BENEFIT-SHARING MECHANISMS FOR REDD: HOW TO EQUITABLY SHARE BENEFITS AMONG FOREST MANAGERS? Maria Fernanda Gebara1 ABSTRACT Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) in tropical countries is now a critical piece of any international agreement that aims to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. After the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) included the prevision of a REDD+ mechanism for the post-Kyoto period, delegates and the broader international community turned the topic in one of prime importance on the agenda of the Climate Change (CC) regime and are now strongly encouraging the demonstration of REDD+ pilot projects. An important issue refers to the equitable distribution of benefits or, in other words, equitable benefit sharing mechanisms (BSM). This analysis seeks to address the gap between theory and practice by considering the main issues of concern in equitable BSM for REDD+. By doing so, it aims to contribute to the more effective design and implementation of BSM and expand debate on the topic. This paper will explore how Local Participation (LP) should be employed in the process of sharing benefits on the ground. It recognizes that REDD+ adaptation and mitigation goals are more likely to be met where there are democratic and interactive processes of LP while developing and implementing BSM, because such processes allow more flexibility in the definition of benefits and distributional mechanisms. The analysis concludes that: (i) the equity criteria should be considered while defining benefits rather than at the time of their distribution and (ii) given the complex and diverse relationships and issues that deforestation involves a more multi-dimensional approach is necessary when identifying beneficiaries, benefits and creating BSM. Key words: REDD+, benefit-sharing, equity, local participation, Juma, Brazil 1 Author affiliations: Oxford Centre for Tropical Forests (OCTF) and Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) Email: [email protected] 1 INTRODUCTION At the risk of some generalization of the concept Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) is the new United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) mechanism for compensating tropical countries for the carbon benefits that their standing forests (“avoided emissions” + “carbon stocks”) offer to the climate. Adopted under the Bali Action Plan (BAP) (UNFCCC 2007) and ratified by the last UNFCCC decisions (UNFCCC 2009a; UNFCCC 2009b) REDD+ has been considered efficient in mitigating Climate Change (CC) (Southgate 1952; Brown et al. 1996; Schneider 1998; Stern 2007; IPCC 2007; Eliash 2008) and strategic in fostering adaptation (“co-benefits”) activities in developing countries (Dutschke & Wolf 2007). There are however dilemmas concerning what kind of benefit-sharing mechanisms (BSM) should be implemented to promote mitigation and adaptation actions. Is it really viable to share benefits on the ground that are fair and at the same time produce additional and permanent outcomes? Because benefits will inevitably interfere with the cultural and economic values of forest managers (by encouraging them to change or maintain current behavior), transforming funds into fair and efficient benefits is a challenging step for REDD+. While the adoption of a REDD+ mechanism is an important and necessary milestone in the process of implementing climate policy, this paper concurs that successful outcomes on REDD+ will also depend on the construction and implementation of equitable BSM. In reaching this goal, local participation (LP) is crucial in developing and designing these mechanisms (Peskett et al. 2008; Griffiths 2008). The present analysis will explore how LP should be employed in the process of sharing benefits on the ground and demonstrate that a lack of participation of local forest managers in these processes will have a negative effect on the outcomes of BSM and consequently in the outcomes of REDD+ schemes in general. In order to test this hypothesis I will look at the very embryonic Brazilian efforts to share REDD+ benefits in the State of Amazonas. After looking at the conceptual framework and challenges of BSM, the case of the Juma Sustainable Development Reserve (JUMA) will be analyzed to explore the degree to which LP was considered while sharing REDD+ benefits, to see what elements of the case study can be applied in other projects and to draw some lessons for the way forward. The analysis seeks to address the gap between theory and practice by considering the main issues of concern in equitable benefit sharing for REDD+. By doing so, it aims to contribute to the more effective design and implementation of BSM and expand debate on the topic. This paper recognizes that REDD+ adaptation and mitigation goals are more likely to be met where there are democratic and interactive processes of LP while developing and implementing BSM, because such processes allow more flexibility in the definition of benefits and distributional mechanisms. The analysis concludes that: (i) the equity criteria should be considered while defining benefits rather than at the time of their distribution and (ii) given the complex and diverse relationships and issues that deforestation involves a more multi-dimensional approach is necessary when identifying beneficiaries, benefits and creating BSM. 2 RESEARCH METHODS Lacking a clear definition of what BSM are and how they should be implemented, an exploratory study was carried out to clarify some interpretations of the subject. To complement the secondary data available on this topic, a questionnaire was sent by email to some academics who are experts in “REDD+-like” schemes, including Payment for Environmental Services - PES. The criteria for selecting interviewees were representation and relevance to the conceptual framework and 8 respondents participated in this part of the research. The questionnaire included questions about their views on REDD+ equity, criteria for the distribution of REDD+ benefits, priority of REDD+ investments, methods of LP and awareness of JUMA. Field research permitted an in-depth investigation and examination of how BSM were designed and implemented in JUMA and the role LP played in this process. 