1. health and fitness
2. disorders
3. mental disorder
4. panic and anxiety

China’s Unassertive Rise
International Journal of China Studies
Vol. 4, No. 3 (Supplement), December 2013, pp. 503-538
503
China’s Unassertive Rise: What Is Assertiveness and
How We Have Misunderstood It?+
Walter Lee*
University of Auckland
Abstract
Since 2010, there has been a drastic increase in the discussion and publication
of “assertive China” and “Chinese assertiveness” in the English-speaking academic sphere, governmental actors and international news coverage. The rise
of the new assertive China narrative could be a return of the “China threat”
dispute between the neo-realists in the West and their hawkish counterparts
in China. The monolithic interpretation and distortion of “assertiveness” have
complicated the picture of a fast-changing and a somewhat unpredictable
China. This article brings together the assertive China narrative, the concept
of assertiveness in behavioural science, and Lucian W. Pye’s psychocultural
analysis of Chinese politics to see how the state psyche of China has been
misread by both the West and China itself. The purpose of this article is not
just to summarize and address the rise of the assertive China narrative, but
to raise psychocultural questions: What is assertiveness? How is it possible
to fit the psychological concept of assertiveness in IR and Chinese foreign
relations? Why is China not assertive? Why should China be assertive?
How can China be assertive? Being assertive never means being aggressive.
Today’s China is transforming from a passive, aggressive stage of behaviour
towards a more active, assertive stage, but it is not there yet.
Keywords: The rise of China, assertiveness, psychocultural analysis, the
Chinese “Self”
JEL classification: F51, F53, F55, F59
1. Introduction
Being assertive never means being aggressive. An assertive person is considered as a positive, assuring, progressive, respectful and respectable person.
When it comes to Chinese international relations, however, the meaning of
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Walter Lee
“being assertive” is distorted by the Machiavellian interpretation: “assertiveness” becomes another word for aggressiveness, confrontation, threat, bullying
and retaliation. Since 2010, there has been a drastic increase in the discussion
and publication of “assertive China” and “Chinese assertiveness” in the English-speaking academic sphere, governmental actors and international news
coverage. There have been too much arbitrary arguments but not enough
substantive analyses on the application of “assertiveness” as a psychological
concept in the scholarship of International Relations (IR).
This article discusses what Alastair Iain Johnston attempted to summarize
as “assertive China narrative” (Johnston, 2011: 25; Johnston, 2013: 7-48).
The purpose is to deconstruct “assertiveness”, to take a closer look to enrich
the meaning of such a concept by borrowing definitions and theories from
behavioural science. I argue that the assertive China narrative is flawed.
Assertiveness has a more profound meaning than aggressiveness. China
is not what some American academics, politicians and journalists believe
as an assertive rising power. I do not want to assert that the proposition
and proliferation of “assertive China” or “Chinese assertiveness” are parts
of the United States (US) and its allies’ strategy of containment or soft
power pivot on a rising China. I rather want to point out this indicates
the West’s transforming perception towards China. From “China threat
theory” (Zhongguo weixie lun 中国威胁论) to “assertive China narrative”
(Zhongguo chengqiang lun 中国逞强论1), the mainstream discussions on and
understanding of China in the global academic sphere have been monopolized
by the English-speaking world’s subjective, fluctuating speculation. The
rise of the assertive China narrative could be a return to the “China threat”
dispute between the neo-realists in the West and their hawkish counterparts
in China. From the Western point of view, China’s assertiveness is a kind of
flaunt and arrogance, but in the Chinese eyes it is an act of self-strengthening
(ziqiang 自强) and the protection of the nation’s “core interests” (hexin liyi
核心利益). The monolithic interpretation and distortion of “assertiveness”
have further complicated the picture of a fast-changing and a somewhat
unpredictable China.
This article begins with a brief summary of the academic and journalistic
debates on “assertive China” and “Chinese assertiveness” from 2010 to 2013.
Then it reconceptualizes “assertiveness” from the perspective of behavioural
science and psychocultural analysis of politics. It sees how these disciplines
lend us new insights into China’s global engagements. The article then goes
on to investigate why there is no assertive China narrative. It argues China
is transforming from a passive, aggressive stage towards a more active,
assertive stage of behaviour, but it is not there yet. Both dragon-slayers and
panda-huggers have to understand one thing: To make China assertive means
making it a healthy member of the international society. Instead of panicking
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about China’s aggressive “assertiveness”, we should go beyond the shallow
definition and restore a more accurate meaning of assertiveness. We will see
what response is needed for an unassertive rise of China, while we also look
forward to China’s deeper, more confident engagements in global affairs.
2. The Assertive China Narrative
The use of “assertive” and “assertiveness” in Chinese international relations
is more popular in the Western context than in the Chinese context. These two
words may refer to confident/confidence (zixin 自信), arbitrary/arbitrariness
(duduan 独断) and flaunting (chengqiang 逞强). In 2006, Evan Medeiros
identified “a growing assertiveness in various areas of Chinese foreign policy,
and with regard to the [US] in particular” (Swaine, 2010: 3). Observers
in the West largely date an increased level of China’s assertiveness from
2008 when Beijing hosted the Olympic Games, Wen Jiabao’s criticism
of the US for its “economic mismanagement” and the People’s Bank of
China’s senior official’s questioning of the US Dollar’s continued role
as the international reserve currency (ibid.). Since then, there has been a
flood of assertive-related words in Chinese international relations writings.
Recently Johnston has tried to systematize this as “assertive China narrative”
and/or “assertive China discourse” (Johnston, 2011: 25; Johnston, 2012).
Here I summarize the assertive China debate from 2010 to 2013 by using
Factiva, a business information and research tool owned by Dow Jones and
Company.2 It is clear that the year 2010 saw a sharp increase in the number
of news sources that cover those two terms. David Shambaugh calls 2010
“the year of assertiveness” for China (Shambaugh, 2013: 416). This echoes
with Johnston’s frequency count of articles referring to “insatiable” and
“assertive” within five words of “China” in the US newspapers and wire
reports (Johnston, 2011: 26).
I argue that “assertive China” and “Chinese assertiveness” can be qualified by five features: (a) economic vulgarism, (b) anti-Americanism, (c) military aggression, (d) diplomatic arrogance, and (e) China’s “core interests”.
(a) Economic vulgarism
Cai da qi cu 财大气粗 (Great wealth, vulgar behaviour).3
The recent emergence of China’s assertiveness is a result of China’s quick and
strong rebound from the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 (Christensen,
2011: 54; Swaine, 2010: 1). China has insisted on projecting an alternative
path to the Western liberal democratic-capitalist model (aka the Washington
Consensus) by sustaining high growth rates and massive foreign exchange
reserves (Swaine, 2010: 1). China’s growing economic success and expanding
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Table 1 Total Document Count of the Appearance of “Assertive China” and
“Chinese Assertiveness” in the Global Media, 2000-2013 (till September) (Factiva)
Assertive China
Chinese Assertiveness
Add-up
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 (till Sep 2013)
14
32
10
8
15
30
28
33
22
52
247
215
264
350
7
5
5
3
4
13
0
8
9
33
154
185
172
124
21
37
15
11
19
43
28
41
31
85
401
400
436
474
Total (from 2000 to Sep 2013)
1,320
722
2,042
Figure 1 Trend of Using “Assertive China” and “Chinese Assertiveness” in the Global Media, 2000-2013 (till September) (Factiva)
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
Assertive China
150
Chinese assertiveness
100
Add-up
50
0
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economic presence in the world are closely related to the argument that China
is single challenger to the US leadership. The Americans’ response has been
paranoiac: “For its part, the US media and pundit discourse has quickly
adopted the term ‘assertive’ to qualify China’s foreign policy in recent times.
Some liberal analysts have begun to argue, along with more conservative
pundits, that the China model or the Beijing Consensus constitutes an
ideological challenge to the USA and its values. One analyst at the Council on
Foreign Relations even goes as far as to call China a ‘revolutionary power’.”
(Johnston, 2011: 22-23) Joseph S. Nye, on a visit to Beijing, asked a Chinese
expert what was behind the new assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy. The
Chinese man answered: “After the financial crisis, many Chinese believe we
are rising and the US is declining.” (Nye, 2011)
Zhao Suisheng believes China has become more forceful in defending its
core interests since the financial crisis. He contends: “seeing a relative decline
of the West, China has found more leverages and rights to forcefully safeguard
China’s core interests rather than compromise them and is therefore more
willing to proactively shape the external environment rather than passively
react to it” (Zhao, 2010). However, Zhao argues that this is only one of the
ways to understand China’s new assertiveness.
