5 Contract Interpretation and the Parol Evidence Rule Richard J. Sankovitz I. [§ 5.1] II. [§ 5.2] Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 What Law Governs Contract Interpretation?: Choice-of-Law Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. [§ 5.3] When Is Choice of Law an Issue? . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. [§ 5.4] Law Governing Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. [§ 5.5] When Choice-of-Law Clauses Exist . . . . . . . . a. [§ 5.6] In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b. [§ 5.7] Contracts Subject to UCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. [§ 5.8] When Choice-of-Law Provisions Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. [§ 5.9] When Contract Is Government Contract . . . . . 4. [§ 5.10] When Contract Is Silent as to Choice of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. [§ 5.11] In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b. [§ 5.12] Contracts Subject to UCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 8 8 8 9 III. [§ 5.13] Who Decides What the Contract Means? . . . . . . . . . 9 A. [§ 5.14] In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 B. [§ 5.15] Issues Decided as Matter of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 C. [§ 5.16] Issues Decided as Matter of Fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1. [§ 5.17] In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2. [§ 5.18] Contracts Subject to UCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 D. [§ 5.19] Standards of Review on Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 IV. [§ 5.20] What Does the Contract Mean?: Rules for Interpreting Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 A. [§ 5.21] Purpose of Interpretation Is Determining and Enforcing Parties’ Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 B. [§ 5.22] Best Evidence of Parties’ Intent Is Contract Itself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 1 CHAPTER 5 C. [§ 5.23] “Plain and Ordinary” Meaning Precedes Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D. [§ 5.24] Parties’ Knowledge at Time of Contracting Is Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E. [§ 5.25] Maxims That Guide Construction of Disputed Contractual Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. [§ 5.26] Read Contract as a Whole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. [§ 5.27] Give Meaning and Effect to All Terms . . . . . 3. [§ 5.28] Avoid Leaving Any Term Unreasonable or Unconscionable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. [§ 5.29] Avoid Unlawful Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. [§ 5.30] Give Greater Weight to Specific Than to General Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. [§ 5.31] Construe Ambiguities Against Drafter . . . . . . F. [§ 5.32] Consulting Extrinsic Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. [§ 5.33] Requirement That Contract Be Ambiguous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. [§ 5.34] In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b. [§ 5.35] What Constitutes Ambiguity? . . . . . . . . . . 2. [§ 5.36] Types of Extrinsic Evidence Courts Recognize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. [§ 5.37] Circumstances of Contracting . . . . . . . . . . b. [§ 5.38] Construction by Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c. [§ 5.39] Other Contracts Between Parties . . . . . . . d. [§ 5.40] Custom and Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1) [§ 5.41] In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) [§ 5.42] Contracts Subject to UCC . . . . . . . . . e. [§ 5.43] Course of Dealing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G. [§ 5.44] Canons of Construction Specific to Insurance Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H. [§ 5.45] Canons of Construction Specific to Government Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. What Is in Contract and What Is Not: Parol Evidence Rule, Battle of the Forms, and Supplying Omitted Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. [§ 5.47] Parol Evidence Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. [§ 5.48] Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. [§ 5.49] Debilitation of Parol Evidence Rule . . . . . . . . 3. [§ 5.50] Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. [§ 5.51] Summary of Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b. [§ 5.52] Is Agreement in Writing? . . . . . . . . . . . . . c. [§ 5.53] Is Agreement Integrated? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 17 18 18 18 19 20 21 21 22 22 22 23 26 26 26 27 27 27 28 28 28 30 [§ 5.46] Ch. 5 Pg. 2 30 30 30 31 32 32 33 33 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE (1) [§ 5.54] Integration Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) [§ 5.55] Fully vs. Partially Integrated Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) [§ 5.56] Value and Use of Merger and Integration Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. [§ 5.57] Effect on Agreements and Expressions of Intent “Outside” Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. [§ 5.58] Contradictory or Substitute Agreements or Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . b. [§ 5.59] Consistent Additional, Supplemental, or Side Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. [§ 5.60] Effect on Negotiations Relating to Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. [§ 5.61] Exceptions to Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. [§ 5.62] To Establish Integration and Intent . . . . . . b. [§ 5.63] To Resolve Ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c. [§ 5.64] To Show Contract Invalid . . . . . . . . . . . . . d. [§ 5.65] When Contract Is Subject to UCC . . . . . . 7. [§ 5.66] Tactical Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. [§ 5.67] Battle of the Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. [§ 5.68] The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. [§ 5.69] A Partial Solution: Contracts Subject to UCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. [§ 5.70] Counseling Clients on Use of Form Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. [§ 5.71] Supplying Omitted or “Implied” Terms . . . . . . . . 1. [§ 5.72] In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. [§ 5.73] Duration of Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. [§ 5.74] Time and Other Details of Performance . . . . . 4. [§ 5.75] Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 34 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 38 38 40 40 41 41 42 45 45 45 46 47 48 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5A Checklist of Rules of Contract Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 I. [§ 5.1] Scope This chapter examines issues of contract interpretation, including choiceof-law considerations and the question of who will serve as interpreter (the judge or jury and the trial or appellate court). In particular, the chapter examines doctrines, practices, and rules of thumb governing the evidence a © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 3 § 5.1 CHAPTER 5 court considers in determining the meaning of a contract when its meaning is disputed. Some of these rules serve an interpretive function; they tell the court what clues to contractual intent to look for within as well as without the document. Other rules serve a supplementary function; they tell the court what terms to enforce when the parties have failed to agree on a given subject. Still other rules, such as the parol evidence rule, serve a gatekeeping function; they tell a court whether it may consider any evidence outside the four corners of the document. Taken as a whole, this chapter follows the basic methodology courts should follow in construing contracts: Start by identifying the documents or recollections that reflect what the parties intended to be their final, complete agreement. Then, look to the provision in dispute and see whether an unambiguous meaning can be derived from that provision alone. If it cannot, look to the rest of the contract, but not beyond its four corners, for its meaning. If that is insufficient, look to evidence outside the contract to resolve the ambiguity and learn the parties’ intent. Like a contract, this chapter should be construed as a whole. Contract interpretation rules should not be applied in isolation or without regard for the central purpose of contract interpretation—determining what the parties intended their contract to be. II. [§ 5.2] What Law Governs Contract Interpretation?: Choice-of-Law Considerations A. [§ 5.3] When Is Choice of Law an Issue? Typically, when a contract is the subject of a dispute in Wisconsin, Wisconsin law should resolve the dispute. However, it is not unusual for the law of a state other than Wisconsin to govern the dispute. When is it necessary to determine whether the dispute is governed by the law of a state other than Wisconsin? It is not necessary unless the other state’s pertinent law is materially different from Wisconsin’s. In other words, if the outcome of the dispute will be the same regardless of which state’s law is applied, then it is not necessary to conduct a choice-of-law analysis.1 1 See Wood v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 942 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Courts do not worry about conflict of laws unless the parties disagree on which state’s law applies. We are busy enough without creating issues that are unlikely to affect the outcome of the case . . . .”); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 222 Ch. 5 Pg. 4 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.6 A conflict of laws might appear to exist in a dispute in which the component documents of a contract (for example, one party’s purchase order and the other party’s acceptance) specify the application of the law of different states. However, even in that case a choice-of-law analysis is unnecessary unless the pertinent law of the two states is different and outcome-determinative. B. [§ 5.4] Law Governing Dispute 1. [§ 5.5] When Choice-of-Law Clauses Exist a. [§ 5.6] In General It is common for a contract to provide explicitly what law will govern2 the interpretation of the contract and disputes arising under it. Indeed, contracting parties are to be encouraged to specify the law they agree to be bound by, to promote certainty and predictability in their contract relations. Wisconsin generally enforces such provisions unless doing so would be unconscionable3 or would contravene an important public policy that would otherwise be applied.4 Examples of public policies Wisconsin considers Wis. 2d 475, 495, 588 N.W.2d 285 (1998). 2 Courts in other jurisdictions have drawn a distinction between contracts using the operative term govern and contracts using the terms interpret and construe. Wisconsin courts do not recognize such a distinction. See Hammel v. Ziegler Fin. Corp., 113 Wis. 2d 73, 77, 334 N.W.2d 913, 915–16 (Ct. App. 1983). 3 See First Fed. Fin. Service, Inc. v. Derrington’s Chevron, Inc., 230 Wis. 2d 553, 558–59, 602 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1999). 4 Generac Corp. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 172 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 1999); CSSWisconsin Office v. Houston Satellite Sys., Inc., 779 F. Supp. 979, 983 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Bush v. National Sch. Studios, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 635, 642–43, 407 N.W.2d 883, 886–87 (1987); General Med. Corp. v. Kobs, 179 Wis. 2d 422, 428, 507 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1993); see Wis. Stat. § 135.025(3) (providing that provisions of Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law may not be varied by contract or agreement). For information on contracts governed by the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, Wis. Stat. ch. 135, see Michael A. Bowen & Brian E. Butler, The Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books 2d ed. 1995 & Supp.). Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this chapter to the Wisconsin © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 5 CHAPTER 5 § 5.7 important are embodied in its laws prohibiting certain covenants not to compete5 or laws protecting dealerships.6 b. [§ 5.7] Contracts Subject to UCC The Wisconsin UCC also makes choice-of-law provisions enforceable, as long as the “transaction bears a reasonable relation” to the state.7 2. [§ 5.8] When Choice-of-Law Provisions Conflict Because choice-of-law provisions are so commonplace, it is not unusual to find parties with dueling choice-of-law provisions. For example, a purchase order issued by a buyer located in Wisconsin may provide that the contract is governed by Wisconsin law, whereas the order acknowledgment issued by the seller from its headquarters across the state line may provide that the contract is governed by the neighboring state’s law. To resolve such a conflict, Wisconsin courts will apply the general “grouping of contacts” conflict-of-law analysis.8 The gist of that approach Statutes are to the 1997–98 Wisconsin Statutes, as affected by acts through 1999 Wisconsin Act 25. 5 See Wis. Stat. § 103.465; Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 84 Wis. 2d 202, 216–17, 267 N.W.2d 242 (1978). 6 See Bush, 139 Wis. 2d at 642–44, 407 N.W.2d at 886–87. 7 Wis. Stat. § 401.105(1) (“when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties”); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 453–55, 405 N.W.2d 354, 377 (Ct. App. 1987); supra § 1.7 (UCC and its adoption in Wisconsin). 