Non-themed section article
What is left and right in
comparative politics? A response
to Simon Franzmann
Party Politics
2014, Vol. 20(2) 297–301
ª The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/1354068813520273
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Detlef Jahn
University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany
Abstract
Recently, I developed a left–right index in Party Politics which provoked some reaction. In particular, my claim that I use a
deductive approach was questioned, it being stressed that other indices are also constructed deductively and that, in turn,
my index is not adequately deductive at all. In this response to Simon Franzmann’s (2013) comment I stress the advantages
and pitfalls of both inductive and deductive approaches. Additionally, I elaborate why I perceive most existing left–right
indices as primarily inductive in nature and stress the importance of theory in a deductive approach. I question that a
high correlation with other left–right indices is a quality criterion of construct validity. I then correct some
misinterpretations fostered by Franzmann and summarize the logic of my index. Finally, I give two brief examples of
the merit and analytical potential of a deductive left–right score.
Keywords
comparative politics, left–right, methodology, party politics
Introduction
I recently developed a left–right index (Jahn, 2011) that has
provoked some reaction.1 Specifically, my claim that I use
a deductive approach has led others to react defensively,
claiming the deductive nature of their indices while questioning this in mine (Budge, 2013; Franzmann, 2013). First,
I emphasize that deductive reasoning is not at all superior to
inductive inferences. However, deductive and inductive
approaches certainly have different advantages and shortcomings. Deductive approaches allow for theory testing but
are not as well tailored to fit empirical data. In fact it is
exactly the point that data might not fit the theory that
determines the essence of the deductive approach. Therefore, a deductive index of left and right asks whether the
left–right dimension is still a valid tool with which to analyse programmatic preferences in modern societies. A precondition for such an analysis is, of course, that left and
right are clearly defined.
Conversely, an inductive approach starts out from
empirical observations. By summarizing the observable
manifestations of left–right criteria, one looks for patterns
in the data and asks if there could be an underlying dimension which may be classified as left–right. The left–right
dimension obtained is then defined by the patterns of data
which emerge from the analysis. The advantage of an
inductive approach is that it fits the index to the data,
whereas the disadvantage is that it is more vulnerable to
validity threats.
When Franzmann (2013: 1) claims that ‘ . . . the central
criterion by which to evaluate different approaches should
be construct validity . . . ’, where the quality criterion is the
bivariate correlation with other left–right indices, he implicitly takes an inductive view. There is no reason that an
index is more valid when it supports the findings of other
indices particularly regarding vague and contested issues
like left–right classifications. As Benoit and Laver (2006:
202) show, the left–right semantic has a specific meaning
for everybody; suggesting that correlating left–right positions with other policy issues in order to specify what is left
and right shows that left and right mean something very different in the countries under investigation. That is, ‘the
Paper submitted 6 December 2013; accepted for publication 15
December 2013
Corresponding author:
Detlef Jahn, University of Greifswald, Baderstr 6–7, Greifswald D-17489,
Germany.
Email: [email protected]
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298
Party Politics 20(2)
meaning of the left–right dimension is not the same across
different national contexts’. And, even more so, Benoit and
Laver (2006: 203) conclude: ‘we might extend this conclusion to speculate that the substantive meaning of left and
right might also change over time, with equally deep implications for the interpretation of times series of party positions, even in one country, on some common left–right
scale.’ Therefore, with this understanding, construct validity as emphasized by Franzmann may be a weaker test of
the validity of deductive left–right indices than he suggests.
Inductive and deductive elements in left–
right indices from party manifesto analysis
Most left–right indices use a combination of deductive and
inductive reasoning, though with a different emphasis on
one approach or the other. I focus here on three indices
which are most established and/or apply various logics of
constructing a left–right index.
The vanilla approach (Gabel and Huber, 2000) is a
purely inductive approach in that it uses factor analysis for
all items that have been coded in the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and the final index is constructed by
the factor scores of all these items. The only deductive element is the premise that all items of the CMP need to be
included in an analysis in order to identify a super dimension. However, in the end we know that we are measuring a
super dimension but know much less about its underlying
features. Consequently, this index has not been utilized to
any larger extent in applied research and the explanatory
power of this index is rather weak.
