Rdeča struga, zlata reka: sociološke refleksije o
Rdeča struga, zlata reka: sociološke refleksije o Zahodni Sahari Saguia el-Hamra, Río de Oro: sociological reflections on Western Sahara Uredila / Edited by Damjan Mandelc in Tjaša Učakar ZA Zahodno Saharo Vsebina Damjan Mandelc, Tjaša Učakar ZA Zahodno Saharo – uredniška beseda .......................................................................... 7 I. Zahodna Sahara in mednarodna skupnost ............................................................ 9 Damjan Mandelc Nevarna pravičnost, pozabljena solidarnost in barva tujega peska ................................ 10 Ana Ješe Perković Vloga Evropske unije pri reševanju statusa Zahodne Sahare: primerjava s Kosovom ..... 18 Monika Štumpfl Vloga Združenih narodov v konfliktu v Zahodni Sahari ................................................. 22 II. Okolje in naravni viri .......................................................................................... 31 Matic Vehovec Zahodna Sahara v številkah ........................................................................................... 32 Tjaša Učakar Okupacija Zahodne Sahare v luči naravnih virov ........................................................... 36 Nika Sirk-Rigler Trgovanje z ribami ali s človekovimi pravicami? ........................................................... 46 III. Religija, kultura, politika ................................................................................... 53 Alen Hajdarević Zahodna Sahara pod okupacijo ...................................................................................... 54 Almin Ljutić Religija in politika v arabskem svetu: primer Zahodne Sahare ....................................... 58 Tatjana Košak Ženske v Zahodni Sahari................................................................................................ 63 Klara Vrhovec Življenje in kulturne značilnosti prebivalcev Zahodne Sahare ....................................... 67 Anja Čuš Umetniško ustvarjanje v Zahodni Sahari ........................................................................ 71 4 Content Damjan Mandelc, Tjaša Učakar For Western Sahara - editorial ........................................................................................77 I. Western Sahara and the international community ..............................................79 Damjan Mandelc Dangerous justice, forgoten solidarity and the colour of foreign sand ........................... 80 Ana Ješe Perković The role of European Union in solving the status of Western Sahara: comparison with Kosovo .......................................................................................................................... 89 Monika Štumpfl The role of United Nations in Western Sahara conflict .................................................. 93 II. Environment and natural resources ................................................................. 103 Matic Vehovec Western Sahara in numbers ......................................................................................... 104 Tjaša Učakar The occupation of Western Sahara in the light of natural resources ............................ 109 Nika Sirk-Rigler Trade in fish or human rights? ..................................................................................... 119 III. Religion, culture, politics ................................................................................ 125 Alen Hajdarević Western Sahara under occupation ................................................................................126 Almin Ljutić Religion and politics in the Arab world: the Western Sahara case................................ 130 Tatjana Košak Women in Western Sahara............................................................................................ 135 Klara Vrhovec Life and culture of Western Sahara .............................................................................. 140 Anja Čuš Artistic creativity in Western Sahara ........................................................................... 144 5 6 Damjan Mandelc, Tjaša Učakar ZA Zahodno Saharo – uredniška beseda »Čopič je orožje boja, svobode in izražanja, gre dlje od raket, saj doseže srca ljudi, ki sejejo življenje.« Moulud Yeslem Položaj in razmere v Zahodni Sahari širši svetovni, kakor tudi slovenski javnosti, načeloma niso (dovolj dobro) poznani. Pred nekaj leti smo na Katedri za občo sociologijo Oddelka za sociologijo Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani prvič pristopili k sodelovanju in organizaciji mednarodnega simpozija na to temo, vzpostavili smo stike s kolegicami in kolegi na Oddelku za romanistiko, poznavalci razmer, civilno družbo, novinarji, predstavnikom Polisaria za Slovenijo in Zahodni Balkan ter Zahodnosaharci, ki živijo v Sloveniji. Naše sodelovanje je kmalu preraslo v prijateljstvo in v zavezo, da s svojim delovanjem po najboljših močeh prispevamo k osveščanju najširše javnosti, k pritisku na državne in evropske institucije ter k večji senzibilnosti slovenskih medijev. V zaostrenih pogojih gospodarske krize - tako smo s kolegicami in kolegi, prijatelji Zahodne Sahare ugotavljali v preteklem letu - ni lahko pritegniti pozornosti širše javnosti za specifične probleme in situacije, ki se dogajajo na geografsko in kulturno oddaljenih prostorih. Zagotovo je del domače javnosti dovolj čuječ za globalne ekološke, socialne, varnostne in gospodarske razmere, vendarle pa je mogoče razumeti, da mednarodna solidarnost, ko primanjkuje solidarnosti navznoter, ni prva preokupacija slehernika. V tem pogledu zapisi in opozorila o položaju in težavah relativno maloštevilne skupnosti nekje med afriško puščavo in oceanom težko prodrejo v kolektivno zavest ljudi. Če mednarodna politika in visoka diplomacija niso najprimernejši medij za osveščanje, kakšne strategije torej zavzeti, da bi problematiko približali najširšemu krogu ljudi? Naši odgovori so bili kultura, etika in izobraževanje, ki jih spremljajo kozmopolitska drža, solidarnost in mednarodna pravičnost. Če kdaj, potem lahko najširša slovenska javnost v času, ko se sama sooča s kolektivno stisko in krizo, razume položaj zahodnosaharskega človeka; begunke in begunca, otroka, politične zapornice, mladega človeka brez prihodnosti. Če kdo, potem lahko slovenska javnost razume razsežnost boja in globino želje po pravici do samoodločbe – to je namreč izkušnja, ki jo delimo z Zahodno Saharo in v kateri je bil izid spričo večplastnih okoliščin bolj naklonjen slovenski kot zahodnosaharski suverenosti in državi. Pričujoči zbornik je nastal v okviru pobude spodaj podpisanih urednice in urednika ter nosilke pri predmetu Osnove upravljanja v kulturi na Oddelku za sociologijo, red. prof. dr. Ksenije Vidmar Horvat. Z izjemo prvega prispevka so zapise prispevali študentke in študenti vseh stopenj univerzitetnega izobraževanja, dve doktorski in ena magistrska 7 študentka, preostala poglavja so prispevali študentke in študenti prve stopnje študija sociologije. Publikacijo smo strukturirali v treh nosilnih delih; prvega predstavlja mednarodni vidik, kjer se avtor in avtorici ukvarjajo s političnimi razsežnostmi zahodnosaharske problematike, vlogo Organizacije združenih narodov in Evropske unije pri njenem (ne)reševanju; drugi sklop predstavljajo prispevki, ki kontekstualizirajo vpliv okolja, problem kraje naravnih virov in druge povezane dejavnike, ki vplivajo na zaostrene razmere na okupiranem območju in v begunskih taboriščih; v zadnji, tretji razdelek so vključeni prispevki, ki naslavljajo razmere v zahodnosaharski družbi; kulturne, religijske, umetniške in druge prakse, položaj žensk ter razpravo o razsežnosti maroške okupacije. Ker je naša publikacija namenjena najširši publiki, želimo z njo v razumljivem jeziku posredovati ključne informacije in okoliščine, ki spremljajo Zahodnosaharce na njihovi težavni poti od španske kolonije, vojne z Marokom in Mavretanijo, premirjem, okupacijo, segregacijo, revščino, življenjem generacij v begunskih taboriščih, bojem za priznanje pravice do samoodločbe na eni strani in na drugi z neskončnim upanjem, solidarnostjo, iznajdljivostjo, pogumom, življenjsko silo in voljo do svobode, ki je enako živa danes kot je bila pred desetletji. Ponosni smo, da bo publikacija o Zahodni Sahari ugledala luč sveta 14. oktobra 2013, ko bo v slovenskem hramu kulture, Cankarjevem domu, potekala velika kulturnohumanitarna in civilno-družbena manifestacija z naslovom Barva peska, na kateri bomo v družbi prijateljev Zahodne Sahare v dnevu ustvarjanja, tradicije, dialoga in kulture praznovali Zahodno Saharo. V sodelovanje smo povezali katedro za občo sociologijo, oddelek za romanistiko, Cankarjev dom, predstavništvo Polisaria, založbo Malinc ter ob pomoči podjetja Sodexo, veleposlaništva bolivarske Republike Venezuele in še nekaterih posameznikov koncipirali serijo dogodkov, ki vključujejo delavnice za vrtčevske otroke, osnovnošolce in srednješolce, obred pitja čaja, vzdušje beduinskega šotora, impresivno razstavo fotografij iz Zahodne Sahare in begunskih taborišč v Alžiriji, dokumentarni film Javierja Bardema »Otroci neba«, okroglo mizo in koncert zahodnosaharske glasbene skupine Estrella Polisaria. Želimo si, da (i)zbor prispevkov vzame v roke čimveč bralcev v Sloveniji in na tujem – spričo mednarodne razsežnosti tematike smo pripravili dvojezično, slovensko-angleško izdajo. Prebivalke in prebivalci Zahodne Sahare potrebujejo in pričakujejo našo pomoč, razumevanje in angažma. Prvi korak na tej poti je, da jih spoznamo. Želiva vam angažirano branje. ZA Zahodno Saharo! dr. Damjan Mandelc, Tjaša Učakar 8 I. Zahodna Sahara in mednarodna skupnost 9 Damjan Mandelc Nevarna pravičnost, pozabljena solidarnost in barva tujega peska Zahodna Sahara je država severozahodne Afrike, leži med Marokom, Mavretanijo in Atlantskim oceanom, na skrajnem severovzhodu se stika še z Alžirijo. Njena lega jo opredeljuje kot eno najbolj sušnih in negostoljubnih pokrajin na svetu, obalni pas se nadaljuje v ravninsko puščavo, ki na severu in vzhodu prehaja v hribe do 600 metrov nadmorske višine. Bolj kot težavni klimatski pogoji Zahodno Saharo definira njena zapletena politična situacija. V tem zapisu se na prebivalce Zahodna Sahare nanašamo kot Saharce oziroma Sahravijce, tudi Zahodnosaharce, kar je politična oziroma nacionalna, ne etnična oznaka. Etnična in kulturna ozadja Saharcev so namreč podobno kot pri drugih saharskih ljudstvih mešana, gre za preplet arabskih, berberskih in črnoafriških značilnosti. Zahodnosaharci, za katere ocenjujejo, da jih je približno pol milijona - točno število je težko ugotoviti, ker živijo deloma na okupiranem ozemlju, največji del v alžirskih taboriščih, manjše število pa tudi na osvobojenem območju Zahodne Sahare in v Mavretaniji. Večina Saharcev govori arabski dialekt hasanija arabščino. Zahodnosaharski osvobodilni boj je do leta 1973 potekal proti španski kolonialni nadvladi, nato do leta 1975 proti maroški in mavretanski okupaciji, po umiku Mavretanije iz Zahodne Sahare pa se osvobodilni boj pod vodstvom mednarodno priznane in legitimne zastopnice Zahodnosaharcev, Polisario Front, nadaljuje proti Maroku. Organizacija/vlada Polisario Front, ki predstavlja legitimno oblast Zahodnosaharcev, kot takšno so jo leta 1979 prepoznali tudi Združeni narodi, deluje v begunskem taborišču Tindouf na alžirskem ozemlju. Po obdobju nasilnih spopadov vztraja z manjšimi oboroženimi spopadi premirje vse od leta 1991. I. »Jeza je vzrok za upor!«, je zapisal letos preminuli pisatelj, diplomat in človek z izkušnjo koncentracijskega taborišča iz druge svetovne vojne, Stéphane Hessel (2010: 26). Ko smo jezni, nadaljuje, postanemo bojeviti in močni, zato ukrepamo, zlijemo se z mogočnim tokom zgodovine, njen tok pa teče proti večji pravičnosti in svobodi. 1. decembra 1955 je v ameriškem mestu Montgomery Rosa Parks sprožila takšen tok zgodovine, ko ni hotela odstopiti sedeža belemu državljanu. Oblast jo je zaprla in obsodila, njena obsodba pa je sprožila veličastno gibanje proti rasni diskriminaciji, ki je v letih, ki so sledila, zajelo celotne Združene države Amerike. Kakor v svoji knjigi povzema Martin Balluch (2011: 85), se je 5. decembra istega leta začel totalni bojkot avtobusnih linij v Montgomeryju, z ekonomskim pritiskom so želeli protestniki sprožiti dokončen obračun z rasizmom in rasno diskriminacijo. Martin Luther King je bil od samega začetka voditelj in organizator omenjenega gibanja. Oblasti so ga od 1955 do 10 1968 tridesetkrat aretirale in ga več kot dvajsetkrat zaprle. Za takratno družbo in oblast je predstavljal nevarnost, označevali so ga za komunista, izdajalca in pokvarjenca. Zgodovina ga je namesto tega spričo njegove odločne volje do svobode in neustrašnosti postavila za voditelja Afro-ameriškega gibanja za človekove pravice, takšno vlogo je opravljal dvanajst let1, dokler ga ni 4. aprila 1968 umoril pobegli zapornik. King je leta 1964 prejel Nobelovo nagrado za mir, po njem od leta 1986 v ZDA praznujejo Dan Martina Luthra Kinga, uzakonjeno rasno razlikovanje v Združenih državah je postalo preteklost. 10. oktobra 2010 je dvajset tisoč Ros Parks in Martinov Luthrov Kingov v kraju Gdeim Izik 2 , približno 20 kilometrov od okupirane zahodnosaharske prestolnice El Aaiún postavilo protestni tabor s približno 6000 šotori3. Po štirih dneh je maroška vojska vdrla v tabor in pričela streljati ter požigati, svoj napad je dokončala v začetku novembra istega leta, ko je brutalno uničila tabor in pregnala protestnike. Do podatkov o smrtnih žrtvah in ranjenih spričo informacijske blokade ni mogoče priti, Polisario Front ocenjuje, da je bilo ubitih približno 40 protestnikov, 723 ranjenih in 163 aretiranih. Upor ni prinesel preboja, ni končal okupacije in velika verjetnost je, da se pogumnih posameznikov ne bo spomnil niti norveški Nobelov odbor, ko bo tehtal o prihodnjih Nobelovih nagrajencih. Kljub temu je upor v Gdeim Iziku izjemno pomemben. Sporoča namreč, da prebivalcev okupirane Zahodne Sahare po petintridesetih letih, odkar je Maroko 1979 z vojaško silo zavzel državo, ni zapustila volja do svobode, jeza in boj za pravico. Vstajo v Gdeim Iziku je sloviti lingvist in še eden od pogumnih predstavnikov človeštva, Noam Chomsky, označil kot začetek arabskih vstaj, pri čemer je potrebno dodati, da Gdeim Izik ni bil zgolj klasični upor proti tiranskim režimom in revščini kot je bil to slučaj v drugih arabskih in bližnjevzhodnih uporih v zadnjih letih. Bil je tudi in predvsem protest proti okupaciji. II. Deklaracija o zagotavljanju neodvisnosti kolonialnih dežel in njihovih ljudstev4, ki jo je sprejela Generalna skupščina OZN 14. 12. 1960 v Preambuli zapoveduje spoštovanje enakopravnosti vseh narodov in njihovo pravico do samoodločbe, desetletje kasneje sprejeta Deklaracija sedmih načel (24. 10. 1970) celovito obravnava vprašanje samoodločbe in daje OZN mandat, da od svojih članic terja spoštovanje pravil in načel, ki veljajo v mednarodnem pravu in pravilih OZN. Nekatere od teh načel velja ponoviti tudi na tem mestu, bralec ali bralka pa naj presodi, v kolikšni meri se svetovna organizacija (in njene članice) takšnih pravil držijo. 1 www.thekingcenter.org (dostop 5. 9. 2013) 2 Podrobnejši video zapis dogajanja v Gdeim Iziku je najti na www.youtube.com/watch?v=z034H97gvN8 (dostop 10. 9. 2013) 3 www.newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2011/09/14/western-sahara-independence-resistance/ (dostop 5. 9. 2013) 4 http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/dicc/dicc.html 11 1) Vsi narodi imajo pravico svobodno določiti svoj politični status. 