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Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters
Author(s): James M. Lindsay
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Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 4 (Winter, 1992-1993), pp. 607-628
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Congressand ForeignPolicy:
Why the Hill Matters
JAMES M. LINDSAY
In 1983 William Bundy called for increased study of Congress and
foreign policy:
Thereis a markeddeficiencyin seriousstudyon howtheexecutiveandCongressinteract
in an era whenthe rangeof issuesrequiringcongressionalapprovalhas expandedway
beyondthe classiccasesof treatiesandforeigntrade,whenconsensuson foreignpolicy
has disappearedperhapsbeyondrecall,and whenthe practicalneed for congressional
and acceptanceextendsto almosteveryimportantstep, howeverlabeled
understanding
or described.'
We have made little progress over the past decade in answering his call. To be
sure, we have witnessed the publication of a dizzying array of books and articles
exploring the legal and normative aspects of Congress's role in foreign policy.2
I WilliamP. Bundy,"TheNationalSecurityProcess:Plus QaChange... .?" International
Security
7 (Winter1982/1983):94.
2 Amongothers,see MichaelBarnhart,ed., Congressand UnitedStatesForeignPolicy (Albany:
State Universityof New York Press, 1987);L. GordonCrovitzand JeremyA. Rabkin,eds., The
FetteredPresidency:LegalConstraintson theExecutiveBranch(Washington,DC:AmericanEnterprise Institutefor Public Policy Research,1989);RobertA. Goldwinand RobertA. Licht, eds.,
ForeignPolicy and the Constitution(Washington,DC: AmericanEnterpriseInstitutefor Public
Policy Research,1990);GordonS. Jonesand John A. Marini,eds., TheImperialCongress:Crisis
in theSeparationof Powers(NewYork:PharosBooks, 1988);andHaroldHongjuKoh, TheNational
SecurityConstitution:SharingPower After the Iran-ContraAffair (New Haven:Yale University
Press, 1990).
JAMESM. LINDSAYis associateprofessorof politicalscienceat the Universityof Iowa. He is the
author of Congress and Nuclear Weapons and co-editor of the forthcoming book, Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill.
Political Science Quarterly Volume 107 Number 4
1992-93
607
608
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
But with a few exceptions,we have seen relativelylittle systematic,empirical
research on congressional decision making on foreign policy.3 The lack of recent
researchmeansthat most of the majorstudiesof Congressand foreignpolicyare
now more than two decadesold.4 Relyingon these studiesto explainCongress
today is problematic:by all accountsCongress'sbehaviorchangeddramatically
followingthe Vietnamwar. The deferenceCongressonce accordedthe president
gavewayto activequestioningof presidentialinitiatives.Bipartisanship
vanished,
replacedinsteadby a substantialdegreeof partisanship.And the inside game,
wherea handfulof seniorlegislatorsspoke for Congresson majorissues, gave
way to an outside game, where many legislators influenced policy.5 It would
seem, then, that the time for systematicstudyof Congressand foreignpolicy is
long overdue.
Or is it? One explanationfor the dearthof researchon Congressand foreign
policyis that politicalscientistshaveneglecteda pressingresearchtopic. Another
explanation,one morecharitableto scholars,arguesthat the topic attractslittle
attentionbecauseit does not raiseinterestingsubstantiveor theoreticalquestions.
Pessimistsarguethatthe executivedominatesagendasettinganddecisionmaking
on foreignpolicy;Congressplaysat best a subsidiaryrole. As a result,studying
congressionalinvolvementin foreign policy represents"a Ptolemaicview of a
"6
Copernicanuniverse."
Theseconflictingexplanationsfor the lackof researchon Congressandforeign
policyraisea simplequestion:Does Congressmatter?Pessimistsareundeniably
right that the White House mattersmore than Congress.The presidentenjoys
inherentadvantagesover Congressin foreignpolicy, advantagesthat have been
reinforcedby variousSupremeCourtrulings.At the same time, the natureand
structureof Congressfrustratecongressionalattemptsto lead on foreignpolicy.
But recognizingthat Congressis a junior partnerin policy making does not
warrantthe conclusionit is irrelevant.Even a subordinateCongressmay influence foreign policy in importantways.
Most efforts to assesscongressionalinfluencelook at the abilityof Congress
3 For a review of the literature, see James M. Lindsay and Randall B. Ripley, "Foreign and Defense
Policy in Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s," Legislative Studies Quarterly 17 (August
1992): 417-447.
4Among others, see Holbert N. Carroll, The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs, rev.
ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Robert Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1950); Malcolm E. Jewell, Senatorial Politics and Foreign Policy (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1962); Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966); Leroy N. Reiselbach, The Roots of Isolationism:
Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1966); and James Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy Making (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press,
1962).
5 James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Defense Policy: 1961 to 1986," Armed Forces and Society 13
(Spring 1987): 371-401.
6 Jonathan Eliot Medalia, The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Limitation Policymaking, 19631972 (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University Press, 1975), 8.
CONGRESSAND FOREIGN POLICY |
609
to generateandpassits ownsubstantivepolicyproposals.Usinglegislativesuccess
as the benchmark,Congressdoes not appearto mattermuch. Despitethe many
changes in Americanpolitics over the past two decades, Congressgenerates
relativelyfew of its own foreignpolicyproposals;the initiativeon foreignpolicy
continuesto residein the WhiteHouse. Congress'sinfluenceover decisionsappearsno better.Althoughcongressionalforeignpolicydebatesaremorefractious
than they weretwenty-fiveyearsago, the House and Senateremainreluctantto
deny a president'sforeignpolicy requestsor to pass alternativepoliciesof their
own.
If Congress'sinfluenceoverforeignpolicyresidedsolelyin its abilityto legislate
its own policy preferences,then we would have our answer.But focusingon the
legislativetrackrecordcapturesonly partof the story.Congressinfluencespolicy
throughseveralindirectmeans: anticipatedreactions,changesin the decisionmakingprocessin the executivebranch,and politicalgrandstanding.Indeed,the
same factors that frustratecongressionalattemptsto lead on foreign affairs
encouragelegislatorsto use indirect means to influence policy. Attention to
these indirect means suggests, contraryto the argumentmade by pessimists,
that Congressoften exercisesconsiderableinfluenceover the substanceof U.S.
foreign policy.
ThesignificantindirectimpactCongresshason foreignpolicymakesit imperative to takeup WilliamBundy'schallenge.We simplydo not understandcongressionalbehavioron foreignpolicy. The studyof Congressandforeignpolicygains
additionalimportancebecauseCongress'sinfluenceis likelyto growin the 1990s.
responsein ConOf course, the Gulf war produceda rally-round-the-president
gress,but that rallyhas crumbledin the face of otherevents.The end of the cold
war is loweringthe electoralcosts to legislatorswho oppose the presidenton
foreign policy. The ever-risingfederal debt is forcing Congressto make hard
choices about U.S. commitmentsabroad. Finally, with perceptionsof a Soviet
threatreceding,nationalsecuritypolicyis losingits privilegedplaceon the policy
agenda. As new types of issues move onto the agenda, congressionalactivism
and influenceon foreign policy will increase.
THE LEGISLATIVE RECORD
Whatdoes Congress'slegislativetrackrecordon foreignpolicylook like? In the
1950sand 1960s,Congressseldomoverruledthepresident.Inthe 1980s,however,
thingschanged.On a varietyof issues, Congresspassedlegislationthat contradictedthe preferencesof the administration.In defensepolicy, Congressblocked
PresidentRonaldReagan'sattemptto reinterpretthe AntiballisticMissile(ABM)
treaty,canceledthe navy'splansto developa new generationof tacticalnuclear
missiles,and limitedthe deploymentof the MX missile.7On the hotly contested
7See Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy
610
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
issues of El Salvadorand Nicaragua,legislatorsplacedso many constraintson
the executivebranchthatbythe endof the Reaganpresidency"U.S.policytoward
CentralAmericawas effectivelybeing set by Congress."8With the Midgetman
missile and sanctionsagainstSouth Africa, Congresseven succeededin generating and enactingits own policy initiatives.All of these successeswould have
been unthinkabletwo decadesago.
