Case study report Cotton in Mali 2015 Commissioned by 1 About this project This research forms part of a project funded by the IFC, the Dutch Ministry of Affairs, SECO and IDH the sustainable trade initiative in which Aidenvironment, NewForesight and IIED sought to develop a holistic transformation model to scale sustainability in smallholder dominated agricultural commodity sectors. For more information about the project and to access other research reports in the series please visit: www.sectortransformation.com About the organisations Aidenvironment is an independent value-driven consultancy. It advises clients in realizing their ambitions in sustainable market transformation in the most prominent commodity sectors. Aidenvironment is known for its in-depth knowledge, reliable quality and good advisory skills, and is continuously asked to work for frontrunners in the private, public and non-profit sector. For more information visit: www.aidenvironment.org NewForesight facilitates sustainable market transformations. As a strategic consultancy NewForesight addresses the global challenges of our time. NewForesight develops innovative strategies, unites stakeholders around a transformative vision for their sector and drives implementation. For more information visit: www.newforesight.com IIED is one of the world’s most influential international development and environment policy research organisations. We build bridges between policy and practice, rich and poor communities, the government and private sector, and across diverse interest groups. For more information visit: www.iied.org Published by Aidenvironment, NewForesight and IIED (2015). 2 Please see www.sectortransformation.com to read our other case studies and reports The Sustainable Sector Transformation Model Sector Governance Models Service Delivery Models Role of Voluntary Sustainability Standards The Sustainable Sector Transformation Model Case study: Cocoa in Ghana Case study: Cocoa in Ivory Coast Case study: Coffee in Vietnam Case study: Palm Oil in Indonesia Phase I: Building a Roadmap to Sustainability in Agro-commodity Production Case study: Cotton in Mali 3 Table of contents Introduction The Sustainable Sector Transformation Model Case study– Cotton in Mali Appendix – the Sustainable Sector Scorecard 4 This research aims to develop a transformation model for sustainability in smallholder dominated agricultural commodity sectors The three phases of the research Goal Develop a transformation model & roadmap towards sustainable agrocommodity production in sectors dominated by smallholder farmers 2013 Phase I - Research • Identify dynamics of market transformation towards sustainability for agricultural commodities • Identify the scope, size and impact of voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) in this process and their possible future role 2014 2015 Phase II - Shaping Phase III - Implementation • Develop a transformation model towards sustainable agro-commodity production • Apply the model to specific country-sector contexts to ensure it has local impact • Support the IFC in integrating the strategy in its corporate priority framework • Implement the roadmap in five country- sector contexts: • Cocoa – Ghana • Cocoa – Ivory Coast • Coffee – Vietnam • Cotton – Mali • Palm Oil – Indonesia • Explore cooperation with other stakeholders 5 The success in scaling sustainability strongly depends on the degree of sector organization and economic performance Absorption capacity for better practices The sector shapes model Pentagon is the desired sector shape for realizing sustainable agriculture Flat pyramid Hybrids Pentagon Economic Performance © NewForesight Type of competition Inversed pyramid Race to the bottom Competing on quality Competing on efficiency Level of organization Very low Low High Medium Average farm size Very small Small Medium Very large Economic performance Very low Low – medium High Very high Absorption capacity for sustainability Very low Low – medium High Low – medium Example of sector Cocoa in Ivory Coast Palm Oil in Thailand Tea in Kenya Soy in Brazil 6 Organizing the production base should be key priority and this requires an understanding of the forces that shape a sector The forces model Enabling environment • Access to capacity building, inputs & finance • Policy/regulatory framework & enforcement • Access to land, tenure & property rights • General education and health care • Infrastructure • Organized effective civil society Production characteristics • GAPs (minimum requirements) • Crop perishability • Ability to mechanize production • Barriers to enter /investments • Possibility to add value upstream Sector Shape © NewForesight Market characteristics • Product Quality & safety requirements • Visibility in end product • Northern vs. Southern markets • Power concentration in value chain • Demand for sustainability impact • Price volatility Alternative livelihoods • Alternative crops (within agricultural sector) • Alternative occupations (also nonagricultural) • Vocational diversification • Migration (urbanization opportunities) 7 Flat pyramid shaped sectors have persistently high levels of poverty and poor social and environmental performance What happens? Simplified sketch of the current situation Finance Extension Extension Unorganized Farmers Inputs © NewForesight Traders Brands Standards, Premiums, Company programs Characteristics Consequences • Production base is unorganized • Competing on poverty • Inexistent or ineffective service • Low productivity market (input, extension and finance) • Inexistent or ineffective products market (dependency on trader) • Uncoordinated support programs • Farmers depend on external financing • Low product quality • Low business skills • Farming as “survival mode” • Not sustainable How does this apply to four agricultural commodities? Cocoa in Ghana & Ivory Coast Coffee in Vietnam Palm oil in Indonesia Cotton in Mali Economic • Poverty • High Yields • Low yields • Poverty • Low yields • Low quality Social • Child labor, • Lack of alternative • Poor labor conditions • Child labor, Environmental • Chemical pollution • Health & safety livelihoods • Health & safety • Water depletion • Deforestation • Chemical pollution • Overuse of chemicals • Erosion • Soil depletion 8 Yet, current processes aiming for full sector transformation fail to reach a critical mass Sector transformation explained: the S-Curve Projects, Pilots & Innovations Competition: Rise of VSS Non competitive collaboration Level Playing field & institutionalization © NewForesight Driving commitment to sustainability • Civil society • Front runner companies & donors • Follower companies & donors • All, including government Producers adopting sustainable practices • Those involved in specific, niche projects. • Late adopters, with sector-based support • All Intervention • Projects Market demand • Niche • Non-competitive investments • Mainstream • Regulation and noncompetitive investment • License to operate Coordination • None • Early adopters, with existing sustainable capacity • Better organized and capitalized farmers • Standards and certification • Growing, but not yet mainstream • Competition • Emerging alignment and collaboration • Full alignment 9 Voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) are an example of supply chain driven instruments that promote sustainability The value added by VSS Key services of VSS In response to public sector failure to address sustainability, VSS added value by : Platform for dialogue Sustainability Standard Key services of VSS Communication & Marketing Implementation Support Assurance System Traceability Market shares of certified production (2013) 71% 29% 80% 82% 87% 20% 18% 13% Coffee Cocoa Tea 96% Palm oil Cotton • Creating consumer and industry awareness on sustainability • Providing a platform for dialogue and governance • Operationalizing the concept of sustainability into concrete practices and norms • Mobilizing market driven incentives for sustainability • Mobilizing