DEMOCRACIES DO NOT FIGHT EACH OTHER. WHY? ANDRES EDUARDO FERNANDEZ OSORIO

DEMOCRACIES DO NOT FIGHT EACH OTHER. WHY?
ANDRES EDUARDO FERNANDEZ OSORIO1
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
SCHOOL OF SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
LONDON
13 DECEMBER 2012
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Beneficiario COLFUTURO 2011
Andres Eduardo Fernandez Osorio
Introduction
“War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will”
Carl Von Clausewitz (1832)
War, understood as an intentional armed conflict between communities in order to achieve
political goals, has been part of the public policy of many nations. In 1832, the Prussian
military strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1832, p.5) defined War as “an act of violence to
compel our opponent to fulfil our will”, when seen in the light of the numerous wars fought
during the 1800s this quote demonstrates how fundamental War was for nations at that time.
Although there are many arguments in support of various nations’ warmongering policies
during the past decades, there is much discussion on how such policies might be necessary if,
as some theorists have proven, it is the case that Democracies do not fight Democracies
(Rummel, 1999).
This article will examine the existing arguments of the Democratic Peace Theory on why
democracies do not fight each other. It aims to summarize the most important aspects of the
theory, and to provide adequate counterarguments. First, it will explain the general
implications of the theory, including its origins and explanations. Second, it will analyze the
related critiques and controversies. Third, it will identify the theory’s practical application.
Finally, it will give conclusions on how effective this theory could be during the present days.
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The Democratic Peace Theory
“Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of
democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other, they make better trading partners and partners in
diplomacy”
William J. Clinton (1994)
General implications
The Democratic Peace Theory, also called Mutual Democratic Pacifism gives a possible
explanation for why democracies do not go to war with each other. This theory has its origins
in 1795 with a German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, who outlined the first relevant idea in
his article “Perpetual Peace.” Kant’s theory is based on a theoretical world in which countries
share a constitutional republic as a political regime, and in which people appeal for
continuous or perpetual peace as an ideal for living. The premise of Kant’s idea is that people
will not decide to go to war unless there is a need to defend themselves, and if all nations
were democratic constitutional republics, there would be no aggressor nations and the war
occurrence could not exist. For Kant, the reluctance of the people to support war and its
related costs restrains democratic leaders from engaging in conflicts with other nations.
Kant’s school of thought, in whom democracies are reluctant to use violent means against
other democracies, continued across the centuries. The Kantian idea of a pacific union,
fostered by shared or common values, cosmopolitan rights (limited to a universal hospitality)
and the right of nations based on a federation of Free states, gained support after the First
World War, when the idea of the right of nations to self-determination inspired the creation of
the League of Nations. Important academics like Small and Singer (1976), Rummel (1979),
Doyle (1986), Bueno de Mezquita and Lalman (1986), Geva, DeRouren and Mintz (1993),
Rummel (1997), Starr (1997) and Danilovic and Clare (2007) have contributed to the theory,
demonstrating with empirical findings that “democracies do not make war on each other”
(Rummel 1999, p.10), and that the “lack of conflict between democratic states is not due to a
spurious causal relation” (Maoz and Russett 1992, p.262).
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Three different schools of thought attempt to explain the Democratic Peace Theory. First, a
structural approach maintains that the organizations or institutions are restricted in their
choice to go to war by the diverse economical, social, and political costs for the government
and the population that war entails, making war an undesirable option for the resolution of
misunderstandings between nations. In addition, the importance of individual freedoms and
free elections maximize the leaders’ political responsibilities because they could be replaced
if they fail to maintain an adequate foreign policy. This view has been supported in the work
of Geva, DeRouren and Mintz (1993, p.224) when concluding: “the major reason why the use
of force against other democracies is counterproductive from a political standpoint is because
it is perceived by the public as a failure of foreign policy”.
Democratic institutions such as transparency, political pluralism, and legal rights minimize
the possibilities of governments and leaders creating false justifications in order to convince
the population to declare war on another state. When thinking about democratic dyads,
transparency is an important factor because it means that both states can clearly perceive or
infer the other’s intentions. Starr (1997, p.157) states, “such transparency means that each
party has too much information about the other to create convincing enemy images, for either
elites or masses”.
Second, a normative approach, sometimes called cultural explanation, maintains that common
liberal and democratic concepts explain stability and peaceful relations between democratic
states. According to this variant, the existent knowledge and culture regarding to democratic
political values and means of conflict resolution, supports honest relations between states and
their leaders. In addition, these leaders expect that their counterparts will also understand the
necessity of solving the differences without the use of violent methods. It is important to note
how this democratic perception of one state by another could affect and modify the
motivation for warmongering policies. Supporting this, Elman (1997) argues that “political
ideology, therefore, determines how democracies distinguish allies from adversaries:
democracies that represent and act in their citizens’ interests are treated with respect and
consideration, whereas non-democracies that use violence and oppression against their own
people are regarded with mistrust and suspicion”.