2) Vsaka država ima dolžnost spoštovati to pravico in spodbujati njeno uresničevanje. 3) Vsaka država ima obveznost vzdržati se vsakršnih prisilnih dejanj, ki bi narode prikrajšala za to pravico. 4) Narodi, ki se upirajo takemu nasilju, so upravičeni iskati in dobiti pomoč v skladu s cilji in načeli Ustanovne listine Organizacije združenih narodov. 5) Na podlagi Ustanovne listine OZN ima ozemlje kolonije ali drugo nesamoupravno ozemlje status, ki je različen in ločen od statusa države, ki to ozemlje upravlja. Tri vplivne države, vsaka z lastno računico in interesi, krojijo usodo Zahodne Sahare s tem, ko vzdržujejo tesno zavezništvo z Marokom - Francija, Španija in ZDA. Četudi nosijo morda največjo odgovornost za to, da se desetletja trajajoči konflikt še ni končal, pa je mogoče s prstom pokazati na celotno mednarodno skupnost, ki molči in ignorira množične kršitve človekovih pravic v Zahodni Sahari. Mednarodna skupnost cinično ignorira pravila in odločitve OZN (denimo resolucijo št. 690 iz leta 1988, ki nalaga izvedbo referenduma o samoodločbi), izvirni greh pa je mogoče pripisati Španiji (in njeni takratni fašistični oblasti), ki je 14. 11. 1975 v tajnosti podpisala t.i. Madridski sporazum z Marokom in Mavretanijo, po katerem se je želela odreči odgovornosti za nekdanjo kolonijo. Takšen unilateralen umik je bil nelegalen (Ruiz, 2007), kar so večkrat potrdili tudi Združeni narodi, ki so Španijo pozvali na odgovornost (de iure je Zahodna Sahara še vedno njeno administrativno ozemlje). Na tem mestu bi bilo potrebno podrobneje orisati tudi odnos in odgovornost Francije, a bo dovolj, da omenimo, da je Francija dolgoletna maroška zaveznica, ki je v OZN večkrat vložila veto ter s tem preprečila večkratne poskuse, da omejijo množične kršitve človekovih pravic v Zahodni Sahari. Obenem se Francija na takšen sporen in neetičen način postavlja tudi proti svoji nekdanji koloniji Alžiriji, ki predstavlja Zahodnim Saharcem najtesnejšo zaveznico v regiji. Alžirija je namreč beguncem iz Zahodne Sahare ponudila puščavski, skrajni jugozahod države, da so si uredili življenje, ker se že več desetletij ne morejo vrniti na svoje domove. Po ocenah Odbora za begunce in migrante OZN (www.unhcr.org, poročilo iz leta 2009) živi v begunskih taboriščih več kot 165.000 zahodnosaharskih beguncev. V težkih puščavskih pogojih so vzpostavili nadomestni dom, tam ima sedež tudi s strani mednarodne skupnosti priznana vlada v izgnanstvu, ki jo predstavlja Polisario Front, medtem ko njihovi rojaki in rojakinje, ki so ostali na okupiranem ozemlju, ostajajo žrtve represije in množičnih kršitev človekovih pravic. Ob tem Maroko nekaznovano črpa tudi naravna bogastva, med zasedenim ozemljem in ozkim pasom ob Mavretaniji, ki ga nadzoruje uradna in priznana predstavniška organizacija Zahodnih Saharcev Polisario Front, pa je zgradil zid in ga zavaroval z vojaškimi patruljami in minami. Takšen zid spominja na Berlinski zid, po njegovi funkciji ga je moč primerjati z zidom, ki so ga med Izrael in okupirano Palestino postavili Izraelci. Ni mu mogoče reči drugače kot Maroški zid sramote. 12 Mandat mirovne misije OZN – MINURSO5, o katerem podrobneje piše ena od avtoric v tem zborniku, in o katerem sta se sporazumeli obe v konflikt vpleteni strani, je edini monitoring mednarodne skupnosti na okupiranem ozemlju, pri čemer Maroko vztrajno krši določila sporazuma in mirovni misiji onemogoča njen (iz)ključni namen, tj. pripravo in asistenco pri aktivnostih, povezanih z referendumom, na katerem bi Zahodnosaharci odločali med neodvisnostjo in integracijo v maroško kraljevino. Do referenduma je očitno še daleč, saj Maroko dosledno blokira vsakršen napredek, v Zahodno Saharo naseljuje Maročane, da bi spremenil demografsko sestavo prebivalstva, in ob izvedbi plebiscita, v kolikor bi uspel z izsiljevanjem, izzid nagnil v svojo korist. Konflikt v Zahodni Sahari in dejstvo okupacije zadeva tudi več regionalnih transnacionalnih organizacij. Medtem ko se je Afriška unija postavila na stran pravice Zahodnih Saharcev (Maroko je po sprejetju Zahodne Sahare v polno članstvo Afriške unije leta 1984 iz organizacije protestno izstopil), igrata dve drugi regionalni asociaciji, Arabska liga in Evropska unija, manj častno vlogo. Prva je na podlagi političnih kalkulacij in notranjepolitičnih razlogov podprla maroško zahtevo (zasedbo) po zahodnosaharskem ozemlju, slednja (EU) ima v procesu ambivalentno, celo shizofreno in do Zahodnosaharcev izjemno problematično vlogo. Evropska unija po eni strani poziva k spoštovanju človekovih pravic in spoštovanju resolucij OZN, z vsebinsko izpraznjenimi izjavami, v katerih zapisuje, da »EU potrjuje polno podporo OZN in opogumlja obe strani k doseganju pravične, trajne politične rešitve v korist vpletenih strani, kar bo pripeljalo do samoodločbe zahodnosaharskega ljudstva v skladu z resolucijami Varnostnega sveta ZN.«6 Takšna pozicija Evropske unije, ki jo izreka po svoji visoki predstavnici Catherine Ashton, je seveda sprenevedanje brez primere in ker ga izreka v imenu EU, katere članica je tudi Slovenija, velja odločno protestirati. Maroko že desetletja preprečuje izvedbo referenduma, naseljuje svoje prebivalstvo na okupirano ozemlje, krade Zahodnosaharcem naravne vire in onemogoča vsakršen napredek pri ureditvi statusa Zahodne Sahare. Evropska unija, namesto, da bi priznala pravico do neodvisnosti in polno suverenost Zahodne Sahare, raje diplomatsko govoriči in si drzne zapisati celo formulacijo, da je »EU ponavljajoče pozivala vse strani, da se vzdržijo nasilja in spoštujejo človekove pravice«. Zakaj ne poziv zgolj Maroku, ki od obeh vpletenih strani edini izvaja nasilje in krši osnovne standarde človekovih pravic na zasedenem ozemlju? Bržkone zato, ker Evropska unija nima poguma, da bi v tem sporu odigrala častno in pravično vlogo. V istem sporočilu Ashton zapiše, da bo v novem ribiškem sporazumu z Marokom Evropska komisija »upoštevala resolucijo Evropskega parlamenta« ter »skušala« uveljaviti klavzulo, ki vključuje zahtevo po spoštovanju človekovih pravic, v primeru pa, da bo Maroko »grobo kršil« človekove pravice, »lahko« EK sporazum tudi prekliče. Če prevedemo iz diplomatske govorice, visoka predstavnica sporoča, da resolucije Evropskega parlamenta, ki nasprotuje ribiškemu sporazumu, ne 5 https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/mandate.shtml 6 http://allafrica.com/stories/201306051487.html 13 bo upoštevala, Maroko lahko očitno »nežno« (ker ne sme grobo) krši človekove pravice, Evropska unija pa tudi v tem primeru ne zapiše decidirano, da bo prekinila sporazum, ampak takšno »grožnjo« artikulira v obliki pogojnika »lahko«. Evropska komisija je 24. julija 2013 v izjavi za javnost sporočila7, da je podpisan nov 4-letni protokol oziroma ribiški sporazum s Kraljevino Maroko. Omeniti velja, da omenjeni sporazum Maroku do februarja 2015 prinaša 36,1 milijona evrov letno in da Evropska komisija v preteklih letih ni preklicala sporazuma, četudi ima vse dokaza, da Maroko sredstev ne deli z Zahodnosaharci, ki jim pripada obala in ribiške pravice v obalnem pasu, da Maroko grobo krši človekove pravice Zahodnosaharcev, zato ne čudijo ostri protesti civilne družbe in prebivalcev Zahodne Sahare, ki sporazum8 obsojajo in ga označujejo kot prevaro in tatvino9. III. Britanski časnik The Economist je okupacijo Zahodne Sahare ustrezno označil kot klasični Anschluss (Arts et al., 2007: 11), kot nasilno pripojitev. Tragična usoda ozemlja države je zgodovinski precedans in je izkaz neuspeha civiliziranosti človeške skupnosti. Sto trideseto leto mineva od Berlinske konference, ki jo je leta 1884 gostil Otto von Bismarch in ki je Zahodno Saharo potisnila v španske roke. Do 1961 kot španski protektorat in po tem letu kot ne-samoupravno ozemlje (Poglavje XI. Ustanovne listine OZN) pod de facto maroško okupacijo, Zahodna Sahara še vedno čaka trenutek, da doseže pravico in o svoji usodi odloči na demokratičnem vsenarodnem plebiscitu (Knop, 2002). Voljo in odločenost, samozavest in organiziranost Zahodnosaharci že desetletja dokazujejo v begunskih taboriščih10, kjer so vzpostavili delujočo (vzporedno) družbo, izobraževalni, zdravstveni in humanitarni sistem, dosegli so polno vključenost žensk v upravljanje skupnih zadev, stopnja pismenosti, ki je bila ob prvih begunskih naselbinah v Alžiriji zgolj 3 odstotna, se je povzpela na preko 90 %. Ko se bo mednarodna skupnost spraševala, ali so Zahodnosaharci sposobni samostojnega življenja v lastni državi, naj njeni predstavniki obiščejo štiri begunska (mesta) taborišča, ki nosijo imena po štirih okupiranih mestih v Zahodni Sahari – Laayoune, Smara, Awserd in Rabouni, vsa v bližini alžirskega mesta Dakhla, kjer ima sedež tudi organizacija Polisario Front, formalna vlada Zahodnosaharcev. Štiri begunska mesta in njihovih skoraj 200.000 begunskih prebivalcev živi v strahu in negotovosti, ko dan za dnem berejo poročila o ugrabitvah, mučenjih v maroških zaporih, represiji, diskriminaciji njihovih rojakov v okupirani domovini. Mnogi med njimi niso videli sorodnikov, staršev, otrok in prijateljev vse od takrat, ko so bili prisiljeni zbežati. 7 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-741_en.htm 8 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/morocco/index_en.htm 9 http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/saharawi-fishermen-condemn-eu-mo-news-530059 10 Več o organiziranosti begunskih taborišč na http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_refugee_camps 14 Narod, razdeljen na dva dela, del pod okupacijo, drugi del v begunskih taboriščih, vmes pa Maroški zid sramote. Kakor skuša nakazati naslov prispevka, je klic po pravici za Zahodnosaharke in Zahodnosaharce nevaren (žrtve Gdeim Izika so temu dokaz), mednarodna solidarnost v obliki humanitarne pomoči je sicer prisotna, prav tako angažiranost globalne civilne družbe. Vendarle pa tovrstni pozivi ne morejo in ne smejo nadomestiti odgovornosti mednarodne skupnosti, predvsem njenih najvplivnejših akterk kot so Evropska unija, njene odločujoče članice, OZN in ZDA, da odločno in nemudoma ukrepajo ter s sankcijami (političnimi in ekonomskimi) prisilijo Maroko, da začne izpolnjevati dane zaveze, mednarodno pravo in resolucije VS OZN. Države so v preteklosti večkrat dokazale, da zmorejo prisiliti članico mednarodne skupnosti, da spoštuje pravila igre. A so takšno namero izkazale najpogosteje takrat, ko so imele same neposredne interese, denimo željo po nafti ali kakšnih drugih surovinah. Zaplata puščave v vedno nemirnem arabskem in afriškem svetu očitno ni dovoljšen razlog, da bi opravile svojo moralno in politično dolžnost. Slovenija se v tem pogledu sramežljivo skriva za izgovori o svoji majhnosti in omejenem vplivu. Prav ta država je leta 1991 klicala na pomoč mednarodno skupnost in pozivala na spoštovanje mednarodnopravnih načel in norm, da bi sama dosegla mednarodnopravno subjektiviteto ter na plebiscitu izraženo voljo državljank in državljanov uresničila v obliki lastne, suverene države. Danes svoj klic izpred 22 let pozablja, se izogiba svoji odgovornosti in svoji zunanji politiki, izneverja se vrednotam slovenske Ustave in uveljavlja dvojna merila (Kosovo je priznala, medtem ko ob primeru Zahodne Sahare in Palestine molči). Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve Republike Slovenije je celo tako klečeplazno in prestrašeno, da je predstavnike Zahodne Sahare namesto v Mladiki, stavbi slovenskega zunanjega ministrstva, sprejemalo v kavarnah v neposredni soseščini, tako je vsaj opazil spodaj podpisani. Slovenski parlament v nasprotju s švedskim, ki je 5. 12. 201211 podprl priznanje Zahodne Sahare (o tem mora sedaj odločiti švedska Vlada), nima poguma, da bi se jasno in pravično izrekel o tem vprašanju, raje svoja pooblastila in odgovornost prenaša na skupno evropsko zunanjo politiko, ki se – kakor smo videli zgoraj – spreneveda na presenetljivo podoben način. Slovenija izkazuje, da svoje zunanje politike onkraj 500 kilometrskega radiusa in osi Trst-Dunaj-Zagreb, ne premore in ne zmore. Čas je, da državljanke in državljani, civilna družba in stroka jasno povemo, da je čas, da se to spremeni. Pri čemer ne bo odveč referenca na jugoslovansko zunanjo politiko, ki je 28. novembra 1984 priznala Arabsko republiko Zahodno Saharo, a je priznanje ugasnilo z razpadom države. Albanija, denimo, je pod pritiski (morebiti tudi kakšnim dobrim poslom v Maroku?) svoje priznanje 11. novembra 2004 umaknila. Mogoče je anticipirati, da bi priznanje skupine manjših držav, članic Evropske unije, sprožilo »domino efekt« in bi posledično o svoji nečastni vlogi in drži premislile tudi evropske institucije ter vplivnejše države 11 www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/29989 15 članice. Takšna serija priznanj bi pomenila izjemen političen pritisk na Maroko, ki bi ga morale po oceni analitikov spremljati tudi mednarodne ekonomske sankcije. Politična oblast na osvobojenem ozemlju in v begunskih mestih v Alžiriji bi morala ob pomoči nevladnih organizacij in prijateljskih držav nemudoma pričeti z evidentiranjem volilk in volilcev, ki se bodo smeli udeležiti referenduma o prihodnjem statusu Zahodne Sahare. Če bi bili izpolnjeni takšni administrativni kriteriji (Mandelc, 2013: 139), bi obstajala realna možnost, da Maroko ob sočasnem pritisku pomembnejših držav klone in ter sprejme zaveze iz Resolucije VS OZN št. 690. IV. Upam in verjamem, da mi bralke in bralci ne bodo zamerili, če ob koncu zapisa dodam še nekaj osebne izkušnje. Moj prvi neposredni stik z Marokom je bilo študentsko potovanje leta 2005. Z nahrbtnikom na ramenih in vodičem Lonely Planet v roki smo se odpravili na raziskovanje čarobne afriške dežele. Po vrsti so nas očarali Marakeš, Rabat, Fez, Casablanca in druga maroška mesta, izročilo, kultura, kulinarika in pokrajina. Še pred odhodom smo v vodiču prebrali sekcijo o nevarnostih in sprva načrtovano pot do prestolnice Zahodne Sahare odpovedali. Moja tedanja ignoranca in nepoučenost sta bili krivi, da nisem v sicer prijetnih večernih diskusijah z domačini odprl tudi vprašanja Zahodne Sahare. Ne vem sicer, ali bi me takšen pogovor postavil v nevarnost; z Maročankami in Maročani, ki smo jih srečali na poti, smo odprto govorili o politiki, kulturi, religiji, pravicah žensk, problemih, s katerimi se sooča država in nisem imel ob tem niti enkrat občutka, da se o kakšni temi ne želijo pogovarjati. Če bi danes takšno potovanje ponovil, ni dvoma, da bi skušal izvedeti več o tem, kako krivice, ki jo maroška država povzroča prebivalcem okupirane Zahodne Sahare, vidijo navadni prebivalci. Takšna bi morala biti po mojem mnenju naloga vseh, ki se odpravijo v Maroko, državo, ki je vsako leto bolj odvisna od prihoda (in denarja) tujih turistov. In če so šli Maročanke in Maročani tako pogumno na ulice v času arabske pomladi, ter v absolutistični monarhiji dosegli nekaj izjemnih političnih uspehov (demokratične spremembe maroške Ustave idr.), ni dvoma, da bi pritisk demokratične maroške javnosti pripomogel, da se začne razpletati tudi zahodnosaharska zgodba. Maročani so z arabskimi vstajami izgubili nekaj strahu pred svojo avtokratsko oblastjo, zato je upravičeno pričakovati, da bodo prisluhnili novicam o krivicah, ki jih v njihovem imenu oblast prizadeja Zahodnosaharkam in Zahodnosaharcem. Danes je medijska blokada tako v Maroku kot v Zahodni Sahari izjemna, a obstajajo druga orodja, denimo družbena omrežja, objektivne informacije na spletu, neposreden stik. Osebno me je pogum protestnikov iz Gdeim Izika globoko nagovoril. Enako desetletja vztrajnosti in naporov Sahravijcev in Sahravijk. Njihova motivacija je inspiracija za vse nas, da jim pri tem pomagamo. Danes smo v njihov projekt in boj, na varni 16 distanci sicer, vključeni aktivisti, akademiki, raziskovalci po vsem svetu. Prav nič drugega kot svoboda in pravica ZA Zahodno Saharo bo končni izkupiček tega skupnega boja. Zlivamo se v mogočen tok zgodovine. Viri Arts, Karin, Pinto Leite, Pedro (ur.), 2007: International Law and the Question of Western Sahara. Oporto: IPJET (International Platform of Jourists for East Timor). Balluch, Martin, 2009: Upor v demokraciji. Državljanska nepokorščina in konfrontacijske kampanje. Ljubljana: Krtina. Corbyn, Jeremy MP, Simanowitz, Stefan, 2011: A new dawn? Western Sahara and the Arab Spring. Dostopno na: www.newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2011/09/14/western-sahara-independenceresistance/ (dostop 5. 