investments in producer organization and training • Promoting transparency in supply chains combined with assurance and traceability to substantiate sustainability claims 98% Soy 10 VSS face serious challenges to reach critical mass in sectors dominated by unorganized smallholders The challenges faced by VSS Constraints in the VSS value cycle Lack of demand in many sectors Key barriers to reach the tipping point in smallholder dominated sectors Reaching unorganized farmers is costly & a minimum level capabilities and resources is required to adopt comprehensive standards Demand Supply Declining competitive advantage of label use & sustainability not main criterion for consumer purchases Added value Credibility of claims Credibility impaired due to impact and assurance issues Unsustainable funding model based Implemenon profits tation of from Western best practices industry and donor money Certified volumes remain low in a number of sectors and certification is not having the desired impacts Assurance Impact Limited impact assessments and mixed impact results • Lack of demand for certified production • Need to proof of impacts • High costs and weak business case for smallholders Today’s challenges demand for • A different perspective on sector transformation • New partnerships • Complementary approaches, innovative solutions and new business models Issues with the quality of audits 11 Achieving a critical mass in sector transformation requires investments that support farm quality and sector quality Outcomes and requirements for achieving farm- & sector quality Farm quality Sector quality Farm quality - outcomes • Farmers (and their workers) earn a decent livelihood • … are adaptive, resilient and innovating • … produce at optimum productivity and product quality levels • … have positive social & environmental impact Sector quality - outcomes • Good product reputation on world market • The sector is resilient in the face of market volatility and climate change • The sector has a net positive impact on natural capital and quality of life in rural communities Farm quality – system requirements • Apply required knowledge (business & GAP) • Optimize input use • Viable farm size • Sufficient negotiating power • Respect social & environmental norms / laws • Farmers are entrepreneurial and have the financial capacity to manage risks and to invest in their farms Sector quality – system requirements • Is able to ensure access to quality technical assistance, inputs and finance • Is able to reward good performance (e.g. sustainability & quality) and remove worst practices) • Production base captures sufficient % of consumer value and re-invests in the sector • The sector manage or organize collective action on public goods and natural capital • Ensures a balanced voice and control between different stakeholders 12 Whereas current models focus on either supply chain approaches or sector approaches, reaching farm and sector quality requires both Sector transformation models Focus of sector transformation Level of success per chosen focus Supply chain approach Buyer driven approaches such as certification, farmer support, outgrower models Low Improvement of Hard times Farmers perform poorly in a dysfunctional sector Improvement of farm performance High Low Focus on the sector approaches Farm & sector quality Farming creates and retains sufficient value to invest sector performance Sector approach e.g. investments in extension services, input subsidies, marketing boards • Public services have often not been clientcentred and subject to political interference • High cost of extension services and input subsidies – create entrenched vested interests • Marketing boards block traceability and do not meet buyers’ needs for quality & integrity Focus on the supply chain approaches High • Scale and scope of impact restricted by demand • Only reach low-hanging fruit • Creates islands of sustainability • Does not knit together farms, communities and landscapes Desired focus • Holistic approach towards sector transformation • Focus on farm- & sector performance • Focus on incremental improvement and removal of worst practices • Focus on sector capacity to re-invest in sustainability 13 Table of contents Introduction The Sustainable Sector Transformation Model Case study– Cotton in Mali Appendix – the Sustainable Sector Scorecard 14 Two key principles guide the sector transformation model Guiding principles of the proposed transformation model I. Continuous improvement on farm quality II. Sufficient value capture at production base Manufacturing Trade Processing • An intrinsic business case is in place for continuous improvement on farm quality • Mechanisms should be put in place that reward Farm Quality (step wise) and remove worst practices • A level playing field should exist for all farmers to get a fair chance to upgrade their farm National public sector Production 15 The sector transformation model provides a comprehensive framework along which strategies could be designed The sustainable sector transformation model and its building blocks I. Sector alignment & accountability • Platform for sector dialogue, alignment and coordination • Shared vision and interest: FQ and SQ • Joint strategy towards vision III. Public sector governance • Regulation and governance of market • Support mechanisms by the government • Alignment of investments, technology packages and farmer support measures • Monitoring, assurance and learning IV. Organization of the production base • Effective producer organization for the service market • Effective producer organization for the product market II. Strengthening of demand • Market alignment and discipline • Good buying practices • Product traceability V. Organization of the service sector • Technical assistance • Input provision • Financing 16 The required steps should follow a logical order to be most effective Organizing the building blocks 1 • The extent to which the five building blocks need to be strengthened is context specific, but a focus on only one or two dimensions is bound to lead to a failure to completely transform sectors . • This transformation is likely to be a process that takes a number of years • It follows some consecutive steps in order to be most effective • Whereas the first steps can be described in generic terms, follow up steps will be dependent on the specifics of the sector A group of stakeholders with a critical weight in the sector takes the initiative to transform the sector. The initiating group should engage the other major actors and develop a shared vision on farm- and sector quality and the implications for the organization of the production base and the organization of the service sector. 2 The major actors align behind this vision, develop a strategy to realize the vision and agree on a monitoring and assurance mechanism. Accountability is key and requires a strategy that is measurable. Many of the failed transformation initiatives lack joint accountability. 3 4 The production base is reorganized effectively for the service- and product market. Vice versa the service sector should cater effectively to the production base. This is not a matter of organizing one before the other. It is about a stable symbiosis between service-and production sector, where producers can pay for services that will further their continuous improvement cycle. Implementing the vision/strategy will require a combination of public and market-oriented measures, based on capacity and desire to implement change in the sector. If the dominant actor is the government, then the initial focus of the transformation should be on improving public sector governance. If the private sector is relatively concentrated and buying companies, traders or service providers have leverage over producers, then the role of the private sector in realizing the transformation will likely be stronger. Both always have to be involved in order to ensure consistent messages and incentives towards farmers, whether via demand, service delivery or policy. In line with this thinking, the public or private sector have an important role to build up a professional service sector. 