Chatham House’s Asia Programme Paper Trying to Read the New
‘Assertive’ China Right (2011) argues that China’s new assertiveness refers to:
first, no significant concessions in trade has been made despite strong outside
pressure and China’s participation in the World Trade Organisation (WTO);
second, China has constantly refused any drastic appreciation of the Chinese
Yuan/Renminbi; third, it remains reluctant to liberalize trade and investment
regimes and it has continued to protect its domestic services industries
from foreign competition. China has yet to accede to the WTO Agreement
on Government Procurement and has successfully banded together with
developing countries to offset pressure to do so; and fourth, China has been
controlling the supply and processing of precious earth metals and the use of
their final products. China has a single-minded desire for economic progress
at the expense of international opinion (Brown and Loh, 2011: 9-10).
(b) Anti-Americanism
China’s economic success and the global shift of power from the West to
the East coincide with the rise of chauvinism and populist nationalism in
Chinese society. China’s new assertiveness is then perceived in the West
as brash, insulting in tone and demeanour, anti-American in direction and
potentially dangerous. Many Western observers doubt whether or not it would
be appropriate for the US to respond to China’s assertiveness in a tough way,
thus pushing the two countries into an assertiveness dilemma that features
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tit-for-tat. According to Michael D. Swaine, these observers “warn of a strong
reaction from the West that could lead to a damaging cycle of retaliation”
(Swaine, 2010: 8). From the Chinese point of view, however, the new
assertiveness is nothing but “an unsurprising reaction to US provocations …
[Many] characterize what Westerners regard as potentially dangerous efforts
to confront and challenge the US and Western norms as a less threatening but
totally justified response to Western (especially the US) provocations” (ibid.:
4, 9). The US has now become the lead country to mention China’s new
assertiveness. Factiva shows that the US ranks second – after China and far
ahead of other countries – in the frequency count of country and capital city
names that are mentioned together with “assertive China” and/or “Chinese
assertiveness” (Table 2). American politicians are frequently mentioned in
articles that describe China’s new assertiveness (Table 3).
China’s new assertiveness came at a time when the US started to decline
in power and the “conciliatory gestures” were given by the Obama administration, which has been seen as “signs of weakness rather than goodwill”
(ibid.: 2). Barack Obama’s treatment in Beijing in 2009 is considered by some
American observers as “humiliating”. The Chinese Government’s stance
towards Obama’s late-2009 decisions on Taiwanese arm sales and the meeting
with the Dalai Lama is considered as “unusually assertive, confrontational and
potentially retaliatory” (ibid.: 3). China may not agree with these accusations
because it believes such increasingly assertive behaviour is merely a gesture
of counterbalancing the illegitimate assertions of the US and its allies on
issues such as arm sales to Taiwan, China’s sovereignty rights at its maritime
Table 2 Countries and Capital Cities Mentioned Together with “Assertive
China” and “Chinese Assertiveness” in the Global Media, 2000-2013 (till September) (Factiva)
China and Beijing
United States and Washington D.C.
India, Delhi and New Delhi
Japan and Tokyo
Vietnam and Hanoi
The Philippines and Manila
South Korea and Seoul
North Korea and Pyongyang
Australia and Canberra
Emerging market countries
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Assertive China Chinese Assertiveness Add-up
1,407
917
1,063
490
2,470
1,407
507
528
105
130
178
180
126
108
416
134
301
137
33
28
66
54
923
662
406
267
211
208
192
162
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Table 3 Politicians Mentioned Together with “Assertive China” and “Chinese
Assertiveness” in the Global Media, 2000-2013 (till September) (Factiva)
Document count
Barack Obama
Hilary Clinton
Xi Jinping
Hu Jintao
Manmohan Singh
Wen Jiabao
Li Keqiang
Mitt Romney
Benigno Aquino III
Leon Panetta
125
67
59
58
58
32
30
29
26
20
periphery, the revaluation of the Chinese Yuan (Renminbi), global climate
change and trade disputes. Seeing a declining US still attempting to keep
China down, China has become less willing to make adaptations and more
ready to assert its interests (Zhao, 2011: 40).
The rise of the assertive China narrative has witnessed a mutual-paranoia
between China and the US. Academics in mainland China tend to bear a
neo-realist perspective on Sino-US relations. Yan Xuetong, as described by
Johnston as the creator of “Superficial Friendship Theory”, argues that the
Chinese and American leaders have mistakenly believe Sino-US relationship
is more cooperative than it really is (Johnston, 2011: 5). The rise of China is
accompanied by Chinese hardliners’ desire to drop the “be skilful in hiding
one’s capacities and biding one’s time” (tao guang yang hui 韬光养晦)
axiom and develop the “take proper initiative” (you suo zuo wei 有所作为)
axiom. According to Jeffrey A. Bader, the former senior director for East
Asian affairs in the National Security Council during Obama’s first term, the
direction of Chinese foreign policy was debated within the Communist Party
of China (CPC) in the last few months of 2010. The advocates of a more
assertive policy had gone unchallenged publicly, while those who supported
tao guang yang hui had been effectively silenced. State Councillor Dai
Bingguo then published an article on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website
and People’s Daily, insisting China’s determination to sustain the Dengist
policy. This could well be seen as Hu Jintao’s response to the hardliners and
his verdict on the debate: China needs to demonstrate to the international
community not its aggressiveness, but its sense of responsibility (Bader,
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2012: 122-123). Nevertheless, by observing China’s behaviour since then,
Western observers have reasons to believe that China is actually becoming
“assertive” (or aggressive). Interesting, Thomas J. Christensen projects a
different understanding of assertiveness and argues that “the United States
needs a more assertive China” (Christensen, 2011: 67).
(c) Military aggression
Carlyle A. Thayer uses “aggressive assertiveness” (Thayer, 2012; Thayer,
2011: 89) to describe China’s assertion of sovereignty over the South China
Sea. It is problematic to group “aggressive” and “assertiveness” together
because these words have different, if not diverging, meanings. Thayer’s
“aggressive assertiveness” shows us when it comes to hard power issues,
“assertiveness” is more likely to be abused. Although China has emphasized
repeatedly it would never lapse into activities that “bully” or “worry” its
neighbours (Brown and Loh, 2011: 8), its maritime assertiveness is concerning
the US as well as India, Japan, Taiwan, some Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) members, South Korea, and even Australia in areas of peace
and stability, regional balance of power, freedom of navigation, and so on.
At the centre of the Chinese military assertiveness is the role played by
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in China’s foreign relations. Swaine
says some observers regard the PLA as a conservative, highly nationalistic
and increasingly capable and confident actor in the Chinese political system
(Swaine, 2012a: 1). These observers see the PLA as an interest group that
pressures the civilian Chinese leadership to adopt a more assertive stance
towards the US (ibid.). China’s military expansion indicates an increasingly
assertive and dangerous China (Swaine, 2012b: 10). Such danger could lead
to the potential military confrontation between China and the US. The Chinese
leaders may have noticed a shift in power in the Pacific gives them more
room to push their interests and agenda, including an ultimate push on the US
military power back to the Second Island Chain (Johnston, 2011: 23).
The worry that China is becoming an anti-status quo power has been
seen to be warranted with the Chinese patrolling vessels’ presence in the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute with Japan, in the South China Sea dispute
mainly with Vietnam and the Philippines, and in Southwest border with India.
China’s expanding power is arguably pushing most Asian countries closer to
the US. The US is still welcomed in the region because it provides strategic
balance. It prevents China from dominating its neighbours. That is why when
the Obama administration announced a strategic pivot towards Asia, China is
bristled, while most other Asian nations felt reassured (Pei, 2011).
China argues that its moves in securing territorial integrity, natural
resources and military modernization are all vital parts of defining its “core
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interests”, while observers outside China disagree. The Lowy Institute in
Australia has warned that China’s military assertiveness could lead to armed
conflict in Asia that draws the US and other Asian countries in (Lees, 2011).
Who knows the emotion embedded in China’s “assertiveness”? It is unclear
whether non-Chinese observers can understand the anger behind China’s
muscle-flexing activities in the region. As Li Mingjiang has pointed out:
The changing Chinese posture towards assertiveness is a reflection of its
growing discontent with the actions of other regional states, its desire to
benefit economically in the South China Sea and the growth of its capabilities
and power … [The] Chinese are very angry at the forceful actions of other
regional states against Chinese fishermen in the Spratly area.
(Li, 2010: 58)
China is not very good at expressing its inner discontent in a way that is
easily understood by outsiders. Without effective and efficient communication, it is easy for China and its neighbouring countries to have mutual
misunderstandings. The former Indian National Security Adviser M. K.