Third, a “Power Transition Theory” formulated in 1958 by A.F.K. Organski presents the
international politics arena as a hierarchy with four levels of power between the states (a
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dominant state, great powers, middle powers and small powers), analyzing the cyclic
occurrence of wars and the effect of transition power in the occurrence of conflicts. Organski
(1980, p.19) states that “an even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities
between contending groups of nations is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is
preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and
advantaged nations”. This work suggests, therefore, that democracies are satisfied states that
share strong economic goals and are less likely to fight about territory; in other words,
peaceful means of resolution will prevail over violent ones.
A further explanation of the theory could be made by using two levels of analysis. The first, a
monadic explanation, uses the assumption that democracies are less violent with other
democracies than with non-democracies. Despite the peaceful behaviour of the democracies,
it is possible that they will use violence when threatened. In the case of threat, democracies
are prone to undertake an escalating confrontation rather than engaging in a direct war with
the enemy; violent means would be considered as a last resort (ultima ratio regum) for selfprotection. For Russet (2009, p.13), this behaviour is a result of the incomplete Kantian world
in which democracies have to survive; only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
end of the Cold War did democracies became a majority, but there is still a great number of
countries with non-democratic regimes or unstable democracies.
The second, a dyadic explanation, describes the reasons why democracies are more peaceful
in their relations with democracies as opposed to non-democracies. Liberal democracies are
prone to respect mutual agreements between nations, unlike non-democracies, due to the
international responsibility taken, and therefore, a world composed by democratic states will
be more peaceful (systemic analysis). Through the creation of coalitions, democracies not
only preserve peaceful coexistence but also improve their ability to defeat their adversaries by
62% (Choi, 2003). Democracies react not only violently when they are threatened but also are
more aggressive in these relations in general.
Critiques and controversies
Even though the Democratic Peace Theory provides a plausible explanation for the nonviolent behaviour between democratic states, a great amount of criticism still exists within
academia. A common critique is related to the ambiguity of the basic concepts of the
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Democratic Peace Theory: democracy and war. Rummel (1999, p.10) provides a useful
definition of democracy: “democracies in its 20th century form means: regular elections for
the most powerful government positions, competitive political parties, near universal
franchise, secret balloting and civil liberties and political rights”. However, Rummel does not
consider transparency as an important element for democracy. Transparency, understood as
the open possibility of observation and discussion of Government decisions and policies is a
requisite for modern democracy and reduces the possibilities for governments to abuse their
power.
Regarding the concept of War, Most and Starr (1989) as cited in Starr (1997, p.154) define
war as a “sustained violent conflict fought by organized armed forces which are directed by a
governmental authority”. Although this definition is comprehensive, it is necessary to be
updated due to the changing components of modern war. In this sense, Forsyth (2004, p.17)
defines war as “an act of force by a nation-state, crime organization, terror group, drug cartel,
revolutionary group, or coalition of states to compel an enemy to do one’s will, accept a
specific ideology, or prevent or allow unfettered criminal activity”. With this new definition,
the applicability of the theory encompasses a wider spectrum.
The controversies related to the Democratic Peace Theory could be divided into two branches.
The first is a critique related to the methodology used to undertake the research and analyze
the empirical data. Many academics argue that there is always some degree of subjectivity
involved when studies are carried out and the results are, to some extent, affected by
prejudices. In this sense, Farber and Gowa (1997, p.393) argue that after re-examining data
used by other scholars, it is possible to find that “only during the Cold War violent disputes
between democracies were relatively rare events”. Schwartz and Skinner attack the theory by
providing historical examples like the First World War, the Franco-Prussian War, the War of
the Pacific, the American Civil War, and Ecuador versus Peru; “Democratic pacifism is not
the first doctrine to come into vogue among intellectuals, though logic and history point
away” (Schwartz and Skinner, 1999).
On the other hand, some theorists maintain that variables other than a willingness for peace,
explain peaceful relations between democracies. Hegemony could be another explanation for
a stable, peaceful coexistence; the control of strategic organization, the monopoly of the
military, political, and economic power, the interests within a specific region, and the
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subordination of the states might produce a situation where violence is not a suitable policy
among the states. Shimmin (1999, p.6) explains this possibility in the following words: “the
economic and political powers of these nations are reliant on their continuing domination of
global markets, international governing bodies such as the United Nations, and the most
powerful military organizations in the world”.
Otherwise, for Farber and Gowa (1997, p.394), the democratic peace after 1945 should be
analyzed using concepts concerning common interests instead of common polities,
analogously, the high number of conflicts before 1914 can be seen as being related to the
clash of interests between democratic states. Mansfield and Snyder (1995, p.87) argue that
democratizing states are more likely to go to war than autocratic states, and Spiro (1994, p.51)
states that the occurrence of war and democracy is unlikely, concluding then, that the peaceful
relations have a high probability of occurrence. These realist critiques have been undermined
by researchers using empirical data, who maintain the idea of the peacefulness of
democracies; Maoz (1997, p.162) states “democracies almost never engage each other in fullscale war, and rarely clash with each other in militarized interstate disputes short of war”.