The most established right–left index, the RILE of the
CMP, uses deductive and inductive elements, though the
latter clearly dominate. After reshuffling the 54 items at
that time to 20 policy categories, a first factor analysis for
each country (it was only 10 countries at that time) identifies four left and three right items. These items were treated
as one variable and ‘ . . . used as input to a second set of
exploratory factor analyses together with the remaining
unclassified variables’ (Laver and Budge, 1992: 27). As a
result, 13 left and 13 right items were identified which constitute the RILE. Although it was stated that ‘ . . . a priori
theoretical coherence was the prime consideration . . . ’
(ibid., p. 26), no reference whatsoever was made to any
theory. In later publications – step by step – ever greater
deductive claims were raised. In Budge et al. (2001: 21 f.)
it was said that the left items referred to unspecified Marx
writings while the right items were ‘ . . . familiar from the
writings and speeches of exponents like Reagan and
Thatcher’. Since the latter personalities are certainly not
political theorists, in later writings right positions refer to
Edmund Burke (Klingemann et al., 2006: 6). So far, the climax of the ex post theoretical underpinnings has been
expressed by Budge (2013), who claimed that the left items
referred to Marx’s, Engels’s and Lenin’s writings while the
right items were connected with the work of Disraeli, Green
and Spencer. Were that mentioned in the original text during
the construction of the RILE and if clearly identifiable arguments of the mentioned authors were consistent with the 26
items dealing with right and left, the RILE would have been
deductive. However, when we look at the history of the construction of the RILE, one can only conclude that inductive
motives of finding issues which parties link together (Budge
et al., 2001: 21) have been the major interest. Therefore, it is
no wonder that some doubt has been cast as to whether all
items actually belong to a right–left dimension (Keman,
2007).
Franzmann and Kaiser (2006; later FK) use party families or party camps as a vehicle to inductively identify the
left and right items for each country using regression analysis. Importantly, it is doubtful if the concept of party family is a theory. As Mudde (1998: 211) points out: the
concept of party families ‘ . . . remains one of the most
undertheorized and least specified approaches to the general classification of parties’. I claim that referring to Bobbio’s (1996) work as a political theorist working exactly on
the topic of defining Left and Right is superior to using a
party classification. Even if we accept party families as a
substitute for political theory, the fact remains that party
families are not one dimensional (left versus right) but
rather multi-dimensional (communist, social democrats,
Christian, agricultural, liberal, nationalist, etc.).
This strong tendency of these left–right indices towards
the inductive approach led me to conclude that they are primarily inductive. Since Franzmann does not clearly see the
merit of my index as a deductive approach I will address
this issue now.
The logic of the deductive LR index
Franzmann (2013: 2) did not present the logic behind my
index correctly. My index consists of three elements: a
left–right core (LR_core), additional left–right issues
(LR_plus), and estimation of the degree of leftness and
rightness of each issue included in the index. Calling my
approach a MDS (multi-dimensional scaling) approach is
misleading because MDS has only been used for one step,
which is actually not the essential one. Continuing Franzmann’s format, one can summarize my approach in the following way:
P1: Bobbio defines the political left as linked to equality
and the political right as legitimizing inequality.
P2: A set of positional issues is identified as being linked
to equality and inequality.
C1: This set of issues is the core of left or right.
P3: Not all issues are equally radical.
C2: The radicalism of issues can be estimated by the
use of these issues by political parties (MDS).
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299
P4: Left and right are defined in national and temporal
contexts.
C3: Issues which correlate significantly with the core
left–right issues are country and/or period specific
issues.
P5: Not all of the country and time-specific issues are
equally radical.
C4: The radicalism of issues can be estimated by the
use of these issues by political parties (MDS).
The LR_core is deductive in that it uses 10 left–right
issues from the CMP data which are found in Bobbio’s theory of Left and Right. I made a systematic content analysis
of Bobbio’s book and deduced which CMP items fit his
argument. Propositions P1, P2 and the conclusion C1 are
purely deductive and set the ground for further analysis.