50 people (mainly households, community2 representatives and students) were interviewed using open (Grummitt 1980) and probing (Torrington 1991) questions in a combination of semi-structured and unstructured interviews. Five criteria were used in selecting interviewees: i. ii. iii. iv. Access to benefits - people receiving and not receiving benefits; Market access – people living near to the roads and far from the roads; Deforestation rates - areas with high and low deforestation rates; Participation in the design and implemention of BSM – people who actively participated and people who did not. Questions focused on interviewees’ views with respect to how LP was approached in the project both in terms of the design and implementation of BSM and the fairness of the processes. Respondents were asked to assess the benefits of the project as fair, significant, sufficient or insufficient. Other questions included how the benefits were affecting forest cover change, forestry incomes and how the project developers approach to BSM could be improved to achieve more effective results. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK It is widely recognized that the conservation of forests largely depends on incentivating and supporting the countries that contain these forests and the people who live and work in them (CBD 1992; UNFCCC 2007; Wollengerg & Springate-Baginski 2009). It is also recognized that incentive mechanisms such as REDD+ can quite substantially increase benefit-flows to forest managers3 (Agrawal & Angelsen 2009). 2 This paper will adopt the definition of community as a rural group culturally differentiated which recognizes itself as such, with its own forms of social organization and that uses natural resources for subsistence and for cultural, social, religious and economic activities. This definition is recognized by Law in the State of Amazonas (LC 53/2007). 3 Forest managers are defined here as any group or individual that depends upon the forest to generate income or to subsist, including private land-holders. 3 The main principle underlying REDD+ is the transfer of large financial incentives from developed to developing countries in order to reduce deforestation and degradation. The scale of the benefits is normally linked to the rates of reduction in deforestation and degradation and in this regard REDD+ can provide substantial financial benefits to developing tropical countries. The way in which these benefits are distributed has become a major issue in REDD+. A particular concern is that the benefits may not be equitably shared between different stakeholders and that some people could lose out because they have less power in the benefit-sharing decision making processes. It is argued by Peskett et al (2008) and Griffiths (2008) that equitable BSM is a fundamental condition for allowing REDD+ to work effectively and this, in turn, depends on the degree to which LP is considered in the process of developing and implementing incentives and benefits. However, whilst concern has been raised in the literature about the impact of BSM in the effectiveness of REDD+, as reflected in overall reductions in deforestation (Luttrell et al 2007; Johns & Schlamadinger 2009; Agrawal & Angelsen 2009), scholars have been unable to reach agreement on how BSM could be made more equitable. Moreover, it is necessary to define what is meant by BSM, what types of benefits they will deliver and by which process (see Diagram 1). At present, the term 'benefit sharing' has many different meanings, which makes it difficult to identify the key main issues and the best ways of approaching it. It is not always clear what types of benefits need to be shared (e.g. financial benefits or in-kind benefits such as access to services). It is unclear how 'legitimate' beneficiaries should be identified, particularly in cases where deforestation is the result of illegal activities; or how benefit sharing systems can be managed at different levels of government, i.e. national, sub-national, local. Defining Benefit-Sharing Mechanisms According to the Bali Action Plan (BAP), BSM and related benefits will be created through the policy approaches and measures for REDD+ (UNFCCC 2007), commonly known as REDD+ Policies and Measures (PAMs) (Eliasch 2008; Peskett et al 2008, Brown 2008). Two types of PAMs related to BSM have already been distinguished; those that aim to generate compensations and those that generate incentives, where compensations are benefits aiming to cover the foregone opportunity costs of deforesting the land, and incentives are the benefits of incentivizing positive choices of behaviour (Peskett et al 2008; Brown 2008). Both incentives and compensations can be delivered up-front, to permit the commencement of REDD+, or dispensed over time, to guarantee the continuance of REDD+. In this paper, compensations are considered as a type of incentive as they serve to encourage conservation behaviours. Other category of PAMs related to BSM are also recognized here – those that aim to generate interventions. Interventions in this context are actions designed to create legal, administrative and technical benefits and include the regularization of land tenure, institutional arrangements, monitoring systems and other actions that are necessary to permit and guarantee positive outcomes for REDD+. 