8 Diesel Serv. Co., 961 F.2d at 640; Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito Am., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1301, 1354 (E.D. Wis. 1992); CSS-Wisconsin Office, 779 F. Supp. at 984; Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Gradall Co., 702 F. Supp. 726, 731 (E.D. Wis. 1988), aff’d, 965 F.2d 1442 (7th Cir. 1992) (where purchaser’s form specified Ohio law would govern and seller’s form designated Wisconsin law, court applied Wisconsin law on grounds that the seller’s principal place of business was located in Wisconsin and contract was performed in Wisconsin); Handal v. American Farmers Mut. Cas. Co., 79 Wis. 2d 67, 73, 255 N.W.2d 903, 906 (1977); Urhammer v. Olson, 39 Wis. 2d 447, 450, 159 N.W.2d 688, Ch. 5 Pg. 6 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.8 is to determine which state has the most significant relationship with the contract. To determine which state has the most significant relationship, Wisconsin courts consider the following factors, which are derived from section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws:9 1. The place of contracting 2. The place of negotiation of the contract 3. The place of performance 4. The place of the subject matter of the contract 5. The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties These factors should be weighed with a view towards enforcing the law under which the contract will be the most effective in accomplishing its apparent objectives and with due respect for each state’s relevant public policies.10 The factors are meant to be weighed, not merely counted, giving due consideration to those factors that are the most significant in a given case.11 It is not easy to predict how these factors will mesh in any given case, but generally if both negotiations and performance take place in the same state, the law of that state will govern.12 689 (1968); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Klein & Son, 157 Wis. 2d 552, 556, 460 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Ct. App. 1990). 9 The Wisconsin Supreme Court endorsed the Restatement test in Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 446–47, 177 N.W.2d 328, 330–31 (1970). 10 Id. at 447. 11 Id. 12 CSS-Wisconsin Office, 779 F. Supp. at 984; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(3) (1969). © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 7 CHAPTER 5 § 5.9 3. [§ 5.9] When Contract Is Government Contract When the federal government is a party to a contract in dispute, the substantive body of law known as federal common law may govern the interpretation of the contract. However, the scope of federal common law and the implications of the Erie doctrine13 are beyond the scope of this chapter. Whether federal common law governs the interpretation of the contract must be explored when analyzing a contract dispute to which the federal government is a party, particularly if the outcome of the dispute will directly affect substantial financial obligations of the United States.14 4. [§ 5.10] When Contract Is Silent as to Choice of Law a. [§ 5.11] In General Most sophisticated contracts explicitly address the issue of what law will govern disputes arising out of the contract,15 but there are many contracts that do not settle the question of what law governs. In such a case, a choiceof-law analysis may be necessary.16 b. [§ 5.12] Contracts Subject to UCC With regard to contracts governed by the Wisconsin Uniform Commercial Code (Wisconsin UCC), the test to be applied is similar to the groupingof-contacts approach (discussed in section 5.8, supra). The provisions of the Wisconsin UCC will apply to transactions “bearing an appropriate relation” 13 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 14 See 19 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure 2d § 4514 (2d ed. 1996); see also, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1979); Eastern Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank v. Sanders, 826 F.2d 615, 616 (7th Cir. 1987); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1270 n.16 (7th Cir. 1981). 15 See infra § 15.68, .69 (standard clauses). 16 See supra § 5.8 (grouping-of-contacts analysis). Ch. 5 Pg. 8 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.15 to Wisconsin.17 In applying this rule, the court looks to “a transaction’s significant contacts” with the forum.18 III. [§ 5.13] Who Decides What the Contract Means? A. [§ 5.14] In General In litigating a contract dispute, it may be of strategic importance to know whether the meaning of the contract will be decided by the jury or the judge. Likewise, if the case is on appeal, it may be important to determine whether the court of appeals will defer to the findings made by the trial court or will review the matter de novo. The following discussion states the applicable rules. B. [§ 5.15] Issues Decided as Matter of Law When the contract at issue is unambiguous, and there is no dispute that the contract is the final and complete expression of the parties’ intent, determining its meaning is a question of law solely for the judge to decide, not the jury.19 The same holds when an ambiguity does exist but there is no extrinsic evidence or other circumstance for the court to consider.20 Even the issue of whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law for the court.21 17 Wis. Stat. § 401.105(1); see supra § 1.7 (UCC and its adoption in Wisconsin). 18 Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 630, 133 N.W.2d 408, 415 (1965);Ford Motor Co., 137 Wis. 2d at 454. 19 Jos. P. Jansen Co. v. Milwaukee Area Dist. Bd., 105 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 16, 312 N.W.2d 813, 818, 820 (1981); Eder v. Lake Geneva Raceway, Inc., 187 Wis. 2d 596, 607–12, 523 N.W.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1994); Kellar v. Lloyd, 180 Wis. 2d 162, 176, 509 N.W.2d 87 (Ct. App. 1993). 20 Kuehn v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Wis. 2d 620, 624, 626–27, 412 N.W.2d 126, 127, 128 (Ct. App. 1987). 21 Energy Complexes, Inc. v. County of Eau Claire, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 467, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989); Management Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 196 Wis. 2d 578, 594, 539 N.W.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 206 Wis. 2d 158, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996). © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 9 CHAPTER 5 § 5.16 The construction of the words and clauses of an insurance policy is generally held to be a question of law for the court.22 An exception arises when an insurance policy is not complete—for example, when an endorsement defining a term in the policy is not provided to the insured—and the court must resort to extrinsic evidence.23 C. [§ 5.16] Issues Decided as Matter of Fact 1. [§ 5.17] In General When the meaning of a contractual term is ambiguous, or when reasonable persons could disagree as to what is contained in the contract, the parties’ intent is a factual issue and the question is properly submitted to the trier of fact.24 The interpretation of writings is traditionally the responsibility of the judge rather than the jury. A matter is for the jury when it is necessary to resort to extrinsic evidence and the evidence consists of a series of mutually inconsistent writings that must be combined with nondocumentary evidence to determine whether or when a contract was made.25 When a court decides it must look beyond the four corners of the document to find evidence of the parties’ intent, the issue involves a question of fact.26 22 Katze v. Randolph & Scott Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 206, 212, 341 N.W.2d 689, 691 (1984). 23 Kuehn, 140 Wis. 2d at 627 (because court was required to consult extrinsic evidence, the question was one of fact). 24 Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 775 F. Supp. 1192, 1195 (E.D. Wis. 1991), aff’d, 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992); Jones v. Jenkins, 88 Wis. 2d 712, 722, 277 N.W.2d 815, 819 (1979); Grosskopf Oil, Inc. v. Winter, 156 Wis. 2d 575, 585, 457 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Ct. App. 1990); Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dane County, 142 Wis. 2d 315, 323, 417 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1987); Jensen v. Janesville Sand & Gravel Co., 141 Wis. 2d 521, 530–31, 415 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1987). 25 Western Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada, Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). 26 Wis. Stat. § 401.205(2); Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency, Inc., 802 F.2d 941, 943–44 (7th Cir. 1986). Ch. 5 Pg. 10 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.19 2. [§ 5.18] Contracts Subject to UCC The Wisconsin UCC creates an exception to the principle that consideration of extrinsic evidence requires submission of the question to the trier of fact. Under the Wisconsin UCC provisions, if the extrinsic evidence consists only of trade usage and the usage “is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing, the interpretation of the writing is for the court.”27 D. [§ 5.19] Standards of Review on Appeal The de novo standard of review applies when the issue on appeal is the meaning of the contract and any of the following applies: 1. The contract is unambiguous.28 2. The contract is ambiguous, but the evidence consists only of documents.29 27 Wis. Stat. § 401.205(2); see supra § 1.7 (UCC and its adoption in Wisconsin). 28 For cases on appeal from state courts, see Estate of Thompson v. Jump River Elec. Corp., 225 Wis. 2d 588, 598, 593 N.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1999); Nauga, Inc. v. Westel Milwaukee Co., 216 Wis. 2d 306, 313, 576 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1998); Yee v. Giuffre, 176 Wis. 2d 189, 192, 499 N.W.2d 926, 927 (Ct. App. 1993). For cases on appeal from federal courts, see Elkhart Lake’s Road America, Inc. v. Chicago Historic Races, Ltd., 158 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 1998); LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Service Merchandise Co., 827 F.2d 74, 78 (7th Cir. 1987). 29 Levy v. Levy, 130 Wis. 2d 523, 529, 388 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1986) (“‘The meaning of a word in a legal document is a matter within the expertise of the supreme court, and is not dependent upon the fact finder’s appraisal of the demeanor of witnesses . . . . [E]ven were we to disagree with the finding of the trial court, we would be free to reach our own conclusion with respect to the meaning of a word.’”) (quoting American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 58 Wis. 2d 299, 303–04, 206 N.W.2d 152 (1973)). Note that the federal court of appeals may take a different approach. See Ginsu Prods., Inc. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 786 F.2d 260, 262–63 (7th Cir. 1986) (clearly erroneous standard applies “‘even when the district court’s findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts’”) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 11 § 5.19 CHAPTER 5 3. The contract is ambiguous, but neither party offers evidence as to the parties’ intent.30 Courts of appeals (both state and federal) usually apply the de novo standard in cases involving the construction of an insurance contract.31 On the other hand, the clearly erroneous standard applies when a contract is ambiguous and the trial court resorted to extrinsic, nondocumentary evidence of the parties’ intentions.32 It is important to note, however, that the threshold question of whether the contract is ambiguous is a matter of law that the appellate court may review de novo.33 Because it is sometimes difficult to sort out which matters the trial court resolved as a matter of law and which it decided as a matter of fact,34 the Wisconsin Supreme Court has encouraged trial courts to make separate findings of fact in cases in which determinations of fact and law are mixed.35 30 Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 108 Wis. 2d 637, 646, 323 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Ct. App. 1982). 31 See, e.g., Continental Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 892 F.2d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 1989); General Cas. Co. v. Hills, 209 Wis. 2d 167, 175, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997); Maas v. Ziegler, 172 Wis. 2d 70, 79, 492 N.W.2d 621 (1992); Employers Health Ins. v. General Cas. Co., 161 Wis. 2d 937, 945–46, 469 N.W.2d 172, 175 (1991) (where no extrinsic evidence is introduced to interpret words in insurance contract, supreme court may redetermine interpretation as issue of law, with no deference to circuit court or court of appeals); Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 561, 278 N.W.2d 857, 860 (1979); Reed v. General Cas. Co., 216 Wis. 2d 204, 208, 576 N.W.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1998). 32 Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2); LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 827 F.2d at 78; Kuehn, 140 Wis. 2d at 627; Badger Produce Co. v. Prelude Foods Int’l, Inc., 130 Wis. 2d 230, 238, 387 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Ct. App. 1986). 33 Borchardt v. Wilk, 156 Wis. 2d 420, 427, 456 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 1990); Jensen, 141 Wis. 2d at 530. 