1. society
2. unrest and war

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARUSIE BARRACKS; PENNSYLVANIA 17013
4
13 JUNE isgO
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SOVIET POUCY TOWARD BA'ATHISI IRAQ
1963 -' 1971
H
STRATEGIC ISSUES
ESEARCU r4ffioRADur4
H
cDD1sAisurJop STATEMENT:
Apófevcdfo, public roloa:
Thvi.w, ópinlon and/or findings
contained in this report ore thoo
otributionunhimlIod
ofthoauthorondahou,dflObO
COflStfudd5anoffjcjiDopá11m0
OfthoArmypoei*Jon policy or
decision unless so designated by
other official dóóumentation.
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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
-----
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4
POLICY TO WARD BA'ATHIST IRAQ
196::979-
Robert O,4reedman
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DISCLAIMER
The views, opinior$,
and/or findings contained in
this
memorandum are thdse of the author and should
not be construed
as an official Departme o'the Army
unless so designated by
position, policy
other official documentation or decision,
S
Composition of this memorandum
was accomplished by Mrs. Pat
Bonneau.
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FOREWORD
This memorandum evolved froth the
Military Policy Symosium
on "The Soviet Union in the Third World:
Success and Failure,"
whih was hosted by the Strategic
Studies
Institute
in the Fall of
1979. During the Symposium, acadmj
and government experts
discussed a number of issues concerning
COntinuing impact on US strategy. Thisthis area which will have a
memorandum considers
-
one of these issues
The Strategic Issues Research Memoranda
program of the
Strategic StUdies !nstitute, US Army
War
Colleg'.
provides a
means for timely dissemination of analytical
papers
which
constrained by format or cOnformity with institutional are not
policy.
These memoranda are prepared on subjects
f
currern
importance
in areas related to the authors' professional
work.
This memorandum was prepared as a
contribution
to the field of
national security research and study. As
sUchjt
does
ot reflect the
official view of the College, the Department
of
the
Army,
or the
Department of Defense
V
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Atç.
DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
" MajorGeneral, USA
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DR. ROBERTO.
FREEDMAN is Dean of
of Graduate Studies
the Peggy Meyáhoff
and
Pear,one School
College Dr Freedman Profesr of Political Science at the Baltimore
received a bachelor's
University of Pennsylan,a
degree in diplomatic history Hbt
He is a graduate of
from th
and he also
Columbia University s Russian
He has written IWO earned his master's and doctorate from
books
Columbia University
Warfare
Soi,ei Economic Pressure Econom,c
Against Yugos(av in the Commune, Bloc A Study of
(1970) and Sov,j Policy
A/ban,0 and Comm,,,
China
appeared in a revised andToward theMiddle East Since 1970(1975)
the latter book
editor of the book, Worldecpanded edit,o in December 1978
Politics and the Arab-israeli
In addition,
coming to Baltimore,
conflict (1979). Prjohe is
Dr
Freedman
to
Science and Russian and
served as Associate
Professor of Political
until completion of his Middle East Area Specjalist.àt Marquet
my service in July 1970, he
UnIversity and,
Russian Histo,, and Government
was Assistant
at the US Military
Professor of
Academy at Wect Point
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SOVIETPOUCYTOARDAATHISTIQ
19681979
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In order- to- assess the success or failure of Soviet po1icftoward
Iraqit is first necessary to examine
Soviet
toward the entire
Middle East, since Soviet policy towardpolicy
Iraq
is
Component of its overall policy toward the region In very muda a
-
Hr
necessary to examine the nature of the Ba'athist addition, it is
regime an Iraq,
since many of the successes achieved and
problems
encountered by
the USSR in its dealings with the
Iraqis
stem
from
singular nature of tI'e Iraqi regime which has been beset the rather
by serious
domestic and foreign problems since at came to
power
After
these
two topics are discussed, this study wall
examine the evolution of
the Soviet-Iraqi relationship from
the coup d'etat which brought
the Ba'athists back to power in July
1968 until the present
SOVIET GOALS AND TACTICS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
In order to understand Soviet
policy toward
to deal first with the problem of determining Iraq, it is necessary
Middle East. Observers of Soviet policy Moscow's goals in the
in this oilrjch and
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strtegicany located region ae generally
divided into two schools
of thought on this'questjon.' While
both
aee that the Soviet
Union wants to he considered
a
major
factor
in Middle Eastern
affairs, if only because of the USSR's
they differ on the ultimate Soviet goalplopinquity to the region,
n, the Middle East. One
school of thought sees Soviet Middle Eastern
policy as being
primarily defensive in nature;
that is, as directed
the region froth being used"as a base for military toward Preventing
attack or political
'subversion against, the USSL
The
other
school
Of thought sees
Soviet policy as primarily offensive
in
nature,
as aimed at the
limitation and ultimate exclusion of Western influence
from the.,
region and its replacement by Soviet inf1uence.
the author that Soviet goals ii the Middle East,It is the Opinion of
mid-1960's, have been primarily offensive in at least since the
nature, and in the
Arab segment of the Middle East, the Soviet Union
appears to have
been engãged in a zero-sum game competitiOn
for
influence with
the United States.
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In its effOis to weaken and ultimately
fluence from The 'Middle East and particularlyeliminate Western in-
from the Arab world
while promoting. Soviet influence,
the
Soviet
leadership has employed a number of tactics. First
of military aid to its regional and foremost has been the supply
clients. Next in importance comes
economic aid; the Aswan dam in Egypt
and the Eiphrates dam in
Syria are prominent examples of Soviet
economic assistnce,
although each project has had serious problems.
In recent 'ears
Moscow has also sought to solidjfy
its
influence
through the
conclusion of long-term Fri,dshipnd
Cooperat ion- Treaties such
as the ones concludtd with Egypt (1971),
(1974) Ethiopia (1978) and Afghanistan Iraq (1972), Somalia
repudiation of the treaties by Egypt (1976)(1978). However, 'the
indicate that this has not been too successful and Somalia (1977)
also attempted to exploit both the lingering a tactic. Moscow has
memories of Western
colonialism and, Western threats
against',
Arab
oil producers. In
addition, the .Russjans have
offered
'the
Arabs
diplomatic Support
at such internationalforums
as the United Nations and the Geneva
Conference On an Arab-Israeli
settlement. However, both its
diplomatic and military aid topeace
the
Arabs
against Israel has been
limited in scope by the Seviet Union.
Moscow
continues to support
Israel's right to exist, both for fear
of
Unduly
alienating
the United
States at a time when the
'
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desire additional SALT
agreements andimproved tradeRussians
relations, and also because
.
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serves as a convenient rallying point for potentially anti-Western
forces in the Arab wórld.
Whj1e the USSR has used all these tactics, it has, also run into
serious problems in its quest for influence in the Middle East. The
flumerous inter-Arab and regional conflicts (Syria-Iraq, North
Yemen-South Yemen, Ethiopia.SomaIia, A1eria-Morocco) have
usually meant that when the USSR has favored one party, it has
alienated the other, often driving it toard the West. Secondly, the
existence of Arab Communist parties has proven to be a handicap
for the 'Russians, as Communist activities hae, on occasion,'
caused a sharp deterioratitrn in relations between the USSR and the
cguntry in which the Arab Communist party has operated. The
Communist-supported coup d'etat in the Sudan in 1971, and
Communist efforts to organize cells in the Iraqi Army in the mid
and late 1970's are recent xampIes of this problem.5 Third, the
wealth which flow:d to the Arab world (ór'at least to its major oil,
'producers) since the quadrupling of oil prices in late 1973 has
enabled the Arabs to buy quality technology from the West and
-Japan, and this has helped weaken the ectnbmic bond between the
USSR and a number of Arab states such as Iraq and Syria. Fourth,
since 1967 and particularly since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Islam
has been resurgent throughout the Arab world, and the USSR,
identified in the Arab world with atheism,'has been hampered'as a'
result. Finly, the United States and to a lesser extent France-and'
China have actively opposed Soviet efforts to achieve predominant
influence7in the region and this has frequently enabled Middle
Eastern states to play the extra-regioral powers off against each
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other and thereby prevent any one of them from securing
predominant influence
Given the problems that the USSR has faced, the Russians have
adopted one overall strategy to seek to maximize their influence
while eakening that of the West The strateg) had been to try to
unite the Arab states (Irrespective of their mutual conflicts)
tOget,her with "progressive" Arab political organizations, such as
'
the Arab Commuthst parties and the PLO, into a large "anti-
imperalist" Arab front directed against what the USSR has termed
the Iinchpin of Western lmperalismIsraelagid its 'estern
supporters Given the heterogeneous composition of the front, the
USSR has not had oo much success with this strategy, although it
appeared to bear fruit during the 1973 war when the Arabs united
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against
Israel andplaced a oil embargo on the West. Unfortunately for Moscow, 'however, the astute diplOmacy of
Kissinger and policy changes by Egyptian President Anwar Henty
Sadat
led to a splintering of this "anti-imperial jt Arab unity" and
the
emergence of a core' of proWesterri Arab states in the aftermath of
of 1li&973 ar left the USSR in a weak position in the Arab world
the, time of the Carter Administration's accession to power in
January1977.' Moscow's position was to improve, however, by the
time of the Carter.Sadat-Begjn summit at Camp David in
tember 1978, and improved still further following the two Sepnti- -'
Egyptian conferences organized by Iraq ip Baghdad
November
1978 and March 1979, as it appeared Lhat tke pro-Western
grouping
of Arab states had disintegrated. Nonetheless, the USSR
was
unable to capitalize on this situation to create its
bloc
of pro-Soviet Arab statesa development due atlong-sought
least in part to
opposition from its ei stwhile ally, Iraq
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THE NATURE OF THE IRAQI BA'ATHIST REGIME
.