Still, legislativevictorieson foreign policy appearto be the exceptionrather
than the rule.9In some areas Congressappearsto do no more than ratify the
president'sproposals.Thisis especiallyso on decisionsto use force.As Operation
DesertStormillustrates,Congressexercisesits war powersreluctantly.In other
areasCongressoften fails to overrulethe president,evenwhenthe circumstances
seem favorable.Take the debatesover the PanamaCanal treatiesand the sale
of AWACS aircraftto SaudiArabia. In both instancessubstantialnumbersof
legislatorsopposed the president'spreferredpolicy. The oppositionlegislators
were highlymotivated,enjoyedthe supportof well-heeledinterestgroups, and
hadpublicsentimenton theirside. Congressseemedpoisedto overrulethe White
House. But in both cases the presidentprevailed.
The reluctanceof Congressto dictateforeignpolicy to the presidentextends
beyond high politics, an area where presidentshistoricallyhave exercisedthe
greatestpower.Tradepolicyoffers a casein point. For almostone-hundred-andfifty years Congresszealouslyguardedits constitutionalprerogativeson trade.
Manyanalystsargue,however,thattodaylegislatorsaremoreinterestedin taking
popularpositionson tradeissuesthanin makingpolicy.'0Withproceduralinnovations such as fast-tracklegislationand private-sectoradvisorycommittees,
Congresshas delegatedenormouspowersto the executivebranch,while asking
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 89-111; and James M. Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear
Weapons (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 62-85 and 145-151.
8 Christopher Madison, "Follow the Leader," National Journal, 12 January 1991, 104.
9 Among others, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the
President, and Foreign Policy, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989); I. M. Destler, Leslie H.
Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own WorstEnemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 129-162; Harold Hongju Koh, "Why the President (Almost)
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair," Yale Law Journal 97 (June
1988): 1255-1342; and John Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking:
A Study of Interaction and Influence, 1945-1982 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983). The one
major exception to the view that Congress seldom legislates issues of consequence on foreign policy
is Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979).
10 See I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics: System Under Stress (New York: Institute for
International Economics and the Twentieth Century Fund, 1986); I. M. Destler, "Protecting Congress
or Protecting Trade?"Foreign Policy 62 (Spring 1986): 96-107; Judith Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions,
and American Trade Policy," International Organization 42 (Winter 1988): 179-217; Robert Pastor,
Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1980); Robert Pastor, "The Cry-and-Sigh Syndrome: Congress and Trade Policy"
in Allen Schick, ed., Making Economic Policy in Congress (Washington, DC: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983).
CONGRESSAND FOREIGN POLICY | 611
only for a processthat will not offend "congressionalsensitivities.""The overwhelmingmarginsof approvalfor tradelegislationare often cited as conclusive
evidenceof the lack of congressionalinfluence.'2
Even when Congresssucceedsin legislatingforeign policy, the results may
be less than meet the eye. In passing legislation Congresstypically delegates
tremendouspower to the executivebranch. Such discretionis justified on the
groundsthat the presidentneedsflexibilitywhenconductingforeignaffairs. But
discretiongives the presidentthe opportunityto subvertthe intentof Congress.
To take one of many possibleexamples,Congressappropriatedmilitaryaid to
El Salvadorprovidedthat PresidentReagan"certifyeverysix monthsthat the
Salvadorangovernmentwas 'achievingsubstantialcontrol'of its armedforces
. . . that it was 'implementingessentialeconomicand politicalreforms,'. . . and
that it was holdingfree electionsand demonstratinga willingnessto negotiatea
politicalsettlement."'3But the constraintmay have been more appearancethan
reality. Given PresidentReagan'sideologicalpreferences,it is hard to imagine
circumstancesin which he would have withheldcertification."4
Efforts to explain the lack of legislativesuccess on foreign policy usually
cite the inherentadvantagesof the presidency:"decision,activity, secrecy,and
dispatch."'5These inherentadvantagesare greatestin nationalsecurityaffairs,
and especiallyin crisis situations.As SenatorArthurVandenberg(R-MI)once
complained,crises"neverreach Congressuntil they have developedto a point
Evenwhenlegislators
whereCongressionaldiscretionis patheticallyrestricted."''6
decideto confrontthe president,he can derailany legislationthroughthe threat
or use of a veto; Congresshas overriddenonly one foreign policy veto since
1973.1' The inherentadvantagesof the presidencyhave been reinforcedby the
SupremeCourt.'8 LN.S. v. Chadha, for example, made it more difficult for
Congressto use the legislativeveto to overturnexecutivedecisions.The Court
" Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,"
InternationalOrganization42 (Summer1988):448.
12 Sharyn O'Halloran, "Congress, the President, and U.S. Trade Policy: Process and Policy Outcomes" (Paper presented at the 1990 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
San Francisco), 16.
13 Destler, Gelb, and Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, 158-159.
14 See, for example, Tanya Broder and Bernard D. Lambek, "Military Aid to Guatemala: The
Failure of U.S. Human Rights Legislation," Yale Journal of International Law 13 (Winter 1988):
111-145.
15 Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 70" in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Jay, The Federalist Papers, Clinton Rossiter, ed. (New York: New American Library, 1961), 424.
16
Quotedin WalterLaFeber,America,Russia,andtheCold War.1945-1971,2nded. (NewYork:
John Wiley, 1972), 60.
17 Bruce W. Jentleson, "American Diplomacy: Around the World and along Pennsylvania Avenue"
in ThomasE. Mann,ed., A Questionof Balance:ThePresident,the Congress,and ForeignPolicy
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990), 160.
18 Thomas M. Franck, "Courts and Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy 83 (Summer 1991): 66-86;
and Koh, "Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs," 1305-1317.
612
JPOLITICAL
SCIENCE
QUARTERLY
has perhapsdone even more to enhancethe power of the presidencywith its
willingnessto dismiss many congressionalchallengesto the executiveon the
groundsthatthecontestedissuesarenot ripefor judicialdecisionor raisepolitical
and not legalquestions.DuringOperationDesertShield,for example,the courts
refusedto enjoinPresidentGeorgeBushfrom orderingU.S. troopsinto combat
without congressionalauthorization.19
The difficultyCongresshas in legislatingforeignpolicycannotbe laid entirely
at the feet of the other two branchesof government.It also owes to factors
specificto the House and Senate.Partisanand institutionaldivisionsmeanthat
lacking consensus-and today consensus is often absent on foreign policyCongresswill not act. Congressionalactionis furthercomplicatedby the widely
held belief that presidentialleadershipis essentialto successfulforeign policy.
Electoralconsiderationsreinforcethe inclinationto deferto the president.Members want to avoid stands that might leave them open to blame and thus to
punishmentat the polls. Because much of the public believesin the need for
strongpresidentialleadership,manymembersfind "blameavoidance"strategies
compelling.20
The inherentadvantagesof the presidency,SupremeCourt rulings, and the
natureof Congresstakeus a long wayin explainingwhyCongressseldomdefeats
the presidenton foreignpolicy. They do not, however,tell the entirestory. An
essentiallesson of life on CapitalHill is that membersoften have soundpolicy
reasonsfor not wantingto defeat the president.The reasonsfor this are many.
Congressionaldebate is public, and the rejectionof presidentialrequestsmay
underminethe negotiatingpostureof the presidentor jeopardizeU.S. relations
with other countries. Legislationalmost by necessity is rigid, but diplomacy
frequentlyrequiresflexibility.Congressacts slowly, but issues can changerapidly. In some cases, resortingto legislationmay meantakinga sledgehammerto
a problemthatrequiresa scalpel.Legislationmayevencreateperverseincentives:
the presidentmay draghis feet implementingcongressionaldirectivesbecausehe
believesany policyfailurewill be blamedon Congress.In short,legislatorsoften
do not wantto win, becausetheybelievethatlegislatedsolutionswillproveunwise
or unworkablein practice.
