PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT INTO PRASA RAIL REAR-END COLLISION AT DENVER STATION OPERATOR PRASA PERMIT NUMBER ASP0002NTS INVESTIGATION SUBJECT PRASA Rail Denver Station rear-end collision DATE OF OCCURRENCE 28 April 2015 REFERENCE NUMBER Head of Occurrence Investigations Preliminary Investigation Report RSR/20150428/011 Thanduxolo Fumbata Page 1 of 7 CONTENTS 1. ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ 3 2. STATEMENT OF INTENT ........................................................................... 3 3. OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................. 3 4. SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION ............................................................. 3 5. BACKGROUND TO THE INVESTIGATION ................................................ 4 5. GEORGE GOCH SIGNAL CABIN FACT FINDING ..................................... 5 6. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................... 6 Page 2 of 7 1. ABBREVIATIONS BOI Board of Inquiry CTC Centralised Traffic Control Km/h Kilometers per hour OHTE Overhead Traction Equipment Perway Permanent Way PRASA Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa RIC Rail Incident Commander RSR Railway Safety Regulator TCO Train Control Officer 2. STATEMENT OF INTENT This investigation has been conducted in accordance with section 38 of the Railway Safety Regulator Act, Act 16 of 2002 (as amended) and is conducted with the objective of determining the facts of the occurrence, the immediate cause and of making recommendations thereof. 3. OBJECTIVE The preliminary investigation’s objective is to collect and understand the factual data relating to this occurrence to assist the Board of Inquiry process. 4. SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION This preliminary investigation included the following: (a) Analysis of the occurrence site (b) Facts gathered from the Denver signal Control office Page 3 of 7 5. BACKGROUND TO THE INVESTIGATION 5.1 On the 28th April 2015 at approximately 07h12 PRASA Rail Business Express Train number 1602 collided into the rear of the Metro Plus Train number 0600 which had stopped at the platform at Denver Station. Both trains had departed from Pretoria Station at different times and were enroute to Park station when the collision occurred. 5.2 It was reported by the Train Control Officer at Signal Cabin that the driver of Train number 0600 stopped at the platform in Denver station because he could not confirm the signal DN11 aspect. 5.3 Train number 1602 coming from Cleveland direction collided into the rear of a stationary Train number 0600. The collision occurred in the morning under clear weather conditions. Extensive damage was caused to railway infrastructure and rolling stock. Figure 1 Showing damage to the collided trains Page 4 of 7 Figure 2 Showing damage to the collided trains 5. GEORGE GOCH SIGNAL CABIN FACT FINDING 5.1. The method of train control in the section from Cleveland station to Denver station is automatic colour light signals. 5.2. There were no faults reported in Denver on the day of the collision in relation to the colour light signalling. 5.3. According to the TCO at the Signal Cabin Metro Plus Train number 0600 passes Denver station at 07h09 and the Business Express Train number 1602 at 07h19. However neither of the trains was scheduled to stop at Denver Station. 5.4. There was a power outage at George Goch signal cabin which started at 01h30 on 28 April 2015. Upon investigation it was also established that the two way radio communication was not working. Page 5 of 7 5.5. As a result of the outage the driver of Train number 0600 could not establish direct communication with the signal cabin to confirm the signal aspect because their communication lines were down; the driver called Operations Control Centre in Braamfontein who then relayed the message to the TCO at George Goch signal cabin. 5.6. The Signal Technician estimated that Metro Plus Train number 0600 was stationary at the platform for approximately 5 minutes. During this period Business Express Train 1602 collided into the rear of the Metro Plus Train number 0600. 5.7. Metro Plus Train number 0600 was protected by Signal DN2 which was at danger (Red Signal). Signal DN1 which precedes DN2 was displaying a caution aspect (Yellow Signal). 5.8. However the Business Express Train number 1602 passed the Signal DN2 at Danger (Red Signal). 6. CONCLUSIONS 6.1. The preliminary investigation suggests that: 6.1.1 The driver of Business Express Train number 1602 passed the signal at danger (Red Signal). 6.1.2 The communication system including the two way radio system was not working. 6.2. The RSR will conduct an independent Board of Inquiry into the circumstances that led to this collision. The BOI will amongst other things scrutinize the following: 6.2.1 The adequacy, effectiveness and personnel knowledge of the relevant procedures and training. Page 6 of 7 6.2.2 Background regarding activities pertaining to adherence to, specifically applicable train operating procedures by the train drivers and the TCO concerned as set out in local instructions, General Appendix and other applicable directives. 6.2.3 The adequacy and effectiveness of maintenance systems and procedures for signals, perway and rolling stock. 6.2.4 The effectiveness of the implementation of RSR previous recommendations issued to the operator regarding similar type of occurrences; and 6.2.5 The risk profile of the train crew and previous occurrence history. 6.2.6 And any other information that will be relevant to the BOI. Page 7 of 7
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