17 Table of contents Introduction The Sustainable Sector Transformation Model Case study – Cotton in Mali Appendix – the Sustainable Sector Scorecard 18 We have now finished the first draft presentations of the fives case studies and will discuss these with the major stakeholders after the SC call Overview of the five case studies Cocoa Cocoa Coffee Cotton Palm Oil Ivory Coast Ghana Vietnam Mali Indonesia Jan Willem Molenaar (Aidenvironment) Emma Blackmore (IIED) Joost Gorter (NewForesight) Laure Heilbron (NewForesight) Laure Heilbron (NewForesight) Sectors Countries Team Laure Heilbron (NewForesight) Jan Willem Molenaar (Aidenvironment) Jan Willem Molenaar (Aidenvironment) Jonas Dalinger (Aidenvironment) In this presentation we will zoom in on the Cotton in Mali case Study 19 The cases studies have been analyzed by using a three-step approach: sector profile, analysis per building block and roadmap development Steps 1 Sector Profile 2 Sector analysis and Recommendations per building block • Collection of sector background information (structure, S-curve, forces, sector shape and farm quality) • Identification of current status per sub-building block • Description of desired status • Appreciation of current status according to Sustainable Sector Scorecard scored */ **/ *** (higher is better ) (16 sub-building blocks see appendix A for scoring framework) • Identification of next steps per building block (5 building blocks) • Consolidation of priority steps to obtain sustainable market transformation • Identification of business case 3 Roadmap 20 Table of contents Introduction The Sustainable Sector Transformation Model Case study – Cotton in Mali Sector profile Gap analysis Priority steps & business case Appendix – the Sustainable Sector Scorecard 21 Cotton is Mali’s main cash crop, accounting for 22% of its total export earnings and providing income to about 40% of the rural population Palm oil in Indonesia General profile Size (square kilometers) Population size (millions) Median age Economic profile 1,240,192¹ 15,840¹ 16¹ Rural population 67%¹ Labor force in agriculture 70%¹ Sector profile GDP (in $ billion) 10,9¹ Number of farmers 167.000² GDP per capita (in $) 476¹ Total land size (ha) 540.000² GDP per sector Average crop plot size 3.1 ha² 863² - Agriculture 39%¹ Average yield (kg/ha) - Industry 24%¹ 450.000² - Services 37%¹ Total production volume (tonnes) Total value (in $ million) 642³ % of GDP 15⁴ % of national export value 22³ Sources: ¹CIA Factbook, ² Programme de developpement de la filiere du coton du Mali 2013-2018, IPC/CMDT 2013 (2012/13 figures), ³The Obervatory of Economic Complexity, ⁴http://www.maliweb.net 22 The cotton value chain is long with limited direct trade relationships between brands/retail and producers Value chain • Long and complex value chain, making traceability complex and costly Retail • Low industry concentration downstream Garment processing • Limited vertical integration downstream Weaver, knitter and fabric producer Spinner • In Mali, high concentration due to CMDT monopoly in collecting, ginning and export Textile processors • Value chain structure and CMDT monopoly does not favor direct trade relationships between retail and producers International cotton trader 20% share Exporter (CMDT) Inputs Ginner (CMDT) Cooperative (UN-SCPC) Smallholders UN-SCPC Price setting Membership • All smallholders are organized in cooperatives and member of UN-SCPC • UN-SCPC has a 20% share in CMDT • Cotton and fertilizer prices are set between CMDT and UN-SCPC 23 Due to a high level of sector organization, the Malian cotton sector has a relative low number of key stakeholders Main stakeholders Sector alignment & accountability • L’Interprofession du coton du Mali (IPC-Mali) – Sector platform for dialogue and management with CMDT and UN-SPCS as main members • Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) - International multi-stakeholder sustainabiltiy initiative (collaborates in Mali with AProCA and CMDT) • Fairtrade International & Organic - International certification initiatives active in Mali • NGOs – Various scattered rural development activities Public sector governance Organization of production base Strengthening of demand • Ministry of Rural Development: Responsible ministry for cotton • Mission de Restructuration de Secteur Coton : Responsible for privatisation proces of CMDT • L'Institut d'Economie Rurale (IER): National research institute • PAFICOT: AFDB funded cotton development program • UN-SCPC – National union representing all cotton producers • AProCA - African cotton producer associaton representing UN-SCPC abroad and BCI partner in Mali • Mobium - Producer organization implementing Fairtrade and Organic certification • Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles (CMDT) – monopoly on seed collection and ginning and export of cotton fiber (ownership: 78% Mali state, 20% UN-SCPC, 2% GEOCOTON) • International traders licensed by CMDT • Brands & retail – imposing quality and sustainability norms Organization of service sector • CMDT - provides TA to all producers and distributes inputs (via UNSPCS cooperatives) to all producers • Input producing or trading companies – deliver inputs to CMDT • FAO – program on integrated pest management 24 The cotton sector in Mali has reached a critical mass phase mainly due to an external push. It still lacks national embedding to institutionalize sustainability. The S Curve of market transformation © NewForesight Characteristics of current phase: critical mass Characteristics of next phase: Institutionalization Triggers for change • Some issues in the sector persist and threaten long-term viability of sector • Persistent issues are consistently tackled Main change agents • Fairtrade & Organic: first movers but remains < 1% of market • BCI: 20% of Malian production is BCI licensed and plans to scale up to 60% are on the way • FAO: Piloting IPM and FFS concept • CMDT: Increasing awareness and some investments on sustainability issues • CMDT, producers and government align strategy and investments supported by international industry and donors • BCI and FFS/IPM are fully embedded in CMDT’s standard practice • Optional niche certification on demand Who is against change • Despite CMDT awareness, it does not fully agree with relevance and priority of proposed solutions by other change agents, e.g. embedding of BCI and IPM is still weak • CMDT may continue to struggle to balance between short-term financial goals and mid to long-term sustainability ambition • Unclear what the eventual privatization process of CMDT may imply Driving forces for the market • Continued NGO campaigning and media pressure • Reduced exposure to NGOs and media (for market) • Longer term viability of the sector (for market and government) • Healthier, wealthier and more entrepreneurial population (for government) Limitations & barriers • Lack of full alignment between change agents • Insufficient resources to make required investments • Economic viability of sector in global market (e.g. how to deal with price volatility?) 