The LR_core is a universal (across countries and time)
left–right index. It is stable and has no context-specific elements. The core issues are specific features of Left and
Right. Without referring to these issues as Left and Right,
a left–right index would be meaningless. Therefore, they
are in fact left–right issues over all countries and time periods.2 In a second step I estimate the radicalism of each
issue (P3 and C2). Although it makes sense to claim that
the demand for nationalization is more radical left than the
demand of market regulation, it is not possible to determine
theoretically the degree to which these two issues are differentially radical. I therefore use an inductive approach
to determine the degree of radicalism. This degree has been
calculated for all democratic countries (not just 10 as in the
CMP) in the period from 1945 to 1973. The countries and
period have been discussed and justified in my previous
article so there is no selection bias if one accepts my earlier
arguments (see Jahn, 2011: 753 f.).
In the third step, I test for additional issues which are
aligned with the LR_core. The assumption here is that
the left–right dimension changes and is context-specific
(time and country) as suggested by Benoit and Laver (P4)
(see also Br¨auninger et al., 2013; Ko¨nig et al., 2013). However, in order to be labelled left or right it needs to correlate
with the LR_core (C3). The additional issues have also
been included in an MDS in order to determine the radicalism of these issues. This part of the analysis is also purely
inductive. However, this inductive reasoning is theoretically grounded because we know that parties are responsive
and integrate new issues in their party ideologies. The
empirical question, however, is which issues are becoming
relevant to Left and Right in the specific countries and time
periods analysed. The final LR index combines the core
issues which are fixed and the inductive issues which vary
between countries and over time.
The identification of various degrees of radicalism of
individual items included in the left–right index also makes
it possible to analyse the ideological cohesion of parties
which no other left–right index allows for. Identifying party
cohesion is essential for many fields of research where it is
important to understand non-unitary actors (e.g. agendasetting, veto players, accountability, coalition-building,
etc.). The benefit of my cohesion index has been demonstrated in a study comparing the ideological cohesion of
social democratic parties in the post-war period (Jahn and
Oberst, 2012). The procedure for developing a deductive
left–right index can also be applied to other ideological policy dimensions (for an environmental policy dimension,
see Jahn, forthcoming). In doing so, one can overcome simple index constructions by using ad hoc individual issues
from the CMP.
However, in the following section I demonstrate what a
deductive left–right index is able to detect. It can, for example, clarify the ways in which Left and Right have changed
in the most developed democracies throughout the postWWII period.
The Changing meaning of left and right
As an illustration of the merit of a deductive left–right
index I address very briefly two research questions about
the changing meaning of left and right. I start from the
hypothesis that the core of left and right declines in importance over time and that parties respond to this trend by
aligning other issues to their party ideology in order to
compete successfully with other parties. For the purpose
of underlining this argument I refer to the frequencies3 of
the LR_core, LR_plus and LR index (Table 1).
For all countries with an uninterrupted time series from
around 1950–2011 the LR_core declines in importance
when parties refer to the left–right dimension. Exceptions
are only Japan, Canada and the United States, all of which
increased the LR_core issues on a low level, in addition to
Switzerland where LR_core issues increased substantially
in the last time period analysed. Although the index of
importance is fairly stable for the LR, the additional issues
have been more frequently mentioned over time. This is
especially noticeable for Austria, Luxembourg, Norway
and Sweden. It is also interesting that the left–right issues
increased in the last period. Data shown online4 demonstrate that the LR increased to a record high of almost 60
percent in the period after the start of the economic crisis
in 2008. However, even in this period the core left–right
issues increased only slightly to 14.55 percent.
Three conclusions can be drawn from these findings.
First, the core issues are less relevant in recent years. Second, parties are able to ‘modernize’ the left–right semantic
by integrating new issues within their ideology. Third, the
modernized left–right dimension is still a relevant policy
dimension in modern Western societies, in particular during periods of economic hardship.
As an example of which new issues have been integrated
within the left–right dimension I look at two: (1) environmental issues are said to have become increasingly taken
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Party Politics 20(2)
Table 1. The importance of core and additional left–right issues over time and countries.
