1. society
2. crime

The Harper Revolution in
Criminal Justice Policy…
and What Comes Next
justice
Anthony N. Doob and Cheryl M. Webster
Fundamental beliefs about the nature of crime and
what public policy can do about it informed Canada’s
criminal justice policies for decades. Stephen Harper’s
Conservative government broke with that consensus,
with serious consequences. However, the next
government, whatever the party, can find grounds for
a new consensus on some grounds and the basis for
constructive change.
Quel que soit le parti au pouvoir, la justice pénale
canadienne reposait depuis des décennies sur des valeurs
fondamentales quant à la nature de la criminalité et aux
moyens de la combattre. Ce consensus a été brisé de
maintes façons par le gouvernement Harper, non sans
lourdes conséquences. Mais au moins dans certains
domaines, le prochain gouvernement, peu importe sa
couleur, aura l’occasion de rebâtir un nouveau consensus
fondé sur des changements constructifs.
F
or most of Canada’s history, a broad consensus
existed on the principles that should govern criminal justice reform, though there were always disagreements about details. The consensus is evident through
statements from cabinet ministers, government reports,
royal commission reports and criminal justice experts.
This shared vision ended in 2006. In this essay we suggest that the next government might initiate a renewal of
the criminal justice system. It could readily identify broad
principles that would raise little controversy. Then, rather than making piecemeal changes, it could review large
areas of the criminal justice system, instituting changes
that reflect broad integrated knowledge of current problems, long-standing Canadian values and empirical knowAnthony N. Doob is a professor emeritus of criminology at
the University of Toronto. Cheryl M. Webster is an associate
professor of criminology at the University of Ottawa.
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ledge. Such an approach requires only the will to create a
fair, efficient and effective criminal justice system.
The pre-2006 consensus is illustrated by the quiz that
appears on the next page. For each statement, try to guess
the speaker’s party, and roughly when the statement was
made. But be warned, it’s hard, because the consensus was so
widely shared and long-lasting. The core of that consensus
consisted of four pillars:
Social conditions matter. Before 2006, involvement in
crime was understood as not simply about choices that individuals make. Rather, it was also a product of the social
conditions in which people live. Quotations 1-6 illustrate
this belief. Governments struggled with criminal justice
issues but understood that solutions to crime largely lay
elsewhere. In fact, the long-term protection of society was
seen as best served through crime prevention.
Harsh punishments do not reduce crime. An impressive
quantity of research demonstrates that governments c­ annot
the quiz
1)
“I want to congratulate the minister for realizing at last
that crime is not just a sordid happening but rather a result
of human behaviour brought about by our economic and
social conditions which we have failed to change.”
9) “It is the Committee’s view that in all cases where there has been
no finding of dangerousness, sentences of imprisonment should
be imposed only where protection of society clearly requires such
penalty…The Committee wishes to emphasize the danger of
overestimating the necessity for and the value of long terms of
imprisonment except in special circumstances…The Committee
maintains that imprisonment or confinement should be used
only as an ultimate resort when all other alternatives have failed.”
2)
“Crime prevention means recognizing connections between
the crime rate and the unemployment rate, between how
a child behaves at school and whether that kid has had a
hot meal that day. In the final analysis crime prevention
has as much to do with [the Minister of] Finance, [the
Minister of] Industry, and [the Minister of] Human
Resources Development, as it does with [the Minister at] the
Department of Justice. To some people, crime prevention
is code language for going soft on crime. I don’t care what
they say. I am interested in what works. It is easy to bring
a crowd to its feet by demanding harsh retribution for the
most brutal of murderers.”
10) “In awarding sentences, preference should be given to the
least restrictive alternative adequate and appropriate in the
circumstances.”
3)
“If locking up those who violate the law contributed to safer
societies, then the United States should be the safest country
in the world. In fact, the United States affords a glaring
example of the limited impact that criminal justice responses
may have on crime.”
12) “All available sanctions other than custody that are
reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all
young persons, with special attention to the circumstances
of aboriginal young persons.”
4)
“A safe society depends on strong crime prevention efforts
as well as traditional justice responses. At the heart of [our]
policies on crime is the belief that a safer society is one
where crime is not only punished but prevented.”
13) “The Committee further believes that, except where to do
so would place the community at undue risk, the correction
of the offender should take place in the community and
imprisonment should be used with restraint.”