25 Public sector regulation is a determining force in shaping the sector, while the direct influence of the international market is relative low The forces shaping the sector The enabling environment Production characteristics • Perennial crop • High need for nutrients and water and susceptible for pests and diseases • Low mechanization rate in Mali • No irrigation is applied (but vulnerable to climate change) The enabling environment Production characteristics Market characteristics Alternative livelihoods • Cotton is the main cash crop in Mali, little alternative cash crops exist • Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world with limited off-farm livelihood opportunities • Cotton is a highly political crop due to economic importance • CMDT has monopoly on collection, ginning and export, but uncertain privatization process • Relatively strong extension service (CMDT) • Pre-financed and subsidized input distribution is centrally managed • Poor access to basic services © NewForesight Alternative livelihoods Market characteristics • 98% of cotton fiber is exported of which most to Asia (>90%) • Long supply chain, limited traceability, and many indirect relationships • Limited concentration downstream • Regular NGO attention to sustainability • Low demand for Organic or Fairtrade cotton • Emerging demand for BCI cotton 26 The sector is fully organized, but the quality of organization can be improved at production base and at sector level The cotton sector in Mali is shaped as a pentagon • CMDT organizes the seed collection, ginning and lint export as well as extension and input distribution centrally • All cotton is produced by smallholders (167.000) and they are all organized in cooperatives (7.000). Capacity of most cooperatives is weak. • Cooperatives are part of the regional and national UN-SPCS which partly owns CMDT (20% of capital). Their role at sector level is increasing but, still considered weak. © NewForesight 27 Despite the high degree of sector organization, cotton farmers are still poor and practices undermine short and long-term sustainability Farm quality Farmers earn a decent livelihood Goals Desired situation • Many cotton farmers live below poverty line • Cotton farmers are well above the poverty line • Limited room for entrepreneurialism in CMDT topdown system • Women are not involved in cotton production due to pesticide use • Entrepreneurialism is promoted by more participatory extension methods and via professional service delivery by cooperatives • Cotton system is based upon crop rotation with other crops (mainly subsistence) • Vulnerability to climate change • Increased profitability of rotational cropping system • Production systems adapt to climate change • Farmers have additional food and cash crops or of-farm income • Irresponsible use of hazardous chemicals • Hazardous tasks for children is common • Respect of (inter)national norms and conventions on labor, chemicals and environment and use of IPM • Children go to school Farmer produce at optimum yield and quality • Average yield is 850 kg/ha • High fiber quality, but not consistently • Potential yield is 1215 kg/ha (IPC, 2013) • High quality is maintained consistently Knowledge & application of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) • Farmers follow CMDT instructions of uniform technology package across the country • Current practices result in severe soil depletion • GAPs are adapted to farm context • Farmer can make own farm management decisions • Fertilizer use sustains cotton production in long-term • All farmers receive high quality input on credit, but doses are uniform across country • Lack of access to organic fertilizers • Farmers use the right types and amount of inputs for their particular context recovering soil health • Organic fertilizers are available • Average farm size is 10 ha, of which 1/3 can be used for cotton (=national regulation) • Farm size allow for a viable diversified cropping system with increased intercropping synergies • Negotiation power (relevant at sector level) is yet insufficient, but increases • Farmers, via UN-SCPC, negotiate on an equal basis with the industry and government • Limited willingness, no capacity unless on credit provided by CMDT • Farmer make well-informed investment decisions and have access to external finance Farmers are entrepreneurial Farmers are resilient Farmers respect social & environmental norms Requirements Current situation Optimize input use Viable farm size Negotiation power Willingness and financial capacity to invest in their farms 28 Table of contents Introduction The Sustainable Sector Transformation Model Case study – Cotton in Mali Sector profile Gap analysis Priority steps & business case Appendix – the Sustainable Sector Scorecard 29 The Malian cotton sector improves its sustainability performance, but some fundamental weaknesses persist Main conclusions of sector analysis Sector alignment & accountability • Sector-wide 5 year strategy exists, but falls short in obtaining short and long-term sustainability • All farmers are registered and yields are monitored, other farmer quality aspects are increasingly monitored, but not yet used for sectorwide learning Public sector governance Organization of the production base • The government has tight control over the sector and provides farmers with different safeguards and services • Full production base is organized around cotton, but not yet strong enough to provide additional services to farmers • Producer influence on sector governance is limited, but growing • At sector level, UN-SCPC has not yet sufficient influence on CMDT and price setting Strengthening of market demand • Market incentives for sustainable practices are limited Strengthening the service sector • Sector-wide technology package lacks flexibility and falls short in terms of sustainability ambition. Credible alternatives exist • The sector has an increasing capacity to finance basic needs, but additional finance is necessary to go beyond business as usual 30 Sector-wide 5 year strategy exists, but falls short in obtaining short and long-term sustainability I. Alignment & accountability – current and desired situation (1/2) Score Platform for sector dialogue, alignment and coordination ** Shared vision and interest: on Farm Quality and Sector Quality ** Joint strategy towards vision, including clear KPIs Alignment of investments, technology packages and farmer support methods Current situation Desired situation • IPC regroups the most relevant stakeholders: CMDT (national • IPC is central platform for sector development and opens up industry) and UN-SCPC (producers) and government (via to other stakeholders (as observers) CMDT) • IPC is well managed and strong in facilitating sector dialogue • IPC aims to facilitate dialogue, strategy development and • UN-SCPC and CMDT have the capacity to use the platform as negotiation basis for strategy development • Civil society and donors are not represented • Common short/mid-term vision exists in sector strategic plan • Long-term economic, social and environmental sustainability is • Focus is too much on short term volume increase at cost of basis of vision and pathway to get there. It is translated in a sustainability and long-term economic viability of sector step-wise improvement path (for example: BCI IPM soil • CMDT organizes literacy courses, not on other social issues fertility restoration ) and the identification of worst practices to • Programs as BCI and IPM offer potentially step-wise approach be excluded to improve FQ, but not yet full buy-in from CMDT (CMDT • Vision is supported by all key stakeholders considers BCI still as a ‘niche’ and IPM as very costly) ** • The sector-wide strategic plan includes clear objectives and targets (on volumes, yield, quality, diversification, farmer literacy, road infrastructure and processing capacity) • Sector wide strategic plan reflects new vision and is adopted by all relevant stakeholders • It defines KPIs on farm quality and sector quality at sector and individual stakeholder level ** • Some dialogue exists between different donors and CMDT to align investments / co-invest • CMDT has uniform technology message and package (but it is not adopted to local needs) • Actors like BCI & FAO work propose alternative packages (partly via CMDT system) but certain key people within CMDT still have different views about the relevance of these packages • CMDT, Mali government and different donors structurally align investments & co-invest • All stakeholders agree upon key messages and technology packages to promote. Technology packages take into account local needs and step-wise approach defined in vision 31 All farmers are registered and yields are monitored, other farmer quality aspects are increasingly monitored, but not yet used for sector-wide learning I. Alignment & accountability – current and desired situation (2/2) Score Monitoring, assurance & learning ** Current situation Desired situation • CMDT has records of all farmers (e.g. on surface • Structural monitoring on key KPIs defined by the and yield) sector wide strategy • BCI introduces more elaborate monitoring and • Data is analyzed and lessons are fed back to CMDT, assurance system (but not used at sector level) farmers and other stakeholders (and farmers can • Data from monitoring is not yet structurally used to benchmark their own performance against others) provide input in sector strategy • Additional assurance could be organized if the market requires (and organized on a regional basis • Fairtrade and Organic use external audits in as with BCI) assurance 32 Redefine vision and strategy to pursue long-term sustainability, further align investments and intensify monitoring and learning I. Alignment & accountability – Next steps Sub building blocks Platform for sector dialogue, alignment and coordination Next steps • Strengthen IPC’s capacity to facilitate sector dialogue • Strengthen UN-SCPC (& AProCA) on their role in the platform • Open up IPC to other stakeholders (potentially observer status) • Define business case of BCI, IPM and soil fertility restoration approaches at farm and sector Shared vision and interest: on level Farm Quality and Sector • Define sector vision to reflect short and long-term sustainability of the sector and translate Quality this into concrete concepts farm and sector quality (e.g. BCI IPM soil fertility restoration, school attendance, access to inputs, etc.) Joint strategy towards vision, including clear KPIs • Based upon the vision and business case, revise sector strategy to introduce and scale activities (e.g. BCI program or IPM) that ensure long-term sustainability and define KPIs at sector level and per stakeholder Alignment of investments, technology packages and farmer support methods • Clarify investment needs for adoption for strategy and rally financers and donors behind it Monitoring & assurance • Set up a data collection and analysis system on KPIs on a wider set of farm metrics and use it to improve the sector strategy and promote farmer performance (analyze options of collaboration between CMDT, UN-SCPC, BCI, Fairtrade, Organic and other initiatives) 33 Market incentives for sustainable practices are limited II. Strengthening market demand – current and desired situation Score Current situation Desired situation Market alignment and discipline * • CMDT does not reward farmers for product quality or sustainability, neither excludes producers for certain worst practices (prices are equal to all) • Relatively low demand for sustainable cotton on international market ; some international buyers willing to pay a small premium for BCI cotton on still limited (but increasing) volumes • CMDT’s export monopoly impedes direct importerproducer relationships, which is a constraint to the Fairtrade system • CMDT has no marketing strategy marketing for sustainable cotton (e.g. BCI) • CMDT uses farmer performance as basis for market access and market incentives. • CMDT has a clear marketing strategy on sustainable cotton with good signals for the market • International buyers demand for sustainability performance and provide some rewards based upon performance • International buyers further co-invest in sector improvement via non-competitive action (like with BCI) Buying practices *** • Farmers are paid in bank account after the input loan is reimbursed via cooperative • Farmers are paid in bank account after the input loan is reimbursed via cooperative *** • Traceability exists from farmer to gin • Fairtrade or Organic require segregation from farm to port and beyond and scaling requires additional • Continue existing CMDT product traceability model investments. • BCI allows both full Mass Balance or Segregated • BCI requires physical segregation until the gin and supply chains (from farm to port) after which Mass Balance is allowed (resulting in unnecessary costs at seed cotton transport and gin level) Product traceability 34 Investigate options for differentiated pricing for different levels of performance II. Strengthening market demand - next steps Sub building blocks Market alignment and discipline Next steps • CMDT investigates whether it can introduce a differentiated pricing for different levels of performance • International buyers demand more firmly for BCI cotton and co-invest in sector improvement • CMDT excludes farmers from their system that continue worst practices Buying practices Product traceability • Focus on traceability rather than segregation, e.g. BCI introduces Mass Balance from farm to gin 35 The government has tight control over the sector and provides farmers with different safeguards and services. Producer influence on sector governance is limited, but growing III. Public sector governance – current and desired situation Score Regulation where the market fails Support mechanisms by government Market Governance Current situation Desired situation ** • Weak enforcement of labor and environmental laws • Lack of legal framework on GMO use • Enforcement of labor and environmental laws • Sound legal framework on GMO use • Sound land use planning with regards to envisioned cotton area expansion ** • CMDT provides all farmers with inputs, instructions • Government subsidizes fertilizers (144 $ US / ha); probably necessary to make cotton viable, but no incentives to increase efficiency • Lack of road infrastructure & basic services • Public research centre works a lot on cotton (largely financed by CMDT) • Governments invests in continuous improvement of seed quality • Government conducts regular soil testing • Government invests in infrastructure and basic services • Fertilizer subsidies are provided in such way that it promotes fertilizer use efficiency (e.g. use of organic fertilizers for soil restoration) ** • CMDT has monopoly on ginning and export and determines technology package, giving them tight control over the sector. Producers partly own CMDT giving them some power in its governance. • Farm-gate price is set between CMDT and UN-SCPC (within IPC) at beginning of season with possible additional fee at end of season (fertilizer prices are also set within IPC) • UN-SCPC producers do influence price setting, but perceived influence is still low, although increasing. • Government pursues privatization of CMDT to reduce financial risks and increase sector efficiency • High transparency and producer influence over pricing of seed cotton and fertilizers and CMDT governance structure • Communication of season seed price before planting season • CMDT has a sufficient large financial buffer to absorb price fluctuations to maintain minimum price system • If privatization takes place, the current advantages of sector organization and control for FQ and SQ should be maintained or improved 36 Maintain and improve safeguards in pricing and farmer support and intensify public sector enforcement and support on social issues III. Public sector government – Next steps Sub building blocks Regulation where the market fails Support mechanisms by government Market Governance Next steps • Enforce labor laws • Develop legal framework on GMO use • Reconsider fertilizer subsidy system to incentivize chemical fertilizer efficiency and replacement by organic fertilizers • Create soil fertility map and conduct regular soil testing • Invest in improvement of seed quality • Create awareness on worst practices (e.g. child labor) and attack root causes of these issues (e.g. access to schooling) • Ensure transparency in price setting negotiations • Consider further increase of producer ownership and control over CMDT 37 Full production base is organized around cotton, but not yet strong enough to provide additional services to farmers. At sector level, UN-SCPC has not yet sufficient influence on CMDT and price setting IV. Organizing the production base – current and desired situation Score