The recent abortive coup d'etat in Iraq -and the subsequent
execution of a large number of high-ranking Ba'athist officials
underlines the tenuous hold on power of the elite which has ruled
Iraqsince July 1968.' Major coup attempts against the regime
have
occurred in 1970, 1973, and 1979, and the regime has also been
faced with an endemic conflict with the autonomy-seeking Kurds
who inhabit the northern mountains of Iraq, as well as resentment
from the Shine majority in Iraq over domination by the Sunni
'Moslem minority regime, most of whose top leaders,
come from the
town of Takrg Even among the Takriti elite itself there
has been
conflict as evidenced, by the ouster of Hardan al-Takritj from
his
position as vice-presidentin 1970, and his subseent
murder (most
probably bj an Iraqi "hit team") in 1971
During itspériod of rule the Iraqi Ba'athists have also-been faced
with a numler of foreign problems. One, a conflict
with their
fellow Ba'aihists who rulejn neighboring Syria, appears to have
been at least temporarily resolved by the Camp David-induced
rapprochement of October 1978, although the abortive July 1979
coup again soared relations A second major problem
concern the
border with Iran, whose population ,s predominne1y
Shine
Moslem, 'and which until the fall of the Shah received' extensive
military Support from the United States While the 1975 treaty
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between Iraq and Iran seemed to reduce the tensions between the
two countries, the rise to power of Ayatollah
precipitated a new round ofcOnflict. Foreign problemsKhomeini
of a less
severe nature facing the Iraqi Ba'ath include a continuing border
dispute with Kuwait, strained relations with
Arabia, and poor relations with Egypt, with neighboring Saudi
whom Iraq has long
been corn j,eting for leadership in the Arab world.
Given these domestic and foreign difficulties,
is perhaps not
surplising that the minority dictatorship which currmtly rules Iraq
has been rather paranoid about threats to its control
over the
country, whether real or only potential. O( this
situation
has
arisen a dependency on the USSR, on whOth the Iraqis have relied
heavily- (although not exclusively) for
At the same time
it' has fostered a deep suspicion in theweaponry.
minds of the Iraqi leaders
about the goals of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which they
see
as actual or potential competitors for power. This, in
turn,
has
created ocàsiona1 conflict in Iraqi-Soviet relations, since the Iraqis
see the USSR as a strong supporter of the ICP.
persists despite periodic Soviet statements that This Perception
each Communist
party has tO achieve power by'its own efforts.
The chronically Suspicious nature of the Iraqi leadthhjp
reflected in its efforts not to become 'too dependent has also
on any
one outside power foi assistance. Thus in 'its early years when
the
nationalization and development, of Iraqi oil were highest priorities
of the Ba'athist regime, Iraq called
upon France as well as the
USSR fOr assistance. Following the quadrupling
of oil prices, when
general economic development became' a major national
Iraq awarded major contracts not only to the USSR butpriority,
also to
firms in Fiance, Japan and even the
United
States
(with
whoni
diplomatic relations remained broken because
of
Iraq's
position
on
the Arab-israeli conflict). The Soviet Union thus
found itself
obtaining a decreasing share of
Iraqi trade. Even in the realm of
---military assistance, the iraqis have been
careful to seek aid from
France so as to avoid too great a dependency
the USSR.
Interestingly enough, however,"uvhile theon
Iraqi
leadership has
sought to avoid too close a dependence
on
the
USSR,
it seems to
have adopted several aspects of what
might
be
termed
model" t- enhance its contr& over Iraqi society. Thus,the "Soviet
there is a
quasi.comrnjs
system in the Iraoi armed forces
both
to help
prevent a military coup and also to indoctrjnate
the
officers
in
Ba'athist ideology. In addition the
Iraqi leaders have sought to
it
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keep the party and state separate, with the Ba'ath party in a
position where it czn control government activities by means of a
unit of Ba'ath party members in each government department.
Similarly the Ba'athists have organized a netwdrk of such cells in
many factories, trade unions, and other official and unofficial
organizations throughcit the country. While this sys1em has not
prevented societal disturbances or attempted coups, it has helped,-'
at least so far, to keep the ruling elite in power. Needless to say
however, adoption of such a system, modeled as it may be on the'
CPSU', does not mean that the Iraqi leadership is any more
dependent on the USSR. Indeed, as the nçxtsectiôn ol this study
will seek to demonstrate, the haqi leadership reached its high point
of dependency on the USSR in the. 1973-74 period and has been
moving away from its position of dependency eer since
THEEVOLUTIONOFSOV1ET.IpQI RELATIONS, 1968-79
July 1968- July 1973: The Growthof Dependency'
The returli of the 13a'ath to power in Iraq in July 1968 may have
becr greeted with mixed feelings by Moscow. On the one hand,
only 5 years before the Ba'athists had slaughtered a large number
of Iraqi Communists in their brief 10 month rule over the country.
This reign had followed the:óverthrow of Abdul Qassim, with
whom the Russians had established close ties. As a result, SovietIraqi relations had deteriorated sharply. On the other hand, the a1Rakr led Ba'àthists were at least professed socialists, albeit
moderate ones, which was more than could be said for the regime
of Abdul Rahrnañ Aref which they overthrew. Even more im-
portant, however, the new regime's internal and external difficulties and the changing situation in the Persian Gulf made it
opportune for Moscow to welcome the Iraqi Ba'athist quest for
improved relations.
Soon after taking power the aI-Bakr regime found itself caught
up in an escalating conflict with Iran. On April 19, 1969, Teheran
denounced the 1937 Iraqi-Iranian treaty fixing their frontier on the
eastern (Iranian) side of the Shaat al-Arab River ' In addition, by
professing hostility to Western-oriented Turkey and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the Iraqis soon found themselves
distrusted by virtually all of their neighbors To make matters
worse they were also beset by internal problems such as the con-
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tinuing conflict with the Kurds, extensive overt and covert opposition to their regime, and an abortive coup
d'etat attempt in
Januar, 1970 Thus beset by internal strife and external
threats,
the
new Iraqi regime was in need of assIstaice
From the point of view of the USSR, the
such a situation must have anpeared to be Pc'ssibiljty of exploiting
Janua;y 36, 1968, British Prime Ministermost timely indeed On
Harold Wilson had
announced that England would maintain its forces
in the Persian
Gulf only until the end of 3971, and Moscow
may
have seen the
possibility of filling the vacuum of poJiticaI/mj1jtar,
pOer iha
would result Iraq, 'ith its public orpostIon
to the Westen-i
:
oriented monarchies in the Gulf and to Ameriran
effort3 to forge a'
Persian (luif security pact to fi!! th
'o,d
left
b>
the departing
British, seemed to be an excellent candidate
for Soviet assistance.
Soviet aid to Iraq was to b both military and
economic in
nature. Arms sale negotiations began in Baghdad
early
an agreement was reached-when Iraqi military délègatesin 1969 and
journced
to Moscow in May of that year." (See Table I for a descrlptjø
of
the subsequent rise in Iraqi military power,) Perhaps almost
as
important to the Iraqi Bä'athists as Soviet military aid
as the
Soviet willingness to help Iraq develop its oil industry.
The
Iraqis
long been locked in conflict with the
Western-owned
oil
companies over such issues as the price Iraq would
receive
for
its
oil, and the quantity of oil the Western
companies
would
be
willing
-to- pump." Thus Iraq could only welcome the agreement
signed
between its state oil company, INOC, and the USSR
in
June
1969
for a $72 milliun loan for drilling rigs, survey
teams,
and
other
oil
field equipment, the loan the following month of an additional $70
million to help develop Iraq's northern Rumelia
major $22 milliot, loan in April C71the latier oil fields, anti a
two loans to b:
repaid in oil, a commodity which the USSR
was
beginning
to frid
in tight supply.sJ While the USSR and
Iraq
were
able
to
agree
on
oil development (although the Iraqis
were not always happy with
the quality of Soviet equipment), and the So%Iet
government hailed
the autonomy agreement reached
on March 1, 1970, between the
Iraqi government and the Kurds, differences
remained on policy
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iraq opposed both
UN Resoiution
242 (which the USSR and Egypt had
accepted)
and
the IsraeliEgyptian ceasefire agreement of August 1970
Indeed,
August 1, 1970, called Iraqi opposition to the latter Pravda on
agreement
"incomprehensible." Iraqi Opposition to these Soviet-backed
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agreements helped to undermine the
the USSR had been endeavoring "anti-imperal 1st" Arab unity
to achieve. Nevertheless, the
Soviet leaders ot only did not
exert any pressure on the Iraqi
leadership (SUCItaS limiting
economic or,military aid, but they
went ahead and signed' a protocol on
trade 'and economic
Cooperation with the Iraqis or, August 13, 1,970,
whkh called for an
increase in trade and Soviet assistance,
and
then
granted the Iraqis
a $34 million loan on August 30, 1970
"These
events
indicated not
oni) the limited degree of Soviet
in Iraq, but also a clear
desire by the Russians to maintaininfluence
good
andsirategicaijy located nation 4Nhich, relations with the oil-rich
as in the days of Nun Said
and Abdul Qassim, had beccr,,e Egypt's'
chief'rjval in the Arab
world.
Moscow's efforts to establish a positive relationship
with Iraq
took on an addd-sjgnjfjca
as Soviet.Egyptjan relations began
to
cool with the death of Nasser and
the
advent
of
Anwar
Sàdat
to
Egypt's Presidenc) Disagreements
over
Soviet
military
assistance
to Egypt and Soviet policy tpward the
Communjstsupported coup
d'etat in the Sudan
n July 1971, together with Egyptian
gestures
toward the United States, led to the deterj,ration
of
the
Soviet
pos;"on in Egypt " By contrasI, Soviet-iraqi
relations
began
to
improve rapidly. In a majOr article
On July 14, 1971, Pravda hailed
"positive changes" in iraq, Citing
especially the Ba'athjsts
willingness to consider including
the ICP in a national front.