34 See, e.g., Badger Produce Co., 130 Wis. 2d at 238, 240 (acceptance of goods under Wisconsin UCC and “reasonableness” are issues that present mixed questions of fact and law); Spensley Feeds, Inc. v. Livingston Feed & Lumber, Inc., 128 Wis. 2d 279, 286, 381 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Ct. App. 1985) (whether contract is divisible is question of mixed fact and law). 35 See, e.g., Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 525–26, 331 N.W.2d 357, 361 (1983). Ch. 5 Pg. 12 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.21 Although the court of appeals is not bound to defer completely to the trial court’s conclusions of law contained in a mixed fact-law determination, those conclusions are entitled to some weight.36 IV. [§ 5.20] What Does the Contract Mean?: Rules for Interpreting Contracts A. [§ 5.21] Purpose of Interpretation Is Determining and Enforcing Parties’ Intent “[T]he cornerstone of contract construction is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties.”37 The canons, maxims, rules of grammar, rules of thumb, and other incantations that courts have developed over time have strategic implications. For example, the party that drafted the disputed term always seems to fight an uphill battle if the term is declared ambiguous.38 However, the rules are meant to serve only one valid purpose: to reveal the parties’ intent.39 Indeed, not every case calls for contract interpretation. When the parties to a validly formed contract make an agreement “‘which does not contravene a principle of public policy, and which contains no element of ambiguity, the court has no right, by a process of interpretation, to relieve one of them 36 Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 349, 358, 377 N.W.2d 593, 598 (1985). 37 State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Pleva, 155 Wis. 2d 704, 711, 456 N.W.2d 359, 362 (1990); see also Elkhart Lake’s Road America, 158 F.3d at 972; Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl, & Bichler, S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 576 N.W.2d 46 (1998); Sampson Invs. v. Jondex Corp., 176 Wis. 2d 55, 62, 499 N.W.2d 177, 180 (1993); Levy, 130 Wis. 2d at 533–34; Patti v. Western Mach. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 348, 351, 241 N.W.2d 158, 162 (1976). 38 See infra § 5.31 (maxim dictating that ambiguity is to be construed against drafter). 39 Courts are wary of applying canons of construction in such a way that they distort, rather than clarify, the parties’ intentions. See, e.g., O’Leary v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 533 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (rejecting “static—albeit sometimes useful—canon” that ambiguity be construed against drafter). © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 13 § 5.21 CHAPTER 5 from any disadvantageous terms’” that have been made.40 In other words, “[i]n the guise of construing a contract, courts cannot insert what has been omitted or rewrite a contract made by the parties.”41 Courts are tempted to reform agreements when one party is treated unfavorably. However, it is a “time-honored axiom . . . that if parties are allowed to convince courts to reform plainly worded contracts, ‘contracts would not be worth the paper on which they are written.’”42 A court should depart from these cardinal principles only when the parties have omitted an essential term43 or when a party can demonstrate grounds for reformation.44 Finally, the art of contract construction does not consist of merely defining words and terms in the abstract. The goal, instead, is to ascertain what the parties meant by the use of the word or the term in the context of their own agreement. For example, presenting a court with another court’s published decision in which the same word or term is in issue may not be decisive. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court wrote: “Obviously, decisions from other jurisdictions determining the intention of other parties are not controlling when the issue is the intention of [these parties] at the time they entered into this particular [contract].”45 40 Dykstra v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 92 Wis. 2d 17, 38, 284 N.W.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1979), aff’d, 100 Wis. 2d 120, 301 N.W.2d 201 (1981) (quoting Algrem v. Nowlan, 37 Wis. 2d 70, 79, 154 N.W.2d 217 (1967)); see also Old Tuckaway Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. City of Greenfield, 180 Wis. 2d 254, 280–81, 509 N.W.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1993); Continental Cas. Co. v. Patients Compensation Fund, 164 Wis. 2d 110, 116–17, 473 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1991). 41 Levy, 130 Wis. 2d at 533; see Westowne Shoes, Inc. v. Brown Group, Inc., 104 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 1997); Huntoon v. Capozza, 57 Wis. 2d 447, 461, 204 N.W.2d 649 (1973) (“important contractual provisions are not ordinarily left to implication”); Goff v. Massachusetts Protective Ass’n., Inc., 46 Wis. 2d 712, 715–16, 176 N.W.2d 576 (1970) (court will not “read into the silence of the contract” a significant and important term). 42 Pincus v. Pabst Brewing Co., 893 F.2d 1544, 1552 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Upton v. Tribilock, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 45, 50 (1875)). 43 See infra §§ 5.71–.75 (supplying omitted terms). 44 See infra §§ 13.80–.84 (grounds for reformation). 45 Patti, 72 Wis. 2d at 355–56. Ch. 5 Pg. 14 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.22 B. [§ 5.22] Best Evidence of Parties’ Intent Is Contract Itself Wisconsin courts espouse the view that the best indication of the parties’ intent is the language of the contract itself; courts must avoid the temptation to allow into the record extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions, for this often leads to interpretations that are contradictory and confusing.46 Accordingly, when the terms of a contract are plain and unambiguous, a court will construe the contract as it is written,47 even though the parties have placed a different construction on it.48 This being the case, courts are apt to place heavy reliance on explicit statements of intent contained in the contract itself—for example, in the recitals of the contract (sometimes known as the WHEREAS clauses).49 C. [§ 5.23] “Plain and Ordinary” Meaning Precedes Others Courts repeatedly emphasize that they will not depart from the plain meaning of a contract.50 In determining the plain meaning of a word, a 46 Pleva, 155 Wis. 2d at 711 (“the purpose of judicial construction is to determine what the parties contracted to do as evidenced by the language they saw fit to use”); Levy, 130 Wis. 2d at 535. 47 United States v. Ettrick Wood Prods., Inc., 916 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir. 1990); Amplicon Inc. v. Marshfield Clinic, 786 F. Supp. 1469, 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1992); Koenings, 126 Wis. 2d at 366; Teacher Retirement Sys. v. Badger XVI Ltd. Partnership, 205 Wis. 2d 532, 555, 556 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1996); Yee, 176 Wis. 2d at 192–93. 48 Kinn v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 582 F. Supp. 682, 686 (E.D. Wis. 1984); Campion v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 172 Wis. 2d 405, 416, 493 N.W.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1992); Schmitz v. Grudzinski, 141 Wis. 2d 867, 871, 416 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Ct. App. 1987); Dykstra, 92 Wis. 2d at 38. 49 See, e.g., Levy, 130 Wis. 2d at 534. For more information on the usefulness of recitals in contracts, see sections 15.47–.48, infra. 50 See, e.g., Keeler v. Keeler, 214 Wis. 2d 32, 37, 571 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1997); Lah v. Century 21 Bales-Salzburg, 204 Wis. 2d 483, 489–90, 555 N.W.2d 149 (Ct. App. 1996); Erickson v. Gundersen, 183 Wis. 2d 106, 117, 515 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1994); Continental Cas. Co. v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 164 Wis. 2d 110, 116–17, 473 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 15 § 5.23 CHAPTER 5 court may look to the definition of the word given in a recognized dictionary.51 Of course, consulting a dictionary may not produce an unambiguous plain meaning, since dictionaries do not have the last word on the meaning to be ascribed to a given word. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the term theft did not have a plain meaning, because it was susceptible to a variety of definitions, of which the dictionary definition was only one.52 D. [§ 5.24] Parties’ Knowledge at Time of Contracting Is Considered Courts presume that parties reach their agreement with an awareness of the law in effect at the time of their agreement, including both statutory and case law.53 Courts also presume that parties have read and understood their agreements. Courts are understandably reluctant to excuse or relieve a party of its fundamental duty to read and understand before signing a document.54 1991). 51 Arkwright-Boston Mars. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wausau Paper Mills Co., 818 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1987); Gorton, 217 Wis. 2d at 507; Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 745, 456 N.W.2d 570, 573 (1990); Ennuis v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 225 Wis. 2d 824, 832, 593 N.W.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1999); Leask v. Magazine Marketplace, Inc., 168 Wis. 2d 668, 673–74, 484 N.W.2d 364 (Ct. App. 1992); Stauffacher v. Preside Properties, Inc., 150 Wis. 2d 242, 246, 441 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Ct. App. 1989); In re Liquidation of AllStar Ins. Corp., 112 Wis. 2d 329, 334, 332 N.W.2d 828, 830–31 (Ct. App. 1983). 52 Kate, 116 Wis. 2d at 211, 213, 341 N.W.2d at 691. 53 Krause v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 161 Wis. 2d 711, 718, 468 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Ct. App. 1991). 54 See, e.g., Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch Machine GmbH, 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1992); Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905 F.2d 1117, 1120 (7th Cir. 1990) (parties who agree to terms in writing without understanding or investigating them do so at their own peril); Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1017, 513 N.W.2d 118 (1994); Hennaing v. Hearn, 230 Wis. 2d 149, 169–72, 601 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999); Rent-ACenter, Inc. v. Hall, 181 Wis. 2d 243, 249 n.5, 510 N.W.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1993); Ritchie v. Campier, 109 Wis. 2d 399, 405–06, 326 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Ct. App. 1982); supra § 3.10 (whether reliance was justified (misrepresentation Ch. 5 Pg. 16 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.24 However, courts will take into consideration the intelligence and experience of an individual who claims to have been misled at the time of signing.55 Courts have explicitly rejected the argument that because a contract is written in a foreign language, it is not enforceable against a party unfamiliar with that language. Such excuses are considered particularly lame in an arms-length transaction between sophisticated businesses.56 E. [§ 5.25] Maxims That Guide Construction of Disputed Contractual Terms 1. [§ 5.26] Read Contract as a Whole A contract must be construed as a whole, so as to give each of its provisions the meaning intended by the parties.57 By reading each provision of the contract in the context of the whole, ambiguity can be avoided.58 Thus, “[when an expression of intent is apparent as to one portion of the agreement, this rule may be extremely useful in determining the intent of the parties as to a related portion.”59 If two clauses of a contract are apparently element)). 55 Bank of Sun Prairie v. Easer, 155 Wis. 2d 724, 733–34, 456 N.W.2d 585, 589 (1990) (citing Ritchie v. Campier, 109 Wis. 2d at 405–06). 56 Although Wisconsin courts have not addressed this issue in published opinions, it has been addressed numerous times elsewhere. See, e.g., Paper Express, Ltd., 972 F.2d at 757 (collecting cases); Envirolite Enters., Inc. v. Glastechnische Industria Peter Lisec Gesellschaft M.B.H., 53 BR. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d without opinion, 788 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1986). 57 Shanks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 777 F. Supp. 1444, 1449 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (quoting Kramer Bros., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 562, 278 N.W.2d 857 (1979)), aff’d, 979 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1992); Campion, 172 Wis. 2d at 416; Hartman v. Otis Erecting Co., 108 Wis. 2d 456, 461, 322 N.W.2d 482, 485 (Ct. App. 1982). 58 Wausau Joint Venture v. Redevelopment Auth., 118 Wis. 2d 50, 58, 347 N.W.2d 604 (Ct. App. 1984). 59 Anderson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 178 Wis. 2d 835, 840, 505 N.W.