9. 2013) EC – Fisheries, 2013: Morocco - Fisheries Partnership Agreement. Dostopno na: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/morocco/index_en.htm (dostop 20.9. 2013) EurActiv, 2013: Saharawi fishermen condemn EU-Morocco fishing treaty ‘fraud’. Dostopno na: http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/saharawi-fishermen-condemn-eu-mo-news-530059 (dostop 20. 9. 2013) Gdeim Izik - The Sahrawi Resistance Camp, 2012. Dostopno na: www.youtube.com/watch?v=z034H97gvN8 (dostop 10. 9. 2013) Hessel, Stephane, 2011: Dvignite se! Ljubljana: Založba Sanje. Kenworthy, Peter, 2012: Swedish parliament wants government to recognise Western Sahara. Dostopno na: www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/29989 (dostop 6. 5. 2013) Knop, Karen, 2002: Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mandelc, Damjan, 2013: Arabska vstaja – kontekst, perspective in učinki. V: Časopis za kritiko znanosti, domišljijo in novo antropologijo. Letnik XL, št. 252, str. 137-151. Ljubljana: Študentska založba. Minurso, 2013. Dostopno na: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/mandate.shtml (dostop 10. 9. 2013) Ruiz, Miguel Carlos, 2007: The Self-Determination Referendum and the Role of Spain. V: International Law and the Question of Western Sahara. Arts, Karin in Pinto Leite, Pedro (ur.). str. 305-318. Oporto: IPJET. Sahara Press Service, 2013: Morocco: European Union Reaffirms Full Support for Western Sahara's People Right to Self-Determination. Dostopno na: http://allafrica.com/stories/201306051487.html (dostop 15. 9. 2013). Sahrawi refugee camps, 2013. Dostopno na: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_refugee_camps (dostop 10. 9. 2013) The King Center, 2013. Dostopno na: www.thekingcenter.org (dostop 5. 9. 2013). 17 Ana Ješe Perković Vloga Evropske unije pri reševanju statusa Zahodne Sahare: primerjava s Kosovom Ko v medijih zasledimo prispevek o Zahodni Sahari, čeprav je to redko in predvsem v tujih medijih, jo ponavadi naslavljajo z zadnjo afriško kolonijo (Abelson, 2012; SkornšekPleš, 2012). Proces dekolonizacije se je v Afriki pričel šele po koncu druge svetovne vojne1, saj so si zmagovalne evropske države ponovno razdelile Afriko po prvi svetovni vojni, in končal v sedemdesetih letih 20. stoletja, razen za eno območje: Zahodna Sahara se v tem procesu ni uspela osamosvojiti in se še sedaj bori za pravico do samoodločbe. Problem konflikta v Zahodni Sahari je njegova izredno slaba sledljivost. Strokovne in znanstvene literature s tega področja je malo oziroma je slabo dostopna, zato bo pričujoča publikacija doprinesla k boljšemu razumevanju problematike Zahodne Sahare v Sloveniji kot tudi drugod po svetu. V tem članku bomo pogledali, kako Evropska unija in njeni odločevalci vplivajo na status Zahodne Sahare. Da bi slovenskemu bralcu približali dotično problematiko v Afriki, jo bomo poskušali osvetliti s primerjavo podobnega primera iz Jugovzhodne Evrope, in sicer z osamosvojitvijo Kosova. Ko govorimo o Zahodni Sahari, moramo za lažje razumevanje tega članka najprej definirati dva bistvena pojma: dekolonizacija in pravica do samoodločbe. Dekolonizacija je proces, ko se kolonije osamosvojijo bodisi mirno ali z nasiljem oziroma se kolonizator umakne iz zasedenega območja in prepusti oblast lokalnim oblastem. Pravica do samoodločbe je fundamentalna pravica vsakega naroda, da svobodno odloča o svoji suverenosti in političnem statusu, kar je zapisano v listini Združenih narodov (The UN Charter, 2013). Združeni narodi so leta 1960 podpisali deklaracijo, ki zagotavlja neodvisnost kolonijam in njihovim narodom (Declaration on the Granting of Independence…, 1960), ter izrecno poudarja pravico do samoodločbe teh narodov. Tako kot Mednarodno kazensko sodišče je tudi generalna skupščina Združenih narodov v resoluciji 1514 potrdila, da imajo prebivalci Zahodne Sahare pravico do samoodločbe in referenduma. Vendar se v praksi to še ni zgodilo, saj mirovni proces Združenih narodov, ki se je pričel v začetku devetdesetih let 20. stoletja, ni obrodil sadov, medtem ko Maroko agresivno izvaja svojo politiko naseljevanja Maročanov na območje Zahodne Sahare, hkrati pa je razdelil teritorij Zahodne Sahare in njene prebivalce z dolgim neprehodnim zidom, zgrajenim v osemdesetih letih 20. stoletja. Če primerjamo proces za dosego nedovisnosti Kosova s prizadevanji Zahodne Sahare, lahko vidimo, kako je percepcija posameznih akterjev v javnosti vplivala na mednarodno 1 Drugi veliki dekolonizacijski procesi so se npr. dogajali v Latinski Ameriki po razpadu Španskega imperija v 19. stoletju ali po razpadu velikih evropskih imperijev po drugi svetovni vojni: nemškega, avstro-ogrskega in otomanskega. 18 skupnost in njeno podporo procesu. Kosovski Albanci so zahtevali pravico do samoodločbe na podlagi razpada nekdanje Jugoslavije ter nastanka novih držav iz jugoslovanskih republik. Arbitražna Badinterjeva komisija, ki so jo sestavljali evropski pravniki, je na podlagi mednarodnega prava podala mnenja o glavnih pravnih vprašanjih, ki so nastala ob razpadu Jugoslavije. Kosovski albanski politiki so iz tega naslova in na podlagi ustave SFRJ zahtevali neodvisnost iz dveh razlogov: 1. Pravica do samoodločbe ter 2. Status avtonomne pokrajine znotraj SFRJ z jasno definiranimi notranjimi in zunanjimi mejami. Dodatno legitimnost kosovski neodvisnosti je dodala vojna na Kosovu leta 1999 med kosovskimi Albanci ter srbsko vojsko, ki se je končala z mednarodno intervencijo z bombardiranjem večjih srbskih mest. Za dosego neodvisnosti Kosova so bili potrebni veliki napori, tako v lobiranju kot v medijski prepoznavnosti problema, kar je zahtevalo tudi veliko finančno podporo. V javnosti so bili Srbi predvsem predstavljeni kot agresorji, tako že v vojni v Bosni in Hercegovini kot kasneje v vojni na Kosovu. Evropsko javno mnenje kot tudi mnenje večine evropskih politikov (razen v državah s težavami ozemljske celovitosti) in tudi v Združenih državah Amerike se je nagibalo v prid kosovskih Albancev. Leta 2008 je kosovska skupščina brez predstavnikov srbske manjšine enostransko razglasila neodvisnost Kosova. Srbija, ki je v tem času že imela proevropsko vlado, se je odločila, da temu dejanju oporeka po pravni poti. Meddržavno sodišče v Haagu je še istega leta presodilo, da kosovska razglasitev neodvisnosti ni bila nelegalna. Do sredine leta 2013 je Kosovo priznalo 105 držav, od tega 23 držav Evropske unije. Kosova niso priznale Španija, Ciper, Grčija, Slovaška in Romunija, pri čemer lahko sklepamo, da so razlogi za nepriznanje lastne težave teh držav glede ozemeljske celovitosti: v Španiji ima težnje po osamosvojitvi več provinc, med najbolj aktivnimi je Katalonija; Ciper spada med tako imenovane zamrznjene konflikte, saj je otok razdeljen na polovico med grški in turški del in vlada grškega dela Cipra ne priznava delitve, pri tem pa grško ciprsko vlado podpira tudi Grčija; tako Slovaška kot Romunija imata močno madžarsko manjšino s težnjami po večji avtonomiji. V primeru Zahodne Sahare je slika nekoliko drugačna. Prebivalci Zahodne Sahare so bili ob umiku Španije iz Severne Afrike slabše politično organizirani kot Kosovski Albanci, predvsem pa so imeli manj mednarodne podpore. Problematika Zahodne Sahare je redko predstavljena v medijih in ima slabo javno prepoznavnost. Zainteresiranost medijev in širše javnosti je majhna, saj večina ljudi še nikoli ni slišala za ta konflikt. Na drugi strani ima Maroko dober mednarodni ugled kot urejena afriška država z dobrimi odnosi z EU in ZDA. Med drugim je Maroko leta 1987 zaprosil za članstvo v Evropski uniji, prošnja pa je bila zavrnjena na podlagi geografske neustreznosti - Maroko ni na evropski celini, vendar to dejanje kaže na pozitivne odnose z Evropsko unijo. Poleg tega ima Maroko z EU podpisanih veliko gospodarskih sporazumov, od dovoljenja za ribolov evropskih ladij v maroških vodah do odprtega zračnega prostora za evropska letala ter vrsto trgovinskih sporazumov, v zameno pa Maroko od EU letno dobiva tudi znatno denarno pomoč. Kot pišeta avtorja Zunes in Mundy (2010), je za razumevanje problematike Zahodne Sahare potrebno dodobra poznati notranjo politiko in zgodovino 19 Maroka. Maroška zahteva po teritoriju Zahodne Sahare temelji na maroškem nacionalističnem prepričanju v vzpostavitvi izgubljenega imperija, hkrati pa si je maroški kralj z zasedbo Zahodne Sahare povečal legitimnost in utrdil položaj, ki je bil pred tem šibak, saj je režim doživel dva državna udara (Zunes in Mundy, 2010). Zasedba Zahodne Sahare pa ni okrepila le maroškega nacionalizma, ampak je prebudila tudi nacionalizem v prebivalcih Zahodne Sahare (Zunes in Mundy, 2010). Z vztrajanjem in nadaljevanjem konflikta se je le-ta še poglobil in okrepil, med drugim pa je povzročil tudi organiziranost ljudi v politični sistem in nastanek fronte Polisario - politično predstavništvo prebivalcev Zahodne Sahare. Kot menita Zunes in Mundy je za dolgotrajnost nerešenega konflikta kriv predvsem Washington, ki je dopustil maroško okupacijo Zahodne Sahare leta 1975, pa tudi kasnejše ameriške administracije, ki so ohranjale in še vedno ohranjajo dobre odnose z maroškim kraljem, saj v njem vidijo zaveznika v boju proti terorizmu, in ne storijo ničesar, da bi se status Zahodne Sahare rešil. Vendar avtorja gledata na konflikt iz ameriškega stališča, evropsko gledišče bi izpostavilo Španijo, ki v procesu dekolonizacije ni poskrbela za predajo oblasti lokalnim oblastem, ko se je umikala iz tega dela Afrike, in Francijo, ki močno podpira Maroko in lobira za njegovo podporo v EU. Še več, evropske države ne protestirajo in vedno znova spregledajo kršenja človekovih pravic, ki se dogajajo v Maroku in v Zahodni Sahari tudi nad tamkajšnjimi prebivalci, ne izvajajo nikakršnega pritiska na maroške oblasti, da bi omogočile prebivalcem Zahodne Sahare izvedbo referenduma in še naprej sodelujejo z maroškimi oblastmi. Leta 2008 je Maroko dobil v okviru Evropske sosedske politike »napredni status« (»advanced status«). Leta 2010 je bil prvič organiziran vrh med EU in Marokom, ki je bil tudi prvi tak dogodek med EU in afriško oziroma arabsko državo. Na vrhu so politiki govorili o privilegiranem statusu Maroka v odnosih z EU, ki naj bi se v prihodnosti zapisal tudi v pogodbeni obliki. Da se tudi v najvišjih krogih evropske politike le kaže nekaj interesa za problematiko Zahodne Sahare, pa lahko izpostavimo skupino evropskih poslancev, ki so spomladi leta 2013 želeli priti v Zahodno Saharo v begunska taborišča in si ogledati tamkajšnje razmere, pa jim je bil vstop v Maroko na letališču v Casablanci onemogočen oziroma prepovedan 2 . Poslanci so po vrnitvi v Evropo javno protestirali, vendar večjega medijskega in političnega odziva ni bilo, tudi nikakršnih posledic s strani EU za maroške oblasti ni bilo. Če primerjamo Zahodno Saharo in Kosovo, lahko rečemo, da za osamosvojitev ni dovolj le legitimna pravica do samoodločbe in potrditev Sveta Združenih narodov ali meddržavnega sodišča, pomembna je predvsem mednarodna politika in podpora glavnih akterjev ter prisotnost v javnosti in medijih. Brez tega so vsi napori za dosego neodvisnosti zaman oziroma lahko proces traja veliko dlje ali pa celo zvodeni. 2 Po poročanju slovenskih medijev je bil v delegaciji tudi slovenski evroposlanec Ivo Vajgl. Ana Čefarin, “Vajgl o maroškem incidentu: to je primitivizem, če ne bo posledic, potem smo papirnati tiger.” Dnevnik, 7. marec 2013. http://www.dnevnik.si/svet/vajgl-o-maroskem-incidentuto-je-primitivizem-ce-ne-bo-posledic-potem-smo-papirnati-tiger 20 Viri Abelson, Jenn, 2012: Western Sahara: Why Africa's last colony can't break free. Boston Globe, 16. junij 2012. Dostopno na: http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/06/15/western-sahara-why-africalast-colony-can-break-free/87jACxXfU5bVUtqEe6uyrM/story.html Čefarin, Ana, 2013: Vajgl o maroškem incidentu: to je primitivizem, če ne bo posledic, potem smo papirnati tiger. Dnevnik, 7. marec 2013. Dostopno na: http://www.dnevnik.si/svet/vajgl-omaroskem-incidentu-to-je-primitivizem-ce-ne-bo-posledic-potem-smo-papirnati-tiger Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960. The United Nations and Decolonisation. Dostopno na: http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml Skornšek Pleš, Aleš, 2012: Zahodna Sahara, zadnja kolonija v Afriki. Razpotja, 30. oktober 2012. Dostopno na: http://www.razpotja.si/zahodna-sahara-zadnja-kolonija-v-afriki/ The UN Charter, 2013. Wikipedia. Dostopno na: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selfdetermination#The_UN_Charter Zunes, Stephen, Mundy, Jacob, 2010: Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution. New York: Syracuse University Press 21 Monika Štumpfl Vloga Združenih narodov v konfliktu v Zahodni Sahari Dekolonizacija Zahodne Sahare ter njen boj za izpeljavo referenduma o samoodločbi ljudstva poteka že od šestdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja. Pri tem se problematika neposredno navezuje na vlogo Organizacije združenih narodov (OZN, ZN) pri doseganju tega cilja, saj je, odkar jo je Generalna skupščina ZN leta 1963 označila kot nesamoupravno ozemlje, stalnica na dnevnem redu ZN (Epstein, 2009: 1). Na odnos OZN do Zahodne Sahare in njenega preteklega, trenutnega in prihodnjega statusa se bom opredelila z vidika vpletenosti in posredovanja ZN v tem konfliktu. To bom razdelala s pomočjo različnih dokumentov, sprejetih s strani ZN, ter mehanizmov, okvirov in načinov delovanja te mednarodne organizacije. OZN je v konfliktu v Zahodni Sahari aktualna predvsem z vidika, da je edina organizacija, ki ima članstvo po vsem svetu in s tem univerzalno legitimnost. Prav tako ponuja političnim voditeljem okolje, ki jim omogoča, da stopijo v stik drug z drugim (United Nations, 2008: xvii, 71, 271). Pri tem bom argumentirala, da je aktualno nedefinirano stanje Zahodne Sahare posledica pomanjkanja operativnega in progresivnega delovanja ZN, pokazatelj prevlade interesov velesil znotraj ZN (i.e. Združene države Amerike (ZDA), Francija) ter naravnanosti k organizacijski hipokriziji in odločanju, ki v samem bistvu zaznamuje delovanje OZN. V prvem delu bom predstavila zgodovinski kontekst in vlogo ZN pri vzpostavljanju samostojne države v Zahodni Sahari, kjer se bom oprla na procese, ki so pri tem potekali v ZN in dokumente, ki so bili medtem sprejeti. V nadaljevanju bom naslovila problematiko ZN v Zahodni Sahari z vidika hipokrizije organizacij na splošno, kar bom aplicirala na delovanje ZN v Zahodni Sahari, pri čemer bo osrednji poudarek na slabi implementaciji odločitev organov ZN v praksi. V zaključku pa bom predstavila svoja spoznanja o tej temi in sklenila razmišljanje o položaju Zahodne Sahare ter o vlogi ZN pri tem. Zgodovinsko ozadje in vloga ZN Španska