Soviet-Iraqi relations grew still warmer
following the abortivec
coup in the Sudan several days later
Faced
by a hostile Saudi
Arabia and Iran to her south and
east,
and
with her western
neighbor Syria having Joined an Arab
Federation
led by Egypt,
Iraq was isolated both in the
Arab world and in the MiddIEast
a' whole. The Iraqis had probably
as
hoped that, by supporting the
military coup d'etat against Sudanese
President Jäafar Nimeri,
they might wean the Sudan
away
from
its
ties with Egypt and into a
Close relationship with Iraq When
the Coup failed and Nimeri
returned to power, the Soviet
UniOñ was the only Country that
surpassed Iraq in its condemnation
of Nimeri's activities__albeit
for-different reasons."Iraq's isolation grew stronger during
the Indo-Pakistani war in
December 1971 when its Persian
Gulf
rival
Iran seized control of
three strategically placed islands
in
the
Persian
Gulf and all Iraqi
appeals for assistance went unheeded by
herfelJowAb states. At
the same time, the truce between
'
'
"
the Iraqi governmn and the "
4
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-7-
___________________________________________________________
/
/
y
-
Kurds had broken don,
Barzanj accusing the Iraqiwith Kurdjsh kader MuHah Mustafa
govern merit of
-
-
not fulfilling the
of March 11, 1970, and of
trying to assassjnatehjm The
then began
while other Kurds returneil arreting a large numherVof Kurds,
to Barzanjs mountain fortresses
prepare for
to
To make matters worse for
Ba'athjst governm
the
narro1y
based
Iranian Foreign Minister AbbaKhaJa(barj
stated in early December
197j
should civil war between the that Iran would aid the Iraqi Kurds
out again. Meanwhile the KtIrds and the Iraqi governrn
break
difficulties in negotia(io5 Iraqi governme Continued t have
the- Western oil companies
sought increased control overwith
as it
its oil and increased'output
companies. Frustrated and isolated,
by
the
oil
USSR.
Iraq turned
agreerne
Irai governme
V
V
V
V
I
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
=
again to the
V
In February 1972 Saddath
Hussein; the second most powerful
member and heir apparent in
Moscow in quest of a treaty. the Iraqi regime, journeyed to
Unio was also interested in For reasons of its own, the Soviet
it would give the Russians a treaty arrangeme In the first place
strong point in the
and make the USSR less another
Arab world
dependent,
on its Position in Egypt.
Perhaps even more important,
the Soviet Union's Position a treaty with Iraq would stengthe
in the Persian Gulf at
politics in the oil-rich
region were in a great state a time when
sequently, less than two
months later the Iraqis of flux Contreaty during Kosygin's visit
to Iraq to inaugura obtained their
Rumeija oil fields.
the Northern
Th treaty bore a number
similarities to the SovietEgyptj
treaty that had been signed 11ofmonths
earlier. Lasting for 15 years,
the treaty provided that
Iraq
and
the
other "in the event of the deve1opmeUSSR would contact each
of situations spelling a
danger to the peace of either
In addition, the two sides party or creating a danger to peace."
agreed not to enter into any
aimed against the other
liance
The
Soviet commitment
however, was even
on
military
aid,
more vague than in the case of
treaty, stating merely
the
Egyptian
that the
cooperation in the strengtheningtwo sides "will Continue to develop
of their defense capacities "I'
Backed by the treaty, the Iraqi
governrn
Position in ts negotiat5
tooka harder
with the Western oil companies
confrontation became more Intense the
As the
Iraqi regime made a gesture
to the USSR by taking two
ICP members into the
/
V
V
V
V
'
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
VV
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
c
V
cabinet
V
as
"a
V
V
V
V
VVVVV
V
1/
1
V
V
V
V
-
V
V
V
V
/
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V
V
V
V
necessary political requirement for the cQnfrontation.!",Then, on
June 1, 1972, less than two months after the 'signing of the treaty,
the major Western oil company, the Iraq Petroleum Company, was
nationalized. There appears to be little doubt that the USSR
actively encouraged the Iraqi nationaliation decision. The USSR
,had long urged the Arab states to nationalize their oil holdings and
thus strike a blow at "Western imperialism," and by February 1972
Soviet spokesmen had begun to point out that unlike the situation
at the time of the Arab dii boycott after the June 1967 war, both
Western Europe and the United States were now vulnerable to
Arab oil pressure2°
Meanwhile, the Western oil companies were steadily retreating in
the face of price demands from the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the oil-producing nations were
now also demanding an increasing percentage of the companies',jI
for their own use. Accordingly, the Soviet leaders may have seen
the IPC 'nationalization as another .major blow to the whole
structure of Western oil holdings in the Middle East and
'forcement of the trend toward full nationalization of Arab aoilreinand"
the consequent weakening of the, Western alliance system headed
by the United States. In the meantime, 'the increasing Soviet involvement in the development of Iraq's oil industry, highlighted by
-
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.
;'-
'
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the Northern Rümelia 'agreement, was a demonstration tq the
Arabs that if cut off by the West, they could turn to the USSRas an
alternative source of oil development assistance.'
Nonetheless, despite their enthusiastic acceptance and encouragement of the Iraqi government's nationalization decision,
I
'.
this action was not without cost to the Soviet leaders. The day after
the nationalization Iraqi Foreign Minister M.S.A. Baki flew to'
only a limited refining capacity, iraq
To make matters worse, the regime ha
in hard-currency revenue as a result
the Russians may have welcomedthe
Iraqi regime, a situation that could
exploiting the unstable situation in thc
cooperation could be achieved wit
nevertheless, the Russians would ha
Thus, 5 days after Baki's arrival,
..,'
'
'
lost about $780 milliOn
nationalization. While
sed dependency of the
closer cooperation in
in Gulf (assuming such
nduly alarming Iran),
y for this dependency.
greemeñt was signed
'
11
-
-
d put to market its oil.
4
I
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_L__.___
stipulating 'hat the Soviet Union would help Iraq transport is oil,
build a refinery in Mosul (near the Kirkiikijeld) with
annual
capacity of 1.5 million tons, and help prospect for oil inan
sQuthern
'Iraq. The Russiansalso agreed to give further
assistanceto the
Baghdad-Basra oil pipeline. This agreement, like previous Soviet-
Iraqi ones, stipultecI that the USSR would be paid for its
assistance by Iraqi oil
exports.22 Indeed, the sharp increase
in Iraqi
exports to the USSR in 1973 (see Table 2), composed almost
tirely of oil, demonstrates that this commodity had become enan
imortant factor ij Soviet-Iraqi trade.
1AiU.E2
*
Sov&et-lraqa Trade. 1969-77 (Zn is1lions of rubles)
Year
SOviiet exports
60.9
59.4
99.1
90.1
141.5
182.3
274.1
341.6
281.0
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
3975
1976
19
Sougces: Vr'torgoy1i55$
19
Soviet imports
1972k
1974w
1976w
Total trade
4.2
65.1
-4.1
5.5
61.6
190,6
270.6
325.4
63.5
104.6
151.7
332.1
453.1
599.5
--32.o
602.0
I
statjstich;,k,( sbornik
1917.
Interestingly enough, even at this period of great dependence on
the USSR the Iraqi Ba'athists were careful not to become too
closely linked to Moscow. Thus less than a week after Baki's visit to
the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein made an official visit to Paris
and on June 18 a 10-year agreement was signed whereby the French
oil firm CFP would buy 23 75 percent of the production of the
nationalized oil fields II To emphasize still further thilraqi desire
to balance the USSR and France, Saddam Hussein stated in an
lntervie in Le Monde that he wished to see Iraq1s
relations with
France raised to the level of those with the USSR." Iraqi efforts to
avoid too great a dependence on thUSSR were not limited to
France, however In August 1972 the Iraqis agreed to the ope'ung
of a US Interests Section in the Belgian Embassy in Baghdad, and
in 1973 major oil agreements were signed with Italy and Japan.
12
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Although the Iraqi government was careful to keep its distance
from the USSR, Moscow after its enforced exodus
fromEgypt in
July 1972 sought to counter this blow to
its Middç East position b
emphasizing its greatly improved relations with Iraq, which it
hailed for taking the lead in combating "anti-Sovietism '
in the
Arab world 26
)
Another lactic utilized by the USSR during this
period was to encourage the establishment of national
fronts in
Arab countries where Communist parties could function as
junior
partners and thereby hopefully influence the Arab national leaders
to tale more pro-Soviet positions While the Iraqi
had given
lip service to the establishment of a national front regime
that the ICP had
long been advocating, the Ba'athzsts did not seriously entertain the
idea until a coup d'etat attempt on June 30, 1973, almost
succeeded
in assassinating al Bakr and overthrowing the regime In reporting
this development, the Soviet foreign affairs weekly
urged the aI-Bakr regime to learn from this experience New Times
and finally
implement the long-promised "progressive national front"
of the
Iraqi Ba'ath Party, the IC?, and the Kurdish National Party."
Perhaps because it was severely shaken by the abortive coup
d'etat
or because its conflict with Iran had escalated to the
brink
of
warfare, the al-Bakr regime consented to the formation ofopen
the
National Front, although on terms that insured the
absolute
dominance of the Ba'ath party While the IC?, which
as
legalized, agreed to the terms of the Front,
the
Kurds
refused
and
Kurdish-Iraqi relations degenerated to the point of virtual full-scale,
warfare
S
S
In addition to the establishment of the National
Front and the
inclusion of two Communists in the Iraqi cabinet, Soviet
assistance
was playing a key role in Iraqi efforts to develop
its
oil
industry,
ar-i So% iet mllitary\ald was helping to protect
Iraq against its
hostile neighbors (and perhaps
encouraging Iraq to take a more
aggressive stance in its border conflict with Kuwait)
In light of
these developments, Soviet influence
in
Iraq,
hig1lighted
by the
visits of the Soviet navy to the Iraqi
part
of
Umm
Qasr,2'
mayiy
said to have reached a high point rn July 1973
However, Moscow's
influence remained clearly limited, and
events
years were to lead to a diminution of even this of the following 2
limited position
July 1973
55
:
March 1975. Dependency Dim
The two majordjffjcul,jes facing thefAished
Iraqiregjje during this
13
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S.