Narayanan has said ‘Beijing’s increasing assertiveness while dealing with
disputes is “most disconcerting”’ (“Chinese assertiveness in disputes disconcerting”, 2nd November 2012). In August 2011, for the first time, the
Japanese government called China “assertive” in an annual white paper
approved by Naoto Kan. It states that “China’s future direction can be a source
of concern stemming from its multiple conflicting interests with neighbouring
countries, including Japan” (Koh, 2011). The Japanese Government’s use of
“assertive” is widely seen as a sign of discontent towards China.
(d) Diplomatic arrogance
China’s recent diplomatic assertiveness has been seen as diplomatic arrogance
by many Western observers. China has become increasingly vocal to protest,
to complain and to suggest alternatives to the current international system.
China stepped up its complaint and warning to the US’s deployment of aircraft
carrier USS George Washington in the Yellow Sea during the US-South Korea
joint military exercise in 2009. China issued six official protests with a
successively tougher tone from calling to “maintain calm and constraint” to
expressing “concern” and “serious concern”, then to “oppose” and “strongly
oppose” (Zhao, 2010). Now it is more common for China to push back the
US and its allies in many global issues. In Swaine’s words, China is finally
“revealing [its] true colors” (Swaine, 2010: 1).
In terms of global engagements, Swaine argues that China was “allegedly
hard-line, obstructionist, and deliberately insulting” (ibid.: 3) at the United
Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009. China was
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persistently resistant to the UN Security Council sanction against the Iranian
nuclear projects and the option for military intervention to the bloodshed
in Syrian Arab Republic. China sent its battleships to the Gulf of Aden to
assist in the international effort to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia
(Christensen, 2011: 56). China is apparently losing patience with North
Korea. It has condemned Pyongyang several times for its violations of the UN
Security Council resolutions. It has joined the rest of the fourteen Security
Council members to pass Resolution 2094 on 7 March 2013 to impose more
sanctions on North Korea’s third nuclear test. China also censored the news
about the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to dissident Liu Xiaobo in 2010. The
Government summoned the Chinese ambassador to Norway and presented an
official complaint about Liu’s award. They called Liu “a criminal”. China then
set up the Confucian Peace Prize in response, “for the promotion of world
peace from an Eastern, Confucian perspective” and “to declare China’s view
on peace and human rights to the world” (Jiang, 8th December 2010).
China is a rising naval power. It is accused by some Southeast Asian
nations of exercising its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, which includes unilateral
commercial fishing bans, cable cutting acts, oil exploitation bans, foreign
fishermen arrests, coastal patrols and live-firing exercises (Pham, 2011: 139;
Thayer, 2011: 77, 85, 89). Derek Pham argues that China’s assertive rhetoric
matches with its tangibly aggressive actions in the South China Sea. Such
behaviour is a response to a rapid change in the security environment in the
region. Thayer says that China’s aggressiveness in the region has provoked
a patriotic anti-China backlash (Pham, 2011: 145; Thayer, 2011: 89 and 91).
China’s “talk and take” policy can be described as “creeping assertiveness”.
Thayer suggests that both ASEAN and the international community “must
confront China over its aggressive assertiveness in the South China Sea
[because] their weakness only invites China to act more assertively” (Thayer,
2012).
At the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi warned Southeast Asian states against coordinating with outside powers
in managing territorial disputes with China (Christensen, 2011: 55). China’s
refusal to join the UN arbitration as suggested by the Philippines to solve
the Huangyan Dao/Scarborough Shoal dispute (“China Rejects Philippines’
Request for UN arbitration”, 20th February 2013) is another example to show
China’s growing diplomatic assertiveness at the expense of ignoring global
rule of law. Xinhua News Agency was apparently pleased with the comment
made by Simon Tay, Chairman of the Singaporean Institute of International
Affairs (SIIA), that the region should “stop legal procedures from creating
political chaos” (fangzhi falü chengxu zhizao zhengzhi luanju 防止法律
程序制造政治乱局) (“Xinjiapo xuezhe renwei guoji zhongcai Nanhai
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zhengduan shi zhengzhi leiqu 新加坡学者认为国际仲裁南海争端是政治
雷区” [Singaporean scholar believes international arbitration for the South
China Sea could touch political landmines], 30th January 2013). Hong Lei,
the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs disapproved the
referral to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He said:
“China does not approve the action of giving up consensus and do something
else” (Zhongfang buzancheng zhezhong beili gongshi, linggao yitao de zuofa
中方不赞成这种背离共识、另搞一套的做法) (“Waijiaobu: Bu zancheng
jiang Zhongfei Nanhai zhengyi tijiao guoji zhongcai 外交部：不赞成将中
菲南海争议提交国际仲裁” [Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Disapproving international arbitration for the South China Sea dispute], 31st January 2013).
Though criticized by many Chinese for “not doing enough”, the Chinese
government has shown a more assertive face to Shinzo Abe in the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Island dispute. Chinese military agencies have entered the disputed
area. There have been maritime incursions, aerial incursions and surface
vessel patrols. On 13th December 2012, a Chinese government aircraft
entered Japanese-controlled airspace for the first time since records began
in 1958 (“Japan’s New Cabinet: Back to the Future”, 5th January 2013). In
February 2013, Japan revealed that a Chinese frigate had locked weaponstargeting radar onto a Japanese destroyer and helicopter on two occasions
in January. The Chinese Jiangwei II-class frigate and the Japanese destroyer
were three kilometres apart, and the crew of the latter went to battle stations.
In late February 2013, U.S. intelligence detected China moving road-mobile
ballistic missiles closer to the coast near the disputed islands, this included
DF-16s (Herman, 2013; Margolis, 2013; Bertz, 2013).
(e) China’s “core interests”
In the eyes of many non-Chinese, China’s new assertiveness can be easily
summed up in a word: “threat”. However, how China and its people look at
Chinese assertiveness is equally, if not more, important. What is the rationale
behind China’s new assertiveness? The answer has to do with China’s “core
interests” (hexin liyi 核心利益), which have close relations to “fundamental
interests” (genben liyi 根本利益) and major concerns (zhongda guanqie 重
大关切). According to Swaine, the concept “core interests” was inserted in
the Sino-US Joint Statement between Hu Jintao and Barack Obama during
the latter’s 2009 China visit. Many observers regard it as a signal of growing
Chinese assertiveness, for three reasons: first, the concept has been more
formally defined and included in official statements and documents; second,
some Chinese officials and unofficial observers have apparently asserted
that China’s “core interests” are essentially non-negotiable in nature, thus
conveying a level of rigidity and perhaps militancy towards whatever issue
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might be defined as a core interest; and third, China is allegedly steadily
defining more and more controversial international issues as affecting its
“core interests”, thus by implication challenging an array of foreign activities
relating to such issues (Swaine, 2011: 2).
Recently another term “reactive assertiveness” has been used by Western
academics and journalists. As Trevor Moss describes:
… a new Chinese foreign policy approach of “reactive assertiveness”:
the idea is that China doesn’t pick fights, but that if someone picks a
fight with China it will offer a forceful response. It has also been called
“non-confrontational assertiveness,” and this perhaps is the smarter term
because it captures the manner in which China reacts assertively while, as
at Scarborough Shoal, still showing significant restraint.
(Moss, 2012)
In a Sino-Japanese relations report published in April 2013 by the International
Crisis Group, “reactive assertiveness” refers to a situation that the Chinese
government, when it comes to maritime disputes, “uses an action by a rival
claimant as an opportunity to change the facts on the ground in its favour.”
A feature of reactive assertiveness is that “the measures taken by China were
designed to be irreversible” (International Crisis Group, 2013: 13 and 50). In
the words of a Chinese maritime researcher, “the series of measures that China
has taken to defend its rights has been mostly reactive and responsive and
was necessary to respond to violation of [China’s] maritime interests” (ibid.:
15). Alastair Iain Johnston, in “How New and Assertiveness Is China’s New
Assertiveness” (2013), uses the word “react” twenty-one times to describe
China’s emotional presentation of assertiveness (Johnston, 2013).
Nevertheless, Chinese officials reject the notion that China’s more
assertive tone is “tough” (qiangying 强硬) or confrontational. Foreign
Minister Yang Jiechi stated in a press conference at the annual National
People’s Congress meeting in 2010 that China is merely sticking to its
principles and defending its “core interests and dignity” (weihu benguo
de hexin liyi he zunyan 维护本国的核心利益和尊严) (Swaine, 2010: 5).
Other Chinese observers criticized the West’s evaluation of China’s new
assertiveness of reflecting “intense anxiety over the gradual loss of American
political, military, and economic power and influence globally, as well as an
effort to make China into a scapegoat for the failings of the West” (ibid.: 6).