5)
“The best solution to crime problems is a strong, growing
economy that provides more jobs and opportunity. However, if
Canada is to have the safest communities in the world, we must
also make sure that criminals are caught and properly dealt with,
that victims of crime are given the help and respect they deserve
and that everything possible is being done to prevent crime in
the first place. Canadians have been saying for many years now
that the justice system is too soft on criminals and too hard on
victims. We agree. Our plan includes measures to ensure that
criminals get the punishment they deserve and victims get the
respect and treatment they deserve. At the same time, we must
be realistic in recognizing that an ounce of crime prevention
is worth a pound of cure. Keeping young people in school,
early intervention in the lives of young people in trouble, and
education of young people in general about the consequences of
crime do more to prevent crime than any other kinds of action.”
14) “Imprisonment is generally viewed as of limited use in
controlling crime through deterrence, incapacitation
and reformation, while being extremely costly in human
and dollar terms…Reducing our dependency on prisons
is needed to achieve greater effectiveness, balance, and
restraint in our system.”
11) “All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are
reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all
offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of
aboriginal offenders.”
15) “The undeniable responsibility of the state to those held
in its custody is to see that they are not returned to
freedom worse than when they were taken in charge. This
responsibility has been officially recognized in Canada for
nearly a century but, although recognized, it has not been
discharged. The evidence before the Commission convinced
us that there are very few, if any, prisoners who enter our
penitentiaries who do not leave them worse members of
society than when they entered them.”
6) “There was a lot of agreement that we can’t just continue to
build more jails… We have to get into the social aspects that
contribute to crime.”
16) “The use of incarceration in Canada has become a concern
on a number of levels...Incarceration costs approximately
10 to 15 times as much...as community-based [sanctions]...
At the same time as there are concerns about the costs
... doubts about its value are also prevalent...Correctional
administrators consistently report that a large proportion of
persons in their jails do not belong there.”
7) “Research indicates that criminal sanctions have only
a limited effect in terms of some of their traditionallyinvoked objectives, such as rehabilitation, deterrence and
incapacitation.”
17) “Non-violent provincial inmates should be out of jail and
working in the community…I think that there are other ways
of dealing with some of the criminal activity that goes on
that are more effective than putting a person in jail.”
8)
18) “If the punishment of the offender is the only object society
should have in view, the Penitentiaries of Canada fully meet
the requirements. They are old-time prisons dominated by
the idea that, not only should the offender be punished
by being deprived of his liberty and confined by iron bars
and stone walls, but the avenging hand of the law he
has violated should continue to bear heavily upon him
in his place of incarceration…Viewed from the economic
standpoint, the reformation of the convict is a matter of
prime importance to the State. The prison of punishment is
the most expensive prison to maintain.”
POLICY OPTIONS
“Certainty of punishment, and more especially certainty
that the sentence imposed by the judge will be carried out,
is of more consequence in the prevention of crime than the
severity of the sentence.”
(SEE PAGE 31 FOR ANSWERS)
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MAY-JUNE 2015
25
Anthony N. Doob and Cheryl M. Webster
measurably affect crime rates by increasing punishments. Previous governments
understood this reality (quotations 7-8)
and policy-makers did not expect prisons to reduce crime (quotations 9-14).
Indeed, the emphasis was on attempting to ensure that prisoners were not
released in worse shape than when they
entered (quotations 15-18). Unsurprisingly, restraint in the use of imprisonment was uncontroversial. When the
Liberal government released a policy
document in 1982 promoting this principle, it was criticized by a Globe and Mail
columnist as repeating mere “motherhood” statements. The Conservatives
reprinted the Liberal policy document
in 1989, making one change: the preface
with Jean Chrétien’s signature (as justice
minister) disappeared.
Development of criminal justice policies should be informed by expert knowledge. Ministers and governments had
priorities, and changes were typically a
result of discussions about priorities and
policies. Details of public policies were
largely left to professional, experienced
experts under the direction of their
political masters. Broad consultation
was required. Evidence mattered. Consensus across stakeholders (federal and
provincial as well as public and private)
was sought. As a result, development
of criminal justice policies would often
be conducted by royal commissions,
government-appointed committees or
parliamentary committees, and they
took time to ensure a comprehensive
examination of the issues. With such a
broad-based approach, criminal justice
policy was seldom the source of partisan divide, and work begun under one
government was often completed by another. Notably, some of the ideas in the
1990 Conservative policy documents on
sentencing and corrections — leading to,
among other things, the Corrections and
Conditional Release Act — can be traced to
studies initiated by Liberal governments.