I
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5
5
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5.
I
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S
S
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/
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0
,
period, once it had recovered from the effects.
of the abortive coup
d'etat, were its conflicts
with Iran and wnh the Kurds who were
receiing military aid from Iran While Soviet
military assistance
was needed both to deter Iran from an
overt
attack
to oust the
Kurds from their m&lntain fortresses, Iraq wasand
to
receive an
unexpected bonus during
period As a result of the quadrupling
of oil prices, thç regimethis
found itself atiie to shop in the world
market for capital gpods to aid in its economic
development and
for military equipme)i( as well It was also
now able o end its
barter deals with socialist countries,
including
the USSR, and to
demand direct payment for its oil This
new
situation
was to lead to
a diminished Iraqi dependence on the USSR, a phenomenon
that
was to make itself increasingly felt in the post-1975 period
From the Soviet viewpojnt, aid to Iraq against
the Kurds was
perhaps distasteful Previous Soviet
policy
toward
the Kurds had'
fluctuated between assistance dtring periods
when
relations were
Strained between Baghdad and Moscow
and calls for Kurdish-Arab
Cooperation when Soviet-Iraqi relations '%ere
good But in the
spring of 1974 when the Iraqi governrne
'egan
preparations for
an all-out attack against theKurds, the USSR
may
have seen aid to
Baghdad as a necessity After a temporary
Amprovement in its
Middle East position during the 1973
Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet
Union's-ftunes had turned downwards again as Egypt,
once the
primarySoviet ally in theArab world, 'began
to
move
into the
American camp and the United States,
long
dormant
in
Middle
East diplomacy, took. the lead in
the Postwar efforts to achieve
Arab-Israeli disengagement and settlement.
During this process a
pro-Western Egyptiansauj Arabian
axis
emerged
which appeared
capable of attractjn other Arab states to its ranks
Given this
development, the USSR faced the danger
of isolation in the Arab
Good relations-with Iraq, one of the
few remaining Arab
countries in which the USSR could claim influence
and an opponent of American diplomatic efforts, became
a
necessity
Thus, following a Moscow visit by Saddam
Hussein in February
1974, the USSR came out in full
support
of
the
Iraqi government
against the Kurds The Soviet media flOW
had been infiltrated and influenced by claimed that the Kurds
"Imperialjs( and reactionary" elements 2'le USSR also
stepped
up Its military aid as
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko
paid
a
visit
to
most probably to Inspect Iraqi preparations Iraq in March 1974,
for their ofiensive
against the Kurds '°In return for the Soviet
diplomatic and military
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0
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14
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0
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+
I
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/
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support,the Ba'athjst regime si1nd a joint communique with the
USSR which advocated the solidarity of the
Arab states "on an
anti-imperialist basis" and. the "Consolidation"
of
cooperation with the USSR. This declaration seemed a small price
S
-
to pay for extensive Soviet aid.
Although Moscow was prepare4 to aid the Iraqis
against the
Kurds, it was more reluctant to get involved in the conflict
between
Iran and Iraq. While the USSR clear'ly did not like the way in which
Iran was becoming the American policeman of the Persian Gulf,
S
Teheran's role in the region was certainly preferable-to
a direct
American one. In addition the USSR had not abandoned the
hope
of ultimately neutralizing Iran, and Moscow had
begun to develop
extensive trade relations with Iran, as it now imported Iranian
natural gas and even sold some military equipmentto the Shah's
regime. Indeed at the high point of the Iran-lra
Soviet trade with Iran exceeded that with Iraq, 495 'onflict in 1974,
million rubles
(0453.1 million rubles
As a result, the USSR sought to play an even-handed
role in the
Iranian-Iraqi conflict,
S
S
S
S
/
!
-
S
frequently urging the leaders, of both
countries to improve relations. I
SR warmly welcomed,
therefore, the agreement of Marc 1975- ween Iran and Iraq in
S
S
S
S
,
S
'I
-
which the two nations signed an greement delineating their longdisputed border and agreeing to cease assistanceto dissident groups
within each other's territory. This meant a termination of Iranian
aid to the Kurds, who were then in the midst of a !ife-ànd-death
struggle with the advancing Iraqi army. With the end of the IranIraq conflict' and the inevitable end of the Kurdish struggle for
autonomy, the Soviet position in the Persian Gulf seemed to be
greatly enhanced. The long-feared possibility that the USSR would
be drawn into a ar between Iran and Iraq was
now eliminated
The USSR could continue to improve its relations with
as well
as Iraq while also assuring itself a continued flow of oilIran
from Iraq
and natural gas from Iran
The Iranian-Iraqi agreement was to have another effect
Soviet
policy, however By removing the two main threats to on
the
Iraqi
government, the agreement,rnae the Ba'athists far less-dependent
for military aid on the USSR In addition, with the
quadrupling of
oil prices an December 1973, the Iraqi
government
was
its economic dependence on the USSR. Baghdad then at the end of
embarked on
a major economic development plan and increasingly
placed its
S
S
/5
155/
&
-'
S
:.
-
',';---
:,
1
'5
-"J-
/
---
S
p
orders for
facorjes ad other
goodsj Weteth- European,
Japanese, and evèn-Amerjcan fims,
East Europe Although Soviet-Iraqi rather than wth the USSR ahd
trade sharpl increased during
this period (see Table 2), Iraqi
exports
were already outstripping
Soviet exports, as the Iraqis began
to
repay
previous Soviet loan
(see Table 3) To be sure, the USSR
remained
active1 invoJed in
the Iraqi economy, training
Iraqi
workers,
building factories,
canals, and
power stations, and Iraq did sign a cooperation
agreement with the CuncjJ fo Mutual
Economic Assistance in
Julyt975." Nonetheless the
Lhrst
of
Iraqi
economic reläilons -was
clearly in a Western direction,
development
which was-to become
even more evident inthe 1975-78 period.
/
TALE3
1ra, trade, 1969-77
-.-..
Year
1969
1970
1971
972
1973
3974
1975
1976
1977
1n ma11io8 o
U
dollars)
......__-
..:
Iraqi
-.
Iraqi 1mpor
440
509
694
713
906
2.365
4.204
3,470
3.898
Soue: !Nstati,.akl,
..-.
cports
I,042
1.100
l,53Q
1.370
2.190
6.942
8,27
8.841
-
-
-,
1.402
1.609
3.334__
2.083
3,96
9.307.
12,480
12,3)1
13,S6
9664
Nw York,
-
aI trede
United Nationa, 1970,
NO. 7, 1979, p. 45.
July 1975 - September J978 Adopting
an Independent Line
In the period following the
signing
of its treaty with Iran, Iraq
embarked on a policy of
improving
relattois wttP its other
neighbors in the Gulf, Particularly
Arab Emirates Increased conflictSaudi Arabia and the United
with Syria and the
however, Clouded Iraq's efforts
to
assume
a-posjtjófl-of leadèhip
of the Arab world and contributed
to its Continuing isOlation theié
Meanwhile, Iraq's economic ties to the West
continued to develop
Of even more serious
Concern to Moscow during this period
was
Iraq's continued Opposition to Soviet
initiatives in the Middle
East, and its persecution of the Iraqi peace
Communist pa ty which had
openly opposed a number of Iraqi governrn
policies. 2
()
1
16
r
4
-
.....
-,
_',l_
a
The Iraqi government made a defiñi(e effort
with its once hostile Persian Gulf neighbors to improve relations
in the aftermath of the
Iran-Iraq Treaty. Thus in July1975, n agreement between Iraq
and Saudi Arabia as signed, dividing the neutral
along their common border in addition, several zone which lay
made tours of Gulf states in an effort to develop Iraqi officials
cooperation and
enhance the Iraqi
role in the Gulf. Iraq also began to extend
ecoTiomic assistance to Jordan during this period, and a road
between the Jordarian port of Aquaba and Iraq was planned
From the Sovietvjewpojnt the new hiqi initiatives
both
advantages and disadvantagelld Iraq draw closerheld
to
Saudi
Arabia, it could conceivably influence the Saudi gonment
to
adopt a less pro-' estern policy and ei ode the Saudi ArabianEgyptian axis which by 1976 had attracted a number of other Arab
states including the Sudan and North Yemen.' On the other hand,
by drawing closer to Saudi Aria, 1raq might
itself come Under
Saudi influence and draw further away from the USSR.
This was a
development the USSR could ill afford at a time when its Middle
East position wascontinuing to deteriorate in the face
of American
diplomatic Success. However, the issue was at least temporarily
mooted by Iraqi assistance to leftist forces during the
civil war of 1965-76, .a development which blunted Lebanese
Baghdad's
diplomatic initiative in the Persian Gulf by
once
again
raising
Suspicions of Iraqi intentions among the pro-Western
monarchies
of the region."