Sahara, nekdanje ime za Zahodno Saharo, je bila s strani Španije kolonizirana leta 1884. Korenine domorodnega ljudstva sežejo vse do 12. stoletja, ko so se arabska plemena na to območje preselila iz Jemna, kjer so se sčasoma spojili z lokalno berbersko populacijo in afriškimi skupinami z juga Sahare. V tem obdobju je bilo Maroško kraljestvo kolonija Francije, ki se je osamosvojila leta 1955. V šestdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja je Španija pričela izkoriščati bogata nahajališča fosfatov v Zahodni Sahari za njihovo lastno gospodarsko dobrobit. To obdobje je bilo priča tudi začetkom sahravskega nacionalizma, ko se je nomadsko sahravsko ljudstvo ustalilo v regiji. Gibanje POLISARIO (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro) je bilo ustanovljeno 10. maja 1973 s strani sahravskih študentov v mestu Rabat ter se je 22 vzpostavilo kot predstavnik ljudstva v Zahodni Sahari ter vlade v izgnanstvu, Saharske arabske demokratične republike (Saharan Arab Democratic Republic – SADR) (Epstein, 2009: 4–5). Resna vpletenost OZN v tematiko Zahodne Sahare se je pričela 16. decembra 1965 s sprejetjem prve resolucije Generalne skupščine (GS) ZN o takratni Španski Sahari (Omar, 2008: 46). V resoluciji 2072 so ZN Španijo zaprosili za sprejetje vseh potrebnih meril, da se Španska Sahara osvobodi kolonialne dominacije, pri čemer je bila Španija prepoznana kot administrativna oblast v Zahodni Sahari (GS ZN, 1965). Do te resolucije, in nasploh do večje vpletenosti ZN v to situacijo, je privedla nepripravljenost Španije, da dekolonizira območje Zahodne Sahare, saj je postala, ko je bila leta 1955 sprejeta v ZN, podvržena normam in pravilom ZN glede dekolonizacije tujih ozemelj. Pri tem je Španija trdila, da je Zahodna Sahara njena provinca Španije in ne kolonija, kjer dobro skrbijo za svoje 'afriške brate'. Glavni razlog za to je bila nepripravljenost odpovedati se možnosti komercialne izrabe zaloge fosfatov na območju Bu Craa, kar bi zmanjšalo njeno siceršnjo odvisnost od Maroka (Munene, 2004: 82 in 111). Med letoma 1966 in 1973 je GS sprejela sedem naknadnih resolucij o ozemlju, kjer so vse pritrjevale pravici sahravskega ljudstva do samoodločbe ter izpostavljale potrebo po referendumu o samoodločbi, za izvedbo katerega je bila odgovorna Španija. Ko se je Španija leta 1974 le uklonila pozivom ZN za izvedbo referenduma o samoodločbi, je maroški kralj Hasan II sporočil, da ta za Maroko ni sprejemljiv, čemur se je zaradi teženj po ohranitvi lastne entitete pridružila tudi Mavretanija. Skupaj z Marokom sta zahtevala mnenje Meddržavnega sodišča o predkolonialnem statusu teritorija, saj sta se oba nadejala, da bo Meddržavno sodišče našlo zadovoljive zakonske povezave med njima in zahodno Saharo, z namenom prilastitve ozemlja Zahodne Sahare (Omar, 2008: 46). Sodišče je nato oktobra 1975 odločilo, da pred špansko kolonizacijo ozemlja ni bilo nikakršnih vezi teritorialne suverenosti med Marokom, Mavretanijo in Zahodno Saharo, ter s tem zavrnilo možnost legitimizacije priključitve ozemlja Maroku in Mavretaniji. Obenem je še enkrat poudarilo, da naj na ozemlju steče dekolonizacijski proces na načelu samoodločbe narodov prek izraza svobodne volje domorodnega ljudstva (Meddržavno sodišče, 1975). S tem je svetovalno mnenje Meddržavnega sodišča postalo temeljni zakonski okvir, kjer se je vprašanje Zahodne Sahare urejalo v sistemu OZN in z njenimi relevantnimi organi (Omar, 2008: 48; Novais, 2009: 60). Kljub naštetim dejstvom je bil 14. novembra 1975 podpisan Madridski tridelni sporazum med Španijo, Marokom in Mavretanijo, s katerim je Španija prenesla administrativno oblast na ozemlju na Maroko in Mavretanijo (Omar, 2008: 49). Odziv ZN na napovedano delitev je bil neodločen, saj sta sledili novi resoluciji (3458 A (XXX) in 3458 B (XXX)), ki sta zopet pozivali k spoštovanju predhodnih resolucij in k začetku dekolonizacije teritorija Zahodne Sahare ter izvedbi referenduma o samoodločbi ljudstva. S sporazumom je bila nato Zahodna Sahara 14. aprila 1976 razdeljena na dva dela, kjer je severni del pripadal Maroku in južni Mavretaniji (ibid.). Slednji primer kaže, da navkljub 23 jasnim pozivom ZN in GS Španija, Maroko in Mavretanija niso upoštevali sodbe Meddržavnega sodišča ter prejšnjih resolucij GS, kjer se je, kot nadaljuje Omar (2008: 50), oblikovala situacija, kjer je bilo logiki realpolitike dovoljeno zlorabiti mednarodno pravo, mednarodna skupnost pri tem ni posredovala, kar je vodilo do nasilne in nelegalne priključitve Zahodne Sahare k Maroku in Mavretaniji, čemur je sledilo obdobje spopadov med POLISARIO in Marokom. Sledilo je obdobje novih resolucij, kjer je GS izpostavila globoko zaskrbljenost nad zaostrovanjem situacije zaradi okupacije ozemlja s strani Maroka, po tem, ko se je Mavretanija umaknila iz spora in se odpovedala ozemeljskim težnjam v Zahodni Sahari. Resolucije GS so še enkrat poudarile neodtujljivo pravico Zahodne Sahare do izvedbe referenduma o samoodločbi, ter obenem priznale gibanje POLISARIO kot predstavnika sahravskega naroda (GS, 1979 in 1980). POLISARIO je bil pozvan, da mora aktivno in polno sodelovati v procesu iskanja pravične rešitve, kar se je kasneje izkazalo kot temelj politik ZN pri mirovnem procesu v Zahodni Sahari, ki se je pričel odvijati konec osemdesetih let. Pri tem so aktivno sodelovali tako ZN kot Organizacija afriške enotnosti (OAE), ter namen katerega je bil izpeljava referenduma o samoodločbi ljudstva Zahodne Sahare, kjer bi se prebivalci odločali med samostojnostjo in priključitvijo k Maroku. (Omar, 2008: 46–52). Po petnajstih letih spopadov je bil nato 6. septembra 1991 dosežen mirovni sporazum med POLISARIO in Marokom, čemur bi moral slediti referendum o samoodločbi ljudstva, kjer bi bazo volilnih upravičencev predstavljal cenzus prebivalstva iz leta 1974 (na referendumu bi lahko sodelovali samo prebivalci, ki so bili leta 1974 zavedeni kot prebivalci območja Zahodne Sahare, popis katerega je takrat izvedla španska kolonialna oblast). S tem namoenom so ZN na ozemlje Zahodne Sahare napotili misijo MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara), ki bi nadzorovala premirje ter pripravila območje za referendum. Naloge MINURSO so vključevale identifikacijo volilnih upravičencev, nadzor nad umikom maroških enot in nad tem, da se enote POLISARIO zadržujejo na prej dogovorjenih območjih (Novais, 2009: 61). Odprava MINURSO ni dosegla pričakovanih rezultatov, k čemur je najbolj prispevalo maroško nasprotovanje bazi volilnih upravičencev, ki bi sodelovali na referendumu, ter poskusov naseljevanja Maročanov na območje Zahodne Sahare, kar bi sčasoma spremenilo demografsko sestavo prebivalcev na tem območju (Omar, 2008: 52). Kljub številnim resolucijam in posredovanjem ZN v preteklih obdobjih, da bi se status Zahodne Sahare uredil, se v prerezu opisa zgodovinskega konflikta zdi, da položaj Zahodne Sahare stagnira, ali kot pravi Zoubir (2007: 158) spada v »kategorijo pozabljenih ali zamrznjenih konfliktov«. Kljub sprejetju mirovnega procesa med Marokom in POLISARIO-m ter kasnejši odpravi MINURSO leta 1991 (Zoubir in Pazzanita, 1995: 614), začetkom identifikacije volilnih upravičencev na potencialnem referendumu in napotitvah konvojev posebnih odposlancev, so bili ZN nezmožni zagotoviti funkcionalne okvire, v katerih bi lahko steklo odločanje o samoodločbi sahravskega ljudstva. Poleg Španije pa sta imeli pri 24 razreševanju konflikta vlogo tudi Francija in ZDA, ki sta pomembno vplivali na položaj Zahodne Sahare. Kot pišeta Zoubir in Pazzanita (1995: 620) je zadnje dni leta 1991 zaznamovala intenzivna diplomatska aktivnost v Varnostnem svetu (VS) ZN. Francoski oblikovalci politik so se namreč upirali ideji samostojne Zahodne Sahare, kjer so se bali, da bi zmaga POLISARIA pomenila propad kraljevine ter destabilizirala maroško državo. Kljub temu je VS sprejel resolucijo 725, ki je bila z namenom dosega konsenza napisana zelo dvoumno, ter ki je zopet pozivala k nadaljnjim ukrepom za razrešitev spora. Na drugi strani so, kot pravi Saidy (2011: 87), ZDA tekom let zavzela številne pristope naproti konfliktu v Zahodni Sahari, kar brez dvoumnosti ilustrira njihove interese v regiji. Pri tem poudarja, da je potrebno razlikovati med ameriško držo in zunanjo politiko, s katero ta pristopa h konfliktu. Ameriška drža temelji na dveh konstantnih elementih, kjer je prvi ta, da ZDA priznavajo Madridski sporazum ter s tem maroško administrativno oblast nad Zahodno Saharo, drugi pa, da so prepričane, da bi nastanek samostojne 'mini države' pomenil vir za nestabilnost Magreba in širšega Sredozemlja. Sama komponenta ameriške zunanje politike pa je odvisna od stranke na oblasti (republikanci, demokrati), pri čemer so v obdobju po hladni vojni ter predvsem po terorističnih napadih 11. septembra 2011 v New Yorku vse sledeče si administracije mnenja, da je edina izvedljiva in mogoča rešitev politični kompromis. Maroške manipulacije z naselbinami v Zahodni Sahari, ki nehote spominjajo na tiste na Zahodnem Bregu Gaze (preseljevanje maroškega prebivalstva na teritorij Zahodne Sahare, z namenom povečanja števila prebivalcev, ki bi ob morebitnem referendumu o samoodločbi glasovali za priključitev k Maroku), ter nepripravljenost na prihajajoče nove zaplete v situaciji, so ZN prikazali kot nebogljeno mednarodno organizacijo, ki sicer zagovarja in promovira ideale demokracije, svobode in enakosti pred mednarodnim pravom, a se ne more zoperstaviti posamičnim interesom znotraj članstva, kjer sta Združene države Amerike (ZDA) in Francija dolgoletni zaveznici Maroka (Munabe, 2004: 111), in katerim, še posebej po terorističnem napadu na ZDA 11. septembra 2001 ter kasneje deklariranem boju proti terorizmu, novonastala država v regiji ne bi bila po godu. Ob vsej izrečeni podpori Zahodni Sahari s strani ZN tako trenutna situacija poraja vprašanje, kakšen pomen ima podpora ZN kot organizacije, če so velesile, kot so ZDA, Francija in Španija, indiferentne do ali celo aktivno nasprotujejo legitimni pravici sahravskega naroda do samoodločbe (Pitts v Epstein, 2004: 107). ZN, organizacijska hipokrizija in politika dvojnih standardov Pri določanju vloge ZN kot organizacije na vzpostavljanje samostojne Zahodne Sahare, je pomembno, da se ozremo na samo strukturo organizacije, ter samo naravo poteka procesov odločanja v njej, saj nam bo to osvetlilo načine ravnanja oziroma (ne)ukrepanja ZN v primeru Zahodne Sahare. Kot pravi Brunsson (2007: 111), so lahko odločitve dojete kot posebna oblika pogovora, ki je indikator volje do udejanjenja in izbire ukrepov. V tradicionalni teoriji odločanja je odločitev dojeta kot indikator ustreznih dejanj v 25 prihodnosti, ali pa je za odločitev vsaj predvideno, da bo povečala možnosti takih dejanj. Pri tem obstaja tudi govorjenje brez odločitev – vodstvo [organizacije] predstavi ideje, vizije, koncepte, cilje, politike ali politične programe, ki pa niso odločitve nanašajoče se na specifične ukrepe, temveč so usmerjena k prepričevanju članic organizacije, da postopajo v skladu z govorjenjem vodstva, kar naj bi večkrat imelo enake učinke kot dejanske odločitve vodstva (Brunsson, 2007: 111–112). A v praksi tradicionalna teorija ne odseva vedno realnosti, kajti ne obstajajo vedno močne povezave med govorjenjem, odločitvami in ukrepi – govoriti je eno, odločati drugo, ukrepati pa zopet nekaj povsem tretjega (Brunsson, 2007: 112). Kajti lahko ukrepamo brez odločevanja ali govorjenja in lahko govorimo in odločamo, brez tega da bi dejansko ukrepali v tej zadevi. Tako obstaja možnost, da bodo mnogokrat obstajale diskrepance med tem kaj je bilo povedanega, odločenega in kaj dejansko narejenega – seveda pa obstaja tudi verjetnost, da bo nek subjekt deloval v nasprotju s tem, kar je povedal ali odločil (ibid.). Rezultat je hipokrizija – koncept, ki je vedno vezan na akterje; le ti so lahko hipokritični. Gledano s tradicionalne teorije odločanja se v sodobni družbi tako pojavljata dve vrsti akterjev – posamezniki in organizacije (Meyer et al. v Brunsson, 2007: 112). V Zahodni kulturi so akterji doumeti kot koordinirane, koherentne in suverene entitete z nameni, ter subjekti, ki imajo zmožnost govorjenja, odločanja in ukrepanja, ter ki lahko nadzirajo svoja dejanja. Hipokrizija je tako nekonsistentnost znotraj akterja, kajti nekonsistentnost med akterji v družbi je generalno gledano rutina in ni nujno problematična. Nekonsistentnost znotraj akterja pa se kaže kot manj običajna in dosti bolj problematična (Brunsson, 2007: 113). Splošna norma narekuje, da bi morali biti akterji konsistentni pri tem kaj povedo, odločijo in naredijo, zaradi česar je hipokrizija ponavadi dojeta kot problem. A po drugi strani hipokrizija izziva moralne norme. Na prvi pogled hipokrit deluje na način, ki je moralno nesprejemljiv (Brunsson, 2007: 113). A te ideje so diskutabilne, saj hipokrizija v določenih primerih ni nujno problem, temveč rešitev, še posebej v primeru organizacijske strukture akterjev. Pri tem je pomembno, da se ozremo na dve predpostavki – konflikt in organizacijski output (ibid.). Hipokrizija je odziv na svet, v katerem so vrednote, ideje ali ljudje v konfliktu – je način, kako se posamezniki in organizacije odzovejo na te konflikte. Organizacije so že rutinsko izpostavljene konfliktom, saj imamo ljudje različne in pogosto kontradiktorne ideje, kako bi morale določene organizacije delovati ter kaj bi morale doseči, kar pomeni, da če ugodimo potrebam in zahtevam ene strani v celoti, to pomeni, da slabo ali pa sploh ne zadovoljimo potreb druge strani (Friedlander in Pickle v Brunsson, 2007: 113). Sodobne organizacije so še posebej zmožne in nagnjene k temu, da se pretvarjajo, da lahko zadovoljijo vrsto nasprotujočih si zahtev. Včasih se zdi, da to počnejo kot odgovor na zunanje in notranje pritiske, včasih pa, da vodstvo aktivno in prostovoljno daje takšne utvare (Brunsson, 2007: 113). 