Considering that some academics have found that the number of democracies is increasing
over time (Boix, 2011), it is possible to infer that as the proportion of democracies rises
around the world, the possibility of war and conflict, appear to be reduced proportionally.
Practical application
The Democratic Peace Theory, with its relative simplicity, has challenged the realist and
neorealist theories of International Relations (IR) that have predominated in the international
arena for several centuries. During the past decades, research undertaken in California (Bueno
de Mesquita and Lalman, 1986), Haifa (Maoz and Russett, 1992), Texas (Geva, DeRouren
and Mintz, 1993), Hawaii (Rummel, 1997) and Illinois (Danilovic and Clare, 2007),
confirmed to some extent the veracity of the Democratic Peace Theory. These studies showed
that statistically the probability of a war between two democratic states is very low and that
the democratic leaders are less interested in using military force or violent actions against
other democracies than against non-democracies.
The theory by itself and the results of these studies are deeply debated, but despite its
weakness, it is possible to derive some basic conclusions from the theory. First, republican
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liberalism, the theory of International Relations (IR) that supports the Democratic Peace
Theory, questioned the applicability of the Realist theory of IR, which argues that the balance
of power and common strategic goals are the main points of explanation for the stable and
peaceful relations between democratic nations. A significant amount of research suggests that
democratic states are continuously motivated by the necessity of peaceful coexistence with
their neighbours, using the same regulations that characterize their domestic policies, but not
by meticulously calculated alliances and profit-related relations. Democratic nations expect
that other democracies will solve misunderstandings using consideration and a nonviolent
scheme; in addition, it is expected that democratic leaders will continuously foster
collaborative and peaceful relations with their counterparts. A good example of this reasoning
is the speech of George W. Bush, former President of the United States of America, who in
1994 said: “the reason why I'm so strong on democracy is democracies don't go to war with
each other. And the reason why is the people of most societies don't like war, and they
understand what war means”.
Second, the Democratic Peace Theory might challenge the usefulness of other political ideas
that differ from those of democracy, in today’s world. This theory is supported by Rummel
(1989, p.10) when he states, “democracy is a general cure for political or collective violence
of any kind – it is a method of nonviolence”. Since a significant number of academic works
identify democracy as a political system less susceptible to the creation and promotion of
foreign policies that advocate violence, with relatively unrestricted levels of civil rights and
participation, it is possible to suggest democracy as a more desirable political system when
compared with despotic or totalitarian regimes.
Finally, political processes such as transparency, cooperation, democratization, and
integration could improve relations among nations. Starr (1997, p.155) highlights the
importance of these elements when he suggests: “the theories of integration stress the role of
learning in the development of norms of cooperation and a sense of community, they stress
the need for mutual benefits and the positive impact of the interdependence on the
management of interdependent relations”. However, it is important to point out the fact that
unstable democracies or nations undertaking a democratization process are not completely
peaceful. A democracy’s political instability might occur when institutions are not strong
enough to support the system or when the transition process intimidates leading sectors. By
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this means, transitional or incomplete democracies might be more inclined than established
democracies to initiate a war or to become involved in war.
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Andres Eduardo Fernandez Osorio
Conclusions
Although the Democratic Peace Theory is quite controversial and has both weaknesses and
strengths, it provides a logical explanation for the peaceful relations that characterize
democracies. Nations who share a democratic political system, with transparency and
legitimacy, are not only peaceful with their neighbours, but towards their own populations;
democracies do not engage in foreign or domestic violence, or genocide as the autocratic
states do. A non-violent foreign policy is the direct result of a peaceful domestic policy
consisting of civil rights, equal participation and a representative government.
Although this article has explored different schools of thought, levels of analysis and studies
that support the Democratic Peace Theory, there are undeniable weaknesses with the theory.
In 1968, Karl Popper wrote, “every solution of a problem raises new problems; the more so
the deeper the original problem and the bolder its solution. The more we learn about the
world, and the deeper our learning, the more conscious, specific, and articulate will be our
knowledge of what we do not know, our knowledge of our ignorance.” Perhaps the solution
for a completely peaceful existence between nations will never be found but the Democratic
Peace Theory still provides a necessary plausible description of this theoretical state of
peaceful coexistence.
The 21st century assigns a great responsibility to the leaders of the nations to protect
international stability and non-violent coexistence. The War on terror, as a worldwide
problem, served to redefine international relations between nations and the norms for the use
of violent means. Integration and democratization processes are more necessary than ever.
Arguably, Foucault’s idea about warmongering – “war is no more than a continuation of
politics” (2003, p. 48) – could redefine the policies of democratic nations in order to obtain a
global peaceful system.
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