Effective producer organization for the service market Effective producer organization for the product market Current situation Desired situation ** • All farmers are member of a cooperative, that via • Cooperatives remain basis for distribution of preregional chapters are part of the national UN-SCPC financed inputs • Cooperatives provide members by CMDT distributed • Cooperatives actively promote good performance pre-financed inputs based upon joint liability on a group according to step-wise approach and avoid worst loan in kind for seeds, fertilizers and pesticides (on a per practices among members (at the penalty of loosing ha of cotton basis). Whereas this creates peer pressure, membership) it may also fuel conflict within cooperatives. • Cooperatives are strong and big enough to develop a • Cooperatives are generally too small and too weak to broader service package for their members (as well as on develop additional services to members other crops than cotton) ** • Cooperatives are basis for collection of seed cotton for which service they receive a fee (which is the main source of income for the coops) • At national level UN-SCPCs role in negotiating prices is increasing, but relatively weak • Cooperatives remain basis for seed cotton collection • Cooperatives engage in marketing of other cash crops of members • UN-SCPC has strong and constructive influence on price setting and is effective in representing its members 38 Invest in the consolidation and strengthening of cooperatives and further professionalization of UN-SCPC IV. Organizing the production base – next steps Sub building blocks Effective producer organization for the service market Next steps • Promote consolidation of cooperatives into larger units • Strengthen UN-SCPC to support and/or coordinate cooperatives in additional service provision to members (also non-cotton related) Effective producer • Strengthen UN-SCPC in its capacity to have a strong and constructive influence on price organization for the product setting market 39 Sector-wide technology package lacks flexibility and falls short in terms of sustainability ambition. Credible alternatives exist. V. Organizing service sector – current and desired situation (1/2) Score Technical assistance Input provision ** ** Current situation • CMDT organizes TA to all producers, irrespectively of their performance. It is bundled with pre-financed inputs • CMDT technology package are uniform across the country and do not allow for adaptation to context (although it invests in the promotion of alternative pest management practices) • CMDT package are directive and do not promote farmers to learn themselves what decisions to make under different circumstances • BCI system, working via CMDT, has a more flexible and and participatory farmer extension approach • FAO IPM program works via Farmer Field Schools, which partly works via CMDT, is very participatory and allows for maximum flexibility • Emergence of specialized service providers (e.g. climate assurance) • Availability and distribution of pre-financed inputs (cotton and to some farmers also non-cotton related inputs) to all farmers which is repaid by a levy on cotton seed payments • Limited attention to sustainability impacts of inputs prescribed and delivered by CMDT • Lack of organic fertilizers or biological pest control inputs (but investments in national production capacity or import are on the way) Desired situation • CMDT applies a more flexible farmer support model, allowing for context specific packages and driving improved performance (BCI IPM soil fertility restoration) • CMDT applies a more participatory support approach to make a farmer more capable in managing their farms optimally. It is based upon the BCI model of learning groups and demo plots or farmer field schools • Specialized providers of additional services serve an increasing number of farmers via CMDT or cooperatives (includes social programs) • Pre-finance and distribution of inputs to all farmers with rewards for better performing farmers and discouragement (potential exclusion) of non-performing farmers • Inputs provided (distributed via CMDT and UN-SCPC) match sector sustainability ambitions at different levels, especially on soil health, worker’s health and biodiversity 40 The sector has an increasing capacity to finance basic needs, but additional finance is necessary to go beyond business as usual V. Organizing service sector – current and desired situation (2/2) Score Financing ** Current situation Desired situation • Basic inputs and TA are pre-financed by CMDT & financial sector and repaid by producers. • Government subsidizes fertilizers • BCI program is financed by international industry and donors, but funds lack to scale up quickly • FAO funds IPM projects, but funds lack to scale up • PAFICOT funds some infrastructure development • CMDT finances some soil fertility restoration activities (limited geographical scope) • Pilot on climate insurance is in development • The financial sector finances all basic operational costs, repaid by producers and CMDT, with a decreasing need for public subsidies over time • The financial sector finances additional mid-term and longer term investments (e.g. soil fertility restoration) based upon a valid business case • The financial sector provides additional financial products such as crop and health insurance • Donors and public sector provide guarantees or coinvestments to increase fundability of mid and long-term investments • In general, funding lacks to invest in the scaling of • Donors and public sector (co-)fund initial investments, practices that go beyond basic activities. For such as scaling BCI and IPM and focus on social investments in for example BCI, FFS, soil fertility investments (e.g. infrastructure or gender & youth restoration, infrastructure, gender and youth related programs) programs, additional funding seems to be required. The • Industry co-finances sector improvement via nonbusiness case of these investments is neither always competitive alliances clear. 41 Clarify business case and organize technical assistance, input provision and finance around farm quality improvement V. Organizing service sector – next steps Sub building blocks Next steps Technical assistance • Linked to business case of BCI, IPM and soil fertility restoration approaches scale more flexible and participatory TA approaches within CMDT system (and by reliable partnerships which provide training on key sustainability issues) • Introduce service agreements with farmers which promote improvement and exclude worst practices Input provision • Map soil fertility and adopt input recommendation to restore long-term fertility (introduce more flexibility) • Develop program around soil fertility restoration • Invest in production/sourcing and distribution of organic fertilizers and biological pesticides Financing • Define finance mechanisms for mid and long-term investments (commercial , soft and guarantees or subsidies) • Attract financers for this model • Set-up donor and public financed programs on social investments (working in complementary with the sector) 42 Table of contents Introduction The Sustainable Sector Transformation Model Case study – Cotton in Mali Sector profile Gap analysis Priority steps & business case Appendix – the Sustainable Sector Scorecard 43 The Malian cotton sector improves its sustainability performance, but some fundamental weaknesses persist Main conclusions of sector analysis Sector alignment & accountability • Sector-wide 5 year strategy exists, but falls short in obtaining short and long-term sustainability • All farmers are registered and yields are monitored, other farmer quality aspects are increasingly monitored, but not yet used for sectorwide learning Public sector governance Organization of the production base • The government has tight control over the sector and provides farmers with different safeguards and services • Full production base is organized around cotton, but not yet strong enough to provide