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Lambert v. Heine, 218 Wis. 2d 712, 729, 582 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1998) (“as is” clause of real estate contract construed in conjunction with inspection and disapproval provisions of same contract). © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 17 CHAPTER 5 § 5.25 repugnant, it is the court’s duty to harmonize them if possible.60 Courts are especially loathe to “put a trick interpretation or twist on one word” of the contract.61 2. [§ 5.27] Give Meaning and Effect to All Terms In construing a contract, the court will select the construction that gives meaning to each of the provisions of the contract, so that no part of the contract is rendered surplusage or meaningless.62 3. [§ 5.28] Avoid Leaving Any Term Unreasonable or Unconscionable In construing a contract, the court must adopt the construction that will result in a reasonable, fair, and just contract as opposed to one that is unusual or extraordinary or produces unfair or unreasonable results.63 In Eden Stone Co. v. Exfoliate Stone Co., for example, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the interpretation that a quarrying contract’s failure to mention a specific kind of stone barred the right to quarry that stone. The 60 In re Rude, 122 BR. 533, 537 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Wis. 1990); Jones, 88 Wis. 2d at 723. 61 Hammel, 113 Wis. 2d at 76. 62 Paper Express Ltd., 972 F.2d at 755; In re Rude, 122 BR. at 537; American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trade Co., 544 F. Supp. 669, 678 (W.D. Wis. 1982), aff’d, 718 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1983); Mass, 172 Wis. 2d at 79; Pleva, 155 Wis. 2d at 711; Jones, 88 Wis. 2d at 722; Lehman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 230 Wis. 2d 56, 62, 601 N.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1999); Estate of Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d at 600; Refiner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 221 Wis. 2d 500, 508, 585 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1998); Banner v. ABC Mfg. Co., 217 Wis. 2d 143, 146, 152, 579 N.W.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1998); Kohler Co. v. Waxen, 204 Wis. 2d 327, 335, 338, 555 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1996). 63 United Farm Agency, Inc. v. Clausen, 112 Wis. 2d 634, 641, 334 N.W.2d 110, 113 (1983); State v. Elmer J.K., 224 Wis. 2d 372, 380, 591 N.W.2d 176 (Ct. App. 1999); Bernhardt, 156 Wis. 2d at 428; Germain v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 367, 375, 350 N.W.2d 730, 735 (Ct. App. 1984). But see supra § 5.21 (purpose of interpretation is determining and enforcing parties’ intent). Ch. 5 Pg. 18 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.28 contract did not specifically mention any kind of stone, so the proffered interpretation would preclude any quarrying at all, an unreasonable result.64 A court will construe the contract “[so] far as reasonably practicable . . . [to] make it a rational business instrument.”65 For example, in Bernhardt v. Will, the court rejected a construction of an attorney fee provision in a mortgage note that would have entitled the mortgagee to recover all of the fees it had incurred attempting to enforce the mortgage, even though much of the fees were incurred defending a counterclaim upon which the mortgagor recovered an amount almost equal to what the mortgagee recovered. The court construed the contract to allow only for fees in an amount proportional to the amount recovered on the note less the amount recovered on the counterclaim.66 4. [§ 5.29] Avoid Unlawful Performance Courts construe contracts so as to avoid an interpretation that would require the parties to perform in an unlawful manner or that would bring about a result that would contravene public policy.67 Contracts that flirt with unlawfulness or tend to violate public policy are strictly construed to avoid such a result in all cases possible. For example, a stipulation absolutely and unconditionally preventing modification of a child support agreement violates public policy, and therefore a court may consider modifying child support obligations without regard to the limitation set forth in the stipulation.68 Likewise, exculpatory contracts (certain releases, for instance) are not favored by the law and are to be construed strictly against the parties seeking to enforce them.69 Courts strictly construe indemnity contracts so as to 64 Eden Stone Co. v. Exfoliate Stone Co., 166 Wis. 2d 105, 115, 479 N.W.2d 557 (Ct. App. 1991). 65 Bernhardt, 156 Wis. 2d at 427. 66 Id. at 428. 67 See supra §§ 3.21–.37 (illegal and unconscionable contracts). 68 See Crewman v. Goldberg, 214 Wis. 2d 163, 178, 571 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1997). 69 Auger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996) (discussing process for analyzing validity of exculpatory contracts in light of public policy issues); Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1015, 513 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 19 CHAPTER 5 § 5.29 avoid the result that a party to the contract will be indemnified against the party’s own negligence.70 Mortgage clauses providing that future advances will be secured by the mortgage (the so-called dragnet clause) also are strictly construed.71 5. [§ 5.30] Give Greater Weight to Specific Than to General Language Contract language that is more specific in nature is likely to make a greater difference in contract interpretation than contract language that is more general in nature. A number of interpretative rules of thumb flow from this observation—for instance, that “where there is an apparent conflict between a general and a specific provision, the latter controls.”72 A related rule is the Latin maxim “expression units est exclusion Aletris,” or, as has been stated by the court of appeals, that “specific mention of one or more matters is considered to exclude other matters of the same nature not expressly mentioned.”73 These rules find expression in cases where part of the contract is written or typed and the rest consists of a preprinted form. In such a contract, if the N.W.2d 118 (1994); Debris v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 514, 468 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (1991); Marten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 210–11, 321 N.W.2d 173, 176–77 (1982); Werdehoff v. General Star Index. Co., 229 Wis. 2d 489, 498–99, 600 N.W.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1999); Hmpf v. City of Appleton, 165 Wis. 2d 215, 224, 477 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Wis. Stat. § 704.07(1) (“An agreement to waive the requirements of this section [regarding repairs and untenantability in a lease agreement] in a residential tenancy is void”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 (1979); supra §§ 3.28–.34 (exculpatory contracts). 70 Hartman, 108 Wis. 2d at 463; Dykstra, 100 Wis. 2d at 125. 71 In re Rude, 122 BR. at 536–37. 72 Goldband Trust v. Goldband, 26 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 131 N.W.2d 902 (1965); see also Isermann v. M.L. Life Assurance Corp., 231 Wis. 2d 136 (Ct. App. 1999); Hull v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 2d 547, 554, 553 N.W.2d 295 (Ct. App. 1996). 73 Anderson, 178 Wis. 2d at 840; see also Gabble v. First Fed. Sat. & Loan Ass’n, 83 Wis. 2d 668, 673, 266 N.W.2d 352 (1978); Hunzinger Constr. Co. v. Granite Resources Corp., 196 Wis. 2d 327, 340, 538 N.W.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1995). Ch. 5 Pg. 20 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.31 parts are apparently inconsistent or leave reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the whole, the written or typed part controls.74 6. [§ 5.31] Construe Ambiguities Against Drafter It is a well-worn rule that ambiguous contractual terms are to be construed against the maker or drafter.75 This is a general rule, however, and is followed only when doing so would be consistent with the language of the whole contract and the parties’ intent.76 This rule is given particular consideration “where a substantial disparity of bargaining power exists between the parties or a standard form is supplied by the drafting party,”77 particularly when the drafting party is an attorney.78 F. [§ 5.32] Consulting Extrinsic Evidence 1. [§ 5.33] Requirement That Contract Be Ambiguous a. [§ 5.34] In General If intent can be determined with reasonable certainty from the face of the contract itself, a court should not resort to extrinsic evidence.79 Only when 74 See In re Rude, 122 BR. at 537. 75 In re Rude, 122 BR. at 537; In re Spring Valley Meats, Inc., 94 Wis. 2d 600, 609, 288 N.W.2d 852, 856 (1980); Garriguenc v. Love, 67 Wis. 2d 130, 135, 226 N.W.2d 414, 417 (1975); Carpocapsa v. First Nat’l Bank, 36 Wis. 2d 714, 720, 154 N.W.2d 271 (1967); Hunzinger Constr. Co. v. Granite Resources Corp., 196 Wis. 2d 327, 339, 538 N.W.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1995). 76 Wilde v. First Fed. Sat. & Loan Ass’n, 108 Wis. 2d 650, 655, 323 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1982); see also supra note 39. 77 Gorton, 217 Wis. 2d at 506 (citing to Goebel, 83 Wis. 2d at 675). 78 See id. at 508 (citing to Dairyland Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Bohen, 94 Wis. 2d 600, 609, 288 N.W.2d 852 (1980)). 79 Erickson, 183 Wis. 2d at 117, 118 n.3; Eden Stone, 166 Wis. 2d at 116. It should be noted, however, that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract that does not address the issue of merger or integration is intended to be final, thereby barring consideration of supplemental agreements. See infra § 5.62. Extrinsic evidence is also admissible, even © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 21 CHAPTER 5 § 5.32 the contract is ambiguous or when the evidence permits more than one reasonable inference concerning the parties’ intent, may the court look beyond the face of the contract and consider extrinsic evidence.80 In Wisconsin Real Estate Investment Trust v. Weinstein,81 the court rejected a construction that would have necessitated the consideration of extrinsic evidence. One of the parties invoked the maxim that courts should give the construction of the contract that the parties themselves adopt. The court explained that this maxim applies only when the contract is ambiguous and pointed out that the contract at issue was held to be unambiguous.82 b. [§ 5.35] What Constitutes Ambiguity? A term in a contract is ambiguous if it might mean different things to different reasonable persons.83 For example, in Patti v. Western Machine Co., the parties disputed the meaning of the term retirement in an employment agreement providing for deferred compensation upon “death, disability or retirement”; the court held that the term was “patently ambiguous” in the case of an unambiguous contract, for purposes of challenging the validity of the contract. See infra § 5.64. 80 Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 468, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989); Capital Inv., Inc. v. Whitehall Packing Co., 91 Wis. 2d 178, 190, 280 N.W.2d 254, 259 (1979); Spencer v. Spencer, 140 Wis. 2d 447, 450, 410 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Ct. App. 1987). 81 712 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1983). 82 Id. at 1099 n.11; see also Elkhart Lake’s Road America, 158 F.3d at 972; Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 221 Wis. 2d 145, 164, 584 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1998). 83 Borchardt, 156 Wis. 2d at 427. The test has been formulated in a number of different ways. See, e.g., Katze, 116 Wis. 2d at 213 (words are ambiguous “when they are reasonably or fairly susceptible to more than one construction”); Security Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wauwatosa Colony, Inc., 71 Wis. 2d 174, 179, 237 N.W.2d 729, 732 (1976) (ambiguity exists when contract “is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses”); Conrad Milwaukee Corp. v. Wasilewski, 30 Wis. 2d 481, 487, 141 N.W.2d 240, 244 (1966) (the word “must have some stretch in it—some capacity to connote more than one meaning”); Jensen, 141 Wis. 2d at 530 (ambiguous “if a reasonable person could understand it differently”). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has employed the same formulation articulated in Katze. See Elkhart Lake’s Road America, 158 F.3d at 972. Ch. 5 Pg. 22 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.35 because it was not defined in the agreement and might mean “anything from voluntary, unilateral termination to involuntary, forced termination.”84 As another example, in Duhame v. Duhame, the court found a divorce stipulation ambiguous because it was uncertain whether the term insurance “available to [the husband] at his place of employment” included insurance that is retained and carried over into retirement.85 In Katze v. Randolph & Scott Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the term theft was susceptible to more than one meaning (including larceny, fraud, and stealing) and therefore ambiguous.86 In Hunzinger Construction Co. v. Granite Resources Corp.,87 a party contended that language requiring a party to pay “for any loss, cost or expense incurred including special damages as a result of delay in or failure to make delivery” required the defaulting party to pay attorneys’ fees as well. The court held that the language was ambiguous and could not be construed to require the payment of attorneys’ fees.88 A common source of ambiguity is a contract containing inconsistent provisions. For example, in Spencer v. Spencer, the divorce stipulation was found to be ambiguous because it referred to maintenance but also to a property settlement in lieu of alimony.89 Ambiguity can also be the result of not foreseeing circumstances in which the contract will be applied. For example, in Borchardt v. Wilk, the parties agreed that a mortgagee would be entitled to attorney fees upon a default by the mortgagor. However, the contract was silent as to a circumstance that actually came to pass—that is, as to whether the full amount of the mortgagee’s attorney fees would be recoverable were the mortgagor to assert a counterclaim arising out of the transaction and recover nearly as much as the mortgagee on the main claim.90 84 Patti, 72 Wis. 2d at 352. 