26 Po drugi strani lahko organizacijska hipokrizija omogoči ZN ali drugim mednarodnim in regionalnim organizacijam, da upravljajo nepremostljive pritiske, ki bi sicer lahko naredili organizacijo nezmožno za učinkovito ukrepanje in ogrožali njen obstoj (Lipson, 2007: 5). Pri tem pa ima hipokrizija globlji pomen le, če imajo govor in odločitve lastno vrednost. Osrednje, a večkrat implicitno predvidevanje v tradicionalni teoriji je, da je dejanje žariščna točka interesa ter da govor in odločitve nimajo nikakršne vrednosti ali interesa per se. Njihova edina vrednost je ustvarjanje poti za temeljno dejanje. A ta predpostavka ne ustreza najbolj modernim organizacijam, saj se politika na splošno vrti, v veliki meri, okoli govorjenja in predstavljanja odločitev (Brunsson, 2007: 114). Prav tako organizacije različnih usmeritev redko prosijo za pozornost, saj jo največkrat dobijo s strani množičnih medijev, katerih interes je visok za organizacijsko načrtovanje, strategije, programe, mnenja in odločitve. Potemtakem govorjenje in odločitve imajo vrednost, katera pa temelji na organizacijskem outputu. Kot lahko razberemo, se organizacije vrednotijo ne samo po tem kaj počnejo, temveč tudi po tem kaj sporočajo in kakšne odločitve sprejemajo. Tako je javna podoba mnogokrat tako pomembna, če ne bolj, kot dejanski produkti in dejanja organizacij (Brunsson, 2007: 114–115). Okolje organizacijske hipokrizije tako lahko jasno apliciramo v primeru Zahodne Sahare, (ter ob drugačnih rezultatih tudi v drugih primerih – primer samoodločbe Kosova), kjer vidimo, da so tekom let organi ZN razpravljali in celo odločali v prid Zahodne Sahare (i.e. svetovalno mnenje Meddržavnega sodišča, številne resolucije GS in VS), a se je od teh odločitev le redko katera efektivno udejanjila. Tako velja poudariti, da se konkretne zadeve, ki bi imele odločilne posledice za končno razrešitev statusa Zahodne Sahare, niso prenesle v prakso. Ob tem lahko trdimo, da OZN hromi številno članstvo, ali če smo bolj eksplicitni - nacionalni interesi njenih članic oziroma velesil, pri čemer so opazna razhajanja pri doseganju določenih ciljev OZN in željami njenih članic (ter izvenorganizacijskih, bilateralnih odnosov med državami, i.e. ZDA – Maroko, Francija – Maroko ipd.). Pri tem se moramo vseeno zavedati, da mednarodno organizacijo kot so ZN povezuje globalno članstvo, ter je dejansko težko predstavljivo, da bi v vseh primerih ukrepala v takšni meri kot to govori in tudi odloča (npr. GS ZN), še posebej ko je spekter in ustroj držav članic tako različen in raznovrsten. A vendar bi se ZN morali držati ključnih norm, ki jih zagovarjajo v svojem bistvu ter v Ustanovni listini ZN, ki v členu 1 eksplicitno zagovarja spoštovanje samoodločbe narodov ter enakopravnost ljudstev v skladu z načeli pravičnosti in mednarodnega prava (UL ZN, 1945). To je izrednega pomena še posebej ko so okoliščine situacije te, da se agonija dekolonizacije iz leta v leto podaljšuje že več kot 40 let in ko je Zahodna Sahara s strani ZN imenovana kot »še edina afriška kolonija« (Mundy, 2009: 115). ZN so bili mnogokrat tarča kritik zaradi neskladja z načeli, ki jih promovirajo. Ta nekonsistentnost je tako lahko posledica omenjene organizacijske hipokrizije, pri kateri se organizacije v pritiskih konflikta v zunanjih okoljih odzovejo skozi nasprotujoča si dejanja in izjave. Mednarodne organizacije kot so ZN so podvržene konfliktnim zahtevam 27 po temu, da dosežejo normativne standarde ter učinkovito koordinirano ukrepanje. Ti pritiski dajejo zagon organizacijski hipokriziji, ki opazuje in opisuje odzive organizacij na te konfliktne pritiske (Lipson, 2007: 5). Organizacijska hipokrizija lahko ima tako disfunkcionalne učinke, s tem ko ločuje organizacijsko vedenje oziroma obnašanje od njenih določenih namenov in spodkopava institucionalno legitimnost (Lipson, 2006). Obenem je vpletenost ZN aktualna tudi zaradi porajajočih se izzivov, s katerimi se organizacija sooča v 21. stoletju, saj je Ustanovna listina ZN, kot pravi Köchler (2006, 324), osnovana na kompromisu med zakonom in močjo, ki vsebuje dva nasprotujoča si elementa oziroma procesa: (a) mednarodno vladavino prava, ki je zagotovljena skozi sistem kolektivne varnosti, zagotovljene s strani Varnostnega sveta (VS) v poglavju 7 UL ZN, ter (b) avtoriteto VS, ki zagotavlja vladavino prava ter je neposredno povezana s pravico veta stalnih članic VS – privilegijem, ki večinoma služi njihovim lastnim varnostnim interesom, ter jih izvzema iz de facto uporabe prav te vladavine prava, ki bi jo morale zagotavljati. Vse od ustanovitve OZN je takšno stanje stvari omejevalo celotno organizacijo, še posebej pa VS, na modus operandi, katerega značilnost je politika dvojnih standardov. Iz primera Zahodne Sahare je razvidno, da se zgoraj omenjena organizacijska hipokrizija ter hipokrizija sprejemanja odločitev neposredno povezuje s politiko dvojnih standardov ZN. Namreč sledenje interesom velesil in bilateralnih alians med državami jemlje za talca ZN, ki sicer z resolucijami GS skušajo doseči kompromis med POLISARIO in Marokom, a se z izjemo redkih svetlih točk v preteklosti (i. e. mirovni sporazum med POLISARIO in Marokom) ne premaknejo z mesta. Zaključek V prispevku smo naslovili dinamiko ter pomembno vlogo ZN pri (ne)razreševanju konflikta v Zahodni Sahari, kjer stagnacija problematike Zahodne Sahare odraža nemoč oziroma hipokrizijo delovanja ZN. Kontekstualizacija problematike Zahodne Sahare z vidika vpliva ZN tako kaže, da imajo ZN zagotovljen okvir delovanja (GS, VS, Meddržavno sodišče, itd.), s katerim lahko omogoči temelje za rešitve konfliktov, ki pa ga onemogočajo določene države članice oziroma velesile s svojimi nacionalnimi interesi. Konflikt Zahodne Sahare z Marokom je reprezentativen primer organizacijske nezmožnosti ZN, da zaključijo dekolonizacijske procese v Afriki, pri čemer v primeru Zahodne Sahare levji delež krivde pri neizvedbi referenduma o samoodločbi ljudstva nosi organizacijska hipokrizija ZN ter njihova politika dvojnih standardov, ki organizaciji že od njenih začetkov onemogoča korektno delovanje. Pri tem je razvidno, da so se ZN sicer dogovarjali in odločali v prid sahravskega ljudstva ter samostojni državi Zahodne Sahare, kjer pa jih je vedno ustavila prevlada ZDA in Francije, ki sta ostali zvesti Maroku ter njegovim interesom. Problematika Zahodne Sahare se tako nadaljuje in ostaja pereč problem tudi v sedanjosti, hkrati pa ostaja utišana in na obrobju mednarodne skupnosti in kjer se možnosti za dejansko izvedbo referenduma, ki bo pomenil nastanek nove samostojne države v regiji, iz leta v leto zmanjšujejo. V kolikor bi 28 želela Zahodna Sahara dejansko doseči popolno neodvisnost od Maroka in se rešiti njegove večdesetletne nadvlade, bi bilo potrebno, da se zanjo zavzame katera izmed velesil, ki bi situaciji omogočila nov momentum ter zagovarjala interese Zahodne Sahare v ZN pred državami kot so ZDA in Francija. Dokler se tematika, tudi v okviru ZN, ne premakne od govorjenja in pogajanja do resnih akcij in odločnega 'ne' maroški nelegalni okupaciji ozemlja, se žal dozdeva, da bo najboljši scenarij, ki ga Zahodna Sahara lahko doseže, omejena avtonomnost pod Marokom, h kateri stremita Francija in ZDA. Viri Brunsson, Nils, 2007: The Consequences of Decison-Making. New York: Oxford University Press. Epstein, Pamela, 2009: Behind Closed Doors: »Autonomous Colonization« in Post United Nations Era – The Case for Western Sahara. Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law. 15 (1): 1–37. Generalna skupščina Združenih narodov, 1965: Resolucija 2072, A/RES/2072/(XX). Dostopno na: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2072(XX)& Lang=E&Area= RESOLUTION (10. 9. 2013). Generalna skupščina Združenih narodov, 1979: Resolucija 34/37, A/RES/34/37. Dostopno na: http://www.un.org/ en/ga/ search/ view_doc.asp? symbol =A/RES /34/37& Lang=E&Area= RESOLUTION (10. 9. 2013). Generalna skupščina Združenih narodov, 1980: Resolucija 35/19, A/RES/35/19. Dostopno na: http: //www.un.org/ en/ga/ search/ view_doc.asp? symbol=A/ RES/ 35/19&Lang=E&Area = RESOLUTION (10. 9. 2013). Köchler, Hans, 2006: The United Nations Organization and Global Power Politics: The Antagonism between Power and Law and the Future of World Order. Chinese Journal of International Law. 5 (2): 323–40. Lipson, Michael, 2007: Peacekeeping – Organized Hypocrisy? European Journal of International Relations. 13 (1): 5–34. Lipson, Michael, 2006: Organized Hypocrisy and Global Governance: Implications for United Nations Reform. Dostopno na: http:// citeseerx .ist.psu. edu/ viewdoc/ download?doi=10.1.1.118.8845&rep=rep1& type=pdf (5. 9. 2013). Meddržavno sodišče, 1975: Zahodna Sahara, svetovalno mnenje. Dostopno na: http:// www.icj-cij.org/ docket/files/61/6195.pdf (21. 2. 2013). Mundy, Jacob, 2009: Out with the Old, in with the New: Western Sahara back to Square One? Mediterranean Politics. 14 (1): 115–22. Munene, Macharia, 2004: History of Western Sahara and Spanish colonisation. Dostopno na: http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/faculties/law/docs/04munene.pdf (10. 9. 2013). Novais, Rui Alexandre, 2009: An Unfinished Process: The Western Sahara as a Post-Scriptum of the Colonial Period. Africana Studia. 12, 59–66. Omar, Sidi M, 2008: The right to self-determination and the indigenous people of Western Sahara. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 21 (1): 41–57. Saidy, Brahim, 2011: American Interests in the Western Sahara Conflict. American Foreign Policy Interests 33(2): 86–92. 29 United Nations, 2008: The United Nations Today. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information. Ustanovna listina Združenih narodov – United Nations Charter, 1948. Dostopno na: http:// www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (15. 4. 2013). Zoubir, Yahia H. in Anthony G. Pazzanita, 1995: The United Nations' failure in resolving the Western Sahara. The Middle East Journal. 49(4): 614–628. Zoubir, Yahia H, 2007: Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality. Middle East Policy. 14(4): 158–177. 30 II. Okolje in naravni viri 31 Matic Vehovec Zahodna Sahara v številkah Za Evropejca je Afrika še vedno precej skrivnosten kontinent. Če izvzamemo poznavalce in strokovno javnost, težko najdemo koga, ki bi znal našteti deset afriških držav. Zato nas ne sme presenečati dejstvo, da je problematika Zahodne Sahare povprečnemu državljanu evropske unije in Slovenije precej tuja. Ob omembi Zahodne Sahare večina ljudi pomisli na zahodni del saharske puščave in so nekoliko zmedeni okoli tega, če je to zgolj regija ali država. S tem pa smo ironično prispeli v samo jedro problema. Politična pozicija Zahodne Sahare je med najbolj kompleksnimi in spornimi v svetu. Če hočemo, da se stanje v Zahodni Sahari izboljša, je pomembno da razumemo kaj se znotraj njenih mej dogaja. Potrebno je priznati nevzdržnost razmer znotraj Zahodne Sahare, saj »nepriznavanje ali popačeno priznavanje lahko povzroči resnične poškodbe; v njem lahko vidimo obliko zatiranja, obliko zapiranja oseb ali skupin v napačen, izkrivljen in omejen način bivanja« (Taylor, 2007: 291). Z namenom osveščanja bom v nadaljevanju podal in interpretiral nekaj statističnih podatkov o Zahodni Sahari. Rad bi izpostavil, da podatki, ki jih bom uporabil, sami po sebi niso nesporni. Glavnina statističnih podatkov, ki jih bom v nadaljevanju uporabil, sem pridobil s strani POLISARIA. Zaradi tega se moji podatki lahko v veliki meri razlikujejo od tistih, ki jih podajajo organizacije in vlade, ki podpirajo maroško okupacijo Zahodne Sahare. V primerih, ko bodo podatki izhajali iz drugih virov, bo to posebaj izpostavljeno. Geografija Zahodna Sahara se nahaja na severozahodu afriške celine, na severu meji na Maroko, na jugu in vzhodu na Mavretanijo ter na severovzhodu na Alžirijo. Celotna površina Zahodne Sahare meri 266.000 kvadratnih kilometrov, kot taka je približno trinajstkrat večja od Slovenije. Podnebje je suho subtropsko oziroma puščavsko, celotna država se nahaja znotraj območja saharske puščave. Znotraj Zahodne Sahare ločimo dve regiji, ki izhajata že iz kolonialnih časov: Saguía el Hamra je severna provinca, ki je bolj gosto poseljena in bolj rodovitna. Na jugu pa je provinca Rio de Oro, ki je manj rodovitna in manj poseljena. Iz teh dveh provinc je dobila ime organizacija POLISARIO: Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (Ljudska fronta za osvoboditev Saguía el Hamra in Río de Oro). Prestolnica Zahodne Sahare je vedno bilo mesto El Aaiún/Laayoune (včasih znano tudi kot: Laayoune Laayoune, La'youne...). To mesto leži ob atlantskem oceanu na severu države, relativno blizu Kanarskih otokov. Lega Zahodne Sahare je strateško pomembna, saj je bila stoletja stičišče trgovskih poti. Preko njenega ozemlja so zgodovinsko (in v manjši meri še danes) potekale karavane kamel, ki so trgovale z dragocenimi 32 surovinami. Njena obala, ki je odprta proti Atlantiku pa je primerna za čezoceanski ladijski promet. Demografija Zahodna Sahara ima dve glavni etnični skupini, Arabce in Berbere, med njima ni večjih etničnih napetosti. Islam je dominantna in praktično izključna religija, uradni jezik je hassanijska arabščina, a neuradno se govori tudi maroško arabščino in španščino. Tradicionalna Saharska družba je bila striktno hierarhična in plemenska, znotraj plemen so obstajale tri glavne kaste: vojaška, svečeniška in pastirska. Zaradi pomakanja vode in slabe rodovitnosti so bila Saharska plemena predvsem nomadska. Za mnoge prebivalce Sahare so drobnica in kamele še danes življenjskega pomena. Podatki o velikosti populacije na območju Zahodne Sahare se zelo razlikujejo glede na vključevanje ali izključevanje maroških priseljencev in Zahodnosaharcev, ki živijo zunaj mej Zahodne Sahare. Zahodna Sahara je bila žrtev prisilnih demografskih sprememb s strani Maroka, ki je okupirano ozemlje naselil z velikim številom lastnih državljanov v upanju, da bi tako legitimiral lastno okupacijo. Leta 1974 je imela Zahodna Sahara populacijo samo okoli 70.000 prebivalcev (Olsson, 2006: 20). A leto kasneje se je zgodil Zeleni marš, v katerem je okoli 350.000 maroških prostovoljcev prečkalo južno mejo z Zahodno Saharo. To je bila sicer zgolj politična gesta, a sčasoma se je v Zahodni Sahari naseljevalo več in več Maročanov. Za državo s tako majhno populacijo je to seveda pomenilo demografsko revolucijo. Zahodnosaharci so hitro postali manjšina v svoji lastni deželi, potisnjeni so bili na rob tako dobesedno v smislu mejnega teritorija, ki je še vedno pod nadzorom POLISARIA, kot tudi preneseno v smislu marginalizacije tistih Zahodnosaharcev, ki so ostali na ozemlju, ki ga je po novem okupiral Maroko. Po podatkih iz leta 1999 je tedaj celotna populacije štela okoli 307.000 ljudi, od tega jih je 120.000 živelo na območju, ki ga okupira Maroko in 187.000 v taborih za begunce zunaj same države. Ta številka pa ne vključuje še okoli 200.000 maroških okupatorjev. Iz te številke se predvideva, da je celotna populacija narasla na okoli 443.000 do leta 2010 (naravni prirastek znaša 3,4 % na leto). Ameriška obveščevalna agencija CIA predvideva, da bo do julija 2013 populacija narasla na 538.811 ljudi (CIA World Factbook). Stiska okupacije in težavne naravne razmere so privedle do tega, da več Zahodnosaharcev živi zunaj mej svoje države kot v njej. Gostota poselitve v Zahodni Sahari znaša zgolj 1,15 oseb na kvadratni kilometer. Kljub temu, da ima Zahodna Sahara približno trinajstkrat večjo površino od Slovenije, je njena populacija vsaj štirikrat manjša. Mnogo statističnih podatkov priča o krizni situaciji znotraj Zahodne Sahare, tu bom za vzorec naštel le nekaj izmed teh: • 25 % odrasle populacije je nepismene. • Do telefona ima dostop zgolj 0,2 % populacije. 33 • Do radia ali televizije ima dostop samo 0,1 % populacije. • 18 % populacije nima dostopa do pitne vode. • Zgolj 15 % Zahodnosaharcev živi v mestih (k temu je veliko pripomogla maroška okupacija, ki je mnoge prisila v življenje v begunskih taboriščih zunaj mest). • Vladni organi Kanarskih otokov predvidevajo, da so zgolj med letoma 2005 in 2007 preprečili imigracijo več kot 42.000 ljudem. 