additional services to farmers • Producer influence on sector governance is limited, but growing • At sector level, UN-SCPC has not yet sufficient influence on CMDT and price setting Strengthening of market demand • Market incentives for sustainable practices are limited Strengthening the service sector • Sector-wide technology package lacks flexibility and falls short in terms of sustainability ambition. Credible alternatives exist • The sector has an increasing capacity to finance basic needs, but additional finance is necessary to go beyond business as usual 44 Scaling sustainability requires a strong national buy-in to make the proposed vision, strategy and approaches the national norm Recommendations per building block for sector transformation Define business case and create national buy-in • Clarify business case of BCI, IPM, soil fertility restoration approaches as well as social programs • Use business case to re-enforce national buy-in from CMDT and UN-SCPC (make BCI/IPM/ Soil fertility restoration the national norm) and integrate this into the sector vision, strategy and KPIs Strengthen IPC, CMDT and UN-SCPC to ensure a balanced sector dialogue and coordination • Upgrade of CMDT sustainability data management system to include KPIs and to improve sector strategy and promote farmer performance Ensure transparency in sector governance and promote social performance • Ensure transparency in price setting between CMDT and UN-SCPC and increase producer ownership in CMDT • Intensify support and law enforcement on social development Organization of the production base Creating market rewards • Invest in the consolidation and strengthening of cooperatives and further professionalization of UN-SCPC • Investigate options for differentiated pricing for different levels of performance • CMDT develops a transparent marketing policy for the commercialization of cotton Scale step-wise approach (BCI, IPM, soil fertility restoration) and social programs in the whole sector • Define finance needs for step-wise approach, determine finance mechanisms and attract financers • Scale BCI, FFS investments to build a more flexibility and participation in CMDTs farmer support approach and to ensure an efficiency in input supply • Invest in production/sourcing and distribution of organic fertilizers and biological pesticides • Set-up donor and public financed programs on social investments 45 Priority steps to further enhance the transformation of a fully sustainable cotton sector in Mali Priority steps Service provision Org. of Sector Market prod. governance demand base Allignment & accountability Clarify business case of BCI, IPM, soil fertility restoration approaches as well as social programs Timelines Who involved Month 1-6 Use business case to re-enforce national buy-in from CMDT and UN-SCPC (make BCI/IPM/ Soil fertility restoration the national norm) and integrate this into the sector vision, strategy and KPIs Year 1 Strengthen IPC, CMDT and UN-SCPC to ensure a balanced sector dialogue and coordination Year 1 Upgrade of CMDT sustainability data management system to include KPIs and to improve sector strategy and promote farmer performance Year 1 Investigate options for differentiated pricing for different levels of performance Year 1 CMDT, UN-SCPC CMDT develops a transparent marketing policy for the commercialization of cotton Year 1 CMDT Ensure transparency in price setting between CMDT and UN-SCPC and increase producer ownership in CMDT > Year 1 Various ministries, CMDT, UN-SCPC Intensify support and law enforcement on social performance > Year 1 Various ministries Invest in the consolidation and strengthening of cooperatives and further professionalization of UN-SCPC Year 1-7 UN-SCPC Year 1 Define finance needs for step-wise approach, determine finance mechanisms and attract financers CMDT, UN-SCPC, IPC, AproCA, BCI, FAO Scale BCI, FFS investments to build a more flexibility and participation in CMDTs farmer support approach and to ensure an efficiency in input supply Year 1-7 CMDT, UN-SCPC, IPC, AproCA, BCI, FAO, IFC Invest in production/sourcing and distribution of organic fertilizers and biological pesticides Year 1-5 CMDT Set-up donor and public financed programs on social investments Year 1-5 CMDT, UN-SCPC, donors and gov. 46 Focus of scaling farm quality should be the introduction of a step-wise approach bringing clear benefits to all 170k cotton farmers Soil fertility restoration + BCI/IPM via demo plot approach Social development BCI standards via learning group approach Current practice 47 There is a clear business case to invest in the whole sector Yield (kg/ha) 1,100 1,000 900 800 700 600 TBD 0 68 850 Baseline BCI (yr1-2) IPM (year 3-5) TBD 1,800 1,600 Net annual cotton farm 1,400 income 1,200 (US$ ) 1,000 100% Chemical 75% pesticide use in 50% % of baseline 25% Soil fertility restoration 75 202 1,443 1.443 1,443 1,443 Baseline BCI (yr1-2) IPM (year 3-5)* Soil fertility restoration 100% 45% 10% 10% BCI (year 1-2) IPM (year 3-5) Soil fertility restoration 0% Baseline Social Performance Child labor, hazardous use of pesticides +PPE use +Awareness child labor Baseline BCI (year 1-2) + Reduced user risks to pesticide use Interventions A. 5 years intervention with 2 years BCI with learning groups followed by 3 years of additional IPM support • Benefits: • +8% yield • +19% net farm income • 90% reduction in pesticide use (* not taking into account farm labor costs for fabricating biopesticides) • NPV : 1,227 US$ per farmer / 203 million US$ all farms combined * • For every US$ of investment, a farmer earns 9 US$ back in 5 years time and 22 US$ in 10 year • Cost / farmer : 105 US$ in 5 years (awareness raising, training, supervision and program coordination) • Costs total sector : 18 million US$ • Estimated time to cover whole sector: 7 years B. Soil fertility restoration where required (costs and benefits to be determined) C. Social programs where basic infrastructure is lacking (costs and benefits to be determined) +Access to schools +women empowerment, +engagement Assumptions • Cotton farm size of 3 Ha • Time horizon for NPV is 10 years • Discount rate is 15% IPM (year 3-5) Soil fertility Social programs restoration Sources: BCI monitoring data and program costs budgets; average yield data by IPC; Settle W, Soumare´ M, Sarr M, Garba MH, Poisot A-S. 2014 Reducing pesticide risks to farming communities: cotton farmer field schools in Mali. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 369: 20120277. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0277 48 Table of contents Introduction The Sustainable Sector Transformation Model Case study– Cotton in Mali Appendix – the Sustainable Sector Scorecard 49 1. Sector alignment & accountability (1/2) Sustainable Sector Scorecard Description * ** *** • Representation of all major Platform for stakeholders in the sector sector • National buy-in and balanced dialogue, voice different stakeholders alignment and • Management at arm’s length coordination from government – though with government as key stakeholder • Systems of checks & balances • Clear roles & responsibilities • Commitment of resources • Strong leadership and facilitation • With minimum & aspiration Shared vision levels. and interest: on Farm Quality and Sector Quality No platform exists. • A platform exists, but not all • Platform exists which includes crucial stakeholders all major relevant participate / several platforms stakeholders. exist in parallel. • No actors in the sector promote sustainability or only very isolated activities. Joint strategy • Including clearly defined objectives and KPIs. towards vision, • Includes a long-term vision including clear with sequenced milestones. KPIs KPIs need to be meaningful, measurable. • No strategy in place. • Strong vision exists, but not shared / sharing of weak vision. • Different actors promote different concepts of FQ, lower company commitments undermine strong vision. • Some strategy exist, but is either weak or not joint (different actors follow different strategies to reach their sustainability objectives of different dimension. • Yes, the sector is fully aligned on a strong vision for FQ and SQ. • Clear, joint strategy of the steps to be taken to reach FQ and SQ and clear roles and responsibilities as well as commitments of different stakeholders. 