The-primary Iraqi foreign problem, once its conflict with Iran
was setiled, was Syria, and this was one conflict in which the
Iraqis
could not call upon Moscow for assistance indeed,
in
his
speech
to
the Twenty-Fifth 'Party Congress in February
19Th,
Brezhnev
publicly ranked Syria over Iraq in its list of Arab
the Iraqi leadership may not have appreciated 36 Inallies, something
any case, theie
were a number of issues dividing the rival Ba'athist
regimes including Syria's cutting off Euphrates River
water
to
Iraq,
Iraq's
cutting off oil supplies to Syria, and attempts by
each governrnefl
to assassinate the leaders of the other The USSR,
still seeking to
forge an "anti-imperialist" alignment
in
the
Arab
world, was
clearly concerned about the Syrian-iraqi
and sought to
overcome ix through public admonishmentsconflict
and a mediation effort
by Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin
At the height of the
Lebanese civil war, he journeyed to both
Baghdad and Damascus
S
S
S
/1
17
-'S
S
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which were backing opposing sides in the conflict. But Kosygin's
efforts were to no avail." Even when Syria and Iraq joined a
number of other Arab states in forming the Front of Steadfastness
and Confrontation to protest : Sadat's
visit
to Jerüsálem in
November 1977, this unity did not last Iraq pulled out of the
meeting, claiming that Syria wanted a deal with Israel." Indeed,
not only was Iraq in conflict with Syria over this point, it also
became involved in the summer of 1978 in an assassination
campaign against PLO leaders whom it claimed were seeking an
(
agreement with Israel.'?
By this time Iraqi opposition even to Soviet-endorsed peace
plans, such as the October 1977 joint statement with the United1
States, was becoming a problem for the USSR, which was trying to'
rebuild its Middle East position byco-ponsoring with the United
States the renewal of the Geneva Conference. Even more
aggravating to the USSR during this period, however, was the
continued westward turn of the Iraqi economy. Indeed by 1977 as
Soviet-Iraqi trade began to drop (see Table 2), Iraqi-merican
trade had sharply increased tO the point that it almost equalled
Iraqi-Soviet trade 40 The Soviet leadership, which has long emphasized the connection between economics and politics, could
have drawn small comfort from Iraq's frequent protestations that
its economic ties in no way influen"ed its political relationships
'
Several additional problems clouded Soviet-Iraqi relations in
1978 Soviet aid to the Mengistu reg:me in Ethiopia in its war
against tne independence-seeking Eritreans, one faction of whom
were' backed by-Iraq, clearly antagonied:.Baghdad.4' On the otler
hand, in the spring of 1978 the Iraqi government announced (he
execution of a number of Iraqi Communists, which could only
'anger MOscow
,
Conflict between the ICP and the Iraqi Ba'athists had long been
brewing By 1976, the ICP had become increasingly unhappy with
its virtually powerless position in the Iraqi government and had
begun to advocate open1 an increased role for itself in the
-National Front In audition the 1CP began to advocate genuine
-
autonomy for the Kurds and openly opposed the Ba'athist policy of
resettling Kurds outside of Kurdistan Clearly unhappy with the
westward drift of the Iraqi economy, the ICP also condemned the
growing power of "private éapital" 'and Iraq's "continuing
dependence on the capitalist
r1d market."4'
18
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In addition to making these open criticisms of Ba'athjst policy,
the Communists reportedly sought to form
secret cells in the iraqi
armed forces and carried on antigOvernmen
Propaganda among
Iraq's Kurds and Shiites-.-.the groups most disaffected with
the
Sunnj Ba'athist rule in Jraq4' Indeed the Ba'at.hists
Suspected Communist involvement in the Februarymay well have
1977 Shiite
religious protest demonstrations. Given the Iraqi regime's
to liquidate any of its outspoken opponents whether readiness
not they
resided in Iraq, it aipeared only a matter of time untilorthe
crackdowns occurred.4' Persecution of the içp
became
increasingly
open in 1977, but in the spring of 1978 the- Iraqi government
decided to execute a number of Communists.
the pro-Soviet coup in nearby Afghañjstn, Possibly reacting to
evidently decided that the crackdown took the Bä'athjst regime
precedence over its
relations with th.. ITQCD £1IUCU
..
as maim
Fladcjad, one of the
leaders of Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command
stated: "All Comunist parties all over the world Council, bluntly
are always trying
to get power. We chop off any weed that pops up."46
The executions cast a pall over Soviet-Iraqi
despite the
protestations of Iraqi leaders at they wantedrelations,
good relations with
the USSR Significantly, however, Haddad
stated "the Soviet
Union is a friend with whom we
canooperate
as
long as there is no
interference in our internal affairs"
But,
Moscow's growing concern about trends in in the midst of
Iraqi foreign and
domestic policy, the Camp David
agreements
gave the USSR
another opportunity to rebuild its posion
in the Middle East.
September 1978- July 1979. The Aftermath of
Camp David
While the Soviet leadership was undoubtedly
unhappy with the
results of Camp David, Moscow could only
a number of dàvelopments in the Arab have been pleased with
Israeli-American sunmjt precipitated.world that the Egyptian
These included the
reconcijiations between Iraq and Syria,
Jordan
and the PLO, and
Iraq- and the PLO, culminating in the
.Baghdad
Conference of
November 1978, which appe,red
to
align
almost
the
entire Arab
world against Sadat In addition,
several
months
later
Moscow
received an unexpected. bonus when
the
Stah
of
Iran
was
ousted
and the Islamic government which
repIced
his
regime left
CENTO, proclaimed Iranian neutralism,
aid
offered
full
tothePalestjniaflcauseUflfortt.I for the IJccD support
--IIt1wvcI,
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just as its long-sought anti-imperialist bloc in the Arab world
appeared to be forming (and had the possibility of expanding to
include Iran), actions by !raq served not only to divide the. nascent
bloc but also to run Counter to Soviet policies in a number of areas
While the Camp David summit was in progress, the USSR
seemed particLiarly conccrned that tJ&e United States would obtain
amilitary base in either Egypt or Israel.'° Although theoutcóme of
Camp David did not provide for such a military base, it was clear
that the United States, buy virtue of its mediating effOrts and its
promises of economic and military aid, was becoming even more
involved in Egypt and Israel. The USSR may well have feared that
a thore formal military arrangement was not far off and that the
Camp David system might expand to include suëh states as Syria
and Jordan and possibly even the PLO.
Not unexpectedly, therefore, the USSR greeted the agreements
with hstility. In a major speech at Baku on September
22,
Brezhnev denounced what he termed the US attempt to "split the
Arab ranks"and force the Arabs to accept Israeli peace terms. In
addition he returned to the old four part Soviet peace pLan, em-
phasizing that Israel had to withdraw totally from all territory
captured in the 1967 war and agree to the establishment of a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Brezhnev also
repeated the Soviet call for a return to the Geneva Conference, with
full participation of the PLO. Interestingly enough, perhaps to
balance the American success at Camp David, Brezhnev hailed
events in Afghanistan in his Baku speech, emphasizing that the new
left-wing government which had seized power in that country in
April had embarked on the road to socialism."
If the Sov,et reaction to Camp David was hostile, the reaction of
most of the Arab states was not much warmer. While President
Carter dispatched a series of administrative representatives to try to
sell the agreement to suchjey Arab 3tates as Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and Syria, they met with liltIe success Indeed, only three days after
the announcement of the Camp David agreements, the Front of
and Confrontation met in Damascus. Not only did it
condemn Camp David, which it termed "illegal," and reaffirm the
role of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people,
at also dccaded on the need to "develop and, strengthen friendly
relations with the Socialist community led by the USSR "°
Reinforcing Soviet satisfaction- with this development, PLO
K
I
1.
Mosco' representative Mohammed
Stead fastne5 and Cpnfrontation Shaer stated that the Front for
was "the core of a future broad
Pan-Arabantjjmperjaljst front
The Soviet U'nion for its part 'noved
once ain torejnforce its
ties ,i'h key members of the
rejectionist
front as first Assad of
Syria, then Boumedienne
of Algeria, and
visited Moscow in October The Soviet finally Ai áíà of the PLO
media hailed the visiting
Assad as a representative of the
Steadfastness
FIo'ntOne result of
the meeting, besids the
joint denunciation of Camp David ana of
attempts to "undermine Soviet-Arab friendship,"
was a Soiei
decision to "further strengthen Syria's defense
potential
""
While the the visit of Assad to
Moscow
could
be considered a
Success for the USSR in its efforts
agreement from acquiring further to, prevent the Camp David
subsequen, move toward a Arab support, theSyrjan
reconciliation with Iraq was
even more warmly endorsed by-the USSR
As discussedabove the
SyrianJraqj conflict had long
bedeviled Soviet attempts to create a'
unified "anti-imperialist" bloc of Arab
states
announced that he had accepted an iñvitat Therefore when
ion to visit Iraq,
the Soviet leadership must have seen this
as
a
ma)or
step toward
creating the long-sought "anti-imperialist"
Arab
S'loc.
Whilemany
observers saw Assad's visit as a tactical plcto
strengthen
Syria's
Position in the face of the projected Israeli-Egyp,ia
treaty, the
USSR was effusive in its praise.
Moscow Radio called i'an event
of truly enormous imporfnce
which had considerb1y
strengthened the position of those forces
capitulatory plans for a settlemen, drawn that deci3lvely rejeche
up at Camp David "
While the Syrian-Iraqi
reconciliation
could be considered by
Moscow as the most positive,
result of Camp David, the limited
rapprochement between the PLO apd
Jordan was also deemed a
favorable development since it further
reduced the chances of
Jordanian participation in the
Camp
David
accords and brought
Jordan closer to an alignment
with
the
anti-Sadat
forces in the
Arab world The two rapprochemeats
helpe4,et
the
stage for the
Baghdad Conference which appeared
to further Consolidate the
bloc of Arab states Opposing
greeted by MOsCow At Baghdad,Sadata developme warmly
not only were the Camp David
agreeme
condemned,
with
even
Sai4i
Arabia Participating (the
Saudis may have been
influenced, if not intimidated
by the SyrianIraqi rappr)chement) but a joint
PLO-Jordanian commission was
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established, foreshadowing further
cooperation between these two
erstwhile enemies. 'In addition, another
reconcjliatiotook place as
the PLO and Iraq, which had been involved
in an assassination
campaign against each other in
the summer, also appeared to end
their Conflict. Besides these
specific anti-Egyptian
measures were decided uponreconciliation5
at
Baghdad.