The Conservatives didn’t hesitate to say
so. “Although the recommendations of
these studies sometimes diverged,” wrote
the Conservative justice minister and solicitor general in 1990, “there has been
a large measure of consensus on needed
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OPTIONS POLITIQUES
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changes that the government can draw
on. While the options proposed in this
document are the responsibility of the
government, it is important to recognize the significant debt the next step
in criminal justice reform owes to these
preparatory analyses.” That statement
wasn’t controversial.
Changes in the criminal law should
address real problems. Politics has always
been a concern in the development of
criminal justice policies — as it should
be in a democracy — but under the old
consensus, politics only occasionally was the predominant concern. For
example, in 1986 the Conservative
government introduced legislation to
block the release of certain offenders after they had served two-thirds of their
sentences. Although plainly counterproductive because it means that those
deemed most likely to commit serious
violent crimes are released without any
supervision when their sentence expires, this legislation was prompted by
a high-profile murder by someone on
“early” release. The political need to be
seen to be doing something trumped
good policy.
Similarly, the Liberal government
introduced mandatory minimum sentences for some gun crimes in 1995 to
soften opposition to its proposed longgun registry. Although it understood
that harsher sanctions do not reduce
criminal activity, political need (to gain
support for the Bill) outweighed good
policy. But these examples stand out
because they were relatively rare. Most
criminal justice policy changes had obvious policy goals. Policy changes were
even made when a political analysis
would suggest there was political risk
and nothing to be gained. This happened in 1982 and again in 2002, when
major reforms of youth justice were
legislated by Liberal governments. And
it happened in 1992, when a Progressive
Conservative government passed the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act,
which governs imprisonment. For the
most part, it was understood that “good
­government” included expending effort
on criminal justice issues that weren’t
necessarily vote-getters.
Shutterstock
JUSTICE
An impressive quantity of research demonstrates that
governments cannot measurably affect crime rates by
increasing punishments.
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27
Anthony N. Doob and Cheryl M. Webster
It is hard to
believe that
anyone is
fully happy
with Canada’s
sentencing
system.
W
hen Stephen Harper’s government assumed power, the old
consensus crumbled. In its place, a new
vision of the role of the criminal justice
system in Canadian society was adopted
that defied the basic elements on which
consensus had rested for over a century.
Crime can be solved through the criminal justice system. While crime prevention is occasionally mentioned, current
criminal justice policies are almost exclusively focused on harsh punishment
as the primary vehicle to control crime.
Restraint in the use of the criminal law
or imprisonment has disappeared. While
the Harper government has generally
avoided stating the rationale underlying
its choice of crime policy domains, it
has occasionally expressed a clear belief
in the efficacy of punishment. As Harper
himself said in 2014, “We said ‘do the
crime, do the time.’ We have said that
through numerous pieces of legislation.
We are enforcing that. And on our watch
the crime rate is finally moving in the
right direction, the crime rate is finally
moving down in this country.”
As figure 1 suggests, the Prime Minister’s statement took advantage of a
pre-existing trend, and the continued drop
in crime rates had nothing to do with his
policies. The beginning of his government
(2005) is marked with a vertical line.
Crime is exclusively a matter of individual choice. The Harper policies involve
much more than increased penalties.
Rather, they represent an explicit attempt
to create divisions among Canadians:
offenders are not the product of social
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circumstances but are inherently bad
people who should be permanently distinguished from law-abiding citizens. As
reported in the Toronto Star in February
2011, referring to the 421 percent increase in the cost of applying for a pardon, Harper’s public safety minister simply explained that “ordinary Canadians
should not be having to foot the bill for a
criminal asking for a pardon.” This statement not only neatly divides Canadians
into two distinct groups but also ignores
the Public Safety Canada data that suggest that 21.2 percent of Canadian males
and 3.9 percent of females over age 12
have criminal records. Over 95 percent of
those receiving pardons never reoffend.
Gone is any real attempt to reintegrate offenders or any belief in the practice. Being
an “offender” is seemingly a permanent
identity. Not surprisingly, pardons are no
longer available for many offences, even
some that carry relatively low maximum
(18-month) sentences.
Similarly, the normative assertion
that “they” have forfeited the claim to
have their interests or human rights
taken into account also appears to be
increasingly considered an appropriate
consequence of wrongful behaviour.