He Kai and Feng Huiyun (2012: 640) argue that it is normal for China,
as a rising power, to form a more confident or even assertive policy because
of its transformed national interests. China’s peaceful or unpeaceful rise not
only depends on China’s intentions, but also relies on the policies of other
countries, especially that of the US, towards China (ibid.: 635). The US and
its allies need to adjust their old political practices in response to China’s
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new assertiveness (ibid.: 633). In fact, as observed by Li Mingjiang, very
few Chinese scholars consider China to have been at fault for the tensions
and disputes over the South China Sea. These people firmly believe China’s
actions were necessary because the country’s legitimate interests are at stake
(Li, 2012).
Interestingly, according to Zhao Suisheng, these narrowly defined core
interests in fact have more to do with “China’s regime survival than with its
great power aspirations” (Zhao, 2011). The first core interest is the survival of
the CPC regime. The second comes state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The last one is economic development and social stability. The three “core
interests” are closely related to and dependent on each other.
This section shows Western observers have commonly used “assertive”
and “assertiveness” in defining an increasingly forceful, triumphalist, aggressive, confrontational and anti-Western (mainly anti-US) China. On the other
hand, Chinese observers believe that the so-called assertive measures are
nothing but demonstrations of China’s determination to protect its legitimate
“core interests”. Others point out that China harbours a sense of insecurity,
despite its increasingly vocal foreign policy.
3. Reconceptualizing Assertiveness
“Assertiveness” is a concept originated from behavioural science. It is
frequently applied in behavioural psychology, clinical psychology, social
psychology, cognitive science, personal development, counselling, communication and social philosophy. One of the earliest use of assertiveness was
found in Joseph Wolpe’s Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition (1958),
in which Wolpe explores assertive responses from the systematic use of the
reciprocal inhibition principle in neurophysiology (Wolpe, 1958: xii and
114). The earliest models of assertiveness training emphasizes strongly the
promotion of self-interest, power, control, self-expression and personal rights
(Wilson and Gallois, 1993: 15 and 21). Andrew Salter defines assertiveness
as “[to] speak up forcefully” (ibid.: 18). Coercive power techniques are encouraged to be used to resist the coercion of others. Such unilateral approach
to personal rights can be seen as self-protective antidotes for manipulation
from others. Assertiveness thus is defined as “me versus you” instead of “me
and you”. It is the ability to determine the behaviour of others in accord with
one’s own wishes (ibid.: 21). The other person, who is termed as a “downer”,
is often viewed as the source of the problem. The early models place too much
emphasis on the “getting what you want” aspect of assertion, at the expense
of relationship aspects (ibid.).4
In contrast to the unilateral approach, the mutual approach to assertion
developed later is regarded as more professional, reasonable and up-to-
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date. Robert E. Alberti, Michael L. Emmons, Arthur J. Lange and Patricia
Jakubowski focused more on the issue of balance, the legitimate/appropriate
assertion and responsible assertive behaviour. Interpersonal relationship is the
goal. Assertive communication is “to give and get respect, to ask for fair play
and to leave room for compromise when the needs and rights of two people
conflict … Assertive behavior [is] a balance of rights and responsibilities”
(ibid.: 25). Assertiveness is complete only with the presence of empathy, obligation, equality, honesty, directness and expressiveness (ibid.: 26-27). In the
past six decades, behavioural scientists, psychologists and social philosophers
have been debating and trying to find a way to settle the tension between the
expression of personal rights and the importance of positive social relationships. Today, more and more professionals and academics believe the mutual
nature of relationships is central to the discussion of assertiveness. According
to Keithia Wilson and Cynthia Gallois, the dictionary definitions indicate a
tension in the English language between “assertiveness as constituting selfconfident, assured, direct expression of ideas” and “assertiveness as aggressive
expression to attain one’s own ends (i.e. dogmatic, peremptory, insistent)”
(Wilson and Gallois, 1993). So what does it mean to be assertive? Behavioural
scientists of today commonly use a three-section spectrum. The meaning
of assertiveness is best to be understood from its contrasting relations with
passiveness and aggressiveness (Table 4). Passiveness and aggressiveness are
Table 4 Assertiveness Understood in Contrast with Passiveness and Aggressiveness (Alberti and Emmons, 2008: 41; Lange, 1976: 53; Jakubowski, 1978: 42-43)
Passiveness
Assertiveness
Aggressiveness
Intent to please
Intent to communicate
Intent to dominate or humiliate
Self-denying, self-depreciating
Self-enhancing without
hurting others
Self-enhancing at expense of
another
Inhibited, emotionally dishonest, indirect
Expressive, appropriately
honest, direct
Expressive, inappropriately
honest, direct
Allows others to choose
for self Chooses for self Chooses for others
Does not achieve desired May achieve desired goal
goal, anger builds up Achieves desired goal by
hurting others
Hurt, anxious, disappointed with self, angry later
Feels good about self, Controlling, righteous, confident, self-respecting at superior, depreciatory at the
the time and later
time and possibly guilty later
Payoff: avoids unpleasant situation, conflict, tension and confrontation
Payoff: feels good, respected by others, improved self-confidence,
relationships are improved
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Payoff: vents anger, feels
superior
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Figure 2 Passiveness, Assertiveness and Aggressiveness
Passiveness
Assertiveness Aggressiveness
two extremes of broad approaches to the conduct of interpersonal relations,
while assertiveness is the golden mean – the most appropriate and flexible
choice of behavior on a continuum (Figure 2).
4. Assertiveness, the State and Global Engagements: A View from Political Psychology and Political Culture
Having discussed the rise of the assertive China narrative and the way behavioural scientists define assertiveness, how do we fit the psychological
concept of assertiveness in Chinese international relations? If we investigate
IR from the perspective of behavioural science and anthropology, we will
see a complex connection between interpersonal relations (person-to-person)
and international relations (actor-to-actor). This is exactly where Political
Psychology and Political Culture intersect with IR. Lucian W. Pye once
argued: “A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a
political system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make
up the system; and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private
experiences” (Pye, 1965: 8). Similarly, Sidney Verba contends that “the
political culture of a nation [derives from] the experiences that individuals
have with the political process” (Verba, 1965: 514). Shih Chih-yu echoes:
“The national face exists in the minds of the individuals, and composing a part
of an individual face. Individuals acquire the concept of nation, feel being a
part of the nation, and acknowledge the meaningful existence of the nation”
(Shih, 1990: 189).
In a brief article titled “Deconstructing China’s ‘Assertiveness’: A
Psychological Science Perspective” (2012), Ravi Bhoothalingam introduces
what he called the “psychological science perspective in international
relations” (Bhoothalingam, 2012). He argues that psychology is not a new
tool for political analysis. From early philosophers such as Plato of ancient
Greece and Kautilya of ancient India (a pity that he did not quote ancient
Chinese philosophers who had also searched deep connection between
politics and psychology), academics, strategists and policy-makers have been
using psychology to interpret multi-causality of complicated political issues.
Relevant findings from psychology include: (1) reasons and emotions are
interlinked rather than separated; (2) Psychology distinguishes between reality
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and what is perceived; and (3) behaviour or action of an actor can be projected
on someone else (ibid.).
(a) Assertiveness in general IR
I suggest three types of assertiveness in IR: first, diplomatic assertiveness,
which is expressed in the form of government actions, legal and diplomatic
submissions, and media statements; second, rhetoric assertiveness, which is
more commonly observed through the official written and verbal statements
and comments; and third, unofficial assertiveness, which is expressed by
the general public in a bottom-up way. A practical example of diplomatic
and rhetoric assertiveness will be a state’s refusal to accept another state’s
requests, accusations and condemnations. An assertive refusal will show a
two-fold respect: a self-respect in a self-confident way; and a respect for the
other government’s rights to ask, comment and criticize.
States and individuals enjoy rights, sovereign rights and human rights
respectively. It will be ideal if they can balance their rights with obligations/
responsibilities to the society (international society and civil community).
From a liberal point of view, such balance is of crucial importance to the
establishment of boundaries between the self and others. Moreover, modern
society, as well as international society, has taken a very negative meaning
of the word “aggressive”. For instance, the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg called the waging of aggressive war “essentially an evil thing …
[To] initiate a war of aggression [is] not only an international crime; it is the
supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole” (Broomhall, 2003:
46). There have been plenty of examples of aggression done in the name of
self-protection of rights and/or protection of the rights of other people or other
state. In interpersonal relations, that falls within the area of civil disputes;
while in international relations, that has to do with the problems of legitimacy
and legality in aggressive warfare and military intervention.
International political theory addresses the issue of the human nature.