Thus,
the Arab League
headquarters was to be removed
from
Cairo
and economic sanctions taken against Egypt should Sadat
go ahead with the signing ofthe treaty.
H
0
Finally the USSR must have been
by the Baghdad
Conference's formula for a "just peace" pleased
in the Middle East:
Israeli
Withdrawal from the territories
captured in 1967 and the
recognition of the "right of the Palestinian
people to establish an
independent state on their
national
soil."
While
the tatter phase
was open to differing interpretations,.,
the
juxtaposjton
of the two
statements seemed to indicate that
and Libya might, for the first time, even such radical states as Iraq
be willing to grudgingly accept
Israel's existence. Although
Baghdad
statement on peace was
far from the 'trade, tourism, and normal
diplomatic relations
wanted by the Israelis, it was very
close
to
the
peace
formula which
had been advocated by the USSR
Since
1974.
In
sum, the Soviet
leadership was undoubtedly
pleased with the results of the Baghdad
slim-mi,, with one Soviet
commentator deeming it "a final blow to
imperialist intentions aimed
at
Arab unity and
pressuring other Arabs to join Campdissolving
'David."
Given tlie key role of Iraq in
orchestrating the anti-Sadat forces
at Baghdad and helping to form
what the USSR hoped might
become the nucleus of the long-sought
anti-imperialist Arab bloc, it
is not surDrisin that
-. vit.iiq relations improved
in the aftermath of the conference. Indeed,
one
month
later,
Saddam
Hussein himself was invited to Moscow.
While the main purpose of
his visit was probably to
Opposing Camp David, itcoordinate the Soviet acd Iraqi Positions
that other issues occupied the
discussions as well. These appears
included Soviet-Iraqi
trade relations,
problems Pertaining to Iraq's Communist
Sunnlv nf arrta . t
party, and 'the Siwit
. zzdg
iouowrng
Camp
David.
Injis regard there
were a number of reports in the Western
press
thaboth Syria and
Iraq were asking for sharp increases
in Soviet weapons supplies to
compensate the Arabs for Egypt's
departure from the Arab
camp.'f The USSR, however,
reportedly
bid Syria and Iraq that
Since they were now cooperating
they could pool their weapons."
I:.
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In resisting the Syrian and Iraqi demands (if
this, indeed, is what
happened), the USSR may have ben concerned that if
the Syrians
and Iraqis were too well armed they might provoke a war
against
Israel at a time Inconvenient for the USSR,or it
may
have
simply
been one more case where an arms supplier
was unwilling to met all
the demands of its clients.
At any rate, while there appeared to have been
progress on the
question of economic relation during the talks,
the
military aid question was not clear. The finaloutcome of the
communique
stipulated only that "the sides reiterated their readiness
to keep
cooperating in strengthening the defense capacity
the Iraqi
Republic,"" Even less was said on the subject of theof
Iraqi
Cornmunist party. The only public reference (and
a
veiled
one
at
that)
to
this area of conflict in Soviet-Iraqi relations
was
made
in
a
dinner
speech by Kosygin who stated:
Friendly relations with the Republic of Iraq
are highly valued in the Soviet
Union and we are doing everything to make them
firm course and it is not affected by circumstantial 'more durabie This is our=considera(jons.'o
If the. Soviet leadership
sought to use the Brezhnev-Hussein
meeting to secure improved treatment for the Iraqi
Communists, it
'was not successful, Less than a month later,
on
January
10, Pravda
published an editorial from the Iraqi Communist
paper Tariq As/iShah deploring "the widespread
persecution
of
Commuinists in
Iraq and repression against the Communist
party's
organizatjo
and press." Pravda followed the editorial
3 days later by publishing
the statement of the December 1978
Conference of Arab Cornm.unst parties which similarly condemned
Iraq for its
r.
the ICP."
The anti-Iraq campaign in the Soviet nrPvc
interest. In the past the USSR had grudgingly
-
S.-,
treatment of
i
z
paittcuir
-
tolerated attacks on
local Communist parties so long as the regime responsible
adopted
a proper "anti-Imperialist" stance
Indeed,
the
USSR
has
even
gone so far as to urge the dissolution of Arab
Communist
parties
or
their restriction to the role of
teacheMS
of
"scientific
socialism" in
Third World countries to avoid sucJv'onnicts2
It may well be, therefore, that Mosow
saw, more than just a
domestic problem in Iraq's persecutjo
of
the ICP, which continued through the first half Of 1979. Iraq, in leading
the Opposition
to the EgvptjanIsraej treaty, was seeking
to project itself as the.
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of the Arab world. Inorder
-
however, Iraq had not only to arrange a to accomplish this task,
rapprochement with Syria
the PLO, but it had as well
toestablish
a working relationship
with Saudi Arabia, the Arab
world's
leading
financier and a
growing Persian Gulf military
power.
The
Soviet
leadership may
have suspected, therefore, that
the
overt
anti-Communist
in Iraq was designed to signal
campaign
to the Saudis that Iraq was no longer
a close ally of the USSR. When
went so far as to state that "we Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein
reject the wide expansion by the
Soviet Union in the Arab homeland"
and that "the Arabs should
fight anyoneeven friends
like
the
Soviets
who try to Occupy the
Saudi land," this may have
confirmed
Soviet
suspjcjons.6
Yet another factor Which
may have tarnished somewhat Iraq's
usefulness to the USSR as a leader of the
American forces in the Arab world was the antiSadat and antieruption of a serious
quarrel beween Iraq and South
Yemen
(the
PDRY), the most
Marxist of the Soviet Dnion's
Arab
allies.
There
been two major causes for the
appear to have
quarrel. In the first place, when the
PDRY invaded pro-American North
Yenin in late February 1979,
Iraq led an Arab mediation
mission
wth7'ast the background
of a major American military
build-up
of NprLh Yemen, pressured
the South Yemenjs to withdraw before
ay of their major objectives were achieved.
Given the apparent Soviet support
inVasion, this would appear
for the
to have been a case where Soviet
Iraqi objectives were in COnflict.64Secofly,
and
an Iraqi Comunist party member Taufjq several months later,
RUshdi, who hadeen
lecturing in the PDRY, was murdered_appenjy
by a "hit team"
of Iraqi seurity men attached to
a PDRY force stormed the Iraqi Iraq's Aden Embassy. In reprisal,
embassy and seized th gunmen,
an action which provoked a
storm
If '!e unity of the anti-Sadat af protest from Baghdad."
forces inhe Arab world was
threatcned by the Iraq.PDy
Conflict,
it was also endangered
the growing strife bctwej
by
Jraq
and
the
Moslem fundamentalist
government led by the Ayatollah
Khomeini in Iran. The prOblem
originated in Iranian Kurdjst
where
portunity provided by the disintegratjo.the Kurds seizing the op.
oftIie- Shah's regime and
the Iranian army, demanded
autonomy."
This in turn led to
bloody clashes between the
central
authorjtje
and Iran's Kurds.As
the Iranian. Kurds agitated
fected the Kurds living in Iraqfor independence this inevitably afwho, after receivi9g arms from their
*
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I
brethren in Iran, rekindled theirwar against the Ba
ist regime in
Iraq. This in turn led to Iraqi bombing of Kurdish
border villages in
Iran and a sharp deterioration in Iranian-Iraqi
relations.6
Relations between the two states deteriorated further with charges
by the Iranian Governor General of Khuzistan
that Iraq had
smuggled weapons into the region in which most of Iran's ethnic
Arabs live. This was followed by an Iraqi
crackdown on Shiite
religious leaders in Iraq who had maintained close relations with
Khomeini," a development which
may have precipitated the
abortive coup d'etat in July 1979. Iran's
clash with Iraq also affected its relations with other Arab states. In response to Iraqi
demands that Iran retti the three Arab islands in the Straits of
Hormuz seized by the hah in 1971, a religious leader close to
Khomeini reasserted Iran's claim to Bahrejn
which the Shah had
renouflcedin 1970.69
.-
.
-
-
iranian-1raq tensions served to split further the camp
of the anji-Sadat Arabs, with Kuwait and Bahrein
lining up behind
Iraq 'whf!e Libya and the PLO, which had
been early Supporters of
Khomeini, continued to back the Iranjans.70
affected iranian-Soviet relations, already strainedIt also negatively
by growing antiCommunist sentiment in Iran and by Soviet support for what was
perceived in Iran as the anti-Islamic Tarakitgime
of Afghanistan.
Thus a frnt page editorial in a governmentsupporte
newspar; the Islamic Republic, claimed that "the ruling Iranian
clique in
Iraq" was plotting against Iran both
to
"prevent
the
spread
of
Iran's Islamic revolution into Iraq" and to "open the road
to the
warm waters of the Persian Gulf to their Lig
master"a
clear
reference to the Soviet Unions"
In spite'of these events, however, Iraqi-Soviet
reach the breaking point. Iraq still proved able relations did not
to play a role in;
Soviet strategy when Iraqi objectives
coincided
with
those of the
USSR, as in the case of the second
Baghdad Conference of late
March 1979, which voted sanctions against
for signing the
peace treaty with Israel and also condemned Egypt
the United States for
its role in the peace settlement. Nonetheless
by June 1979 it was
clear that Iraq was no longer a client of
the USSR. It could not be
counted on for pro-Soviet statements in return for Soviet
economic
inc rise in
I'
and military aid While the USSR
continued to sell military
equipment to Iraq, the Iraqis were also
receiving an increasing
amount of military equipment from France. (The
French sold Iraq
25
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18 Mirage F-I itherceptors and 30 helicoptrs
in 1978 ana were
negotiating a major $2 billion
arms deal for aircraft, tanks and
other weapons in the summer of
1979 )" In addition, Iraq conliriued to depend heavily on the
West
as it sought to play an increasing rolefor its economic development
in Arab, regional and world
affairs.