For these members,then, the object is not to pass bills but to use the threat
of legislationas a leverwith whichto pressurethe president.Takethe efforts of
RepresentativeLesAspin(D-WI)to savethe MX missile.Likemanyof his fellow
Democrats,Aspin doubtedthe strategicargumentfor the MX. If stoppingthe
MX werehis sole concern,a vote againstthe missilewould have been in order.
But Aspin concluded that killing the MX undermineda higher policy goal,
namely, arms control. Keepingthe missile alive would place pressureon the
administrationto negotiatean armscontrol treaty.
'9 Anthony Lewis, "Republic Under Law," New York Times, 4 January 1991.
20
R. Kent Weaver, "The Politics of Blame Avoidance," Journal of Public Policy 6 (OctoberDecember 1986): 371-398.
CONGRESSAND FOREIGN POLICY |
613
It seemedto me that if [Brent]Scowcroftcame up with a bipartisanpackageand the
Presidentacceptedthat, the Democratswould not be in good shape if it was voted
down. It was clearthatmost Democratswouldvote againstit. But if enoughvoted for
it, and Reagangot it, the headlinewould say "ReaganGets MX." If not, the headline
wouldbe "DemocratsBlockMX."Reagancouldhaveusedthatas an excuse.Now that
he has the tools he needs,the Administrationis in a bit of a hot seat. It has to produce
an agreement.21
Similar concerns dominated the 1985 debate in the Senate Finance Committee
over fast-track legislation for the U.S.-Canada free trade negotiations. Angered
by what they saw as an incoherent American trade policy, half the members of
the committee voted against granting fast-track status to the negotiations. The
opponents, however, believed that the trade talks were necessary and that denying
fast-track status would damage U.S.-Canadian relations as well as future trade
negotiations. The senators voted no anyway, because they were "expecting to
lose; theirs was to be a protest vote."22
The desire many members of Congress have to change policy without passing
legislation begins to highlight the problem with using legislative scorecards to
assess congressional influence. Executive-legislative relations on foreign policy
are far more complicated than can be captured simply by examining which bills
pass. Congress often influences policy indirectly. It is to those indirect means of
influence that I now would like to turn.
ANTICIPATED REACTIONS
A major flaw with legislative scorecards is that they assume that influence can be
determined on the basis of observed behavior alone. Yet in any stable institutional
arrangement people will act strategically. Just as chess players consider their
opponent's possible moves and plan several steps ahead, Congress and the executive branch anticipate one another's behavior and modify their own behavior
accordingly.23Presidents are especially likely to anticipate the mood in Congress
on foreign policy, because public defeats threaten to weaken their credibility on
the world scene. As Secretary of State James Baker explained President Bush's
reluctance to request congressional authorization for Operation Desert Storm:
"The President has not wanted to ask for such a resolution unless the leadership
of the Congress could assure him that such a resolution would be forthcoming,
because your hand would be weakened if it were not forthcoming."24
21 Quotedin
ElizabethDrew, "A PoliticalJournal,"New Yorker,20 June 1983, 75 (Emphasis
added.)
22 "US-CanadaFreeTradeNegotiations:GainingApprovalto Proceed(B),"CaseC16-87-786.0,
HarvardUniversity,John F. KennedySchool of Government,1987,8.
23
See Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in
Europeand America,rev. ed. (Boston:Little, Brown, 1941),589-591.
24 Quotedin AdamClymer,"VotesBackingUse of ForceAre Predictedin Congress,"
New York
Times,7 January1991.
614
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
Of course, anticipatedreactionshave alwaysinfluencedexecutive-legislative
relations. The essentialquestion is whetheranticipatedreactionsmattermore
today. That questionis far easierto ask than to answer.No systematicstudies
have been done on anticipatedreactionsin foreignpolicy. We can only turn to
logic and anecdotes.Logic suggeststhat today the presidentis more inclinedto
incorporatecongressionalpositions into his own policy proposals.The willingness of the presidentto act strategicallyvaries directlywith the willingnessof
Congressto contesthis proposals,andby all accountsCongressoverthe pasttwo
decadeshas become more willingto challengethe president.
On the anecdotallevel, stories abound of administrationschangingcourse
becauseof anticipatedcongressionalopposition. Take for examplearms sales.
Inthe mid-1970s,Congresspassedlegislationgivingitselfthe powerto veto major
armssales.AlthoughCongresshas nevervetoedan armssale, the threatof a veto
appearsto have shapedmany presidentialproposals.On severaloccasionsthe
Ford and Carteradministrationsmodifiedtheirproposedarmspackagesto defuse congressionalopposition.25Threetimesbetween1983and 1985the Reagan
administrationproposedsellingarmsto Jordan,and all threetimes it withdrew
the proposalbecauseof the mood in Congress.26
Followingthe Iraqiinvasionof
Kuwait,the Bushadministrationpostponedits plansto ask Congressto approve
the sale of $13 billionin weaponsto SaudiArabia.Officialscalculatedthat if the
proposalhad gone forward,"Israel'smajorsupportersin Congresswould have
raisedan uproar."27
Thehistoryof armscontroltalksalso givessomeflavorof the increasedimportanceof anticipatedreactions.In the 1960s,presidentstypicallyignoredCongress
on armscontrol.Duringthe SALTI (StrategicArmsLimitationsTreaty)negotiations, for example,SenatorJohn ShermanCooper(R-KY)repeatedlyfailed to
convincethe Nixon administrationto includesenatorsin the AmericannegotiWhenSenatorHughScott(R-PA),the Senateminorityleader,
atingdelegation.28
announcedhe would visit Helsinki, the U.S. delegationdiscussedwhetherit
shouldmeet with him. The delegationeventuallydecidedto meet with Scott but
agreedto tell him little of substance.29
WhiteHouseattentionto the mood in Congresssoon increased.JimmyCarter
actively solicited congressionalviews, especiallythe views of Senator Henry
"Scoop"Jackson (D-WA).
The specialattentionthat was paid to the Washingtonsenatorwas manifestedin numerousways, including:(1) a willingnesson the part of the administrationto study
25 RobertS. Gilmourand BarbaraHinksonCraig,"Afterthe Congressional
Veto:Assessingthe
Alternatives,"Journalof Policy Analysisand Management3 (Spring1984):375-376.
2 Jentleson,"American
Diplomacy,"161.
27 RochelleL. Stanfield,"Weighing
Arms for Saudis,"NationalJournal, 12 January1991,79.
28 Alan Platt, The U.S. Senateand StrategicArms Policy, 1969-1977(Boulder,CO: Westview
Press, 1978), 19-20.
29 Personalcommunication
withJosephKruzel,memberof the SALTI delegation,22 September
1990and 19 June 1991.
CONGRESSAND FOREIGN POLICY
j 615
seriouslyand ultimatelyincorporatea numberof Jackson'sSALT recommendations
into the comprehensiveU.S. proposalpresentedto the Sovietsin March1977;(2) an
unprecedentedcommitmentby Secretary[Cyrus]Vancein October1977to meet with
Jackson'sArmedServicesSubcommitteeeverytwo weeks;and (3) PresidentCarter's
agreementto reappointGeneralEdwardRowny,Jackson'schoice,to be the representative on the SALT delegation.30
The Carteradministrationalso approvedthe creationof a SenateSALTadvisers
group. "Memberswerepermittedto attendplenarysessionsof the negotiations
as observers,to sit in on delegationmeetingsin Geneva, and even to read the
joint drafttext of the treaty."'"The Reaganadministrationinitiallytriedto shut
Congressout of the armstalks. Congressionalpressureforcedthe administration
to retreat,however,and in 1985a SenateArmsControlGroupwas reestablished.
