escalate. Be more forthright in confronting regional actors who contribute to the conflict by providing arms or other military or political support – notably Chad, Egypt, Qatar, Sudan, Turkey 15 and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and encourage them to press their Libyan allies to negotiate in good faith in pursuit of a political settlement. Military intervention on counter-terrorism grounds, as requested by Egypt, would torpedo the political process, and for now should be opposed. Devise, without prejudice to the UN’s efforts to achieve reconciliation, political and military strategies to fight terrorism in coordination with Libyan political forces from both camps but refrain from supporting outside military intervention to combat the IS. Keep in place the UN arms embargo, expressly reject its full or partial lifting and strengthen its implementation to the extent possible Consider UN sanctions against individuals only if so advised by the Secretary-General and his representative. Protect the neutrality and independence of financial and petroleum institutions: the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), the National Oil Company (NOC) and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA); and ensure that these manage the national wealth to address the basic needs of the people and contribute to a negotiated political solution.” VIII. Questions a Resolution should answer The main task of this committee will be to evaluate the current stand of international law on the Right of Sabotage, taking into account both the possibility of increased space militarization through the permission of Anti-Satellite Missiles, and the topic of orbital debris. “Because all space systems, whether civil or military, are subject to the threat or damage from orbital debris, States need to consider what international norms, laws and agreements may be needed to protect all space systems” (Secure World) The main questions that a resolution in the Security Council should answer are: 16 Does the operating country of a satellite have a right to shoot down its own satellites without consultation with other operators, that may result affected by the orbital debris caused? How should countries developing Anti-Satellite Missiles technology build trust and accountability with its partners to guarantee the peaceful objectives of their programs? Should satellites be placed under international control? How would such a system look like? IX. Literature David, Leonard: “China’s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud circles Earth, Space.com, 2 February 2007 Hartman, Pierre; Hosenball, Neil: “The Dilemmas of Outer Space Law”, American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1974) Kaufman, Marc; Linzer, Dafna: “China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test”, Washington Post, 19 January 2007 Mushkat, M.: “New Developments in Outer Space Law and their role in increasing International Security”, Max-Planck-Istitut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1970) NASA Orbital Debris Program Office: Frequently Asked Questions, Last Updated: March 2012, Accessed on April 2015. < http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html#16> Office of Science and Technology Policy: Interagency Report on Orbital Debris, November 1995, URL < http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/IAR_95_Document.pdf> 17 Secure World: “Space Law and Policy”, Last updated: July 2013, Accessed on: April 2015, URL: < http://swfound.org/our-focus/space-law-and-policy/#> Vignard, Kerstin: Prologue. Making Space for Security, Disarmament Forum (2003) Wolff, Johannes: “‘Peaceful uses’ of outer space has permitted its militarization – does it also mean its weaponization?”, Making Space for Security?, Disarmament Forum (2003) United Nations: “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies”, 10 October 1967, United Nations: “Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects launched into Outer Space”, 3 December 1968 United Nations: “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects”, 29 March 1972 United Nations: “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies”, 11 July 1984 X. For further research United Nations Secretary General Report to the Security Council on the UN support Mission in Libya S 2015/144, February 2015 Special report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of the United Nations presence in Libya, S/2015 113, February 2015 International Crisis Group, Middle East and Africa, Divided We Stand, Libya’s Enduring Conflicts, September 2012, ICG Security Council Report 18 21 Christians Egyptians killed by IS, Testimonial ISIS comes to Libya, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi speech, CNN 19
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