80 % teh imigrantov je bilo iz Zahodne Sahare ali južnega Maroka (Poročilo CODESA, 2007: 48). • Najvišji življenjski standard v Zahodni Sahari imajo maroški priseljenci, na okupiranem ozemlju je za njihovo korist maroška vlada izvedla številne programe za izboljšanje življenjskega standarda. Načrt je bil, da bo velika maroška populacija legitimirala okupacijo (Olsson, 2006: 20). Naravno bogastvo Zaradi suhega in negostoljubnega podnebja je poljedelstvo v Zahodni Sahari skoraj nemogoče, zato so se Zahodnosaharci vedno osredotočali na živinorejo. Pašne živali v tej regiji še vedno predstavljajo pomemben vir dohodka (okoli 19 % zemlje je namenjeno stalni pašnji). A pravo bogastvo Zahodne Sahare izhaja iz drugih virov. Maroški okupatorji v to regijo niso prišli zaradi peska, temveč so si prilastili najbogatejši obmorski del države. Pod nadzorom POLISARIA ostaja zgolj tanek pas negostoljubne pokrajine ob vzhodni ter južni meji z Alžirijo in Mavretanijo. Tako so bili prvotni prebivalci prisiljeni v umik v najbolj negostoljuben in pust del lastne dežele ali v begunska taborišča znotraj Alžirije. Ena izmed najbolj vročih tem pri maroški okupaciji Zahodne Sahare je maroško koriščenje enega od najbolj bogatih ribolovnih področji na svetu. V šestdesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja je Maroko ulovil okoli 200.000 ton rib na leto, a ta številka je do 2001 narasla na čez milijon ton. Ta drastičen porast se je zgodil predvsem zaradi dostopa do bogatih zahodnosaharskih ribolovnih vod. Ribiška industrija direktno in indirektno zaposluje okoli 400.000 Maročanov in generira profit čez bilijon ameriških dolarjev (Olsson, 2006: 17). Poleg ribolova je znotraj območja Zahodne Sahare, ki ga nadzoruje Maroko, tudi rudnik fosfatov Bu-Craa. Ta rudnik velja za eno izmed najbogatejših najdišč fosfatov na svetu. Leta 1962 je po ocenah novo ustanovljene nacionalne rudarske družbe ENMINSA Zahodna Sahara imela na zalogi 10 bilijonov ton fosfatov, sam rudnik Bu-Craa pa je dokazano imel 1,7 bilijonov ton visoko kakovostnih fosfatov (75 – 80 % čistosti). Do leta 1974 je dobiček od rudarjenja fosfatov dosegel 4,7 bilijonov takratnih pezet. Če bi Zahodna Sahara že tedaj dosegla samostojnost in posledično nadzor nad lastnim naravnim bogastvom, lahko sklepamo, da bi zaradi svoje majhne populacije lahko dosegla življenjski standard zahodne Evrope ali zalivskih naftnih držav (Hodges, 1984: 83-84). Maroko je prav tako pričel iskati nafto na območju okupirane Zahodne Sahare, zdi se verjetno, da bo našel bogate zaloge, a tako kot pri ribarjenju in rudarjenju bo šel levji 34 delež profita v Maroko, koristi za lokalne prebivalce pa bodo zopet minimalne (Olsson, 2006: 19). Dejstvo, da kljub vsem tem naravnim bogastvom večina avtohtonih prebivalcev Zahodne Sahare živi v hudi revščini, pogosto zunaj svoje domovine, je grenko ironično. Vse kaže na to, da bi v odsotnosti sedemintrideset letne maroške okupacije Zahodna Sahara lahko razvila izjemno uspešno gospodarstvo in dosegla življenjski standard prvega sveta. Sklep Zahodna Sahara je dežela protislovji. Je kolonija v postkolonialnem svetu, je dežela tretjega sveta, ki bi lahko bila država prvega sveta. Je kraj, kjer politične in ideološke meje ustvarjajo razkol med privilegiranimi okupatorji in zatiranimi domačini. Je kraj, kjer si nepovabljeni gosti lastijo kraljevsko posteljo medtem, ko so lastniki hiše prisiljeni spati na kavču ali pa se zateči h gostoljubnim sosedom. Problemi Zahodne Sahare so globoki in njihova rešitev ne bo niti lahka niti hitra. Četudi bi Zahodnosaharci že jutri dosegli neodvisnost, problemi te regije ne bi izginili čez noč. Še vedno bi ostal problem, kaj storiti z več sto tisoč maroškimi priseljenci? Ti so po desetletjih okupacije pognali globoke korenine in globokih korenin se ne da neboleče izruvati. Mnogi Maročani, ki so prišli kot okupatorji, so že ostareli in so v Zahodni Sahari vzgojili svoje otroke. Pregnati vse te civiliste iz njihovih domov se morda zdi pravično, a prav gotovo ni moralno neoporečno. Na drugi strani pa bi za svobodne Zahodnosaharce tudi miren soobstoj z maroškimi priseljenci pomenil določen izziv. A vsi ti problemi so v (upajmo ne preveč daljni) prihodnosti, za sedaj se Zahodnosaharci še vedno borijo za svobodo od zatiranja in za dolgo neuresničen sen lastne države. Viri CIA World Factbook, 2013. Dostopno na: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/wi.html, 10.5.2013. Hodges, Tony, 1984: The Western Sahara File. Third World Quarterly, 6(1): 74–116. Dostopno na: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3991228, 11.5. 2013. Olsson, Claes (ur.), 2006: The Western Sahara conflict - The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization. Dostopno na: http://www.wsrw.org/files/dated/2008-1022/claes_olsson_2006_natural_resources.pdf, 4.5. 2013. Poročilo CODESA (Kolektiv saharskih braniteljev človekovih pravic), 2007. Dostopno na: http://www.arso.org/CODESAreport2007.pdf, 4.5. 2013. Poročilo fronte Polisario – Predstavništvo za Slovenijo in Zahodni Balkan. Taylor, Charles, 2007: Politika priznavanja. V: Zbornik postkolonialnih študij, Jeffs, Nikolai (ur.), Ljubljana : Krtina, str. 291–337. 35 Tjaša Učakar Okupacija Zahodne Sahare v luči naravnih virov Ozemlje Zahodne Sahare na prvi pogled ni bujna oaza sredi puščave, niti obljubljena dežela gorskih izvirov, rajskih plaž ali bujne vegetacije. A 266.000 km2 vročega in suhega puščavskega ozemlja na zahodu saharske puščave, na drugi strani obdanega z Atlantikom, katerega hladni tokovi ustvarjajo gosto roso in meglo, obsega številna naravna bogastva, kar poglavitno pojasnjuje razloge za maroško zasedbo tega ozemlja, ki segajo precej širše od zgolj maroških sanj o »Velikem Maroku«. Naravno bogastvo Zahodne Sahare je brez dvoma med poglavitnimi razlogi za zanimanje za ta del sveta. Maroška okupacija Zahodne Sahare se je sicer zgodila iz več razlogov, a eden od poglavitnih vzrokov, da se stanje okupacije nadaljuje še danes, je prav bogastvo naravnih virov. Maroko si z okupacijo zagotavlja dostop in izkoriščanje teh virov, s tem pa še utrjuje svojo navzočnost na okupiranem območju. Kot na številnih drugih območjih na svetu prinaša izkoriščanje naravnih bogastev v Zahodni Sahari pomemben vir dohodkov za okupacijsko silo ter številne možnosti zaposlitve za prebivalstvo. S tem se status quo nadaljuje, okupacija pa se legitimira kljub kršenju mednarodnega prava. Maroko svoje plenjenje naravnih bogastev na območju, ki ga nelegalno okupira, opravičuje z argumentom, da z vlaganji na območju Zahodne Sahare pomaga gospodarskemu razvoju tega, sicer puščavskega območja, saj gradi infrastrukturo in ustvarja nova delovna mesta. Mesta v Zahodni Sahari se modernizirajo, postajajo omrežena, povezana z maroškim transportnim, električnim in telefonskim omrežjem. Večja mesta se ne spopadajo z barakarskimi naselji, kot je to značilno za maroška mesta. Gradijo se šole, bolnice, omogočen je dostop do pitne vode, prestolnica El-Aaiún ima dve razsoljevalni postaji in učinkovito pristanišče (Lewis, 2011). Območje Zahodne Sahare je deležno večjih investicij kot preostali Maroko. V zadnjih 35 letih so ekonomske investicije na območje Zahodne Sahare privabile veliko prebivalcev s severa, večinoma Maročane, ki po nekaterih podatkih že predstavljajo okoli tri četrine prebivalstva na tem območju (Shelley, 2006). Maroko je preseljevanje spodbujal prek subvencj in nižjih davkov, ugodnih stanovanj in podobnih družbenih ugodnosti, večina priseljencev pa je zaposlitev našla v ribiški industriji (Lewis, 2011; Hagen, 2008). Demografska slika se je tekom let tako popolnoma spremenila. To gre v prid Maroka, saj bi na morebitnem referendumu o neodvisnosti Zahodne Sahare maroška večina glasovala proti pravici Zahodne Sahare do lastne države. Kot rečeno, zagovorniki Maroka okupacijo podpirajo z argumentom, da Maroko v Zahodno Saharo vlaga največ sredstev od vseh svojih regij. A ta argument je potrebno dati pod vprašaj. Tudi če pustimo ob strani vprašanje, ali lahko ekonomski razvoj nadomesti možnost avtonomije in samoodločbe, je razlog za maroška vlaganja drugje, 36 niti koristi za lokalno prebivalstvo niso primerljive njihovim izgubam. Res je, da Maroko v razvoj Zahodne Sahare vlaga veliko, a primerljivo z zneski, ki jih prejema na račun koriščenja naravnih bogastev, je jasno, da od koriščenja naravnih virov nimajo koristi avtohtoni Zahodnosaharci, pač pa maroške oblasti (Smith, 2011). Res je, da ima Zahodna Sahara po statistikah višji delež dostopa do pitne vode in elektrike kot Maroko, zgrajenih je bilo veliko cest, pristanišč, javnih zgradb, stanovanjskih naselij (Shelley, 2006), a Zahodnosaharci so v vsakodnevnem življenju diskriminirani in marginaliziani. Imeli naj bi sicer možnosti zaposlitve v industriji fosfatov in ribolovu, a različne organizacije, ki podpirajo Zahodno Saharo opozarjajo, da so Zahodnosaharci pri teh delovnih mestih marginalizirani ter socialno in ekonomsko diskriminirani (Lewis, 2011). Na problemtiko koriščenja naravnih virov Zahodne Sahare so opozorile mnoge institucije. Med drugim se je do koriščenja naravnih virov območij in narodov, ki nimajo lastne države, opredelila tudi Organizacija Združenih narodov, z Resolucijo 1803, ki opredeljuje pravico ljudstev, ki ne razpolagajo s svojo državo, do stalne suverenosti nad svojimi naravnimi viri. V primeru Zahodne Sahare je ta resolucija kršena, saj Zahodnosaharci niso pristali na maroško izkoriščanje virov, niti od tega nimajo koristi, ki bi bile večje od povzročene škode (Permanent Sovereignty…, 1962; Smith, 2011). Glavna organizacija, ki opozarja na maroško izkoriščanje naravnih virov Zahodne Sahare, je Western Sahara Resource Watch, ki opozarja na štiri vrste naravnih virov, ki so v osrčju teritorialnega spora med Zahodno Saharo in Marokom: občasno odvažanje mivke z obal Zahodne Sahare na obale Kanarskih otokov, iskanje nafte na kopnem in na območju kontinentalne police Zahodne Sahare, priobalni ribolov ter pridobivanje fosfatnih kamnin pri kraju Bu Craa (Smith, 2011). Ribe in fosfati ter možne rezerve nafte in zemeljskega plina tako predstavljajo enega pomembnejših razlogov za teritorialni spor med Zahodno Saharo in Marokom. V nadaljevanju bomo analizirali posamezne naravne vire in vlogo Maroka pri njihovem izkoriščanju. Ribolov Maroko si z okupacijo Zahodne Sahare zagotavlja dostop do 1150 km obale na enem najbogatejših ribolovnih območij na svetu. Ribolov v Zahodni Sahari je za Maroko pomemben iz treh razlogov. Ribištvo je za Maroko pomemben generator prihodkov in zaposlitve, globalno povpraševanje po morski hrani raste, vode Zahodne Sahare pa so zaenkrat še zelo bogate in predstavljajo pomemben delež maroškega ulova. Ta se je od 1960-ih let, ko je znašal okoli 200.000 ton, povišal na čez en milijon ton v letu 2001. Ribiška industrija zaposluje okoli 400.000 Maročanov, prihodki od izvoza rib pa predstavljajo okoli 15 % celotnega izvoza (Shelley, 2006). Ribištvo prispeva za okoli 6,5 % služb v Maroku, ta delež pa želi Maroko v prihodnjih osmih letih še bistveno povečati. Skoraj 40 % nacionalnega ulova je iz območja okoli mesta El-Aaiún v Zahodni Sahari (Lewis, 2011). 37 Zaradi prelova so maroške vode že precej izčrpane, predvsem severne obale ob Mediteranskem morju, zato postaja obala Zahodne Sahare za maroški ribolov vedno bolj pomembna. Po podatkih Organizacije Združenih Narodov za hrano in kmetijstvo, naj bi se delež ulova sardin v maroških vodah zmanjšal za 80 %, medtem ko naj bi zaloge v voda Zahodne Sahare ostajale zdrave. Poleg tega 80 do 90 % prihodkov od ribolova prinesejo glavonožci, ki se nahajajo skoraj izključno v zahodnosaharskih vodah (Shelley, 2006). Po nekaterih ocenah naj bi kar 70 do 90 % maroškega ulova pristalo v pristaniščih na območju Zahodne Sahare, ki jih je Maroko dobro tehnološko opremil, zgradil pa tudi številne obrate za predelavo, zamrzovanje, pakiranje itd. (Hagen, 2008). A zaradi intenzivnega in nenadzorovanega ribolova tudi v Zahodni Sahari v zadnjih letih že prihaja do prekomerne izrabe, do prelova in opaznega zmanjševanja zalog. Po podatkih Organizacije Združenih Narodov za hrano in kmetijstvo celotno ribolovno območje Zahodne Afrike ogroža prelov, predvsem v škodo lokalnih ribičev, ki s svojimi barkami ne zmorejo tekmovati z modernimi ribiškimi ladjami, opremeljenimi z najnovejšo tehnologijo, ki jih v vode Zahodne Afrike pošilja EU. Njena močno subvencionirana flota v vodah Zahodne Sahare in Mavretanije letno ulovi 235.000 ton pelagičnih vrst. To območje tako postaja eno glavnih lovišč Evropske unije, ki 25 % rib ulovi v vodah držav v razvoju, s tem pa slabi lokalne ekonomije, ki so eksistencialno odvisne od ribolova. V Senegalu se je ulov zmanjšal za 75 % v zadnjih desetih letih. Vlade so postale odvisne od prihodkov od prodaje ribolovnih pravic tujim korporacijam in državam, lokalno prebivalstvo pa se sooča s pomanjkanjem, zato nekateri analitiki opozarjajo, da se lahko v Zahodni Afriki ponovi primer Somalije (Vidal, 2012). Ribištvo sicer ni bila tradicionalna panoga Zahodnosaharcev, razen v regijah na jugu, danes pa je skoraj celotna ribiška industrija Zahodne Sahare pod maroškim nadzorom (Hagen, 2008). Koristi od razvoja ribolova so za zahodnosaharce zanemarljive, le malo je dovolj premožnih, da bi si kupili barko in ribiško opremo, v pristaniščih je zaposlen zgolj manjši delež zahodnosaharcev, Maroko pa dovoljenja za poslovanje podeljuje zgolj bogatejšim zahodnosaharcem, ki izkazujejo prijateljski odnos z Marokom (Shelley, 2006). Maroko poskuša z izdajanjem ribolovnih pravic nadzorovati ulov in kontrolirati zaloge, a po predvidevanjih je ilegalnih ribiških ladij prav toliko kot tistih z dovoljenji, kar še pospešuje prelov in manjšanje zalog (Shelley, 2006). Tuji ribolov ima v vodah Zahodne Sahare že dolgo zgodovino, stoletja so ribiči s Kanarskih otokov in Španije lovili ribe tudi v vodah Zahodne Sahare. Ko je Španija prepustila kolonialno oblast nad Zahodno Saharo je ohranila pravice do priobalnega ribolova v vodah Zahodne Sahare. Ko je Španija vstopila v Evropsko unijo, je pravice vnesla v širšo evropsko skupnost, sama pa še vedno nadzoruje pogajalske procese z Marokom glede ribolova (Hagen, 2008). Ribolovni partnerski sporazum med Evropsko unijo in Marokom je stopil v veljavo 1. marca 2006, s protokolom pa naj bi se obnavljal vsako leto. EU je za 36 milijonov evrov dobila dostop do teritorialnih vod Maroka za več kot 100 svojih ladij. Sporazum je 38 določal veljavnost na območju voda, ki spadajo pod suverenost ali jurisdikcijo kraljevine Maroko. Kritiki sporazuma so mu očitali nelegalnost, saj Združeni narodi ne priznavajo Maroške oblasti nad Zahodno Saharo, poleg tega pa ribiški dogovor ne prinaša koristi Zahodnosaharcem. Na pobude, da bi iz sporazuma izvzeli vode Zahodne Sahare je Evropska komisija takrat odgovorila, da za to ni potrebe, saj naj bi bil sporazum v skladu s pravnim mnenjem Združenih narodov. Po podatkih švedske poslanke v Evropskem parlamentu, 74 % flote EU deluje v vodah Zahodne Sahare, pri tem pa ljudje s tega območja nimajo nobene besede. Maroko z ribiškim sporazumom z EU legitimira svojo okupacijo Zahodne Sahare, EU pa sodeluje pri tem dejanju. Evropski poslanci so leta 2011 zavrnili podaljšanje sporazuma s 326 glasovi proti in 296 za, kar je vodilo v opustitev sporazuma (Lewis, 2011; Hagen, 2008). Decembra 2011 so se tako prenehale ribolovne dejavnosti EU na območju Maroka, začela pa so se pogajanja za sprejem novega protokola. Nekatere članice EU so si prizadevale nov protokol sprejeti čimprej, saj so se nekateri segmenti njihovih flot znašli v težavah, a so na drugi strani številne delegacije poudarile pomen vključitve klavzule o človekovih pravicah, nujnost skladanja protokola z mednarodnim pravom ter z zagotavljanje trajnostne rabe virov (Svet Evropske unije, 2013). Poleg tujih ribolovnih ladij, ki imajo sklenjene sporazume z Marokom, v vodah Zahodne Sahare lovijo tudi velike ribiške ladje privatnih podjetij, ki se povezujejo z maroškimi podjetji, da lahko plujejo in lovijo pod maroško zastavo (Hagen, 2008). Po podatkih Western Sahara Resource Watch Maroko od ribolovnih sporazumov z Evropsko unijo in Rusijo na leto zasluži približno 50 milijonov evrov (Smith, 2011). Rudniki fosfatov Rudniki fosfatov se nahajajo v puščavski notranjosti Zahodne Sahare, v glavnem so v lasti Maroka, ki izkope izvaža prek Zahodnosaharskih pristanišč. Fosfatne kamnine se uporabljajo predvsem za proizvodnjo umetnih gnojil za kmetijstvo, globalno povpraševanje po njih pa raste skladno z globalno intenzifikacijo kmetijstva. Zaloge fosfatov tako postajajo vse bolj dragocene z globalnim naraščanjem povpraševanja po gnojilih. Široka uporaba fosfatov v kmetijstvu je omogočila izjemno rast donosnosti kmetijskih površin, na drugi