4 Another important consideration is the process by which BSM implement benefits: directly or indirectly (Peskett et al 2008). Direct benefit-sharing includes direct benefits to forest managers (e.g. PES, technical materials) and indirect benefit-sharing includes benefits that aim to foster broader development and adaptation actions that enhance co-benefits (e.g. social benefits). BSM would then deliver these benefits at national and local levels. The choice of PAMs used to establish BSM will affect the whole structure of a REDD+ scheme by determining who is to be incentivized to do what and what kind of interventions are needed to facilitate the successful implementation of the process. BSM (created by PAMs) Process: Timeframe: Direct X Indirect Upfront X Overtime Benefits Incentives E.g.: Social Benefits, PES Interventions E.g.: Definition of Land Rights Diagram 1: Summary of BSM characteristics Defining Beneficiaries In this paper I will consider three categories of beneficiaries: national, sub-national and local. National and sub-national beneficiaries, such as federal and state government agencies, receive resources to implement interventions through PAMs. Local beneficiaries, such as forest managers, receive a variety of incentives, including direct payments and subsidies. All these actors benefit from REDD+ investments and should be considered as BSM beneficiaries They include: governments, agencies, private entities, municipalities, traditional communities, indigenous communities, settlers, private land-holders, associations, institutes, non-governmental organizations, among others. CHALLENGES OF BSM: LOCAL PARTICIPATION AND EQUITY Local Participation It has been argued by some academics that active and continued LP is necessary to identify beneficiaries, appropriate benefits, the timeframe for implementation and the 5 ways in which benefits will be received while developing and implementing BSM for REDD+ schemes (Santilli et al. 2005; Nepstad et al. 2007; Peskett et al. 2008; Griffiths 2008). However, evidence shows that processes of LP are being poorly implemented or even not implemented at all in REDD+ pilot-schemes (see for example Dooley et al. 2008 review of nine Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PINs) submitted to the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)4). For the purposes of this paper it is important to define LP. Local maybe defined as any group that depends upon the forest to generate income or to subsist, including private land-holders. These people, who will be referred to in this paper as “forest managers” derive significant benefits from the forest and therefore are more inclined to manage and take care of it. If there are any changes in the forest cover, quality of the forest and its services, they will be the first to feel the impact. Participation, on the other hand, can have different meanings, depending on the context. Whatever the definition, participation is “highly context-specific and its effects range from coercion to full local control” (Hobley 1996). First, there are two distinct perspectives for participatory approaches: participation as a mean and participation as an end (Cleaver 1999; Diamond 2002). The first refers to participation as a mean to improve effectiveness of certain interventions and the second as a necessary tool for equity and empowerment of suppressed groups. Second, according to Pimbert & Pretty (1994), there are different levels of participation, from simple sharing of information to transfer of power, as described in Table 1, below. Table 1 – Typologies of Participation Typology of participation Manipulative Passive Participation by consultation Participation for material incentives Functional participation Characteristics People’s representative is unelected and has no power. People are simply being told what has been decided; unilateral announcement by administrators. People are consulted; analysis and decisions are made by external agents. People contribute resources (e.g., field and labor), and receive cash, food, and other material incentives. People have no stake in prolonging participation incentives when the incentives end. People’s participation is an answer to predetermined objectives formulated by external agents. They may be involved in decision-making, but tend to appear only after major decisions have been made. They may simply be co-opted. 4 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, one of the 4 World Bank’s funds for forest and REDD+ issues. 6 Interactive participation People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans, and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is a right, not an obligation to achieve a goal. A group has control over local decisions and resources. They have a stake in maintaining structures or practices. Self-mobilization Independent initiative by the people. Contact with external institution is based on their need. They retain control over decisions and resources used. Facilitation from outside technical assistance. Structure and distribution of wealth and power may or may not be challenged from within. Source: Pimbert & Pretty 1994 in IIED 1994 Since the 1970s many different participatory approaches to research, policy making and planning have been suggested. However only since the 1990s participatory methods have entered the development mainstream. Participation became a buzzword in studies related to the poor and on development projects. In this regard the best known participatory approaches are: Beneficiary Assessment, Social Analysis and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). The table below summarizes the main characteristics of these approaches. Table 2: Participatory Approaches Beneficiary Assessment Social Analysis BA is a method most associated to Salmen (1987, 1995), who has defined it as: “an approach to information gathering which assesses the value of an activity as it is perceived by its principal users… a systematic enquiry into people´s values and behavior in relation to a planned or ongoing intervention for social and economic change” (Salmen 1995: 1, in Francis 2001:74). Participatory Rural Appraisal Social analysis is associated According to Chambers (1994: 953) “PRA is a with the work of Michael growing family of Cernea (1991) and relates to the “social dimension”, approaches and methods a “structure of social to enable local people to relations” in which share, enhance and analyse their knowledge of “people´s economic activities are embedded” life and conditions, and to (Cernea 1991:9, in Francis plan, act, monitor and evaluate”. 