"In additionto the functionscarriedout by their predecessors,the new Senate
observerswerepermittedto meetseparatelywithSovietnegotiators,bothto learn
firsthandof Soviet positions and to expresstheir own concerns."32
It should be said that in influencingexecutivebranchbehavior, anticipated
reactionsfunctionas a negativepower.33As presidentslook to CapitolHill, their
readingof the congressionalmood tells them what policies are not politically
possible. But the mood in Congress seldom compels the presidentto pursue
specific policies. The one exceptionis the rare case where consensusreignson
CapitolHill on a particularissue. As U.S. policytowardChinaafterTiananmen
Square attests, however, presidentscan resist congressionalattemptsto push
themin a specificpolicydirectionevenin the face of nearunanimousopposition.
Anticipatedreactionsclearlyinfluencethe executivebranch.Yet does the impact of anticipatedreactionsextendbeyondthe marginsof policy?On a major
policyissuea presidentmayignorecongressionalobjectionsor sidestepthe objections by changingthe style but not the substanceof policy.34 Refutingthis claim
is impossible,both becausewe lack systematicstudies of anticipatedreactions
Even if anticipated
and becausethe claim inevitablyinvolvescounterfactuals.35
reactionsoperateonly at the margins,Congress'sinfluencestill should not be
dismissedas inconsequential."Themarginsare frequentlythe vital edges, and
30 Alan Platt, "The Politics of Arms Control and the Strategic Balance" in Barry M. Blechman,
ed., Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982), 169-170.
31 Barry M. Blechman, "The New Congressional Role in Arms Control" in Thomas E. Mann, ed.,
A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress andForeign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 1990), 122.
32 Ibid., 122.
33 Friedrich, Constitutional Government, 590-591.
-1 See, for example, Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee. The Press and the Reagan Presidency
(New York: Schocken Books, 1989); and Jonathan Schell, The Time of Illusion (New York: Vintage
Books, 1975).
35 On the problems posed by counterfactuals, see James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politics 43 (January 1991): 169-195.
616 |
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
Congress's ability to shape them is of real importance."36As the history of U.S.
involvement in Vietnam illustrates, incremental decision making can lead to
major policy commitments.
STRUCTURES AND PROCEDURES
A second reason why a focus on the legislative track record underestimates Congress's influence over foreign policy is that it assumes that legislators only try to
change policy directly. Yet legislators are far more savvy than this assumption
suggests. They know all too well that efforts to change policy face considerable
obstacles. That's why they often try to change structures and procedures in the
executive branch. As Representative Aspin writes: "often by establishing new
procedures, which are, of course, ostensibly neutral, Congress is able to effect
substantive changes."37
Political scientists have been slow to recognize how process shapes policy.
Recently, however, the "new institutionalism," which seeks to uncover how different institutional forms affect policy outcomes, has begun to explore the topic.38
New institutionalists begin by noting that electoral incentives limit the enthusiasm
legislators have for proactive, systematic reviews of agency behavior. Such "police patrol" oversight has limited electoral appeal either because the agency usually
complies with the intent of Congress or because the agency does not harm a
legislator's supporters. Either way, legislators often cannot gain credit for their
legislative work. Moreover, police patrols entail opportunity costs; legislators
could be devoting time to more electorally valuable activities. This incentive
structure encourages legislators to fashion the decision-making process in the
executive branch in ways that will promote executive compliance with legislative
intent or, failing that, will make it easier for affected groups to seek remedies
from the agency, the courts, or Congress itself.
Although new institutionalists generally assume legislators are single-minded
seekers of reelection, the assumption is not critical.39Members who want to
influence policy also have reason to prefer procedural innovations over police
Its Vices,"ForeignPolicy 3 (Summer1971):125.
Les Aspin, "TheDefenseBudgetand ForeignPolicy: The Role of Congress,"Daedalus104
(Summer1975):168.
Proceduresas
38 See MathewMcCubbins,Roger Noll, and BarryWeingast,"Administrative
36 Alton Frye, "Congress:
The Virtuesof
37
Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (Fall 1987): 243-
277; MathewMcCubbins,RogerNoll, and BarryWeingast,"Structureand Process, Politics and
Policy:AdministrativeArrangementsand PoliticalControlof Agencies,"VirginiaLaw Review75
Oversight
(March1989):431-482;and MathewMcCubbinsand ThomasSchwartz,"Congressional
Overlooked:PolicePatrolVersusFireAlarms,"AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience28 (February
1984): 165-179. For an assessmentof the claimsmade about congressionalinfluenceby the new
Domiinstitutionalism,seeTerryM. Moe, "AnAssessmentof the PositiveTheoryof 'Congressional
nance,"' Legislative Studies Quarterly 12 (November 1987): 475-520.
OversightOverlooked,"167.
39 McCubbinsand Schwartz,"Congressional
CONGRESSAND FOREIGN POLICY
1 617
patroloversight.Becauseproceduralchangesareoften seenas neutral,members
findit easierto builda winningcoalitionarounda proceduralchangethanaround
a substantivepolicy change.Legislatorsalso knowthat "anounce of prevention
is worth a pound of cure."Policy battles are most easily won if the policy can
be counteredbefore it gains momentum.And policy-orientedlegislatorsalso
have an incentiveto shift the burdenfor monitoringthe behaviorof agenciesto
other groups:it frees them to work on other issues.
Whateverthe motivesof legislativebehavior,attentionto processleadsto two
conclusionsat odds with the conventionalwisdomabout Congress.One is that
the decisionto delegateauthorityto the executivebranchdoes not necessarily
meanCongresshas abdicatedits powers.Congressmay havecreateda decisionmakingprocessthat incorporatescongressionalviewsor that providesCongress
with opportunitiesto influencethe developmentor implementationof policy.
The other conclusionis that a declinein traditionalindicatorsof oversight(for
example,hearings,reports)does not mean that Congresshas abandonedoversight; Congressmay have designedproceduresthat lessen the need for police
patrols.
Overthe past severaldecadesCongresshas createdseveralinstitutionalstructuresinsidethe executivebranchin an effort to shape foreignpolicy outcomes.
In 1961it createdthe ArmsControland DisarmamentAgency(ACDA)because
many membersbelievedthat insufficientattentionhad been given to armscontrol.' Congressestablishedthe Officeof the SpecialTradeRepresentativein 1974
because legislators believed "that the State Department .
.
. was unsympathetic
and unresponsiveto domestic interestsand that the responsibilityshould be
assignedelsewhere."4'And in 1986Congresscreatedthe post of UnderSecretary
of Defense for Acquisition"to prod the systemto buy weaponsthat work, on
time and at cost."42All of these efforts proceededfrom a simple assumption
about bureaucraticlife: policies that don't have championsin the bureaucracy
are doomed.
Legislatorsalso at times seek to change procedure.One approachis to give
Congressa veto over executiveactions. The War PowersResolutionis a case in
point. Of course, Chadhareducedthe effectivenessof the legislativeveto as a
checkon executivepower.43Still, it did not requirethat all congressionalresolutionsof disapprovalbe presentedto the president(and,hence,subjectto his veto).
I See Duncan Clarke, Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (New York: Free Press, 1979), x.
41 Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 112. See also U.S. Congress,
House, Committeeon Waysand Means, TradeReformAct of 1973, 93d Cong., 1st sess. H Rept.
571, 1973, 40.
42 Representative
Aspin as quotedin David C. Morrison,"AnotherCzarBows Out,"National
Journal,5 January1991,43.
Veto,"373-392;andThomasM. Franckand
43 See Gilmourand Craig."Afterthe Congressional
ForeignRelationsLawAfterthe ChadhaCase,"
CliffordA. Bob, "TheReturnof Humpty-Dumpty:
American Journal of International Law 79 (October 1985): 912-960.
