1. No category

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT INTO
THE HEAD-ON COLLISION BETWEEN TFR TRAIN
No 4213 AND SHOSHOLOZA MEYL TRAIN No
47014
OPERATORS
TRANSNET FREIGHT RAIL AND PRASA
PERMIT NUMBER
ASP0001NTS & ASP0002NTS
INVESTIGATION SUBJECT
TFR-Shosholoza Meyl head-on train collision
DATE OF OCCURRENCE
20 May 2015
REFERENCE NUMBER
Head of Occurrence
Investigations
Preliminary Investigation Report
RSR/20150520/004
Thanduxolo Fumbata
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CONTENTS
1.
ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ 3
2.
STATEMENT OF INTENT ........................................................................... 3
3.
OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................. 3
4.
SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION ............................................................. 4
5.
BACKGROUND TO THE INVESTIGATION ................................................ 4
5.
CAMBRIDGE SIGNAL CONTROL OFFICE FACT FINDING ...................... 5
6.
CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................... 6
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1.
ABBREVIATIONS
BOI
Board of Inquiry
CTC
Centralised Traffic Control
Km/h
Kilometers per hour
OHTE
Overhead Traction Equipment
Perway
Permanent Way
PRASA
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa
RIC
Rail Incident Commander
RSR
Railway Safety Regulator
RTO
Radio Train Order
TCO
Train Control Officer
TFR
Transnet Freight Rail
2. STATEMENT OF INTENT
This investigation has been conducted in accordance with section 38 of the Railway
Safety Regulator Act, Act 16 of 2002 (as amended) and is conducted with the
objective of determining the facts of the occurrence, the immediate cause and of
making recommendations thereof.
3. OBJECTIVE
The preliminary investigation’s objective is to collect and understand the factual data
relating to this occurrence to assist with the Board of Inquiry process.
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4. SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION
This preliminary investigation included the following:
(a)
Analysis of the occurrence site.
(b)
Facts gathered from the Signal Control Office in Cambridge, East London.
5. BACKGROUND TO THE INVESTIGATION
5.1. On 20 May 2014 at approximately 11h30, TFR Train No. 4213 hauling cement
laden wagons from Queenstown to Cambridge, East London collided head-on
with Shosholoza Meyl long distance passenger train, Train No. 47014 which
was enroute from East London to Johannesburg. The collision occurred in a
section between Blaney and Southdown Stations in the Eastern Cape. As a
result of the collision the following fatalities and injuries were recorded:
5.2. There were 2 deceased and 8 injured operator employees. 3 passengers were
injured out of 35 passengers in the train at the time.
5.3. There was extensive damage to the Rolling Stock, Perway and OHTE.
5.4. The method of train control in the section is the radio train order (TRO).
Figure 1 Showing damage to the collided trains
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Figure 2 Showing damage to the collided trains
6. TFR CAMBRIDGE SIGNAL CONTROL OFFICE FACT
FINDING
6.1. The TCO issued token No. 1260 to Train No. 4213 from Amabele station to
Blaney station at 10h50. The token was cancelled at 11h15.
6.2. At 11h22 the TCO issued token No. 1263 to Train No. 47014 from Blaney to
Southdown. After being issued with the token, the train immediately departed
from Blaney at 11h22.
6.3. When listening to the RTO communication recordings between Train 4213 and
the TCO, the train driver reported to be passing Southdown at 11h15, instead of
the TCO repeating what the driver reported she said Blaney 11h15 which was
the wrong station.
6.4. The substance abuse test results for the TCO during sign-in and after the
occurrence were negative.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
The preliminary investigation conclusions are that:
7.1
The TCO gave a conflicting token to the Shosholoza Meyl Train No 47014,
this allowed two trains into the section and resulted in a head-on collision.
7.2
The RSR will conduct an independent Board of Inquiry into the circumstances
that led to this collision. The BOI will amongst other things scrutinize the
following:
7.3
The adequacy and effectiveness of procedures, training and personnel
knowledge of the relevant procedures;
7.4
Background regarding activities pertaining to adherence to, applicable train
operating procedures by the train drivers and the TCO concerned as set out in
local instructions, General Appendix and other applicable directives;
7.5
The adequacy and effectiveness of maintenance systems and procedures for
signals, radio communication network, perway and rolling stock; and
7.6
And any other information that will be relevant to the BOI.
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