One need only recall Harper’s 2006
election promise to work toward a constitutional amendment to take the vote
away from federal prisoners.
Further, the punitive effect of legislation on disadvantaged people is either
ignored or desired. A bill introduced in
March 2015 would restrict some offenders serving penitentiary sentences
for sexual or violent offences to six
months of supervised “statutory release” rather than the current one-third
of the sentence. The government’s own
data demonstrate that 32 percent of
non-Aboriginal women but 54 percent
of Aboriginal women are at risk of serving more time in penitentiary under
this proposal. For men, 46 percent of
non-Aboriginal prisoners might serve
longer sentences, as compared with 61
percent of Aboriginal offenders. So this
bill would increase the already disproportionate imprisonment of Aboriginal
people in Canada: Aboriginal people
constitute about 3 to 4 percent of the
population of Canada but 23 percent of
the men and 33 percent of the women
in Canada’s penitentiaries.
The government would have
known about the Bill’s disproportionate impact on Aboriginal people. The
data are publicly available in government reports and demonstrate similar disproportionate effects of current
policies on Aboriginal people. In this
context, it is little wonder that Harper sees the large number of missing
and murdered Aboriginal women as
a crime problem, not a sociological
phenomenon, and he is not — unlike his predecessors — interested in
looking for systemic solutions. Much
has changed, it seems, since the 1968
Conservative platform of Robert Stanfield, which stated that “one of the
greatest blots on Canada’s reputation
for fairness and equity is the condition of [Canada’s Aboriginal people]…
It is a problem that should touch the
conscience of all Canadians.”
Crime legislation is developed largely
by politicians, without advice from those
knowledgeable in criminal justice policy.
It is not coincidental that the recourse to government or government-­
appointed commissions and committees — with their emphasis on extensive consultation, evidence-based recommendations and broad consensus
across stakeholders — has all but dried
up. Other than one discredited 2007
report on federal imprisonment, there
have been no broad policy documents.
Meaningful debate and broad examination of legislative bills have been
severely truncated. Notably, many of
the criminal justice initiatives have
been passed without serious discussion of costs. Rather than thoroughly reviewing broad policy fields and
introducing comprehensive reforms,
the current government constantly
fiddles and tweaks.
The government’s signature justice
reform — the creation of mandatory
minimum sentences — follows this
pattern. If the government believes, in
fact, that sentences in general are too
lenient, it could review sentencing generally and consider broad reforms that
Total reported crime per 1,000 residents (n)
100
Nontraffic
crime
80
2.5
2.0
1.5
Homicides
1.0
20
0.5
0
1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
would accomplish its policy goals. But
it has declined to do so. Instead, it has
introduced one mandatory minimum
after another, often in response to
headlines somewhere in Canada, with
no apparent consideration of the cumulative effect of these changes on the coherence of sentencing or the operation
of the courts. Nor, for that matter, has
the government taken into account
the extensive research demonstrating
the ineffectiveness of mandatory minimum sanctions in reducing crime.
Crime policy has become increasingly politicized. So far, the Harper government has introduced 90 criminal
justice bills, including two multipart
“omnibus” bills. The sheer number
has ensured that the underlying message that offenders are inherently bad
people is heard repeatedly. Hence, one
of the most obvious manifestations of
the centrality of political calculation is
the government’s piecemeal approach
to reform. Sometimes changes are consequential but almost always they are
focused on a few specific matters —
some of which do not appear (empirically) to even be problems. Consider
the changes that the government has
introduced to parole and other forms
of release of federal prisoners into the
community:
• The government made general changes to attempt to restrict parole. Yet,
3.0
60
40
evidence demonstrates that if full
parole were completely abolished
for those serving ordinary sentences,
Canada’s imprisonment rate would
increase by only 2.7 percent.
• It abolished the “faint hope” clause
whereby those serving life sentences
could have their parole ineligibility
period reduced by a jury. About six
people a year received shorter parole
ineligibility periods under this law.
• A form of presumptive parole was
abolished.
• Consecutive parole ineligibility periods were introduced for multiple
murderers.
• Legislation permitting sentences of
“life in prison without parole” was
introduced.
• Legislation restricting presumptive
release of prisoners at the two-thirds
point in their sentences was introduced.