618 |
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
So long as they affect congressionalprocedureratherthan policy, committee,
one-house, and two-house vetoes remain constitutional. Thus, the Omnibus
Tradeand CompetitivenessAct of 1988allows the presidentto extendthe fasttrackprocedureso long as neitherchamberadopts a resolutionof disapproval
within ninety days of his requestfor an extension.PresidentBush invokedthe
procedurein March 1991when he asked Congressto extend for two years the
fast-trackprocedurefor consideringany agreementthat emergedfrom the Uruguay roundof negotiationson the GeneralAgreementon Tariffs and Trade.44
A second type of proceduralinnovation stipulatesconditions the executive
mustmeetbeforeit can go forwardwitha policy. Thistypeof proceduralinnovation has beenpopularin humanrightspolicy.45The Jackson-VanikAmendment,
for example,barredthe presidentfrom grantingmost-favored-nationstatusto
nonmarketcountriesthat deny their citizensthe rightto emigrate.Likewise,in
1981 Congressaccededto PresidentReagan'srequestthat it repeala 1976ban
on militaryassistanceto Chile. But in doing so, Congressconditionedfutureaid
on presidentialcertificationthat Chilehad takenstepsto bringthe murderersof
Orlando Letelierto justice, a condition the Reagan administrationcould not
meet.
A thirdproceduraltacticpopularwithlegislatorsis to imposereportingrequirementson agencies.Currentstatutescontainroughly600requirementsfor routine
reports in the area of foreign policy.46Many of these reportingrequirements
merelyrequirethe executiveto inform Congressof agencydecisions.Eversince
the passageof the Hughes-Ryanamendment,for example,the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA) has been requiredto reporteach covert operationto the
appropriatecongressionalcommittees. Other reportingrequirementsare designedto forcethe executiveto assessthe implicationsof its policies.Forinstance,
Congressrequiresthe Departmentof Defense(DOD) to submitan armscontrol
impactstatementfor everymajorweaponsprogram.Besidesrecurringreporting
requirements,Congressalso directs agencies to undertakestudies of specific
issues. The use of such reportshas been especiallypopular in defense policy,
whererequestsfor reportsrose from roughly30 peryearin the 1960sto over 500
in the 1980s.47
A fourth proceduralinnovationlegislatorsuse is to enfranchisenew groups
into the decision-makingprocess.Sometimesthe newlyenfranchisedgroupsare
existingagenciesthat sharethe preferencesof Congress.In 1988, Congressre" "BushAsks to Stay on Fast Track,"CongressionalQuarterlyWeeklyReport,2 March1991,
531.
Aid to Guatemala";
and DavidP. Forsythe,HumanRights
45 See Broderand Lambek,"Military
and U.S. ForeignPolicy: CongressReconsidered(Gainesville:UniversityPressesof Florida,1988).
WashingtonQuarterly11(Winter
4 EllenC. Collier,"Foreign
PolicyBy ReportingRequirement,"
1988):75.
47 James M. Lindsay, "Congressand the Defense Budget," WashingtonQuarterly11 (Winter
1988):61.
CONGRESSAND FOREIGN POLICY
1 619
quiredDOD to solicit recommendationsfrom the CommerceDepartmentwhen
negotiatingagreementswith foreigngovernmentson the productionof defense
equipment.48
At othertimesCongressincorporatesnongovernmental
groupsinto
decisionmaking.TheTradeAct of 1974"establishedvariousprivatesectoradvisorygroups,representinglabor,industry,agriculture,consumers,andthegeneral
Members
public, to providepolicy and technicaladviceduringnegotiations."'49
even legislatethemselvesinto the process.In 1983, for example,Congress"creconsultationsin anti-drugpolicy."50
ateda formalprocessof executive-legislative
Congressmay even create a space for itself in internationalnegotiations.The
TradeAct of 1974,for instance,providedfor membersto serveas officialadvisers
in internationaltradenegotiations.At a recentmeetingof the UruguayRound
of tradetalks, a dozenmembersof Congressand manymorecongressionalaides
participated.5"
Structuralandproceduralinnovationsneednot be directedat changingpolicy.
Legislatorsmay alterthe processbecausethey want to protectthemselvesfrom
constituentwrath.Here innovationsbecomea rusedesignedto "passthe buck"
for decisionsto the bureaucracy.52
Yet, innovationsprobablyaren'tused very
often to accomplishthis end. If constituentsare intelligentand forward-looking
(as most of the literaturein the new institutionalismassumes), they will see
Conthroughthe ruse, and the incentiveto use the innovationwill evaporate.53
versely,if constituentsare ignorantof congressionalactions,then legislatorsdo
not need the protectionthat the innovationwould afford.
While proceduralinnovationsmight be used as ruses, many (if not most)
innovationsare designedto influencepolicy. They do this in severalways:they
keep Congressabreastof what the agencyis doing;they discouragethe agency
fromactingin wayssubstantialnumbersof legislatorswoulddisapproveof; they
force the executivebranchto consultwith Congressor key legislators;and they
ensurethat someone in the executivebranchis accountable.For instance,the
sponsorsof the arms control impactlegislationbelievedthe statementswould
force DOD to consider the arms control implicationsof the weapons it was
developing, and, failing that, provide Congresswith advancewarningof the
48 U.S. Congress,
House Committee
on Conference,
National Defense Authorization
Act, Fiscal
Year 1989, 100th Cong., 2nd sess, H Rept. 753, 1988, 105.
4 O'Halloran, "Congress, the President, and U.S. Trade Policy," 19.
so Jeffrey A. Meyer, "Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance," YaleJournal of International
Law 13 (Winter 1988): 86.
51Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. Trade Team: 'A Kind of Stew,"' New York Times, 1 December
1990.
52 Morris P. Fiorina, "Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 33 (Spring 1986): 33-51.
53 See Murray J. Horn and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Commentary on 'Administrative Arrangements
and the Political Control of Agencies': Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative
Responses to Agency Costs," Virginia Law Review 75 (March 1989): 505.
620
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
potentialarmscontrolramificationsof new weaponssystems.54The authorsof
the provisionrequiringDOD to consult with the CommerceDepartmentwhen
negotiatingco-productionagreementswanted to check what they saw as the
willingnessof DOD to negotiate agreementsthat hurt Americancommercial
interests.The sponsorsbelievedthat includingthe CommerceDepartmentin the
processwould substantiallychange policy outcomes."
How successfularestructuralandproceduralchangesin shapingpolicy?Definitiveanswersarehardto comeby, becausethe subjectis understudied.Evenwhen
scholarsbeginto addressthe question,it willbe a slipperyone to answer,because
it involvesanticipatedreactionsandcounterfactuals.We haveno wayof knowing
how manycovertoperationsor armssalespackageswerestillbornbecauseadministrationofficials knewthe proposalswouldnot pass musterin Congress.Moreover, studies of structuraland proceduralinnovationswill have to put aside
conventionalnotionsof oversight.Innovationsareoften designedto forceexecutive compliancewith legislativepreferenceswithoutrequiringCongressto act.
For example, much has been made of the fact that Senator Gaylord Nelson
(D-WI)seldomreadDOD reportson U.S. armssales, eventhoughhe had sponsoredthe legislationthat mandatedthe reports.Manyobserverspoint to Nelson
as an exampleof the emptinessof muchof Congress'sworkon foreignpolicy.56
Such an inference, while tempting, is wrong. Nelson didn't need to read the
reportsfor his legislationto affect policy. By requiringDOD to makepublicits
armssalesproposals,he hadensuredthatinterestedgroupswouldreceiveadvance
notice and could mobilizeto defeat proposalsthey opposed.
Whatconclusionscan be drawnthen?The leastcontroversialone is that some
innovationsflop. ACDA, the War Powers Resolution,and the post of under
secretaryof defense for acquisitionall failed to fulfill legislativeexpectations.57
Theseexamplesnotwithstanding,however,in manyinstancesstructuralandproceduralinnovationsdo affect policy. In the case of trade,Congressoften tinkers
with the decision-makingprocessto ensureexecutivecompliancewith legislative
intent. The 1988 Trade Bill took severalsteps to limit presidentialdiscretion.