A social Darwinist point of view contends that states are by nature aggressive and rational actors. This argument is derived from the belief that
aggressiveness is the necessary skill for human survival and rationality is
a human endowment that can be developed a posteriori. That said, states
and individual human beings are both rational. They can choose what to
do and what to learn from according to their needs. In an attempt to refute
the argument that human beings are by nature aggressive, and so is state
behaviour, Robert E. Alberti and Michael L. Emmons quote from the Seville
Statement (1986), written by twenty distinguished social and behavioural
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scientists from twelve nations and endorsed by the American Psychological
and American Anthropological Associations, which concludes:
[that] biology does not condemn humanity to war, and that humanity can be
freed from the bondage of biological pessimism … The same species (that)
invented war is capable of inventing peace.
(Alberti and Emmons, 2008: 46)
Based on the above arguments, I propose that: first of all, states are made
up of humans. A state’s policies are by nature human decisions; second,
human beings are not doomed to be aggressive at all times, so are states;
and third, human beings can educate themselves to be healthily assertive
people, so can states. The behavioural science’s definition of assertiveness
can be applied to international relations. Behavioural science does not reject
the existence of violence in humans. Rather, it acknowledges its presence
and insists that humans should learn to balance the self-expressive side of
life with social relationships and to respect one’s own rights as well as the
rights of others.
(b) Assertiveness in Chinese politics: Hints from Lucian W. Pye
Can the psychological concept of assertiveness be applied to analyse
China’s political behaviour? The late Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(M.I.T.) China expert Lucian W. Pye may offer us some hints. His works
focus heavily on how individuals’ childhood and interpersonal relations in
family life become an indispensable factor in political socialization, which
shape the state’s deep psyche, policy-making and political development. His
investigation into the concept of aggression in China may offer us a hint
on how assertiveness could be linked to political psychology and political
culture. Much different from the European experience of citizenry, the Church
and the bourgeoisie, the ultimate core of political life in China is the family.
This has been valid since Confucian legalism took control of imperial politics
under the rule of Emperor Wudi (156-87 BC) in Western Han Dynasty.
Not the 1911 Xinhai Revolution nor Mao Zedong’s political agenda could
interrupt such continuity originated from a pre-modern agricultural society.
If we consider Chinese politics as an extension of the Chinese family’s power
structure, dynamics, rules and values, then Pye’s study could be directly
relevant to our analysis.
The repression of aggression: One important connection between
Confucius’s life and Chinese political culture is the repression of aggression.
Confucius lived a very chaotic life in his time. It was a time of frequent and
massive warfare, assassinations and moral degradation. It was a time when
weaker kingdoms were humiliated, intervened and attacked by stronger
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kingdoms. The search for security and survival through communal means
could well be a reflection of Confucius’s response to the civil unrest during
his time. Likewise, Mencius has made it clear that benevolent rule (renzheng
仁政) is preferable than hegemonic rule (bazheng 霸政). The result of this is
the repression of aggression. The belief that “the pure and blameless self is
invariably weak and helpless, and the initiator of injustice is always strong
– and should be, but is not, controlled by moral principles” (Pye, 1965: 76)
is nothing but a mirror of China two thousand years ago. Being innocent,
impotent but moral is better received than being strong and outspoken in the
Chinese society, because strength can be followed by immoral acts that cause
injustice and unhappiness. That said, in order to survive in a brutal world, one
can always be moral if he/she is not able to be powerful, for moral people are
to be praised and they will stick together to form a strong security network for
self-protection. Culturally, it is allowed and even encouraged to be weak but
moral (aka being nice, pure and innocent) in China. Confucius was bullied by
hegemonic powers in his time, yet his system of morality was made a longruling hegemonic power in China after his death.
The consequence of this is tremendous. The respect for morality and the
tolerance towards innocence and impotency has made the Chinese general
public complacent with passiveness, submissiveness, unassertiveness and nonassertiveness. The fear, distrust and rejection of power and competitiveness
have made China paranoiac to the Western institutions, values and people.
This perhaps explains why both the Nationalists and the Communist regime
have been articulating the purity of innocence of the Chinese nation,
complaining how unjustly they were treated in “a century of humiliation”, but
never retaliate by taking actions. The Confucian idea of “repressing aggression
and staying moral” becomes the top commandment of the familial, social and
political mentality. Any expression of aggressive sentiments and all forms of
conflict, confrontation, competition and criticism are seen as a breakdown
in order thus causing great anxieties, confusion, and collapse of hierarchy
(ibid.: 102).
Yet, this does not mean harmony is always there. Harmony has been
remaining as a utopian ideal of Confucianism for thousands of years. In
reality, the repression of aggression has made aggression “constantly creep[s]
into personal relations” (Pye, 1981: 137; Pye, 1992a: 102). It creates “masking
aggression”, which is passive aggressiveness. Beneath the veneer of harmony
and politeness, there is always realistic consideration, calculation and
manipulation. The proliferation of the use of deception has made the Chinese
people suspect that “danger and hostility always lurk just below the surface
… [There] can be scheming behind placid activities” (Pye, 1981: 228). Even
worse, the Chinese people swing abruptly between two extremes: disciplined
order and explosive emotional outbursts. This kind of repressive aggression, in
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George R. Bach’s term, is called “catatonic schizophrenia” (Bach, 1989: 149).
Similarly, Alastair Iain Johnston says China’s new assertiveness is featured
with reactive and passive policies (Johnston, 2013: 31). The dishonesty found
in the Chinese mentality not only obstructs the development of assertiveness
among the people, but also China’s modernization project.
The prohibition of spontaneous expression of emotion in Chinese political
culture has made people to swing between passiveness and aggression,
deprived people’s rights to develop their selves, and fostered an attitude of
indifference to the environment and made people never to reveal their true
feelings. At the state level, where is China’s national Self? Is the Chinese state
honest to itself, to its people, to history and to the world? How does this affect
the evaluation of China’s assertiveness? How does the lack of assertiveness
affect China’s global engagement?
The emotion of hate, shame, and humiliation: The outburst of aggression
has been more obvious since the CPC came into power in 1949. Communism
and nationalism opened up new channels for both the overt and the covert
expression of aggression (Pye, 1992a: 34). I do agree with Pye that the theme
of hate is related to the sense of humiliation and shame that has been so much
a part of the Chinese modernization process and the political frustration of
the romantic intelligentsias (Pye, 1992a: 68). China has been experiencing
identity crisis since the arrival of challenge by Western modernity and the
consequent loss of confidence in its national Self. The recent “assertiveness” or aggressiveness of China’s behaviour could then be a search of an
“adult identity” in international society. It could also be a search of “strength
and self-esteem from narcissistic satisfactions gained through suffering and
humiliation” (ibid.: 75).
Moreover, China’s all-time hostility towards the US and Japan and its
occasional hostility towards other Western states could be “a desire to show
that [China was] once mistreated and that it is the mature powers who lack
morality” (ibid.: 69). With the help of populist nationalism, Chinese people
are allowed to vent their anger that is caused by national humiliation and
shame. A consequence of this is the proclamation of the “blameless self”
and the assertion of “there is no justice in international politics” (ibid.: 72).
Chinese leaders have been unable to understand the history of Western powers
is a process of give and take, of benefit and liability (ibid.: 73). China’s world
view is a “harmonious world” where the Confucian concept of the repression
of aggression applies in the form of Chinese universalism and Chinese
exceptionalism. I argue this is totally impractical because aggression is part of
the human nature just the same as the need for peace. Aggression and peace
co-exist in real-time international politics. We should work to our best to stop
violence but the complete absence of violence in international relations is
nothing but a dream.
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And then there is what Pye called “the blending of xenophobia and
xenophilia” (Pye, 1992b: 94). The Chinese’s rationalization of ambivalence
over the attraction and repulsion of the West shows that Han chauvinism
does not project a coherent argument: In international negotiation, Chinese
businessmen and diplomats may be dazzled by foreign products and ideas,
but that could also trigger the counter-emotion of xenophobia and the urging
need to assert Chinese superiority. After all, nobody wants to be seen as a
traitor to the great traditions of China (ibid.: 95). The spirit of “Chinese
learning for fundamental principles and Western learning for practical
application” (zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong 中学为体，西学为用) is still
very valid in China today. Such paradoxical performance could well perplex
China Pulling Your Own Strings: How to Stop Being a Victim and Take
Control of Your Life’s foreign counterparts. What they may not understand
is the origin of such arrogance-self-pity psychology: the sense of national,
cultural and civilizational pride clashes with the painful experience of “a
century of humiliation”.
5. Why Is the Assertive China Narrative Misplaced?
The previous sections have demonstrated that in China, the negative consequences of the hierarchical nature of politics, the repression of aggression
and the emotion of hate, shame and humiliation are all evident from the
individual level to the state level; from personality psychology to collective
psychology. The repression of aggression leads to the polarization and
abrupt swing between passiveness and aggressiveness. Assertiveness thus is
impossible to emerge. One may then ask: If we cannot be sure whether the
Chinese leaders and diplomats are assertive, how can we presume the Chinese
state is assertive?