2001:74). 7 This sounds fine in theory. In practice, however, some recent applications of participatory approaches in the development mainstream have fallen short of their original intentions. Participation is sometimes used merely as a tool for achieving preset objectives and not as a process to empower groups and individuals to take leadership, envision their futures, and improve their lives (Cornwall, 2000; Cleaver, 2001). The crucial role of LP in the implementation of BSM is to develop approaches that are flexible, suitably and able to secure the full and robust participation of forest managers. Since interactive and self-mobilization participation, as described by Pimbert and Pretty, involves control of local decisions and resources by forest managers, they are more likely to enhance such approaches. There is a risk, however, that BSM will end up reinforcing the status quo and that the control of the benefits will remain in the hands of project developers or central governments to be distributed according to their own criteria (Griffiths 2008), producing unfair outcomes. Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) should be considered while promoting LP processes. This involves making sure that: (i) there is information about and consultation on any proposed initiative and its likely impacts; (ii) there is meaningful participation of forest managers; and, (iii) there are representative institutions (UN 2005). It has been argued that only through such participation is it possible to design interventions and incentives that reflect the priorities of forest managers and are relevant and feasible from their points of view (UN 2005). This type of participation, in turn, helps them to maintain control and affects sustainability by building on their knowledge, initiatives and motivation. Additionally, participation enables forest managers to identify and adjust to emergent problems, and to engage in advocacy and policy dialogue with local and national policy makers. Effective participation, however, requires long implementation periods, flexibility in the design of benefits, close monitoring and evaluation, and an effective system for communication amongst stakeholders (UN 2005). The earlier the forest managers are included in the process of developing and implementing BSM, the greater the chances are of making it more feasible and effective for them. Also, forest managers must be well organized and able to negotiate if the outcomes of participation processes are to be maximized. In this regard, the provision of legal assistance for forest managers is also recommended (Griffiths 2008). From what has been stated above, it seems clear that guidelines for LP need to be established in order to build a distributional mechanism in a REDD+ scheme and this will vary from one REDD+ country to another. PAMs should include flexible approaches for BSM, which can be adapted to the needs of forest managers and to the area in which the REDD+ scheme is to be developed. It is essential, however, to guarantee that the process of participation follows FPIC principles, is democratic and interactive and is implemented before any other step is taken to share the benefits generated by the REDD+ scheme. As the analysis of the case study will show, only forest managers are capable of defining what fair benefits are and the best way of receiving them. 8 Equity Equity is recognized as a key element when designing and implementing BSM for schemes like REDD+ (Pagiola & Platais 2007; Peskett et al 2008; Grieg-Gran, in press). There are different ways of defining equity and most definitions are based on ideas of distributive justice (Rawls, 1971, Dobson, 1998; Okereke, 2008) which are as varied as the cultures from which they eminate (Sachs and Santarius, 2007:136). Following this the argument can be made that the definition of equity will always vary from one REDD+ country to another. We must also consider the way in which equity is analyzed: both in the outcomes of a distributional scheme and in the process of coming to an agreement on such scheme (Lind and Taylor, 1988). This distinction has already been described by Brown and Corbera (2003) respectively as “equity in outcomes” and “equity in decision-making”, where the first refers to the distribution of project outcomes among project participants (Corbera et al, 2007:368) and the later concerns to procedural fairness within the project framework, and considers the issues of recognition and inclusion in strategic management decisions (Fraser, 1997; Paavola, 2003 in Corbera et al, 2007:368). This paper recognizes that equity in decision making will directly interfere in equity in outcomes, as already argued by Corbera et al (2007), and will employ this distinction to analyze the way in which BSM were designed and implemented in JUMA. To analyze equity in the decision making process I will use Pimbert and Pretty (1994) typologies of participation to look at how local forest managers were engaged in the design and implementation of BSM. To analyze equity in the outcomes, I will look at the fairness of the benefits being distributed following Aristotle’s dictum of what is just is what is proportional (Muller 2001). Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis fair benefits will be those benefits capable of meeting different needs proportionally, looking not just at incomes and costs (as the literature on PES has been doing, e.g. Grieg-Gran, in press), but also at the main needs of those in charge of keeping the forests standing. Including “meeting needs” in my definition of fair benefits is justified by the fact that it figures prominently in the sustainable development discourse (WCED 1987; Okereke & Dooley, in press). One major concern when incorporating equity in REDD schemes is that in order to meet the additionality criteria (as defined at the Clean Development Mechanism), REDD+ needs to benefit large landowners who are likely to be responsible for the large emissions from deforestation and degradation and this would be unfair to those who have been conserving the forest for a long time, like indigenous communities (Sunderlin et al 2008, in Griffiths 2008; Bond et al 2009). Consequently is necessary to pre-determing through national and sub-national PAMs the eventual beneficiaries of any REDD+ scheme and which types of incentives and interventions they will be related to. In other words, who are to be encouraged to maintain behaviours (e.g. 9 indigenous communities), who will be compensated for the opportunity costs of REDD+ (e.g. large landowners) and which interventions need to be made in each case. In this sense, it is argued that as forest managers have different ways of managing and obtaining benefits from the forest, they will have different demands for assuming (in the case of large-landholders) or maintaining (in the case of indigenous communities) conservation behaviour. To reach this goal, a contextualized assessment of forest managers’ needs and which interventions are necessary in each case appear to be a crucial step in determining equity parameters when defining the benefits and BSM of REDD+ schemes at the local level. Additionally, as already shown by Corbera et al (2007), a more contextually informed definition of the benefits is critical to ensuring equitable BSM. CASE STUDY General Information The Juma Sustainable Development Reserve project for reducing GHG emissions aims to address deforestation in an area of the State of Amazonas (Brazil), which is under pressure from land-grabbers and illegal loggers, due to two main highways that run alongside the area (BR-319 and AM-174). The main activity of the area is small-scale agriculture, for the production of tubercles, cereals and fruits. The project is financed by government and private entities and has a complex institutional framework. The area is a conservation unit (sustainable development reserve) created in 2006, which belongs to the state and is protected by law. The overall project, however, is being coordinated by a private entity called Amazonas Sustainable Foundation (Fundação Amazonas Sustentável – FAS, in Portuguese). All the carbon credits generated by the JUMA project belong to FAS, in consequence of Law n° 3135 and the Decree n° 27.600 (Amazonas 2008) and will later be sold to Marriott International, the main private funder of the project. The fact that the carbon rights are owned by FAS can raise questions about the fairness of these PAMs taking these rights away from the local forest managers, responsible for reducing emissions. In fact, REDD+ like schemes, normally represent a virtual transfer of property rights from service providers to resource users (Corbera et al, 2007), who often control the nature of this transaction. Therefore, if forest managers are to be compensated and incentivized in a fair way, there need to be transparent and accountable BSM. BSM in JUMA JUMA uses financial resources in both incentives and interventions, using different types of BSM. Due to the complex nature of the research involved in analysing interventions, this paper will limit its investigation to an analysis of incentives. The BSM used by JUMA to implement incentives, was originally a state program to pay for environmental services known as Bolsa Floresta Program (BFP). This program was established by law in 2007 and is implemented in all the conservation units in the state of Amazonas. In the case of JUMA, however, due to extra financial resources provided 10 by the REDD+ project there are more types of benefits being distributed as part of the BFP than in other conservation units (R. Luna, 2009, personal communication), which guarantees the financial additionality of the project. Under the Decree n. 27.600 (Amazonas 2008), the coordination of the program is delegated to FAS and the program now consists of four voluntary components: i) Bolsa Floresta Family (BFF); ii) Bolsa Floresta Social (BFS); iii) Bolsa Floresta Association (BFA); and iv) Bolsa Floresta Income (BFI). In 2007, Decree n. 26.581 created the State Fund for Climate Change, which is where the resources for CC related activities, including REDD+, are deposited. The amount of money designated for the benefits distributed by the BFP is equivalent to the interest obtained from REDD+ investments in this Fund (M. Cenamo, 2009, personal communication). The components of the program and other relevant information are summarized on Table 2, below. Table 2: Bolsa Floresta Program BFP Characteristics Beneficiaries Traditional Communities, Local Associations, Women, Households and Children Coordination FAS State Climate Complementary Decree Decree PAMs created Change Law Law 53/2007 – 26.581/2 27.600/2008 (Law Regulated the 007– – Defined the coordination 3135/2007) – State Climate Created Established Change Law the of the the Program State Program Fund for Climate Change Funds Interests from the State Climate Change Fund, administrated by FAS with funds donated by the state and private investors. BFI BFF BFS BFA An average Direct An average Payment to value of BRL payment of a value of BRL the monthly grant 4,000 (+- USD association of 4,000 (+- USD 2,000) per people living 2,000) per of BRL 50 (+community in the USD 25) per community per year. This Components family, to the per year, reserve. It of BFP households of destined to corresponds portion is social to 10% of all destined for these supporting families. improvements the BFF sustainable . granted. Its purpose is to production. strengthen the organisation and social control of the 11 program. 