Notably, these initiatives were
contained in six separate bills over a
six-year period, so Parliament had no
opportunity to examine conditional
release of prisoners as a whole. But six
bills meant six times as many opportunities to communicate the government’s
message — that it is on the side of good
people and is making life unpleasant
for bad people — than it would have
had if only one comprehensive bill had
been introduced.
xxx
3.5
Homicides per 100,000 residents (n)
Source: Statistics Canada.
120
Harper Government
Figure 1.
Crime and Homicide
Rates, Canada, 19602012
0.0
Even more illustrative is the plethora
of reforms that can only be described as
minor, trivial or redundant. In 2006, the
Harper government introduced legislation increasing the (Liberal-imposed)
mandatory minimum sentences for firsttime violent offences with a handgun or
prohibited weapon (but not a shotgun or
rifle) from four to five years. The suggestion — it seems — is that people will be
deterred by a possible five-year sentence
but not a four-year sentence.
In 2014 the government introduced
the Justice for Animals in Service Act
(Quanto’s Law), named for a police dog
killed in service. It would create a new
offence of killing or maiming a police
or military animal, notwithstanding the
fact that comparable laws already exist.
The announcement was made by the
Prime Minister himself, with his wife
and cabinet minister Rona Ambrose also
in attendance. Similarly, a new aggravating factor in sentencing was created in
2012 with the Protecting Canada’s Seniors Act, which requires consideration of
“evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering
their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation.” Those 24 words constitute the entire substance of the bill.
We doubt that there is a judge anywhere
who wasn’t already considering the vulnerability of victims. The government
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29
120
and Cheryl M. Webster
Source: Statistics Canada.
100
80
60
40
20
0
1955
suggested that “this legislation would
further support our Government’s common front to combat elder abuse in all
forms…The interests of law-abiding citizens should always be placed ahead of
those of criminals.” While arguably a
means of attracting targeted voters, this
approach ignores the need for comprehensive, thoughtful bills.
T
here is little doubt that fundamental differences exist between the
Harper government’s vision for the
criminal justice system and the one
rooted in the consensus that preceded
it. Bridging these divides seems unlikely. However, we would argue that a new
agenda for Canadian criminal justice
policy is still well within our reach.
The next government need not
panic. Notwithstanding the many
uncoordinated changes since 2006, and
contrary to the worst fears of critics,
incarceration rates have not increased
dramatically (see figure 2).
If we look at the evidence presented
in figure 1, Canada has neither a crime
crisis nor, so far, an imprisonment crisis.
Notwithstanding recent divisive approaches to criminal justice policy, we
are confident that a few basic principles
that almost certainly are consistent with
the values of most Canadians could form
the basis for systematic reform of the
criminal justice system.
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Harper Government
Adult prisoners per 100,000 residents (n)
Figure
2.
Anthony
N. Doob
Adult imprisonment
Rate, Canada, 19552010
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1) Prosecutions should be effective,
fair and efficient. It is hard to believe
that this suggestion could be controversial. However, there is evidence
that mandatory minimum sentences
disrupt the prosecution process. Substantial numbers of people charged
with criminal offences who are in
jeopardy of losing their liberty or
livelihood cannot afford lawyers.
People wait months, if not years, to
have their cases heard. Decisions on
pretrial release that used to be concluded in one hearing now take days.
2) The criminal justice system’s response to wrongdoing — and sentences in
particular — should be proportional to the
seriousness of the offence.
3) Governments have a responsibility
to focus resources on prevention. Medical
interventions early in life (e.g., visits
by prenatal public health nurses to atrisk families) improve a child’s physical health and reduce later criminal
behaviour. School policies and practices can be shaped to reduce violence.
We can invest in preventing crime or
we can invest in imprisoning more
people. It costs more to imprison one
person for a year than it does to hire
one teacher or one police officer or
one visiting public health nurse.
It is hard to imagine that many
people would argue against effective
prosecution, proportional response to
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
crime and a serious focus on prevention. Within this context, we would
suggest that rather than tinkering with
individual sections of laws, Canada
should look broadly at our criminal
justice system, guided by our history
and by evidence. A government could
examine areas such as the following:
• Bail and the pre-sentence custody problem. Of all prisoners in Canada, 35
percent are awaiting trial (that is 55
percent of all provincial prisoners).
Using existing research, thoughtful
cooperation between the provinces
and the federal government could
address this problem effectively.