Today’s China is not assertive. To be assertive means to be rightsconscious, to have strong and mature self-conception, to be direct, honest,
equal, and truth and justice-seeking. It could also mean – to a certain extent
– defensive, but it is neither submissive nor offensive. China’s behaviour and
its collective mentality suggest that the country could be transforming from
a stage of passive aggressiveness to a stage of more assertiveness, but it is
not there yet. The construction and spread of the assertive China narrative
indicates that a lot of Western observers have misread China to be solely
aggressive, while the Chinese interpretation has effectively ignored the
passive aggressive pathology. The American and the Chinese understanding
of Chinese assertiveness are both unconvincing.
The Chinese assertiveness discourse is very much an American initiative.
Many Americans took China’s comments – particularly those on the US’s
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decline – seriously. Jeffrey A. Bader, writing from the perspective of an
experienced diplomat and political scientist, has made it clear that:
By the middle of 2010 many China-watchers inside and outside the US
government were beginning to write about what they saw as a more
assertive China … Many descriptions of this newly assertive China were
overdramatized, and some included irrelevancies such as impoliteness by
random Chinese during dinner conversations.
(Bader, 2012: 79-80)
In his book entitled Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present,
and Future (2000), Michael D. Swaine suggests three possible versions of a
future China: a chaotic China, a cooperative China, and an assertive China.
The first one was described as “the irony of success”, the second one “the
triumph of reason”, and the third one “the tyranny of power” (Swaine, 2000:
vi). I wonder if any behavioural scientists will agree that being assertive
means being tyrannical. I have no objection to Swaine’s argument that
“growing Chinese power will most likely result, over the very long term, in
a more assertive China” (ibid.: 7). However, it is debatable whether or not
an assertive China will repeat what the major world powers in the past did
in the hegemonic cycles of modern history (ibid.: vii, 219).5 I do not take
every argument of Chinese exceptionalism for granted. I just believe that
it is intellectually and politically healthy to allow the existence of another
possible path for a rising China to take. The rise of a non-Western state as a
global power could incite power competition as hinted in the security dilemma
theory, but it is not the only possible result. Swaine has totally misunderstood
the meaning of assertiveness:
Although China could emerge from its calculative strategy as a cooperative
power because it is steadily transformed into a liberal polity over time, it is
equally possible that it could emerge as an assertive state fully cognizant of,
and demanding, its prerogatives in international politics.
(ibid.: 197-198)
Here Swaine tries to make a liberal, cooperative power contradictory to an
assertive state, which is completely misleading. What is more, like some
other American scholars, Swaine is creating an enemy for the US just
because that “enemy” could bring challenges to the US’s benefits and status
in the world. He quoted Robert Gilpin and to argue that China is trying to
reconfigure the existing international system. I think an assertive state will
articulate in a confident tone what it wants but it does not mean it will for
sure upset the whole current system. What Swaine means by assertive is
nothing but aggressive. Perhaps the memory of the Cold War is still haunting
some American academics and politicians but the fact is when it comes to
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aggressiveness, China’s behaviour has been absolutely no tougher than the
Soviet Union.
Swaine argues, as a rising state, China is unlikely to simply accept the
prevailing US-dominated international political order and peacefully integrate
itself into it (ibid.: 228). I will say this is not only true for China, but also
true for many other states, including many small states in the world. Every
sovereign state has the rights to say no, no matter how powerful or weak
they are. “Assertive” diplomatic gestures in the face of the US hegemony
have been found not only with China, but also with some Latin American
states, African states, the Middle-East states, Russia and even Germany,
France and New Zealand. Swaine also contends, the exercise of assertiveness
could generate a range of political, economic conflicts and even a major
regional war which involves the US (ibid.). Here Swaine apparently equalizes
assertiveness to aggressiveness.
Does China’s international behaviour match the standard of assertiveness
set by behavioural scientists? Here is my take (Table 5). China’s behaviour
matches with a few characteristics of assertiveness. Like all other state actors,
China makes rational choices and acts in its best interests. Being a rising
power that upholds Westphalian values such as sovereign rights and territorial
integrity, China is increasingly vocal in proclaiming what it needs/does not
need and what it wants/does not want. This can be observed in how it defines
its “core interests”. Other examples include China’s determination to speed
up military modernization, its uncompromising position on global climate
change, its constant refutation of the relevance of separation of powers and
constitutionalism to its political reform, etc. These are, however, not enough
to make China an assertive nation.
The behavioural scientist Richard F. Rakos believes that the obligation
component in assertiveness distinguishes assertion from aggressiveness. “Selfexpression in the absence of obligation is considered aggressive and a bare
assertive statement” (Wilson and Gallois, 1993: 13). China has acknowledged
the need to be responsible. Nonetheless, it is not corresponding to some of
its behaviour. China’s support to the Sudanese regime, its refusal to show a
rigid face to North Korea in the sinking of Cheonan vessel and the shelling of
Yeonpyeong, the struggles with the US, the UK and France at the UN Security
Council on how to stop the bloodshed in Libyan civil war and Syrian civil
war are relevant examples.
China should also listen more effectively and emphatically to other states
and non-state actors. China tends to make a “friend-or-foe” and “black-orwhite” judgment when it comes to discussions related to its “core interests”,
say the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute (notice that China’s understanding of
Japan is said to be worse than Japan’s understanding of China) and the Tibet
question (China sets rigid prerequisite for talks with the Dalai Lama). After
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Table 5 China’s International Behaviour Compared with Psychological Standards
of Assertive Behaviour (Alberti and Emmons, 2008: 38-39, 51; Burley
Allen, 1995: 20, 22, 26, 31, 35; Bower, 1991: 5; Jakubowski, 1978: 23)
1. To exercise sovereign rights Behaviour of China
Behaviour
of China
L
D
11. To be socially responsible 2. To respect and not deny the D
12. To focus on the matter, not rights and needs of others stereotyping specific states/
non-state actors UL
3. To act in its best interests
L
13. To be positive at times (praise, appreciation),
negative at times
(disagreement, criticism,
condemnation)
D
4. To let others know what it L
14. To know how to listen D
wants
effectively and emphatically 5. To have positive self-image L
15. To be verbally and
and stand up for itself nonverbally assertive D
6. To have strong and coherent UL 16. To handle criticism
narration of self-conception appropriately UL
7. To be honest and express UL 17. To say no in a calm and
itself comfortably
clear manner D
8. To be direct, firm and persistent without the need
for proof UL
18. To take risks
UL
9. To promote equality in relationships D
19. To take sides
UL
10. To negotiate mutually satisfactory solutions
D
20. To make apologies
UL
Table key: L = Likely; UL = Unlikely; D = It depends.
2010, the tone and content in the Chinese diplomatic language and actions
have suddenly switched from a prudent and modest manner to a tougher mode.
Some Western observers regard this as “threatening” and “provocative”.
China’s international behaviour is non-risk taking. It seldom takes sides.
David Shambaugh has a precise comment: “Generally speaking, Chinese
diplomacy remains remarkably risk-averse and guided by narrow national
interests. Chinese diplomacy takes a kind of lowest-common-denominator
approach, usually adopting the safest and least controversial position, and
usually waits to see the positions of other governments before revealing their
own” (Shambaugh, 2013: 9). One example of this is the use of veto power at
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the UN Security Council. Till 2012, China has exercized its vetoes nine times,
in contrast to France (18 times), the UK (32 times), the US (83 times) and
Russia (plus the former USSR, 128 times) (Global Policy Forum, 2012). China
is a frequent abstention voter at the UNSC. This is again, not assertive.
Three factors contribute to China’s non-assertiveness and unassertiveness:
the problem of national Self and identity, the Chosenness-Myths-Trauma
(CMT) complex and an overreliance on realism.
(a) National Self and identity problem
Strong self-conception is indispensable for the construction of assertiveness.
Without a deep understanding and a clear self, one can hardly attain selfaffirmation and self-worth, let alone to behave in an assertive way. In The
Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy (1991), Shih Chih-yu argues that “selfconcept [serves] as the deepest motivating factor in human behaviour” (Shih,
1990: 1). He believes that the self can be expanded from the individual
level to the state level, as he says in his China’s Just World: The Morality
of Chinese Foreign Policy (1993) that the: “so-called national self-role
conceptions can affect policymaking” (Shih, 1993: 18).