Concernedthatthe presidentwasunwillingto punishtradingpartnerswhoengage
in unfairtradepractices,Congresstransferredresponsibilityfor retaliationfrom
the presidentto the specialtraderepresentative.The 1988TradeBill also broadened the definition of unfair trade practicesand terminatedthe International
54 See RobertLyleButterworth,
"TheArmsControlImpactStatement:A Programmatic
Assessment,"Policy StudiesJournal8 (Autumn1979):76-84.
55 LouisL. Ortmayer,
"ThePoliticalEconomyof NationalSecurity:TheFSXAgreement"(Paper
presentedat the 1990annualmeetingof the InternationalStudiesAssociation/South,Raleigh,North
Carolina).
56 Destler,Gelb, and Lake, Our Own WorstEnemy, 145.
57 OnACDA, seeClarke,PoliticsofArms Control,97. Onthe WarPowersResolution,see Robert
A. Katzmann,"WarPowers:Towarda NewAccommodation"
in Mann,A Questionof Balance,35,
65. On the post of undersecretaryof defensefor acquisition,see Morrison,"AnotherCzarBows
Out,"43.
CONGRESSAND FOREIGN POLICY |
621
TradeCommission'sdiscretionto investigateclaimsof dumping.Both changes
were designedto make it easier for injuredgroupsto claim relief.58
In changingthe rules of the game, the OmnibusTradeBill also changedthe
behaviorof the White House, which underscoresthe link betweenprocedural
skirmishesand anticipatedreactions.When Congressbegan in the mid-1980s
to debateproposalsfor restrictingpresidentialdiscretionon trade, the Reagan
administrationsuddenly made trade policy a priority.59Then-VicePresident
George Bush spelled out the link betweenthe new-foundexecutiveinterestin
trade and the mood on CapitolHill: "Frankly,we are tryingas hardas we can
to derailthe protectionistjuggernautnow sweepingthroughthe United States
Congress.... That'sone morereasonwhyourrecentactionshavebeennecessary.
If we don't demonstrategood faith in enforcingour existingtradelaws, we risk
When the OmnibusTradeBill
invitingsternermedicinefrom the Congress."60
finallypassed,the Bushadministrationinitiatedthe StructuralImpedimentsInitiativetalkswithJapanin an effort to avoidinvokingthe retaliatoryprovisionsof
the bill. The OmnibusTradebill also alteredthe behaviorof severalof America's
tradingpartners.South Korea, for example,apparentlyworkedto increaseits
importof American-madegoods in an effort to avoidbecomingthe targetof the
retaliatoryprovisionsof the bill.6'
The successof proceduralinnovationson tradepolicymightnot seemremarkable given Congress'shistoricaland constitutionalinterestsin tradepolicy. But
innovationsappearto work in other areas of foreign policy as well. The CIA
provides an examplethat challengesconventionalwisdom. As a result of the
reformsimplementedover the past fifteen years, virtuallyall CIA assessments
go to the IntelligenceCommittees.TheAppropriations,ArmedServices,Foreign
Affairs, and ForeignRelationsCommitteesalso receiveCIA reports,and many
individualmembersreceiveCIA briefings.62These reformshave made the CIA
moreattentiveto the viewsof Congress.To quote RobertM. Gates,then deputy
directorof CentralIntelligence:"Theresultof theserealitiesis thatthe CIAtoday
findsitself in a remarkableposition,involuntarilypoisedequidistantbetweenthe
executiveand legislativebranches.The administrationknowsthat the CIA is in
no positionto withholdmuchinformationfromCongressand is extremelysensitive to congressionaldemands;the Congresshas enormousinfluenceand infor58 See Pietro S. Nivola, "Trade Policy: Refereeing the Playing Field" in Mann, A Question of
Balance, 235-239; and O'Halloran, "Congress, the President, and U.S. Trade Policy," 13-14.
59 Harold Hongju Koh, "Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking after I.N.S.
v. Chadha," New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 18 (Summer 1986):
1223-1225.
6 Gerald M. Boyd, "Bush Urges Restraint by Canada," New York Times, 13 June 1986.
61 Ronald D. Elving, "Trade Mood Turns Hawkish As Frustration Builds," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 31 March 1990, 969.
62 Crabb and Holt, Invitation to Struggle, 182; Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs 66 (Winter 1987/88): 225; Gregory Treverton, "Intelligence: Welcome to the American Government," in Mann, A Question of Balance, 79.
622
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
Even the Iran-contraaffair
mation yet remainssuspiciousand mistrustful."63
supportsGates'sconclusionabout Congress'sinfluenceover the CIA. William
Caseytriedto createan "off-the-shelf"covertoperationsteampreciselybecause
he wantedto circumventcongressionaloversightof covert operations."6
Structuraland proceduralinnovationsgive Congressan indirectmeans for
influencingforeignpolicy. Again, we do not knowpreciselyhow importantsuch
innovationsare. Some matter, others don't. More researchis needed. Future
studies should try to answertwo questions.First, why4t times does Congress
pushpolicieson the executivewhileat othertimesit pushesprocedures?Second,
underwhat conditionsdo structuraland proceduralinnovationsgive an advantage to Congress?The answersto these two questionswill greatlyimproveour
understandingof how Congressinfluencesforeignpolicy.
GRANDSTANDING
Observersoften lament that Congresscontainstoo many showhorsesand not
enoughworkhorses.It is understandablewhy membersof Congressgrandstand.
Well packagedcommentson majorissuescan attractconsiderablemediaattention. RepresentativeStephenSolarz(D-NY), for example,figuredprominently
in news coverageof the Philippinesin 1986. "Byhis staff's count, he appeared
on thirty-fourradioandtelevisionshowsandwas quotedin eightyarticlesin The
New YorkTimes, The WashingtonPost, and The WallStreetJournalin a five
month period."65Exposurecan help a legislatorif the position taken pleases
constituents,interestgroups, or campaigndonors, or it may help simply by
givingthe membermore visibility.' Howeverhelpfulgrandstandingmay be to
legislators,manypeoplebelievethat playingto the gallerieshurtsU.S. interests.
As one workcomplains:"Wepaywhenloudpositiontakingandideologicalpoint
scoringsubstitutefor a willingnessto act and shareor bearthe consequences."67
The inclinationof criticsto assumethat the work of Congressshould be an
"eat your peas and spinach"endeavor fundamentallymisunderstandslife on
Capitol Hill. To be sure, memberssometimesgrandstandfor cynicalreasons.
in Cuba
SenatorFrankChurch(D-ID)soundedthe tocsinon the Soviet"brigade"
less to influencePresidentJimmyCarterthan to ingratiatehimself with voters
back home.68Muchthe sameoccurredwith the neutronbomb controversy.The
63 Gates, "TheCIA and ForeignPolicy,"224-225.
4 See Bob Woodward,Veil: The Secret Warsof the CIA, 1981-1987(New York: Simon and
Schuster,1987).
65 HedrickSmith,ThePowerGame:How Washington
Works(NewYork:RandomHouse, 1988),
140.
1 David R. Mayhew,Congress:TheElectoralConnection(New Haven:Yale UniversityPress,
1974), 43-79; and James M. Lindsay,"CongressionalOversightof the Departmentof Defense:
Reconsideringthe ConventionalWisdom,"ArmedForcesand Society 17 (Fall 1990):7-33.
67 Destler,Gelb, and Lake, Our Own WorstEnemy, 157.
6 See Dan Caldwell,TheDynamicsof DomesticPoliticsandArmsControl:TheSALTII Treaty
RatificationDebate (Columbia:Universityof South CarolinaPress, 1991), 160-163.
CONGRESSAND FOREIGN POLICY 1
623
floor debatesrevealedthat manylegislatorsdid not understandthe weaponthey
were discussing.69But even when motivatedby cynical reasons, grandstanding
mayaffectpolicy.SenatorChurch'schargesexacerbatedanti-SALTII sentiment,
and the flap over the neutronbomb turnedan obscureweaponsprograminto a
divisiveissue for the Atlantic alliance.