• Court processing and court delay. Accused people, witnesses, police officers and court personnel waste
an enormous amount of time and
money with unproductive court appearances. Even simple cases often
take months to be completed. Ten
years ago, the federal department
of justice worked with its provincial
counterparts on this issue. There is
a substantial amount known about
the problem, which would point to
effective solutions.
• Sentencing. It is hard to believe that
anyone is fully happy with Canada’s
sentencing system. The 1996 sentencing provisions constituted a good
first step. However, more steps are
needed. Canada could learn from
table 1.
Outcomes of adults
Released on Parole from
Penitentiaries, Canada,
2011-12 and 2012-13
Source: Public Safety Canada, 2013.
Full parole
2011-12
2012-13
Day parole
2011-12
2012-13
Total number of adults charged with
violent offences in Canada
150,044
150,371
150,044
150,371
Number of people on parole revoked
for a violent offence (%)
7 (0.5)
3 (0.3)
7 (0.3)
4 (0.1)
Number of people on parole revoked
for a nonviolent offence (%)
70 (5.4)
39 (3.3)
44 (1.7)
45 (1.5)
Number of people on parole revoked
for violating a condition of release (%)
200 (15.4)
134 (11.3)
268 (10.3)
282 (9.2)
Number of successful completions of
parole (%)
1,022 (78.7)
1,014 (85.2)
2,275 (87.7)
2,749 (89.3)
Total number of people completing
this type of parole (%)
1,299 (100)
1,190 (100)
2,594 (100)
3,080 (100)
the experiences in other countries
on how sentencing decisions might
best be structured.
• Penitentiaries. In 1989, the Correctional Service of Canada created a
mission statement that included
two “core values,” which appear
to have been forgotten: “We respect the dignity of individuals,
the rights of all members of soci-
ety, and the potential for human
growth and development,” and
“We recognize that the offender has the potential to live as a
law-abiding citizen.” In the past
five years, an average of 5,116 recently sentenced prisoners entered
Canada’s penitentiaries. On average, 53 prisoners per year die from
all causes in federal penitentiaries.
Quiz answers
1. Conservative justice critic Eldon Woolliams, responding to the (Liberal) Solicitor
General, House of Commons, 1972.
2. Allan Rock, Liberal justice minister, 1995.
3. (Conservative-dominated) Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor
General, February 1993.
4. Liberal Party of Canada platform, 1997.
5. Progressive Conservative Party of Canada platform, 1997.
6. Conservative MP (and former RCMP officer) Bob Horner, February 1993.
7. Sentencing. Liberal government, February 1984.
8. John A. Macdonald, 1871.
9. Canadian Committee on Corrections, 1969.
10. Criminal Law in Canadian Society, Liberal government policy statement,
August 1982.
11. Criminal Code of Canada, section 718.2 (1996-present).
12. Youth Criminal Justice Act, section 38(2)(d) (2003-present).
13. Taking Responsibility, House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and
the Solicitor General (Conservative-dominated committee chaired by Conservative
David Daubney), 1988.
14. Conservative Justice Minister (Kim Campbell) and Solicitor General (Pierre
Cadieux), preface to government policy statement, 1990.
15. Royal Commission to Investigate the Penal System of Canada, 1938.
16. Neilsen Task Force investigating federal programs for the Conservative
government, 1985.
17. Brian Evans, Alberta justice minister in Conservative premier Ralph Klein’s
government, 1996.
18. Royal Commission on Penitentiaries, 1914.
xxx
The rest return to the community.
It is in everyone’s interest to ensure
their effective reintegration. Those
“lost” core values might constitute
a starting point.
• Parole and other forms of release from
prison. Parole and related issues have
been the target of piecemeal legislation. A thoughtful review of Canadian practices might help us learn
from our successes. Those released on
parole from Canada’s penitentiaries
are responsible for almost no crime
(table 1). Of the roughly 150,000
adults charged in Canada with a violent offence, very few (7 in 2012-13;
14 in 2011-12) were on some form
of parole. Unsuccessful paroles relate
largely to violations of conditions of
release, not reoffending.
These areas are examples of what
any government that is interested in
creating a fair, efficient and effective criminal justice system might do.
None is easy. Achieving a consensus
will be a challenge. But in the past
50 years, we have accumulated substantial knowledge on the operation
of the criminal justice system. A government motivated to make improvements could show leadership and, in
cooperation with the provinces, move
Canada’s criminal justice system in a
direction of which most Canadians
would approve. n
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