strani pa vodila tudi v veliko onesnaženje in evtrofikacijo. Globalne zaloge fosfatov se manjšajo, potrebe po hrani pa večajo, zato je rudnik fosfatov danes izjemnega strateškega pomena. Industrija fosfatov za Maroko predstavlja strateško pomemben sektor, v letu 2008 so npr. fosfati predstavljali 33 % izvoza države, približno 10 % fosfatov pa Maroko nakoplje na okupiranem območju v Zahodni Sahari. Če bi to ozemlje pripadalo Zahodni Sahari, bi Maroko dobil močno konkurenčno ponudnico, kar bi lahko znižalo globalne cene. Cene fosfatov na globalnem trgu rastejo, sploh po letu 2008. Rast cen je po predvidevanjih Hagna (2008) povezana z rastjo proizvodnje biogoriv, ki ironično zahtevajo večjo uporabo umetnih gnojil, s krčenjem globalne zaloge fosfatov ter 39 večanjem potreb po hrani zaradi večanja števila svetovnega prebivalstva ter sprememb v načinih prehranjevanja. V Zahodni Sahari se nahaja eno najbogatejših nahajališč fosfatne kamnine na svetu, in sicer območje Bu Craa. Nek ameriški novinar je v ponazoritev, kako zelo pomembno nahajališče fosfatov je Bu Craa, zapisal, da nas danes večina, skoraj vsak dan, poje nekaj hrane, ki je zrasla na poljih, gnojenih s fosfati iz tega rudnika (Pearce, 2011). V tem obširnem nahajališču nakopljejo letno nekaj milijonov ton fosfatne kamnine, ki jo po 150 km dolgem tekočem traku - najdalšem na svetu - pretovorijo do pristanišča El-Aaiún, kjer kamnino operejo, posušijo, skladiščijo in nato razvozijo po svetu za predelavo v gnojilo. Nahajališče Bu Craa so odkrili že Španci v 40-ih letih in ga opremili s potrebno infrastrukturo, Maročani pa so po zasedbi Zahodnosaharskega ozmelja nadaljevali s kopanjem rude. Nahajališče Bu Craa in ostala nahajališča v Zahodni Sahari in Maroku so svetovno pomembna, okoli 15 % delež svetovnega letnega izkopa fosfatnih kamnin, ki znaša približno 170 milijonov ton, namreč prihaja iz nahajališč v Maroku in Zahodni Sahari. Večja nahajališča so že v ZDA in na Kitajskem, a ti dve državi večino izkopa porabita za domače potrebe, zato je Maroko daleč najpomembnejši dobavitelj fosfatov na mednarodne trge. Poleg tega so po nekaterih ocenah svetovne zaloge največje prav v Zahodni Sahari, medtem ko se zaloge drugje zmanjšujejo (Pearce, 2011; Hagen, 2008). Največji uvoznik fosfatov maroškega porekla so ZDA, saj kar 99 % vsega njihovega uvoza prihaja iz Maroka in Zahodne Sahare (Hagen, 2008). Po podatkih Western Sahara Resource Watch Maroko od nakopanih treh milijon ton fosfatnih kamnin na leto dobi čez 400 milijonov evrov. Če to primerjamo s številko o okoli 600 milijonih evrov vredni razvojni pomoči Maroka v Zahodni Sahari v obdobju petih let, ta vlaganja niso več tako velika, saj so dobički Maroka od naravnih virov Zahodne Sahare zelo veliki (Smith, 2011). Hagen (2008) je izračunal, da je vrednost ene tovorne ladje, naložene s fosfatnimi kamninami, vredna enako kot vsa multilateralna humanitarna pomoč begunskim taboriščem v enem letu. Čeprav bi razvoj in uspešnost nahajališča Bu Craa lahko pomenila zaposlitveno priložnost za Zahodnosaharce, temu ni tako, saj so sistematično marginalizirani. Leta 1968, torej nekaj let pred maroškim prevzemom nadzora nad nahajališčem, je bila večina od 1600 delavcev Zahodnosaharcev, leta 2008 je Zahodnosaharcev med 2000 zaposlenimi le še okoli 200, ostali zaposleni so maroški priseljenci (Hagen, 2008). Rudniki fosfatov so še en primer naravnega vira, ki ga izkorišča Maroko, Zahodnosaharci pa od razvoja na tem področju nimajo veliko. Res je, da Maroko vlaga v razvoj območja, a večino industrije je že prevzel od bivše kolonialne sile, Španije, Zahodnosaharci pa so iz upravljanja in zaposlitev na območju v veliki meri izločeni. Interes največjih porabnikov fosfatov je verjetno ohranjanje statusa quo, saj imajo z Marokom dobre odnose, ustanovitev nove države v že sicer nemirnem območju Megreba in zahodne Afrike pa bi pomenilo dodatno negotovost in novo vzpostavljanje odnosov moči. 40 Obnovljivi viri energije Ker Maroko ne razpolaga z nafto ali zemeljskim plinom, je preskrba z drugimi, obnovljivimi viri energije zelo pomembna. Lega Zahodne Sahare v subtropskem pasu in posledično njeno suho podnebje omogoča dobre pogoje za izrabo sončne energije, saj je osončenost območja velika. Poleg tega lega ob obali Atlantika, ob kateri teče hladni morski tok, omogoča izrabo vetrne energije, saj so na območju prisotni stabilni vetrovi. Sončne in vertne elektrarne na območju Zahodne Sahare predstavljajo 5,5 % energije, ki jo Maroko pridobi iz obnovljivih virov, v organizaciji Western Sahara Resource Watch pa napovedujejo, da bo ta delež do leta 2020 zrastel na 26,4 %. Maroko naj bi na območju okupirane Zahodne Sahare nameraval zgraditi sončne in vetrne elektrarne, skupne zmogljivosti nad 1000 megavatov (Morocco: Green Energy..., 2013). V letu 2013 je Maroko načrtoval gradnjo petih vetrnih elektrarn, od tega bi dve postavil na območju Zahodne Sahare, v krajih El-Aaiún and Boujdour. Organizacija Western Sahara Resource Watch mednarodno javnost in podjetja stalno opozarja, da gre za gradnjo na okupiranem ozemlju in poziva podjetja, naj pri okupaciji ne sodelujejo. Poleti 2013 je tako General Electric odpovedal sodelovanje pri gradnji vetrni elektrarn na okupiranem območju (Morocco: General Electric…, 2013). Na drugi strani je podjetje Siemens skupaj z maroškim holdingom Nareva leta 2012 kandidiralo za pridobitev emisijskih kuponov na razpisu Združenih Narodov za čisti razvoj (United Nations’ Clean Development Mechanism), za projekt postavitve vetrne elektrarne pri kraju El-Aaiún v Zahodni Sahari. Njihove vloga je bila zavrnjena, prav zato, ker je bila gradnja predvidena na obmčju zunaj maroških teritorialnih meja (Siemens starting up…, 2013). Maroko na ta način, prek gradnje in lastništva industrijskih obratov in elektrarn utrjuje svojo navzočnost na okupiranem območju. Zaposlitve v teh panogah večinoma pripadejo priseljencem iz Maroka, dobički se prav tako stekajo v maroško blagajno. Tuja podjetja, ki Maroku dostavljajo tehnologijo in znanje, zaradi pasivnosti, nepoznavanja in nezainteresiranosti za vpletanje v meddržavne konflikte, tiho podpirajo maroško okupacijo. Nafta Za razliko od svojih vzhodnih sosed Maroko ne razpolaga z zalogami nafte, zato je v letu 2001 začel z intenzivnejšimi raziskavami območja Zahodne Sahare, tako na kopnem kot na morju. Iskanje se je začelo pospeševati po odkritju zalog nafte ob obalah sosednje Mavretanije, saj je geološka sestava v Zahodni Sahari zelo podobna, po predvidevanjih pa naj bi šlo za potencialno naftno območje, ki naj bi se raztezalo iz Gvinejskega zaliva proti severu (Shelley, 2006). Maroko je podelil dovoljenja za raziskovanje območja francoskim in ameriškim podjetjem, kar je sprožilo ostre proteste Polisaria, saj naj bi bile take raziskave v nasprotju s pravnim mnenjem Sekretariata Združenih Narodov iz leta 2002. Tam je 41 jasno zapisano, da bo vsako raziskovanje in raba naravnih virov, ki ne bosta v skladu z željami in interesi Zahodnosaharcev, predstavljalo kršitev mednarodnega prava (United Nations Security Council, 2002). Čeprav so se nekatera podjetja že umaknila z območja, rekoč, da zalog nafte ni, v Zahodno Saharo prihajajo nova podjetja, ki nadaljujejo z aktivnostmi (Hagen, 2008). Odkritje nafte bi maroško zavzemanje za priključitev Zahodne Sahare še okrepilo. Hkrati bi korist od nafte ponovno imel zgolj Maroko, ki danes financira raziskave in bi prispeval k postavitvi infrastrukture. Trenutno pritisk nevladnih organizacij nekaterim podjetjem preprečuje, da bi se aktivneje vključila v poslovanje na tem območju, a prihajajo druga podjetja, ki jih protipravno stanje med državama ne zanima in z zasledovanjem svojega poslovnega interesa tiho podpirajo maroško okupacijo. Razsoljevanje morske vode Zaradi klimatskih pogojev (sušno, puščavsko in polpuščavsko podnebje) je pomanjkanje sladke vode na območju južnega Maroka in Zahodne Sahare pričakovano. Eden od načinov pridobivanja sladke vode je postopek razsoljevanja morske vode. Poleg potrebe po pitni vodi je sladka voda potrebna predvsem pri predelavi fosfatov. Maroško državno podjetje OCP fosfate pridobiva na okupiranem ozemlju Zahodne Sahare, a za izvoz fosfatov potrebujejo sladko vodo, s katero nepredelane kamnine fosfatov umjejo, preden jih pošljejo na ladje, ki čakajo v pristanišču El-Aaiún. Maroko tako obrate za razsoljevanje morske vode gradi tudi na okupiranem območju Zahodne Sahare. Pri dobavi tehnologije in gradnji sodelujejo podjetja iz drugih držav, npr. Norveški Aqualyng. Norveške organizacije za podporo Zahodni Sahari so podjetje sicer opozorile, da je Maroko okupacijska sila na območju, kjer želijo graditi obrat, in ga pozvale k premisleku in umiku od sodelovanja z Marokom (Controversial Norwegian PR…, 2008). Norveška je ena od držav, ki so pri opozarjanju na potencialno sporne naložbe podjetij posebej pozorne, saj na spletni strani ministrstva za zunanje zadeve, ki norveškim podjetjem pomaga pri pridobivanju poslov v tujini, opozarja podjetja, da poslovanje na območju Zahodne Sahare pomeni sodelovanje pri teritorialnem sporu z Marokom in to sodelovanje odsvetujejo. Med dobavitelji razsoljevalnih naprav je med drugim francosko podjetje Veolia, ki med svojimi referencami navaja razsoljevalno postajo v kraju Laayoune, za katerega zapiše, da se nahaja v Maroku, čeprav gre za ozemlje okupirane Zahodne Sahare (Desalination.com, 2013). Izvoz peska/mivke Zahodna Sahara je že desetletja pomembna izvoznica peska oziroma mivke, največ izvoza gre na Kanarske otoke in Madeiro, kjer pesek uporabljajo v gradbeništvu in turizmu, za vzdrževanje peščenih plaž (Hagen, 2008). Pesek so začeli iz Zahodne Sahare na Kanarske otoke tovoriti že Španci, še v času kolonializma. Umetne plaže na 42 Kanarskih otokih so začeli vzdrževati s peskom iz Zahodne Sahare, ki je bil cenejši in bolj dostopen kot temni vulkanski pesek Kanarskih otokov (The dirty sand…, 2011). Točnih podatkov o prevozu peska iz Zahodne Sahare ni, saj pristanišča, ki pesek uvozijo, zapišejo le, da je pesek prispel iz Afrike. V letu 2008 je organizacija Western Sahara Resource Watch začela z monitoriranjem izvoza peska in ugotovila, da izvoz peska poteka stalno in v velikih količinah (Sand exports…, 2013). Kmetijstvo Od leta 2004 se je v južnem delu Zahodne Sahare, v območju okoli mesta Dakhla, razvila intenzivna pridelava sadja in zelenjave, ki uporablja sladkovodne zaloge podtalnice na tem območju. Po nekaterih informacijah (Dakhla farms depleting…, 2013) črpanje vode za namakanje obsežnih kmetijskih površin na tem območju že ogroža zaloge podtalnega vodonosnika. Glede na to, da gre za vodonosnik s fosilno vodo (voda, ki je ujeta med dve nepropustni plasti in se ne obnavlja), kar pomeni, da se zaloge ne obnavljajo, intenzivno črpanje vode ni trajnostna rešitev, zato obstaja strah, da se bodo zaloge vode iztrošile, preden bo konflikt med Zahodno Saharo in Marokom rešen. Kot navaja WSRW (Dakhla farms depleting…, 2013) je študija o natančnih zmožnostih vodonosnika sicer obljubljena, a zaradi interesov lastnikov obdelovalnih površin ne pride v javnost, saj bi lahko povzročila občutno zmanjšanje pridelave, če bi se izkazalo, da vodonosnik ni zelo zmogljiv, ali pa povečanje konkurence, v primeru, da bi študija pokazala obilnost podzemenga vodnega vira. Vodnega vira pa ne ogroža zgolj črpanje vode, pač pa tudi onesnaženje zaradi umetnih gnojil. Lokalna agencija za vodo opozarja, da bi se lahko mesto Dakhla ob nespremenjeni izrabi vodnega vira že do leta 2030 soočilo z velikim pomanjkanjem sladke vode (Dakhla farms depleting…, 2013). Poraba vode pa ni edina težava kmetijstva na tem območju. V panogi se je zaposlilo nekaj tisoč novih maroških priseljencev, pridelki pa se večinoma izvažajo na evropski trg (Hagen, 2008). Lokalni prebivalci torej ponovno izgubijo na več ravneh. Ne pridobijo novih možnosti zaposlitve, ne sodelujejo pri pridelavi, ne dobijo zaslužkov od pridelkov, ki zrastejo na njihovi zemlji, niti ne dobijo produktov, saj so namenjeni izvozu na evropski trg. Hkrati pa se porablja njihov najbolj dragocen naravni vir - voda. Sklep Uradno mnenje Združenih narodov pravi, da se mora izkoriščanje naravnih virov na neavtonomnih območjih izvajati izključno v korist lokalnega prebivalstva. Pomembno vprašanje se postavlja z vse večjim priseljevanjem Maročanov na območje Zahodne Sahare, koga torej šteti med lokalne prebivalce. Zgolj tiste, ki so na območju živeli pred letom 1975 ali tudi nove priseljence, ki bi jim morebitni mirovni načrt lahko omogočil pravico do glasovanja na morebitnem referendumu o samoodločbi (Shelley, 2006)? Maroško izkoriščanje naravnih virov Zahodne Sahare je v velikem nasprotju s pravično 43 mirno in pravno ustrezno rešitvijo za Zahodno Saharo. Trgovanje z naravnimi viri Maroku prinaša legitimizacijo okupacije, pomemben denarni priliv, prek katerega se nato okupacija lažje financira, še pomembneje pa z izkoriščanjem naravnih virov Zahodnosaharce prikrajšuje za uporabo teh virov v prihodnje. Maroko z izkoriščanjem naravnih virov Zahodne Sahare nudi zaposlitev tisočim Maročanom, ki se preseljujejo na okupirano območje, ter napaja svoj proračun. Hkrati pa mednarodna skupnost, ki sicer podpira resolucijo ZN o pravici do samoodločbe Zahodnosaharcev, trgovinsko sodeluje z Marokom in tako sprejema trenutno situacijo, torej stanje okupacije. Viri Controversial Norwegian PR in occupied Western Sahara, 2008: Støttekomiteen for Vest-Sahara, 24.04.2008. Dostopno na: http://www.vest-sahara.no/a104x890. Dakhla farms depleting underground water reserves? 2013: WSRW, 06.04.2013. Dostopno na: http://www.wsrw.org/a106x2557. Desalination.com, 2013: Veolia Water Solutions & Technologies. Dostopno na: http://www.desalination.com/suppliers/med-epc/veolia-water-solutions-technologies. Hagen, Erik, 2008: The role of natural resources in the Western Sahara conflict, and the interests involved. International conference on multilateralism and international law, with Western Sahara as a case study, Pretoria, 04. in 05.12.2008. Dostopno na: http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/faculties/law/docs/15hagen.pdf. Lewis, Aidan, 2011: Morocco's fish fight: High stakes over Western Sahara. BBC News, 15.12.2011. Dostopno na: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16101666. Morocco: General Electric Pulls Out of Tender for Building Wind Farm in Western Sahara, 2013. Sahara Press Service, 06.07.2013. Dostopno na: http://allafrica.com/stories/201307082255.html. Morocco: Green Energy to Uphold Moroccan Occupation in Western Sahara (ong), 2013. Sahara Press Service, 31.08.2013. Dostopno na: http://allafrica.com/stories/201308310605.html. Pearce, Fred, 2011: Phosphate: A Critical Resource Misused and Now Running Low. Yale Environment 360, 07.07.2011. Dostopno na: http://e360.yale.edu/feature/phosphate_a_critical_resource_misused_and_now_running_out/2423/. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 1962: General Assembly resolution 1803. New York, 14.12.1962. Dostopno na: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ga_1803/ga_1803.html. Sand exports from occupied Western Sahara to Las Palmas continue, 2013: WSRW, 27.08.2013. Dostopno na: http://www.wsrw.org/a105x2639. Shelley, Toby, 2006: Natural resources and the Western Sahara. V: Claes Olsson (ur.) The Western Sahara Conflict: The role of natural resources in Decolonization. Current African Issues No. 33, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala. Dostopno na: http://nai.divaportal.org/smash/get/diva2:240540/FULLTEXT02.pdf. Siemens starting up controversial wind project on occupied land, 2013. WSRW, 05.03.2013. Dostopno na: http://www.wsrw.org/a106x2527. 