1945–1969
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Total
1970–1989
1990–2011
LR
LR_core
LR_plus
LR
LR_core
LR_plus
LR
LR_core
LR_plus
60.44
41.74
63.93
48.07
59.35
29.93
68.74
37.31
41.01
31.24
56.78
45.37
30.09
73.67
70.66
56.03
66.59
53.14
41.68
36.85
52.16
26.16
21.30
15.62
11.75
26.39
20.24
14.29
17.29
17.71
18.20
17.18
10.27
15.89
21.50
23.82
17.72
26.11
20.71
20.29
14.96
19.52
34.28
20.44
48.30
36.33
32.96
9.69
54.44
20.03
23.30
13.04
39.60
35.10
14.20
52.17
46.85
38.30
40.48
32.43
21.39
21.89
32.64
52.34
37.53
54.27
44.64
61.66
45.06
67.32
41.06
38.48
23.80
41.49
41.56
34.70
65.89
57.23
69.83
63.62
52.25
42.55
32.58
51.21
21.22
15.80
12.42
13.71
24.64
21.99
19.80
11.82
14.93
11.96
10.86
11.38
12.92
11.77
12.13
15.57
19.20
19.83
17.69
11.61
16.47
31.12
21.73
41.85
30.94
37.02
23.07
47.52
29.24
23.55
11.84
30.63
30.18
21.77
54.13
45.10
54.26
44.42
32.42
24.86
20.97
34.74
56.82
62.20
55.82
58.39
57.83
41.84
51.66
65.98
40.16
42.64
55.35
29.64
54.97
57.28
48.99
69.71
78.94
60.36
36.27
38.00
54.12
17.27
13.24
10.42
13.02
15.91
15.77
13.74
12.16
12.83
12.59
13.97
10.50
10.18
12.76
17.80
13.04
15.91
25.54
9.43
15.30
14.30
39.55
48.96
45.41
45.37
41.92
26.07
37.92
53.83
27.33
30.05
41.39
19.14
44.79
44.52
31.20
56.67
63.03
34.82
26.84
22.70
39.82
over by the left–right dimension and (2) the issue of European integration has become increasingly controversial
as a potential left–right item.
Concerning environmentalism (per418 and per501) the
assumption gets some support. In most countries green
issues are becoming part of the left ideology. This is so, for
example, in Australia since 1996, Austria since 1994, Germany since 1987, Italy since 1992, New Zealand since
1999, Sweden since 1991, and Switzerland since 1983. In
other countries, green issues are aligned to the left over the
whole period of analysis (Canada, The Netherlands and
Norway). However, there are exceptions. In Belgium and
France green issues belong to the ideological right and for
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the
United States green issues do not belong to the left–right
dimension at all.
We obtain an even more diverse picture when looking at
EU membership (per108 and per110). For most countries,
the pro-EU position is aligned with the right and anti-EU
sentiments with the left. However, in Belgium it was the
opposite from 1946 to 1974 and the left only integrated
an anti-EU stand starting in 1987. In Austria, Finland, Ireland, Norway and Switzerland, European integration is not
an issue of the left–right dimension at all. In The Netherlands, EU membership was neutral until the last two elections (2006 and 2010) when anti-EU positions go
together with the right ideology. Even if pro- or anti-EU
positions were engaged, it was so seldom that the EU issue
divided the left and right in a way that both ideologies
aligned with different positions simultaneously. However,
this was the case in Belgium from 1946 to 1974, in Denmark from 1979 to 1987, in France in 1978, in Italy in
1979 and 1992, Luxembourg from 1999 to 2009, in Portugal for the entire period, in Spain since 2008, and in Sweden since 1998. Such an analysis can only be conducted
when the analytical tool is deductive – a merit of the index
I introduced in Party Politics.
Concluding remarks
A major problem of the left–right dimension in comparative politics is that everybody has an intuitive feeling about
what it consists of. That is the reason why the RILE is a
kind of catch-all index aimed at satisfying everybody’s
needs.5 However, empirical research shows that there may
not be a commonly understood left–right dimension over
time and across countries. Identifying country-specific
dividing lines between parties in various party systems is
the strength of the FK index.6 However, following the
FK approach, it remains difficult to interpret the underlying
meaning of these dividing lines. Solving this problem by
constructing left–right scales that meet the expectations
of common sense (by correlating the indices with other
left–right indices) misses the point if there is the theoretical
possibility that left and right are not relevant anymore or
that they change meaning in different contexts. One can
analyse this question only if using a deductive approach.