Assertive behaviour begins with self-awareness – an internal dialogue
of positive self-conception. A person, as well as a state, cannot be outwardly
assertive and inwardly confusing. The search for the national Self and identity
has been an on-going project for the PRC, which is trapped between China’s
indigenous civilization and Western modernity. I agree with Kerry Brown and
Loh Su Hsing that “China’s projection of itself interplays with the way it is
viewed by other countries … In the short term, engaging China is not going
to get any easier while this soul-searching continues” (Brown and Loh, 2011:
4). Brown and Loh point out the lack of common ideology in today’s China
has made the country difficult to be understood. They also advocate that China
observers should focus less on China’s political rhetoric and inconsistent
narrative, and concentrate more on objective assessment of China’s pattern
of behaviour.
Ironically, without the support of a strong national Self, China still
promotes its ancient wisdoms to the world. William A. Callahan argues that
China is shifting its role from a rule-follower to a rule-maker: “Like with
America’s soft power, China’s soft power actually takes shape through the
romanticization of a particular national culture into ‘universally desirable
values’” (Callahan, 2010: 4). The resonance is found in Henry Kissinger, who
says that the Chinese “do believe that they represent a standard of civilization
that it’s unique, and so they react badly to lectures about how they should
modify themselves” (Kissinger, 2011). The comments from Callahan and
Kissinger echo with a phrase that is frequently quoted narcissistically by the
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Chinese people: “The Chinese culture is amazing for its breadth and depth”
(Zhonghua wenhua boda jingshen 中华文化博大精深).
However, when asked to further describe the “breadth” and “depth”
of the Chinese culture, often no systematic and critical answer would be
forthcoming. In The Chineseness of China (1991), Wang Gungwu has pointed
out that “almost every aspect of Chineseness underwent considerable change
during the past 3,000 years” (Wang, 1991: 1). “Chineseness” is living and
changeable. It is the product of a shared historical experience – including
the very unstable boundaries and large-scale migration of multi-ethnicities
– whose record has continually influenced its growth (ibid.: 1-2). Good selfunderstanding builds up solid self-conception, hence assertiveness. How
can China be assertive if we do not know what elements in the Chinese
civilization are instrumental for the construction of the 21st century Chinese
international relations? Being an obstacle in nurturing assertiveness, the
Chinese state’s weak self-conception is well-explained by the words of Qin
Yaqing of China Foreign Affairs University: “The heart of Chinese foreign
policy thus is not a security dilemma, but an identity dilemma: Who is China
and how does it fit into the world” (quoted in Callahan, 2010: 13). Some
Chinese observers suspects that the US sees China as an aggressive “other”
or “deviant” (linglei 另类, yilei 异类) (Johnston, 2011: 21; Swaine, 2010: 6),
but who exactly is this “other” or “deviant”? Such self-depreciation is totally
unnecessary. A nation with a strong national Self does not even bother how
others perceive itself.
China’s weak soft power has a lot to do with its weak and fuzzy selfconception. I agree with Wang Gungwu that as long as the future Chineseness
is still unclear, the world will continue to be ambivalent about China’s
self-image. The Chinese Government will find discussion of Chineseness
embarrassing unless it can define it to fit its present situation (Wang, 1991: 1
and 7). In interpersonal relations, non-assertive people and unassertive people
always find it frustrated to be misunderstood by others. China has a similar
problem. Because of its passive aggressiveness, China is often regarded by
Western observers as incomprehensible, hence it is distrusted. “Let the world
understand China” (rang shijie liaojie Zhongguo 让世界了解中国) has
become such an important issue in China partly because China has difficulty
in explaining itself.
(b) The Chosenness-Myths-Trauma (CMT) complex
As discussed above, many Western observers have mistaken China’s passive
aggressiveness as assertiveness and open aggressiveness. They have not
noticed that today’s China, if it looks and sounds more offensive than it did,
is in fact aggressive in a passive manner. It is the repression of aggression
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in the Confucian tradition that makes the Chinese people and the state swing
between the two extremes of passiveness and aggressiveness – a typical
feature of passive aggressiveness. Passive aggressive states/people avoid open
conflicts, but it does not mean they are not frustrated or angry – they would
express their sentiment in an indirect way.
The passive aggressive character of the Chinese state matches Callahan’s
diagnosis of China as a “pessoptimist nation”. Speaking in a dialectic tone,
Callahan argues that “to understand China’s glowing optimism, we need
to understand its enduring pessimism” (Callahan, 2010: 9). Similarly, to
understand China’s seemingly aggressive behaviour, we need to understand
its passive, submissive character. For Callahan, this has to do with China’s
identity politics in that “Chinese identity emerges through the interplay of
positive and negative feelings in a dynamic that intertwines China’s domestic
and international politics. China thus is the pessoptimist nation where national
security is closely linked to nationalist insecurities” (ibid.: back cover). So
what is the source of that pessimism and sense of insecurity? How do they fit
together with China’s passive aggressiveness?
The answer is China’s mentality of victimhood. In Never Forget National
Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations
(2012), Wang Zheng borrows Johan Galtung’s idea of Chosenness-MythsTrauma (CMT) complex6 and argues that the CMT complex plays a critical
role in building China’s mentality (Wang, 2012: 41). “Trauma” is a deep
seated part of the Chinese psyche. It refers to the foreign invasions and lost
wars from the First Anglo-Chinese War (aka The First Opium War, 1839-42)
to the surrender of Japan in the Second World War in 1945. The keywords
for this are “repeatedly fought and lost” (lüzhan lübai 屡战屡败), “to cede
territory and pay indemnities” (gedi peikuan 割地赔款), and “to surrender
sovereign rights and bring humiliation to the country” (sangquan ruguo 丧权
辱国). Victimization thus implies a silent complaint: “I was heaven-blessed,
dignified and civilized. You are evil and you made me fall. You are the
only party to blame. You are responsible for all my miseries.” Victimization
pervades the Chinese consciousness and provided the current Chinese
leadership with plenty of analogies to use for the drawing of parallels between
current and historical events (ibid.: 183). It has deeply affected Chinese
people’s attitudes, interpretation, and judgment in conflicts. Any Sino-“The
Other” confrontations are often perceived as assaults on China’s fundamental
identity, dignity, authority and power (ibid.: 200).
Callahan (2010) and Wang (2012) coincide in offering an opinion that
in the Chinese mentality, pride and humiliation are interwoven; positive
and negative feelings are mixed; the dream for a “great renaissance” and
great power status blend with the principle of “never becomes a hegemon”
(yongbu chengba 永不称霸); the pessoptimist nation puts chosenness, myths
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and trauma together to form a pathological complex. China’s contemporary
national Self is by nature self-contradictory and passive aggressive. Thus, how
could it be possible to argue that “China is an assertive nation”?
(c) Overreliance on realism
How does contemporary China borrow realist IR theory (mainly neo-realism,
aka structural realism) from the US to explain the CMT complex, the victims
narrative, and the passive aggressive behaviour. The rise of Chinese realism
has no basic difference from realism in other countries. It derives from fear
and believes in international anarchy, state-centric model, the evil human
nature, rational choice, interest maximization, etc. Aggressive behaviour is
inevitable. Many Western (mainly American) observers believe that China is
getting increasingly aggressive. However, I would say that China’s behaviour,
even if it could be considered as aggressive, is neither the Machiavellian type
aggressiveness, nor the one derived from Xunzi as Yan Xuetong argues, but
an under-the-table type of passive aggressiveness.
Behavioural scientists suggest that aggressiveness is a result of powerlessness. It is a defense mechanism for survival in an environment where a
person feels vulnerable, helpless, unsafe and losing control over a situation.
It is a reaction of fear to being overwhelmed by people or circumstances. The
Chinese state and people believe that the US will never give up containing
China because of the presence of a structural conflict between China as
a rising power and the US as the current superpower. Hawkish military
leaders and nationalists in China suspect Western conspiracy is always there
to prevent China from rising to its rightful place. The US is responsible for
China’s paranoia for two reasons: first, the theory of neo-realism or structural
realism is an American product, which has significantly shaped today’s
Chinese view on international relations. Many Chinese IR scholars believe
that they are nationalistic, yet they are not aware how much they have been
brainwashed by the American theories and methodologies. American paranoia
triggers Chinese paranoia, both falling victim to an infinite fear in a security
dilemma, with no end in sight.
Today, China could be seen as externally aggressive but domestically
insecure. As Bhoothalingam argues, “Assertion and aggression are not
the opposite sides of the same coin … [Aggression] reveals vulnerability.
So what comes to dominate the scene is a rising but vulnerable China”
(Bhoothalingam, 2012). The unresolved social problems, the loss of trust
within society, the legitimacy crisis of the CPC, all point to China’s internal
weakness. The natural instinct of being aggressive and the belief in a
Hobbesian “all-against-all” world have surfaced since the Cultural Revolution
and intensified in the 1990s, with the growth of populist nationalism invoked
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by Jiang Zemin’s Patriotic Education Campaign. The public’s fury is also
the result of the repression of aggression in people’s familial, social, and
political life.