85 Duhame v. Duhame, 154 Wis. 2d 258, 266, 453 N.W.2d 149 (Ct. App. 1989). 86 Katze, 116 Wis. 2d at 211–13. 87 196 Wis. 2d 327, 538 N.W.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1995). 88 Hunzinger, 196 Wis. 2d at 339. See also Laho, 204 Wis. 2d at 489 (insurance contract found ambiguous). 89 Spencer, 140 Wis. 2d at 451. 90 Borchardt, 156 Wis. 2d at 427–28. © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 23 § 5.35 CHAPTER 5 A contract is not necessarily ambiguous, however, just because one of its terms is broad enough to encompass more than one option. “Broad terms may be used to permit flexibility in the choice of methods available [to one party to perform the contract] without creating an ambiguity.”91 In Shanks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United,92 an insured disputed whether a visit to his doctor for a back exam within 12 months before his health insurance policy became effective triggered a waiting period under the policy and excluded coverage for later back surgery. The question presented was whether the operative term treatment covered the back exam. The court held that, although there are many different kinds of treatment, the term is not ambiguous. “[A]n insurer does not create an ambiguous contract provision simply by employing terms of ‘broad, general and comprehensive scope’”; “the term ‘treatment,’ although broad and general, is not reasonably and fairly susceptible to more than one construction.” Furthermore, that a party is able to “‘conjure up a remotely possible second interpretation is not sufficient to invoke the ambiguity rule.’”93 Poor choice of words in contract drafting raises the possibility that a contract will be considered ambiguous, but poor wording alone will not necessarily lead to a finding of ambiguity. In Rufener v. State Farm Fire Ins. Co.,94 the court considered an exclusion from coverage for “business pursuits” and an exception to the exclusion for “activities which are ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits.” Although the court considered the provision “awkwardly worded and its meaning . . . not obvious,”95 the court held that the language was not ambiguous. The court was swayed by a long line of cases interpreting the policy language that consistently held that its meaning is clear and unambiguous. 91 Wilke, 108 Wis. 2d at 654 (ruling that fact that there was more than one way for a savings and loan to make a “corresponding adjustment in [a] required monthly payment” did not render promissory note ambiguous). 92 777 F. Supp. at 1449. 93 Quevillon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 177 Wis. 2d 160, 164, 165, 501 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 164 Wis. 2d 499, 503, 476 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1991)) (further quotation omitted); see also Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 196 Wis. 2d 485, 499, 538 N.W.2d 834, rev’d on other grounds, 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996);Wilke, 108 Wis. 2d at 654. 94 221 Wis. 2d 500, 585 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1998). 95 Id. at 507. Ch. 5 Pg. 24 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.35 Mere silence on a point does not necessarily constitute ambiguity,96 and a contract “is not ambiguous…purely because its language is general or broad,”97 but the lack of specificity on a point may leave other terms ambiguous.98 Consequently, in drafting contracts, attention should be given to providing precise definitions of key terms that might otherwise be viewed as ambiguous. 2. [§ 5.36] Types of Extrinsic Evidence Courts Recognize a. [§ 5.37] Circumstances of Contracting Intent may be inferred from the circumstances in which the parties agreed to enter the contract, such as the parties’ purposes for entering the contract, as well as from the words used in the contract.99 For example, in Patti v. Western Machine Co., the Wisconsin Supreme Court took a detailed look at the circumstances surrounding the creation of a deferred compensation agreement containing the ambiguous term retirement and from those circumstances drew inferences as to whether the company agreed to give deferred compensation to a key executive who retired before age 65.100 b. [§ 5.38] Construction by Parties Evidence of the parties’ practical construction of an ambiguous contract is “highly probative” of the intended meaning of the contract, and the court will normally adopt that interpretation of the contract that the parties themselves have adopted.101 Evidence of the parties’ construction of the 96 Kuehn, 140 Wis. 2d at 626. 97 Yauger, 196 Wis. 2d at 499, rev’d on other grounds, 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996). 98 Borchardt, 156 Wis. 2d at 427. 99 Employers Health Ins., 161 Wis. 2d at 946; Spencer, 140 Wis. 2d at 450 (purpose of maintenance stipulation considered in light of statutory authority for terminating maintenance upon remarriage). 100 Patti, 72 Wis. 2d at 354–55. 101 William B. Tanner Co. v. Sparta-Tomah Broadcasting Co., 716 F.2d 1155, 1158–59 (7th Cir. 1983); Shanks, 777 F. Supp. at 1448; Zweck v. DP Way Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 426, 435, 234 N.W.2d 921 (1975); Wisconsin Natural Gas © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 25 CHAPTER 5 § 5.36 contract is so persuasive that a court with such evidence will normally disregard other rules of interpretation. For example, in Kuehn v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, the court wrote that “when doubt as to the meaning of a contract has been removed by the construction placed upon the contract by the parties, as evidenced by acts or conduct, indicating a mutual intent, the rule that [an insurance] policy must be construed against the insurer is not to be applied.”102 c. [§ 5.39] Other Contracts Between Parties As a general rule, contracts that are executed at the same time, by the same contracting parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction, will be construed together as if one contract, even when one does not refer to the other.103 However, the agreements will not be read together when there is no evidence that the parties intended the agreements to be construed together and there is no express, internal connection or reference of incorporation between the agreements, even if signed contemporaneously.104 d. [§ 5.40] Custom and Usage (1) [§ 5.41] In General Courts may resort to industry knowledge to construe ambiguous technical terms in a contract. Such terms are to be interpreted as they are usually understood by persons in the profession or business to which they relate.105 Co., v. Gabe’s Constr. Co., 220 Wis. 2d 14, 23–24, 582 N.W.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1998); Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 169 Wis. 2d 437, 456, 485 N.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1992); R&M Mkts., Inc. v. Spatz Ctrs., Inc., No. 96-0788, 1997 WL 163619 (Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1997) (unpublished opinion not to be cited as precedent or authority per section 809.23(3)). 102 Kuehn, 140 Wis. 2d at 626 (citation omitted). 103 O’Leary v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 533 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Harris v. Metropolitan Mall, 112 Wis. 2d 487, 496, 334 N.W.2d 519 (1983). 104 Conrad Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 2d at 487. 105 In re Liquidation of All-Star Ins. Corp., 112 Wis. 2d at 333. Ch. 5 Pg. 26 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.41 Custom and usage may supply significant terms of a contract, even when express terms addressing the subject are missing.106 (2) [§ 5.42] Contracts Subject to UCC The Wisconsin UCC provisions explicitly recognize that custom and usage may be consulted to determine the meaning of a sales contract.107 They define usage of trade as “any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”108 A party need not know of the custom; if the party should have known of it, the custom is binding.109 e. [§ 5.43] Course of Dealing Inferences about the meaning of a disputed term may be drawn from the way the parties have used the same contractual terms in prior dealings with each other.110 Parties dealing for the first time may not make a claim to a “course of dealing,” however.111 106 See Columbus Milk Producers Coop. v. Department of Agric., 48 Wis. 2d 451, 459–63, 180 N.W.2d 617 (1970). 107 See Wis. Stat. § 401.205(4). For the UCC and its adoption in Wisconsin, see section 1.7, supra. 108 Wis. Stat. § 401.205(2). 109 Western Indus., Inc., 739 F.2d at 1202. 110 See Wis. Stat. § 402.208(1) (Wisconsin UCC); Novelly Oil Co. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 147 Wis. 2d 613, 618 n.*, 433 N.W.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1988). 111 Ft. Howard Paper Co. v. Standard Havens, Inc., 901 F.2d 1373, 1381 (7th Cir. 1990). © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 27 § 5.42 CHAPTER 5 G. [§ 5.44] Canons of Construction Specific to Insurance Contracts Although the construction of the language of an insurance contract is generally controlled by the same rules of construction applied to all contracts,112 some more refined rules have evolved regarding insurance contracts. When the terms of a policy are plain on their face, the policy should not be construed to bind the insurer to a risk it was unwilling to cover and for which it was not paid.113 When the terms of a policy are, on the other hand, ambiguous, the words are to be construed to accord with the insured’s reasonable expectations as to what the contract meant. The “test is not what the insurer intended the words to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of an insured would have understood the words to mean. Whatever ambiguity exists in a contract of insurance is resolved in favor of the insured.”114 The maxim that ambiguities are construed in favor of the 112 Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F.2d at 593; Peace v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106, 120, 596 N.W.2d 429 (1999); Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 230, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997); Hills, 209 Wis. 2d at 175. 113 Bradley Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 737 F.2d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 1984); Shanks, 777 F. Supp. at 1447; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 121 (“[T]his principle does not allow a court to eviscerate an exclusion that is clear from the face of the insurance policy.”); Smith v. Katz, 226 Wis. 2d 798, 807, 595 N.W.2d 345 (1999); Maas, 172 Wis. 2d at 79, 82; Garriguenc, 67 Wis. 2d at 135; Meyer v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 499, 503, 582 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1998); Davis v. Allied Processors, Inc., 214 Wis. 2d 294, 300–01, 571 N.W.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1997). 114 Hull v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 637–39, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998); Katze, 116 Wis. 2d at 213 (quoting Garriguenc v. Love, 67 Wis. 2d at 134–35); see also Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F.2d at 594 (quoting Kremers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984)); C&S Mfg. Corp. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 822 F. Supp. 1330, 1332 (E.D. Wis. 1992), aff’d, 993 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1993); Nelson v. McLaughlin, 211 Wis. 2d 487, 509, 565 N.W.2d 123 (1997); Hills, 209 Wis. 2d at 175; Handal, 79 Wis. 2d at 77 (“Contracts of insurance should not be construed through the magnifying eye of a technical lawyer, but rather from the standpoint of what an ordinary man would believe the contract to mean.”) Milbrandt v. Huber, 149 Wis. 2d 275, 291, 440 N.W.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989) (test is an objective one). Ch. 5 Pg. 28 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.44 insured and against the insurer has particular force when ambiguity lies in an exclusionary clause.115 H. [§ 5.45] Canons of Construction Specific to Government Contracts When construing a contract between the State of Wisconsin and another party, additional canons of construction may come into play. First, the contracting state agency is authorized to contract only insofar as it is empowered, expressly or as necessarily implied.116 Second, all parties contracting with the state are presumed to know state law.117 For example, in Brown v. State, the winning state lottery ticket issued to the plaintiff did not expressly state that her winnings would be paid out over 25 years; it simply called for payments in 25 “installments.” The state refused the plaintiff’s demand for payment in monthly installments. The court sided with the state, explaining that the contract on which the plaintiff made her demand was to be construed in light of state laws and regulations that unambiguously provide for lottery payments over twenty-five years. V. [§ 5.46] What Is in Contract and What Is Not: Parol Evidence Rule, Battle of the Forms, and Supplying Omitted Terms A. [§ 5.47] Parol Evidence Rule 1. [§ 5.48] Purpose The parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence118 but a rule of contract law. Its purpose is to lend integrity, certainty, and predictability to contracts that have been sufficiently formalized. It accomplishes this purpose by 115 Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 230; Just, 155 Wis. 2d at 746; Ennis, 225 Wis. 2d at 833–34; Hull, 203 Wis. 2d at 553. 