How to Secure Infrastructure Clouds with Trusted Computing Technologies Nicolae Paladi Swedish Institute of Computer Science 2 Contents 1. Infrastructure-as-a-Service 2. Security challenges of IaaS 3. Trusted Computing and TPM 4. Trusted VM launch 5. InfraCloud 6. Future work 3 Infrastructure-as-a-Service • A 'cloud computing' service model (NIST:2011):  Provision processing, storage, networks.  Deploy and run arbitrary software.  No control over underlying cloud infrastructure.  Control over OS, storage, deployed applications.  Limited control of select networking components. 4 Infrastructure-as-a-Service architectural overview OpenStack architectural overview https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/ArchitecturalOverview 5 Infrastructure-as-a-Service security issues  2011: Vulnerabilities in the AWS management console (XSS and XML wrapping attacks) OpenStack architectural overview https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/ArchitecturalOverview 6 Infrastructure-as-a-Service security issues  2011: Vulnerabilities in the AWS management console (XSS and XML wrapping attacks)  2012: Cross-VM Side Channels can be used to extract private keys. OpenStack architectural overview https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/ArchitecturalOverview 7 Infrastructure-as-a-Service security issues  2011: Vulnerabilities in the AWS management console (XSS and XML wrapping attacks)  2012: Cross-VM Side Channels can be used to extract private keys  2012: Rackspace’s “dirty disks” OpenStack architectural overview https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/ArchitecturalOverview 8 Can we help it? 9 Introducing the TPM      Trusted platform module v1.2 as specified by TCG. v2.0 is currently under review. Tamper-evident. 16+ PCRs for volatile storage. Four operations: Signing / Binding / Sealing / Sealed-sign. 10 Introducing the TPM: output •  Produces integrity measurements of the firmware at boot time. Can produce integrity measurements of the loaded kernel modules (sample below). 11 Introducing the TPM: usage • Microsoft BitLocker • Google Chromium OS • Citrix XenServer • Oracle’s X- and T-Series Systems • HP ProtectTools • Others 12 Securing IaaS environments with trusted computing • Virtualization security. • Storage protection in IaaS environments. • Computing security in IaaS environments. • Remote host software integrity attestation. • Runtime host software integrity attestation. • Encryption key management in IaaS environments. 13 Computing security in IaaS environments: Problem Setting • “Consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications.”     Client can launch VMs for sensitive computations. Trusted VM launch – the correct VM is launched in a IaaS platform on a host with a known software stack verified to not have been modified by malicious actors. IaaS security with trusted computing. How do we ensure a trusted VM launch in an untrusted IaaS environment? 14 Attack scenario 1 Remote attacker (Ar) Scheduler (S) Ar could schedule the VM instance to be launched on a compromised host Client (C) Trusted Compute Host (CH) Compute Host (CH) Hardware Hardware Hardware 15 Attack scenario 2 Remote attacker (Ar) Scheduler (S) Client (C) Ar could compromise the VM image prior to launch Trusted Compute Host (CH) Compute Host (CH) Compute Host (CH) Hardware Hardware Hardware 16 Trusted VM launch protocol • Ensure VM image launched on a trusted host. • Ensure communication with VM launched on a trusted CH rather than a random VM. • Compute host to verify the integrity VM image to be launched. • Minimum implementation footprint on the IaaS codebase. • Transparent view of the secure launch procedures. Protocol: birds-eye view (S) 3. 1. 4. 5. 2. 6. CH HW Client (C) CH HW CH HW + TPM 18 Prototype implementation • • OpenStack cluster deployed on 3 nodes (TPM-equipped) Code extensions: • Changes OpenStack launch procedure. • Implementation of an OpenStack–TPM communication “glue”. • Implementation of a TTP (interpretation of attestation info) • Implementation of client-side functionality (token generation, trusted launch verification). 19 Securing IaaS with InfraCloud: The project • Ongoing project in collaboration between Region Skåne, Ericsson Research and SICS. • Aim: proof of concept design and deployment of one of the region’s medical journaling systems in a hardened and trustworthy IaaS environment. • Prototype implementation based on earlier research, as well as solutions to newly identified challenges. 20 Securing IaaS with InfraCloud: The challenges Numerous new research challenges have been identified already in the early stages of the project: • Storage protection in untrusted IaaS environments. • Verification and protection of a deployment’s network • • • • configuration. Runtime VM instance protection (prevent memory dumping, cloning). Secure key handling mechanisms in untrusted IaaS deployments. Update and patch deployment on guest VM instances. Interpretation of TPM attestation data. 21 Conclusion • Out-of-the-box public IaaS probably not acceptable • • • • for most organizations handling sensitive data. A comprehensive solution for data protection in public IaaS environments has not been found yet. SICS Secure Systems lab works with various aspects of guest protection in untrusted IaaS. Trusted Computing Technologies allow to address some of the issues with IaaS security. Participation in the InfraCloud project and practical application of protocols reveal multiple new research challenges.