50 1. Sector alignment & accountability (2/2) Sustainable Sector Scorecard Description • Investments made in the Alignment of sector are aligned across investments, stakeholder groups (around technology farm and sector quality and packages and farmer support how to achieve that), to reduce duplication in effort methods and improve efficiency in allocation of funds and effectiveness of joint efforts. Monitoring, assurance and learning * • No alignment of investments in farmer support. • Monitor to measure progress • No system in place to monitor on FQ and SQ KPIs, to measure the implementation and impacts and to facilitate sector success of a sector wider wide learning. strategy. • Additional assurance could be integrated if there is a demand for it. ** *** • Some actors align investments • All /most investments and and support strategies . support strategies are aligned. • Scattered systems exist, but not wide-spread or not efficient enough. • Primary focus on assurance not on improvement of sector strategy or farmer performance. • There is an efficient and widespread monitoring system in place (with additional assurance options if required). • Monitoring results are used to promote learning at sector and farm level 51 2. Strengthening of demand Sustainable Sector Scorecard Description * ** *** Market alignment& discipline • Consistent enforcement of • There is no agreement • Some companies implement vision on farm and sector between companies on quality quality purchasing and quality by all market players in purchasing and discrimination discrimination of worst rewarding best performers of worst practices. practices. and excluding worst practices. • There exist agreements between the major companies in certain landscapes/supply sheds of companies on quality purchasing and discrimination of worst practices. Implementation is monitored. Buying practices • Companies compete to become buyer of choice through procurement practices (reliability, payment terms, transparency) that reflect demand for sustainability. • Buying practices that do not favor FQ. • Some companies implement • Buying practices adopted buying practices favor FQ sector-wide, and favor FQ on a through reliability, large scale. transparency, capacity building etc. Product traceability • Ensuring products can be traced back to the farm on which they were grown. • Requires tracking and documentation of some kind (and often for segregation to be built into the system). • Traceability systems not in place or blocked by market regulation. • Traceability only in place for a • Traceability widely limited number of niche implemented in the sector or chains. replaced by monitoring based systems 52 3. Public sector governance Sustainable Sector Scorecard Description Regulation • Where the market fails to remove poorest quality and worst practices. * ** • No, many cases where sector • Some good policies in place, regulation falls short or is even but poor enforcement . counterproductive to realize market transformation. • Support/subsidies to obtain • Lack of services and • Services and infrastructure Support inputs, research into infrastructure (R&D, capacity available only to elite farmers mechanisms by agricultural practices, crop building, energy, water, roads, or well served areas. government types, disease etc, grades and standards, contract infrastructure, basic services oversight) put whole sector at (water provision etc), credit a competitive disadvantage. and finance. • Overall sector and farm quality • Counterproductive measures • Some good and some bad Market can be raised through to regulate the market and measures / lack of some governance regulation of supply, demand, maintain sufficient value at the measures. transaction systems, price and producer base. quality e.g. • Via minimum prices • Buffer stock management • Marketing boards • Auction systems • Commodity exchanges *** • In general the right regulation exists and is effectively enforced, removes commodities produced worst quality/illegal practice from the market. • Basic services and infrastructure in place and accessible to majority of producers. • Market governance is either not needed or effective in creating the right economic environment, capture value at the production base. 53 4. Organization of the production base Sustainable Sector Scorecard Description Effective Producer organization for service market • The organizational model that enables efficient delivery of high quality extension, inputs and finance Effective producer organisation for product market • The organizational model that allows for efficiency in supply chains, rewarding of quality and capturing sufficient value at the production base to reinvest * ** *** • Producers are not organized in • While some effective • Farmers are well organized any way to ensure effective organization models that allow and have access to access to a high quality and producers to access competitive, high quality competitive service market. competitive service markets service markets. exist, still many are facing • The service market is not • Alternatively the service monopolistic service markets organized in a way to market is organized in such a or are trapped in trading effectively serve a large way to reach out to relationships. number of unorganized unorganized farmers and farmers. provide them with high quality services at a competitive price. • Farmers have no choice where • Larger scale and/or better • Most farmers are organized in to sell their produce and their capitalized farmers are such a way that they can lack of market power leaves effectively organized to ensure access to a remunerative little room to invest in their access to a remunerative product market which rewards farms. product market which rewards quality and leads to efficiency quality and leads to efficiency in the supply chain as well as in the supply chain. sufficient value captured at the production base to invest in farm quality. 54 5. Organization of the service sector Sustainable Sector Scorecard Description * • Good quality extension • Sector is not capable of services are provided to delivering basic TA. producers to enable the achievement of farm quality, rewards good performance and excludes worst practices. • The deliverable model is sustainable, accessible, demand driven, participatory, consistent, continuous , available, and bundled. • Sector is not capable of Input provision • Input provision supports farmers in producing farm delivering basic inputs or quality. The deliverable model inputs face quality and is sustainable, accessible, authenticity issues. demand driven, consistent, continuous available, bundled. • Availability, accessibility and • No formal provision of Financing relevance of short, mid and affordable finance from value long term credit to chain, banks, warehouse smallholders necessary to receipts, producer support investments in FQ. organizations or microfinance base. Technical assistance ** *** • Sector delivers some TA, but • Sector is able to deliver not as driver for FQ or TA only different levels of TA driving reaches a very limited number FQ and reaches out to a large of farmers. proportion of the farmers in need for TA. • Sector delivers some quality input provision, but not as driver for farm quality or the services only are available to a limited amount of farmers. • Sector is able to efficiently/competitively deliver quality inputs in ways that are adapted to smallholder farms, driving FQ. • Formal finance only available to large farms with sufficient collateral. • The financial /private sector provides finance in a competitive and inclusive way, with products adapted to the smallholder majority. 55
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