Moreoften thanis acknowledged,however,membersof Congressgrandstand
to influence policy.70Becauseof the power of the presidency,playing to the
galleriesis an essentialtool of policy entrepreneurs.Legislatorsunderstandfar
betterthantheircriticsE. E. Schattschneider's
point that increasingthe scope of
the decision-makingarenamay changethe ultimatedecision.7"The media, and
especiallytelevision, give membersthe means to overcomethe obstacles that
block attemptsto shapepolicy throughsubstantivelegislation.The glareof the
publicspotlightis often the best weaponlegislatorshave to dislodgea bill from
a hostile committee,to force the administrationto reverseits courseof action,
or to build public supportfor new policy initiatives.
The fact thatlegislatorsusuallystandto benefitpoliticallyfromgrandstanding
does not make it any less useful a tool for influencingpolicy. The American
politicalsystemrestson the assumptionthat self-interestwill motivatelegislators
to addresspressingpolicy issues. As James Madison wrote, the best way to
promotethe public good is to createa systemin which "theprivateinterestof
everyindividualmay be a sentinelover the publicrights."72
Grandstandingalso
is no less usefulbecauseit typicallyinvokessimple,if not simplistic,arguments.
Not only do presidentsthemselvesindulgein simpleanddramaticappeals- recall
PresidentReagan'sStarWarsspeech-such appealsare essentialto winningthe
support of the averagecitizen. Roger Hilsman'sdiscussionof defense policy
illustrateswhy legislatorsmust simplify issues if they want to shape opinion:
"Thereis a great advantagein having an investigationof our militarypolicy
concentrateon the single questionof who has the most airplanes,the Russians
or ourselves.This is a questionthat anyone can understand,and if the answer
is that it is the Russians,then the burdenof proof lies on the Executiveto justify
itself and its policy."73
At the most generallevel, legislatorsgrandstandto change public opinion.
Writingthirtyyears ago, WarnerSchillingarguedthat legislatorswho want to
influencedefensepolicyshould"changetheirpolicytargetfromthe budgetto the
69 BarryRubin, "TheMediaand the NeutronWarhead,"WashingtonReviewof
Strategicand
International Studies 1 (July 1978): 93.
70
See John A. Ferejohnand CharlesR. Shipan, "CongressionalInfluenceon Administrative
Agencies:A CaseStudyof Telecommunications
Policy"in LawrenceC. Dodd and BruceI. Oppenheimer,eds., CongressReconsidered,4th ed. (Washington,DC: CQ Press, 1989).
" E. E. Schattschneider,TheSemisovereignPeople (New York:Holt, Rinehart,1961), 1-3.
72 JamesMadison,"Federalist
No. 51,"in Hamilton,Madison,and Jay, TheFederalistPapers,
322.
73 RogerHilsman,"Congressional-Executive
RelationsandtheForeignPolicyConsensus,"American Political Science Review 52 (September 1958): 737.
624
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
climateof opinionthat shapedit."74In the mid-1980s,SenatorCharlesGrassley
(R-IA)showedthe wisdomof Schilling'sadvice.Ratherthanattackingindividual
defense programs,Grassleyreleasedinformationthat the air force had paid
$916.55to purchasea small plasticcap for the leg of a navigator'sstool.75The
storycapturednationalheadlines,and soon otherlegislatorswerescramblingto
revealstoriesof waste,fraud,andabusein the Pentagonbudget.As theAlmanac
of AmericanPolitics describedGrassley'sgrandstanding:"He has shown the
capacityto changethe termsof the debate,andfuturehistoriansmaydatethe end
of the ReaganAdministration'shuge increasesin defensespendingto Grassley's
initiative."76
Legislatorsalso grandstandto convincethe administrationto changeits policies. Tradepolicy is drivenby a "cry-and-sigh"
paradox.77Although members
know that the protectionisttariffs containedin the Smoot-Hawleybill of 1929
helpedcause a world depression,electoralincentivespush them towardprotectionism. Caughtbetweencompetingimpulses,membersuse threatsof protectionistlegislation,fieryspeeches,andpoliticaltheaterto pressurethe administration to addresstheirgrievances."Inshort,the signalsfromCongressarereceived,
and upon recognizingthis, the congressionalfrustrationquotientdrops, and a
liberaltradelaw is passed, or at the least, a restrictivebill fails. A sigh of relief
is heard."78
Legislatorsalso used grandstandingto force the Reaganadministration to withdrawits support for FerdinandMarcos. When PresidentReagan
disputedreports of massive fraud in the February1986 Philippineelections,
SenatorRichardLugar(R-IN), the chairof the SenateForeignRelationsCommittee,counteredwitha mediablitz. "Heappearedon all threenetworktelevision
interviewshows (Meet the Press, Face the Nation, and This Weekwith David
Brinkley).... Fromthattelevisionplatform,Lugarcalledon Reaganto telephone
Marcosto ask him to resign."79
Lugar'smedia campaignworked;within days
Reaganwithdrewhis supportfor Marcos.
In sendingsignalsto the president,legislatorsoften act on behalf of midlevel
officials in the executivebranchwho believecurrentpolicyis flawed.The fall of
Marcosillustratesthe point. By 1985, midlevelofficials at State, DOD, and the
NationalSecurityCouncilhad concludedthat the United Statesshouldease out
Marcosif it wishedto avoid anotherIran. With Reaganand his senioradvisers
staunchlysupportingMarcos,however,mid-careerofficialsencouragedcongres74 Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950" in Warner Schilling, Paul
Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, eds., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1962), 248.
75 Theodore J. Crackel, "Pentagon Management Problems: Congress Shares the Blame," Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder, No. 405, 22 January 1985, 3.
76 Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, TheAlmanac of American Politics 1988 (Washington, DC:
National Journal, 1987), 424.
77 Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 191-198.
78 Ibid., 193. (Emphasis in the original.)
79 Smith, The Power Game, 43-44.
CONGRESSAND FOREIGN POLICY
1 625
sional debate over the Philippines "as a way to persuade their bosses, not least
the president, that Marcos might have to go."80More recently, a government
scientist turned to Senator Albert Gore, Jr. (D-TN) for help when the Bush
administration toned down his conclusions on the need to combat global
warming. When Gore played the story to the hilt with the media, the White House
found itself under a barrage of criticism. Bowing to public pressure, "the White
House announced it would hold a workshop on global warming to prepare for
negotiations on an international treaty."'"
The third possible target of political grandstanding is another country. Legislators often want to send signals to friends and foes. At times the administration
encourages grandstanding as a way of strengthening its own hand in foreign
negotiations. For instance, during the Nixon administration Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans asked Wilbur Mills, the chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, to introduce a bill on textile quotas. Stans apparently hoped to create
a good cop/bad cop scenario that would force the government of Japan to make
additional concessions in trade negotiations.82
More often, however, the executive and legislative branches are not colluding.
Take the case where a subsidiary of Toshiba sold sensitive technology to the
Soviet Union. The government of Japan initially dragged its feet on the issue.
Then the matter reached Capitol Hill. On 20 June 1987, five members of Congress
took sledgehammers to a Toshiba radio on the grounds of the Capitol building.
The video clip was replayedagainand againon Japanesetelevision.One day later,the
chairmanandpresidentof ToshibaCorporationannouncedtheirresignations.On July
20, the Toshiba Corporationran a full-pagead in dozens of Americannewspapers
apologizingfor theactionsof its subsidiary.Bytheendof July,a memorandumbetween
MITI[Ministryof InternationalTradeandIndustry]andthe JapaneseForeignMinistry
providedfor ministerialreviewof sensitiveexports, thus raisingexport control to a
highergovernmentlevel. On July 31, the Japanesegovernmentsent a tougherexport
controllaw to the Diet; the bill passedin earlySeptember.In a seriesof talks over the
summerandfall, the Japaneseagreedto becomepartnerswiththeUS in a newprogram
to developanti-submarinewarfaretechnology.Japanesecompanies,led by Toshiba
Corp., beganformulatingtheirown COCOM[CoordinatingCommitteefor Multilateral ExportControls]complianceregulations.83
Or take Operation Desert Shield. Germany and Japan initially balked at providing aid. In September, a burden-sharing amendment to the House defense
appropriations bill sparked "a storm of animosity, extraordinary in its extent
and intensity," over the reluctance of Germany and Japan to help support the
80 Treverton,"Intelligence,"
98.