The abortive coup d'egqt of July 1979 'iii
which Syria may have,
been implicated, served to cool
'Syrian-Iraqi relations and slow
1aq's quest for leadersl"p in the Arab world
This event, which
once again underlin, the precarious
nature
of
the ruling elite's
hold over the Iraqi governme,
serves
as
a
useful
point to review
Soviet-Iraqi relations since the Ba'athists
returned 'to power in
1968.
'
CONCLUSIONS
'
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/
In evaluating Soviet
policy towards
period, one can make several generalBa'athjst Iraq in the 1968-79
comments about the successor the lack thereof__of Soviet policy.
In the first place,
Soviet influence
with the elite ruling Jraq has been shown
to be very
limited indeed If one measures
influence in terms of the Soviet
abilit) to modify the behavior of a ruling elite,
the USSR has been
singularly ineffective with the' Iraqis
on
matters
Iraq Thus the USSR has not been able to alter of Significanc0
Iraqi Opposition to
Soviet.endorsd plans for ending
the
Arab-Jsrjeli
conflict; nor has
been able to prevent mistreatment
of
the
Iraqi
Community
pariy.
Indeed, only in the period from
1972 to 1975 when Iraq was in
'greatest need of Soviet help were the
concessions vls-a-v,s the Communists Ba'athjsts willing to make
Even the COflCCSSIOflS that
were made, the inclusion of two Communists
in cabinet posts and
the establishment of a national
front
with
Communist participation, were relatively insignificant
ones,
since
the' Ba'athjsts
kept the reins o.f power firmly in their
own
hards.
In
any case, the
-crackdown on tle ICP which began in 1977
effectively
eliminated
any hopes the USSR might have had
that
the
ICP
would
have any
influence in the Iraqi regime
In thearea of-behavior reinforcemem,
a much lower indicator of
intrastate influence, the USSR has had more
success Thus Soviet
oil development assistance strengthened
the
position to the Western.owned oil companies Iraqis in their OP.
and was a factor in
ç
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I
Iraq's June 1972 decision to nationalize
the Iraq Ptro1eum
Company Similarly, Soviet military
aid to Iraq helped it to defeat
the Xurds, deter an attack
from
pro-Western
Irin, and build up
Iraqi military strength so that
it
might
serve
as rival leader of the
Arab world to Eg3pt Indeed,
aiding the Iraqis in areas where
Iraqi interests coincided with by
those of the USSR,
nationalization and In Iraq's Opposition to Sadat's as in the oil
peace Initiative
Moscow has sought to utilize Iraq as
a
major
"anti-imperialist
force in the Middle East in the overall Soviet
strategy of weakening
and ultimately excluding Western
influence
from
the region
Unfortunately for Moscow,
however, Iraqi and Soviet objectives
have not always Coincided Divergences
in the approaches of the
two Countries became Increasingly
apparent
in the period following
the Iranian-Iraqi Treaty of 1975
when
Iraqi
dependence on the
USSR diminished Thus while the
had looked to Iraq to be a
center of anti-Western activity inUSSR
the Arab world, Iraq
v'elop very close and military
began to
ties
to
France,
and
reoriented
econom, toward the West In addition,
its
as Iraq began to project
itself as the leader of theArabworld,
its anti-Communist domestic
policy began to take on
overtones
of
an
anti-Soviet forign policy
Finally Iraq's quarrels with the
PDRY
and
Iran and its continued
Strained relations with the PLO
served
to
weaken
had hoped would emerge
what Moscow
as
a
solid
"anti.jmperja1jst
Middle Eastern states following
bloc of
the Camp David agreeme5
therevolutioniflIran
and
In sum, therefore, the Soviet
Union's record of Success in its
dealings with Iraq is a mixed one
have proved useful in establishing Its economic and military aid
value of both instruments of Soviet ties with the regime, but the
as Iraq deePenedtelatioflshlp policy have tended to diminish
with France and other Western
Countries At the same time tl'e Iraqi
Communist party has proven
to be a major obstacle
in
the
path
of establishing a close
relationship between Moscow
and
Baghdad,
tends to see the hand of
since the Iraqi regime
Moscow behind the activities
All in all the cotirse of Iraqi.Sovj
of the ICP
relations in the 1968-79
Indicates the low le'ej of Soviet
period
Influence over a "client
has given relatively little
state"
that
in the way of Political obedience
for a large amount of Soviet
in return
economic and military assistance
27
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CF
"\
ENDNOTES
I. Forre
Studies of Sovj
man, Soviet Policy
Polky in the Middle East.
Toward the ''dd/e East
Praer 1978; Jon D.
ee Robers 0. Free.
Glassman, A rmsj0 Since 1970, Second Cditj0
the Middle Ease,
Nw York:
theA abs; The Sopj
Johns Hopkins
After The Sov/et Baltimore:
Unjo ad War in
Unjo and she
1975;
Gaa
Middle
Golan,
Press, 1977 and Yaacov
Yomppur and
Eaj cr
London. CambrjdgeUn..
Ro'I, From Encroachment,
Study of Sovj91p011
Pot a general Study in (he Middle East, Jerusaleth. !flVo/men,. 4
Israel Universities
and A.L. Horeck of Possible SOVIet object ivcs
Press, I 974
Soviet Policy in the Middle the Middle Ease
Rand Pubhcaijon R.504.Fp,
see A.S. Beck
East,
Santa Monica
1970. For an Arab vkwpoj1
TheSphiflxafld,h
Cafornia.
Cómmsa, New York:
2. Poljtic SCICflC
Harp and Row,see Mohamed He1kl
1978,
foreign policy in generajmodels dewing with the
Cxeflion of influence in
ticular are still relatively and Soviet foreign
Sovi
rare. For a genera Pocy toward the Middle
is advised to onsuJt
East in parStudy of Influence the
J.
David
Singer's
Model, in the Iflfluence
interested reader
article, "InterNation
theory Section of
1nfluence.
Internat,o01p,..
A Formal
N. Rosenau New York:
distinction between
MacMifian
l969 Singer makes thePolicy
influen leading in fluence leading to behqior
to behayj0
useful
modification
the Phenomenon
reinforcement Aflothe
in a (arget State and
Of
in
fluene
useful
study,
Singer, Weak Stales
from the per5pectiv of
Which exajaes
in. a World Of Powe
the target state, is MarshaH
chapters 6, 7, 8. See
New York: Free
R,
Tweflhie,h Cen(uryD,,oao Richard W. Cot
1972, CSPecifly
Copjjijve
an attempt to analyze
Pittsburgh:
UflIVersjtyofpittb Interferenc, and
!fluencein the Third Sovj infl
in
the
Third
Press, l967.For
World ed. by A1v
World see Sovie,
For an effort to
and Chin ee
Z.
Rubintejfl.NCW
Sto on the Nile: measure Soviet influence In
York:
Prae
Egypt, s
197$.
The Sovieg.Ep,ion
Princeton. Princeton
influence Re,ioh, Z. Rubthst
Red
University
3. For Studies of
Press, 1977
Since the June
Soviet Advances in Soviet military d, see
Glassrnan and George
the Mfddk E051, Washgj0.
1972.
erican Enterp Lenczow$ki
4. For a view of the
Insj
role of Israel in Sovj
Middle East strategy,
5. For a Study of
see Freedman
Soviet Policy toward the
see ROben 0. Freedman,
Arab World: An UncertainThe Soviet UIoCommunist parties of the Arab world
and the Cothmunjst
Re,Io With the
in
Sov Economic Parties or the
veIop8
Wor/4
New York: Praeger 1973,
Cd. by og
and Political
E. anet and Donna
PP. 100-334 and John
Arab Communism,.,
Problç
. Cooley "The Shifting Bah
ofCommunm
6. For an any
Sands of
Vol.
24,
of
the
Soviet
War of 97S-76,
diplomatic difficu,tj5No.2, 1975, p, 222
see Freedman
during
the
7. For two books
Chapter 7.
Lcbanesei
Perspectiv5, see Edithwhich treat the Iraqi Ba'athjs,
Nationai Develop,, and E.F. Penre 'Iraq: regime from ve differe1
'n:ërna,jo0, Re100
Socialist Iraq.' A Study inBoulder: Wesj
Prs, t97 and Majid
and
Iraqi Poli1j(.$
197g, The Study by the
hadduI
Penro5 Is highly-Washingto DC: Middle
LKhaddurj's book is
critical or the Ba'athist East lnstitu,
backgroufld history so føvorable in itsireatment
regime While
as o be aost a panegyrj
on the Ba'ath,
See John Dev
For a
The Ba'a:h POt1,:4
ed. byJ5
Retio.
Hto
-
I
.,
/'"
TI
l
H
From Its Origins to /966,
Stanford:. Hoover' Insticutjcjn
Communist party is extens vely
3976. The role of Iraq's
treated in Hanna Ratatu The
Old Social Classes and
theReo!uzIonaryMovemefl,s of Iraq
8. See Khaddurj, pp. 36-38 for Princeton Princeton University Press 3978
a descripijbfl of the Ba'athjst efforts
party and State separate.
to keep
9. Thid.,p.7.
10. For an analysis of Soviet policy
Yodfat and M. Abir, In the Direction toward the Prsjan Gulf at thj time, ee A.
of the Persian Gü(f,
Co.,1977,Ch6
London: Frank ('a,s'
11. Khadduri,p 144.
12. See Penrose, chs lOand 16.
13. Ibid., pp. 427.428. See also
Arthur klinghoffer The Soviet UnIon
ternationalOil Po'jtj Nw York: Columbia
and InUñivèrsity Prëss,1977
14. See Freedman, So IPoifty To
'
I
V
V
ward the Middle East Since 1970,
15. Foradescriptjofloflhesee
16. For an examination of the
V
Iraqi. role th the Sdanese evets,
Shaked, et aL, "The
see Haim
Party in the Sudan 1946-1971,"
the Middle East, ed. Communist
iii The USSR and
by Michael Confjno and Shimon
Universities Press, 1973, p. 362.