116 Brown v. State, 230 Wis. 2d 355, 377–78, 602 N.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1999). 117 Id. 118 Spring Valley, 94 Wis. 2d at 607; Cobb State Bank v. Nelson, 141 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 413 N.W.2d 644 (Ct. App. 1987). In fact, a court is required to disregard parol evidence even if no party objects on that ground. Schmitz, 141 Wis. 2d at 872. © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 29 CHAPTER 5 § 5.45 barring a court from considering other agreements that the parties may have made during their negotiations leading up to the contract or evidence that the parties might offer to “explain” their purposes in agreeing to the contract. The contract is thereby kept safe from variance, contradiction, or doubt arising out of things that were said or beliefs that were tentatively held prior to the contract. 2. [§ 5.49] Debilitation of Parol Evidence Rule In a previous time, agreements were sealed with one’s word. In the modern era, however, we have come to place our faith in documents. The parol evidence rule was once a stalwart protector of that faith, protecting the righteousness, finality, and clarity of documents from the infiltration and insidiousness of unwritten understandings. As time has progressed, however, we have fallen away from the faith. Courts and litigants alike pay less respect to the parol evidence rule and give much more consideration to evidence beyond the four corners of the document than they did before. In its basic operation the rule requires a court to turn a blind eye towards such evidence. As the rule is applied presently, however, courts use a variety of means (including exceptions, excuses, and provisos) that they have created to sneak a peak at the evidence lying outside the four corners of the contract. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained: Although the parol evidence rule thus stated appears simple and makes good sense—the final agreement of the parties supersedes earlier negotiations—it “is in fact a maze of conflicting tests, subrules and exceptions adversely affecting both the counseling of clients and the litigation process.” . . . Several writers have commented that there are few subjects in the law seemingly as indefinite and uncertain of application as the so-called rule of integration or merger of prior or contemporaneous negotiations.119 Commentators are unified in the view that the modern trend in applying the parol evidence rule is toward increasing liberality in the admission of parol agreements.120 119 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. First Mortgage Investors, 76 Wis. 2d 151, 156, 250 N.W.2d 362, 365 (1977) (footnotes omitted). 120 See, e.g., 11 Lord, Williston on Contracts § 33.4 at 576 (4th ed. 1999). Ch. 5 Pg. 30 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.49 Ultimately, it seems, courts and litigants have lost faith in the wisdom of the rule and would prefer that a court look over all of the evidence before deciding whether to rely just on the contract in determining the parties’ intent. In so doing, the courts have drastically altered the rule. The rule once rigorously excluded extrinsic evidence from consideration, streamlined proceedings, and left no doubt as to the validity of a formal written agreement; it now acts hardly as a barrier at all. For a once vital, respected doctrine, it is hard to imagine a more unflattering comparison than that recently bestowed by the court of appeals: “The parol evidence rule, like the dead man’s statute, is an exclusionary rule not favored by the law. Its application is limited and its use narrow.”121 3. [§ 5.50] Elements a. [§ 5.51] Summary of Elements122 In construing an 1. unambiguous, 2. written, 3. integrated contract, a court may not consider evidence of 4. prior or contemporaneous 5. agreements among the parties, or 6. evidence of their intentions regarding the contract.123 The rule applies to a narrow set of integrated, or partially integrated, contracts. An integrated contract is one that the parties intend to be the final, complete expression of their agreement. The rule does not bar all evidence of extrinsic agreement or intent—only agreements made or intentions expressed prior to the execution of an unambiguous contract. The rule does not bar the admission of evidence of 121 Cobb State Bank, 141 Wis. 2d at 7. 122 Each of these elements is discussed in greater detail in the following sections, and authority for each of these elements is cited there. 123 Spring Valley, 94 Wis. 2d at 607; Schmitz, 141 Wis. 2d at 872 n.4 (“[T]he parol evidence rule prohibits a trial court from inquiring into the intent of parties to an unambiguous written agreement.”). © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 31 CHAPTER 5 § 5.50 alleged oral agreements that are formed subsequent to the original contract (such as modifications).124 Further, the rule does not preclude the consideration of evidence adduced to (1) determine whether the contract is integrated125 in the first place or (2) show that the contract is invalid.126 b. [§ 5.52] Is Agreement in Writing? The rule applies only to agreements that are reduced to writing,127 although the entire agreement need not be written.128 c. [§ 5.53] Is Agreement Integrated? (1) [§ 5.54] Integration Defined An integrated agreement is an agreement that addresses all that has been agreed upon, showing that the negotiations are final and resolute. The party seeking to invoke the parol evidence rule must show that the document proffered as the integrated agreement was intended to be the final definition of all rights and obligations. For example, in Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co., the executives of two parties to a dispute executed a handwritten settlement agreement. Later, an issue arose as to whether the agreement covered all of the claims between them. The court declined to enter summary judgment because there was a dispute as to whether the document was intended to be the final, complete agreement between the parties.129 In Kramer v. Alpine Valley Resort, as another example, the contract at issue, a lease agreement, was “one minor aspect of a larger business relationship.” Consequently, the court found that the parol evidence rule was inapplicable.130 124 See infra §§ 7.14, .16. 125 See infra § 5.62. 126 See infra § 5.64. 127 See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 76 Wis. 2d at 156. 128 For further discussion, see section 5.55, infra (partially integrated agreements). 129 Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp. 273, 278 (E.D. Wis. 1975). 130 Kramer v. Alpine Valley Resort, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 417, 424, 426, 321 N.W.2d 293, 297, 298 (1982). Ch. 5 Pg. 32 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.54 There may be circumstances in which two separate-but-contemporaneously-signed contracts exist. If neither contract contains an unambiguous integration clause, the court may construe the two contracts as one.131 Even if one of the two separate contracts does contain an unambiguous merger clause, a court would be free to consider the other contract at least to the degree necessary to determine whether the parties truly believed the mergercontaining contract was their final, complete agreement.132 (2) [§ 5.55] Fully vs. Partially Integrated Agreements There is an exception to the parol evidence rule for agreements that supplement but do not contradict an agreement. Such an agreement is called partially integrated. The insurance policy in Kuehn v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America is an example of a partially integrated contract. That policy was missing an endorsement containing a critical definition. The court of appeals held that parol evidence was properly admitted as to the parties’ intent regarding the missing definition. However, the court was careful to point out that “it is proper to consider parol evidence which establishes the full agreement as long as the parol evidence does not conflict with the part that has been integrated in writing.”133 Partial integration is the norm under the Wisconsin UCC provisions governing contracts for the sale of goods.134 A court will bar evidence of consistent additional terms only when it finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.135 131 See supra § 5.39. 132 See infra § 5.62 (parol evidence is always admissible to show whether the parties intended their agreement to be the final one). 133 Kuehn, 140 Wis. 2d at 624; see also Conrad Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 2d at 488 (oral part of agreement cannot contradict written part). 134 Wis. Stat. ch. 402; see Wis. Stat. §§ 402.102, .105(1)(c) (defining goods); supra § 1.7 (UCC and its adoption in Wisconsin). 135 See Wis. Stat § 402.202(2). © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 33 CHAPTER 5 § 5.55 (3) [§ 5.56] Value and Use of Merger and Integration Clauses Use of an unambiguous integration clause136 is the only sure way to exclude the risk that agreements or statements made during negotiation will come back to haunt the parties. Such a clause should be drafted to “exclud[e] additional understandings or agreements not contained in the writing,” and “expressly negative[ ] collateral or antecedent understandings.”137 A well-drafted integration clause may not only cancel all prior agreements and nullify use of prior oral representations in construing a present contract, but also preclude an opponent from upending the contract on a theory of promissory estoppel.138 Promissory estoppel is a doctrine that provides for the enforcement of specific promises that have induced substantial reliance by the promisee.139 For example, in Kinn v. Coast Catamaran Corp.,140 a would-be dealer attempted to assert that the defendant was bound by promissory estoppel to an oral dealership agreement, the terms of which were broader and more protective of the dealer than the written contract the parties had entered. The Kinn court rejected the promissory estoppel theory because it hinged on recognizing an oral agreement that was explicitly addressed in the integration clause contained in the parties’ written contract. 136 Such clauses are also known as merger or merger and integration clauses. 137 Spring Valley, 94 Wis. 2d at 608. 138 Durkee v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 676 F. Supp. 189, 191–92 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (“To entertain a theory of recovery that makes a prior, inconsistent promise enforceable is to write the rule out of existence.”). 139 See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 698, 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (1965); see also supra §§ 2.73–.79 (promissory estoppel in context of formation essentials). 140 582 F. Supp. at 687. Ch. 5 Pg. 34 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.56 4. [§ 5.57] Effect on Agreements and Expressions of Intent “Outside” Contract a. [§ 5.58] Contradictory or Substitute Agreements or Intentions If it is shown that an unambiguous written contract was intended to be final and complete, no evidence may be considered that would vary or contradict any of the terms of the contract,141 although courts do not appear rigorous in their analysis of these factors. For example, in Schmitz v. Grudzinski, the trial court admitted evidence about the intended scope of a security agreement. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the language of the security agreement was unambiguous (the court did not address the question of finality, perhaps because the parties may not have made it an issue), and the evidence the trial court relied upon varied the terms of the security agreement.142 Likewise, in Milwaukee Valve Co. v. Mishawaka Brass Manufacturing, Inc., the court found delivery terms in a contract for the supply of copper ingot to be unambiguous. The trial court refused to consider parol evidence of a telephone conversation that preceded the issuance of the purchase order and concerned the delivery of the ingot: “The record indicates that the rejected evidence was offered solely to contradict the delivery terms specified in the purchase order . . . The evidence can in no way be construed as explanatory or supplemental, and goes to the accuracy of the contract, not its finality.”143 141 Kramer, 108 Wis. 2d at 426; see also United States v. Arrowood, 717 F. Supp. 1405, 1408 (E.D. Wis. 1989). 142 Schmitz, 141 Wis. 2d at 872. 