(Emphasisin the original.)
81 KarenWright,"Heatingthe GlobalWarmingDebate,"New YorkTimesMagazine,3 February
1991, 31.
82 Pastor,
Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 193.
83 "TakingToshibaPublic,"CaseC15-88-858.0,HarvardUniversity,JohnF. KennedySchoolof
Government,1988, 11-12.
626 |
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
multinationalforce.84Withintwo days of the debate, Germanyagreedto contributeto the Gulf effort, and Japan quadrupledits aid offer.85
Of course, it is difficult to establishthat grandstandingin Congresscauses
real changesin the behaviorof other political actors, be they the public, the
administration,or foreign countries.Public supportfor high levels of defense
spendingmay have fallenwithoutthe efforts of SenatorGrassleyand his imitators. The Reaganadministrationmight have droppedits supportfor Ferdinand
Marcoseven without being pushedby SenatorLugar.And the changesJapan
madeto its exportcontrolsmightbe all styleand no substance.Evenso, it'shard
to deny the conclusionthat membersof Congressoften focus the glare of the
public spotlighton foreignpolicy issues and that sometimesthe resultsmatter.
Scholarsmustabandontheirimplicitassumptionthat grandstandingsimplyinjects politics into an otherwisetechnocraticprocessand recognizeit as another
tool membersuse to counterthe inherentadvantagespresidentshave on foreign
policy.
CONCLUSION
To returnto the questionthat beganthis article,Congressdoes matteron foreign
policy.To be sure,pessimistsarerightto claimthatCongresssustainsthe policies
of the presidentfar more frequentlythan it overturnsthem. And withinforeign
policy, Congress'srecord of success varies across policy domains; Congress
seldomdefeatsthe presidenton issuesinvolvinghighpolitics.But focusingon the
legislativescorecardoverlooksthe dynamicsof influence.Thebulkof Congress's
influence over foreign policy rests in indirectmeans. The failure of political
scientiststo scrutinizeanticipatedreactions,structuraland proceduralinnovations, and politicalgrandstandinghas createda seriousgap in our understanding
of how Congressinfluencesforeign policy.
Rigorousstudyof Congressand foreignpolicy is moreimperativetoday than
ever before. Severalongoing developmentsat home and abroadpromiseto enhance the power of Congressin foreignpolicy. The first is the end of the cold
war. As perceptionsof externalthreatrecede,the publicis much more likelyto
toleratelegislativedissenton foreignaffairs. Facedwith fewerelectoralcosts in
opposing the president,legislatorsare more likely to deal the presidentpublic
rebuffs. Some signs of increasedcongressionalassertivenessappearedin 1990,
when Congressimposedsignificantrestrictionson how DOD spendsmoney on
"blackprograms."86
Congressalso passeda bill, subsequentlypocket-vetoed,that
84 R. W. Apple, Jr., "Bonnand Tokyo Are Criticizedfor Not BearingMoreof Gulf Cost,"New
YorkTimes, 13 September1990.
85 John Tagliabue,"KohlVows to WidenRole in Gulf Effort,"New YorkTimes,14 September
1990;and StevenR. Weisman,"JapanDefendsAid in MideastEffort,"New YorkTimes, 15 September1990.
86 RobertPear, "CongressImposesNew Restrictionson SecretFunds,"New York Times, 31
October1990.
CONGRESSAND FOREIGN POLICY |
627
would have requiredthe presidentto inform Congresswheneveran American
intelligenceagency sought foreign help in conductingcovert operations.87The
Gulf war is likelyto proveonly a brief detouron the road to increasedcongressional assertiveness.
A second reason why Congressis likely to become more influentialis that
global interdependenceis blurringthe line that once separateddomesticpolicy
from foreign policy. Acid rain providesan exampleof such an "intermestic"
issue.88The problemaffects not only U.S. relationswith Canadabut also the
economicwell-beingof states in the Midwest.Drugs, energypolicy, farm subsidies,globalwarming,andimmigrationareothersalientissuesthatlie astridethe
domesticand internationalspheres.Intermesticissues encouragecongressional
influencebecausetheyinvolvedecisionstraditionallyconsideredpartof domestic
policy. Membersof Congress,who canbe countedon to protecttheirinstitutional
prerogativesand their constituents,will feel comfortablerewritingpresidential
proposalson intermesticissues, regardlessof the foreign policy implications.
The thirddevelopmentpushingCongresstowardgreaterinfluenceis the ever
risinggap betweenAmericancommitmentsabroadand Americanresources.No
one deniesthattodaythe UnitedStatesoperatesundera severebudgetconstraint.
With it becomingincreasingunlikelythat the federalgovernmentcan solve the
commitment-resources
gap by runninglargerbudgetdeficits,Congresswill have
to chose between guns and butter. As the steady decline in real spendingon
defense illustrates,guns are likely to lose that showdown.
The last developmentthat offers to enhance Congress'spower stems from
growing fears that the Americaneconomy is falling behind the economies of
Germanyand Japan. In the wordsof RepresentativeAspin, today we are seeing
"the emergenceof an entirely new concept of national security. It embraces
FormerU.S. tradenegotieconomicsand competitive,commercialrelations."89
ator Clyde Prestowitzput the same point more bluntly:"Tradeis defense. We
If the argumentthat economicvitality
must recognizethe natureof the game."90
is nationalsecuritycontinuesto gainground,Congresswillbecomemoreinvolved
in nationalsecuritypolicyfor the samereasonsit is moreinfluentialon intermestic
issues. If issues are definedin domesticeconomicterms, Congressbecomesless
likelyto deferto the wishesof the president.In this respectthe 1989debateover
the FSX fightermay be a harbingerof things to come.9'
Today the UnitedStatesis crossinga watershedin its history.The collapseof
the Soviet Union and the decline of Americanhegemonyare forcing the first
15 December1990, 3056.
BaylessManning,"TheCongress,the Executiveand IntermesticAffairs: ThreeProposals,"
Foreign Affairs 55 (January1977):306-324.
89 Quotedin John Greenwald,"Friendor Foe?"Time, 24 April 1989, 44.
90Ibid., 45.
9 See Ortmayer,"ThePoliticalEconomyof NationalSecurity";
and BruceStokes,"Beat'Emor
Join 'Em,"National Journal, 25 February1989,454-464.
87 See ChristopherMadison,"ReopenedWound,"National Journal,
88
628
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
majorrethinkingin fifty yearsof the premisesof U.S. foreignpolicy. Congress
will play a key role in redefiningAmerica'sinterestsand strategies.How well or
poorlyelectedrepresentativeshandlethe comingchallengeswill shapethe future
of both the countryand the world. Unfortunately,a fixationwith the legislative
scorecardhas led scholarsto underestimatehow Congressinfluences foreign
policy; as a result, we are ill preparedto explainand predictcongressionalbehavior. Hopefully, future researchwill take up WilliamBundy'schallengeto
explorethe complexitiesof congressionaldecisionmakingon foreignpolicy. The
rewardis not only a betterunderstandingof how Congressoperates,but also a
betterunderstandingof how U.S. foreignpolicy is made.*
* An earlierversionof the paperwaspresentedat the annualIowaConferenceof PoliticalScientists, 3 November1990,in Des Moines.I amgratefulto EileenBurgin,PaulGehman,JosephKruzel,
JamesMcCormick,and especiallyStevenS. Smithand PeverillSquirefor theirhelpfulcomments
and suggestions.