1. Be a resident of the reserve for at least 2 years. Eligibility 2. If there are children have them at school. 3. Actively participate in the Association and in the development of management plans and complying with their rules. 4. Sign a commitment agreement for keeping crop and pasture areas no larger than those of the year when the Program was instituted. Rules Families who deforest an area a little larger than their crops (up to 50%), are given a “yellow card” and after explaining their reasons to the Association are allowed to continue in the Program for another year. If they continue deforesting, the families are given a “red card”, and their benefits are suspended for undetermined time. Whoever deforests an area much larger than their crop are (in excess of 50%) is given a “red card” in the first year. Families given either two consecutive yellow cards or three in alternate years are excluded from the Program. Source: Adapted from the Amazonas State secretariat for sustainable development website (www.sds.am.gov.br). This paper will use the definition of a traditional community as given by Complementary Law 53/2007, which regulates the Climate Change State Law; a rural group culturally differentiated which recognizes itself as such, with its own forms of social organization and that uses natural resources for subsistence and for cultural, social, religious and economic activities. These communities maybe indigenous, but in the case of JUMA there are no indigenous communities, just river bank ones. FINDINGS Local Participation in BFP The BFP program is voluntary and beneficiaries of the program include: the Association in the reserve, traditional communities, households, women and children. The association benefits from the BFA, while traditional communities, households, women and children benefit from all the other components: BFI, BFF and BFS. According to Project Design Document (PDD, 2008) “the project was designed through a transparent process involving participatory workshops and political consultations in order to guarantee the involvement and commitment of all the local stakeholders” (p.7). Also, “the use of participatory methods in all of these meetings, workshops and public hearings throughout the reserve creation process was very important for increasing understanding at the community organization level and for communicating the modus operandi to the local communities” (p.54). These workshops were meetings with local communities where climate change, the program and REDD+ were explained. 12 When asked to describe their participation in these meetings, the majority of households interviewed classified them as informative/passive rather than as empowering. In fact, as the whole program had already been developed (with the participation of just key stakeholders5) when these workshops occurred they served more to inform than to help in constructing the project and its BSM. It was during these meetings, also, that people were invited to sign a non-deforestation commitment (M.Cristo, 2009, personal communication). With the exception of the BFS case, the traditional communities and households in the reserve were not included during the early stages of the development of the components of BFP and were not given the opportunity of choosing the benefits they would receive and how they would receive them. Because the LP process was passive almost all the households interviewed considered that direct payments under the BFF, for example, made no difference to their wellbeing and in fact meant “nothing” to them. Some of the households (15%) considered that it was “better than nothing”, but was not sufficient to help encourage better behaviour in view of the fact that the benefits they could obtain from the forest were greater6. Another complaint was that to receive the money the households had to travel to the nearest town and this involved spending almost an equivalent amount on fuel to get there – this decreased the efficiency of the payments. Despite having the last word on how resources should be applied in any one year, some communities were not able to participate in the BFI decision making process, due to a lack of information with respect to the days on which BFI decisions would be taken. Thus, the BFI choices benefited only the communities in one part of the reserve and this prevented fair and effective outcomes. In order to monitor the impacts of the project in the communities, a socio-economic evaluation of these communities was carried out during the initial stages of the implementation of the project. Through a questionnaire answered by the head of the household, the social conditions of communities were evaluated and their social needs were identified (PDD 2008:93). This evaluation was also used to determine social benefits, and the best way to distribute them in the BFS (R.Luna, 2009, personal communication). The fact that the families in the reserve did not have easy access to services such as education, health, water and energy, made social benefits in the BFS very important in that they provided permanent, self-sustainable benefits, without creating dependency. Also, according to the majority of households interviewed, such benefits were more effective in modifying behaviour than direct payments. With their children at school, for example, families felt much more confident about meeting their commitments with respect to conservation (M. Adu, 2009, personal communication). 5 These included: NGOs, state representatives and forest managers representatives in Manaus, the capital of the State of Amazonas. 