Shamjr, Jerusalem: Israel
17/ Cited in Middle East MOnitOr
Vol. 2, No. 1 January 1, 1972,
18. TheteictofthetreatyjsjnKhdd.
pp.2-3.
V
V
.19. CitedinPenrosep4
V
p. 34.
V
V
V
20. See I. Bronin,
"Arabskaia NeftSsha.pa,naja
economika I mezhdunarot.f.ne
Europa," Mirovaja
No. 2, February 1972,
21. For an analysis of Sovietolnoshen,ja
pp. 31-42.
policy toward the Arab oil
Freedman "The Soviet Union and
weapon,
Robert O
the Pljti5 of Middle Eastern Oil see
Impact on the Arab Coungrws
"in Arab Oil
and
Global
Imphca,,ons,
Naiem Sherbiny, New York: Praeg.r,
ed by Mark Tessler
and
1976, Pp. 305-327.
'22. kvestjja, July 22, 1972.
23. Vneshnhia torgovijia
SSR za 1974 god, Mbscow; International
1975,p.238.
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
Relations,
24. Penrose, p.434,
25. Ibid., p 435
26 See Freedman, Sov:eilI'oi,cy
To ward the Middle
27., New Times. No.
East Since 1970, p 100
281973 p 17..
V
V
V
V
28 For an aUalysi.s of the
impact of Soviet
V
V
V.
Kelly, "Port Visits and the Internationalist port visits of this type, see Anne M
Mission of the Soviet Na'.),
Naval Influence Domestic and
' Souet
Foreign Dsme,,oas ed by Michael
John McDonnell, New York: Praeger,
Mccjwjye
and
1977, PP. 530.529.
29 See Pravda, March 14, 1974,
30 Pravda, cm March 27, 1974, April26, 1974
stated that Grechko had come for
discussion of questions relating
"a detailed
Soviet Iraqi cooperation in the to the Prcsejit state and future development of
military and other spheres"
31 I'neshn,o, torgov/ua
SSR za 1974 god p 14
32. See Foreign Trade (Moscow);
Soviet economic cooperation with IraqNo. 10, 1975, pp. 8.4 for a Soviet viewV of
33 Khaddun, p. 160.
34. For a study of intra-Arab
,
diplomacy during this period;
Policy Toward the M,ddk
see Freédaji, Soviet
East Since 1970, ch 7
V
V
V
V
V
-
V
V
V
'29.
V
'V
V
VV
'V
V
V
I'V'V
V
'V
V
'
V
1
a
'
'
I
V
V
________________________________________
33 lbid,Khadduri
I
p f$
36. FreedmanSovje,po,icyTd
37. Ibid;, PP. 242.245
38. Ibid., p.318.
39. See Følvio Grüaldj, "The
5
-
PLO-Iraq Conflict," Middle
East, No. 47,
Middle East, July 1978,
p.
63;
total
Iraqi.Amcrjca
$592,400,000.
trade in 1977 wa
41. See comments by Iraqi Trade
Secretary Mahdj al-Ubaidi, Middle East,
41.Marchl978p 101
No.
42. On this point, see David
Aibright, "The War in the Horn
Arab.Israeij Conflict," in World
of Africa and the
Po/Ijcs
RobertO. Freedman. New York: Pergamon and the Arab4s,ae/j onflicg, ed. by
1979.
43 See Baqir Ibrahim, "The
MarxfReyje. Vol. 19, No. Masses The Party and the National Front " World
8, August 1976, PP. 49-56 -and Ath
"Tasks of the Revolutionary Forces
Mohammed,
of raq" World Md/xt Review, Vol.
9,September 1976 pp 10 18
19, No.
:
September 1978, pp. 38.39
-5
-
5
-
-
=
4
S
44. Tewfiq Mishlawi, "Crackdown
July
S
S
..
Communists in Iraq." Middle East, No.
43 For a list of Iraqi actions
againsi enemies of the regime,
Smith, The Washington Post August
see the article by J P
6, 1973.
45,
S
1978, pp. 29-SO.
on
S
S
S
46. Cited in Ibid.
47. Cited in Mishlawi, p. 30.
48, SeePravdaSeptemberlO,979
r
49. Pravda, September23, 1978.
50. Leonid Medvenko
"Middle East; Fktions and Realities,"
4O,1978,p.6.
New Times, No.
SI A Stepanoy, "Hour of Trial
for the Palestinians," New
J97$,p.7.
Times, No 41,
52. Pravda, October 7, 1978.
$3. Radio Moscow (Domestic Service),
October 28, 1978 (International Diary
Program).
54. For a report on the results
of the Baghdad Conference
November 5, 78, in Foreign
see Baghdad I.N.A.
Broadcast
Information Service, Daily
East and North Africa, November
Report Middle
Ra'y, in Arabic, November 6, 1978 6, l978p. A-13 -- A15 See also Amman Ar
53. Radio Moscow (in Arabic tointhIbid ,pp A 19 A-20
Arab World), November
however, late, backed away from
the apparent concession of Israel 6, 1978. iraq,
56 5cc Reuters report in
Jerusalem Post, November 24, 1978, s right to CCI$L
New York Tunes, November
24, 1978, and the article by Ned AP report in The
Science Mo,tr, November 30,
Temko, Chrjgtin
1978
also the broadcast by Radio Kuwait
(KUNAIon December 13, I978 of
anA, RoyA/ 'am
S
S
S
S
-
S
S
S
S
5
5
S
to give more rniiiary
S
article challenging the USSR
assistance to Iraq
and Syria.
57. APrePort.IromMo$cow,Je,.usa,empos,
Janua S 1979.
58 II so, the incident is reminiscent
of Moscow's unwillingns to
with the weaponry Sadat wanted
provide Egypt
following Camp David the USSR in 1971 and 1972 There were also reports that
and it could e*crcjse that leverage felt it had greater leverage over Iraq and Syria
Iraq and the long.sought friendshipto obtain Improv treatment of the ICP from
and cooperation treaty from Syria.
(Se1h
5
5
-
-;
..
-
,'-
5
S
.5
L
1
-
..S
--
-S
:.
-,
/
'.5
S
-
-
-
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-
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Western sources mentioned in footnote 56 abo'e)
59. Pravda, December 14. 1978.
.
Tass in English, December 12, 1978. (Foreign Broadcast Information Seryice.
Daily Report Soviet Union Vol III December 13 1978 p F 3)
6I. Pravda. January 13. 1979.
62. On this poirn;see Freedman, "The USSR and the Communist Parties of the
Arab World"
63. Cited in report by Ned
christian Scióce Monitor, April II, 1979.
64 For an analysis of the Soviet role in the PDRY invasion of North Yemen see
Temko1
Robert 0 Freedman 'Soviet Middle East Policy in the Aftermath of Ca!np
David," a paper delivered to the 1979 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association Washington, 1979, pp 33 36
65 This incident is
Headaches,"
in Tewfiq Mishlawi, "Iraq s
discussed
The Middle East, No. 57. JUly 1979, p. 10.
Foreign Pohc)
66;. For a discussion of the events in Iran,. seo Robert 0. Freedman, "Iran's
Revolution and the Mideast Balance of Power," Jewish Frontier, Vol. 46, No. 6,
June-July 1979. pp. 4-5; 30.
67. See report in The Washington Posi, June IS, 1979.
68 Cited in AP report from Teheran, Baltimore Evening Sun June 6 1979 (
69. Cited in report by William Branigin, The Washington Post, June16, 1979,
70 See report by Ned Temko Christian Science ilonuor, June 18, 1979
71. Cited in AP report from Teheran, The Bolt imore Evening Sun,iune 6, 1979.
72. SIPRI Yearbook, 1979, London; Taylor& Francis Ltd., 1979, pp. 218.220.
-
73. See report in The New York Times,
July
Jerusalem Post, August 5, 1979.
28, 1979 and UPI report in
IJ
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.57
H:
A
REPORT DOCUMENTATIOH
AGE
STRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMpLE7G FORM
POLICY TOWARD BA'ATHIST IRAQ, 1968-1979
trategjc Issues Research
Memoranda
-
n
tTT
I.AN T NUMO(.(.,
Dr. Robert o. Freedman
.:
Strategic Studiea Institute
US Army War College
UNAs5IFIED
TThN.NGaAo,qO
$TRISUT,ON SY*TtNCNT(.gth,.R,,,,,,
Approved for public
release; distrjbutian unlimited.
a.,..,,
ORO$ (C.nsb.. ..,
--
lid. U..,,..
foreign policy, Iraq,
Ba'athjt regima, Iran, Israel,
Egypt, PUddle
Thj mamorand
first examjne
aesao5 the 8ucee
Sovj*t policy toward of Soviet policy tcwa
Iraq
The author
the entte Middle
p"licy toward Iraq is very much
Eactj,
Soviet
a
co
region.
ntoió
overall
In4ddjtj
ho Considers
the nature of the Ba'aapo1iy toward the
since many of the SuccesseS
4chiev0d end problena encountered regina in Iraq,
tie dejtg9 vttI the
Iraqis otos from thó rather oingu1a
by the USSR in
mature of the Iraqi
1-,
-
--
-I
AOOVTIPAD_
ie to power.
The paper finally
examjnen the evolution of the Sovtet_raqj
lationahip. from the coup d'etat: which brought
the Ba'athjata back to power
July 1968 until the preaent
and drava some
COnClujon5 about the aucce8s
Soviet foreign po icy duriig that time.
C)
I
UNCLASSIFIED
5aCUTY CLAS$JPIC*TON O YNIS P*OIi1.,, 0..
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