143 107 Wis. 2d 164, 170, 319 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Ct. App. 1982); see also Durkee, 676 F. Supp at 191 (barring parol evidence, and explaining that “[t]he issue to which plaintiffs wish to offer parol evidence . . . is one which is directly addressed by the written contract”); Conrad Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 2d at 488 (oral testimony must “clarify an existing ambiguity” and may not establish an understanding in variance with terms of written document). © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 35 CHAPTER 5 § 5.57 b. [§ 5.59] Consistent Additional, Supplemental, or Side Agreements The parol evidence rule does not bar the enforcement of collateral or supplemental agreements, or evidence that explains the parties’ agreement, if the agreements or other evidence do not vary or contradict the terms of the parties’ contract.144 An example of such an agreement is a side letter, a common device used in complex negotiations.145 With regard to insurance contracts, it should be noted that correspondence about the contract can become an enforceable supplemental agreement. Correspondence about the contract can become part of the contract when the parties have plainly manifested their intent to make subsequent correspondence part of the contract.146 Assessing whether a side agreement is truly consistent requires taking into account all facts that might make a side agreement inconsistent, such as oral modifications, parol agreements to the side agreement, and so forth. 5. [§ 5.60] Effect on Negotiations Relating to Contract When the parol evidence rule applies, it excludes extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions regarding the contract. In Schmitz v. Grudzinski, for example, the court of appeals barred the admission of evidence of a bank officer’s statement of intent regarding the scope of the unambiguous security agreement. The court wrote that “[p]arol evidence is inadmissible to vary or explain unambiguous written terms . . . The trial court was required to disregard the parol evidence of [the parties’] intent.”147 144 See Ft. Howard Paper Co., 901 F.2d at 1381. 145 See Reports Corp. v. Technical Publishing Co., 411 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1969); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §§ 210 cmt. a, 216 (1979). Note that such additional supplemental and side agreements are not barred by partially integrated agreements, except to the extent the provisions of the partially integrated agreement specifically bar reference to the particular side agreement in question. 146 Handal, 79 Wis. 2d at 76. 147 Schmitz, 141 Wis. 2d at 872. Ch. 5 Pg. 36 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.60 6. [§ 5.61] Exceptions to Applicability a. [§ 5.62] To Establish Integration and Intent Parol evidence is always “admissible to show whether the parties intended to assent to the writing as the final and complete (or partial) statement of their agreement.”148 The court need not limit itself to the text of the document itself in making this determination; it has wide latitude to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the contract.149 Thus, when the written terms of the parties’ agreement do not unambiguously show whether they intended the document to be the final expression of their agreement, the court may consider “facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the writing” to determine whether the parties intended an integrated document.150 b. [§ 5.63] To Resolve Ambiguity The rule does not bar a court from considering extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of an ambiguous contract.151 c. [§ 5.64] To Show Contract Invalid The existence of a fully integrated agreement does not bar a party from showing that the agreement was without consideration and is therefore unenforceable.152 Parol evidence is admissible when a party makes a sufficient showing that the agreement sought to be enforced was a product of fraud or abuse of bargaining power.153 In Bank of Sun Prairie v. Esser, for example, a party 148 Spring Valley, 94 Wis. 2d at 608; Cobb State Bank, 141 Wis. 2d at 7. 149 Spring Valley, 94 Wis. 2d at 608; Cobb State Bank, 141 Wis. 2d at 7; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210 cmt. b (1979). 150 Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co., 400 F. Supp. at 277–78. 151 See supra §§ 5.33–.35 (what constitutes ambiguity and use of extrinsic evidence to resolve). 152 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214(d) & cmt. c (1979); see supra §§ 2.51–.72 (requirement of consideration). 153 Bank of Sun Prairie, 155 Wis. 2d at 731. © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 37 CHAPTER 5 § 5.65 accused a bank of fraudulently inducing the party to sign a personal guaranty. The bank argued that evidence of the alleged misrepresentation was barred by the parol evidence rule because it would contradict the express language of the guaranty. The court held that the rule does not bar consideration of parol evidence to show fraud, misrepresentation, or other grounds that void a contract.154 Similarly, in H&M Italian Food Corp. v. General Growth Development Corp., the court of appeals held in an unpublished opinion that parol evidence was admissible in the case of an alleged intentional deceit even though the evidence was in direct conflict with a formal written real estate lease governed by the statute of frauds.155 The court explained that “equity will not permit the statute designed to prevent fraud to be used as an instrument of fraud.”156 There are other grounds besides fraud upon which a court may void an otherwise enforceable contract, such as illegality, unconscionability, duress, and mutual mistake.157 The parol evidence rule does not bar a court from considering evidence outside the contract that would establish those grounds for avoiding a contract.158 d. [§ 5.65] When Contract Is Subject to UCC The Wisconsin UCC, which governs most contracts for the sale of goods,159 codifies the parol evidence rule in terms similar in all respects to the foregoing but permits the admission of certain evidence that is otherwise 154 Id. at 730–31; see supra §§ 3.3–.10 (misrepresentation). 155 No. 88-1257, 1989 WL 53664 (Wis. App. Mar. 21, 1989) (unpublished opinion not to be cited as precedent or authority per section 809.23(3)). For discussion of statutes of frauds, see Chapter 4, supra. 156 Id. at *2. 157 See generally supra §§ 3.21–.37 (illegal and unconscionable contracts), 3.38–.46 (contracts made under duress), 3.17–.19 (contracts made as a result of mutual mistake). 158 Spring Valley, 94 Wis. 2d at 608; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 76 Wis. 2d at 156; Erickson, 183 Wis. 2d at 118 n.3; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214(d) (1979). 159 See Wis. Stat. §§ 402.102, .105(1)(c) (defining goods); see also supra § 1.7 (UCC and its adoption in Wisconsin). Ch. 5 Pg. 38 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.64 barred by the rule. The Wisconsin UCC provisions explicitly provide that integrated agreements “may be explained or supplemented” but not contradicted160 by any of the following: 1. Course of dealing or usage of trade (see section 401.205 of the Wisconsin Statutes161) 2. Course of performance (see section 402.208) 3. Consistent additional terms (see section 402.202) 7. [§ 5.66] Tactical Use Although it has been the experience of many that courts will bend the parol evidence rule and naturally look beyond the four corners of the agreement, one commentator suggests that a court’s willingness to do so may depend on the sophistication of the parties to the contract.162 As an example, in Bank of Sun Prairie v. Esser, the court held that an unsophisticated party who had not read the fine print of a guaranty agreement was entitled to introduce parol evidence on whether the party justifiably relied on representations. The court implied that the party’s status was a consideration in its decision, stating that all the circumstances must be considered, including the contracting party’s intelligence and experience.163 Thus, how one characterizes the contract, the circumstances of its negotiation, and the nature of the extrinsic evidence may make a difference as to whether parol evidence will be admitted. It will be easier to persuade a court to admit parol evidence if it is characterized as anything but an alleged prior understanding that is being substituted for the unambiguous meaning of the terms of the written agreement. Instead, the contract should be depicted as an informal agreement, a side agreement, or an ambiguous agreement, to the extent the evidence will support such a theory. Courts are 160 See 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-10, at 89 (4th ed. 1995). 161 Textual references to the Wisconsin Statutes are hereinafter indicated as “chapter xxx” or “section xxx.xx,” without the designation “of the Wisconsin Statutes.” 162 Michael A. Lawrence, The Parol Evidence Rule in Wisconsin: “Status in the Law of Contract,” Revisited, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1071. 163 155 Wis. 2d at 732–34. © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 39 CHAPTER 5 § 5.65 more likely to admit parol evidence, even if the contract is formal, if the contract can be characterized as an ambiguous agreement or if the parol evidence can be characterized as a side agreement as opposed to a substitution of new terms into a clear written agreement.164 B. [§ 5.67] Battle of the Forms 1. [§ 5.68] The Problem The forms that contracting parties customarily use to express their agreements are a fertile source of dispute. Parties rely upon forms because it is expedient to do so and because it is inefficient and costly to negotiate anew every term of every contract in a series of transactions involving the same goods or services. Expediency and efficiency notwithstanding, however, reliance upon forms often and quite predictably leads to confusion, ambiguity, and uncertainty. Sellers and buyers alike use form contracts, and for the same reasons, but it is doubtful that any one seller’s form will be the mirror image of any one buyer’s form. Indeed, the contrary is probable. Sellers draft their forms to give them an advantage over buyers, and buyers draft their forms to defeat any advantage the seller might seek or to give the buyers their own advantages.165 When form contracts are used, it is thus predictable that the terms of the forms will diverge and that disputes will arise as to whether a contract was formed and which terms govern the performance of the contract. The common law’s solution to this problem was simple. At common law, if the forms were not mirror images of one another, no contract would be deemed to have been formed; the second form would be deemed a counteroffer, not an acceptance.166 The problem with this solution is that it gave parties who had the intent to form a contract, and who even may have begun performing the contract, a technical ground to declare the contract invalid and back out. 164 See Lawrence, supra n.162, at 1073 & n.17. 165 See generally U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1; White & Summers, supra n.160, at 6–7. 166 See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 211, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973); supra § 2.32 (“acceptance” on terms varying from offer). Ch. 5 Pg. 40 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.69 2. [§ 5.69] A Partial Solution: Contracts Subject to UCC The battle of the forms is abated somewhat by a provision of the Wisconsin UCC—section 402.207. Thus, at least in contract disputes involving contracts for the sale of goods,167 form contract disputes do not necessarily lead to the invalidation of the contract. Section 402.207 (corresponding to section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)) attacks the battle-of-the-forms problem in three distinct ways. First, conflicting forms are treated not as counteroffers but as acceptances unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to its additional or different terms.168 This tends to check the uncertainty as to whether a contract was formed in the first place and prevents parties from using technical grounds to back out of bad deals. Second, section 402.207 sets forth criteria for determining whether and when additional terms have been added to the contract through acceptance or confirmation. Under section 402.207(2), it is presumed that the additional terms set forth in a confirmation or acceptance are effective unless (1) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer, (2) the additional terms materially alter the offer, or (3) the offeror objects to the terms within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.169 The first and third of these criteria are fairly self-explanatory. With regard to the second criteria—that is, whether an additional term “materially alters” the offer—the test is whether the additional term would surprise or work an unreasonable hardship on the offeror.170 Wisconsin courts have addressed the second criteria in terms of whether form contracts containing form damage disclaimers or form indemnification provisions are enforceable. In Wisconsin, when a party seeks to add such terms to a contract by acceptance or confirmation, such terms are considered to “materially alter” the offer and therefore are not enforceable unless the other party expressly 167 See Wis. Stat. §§ 402.102, .105(1)(c) (defining goods); see also supra § 1.7 (UCC and its adoption in Wisconsin). 168 Wis. Stat. § 402.207(1). 169 Wis. Stat. § 402.207(2); see also U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6 (regarding effect of offeror’s failure to object to additional terms within reasonable time after receiving notice of them). 