6 For the question about how much is their forestry income in cash per month answers varied from a minimum of BRL500 (around USD 200) to BRL5000 (around USD 2000). 13 In the case of BFA, when it came to the application of the resources households did not have the power to decide. In the first year, for example, although households participated by giving opinions on resources in some workshops realized by FAS, final decisions of the BFA were made by the foundation. Also, the equipment that FAS bought for the Association belongs to the foundation. Indeed, the households are starting to call the BFA the “Bolsa Floresta Foundation” (D. Correa, 2009, personal communication)! Participation in this case can only be considered consultative and this could reduce the autonomy of the Association and limit the chances of it reaching its goals. Equity in BFP In this section I will look at how the decision-making process affected the outcomes of the BSM in JUMA by analyzing equity in decision-making and in outcomes. With regard to direct payments made by BFF there was no attempt to determining households´ needs, how they would access the money and transaction costs that participants would incur. Furthermore, households could not renegotiate the deal and this placed them in a very passive position, which had negative implications for equity. In the case of BFS, however, the fact that the communities’ social needs were considered before implementing social benefits meant that there was “equity in the decision-making” and “in the outcomes”. The families in the reserve did not have easy access to services such as education, health, water and energy and so these became additional benefits, which were permanent in nature. Strategies to decrease dependence on forests such as more educational and social services can be effective ways of reducing emissions and generating co-benefits (Byron & Arold 1999) on REDD+ schemes. The most concrete benefit of JUMA up to now is, undoubtedly, the provision of education through the establishment of the main school of the project. Indeed, the majority of the academics interviewed believed that from an equity stand point local adaptation and capacity building must be the main focus when sharing benefits in a REDD+ project7. The aim of the Association is to strengthen the participation and the organisational character of the local communities and should be seen as a very important step to enhancing equity and attempting to follow FPIC principles. Nevertheless, as not all people are able to actively participate in the decision-making process and receive benefits from the association, these goals are not being reached. On the contrary, conflicts have arisen among communities and the association representatives and this has made the process of meeting different needs more difficult. In this sense, there is a need to improve equity both in decision-making and in outcomes in BFA. In the case of BFI, the resources were all invested in the production of Brazilian nuts and this activity was not capable of serving the interests of all communities. Households complained that there was a need to invest the resources in diversified 7 Information obtained through the analysis of questionnaires that were distributed among the experts. 14 activities, to benefit more people in the reserve. Households also reported that the investment was inefficient, because they receive the income from Brazilian nuts just once a year, rather than all year around. DISCUSSION This paper aimed to explore how to fairly distribute REDD+ benefits based on a framework of LP and equity. This section examines the prevalent issues and suggests ways forward. It also identifies elements of this study that can be applied in other REDD schemes. Two specific issues arise within this framework (1) how to define benefits and (2) how to develop and implement a BSM. How to define benefits The JUMA experience has demonstrated that benefits may be fairer and more efficient if defined before deciding how to share them. The advantages of defining the benefits before defining their distributional mechanism are: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) the ability to identify what will work more effectively for forest managers and which benefits are more efficient in changing behaviour; a greater possibility of guaranteeing additionality and the permanence of the scheme; the ability to meet different needs; the ability to deal with multi-stakeholders’ issues more effectively. It is also clear that defining fair benefits depends upon a transparent, interactive, inclusionary and well-implemented process of LP. However, it has already been argued that LP processes are difficult to implement because they require communication among forest managers, information, logistics systems and close monitoring and evaluation (UN 2005). Moreover, local power relationships are very often underestimated or not even taken into account, leading to a distorted version of the local reality (Cleaver 1999, Kanji and Greenwood 2001, in Maniggel 2005:60). As Agarwal (2001:1625) states: “There are limits to what participation alone (even if interactive) can achieve in terms of equity and efficiency, given pre-existing socio-economic inequalities and relations of power.” Therefore, the evaluation of forest managers’ needs and what may be considered fair and effective benefits could lead to a more equitable benefit sharing process. There are some core needs for financial investments in REDD+ schemes, but it is crucial to analyze the particular needs of the area where the scheme will be implemented in order to try to obtain fairness, additionality and permanence. • What can be replicated in other REDD+ schemes? 