This is particularly relevant when we apply the left–right
dimension to different contexts.7 Wiesehomeier and Doyle
(2012) made this clear when they used the rationale of my
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Jahn
301
index to analyse the left–right divide in Latin America. The
same may be true for countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. In sum: if researchers are interested in
knowing what they are measuring, the LR index developed
in Party Politics is the instrument at hand.
1. I thank Nils D¨upont, Kati Kuitto and Christoph Oberst for
comments and suggestions. I also thank Ashley Gongaware for
language editing.
2. This may be a disadvantage of the FK method. If, for instance,
labour parties emphasize privatization extensively, the FK
index would identify this issue as a genuine Left item which
would be misleading.
3. Frequencies were referred to as importance in my original
article.
4. For online data, see http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/
5. After all, the RILE contains almost half of all items included in
the CMP data.
6. Unfortunately the FK index is not continued after 2007. The
methodology also implies that the last election cannot be used,
so application of this index ends around 2003. In contrast, the
LR is applicable from 1945 until 2011 and will be regularly
updated (http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/).
7. The FK approach requires a ‘ . . . minimum of party system stability . . . ’, which is not a given in transitional democracies or
even Italy (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006: 185). Therefore, it is
surprising that Franzmann and Kaiser offer data for just these
countries in their updated online version: http://www.verglpolwiss.uni-koeln.de/10603.html (accessed 17 October 2013).
Franzmann S and Kaiser A (2006) Locating political parties in
policy space. A reanalysis of party manifesto data. Party Politics 12(2): 163–188.
Gabel MJ and Huber JD (2000) Putting parties in their place: Inferring party left–right ideological positions from party manifesto
data. American Journal of Political Science 44(1): 94–103.
Jahn D (2011) Conceptualizing Left and Right in comparative politics: Towards a deductive approach. Party Politics 17: 745–765.
Jahn D (forthcoming) Party preferences, institutional settings and
interest group mobilization in environmental politics. Manuscript: University of Greifswald.
Jahn D and Oberst C (2012) Ideological party cohesion in macrocomparative politics: The Nordic social democratic parties
from a comparative perspective. Scandinavian Political Studies 35(3): 222–245.
Keman H (2007) Experts and manifestos: Different sources –
same results for comparative research? Electoral Studies
26(1): 76–89.
Klingemann H-D, Volkens A, Bara JL, Budge I and McDonald
MD (2006) Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1990–2003. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Ko¨nig T, Marbach M and Osnabr¨ugge M (2013) Estimating policy positions of political actors across countries and time – a
dynamic latent variable model for manifesto data. Political
Analysis 21: 468–491.
Laver M and Budge I (1992) Measuring policy distances and modeling coalition formation. In: Laver M and Budge I (eds) Party
Policy and Government Coalitions. New York: St. Martin’s.
Mudde C (1998) The party family and its study Annual Review of
Political Science 1: 211–229.
Wiesehomeier N and Doyle D (2012) Attitudes, ideological associations and the left–right divide in Latin America. Journal of
Politics in Latin America 3(1): 3–33.
References
Author biography
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Bobbio N (1996) Left and Right. The Significance of a Political
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Detlef Jahn is Professor of Comparative Politics at the University
of Greifswald. He has published in International Organization,
European Journal of Political Research, West European Politics,
Journal of Public Policy and Journal of Public Health in the fields
of social and environmental policy and policy diffusion. Concerning party preferences he has published ‘Ideological Party Cohesion
in Macro-Comparative Politics: The Nordic Social Democratic Parties from a Comparative Perspective’ in Scandinavian Political
Studies together with Christoph Oberst and ‘The Diffusion of Party
Positions: Policy Positions Moving from the Nordic to the Baltic
States’ in Nicholas Aylott (ed.) Models of Democracy in Nordic
and Baltic Europe – Political Institutions and Discourse. He is presently preparing a book manuscript comparing the impact of the
left–right and environmental dimension in environmental politics.
Professor Jahn and his research team in Greifswald have created
a comprehensive database for analysis of the political process in
modern democracies which is updated regularly and can be
accessed at: http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency
in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Notes
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