170 See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4. © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 41 CHAPTER 5 § 5.69 agrees to them.171 Credit terms providing for the payment of interest on overdue invoices have been held not to “materially alter” the offer.172 Professors White and Summers, authors of the leading treatise on the UCC, identify eight distinct scenarios in which the three criteria contained in section 402.207(2) might come into play. In one scenario, for example, one form contains a clause of which no mention whatsoever is made in the other form (i.e., one form calls for arbitration of all disputes, but the other form does not address the issue of dispute resolution). In another scenario, both forms address an issue but call for conflicting outcomes (i.e., one form requires all disputes to be arbitrated, and the other form confers exclusive jurisdiction in a designated federal court). Giving due consideration to each of these scenarios is beyond the scope of this work, and the reader is encouraged to refer directly to the discussion in White and Summers.173 The third way in which section 402.207 addresses the battle-of-the forms problem is to recognize and enforce legitimate contractual bargains even if the forms used by the parties would technically defeat an enforceable contract. Not infrequently, each of the parties to a contract uses a form reciting the boilerplate that the terms of that form are exclusive and that no other terms will be honored. In such a circumstance, however, section 402.207(3) makes it possible for a contract to form anyway. It provides that a contract may form by reason of the parties’ conduct, to the extent that their conduct manifests an agreement to a contract, notwithstanding the provisions of their form offers and confirmations. Section 402.207(3) states that Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of chs. 401 to 411. 171 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 58 Wis. 2d at 214; Resch v. Greenlee Bros. & Co., 128 Wis. 2d 237, 244–45, 381 N.W.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1985). 172 See Advance Concrete Forms, Inc. v. McCann Constr. Specialties Co., 916 F.2d 412, 415–16 (7th Cir. 1990). 173 See White & Summers, supra n.160, at 6–31. Ch. 5 Pg. 42 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.72 In a case involving a dispute over conflicting warranties,174 the court considered whether the language referring to “supplementary terms” permits a court to add to the contract only those “supplementary terms” expressly provided in the UCC (such as the implied warranties spelled out in section 402.314) or whether the parties may import into their agreement other terms that are not spelled out in the UCC but may be implied from the parties’ course of performance, course of dealing, usage of trade, and so forth. In resolving the question, the court noted differences in the language of Wisconsin’s version of the UCC as compared to the versions found in other states, such as New York. The court held that under Wisconsin’s version the language “supplementary terms” was not meant to limit the contract to “gap-filler” contractual terms explicitly stated in the UCC.175 3. [§ 5.70] Counseling Clients on Use of Form Contracts In advising clients on the use of form contracts, the conventional wisdom is that it is not possible to draft a form in such a way as to ensure a client that the client’s contract will always govern and always on the client’s own terms.176 Consequently, the best advice to a client is this: “If a certain term is essential, be sure to negotiate it explicitly and obtain the adverse party’s explicit agreement to it.” C. [§ 5.71] Supplying Omitted or “Implied” Terms 1. [§ 5.72] In General What parties leave out of their contracts can be as troublesome as what they put in. Parties to a contract may entirely fail to foresee a situation in which the performance of one or both parties will be impaired. Parties may deliberately ignore certain subjects, out of faulty assumptions about how the contract will operate or whether the subject makes a difference. Indeed, 174 Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442 (7th Cir. 1992); see infra § 6.34 (discussing Dresser in context of applying course of performance, course of dealing, usage of trade to establish implied warranties in contracts subject to Wisconsin UCC). 175 Dresser, 965 F.2d at 1450–51 (distinguishing C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int’l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977) (decided under New York law)). 176 See White & Summers, supra n.160, at 31. © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 43 CHAPTER 5 § 5.73 certain terms may be omitted simply because the parties found them unpleasant to discuss or likely to produce an impasse. In such a circumstance, the fundamental pursuit of contract interpretation —ascertaining the parties’ mutual intent—will prove fruitless because the parties simply did not form any. The court must fill a void when no evidence of intent exists and when, consequently, the tools of contract interpretation are useless. Although Wisconsin courts are wary of inserting into contracts terms that the parties themselves failed to insert,177 the courts have endorsed178 the principles of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in such situations: “When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstance is supplied by the court.”179 In determining what is “reasonable in the circumstance,” a court might try to reconstruct the process the parties followed in reaching their meeting of the minds. It might ask what the parties would have agreed to if the question had been brought to their attention. These extrapolations are highly unreliable, however, without clear evidence of the parties’ intentions. If such evidence exists, the fact that the parties are in dispute with one another makes it unlikely that such intent will prove mutual. The comment to the Restatement suggests that the court instead “supply a term which comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining process.”180 Trade custom, for example, is recognized as a fruitful source of these standards.181 177 See supra § 5.21 (purpose of interpretation is determining and enforcing parties’ intent). 178 See Spencer, 140 Wis. 2d at 451 (remanding to permit trial court to supply missing term to stipulation regarding maintenance payments upon remarriage). 179 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 (1979). 180 Id. cmt. d. 181 Columbus Milk Producers Coop., 48 Wis. 2d at 459–60. Ch. 5 Pg. 44 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE § 5.74 2. [§ 5.73] Duration of Contract Most contracts that are silent as to duration are construed to be terminable at will or are declared void for failing to comply with an applicable statute of frauds.182 Most contracts that provide that they are to continue for an indefinite period will be deemed to continue for a reasonable time considering the circumstances.183 3. [§ 5.74] Time and Other Details of Performance184 When a contract is of a definite duration but fails to state a deadline for performance, a reasonable time for performance will be implied.185 Time is not ordinarily regarded of the essence unless the contract so states or the circumstances indicate that the parties intended time to be of the essence.186 For example, in Employers Ins. v. Jackson,187 the court held that time was of the essence in a contract setting deadlines for the nomination of an arbitrator. Among the factors the court considered were the language of the contract and the reaction of one of the parties when the other party attempted to nominate an arbitrator after the 30-day deadline stated in the contract.188 Option agreements fall within an exception to this general rule, however. Time is ordinarily of the essence to an option agreement whether or not the agreement specifically so provides.189 With regard to other aspects of performance, there are only a few examples of published decisions in which the court supplied some specific of performance that was neglected by the parties at the time they drew up 182 Landess v. Borden, Inc., 667 F.2d 628, 632–33 (7th Cir. 1981). For discussion of statutes of frauds, see Chapter 4, supra. 183 See Wis. J.I.—Civil 3049 (1993). 184 See infra §§ 12.8 (full performance discharges duty; best efforts); 12.10–.15 (implied aspects of performance). 185 William B. Tanner Co., 716 F.2d at 1158–59; Schneider v. Schneider, 132 Wis. 2d 171, 175, 389 N.W.2d 835, 837 (Ct. App. 1986). 186 Huntoon, 57 Wis. 2d at 452. 187 190 Wis. 2d 597, 527 N.W.2d 681 (1995). 188 190 Wis. 2d at 616–18. 189 Clear View Estates, Inc. v. Veitch, 67 Wis. 2d 372, 378, 227 N.W.2d 84, 87 (1975); see supra §§ 2.24–.27 (option contracts generally). © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 45 CHAPTER 5 § 5.75 their agreement. An agreement to transplant trees and landscape grounds was held to imply that the landscaper will use a degree of diligence and skill adequate to perform the undertaking.190 Similarly, a written contract calling for a contractor to “furnish and install . . . precast basement beams” was held to require the contractor to furnish and install a properly designed prestressed concrete system sufficient to support the weight that the architectural plans and specifications showed would be placed on the beams when the building was complete.191 Plans and specifications that are not agreed upon may not be incorporated into a contract by reference without some identification in the original contract and some form of adoption by the person sought to be charged with performance.192 A “best efforts” clause may be implied in an exclusive distributorship contract.193 4. [§ 5.75] Price In contracts governed by the Wisconsin UCC, at least, a court must supply a reasonable price even if the parties have left the term open.194 190 Coryell v. Bluett, 251 Wis. 458, 29 N.W.2d 741 (1947). 191 Stevens Constr. Corp. v. Carolina Corp., 63 Wis. 2d 342, 217 N.W.2d 291 (1974). 192 Martinson v. Brooks Equip. Leasing, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 209, 217, 152 N.W.2d 849 (1967). 193 General Beverage Sales Co.-Oshkosh v. East Side Winery, 396 F. Supp. 590, 593 (E.D. Wis. 1975). 194 See Wis. Stat. § 402.305; see, e.g., Schmieder v. Standard Oil Co., 69 Wis. 2d 419, 230 N.W.2d 732 (1975); see also supra § 1.7 (UCC and its adoption in Wisconsin). Ch. 5 Pg. 46 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE App. 5A Appendix 5A Checklist of Rules of Contract Construction Appendix 5A Checklist of Rules of Contract Construction I. Determine which, if any, rules regarding canons of construction, extrinsic evidence, the parol evidence rule, and so forth will apply by first asking the following questions: G Does the contract state unambiguously that the parties intended the contract to be their final, complete agreement (i.e., does it contain an unambiguous merger clause)? G Is the contract unambiguous? II. If the answer to both questions in Part I is Yes, the only evidence the court need consider is the contract document itself except in the following circumstances: G G When the contract is claimed to be invalid on account of any of the following: G Lack or failure of consideration G Fraud/misrepresentation G Duress G Illegality G Unconscionability When the contract is governed by the Wisconsin UCC, in which case the court may consider evidence of trade usage and course of dealing III. If the answer to either of the questions in Part I is No, then proceed as follows: A. If contract not unambiguously intended as parties’ final, complete agreement, consult extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties intended the contract to be final: G If they did so intend and the contract is unambiguous, apply the contract as written. © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 47 CHAPTER 5 App. 5A B. G If they did so intend but the contract is ambiguous, proceed to step B. G If they did not intend a fully integrated contract but did intend a partially integrated document, consider evidence of prior and contemporaneous agreements but only as long as such evidence does not vary or contradict the written terms of the contract. G If they did not intend an integrated contract, proceed to step C. If ambiguity exists within contract, consider the following canons of construction to resolve ambiguity within document: G Construe the contract as a whole. G Construe the contract so as to give meaning and effect to all its terms. G Construe the contract so as to avoid leaving any term unreasonable or unconscionable. G Construe the contract so as to avoid an interpretation that is unlawful or contrary to public policy or the public interest. G Give greater weight to specific terms than general terms. G Construe ambiguities against the drafter. G Give technical terms their technical meaning. C. Consider supplying an omitted term if necessary. D. If the ambiguity cannot be resolved within the four corners of the document, consider extrinsic evidence, such as the following: G The parties’ purposes in entering the contract G The circumstances in which the contract was entered G The construction placed on the contract by the parties G Other contracts between the parties G Custom and usage within the trade G The parties’ course of dealing and performance Ch. 5 Pg. 48 © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books CONTRACT INTERPRETATION; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE App. 5A © April 2000, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books Ch. 5 Pg. 49
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