15 Benefits as social improvements, like education, and the idea of generating income through the promotion of sustainable businesses were, in the JUMA experience, fairer, more additional and more permanent benefits than direct payments. Consequently, it appears that REDD+ schemes are more sustainable if based on benefits like these rather than on direct monetary compensations. It was also clear that these benefits were successful in improving the welfare of forest managers and in generating cobenefits while, at the same time, reducing emissions. Developing and Implementing a BSM The case study shows that where local forest managers do not fully engaged in participation processes as in the cases of BFF, BFI and BFA, there can be a negative effect on the outcomes of equitable BSM. On the other hand, a more contextually informed and interactive participation of forest managers in the design and implementation of BSM, as in the case of BFS, can increase positive outcomes in terms of equity. Because benefits must be distributed across multiple stakeholders and at different levels, there must be different options for sharing them. They must also be developed according to local capabilities and be reviewed and monitored from time to time to guarantee equity, permanence and additionality. In the absence of reviewing processes, as in the case of BFP, there is a risk of forest managers being locked into inappropriate long-term commitments, receiving benefits that are insufficient to cover the costs of reducing deforestation. Finally, but no less important, strong local organisation and negotiation capacity appeared to be vital for guaranteeing that benefits were distributed following a bottom-up approach, rather than a top-down approach based on discretionary criteria. Mechanisms for resolving social conflicts were also considered crucial by the majority of households interviewed, highlighting the need for implementing accessible and transparent grievance mechanisms in JUMA. This lack of monitoring could make the difference between being in favour of or against the program. • What can be replicated in other REDD+ schemes? Although it is a flexible mechanism, BFP has shown that BSM will only produce equitable outcomes with interactive local participation in all the stages of benefitsharing, from the design and definition of benefits to the implementation of the mechanisms that will distribute them. The main approaches adopted in JUMA for the inclusion of forest managers in the process of sharing benefits were more consultative and informative, which lead to conflicts between forest managers’ needs, the benefits that were being implemented, and the ways in which they were receiving them. The JUMA project has also shown that monitoring and accountable systems to administrate BSM are important tools for equitable outcomes, especially where forest managers do not retain carbon rights. 16 Nevertheless, the four components of BFP contribute to the development of other BSM because it is extremely important to have different benefits that meet the social, organisational and financial (mainly income generation) requirements of forest managers. CONCLUSIONS This paper aims, trough the study of the JUMA project, to address the extent to which LP was considered while sharing REDD+ benefits in the project and what the implications of these were for equity parameters. It appears, from the analyses of JUMA, that it is more important to consider the equity criteria while identifying benefits than when sharing them. Moreover, because of the complex and diverse relationships and issues that deforestation involves a more multi-dimensional approach in identifying beneficiaries, benefits and creating BSM is indispensable. A multi-dimensional approach would reflect the relative costs and needs of different stakeholders. As schemes like REDD+ must also target areas that are at greatest risk in terms of effectively reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (Hall 2008; Wunder 2007), benefits for these areas will need to consider the conservation efforts and the costs of forest managers in the given areas. A multi-dimensional approach should also include benefits for those who already have conservation behaviour (such as indigenous communities), because such benefits are essential for dealing with equity dilemmas and avoiding “perverse incentives” that could increase deforestation (Richards & Jenkins 2007). In considering these factors and multi-task processes, project developers must keep in mind that there is no “one size fits all” for REDD+ projects and BSM implementation will need to vary from one project to another. Also, further research is needed for the development of guidelines for implementing inclusionary, interactive and democratic processes of LP. Finally, when we think about how to equitably share REDD benefits among forest managers and whether it is really possible to share benefits that are fair, additional and permanent at the same time we need the ask the question: how far are REDD+ benefits consistent with the needs and conservation efforts of forest managers? That one more question has been raised is perhaps not surprising for a subject matter that is relatively new. What can be said is that for that to be fair, additional and permanent benefits BSM will need to be developed and implemented with inclusive approaches and a flexible dynamic to benefit different types of forest managers. If not, REDD+ will only aggravate social relations in the forest and obstruct the process of reducing emissions. 17 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This research was realized with the support of the James Martin 21st Century School Tropical Forests Initiative visitor programme, while at the Oxford Centre for Tropical Forests (OCTF) at the Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford. I am extremely thankful to Connie McDermott, Tim Forsyth and Tony Hall for all the help and attention they gave me for the production of this work. Special thanks to Mauricio Adu and João Tezza for the realization of the field research. 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