China’s realist turn could well be an extension of its experience of
“a century of humiliation”. It matches with the “rubber band effect” in
behavioural psychology: “a mildly threatening situation has considerably more
impact when it reminds a person of a previous negative experience. The new
situation is like a rubber band, snapping the individual’s consciousness back
to that unpleasant event…. His reaction to this current experience is colored
by his past; this current ‘threat’ is partially an unresolved threat from the past”
(Jakubowski, 1978: 72). In a nutshell, internal worries and external threats
have pushed China to the realist side, which could potentially hinder China’s
development of assertiveness.
6. China’s Assertive Rise: Do We Need It?
China is not assertive and it needs to be assertive. A truly assertive China
not only empowers the Chinese state and people, but also benefits Sino-US
relations and the world. Western observers might be happy to see a China
that is proactive, modest and comfortable with itself, but not reactive,
confrontational and insecure. In “The Advantages of an Assertive China:
Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy” (2011), Thomas J. Christensen
argues that China’s current “assertiveness” is better understood as reactive
and conservative rather than truly assertive and innovative. He does not agree
with the conventional interpretation of “assertiveness”. Instead, he argues
that China’s foreign policy was more creative and proactive in the two years
prior to the global financial crisis. Between 2006 and 2008, China adopted
constructive and assertive policies towards North Korea, Sudan, and the
Somalian piracy. This was unprecedented in the history of the PRC’s foreign
relations. The US and its allies should promote and welcome the return of
such an assertive China (Christensen, 2011: 54-55).
However, people feel threatened by any change in behaviour, so do states.
They prefer status quo rather than assertive turns. Adopting more assertive
behaviour will “make waves” and disturb the relations that a passive person/
state had with others (Bower, 1991: 6). Should China become truly assertive,
it has to help other states and actors in international society to deal with its
new assertiveness, just as an individual needs to help people around him/her to
deal with his/her new image, character and behaviour. China has to convince
the world by action that its aim is to attain mutual satisfaction, not “turning
the tables”. Its objective is to speak up and stand up for its rights without
aggressively putting down other people and trampling on their rights. On the
other hand, international society will have to find ways to get used to it.
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So what would an assertive China look like? China was arguably assertive
in the past, say during the early and middle phase of the Tang Dynasty (618907 AD). Ezra F. Vogel considers China to be relatively more assertive during
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping’s rule (Vogel, 2012). In recent years there
has been a call in mainland China for the vitalization of Deng Xiaoping’s
“taking proper initiative” (you suo zuo wei 有所作为) principle. Thomas J.
Christensen and Andreas B. Forsby have suggested some better solutions:
Washington and other governments have an opportunity to shape the
international environment in a way that can assist those Chinese elites who
are espousing creative, constructive, and assertive policies while undercutting
those who advocate reactive, conservative, and aggressive ones.
(Christensen, 2011: 65)
With regime legitimacy no longer resting on communist doctrines of elite
avant-gardism, the regime must not only fill an ideological void, but also
increasingly incorporate popular inputs. Hence, a preoccupation with regime
survival may, in fact, prove to be the strongest reason for translating popular
nationalism into a more particularistic and self-assertive identity narrative
of China.
(Forsby, 2011: 20)
That said, a bottom-up solution may work better for China. China is able to
work out a way to build a stronger national Self and identity only if the individuals are equipped with more assertive mentality. China’s soul-searching
and self-conception building process could take a while, but these are necessary tasks, otherwise the country will remain as a passive, aggressive state.
7. Conclusion
The debate on the new assertive China narrative has continued up to this
day. By borrowing from behavioural science, this article has made a new
assessment of the definition of “assertive” and “assertiveness” in the context
of a rising China as a responsible power. Xi Jinping, in his inauguration
speech at the National People’s Congress meeting on 17th March 2013,
called for the “great renaissance” of the Chinese nation and the realization
of the “China Dream” (Zhongguomeng 中国梦). He also called for “Three
Self-confidences” (Sange Zixin 三个自信) in China’s political system, in the
party line and in party theory (“Political Balancing: Mixed Messages”, The
Economist, 29th June 2013). This was read by the Western media as a signal
of wishes to formulate more assertive (aka aggressive) policies (KleineAhlbrandt, 2013).7
However, a more profound reflection was made by Zheng Yongnian. He
believes that in Chinese history, every time when the public discusses the
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“China Dream”, there is not only a crisis in the collective self-confidence but
also a yishi weiji 意识危机 (crisis of consciousness). It is the drastic changes
in China’s international environment and domestic transformation that bring
about such crises. As a response, intellectuals and the regime initiate idealistic
debates (Zheng, 2013). That said, Xi’s call for the realization of the “China
Dream” and “Three Self-confidences” are nothing but a reactive behaviour to
the anxiety that China faces. From a psychological perspective, the “assertive”
China in the West’s eyes is in fact a zhilaohu 纸老虎 (paper tiger).
The “assertiveness” presented by today’s China is immature. China can
never attain real assertiveness by simply drawing a line between “China” and
“The West”. Assertiveness is possible only if China acknowledge the existence
of both itself and “The West” as equal members of this world without putting
up any “Other”. Assertiveness is possible only if China is liberal and openminded enough to appreciate, criticize and selectively apply cultural, legal and
political values from abroad. Being self-confident about the national Self and,
at the same time, respectful to the intellectual and material heritage of human
civilization contributed by the aging West, the adolescent China (Vines, 2012)
would then be in a better position to utilize its phenomenal momentum to
participate creatively in every aspect of global governance. Nobody should
take the assertive China narrative for granted.
Notes
+
The author took the pleasure to draft this article in the post-colonial Hong Kong
and finished the editing tasks in the increasingly cosmopolitan Beijing between
January and September 2013. These two cities have inspired him with distinctive
perspectives to reflect on the Chinese assertiveness thesis. The author would like
to give special thanks to the Centre on Behavioural Health, University of Hong
Kong, for introducing the behavioural science concept of assertiveness to him.
* Walter Lee 李芸辉 is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Studies
at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. He holds a MA in International
Relations from the University of Warwick. He was Visiting Scholar to the
Division of International Politics Theory, Institute of World Economics and
Politics (IWEP) at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (July to November
2013); and Visiting Fellow to the Centre for Comparative and Public Law
(CCPL), Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong (January to June 2013).
<Email: [email protected]>
1. Translated by the author.
2. Sources used include articles and reports taken from newspapers, magazines,
journals; television programmes and radio transcripts, etc. The top 10 most
mentioned sources are from Reuters (126 items), Vietnam News Brief Service
(124 items), Agence France-Presse (100 items), The Wall Street Journal (86
items), Financial Times (77 items), South China Morning Post (59 items), The
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
533
Straits Times (50 items), Dow Jones Newswires (43 items), Times of India (41
items), The New York Times (40 items). Factiva, 30 September 2013.
Traditional Chinese saying.
This includes the application of techniques such as “broken record” and
“fogging”, which help people to keep the upper hand and not being dominated
by others.
According to Swaine, these include: “[China’s] efforts to augment its military
capabilities in a manner commensurate with its increased power; develop a sphere
of influence by acquiring new allies and underwriting the protection of others;
acquire new or reclaim old territory for China’s resources or for symbolic reasons
by penalizing, if necessary, any opponents or bystanders who resist such claims;
prepare to redress past wrongs it believes it may have suffered; attempt to rewrite
the prevailing international ‘rules of the game’ to better reflect its own interests;
and, in the most extreme policy choice imaginable, even perhaps ready itself to
thwart preventive war or to launch predatory attacks on its foes.”
“Chosenness” is the belief in being selected by some transcendental force such
as God, Allah, or History. The concept of “all-under-heaven” (tianxia 天下), “the
Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo 中国), and “the mandate of heaven” (tianming 天
命) all represent the belief of chosenness. “Myths” are the selected memories
of glories and pride of the Chinese civilization, as presented in phrases like: “a
civilized ancient nation” (wenming guguo 文明古国), “a nation of ritual and
etiquette” (liyi zhi bang 礼仪之邦), and “the vast land and bountiful goods” (dida
wubo 地大物博). Many Chinese believe that China is an all-time peace-loving
country because it has never bullied the weak and the small. For anti-thesis, see
Wang Yuan-kang’s Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power
Politics (2011) published by Columbia University Press.
“That means we can expect Beijing to continue with its ‘reactive assertiveness’
foreign policy tactic. China has perfected this approach in its ongoing maritime
disputes in the South and East China Seas” (Kleine-Ahlbrandt, 2013).
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