44 Smith, Jeffrey, 2011: The Question of Western Sahara and the Natural Resources of the Territory. Submissions to the United Nations General Assembly, Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee). New York, 4.-6. oktober 2011. Dostopno na: http://arso.org/WSRW4Committee2011JSmith.pdf. Svet Evropske unije, 2013: Sporočilo za javnost, 3225. Zasedanje Sveta – Kmetijstvo in ribištvo. Dostopno na: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/SL/agricult/136199.pdf The dirty sand of Canary Islands’ beaches, 2011. WSRW, 05.10.2011. Dostopno na: http://wsrw.org/a204x2103. United Nations Security Council, 2002: Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-SecretaryGeneral for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2002/161, 12.02.1992. Dostopno na: http://www.wsrw.org/files/pdf/olaeng.pdf. Vidal, John, 2012: Is the EU taking its over-fishing habits to west African waters? Guardian, 10.04.2012. Dostopno na: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/apr/02/eu-fishing-westafrica-mauritania. 45 Nika Sirk-Rigler Trgovanje z ribami ali s človekovimi pravicami? Največji ribolovni rezervoar zahodne Afrike je med drugim tudi eden izmed najpomembnejših in najbogatejših nahajališč na svetu, saj je vzdolž 150.000 km2 dolgega območja Zahodne Sahare tamkajšnja količina jat rib ocenjena kar na 10 ton na km²; prav tako velja poudariti njeno biotsko diverziteto, ki jo sestavlja preko 200 različnih vrst rib, 70 vrst mehkužcev, raznolikih vrst lignjev, sip, rakovic, škampov itd. Dovolj zgovoren je tudi podatek o letni količini ulova, ki presega dva milijona ton, zato ne preseneča dejstvo, da je leta 1974 Svetovna banka proglasila saharski šelf za najbolj bogat predel vsega Magreba, h kateremu pripomorejo še nahajališča drugih naravnih virov, kot so bogastva fosfatov, mineralov, urana, vodnih virov ter celo potencialna nahajališča nafte in zemeljskega plina. Maja 2006 je Evropska unija brez vključenosti in odobravanja avtohtonega prebivalstva sklenila ribolovni sporazum z Marokom, ki je med drugim vključeval tudi vodovja okupiranega dela Zahodne Sahare, v katerih je bil evropskim ladjam dovoljen ribolov. Edina država ki je izrazila svoje nestrinjanje je bila Švica, medtem ko je bila podpora Finske, Irske in Nizozemske pogojena s priključitvijo obrežnega morja t. i. »Gran Magreba«. Tako se namreč po tradiciji imenuje najbolj zahodni del arabskega sveta oz. severne Afrike, ki zaobjema države Maroka, Tunizije, Alžirije, v moderni dobi pa vključuje tudi Mavretanijo, Libijo in Zahodno Saharo. Kljub temu je sporazum požel 409 glasov za, 167 proti, število 66 glasov je bilo vzdržanih. Observatorij naravnih resursov Zahodne Sahare (WSRW) je pred časom lansiral kampanjo »Ustavite evropski ribolov v vodah Zahodne Sahare« z namenom, da mora civilno prebivalstvo pritisniti in izraziti svoje nestrinjanje z renovacijo ribolovnega sporazuma leta 2013, saj je le-ta v nasprotju z moralnimi in pravnimi pravicami saharskega prebivalstva; s pravnega vidika se namreč odpira vprašanje ali ima Maroko sploh pravico razpolagati z bogastvi tega zasedenega ozemlja. Mednarodna kampanja pod imenom Fish Elsewhere! (¡Pescado saharaui!) je torej želela doseči, da se Evropska unija odpove odobravanju in podpori tovrstnih nemoralnih dejanj ter ribarjenju v njenih vodah, vse dokler ostaja konflikt v zadnji afriški koloniji − po sedaj že skoraj 40 letih − nerazrešen. Omenjena kampanja obenem tudi poziva Evropsko komisijo za ribištvo, naj deluje v okviru mednarodnega miru in tako podpre prizadevanja Organizacije združenih narodov za pogajanje k miroljubni razrešitvi konflikta, glede na to, da aspiracije avtohtonega prebivalstva po organizaciji referenduma o neodvisnosti do sedaj še niso bile uslišane. Po določbi mednarodnega prava se maroška eksploatacija naravnih virov Zahodne Sahare lahko realizira le pod pogojem, da se želje in interesi Zahodnosaharcev skladajo s 46 podpisom sporazuma. Vendar je tu še upoštevanje drugega načela, ki si ga je komisija zastavila pri sklepanju tovrstnih zadev, in sicer, da mora država prejemnica zagotoviti, da se denar, ki ga prejme, nameni med drugim tudi ljudem, ki so zaradi tega v slabšem položaju, v tem primeru avtohtoni saharski skupnosti. Pogoj zahteva, da se tudi slednja okoristi z ribolovom v svojih vodah, na kar se Maroko ne ozira, glede na to, da je kar 95 % Maročanov vključenih v ribiške dejavnosti, s čimer zmanjšujejo brezposelnost v državi. Šele dobro leto kasneje so maroški organi vendarle priskrbeli zaprošene podatke (na tem mestu velja omeniti, da niso predstavili nobenega podatka tovrstne narave v prvih treh letih izvajanja sporazuma). Da Evropska unija prosi Maroko za dokumentacijo, kako se sporazum izvaja v korist lokalnega prebivalstva, glede na to, da mora le-ta biti zasnovana na sodelovanju oz. posvetovanju – ne samo z lokalnim, temveč z avtohtonim prebivalstvom - je pravi absurd, saj je Maroko na zasedena ozemlja naselil več tisoč Maročanov, kar zlahka privede do manipulacije s podatki. Kakorkoli, del poročila, namenjen »socialno-ekonomskemu vplivu«, je obsegal zgolj tri strani; na eni izmed njih je bilo tako objavljeno, da se je v regiji »Južnega Atlantika« ustvarilo 20.700 delovnih mest, vendar pri tem ni navedeno kako in kdaj je do tega prišlo, niti v katerih podjetjih. Zaslediti ni niti podatka, koliko Zahodnosaharcev zaseda omenjena delovna mesta. Kljub morebitni verodostojnosti navedene številke, vendarle ni mogoče deducirati, da zahodnosaharsko prebivalstvo od tega pridobiva dejanske koristi, glede na to, da je na ozemlju nikdar dokončane zgodbe dekolonizacije, danes avtohtono prebivalstvo pravzaprav že manjšinsko. Omenjeni dokument je sicer nakazoval na izgradnjo pristanišča Bojador in razširitev pristanišča Dajla v saharskih mestih (označenih v resnici kot maroška), toda navedeni pojasnili bi morali smatrati za nebistvena podatka, kajti po mnenju Evropske zbornice iz leta 2009 gradnje infrastrukture vendarle ni mogoče enačiti s koristjo populacije. Februarja 2010, natanko leto dni pred iztekom štiriletnega sporazuma, je evropska komisarka za ribištvo Maria Damanaki na srečanju z maroškim ministrom za kmetijstvo in ribolov Azizom Akhannouchom zahtevala, naj navede, kakšne koristi ima od sporazuma zahodnosaharska skupnost. Odgovora na vprašanje ni dobila, kar je posledično povzročilo vprašljivost enoletnega podaljšanja sporazuma, ki ga je Evropska komisija predlagala državam članicam EU. Sporazum je pod vprašaj postavila tudi višina zneska finančne kompenzacije, ki ga je Evropska unija namenjala Maroku; slednji je v skladu s (nedavno še veljavnim) sporazumom za ribiške pravice v svojem morju, vključno z vodami Zahodne Sahare, od Evropske unije prejemal kar 36 milijonov evrov letne odškodnine, izmed katerih naj bi bilo 13,5 milijonov evrov namenjenih razvoju maroškega ribiškega sektorja. Kot pričajo evropski viri, se je ponudba Evropske unije ob podpisu podaljšanja sporazuma vrtela okrog 25 milijonov evrov, medtem ko si je Maroko prizadeval povzdigniti znesek na še višjih 38 milijonov evrov. Povrhu je soglasje ustvarjalo izgubo, saj se je od vsakega investiranega evra povrnilo le 83 centov. 47 Po besedah nekdanjega avstrijskega zunanjega ministra Erwina Lawrenca »se moramo zavedati, da na ta način neposredno podpiramo tudi okupacijo Zahodne Sahare in smo soodgovorni za to, kar se dogaja v puščavi znotraj puščave« (Longoria, 2012). Drugače povedano, obnovitev sporazuma je bila in je še vedno pod vprašajem tudi zaradi konflikta Zahodne Sahare, saj je jasno, da je sporazum podpiral zasedbo. Prizadevanja Maroka, tako za njeno okupacijo kot tudi za odobritev predstavljenega sporazuma, so zgolj ekonomske narave, saj maroška kraljevina skorajda nima lastnih naravnih bogastev, temveč živi od turizma, emigracije in predvsem od tranzicije droge, kjer ni skrivnost, da ima Maroko pod nadzorom celotno prekupčevanje s hašišem na ozemlju severne Afrike. Kljub temu, da je Bruselj priskrbel podatke, ki so jih države članice zahtevale za podporo renovacije sporazuma, so bile le-te med seboj do zadnjega razdeljene, prav tako ni obstajala potrebna kvalificirana večina, ki bi bila naklonjena predlogu Evropske unije. Španija in Francija sta bili na čelu držav, ki so prosile za hitro odobritev sporazuma in opozarjale nenaklonjeni in sumničavi Švedsko in Dansko, da je v igri zgolj enoletni odlog. Evropski parlament je dve leti nazaj, 14. decembra 2011 nazadnje s tesno večino glasov zavrnil podaljšanje ribiškega sporazuma med Evropsko unijo in Marokom, in obenem zamrznil tudi vojaško pomoč Maroku z namenom razrešitve situacije grobe kršitve človekovih pravic, ki neprestano poteka na spornem ozemlju. Izdelana poročila za Evropsko komisijo so dokazala, da plačevanje odškodnine Maroku za ribolov Evropske unije v Zahodni Sahari predstavlja zapravljanje davkoplačevalskega denarja članic EU, poleg tega so pravne službe Evropskega parlamenta sklenile, da sporazum krši mednarodno pravo, glede na to da Zahodna Sahara ni del Maroka ter da avtohtona populacija teriotorija pravzaprav nikdar ni dopustila sklepa o ribolovu. Temu končnemu izidu je sledil ukaz, da mora flota Evropske unije nemudoma prenehati z ribolovom v Zahodni Sahari in se vrniti v pristanišče. Evropska unija nima nikakršne koristi od sedanjega stanja v tej deželi, žrtvi lastnih bogastev, saj bi s svojimi naravnimi viri (ribami in fosfati) lahko razpolagala in trgovala tudi neodvisna Zahodna Sahara; glavna razlika bi bila predvsem v tem, da bi se lahko Zahodnosaharci končno rešili iz stiske; predvsem mladi, ki so izobraženi in pripravljeni na delo ter naveličani mirne razrešitve konflikta, saj zahtevajo pravico do službe, pravico do stanovanja ter pravico do razpolaganja z lastnim naravnim bogastvom. Posledično bi upadlo število ilegalnih emigracij na Kanarske otoke, ki predstavljajo rešilno bilko za vse tiste, ki bežijo pred kruto usodo v maroških okvirih, zaznamovano z revščino, nepismenostjo, korupcijo, nasiljem, poboji in še bi lahko naštevali. Kot zagotavlja predstavnik gibanja Frente Polisario na Balkanu Malainin Mohamed »bi Evropa z neodvisno Zahodno Saharo veliko pridobila – najprej mir in stabilnost v regiji in nato še z našimi naravnimi bogastvi« (Vasev, 2013). Leto pred iztekom sporazuma je španska vlada Evropsko komisijo zaprosila za že zgoraj omenjeno začasno – enoletno – podaljšanje s ciljem, da bi lahko naklonili več časa 48 izpogajanju pogojev novega sporazuma, brez da bi zaradi tega morali v območju zaustaviti ribolov. In ravno Španija, imenovana od Organizacije združenih narodov kot bivša kolonialna sila, odgovorna za dekolonizacijo Sahare, je bila tista, ki je imela od sporazuma največ koristi, saj je pridobila najmanj 100 od 119 ribiških licenc, ki so v večji meri odšle v last ribičem iz Andaluzije (42) in Kanarskih otokov (37). Iz tega podatka je razvidno dejstvo, da se je 80 % španskega ribolova odvijalo v vodah Zahodne Sahare, v okviru katerega sta prednjačila kategorija ribolova na dnu morja ter ulov tun, morskih psov, sardin, orad, inčunov in rib mečaric (zadnja kategorija predstavlja približno 60.000 ton ulova). Zato ni nič nenavadnega, da je španski parlament, skupaj s predstavniki ladjedelcev, izrazil svojo nejevoljo in jezo nad rezultatom zadnjega glasovanja, kateri je bil nedvomno presenečenje po vseh teh letih vsakokratnega Maroškega zmagoslavja v Strasbourg. Tako je generalni sekretar Španske konfederacije za ribolov (Cepesca) Javier Garat zagotovil, da je trgovinska blokada »velika napaka« in »slaba novica«, saj lahko vodi k izgubi zaposlitve, delovnih mest in ribiške aktivnosti v Španiji. Konec istega leta je Španija od Evropske unije že zahtevala odškodnino za škodo, ki jo je njeni floti povzročil veto Evropskega parlamenta za podaljšanje ribolovnega sporazuma z Marokom, saj naj bi bilo prizadetih okrog 70 ladij in več kot 500 neposrednih delovnih mest, prav tako naj bi del odškodnine bil namenjen posadki, ki ima svojo zaposlitev na ribiških plovilih. Španija in Maroko bosta nedvomno zaprosili za nov mandat ribolovnega sporazuma, ki bo zgrajen na novih, drugačnih osnovah, ki bodo ekonomsko, ekološko in socialno podprte, vendar je evropska komisarka za ribolov in pomorske zadeve Maria Damanki na to odgovorila, češ, da »ne vemo, ali je nov ribolovni sporazum z Marokom sploh še mogoč (...) V vsakem primeru bi bilo ob sprejetju sporazuma potrebno vključiti prepričljive odgovore na ključne teme, kot so razvoj okolja, ekonomski dobiček ter mednarodna legalnost« (Soto, 2011). Ob sprejetju sporazuma leta 2006 je bila slednja prezrta s strani Evropskega parlamenta, ki je sramotno postavil ekonomski dobiček in določene trgovske interese nad človekove pravice ter s tem povozil načela mednarodnega prava. Nedavno smo lahko bili priča enunciaciji maroškega diplomata Youssefa Amrania, ki je razglasil, da je »sodelovanje z Evropsko unijo izredno težko, ker imamo za Evropski parlament dinozavra, ki preprečuje vsakršno napredovanje – tj. sklenitev novega soglasja o ribolovu med EU in Marokom« (Vasev, 2013). Jasno je izrazil željo svoje vlade po obnovitvi sklepa, ki dovoljuje evropskim barkam vreči svoje ribiške mreže v severnoafriško morje, saj je sedaj preteklo že leto dni in pol odkar so le-te morale konfliktno cono dokončno zapustiti. Država, ki jo je prekinitev sporazuma prizadela, je poleg Španije še Francija, ki ravno tako meni, da se trgovanje odvija po dobri poti in zahteva čimprejšnjo raz(rešitev). Navsezadnje je »v Maroku prisotnih več kot 600 francoskih podjetij in je zato Francija tista, ki zares vlada v Maroku«, je dejal predstavnik 49 Frente Polisaria za Slovenijo, Hrvaško, Bosno in Hercegovino ter Makedonijo Malainin Mohamed (Vasev, 2013). V Sloveniji se proti podaljšanju dogovora borita predvsem evropski poslanec Ivo Vajgl (ki je obenem tudi podpredsednik skupine za Zahodno Saharo v Evropskem parlamentu) in sedaj že nekdanji poslanec slovenskega parlamenta in član stranke Zares Franco Juri, ki sta apelirala na slovensko vlado, naj ne blagoslovi nadaljevanja nezakonitega ribolova v vodah Zahodne Sahare. V tem dejanju sta videla možnost, da Slovenija potrdi svojo načelnost in nadalje prisostvuje pri reševanju statusa quo v tej, od vseh pozabljeni deželi, vendar je Slovenija kljub vsemu enoletno podaljšanje sporazuma ocenila kot ustrezno in smiselno prehodno rešitev. Malainin Mohamed slovenske oblasti še vedno naproša k temu, da »naj si Slovenija izoblikuje čim bolj jasno stališče glede podpore zahodnosaharskemu ljudstvu kot večina drugih članic EU. Želimo, da nasprotuje sporazumom z Marokom, kot je sporazum o ribištvu, ki vključuje ozemeljske vode Zahodne Sahare, ker ti sporazumi podpirajo okupacijo, in s humanitarno pomočjo želimo lajšati trpljenje Saharcev« (Vasev, 2013). Odgovor na vprašanje, kaj je od Slovenije in od morebitne razrešitve skorajda že 40-letnega konflikta pričakovati v prihodnosti, bo prinesel zgolj čas. »Kar je izgledalo kot morje peska je ozemlje polno upanj, povzdignjeno od svojega ljudstva.« (Malak: Upanje Zahodne Sahare) Viri Agencia EFE, 2013: La CE no quiere pagar más a Rabat por el acuerdo de pesca y aún ve problema en el Sáhara. Terra España. Dostopno na: http://noticias.terra.es/mundo/europa/,034e27251c21d310VgnCLD2000000dc6eb0aRCRD.html. Basteiro, Daniel, 2011: La Eurocámara anula el acuerdo de pesca con Rabat por el Sáhara. Público. Dostopno na: http://www.publico.es/412140/la-eurocamara-anula-el-acuerdo-de-pesca-con-rabatpor-el-sahara. Deiros, Trinidad, 2011: La UE encubre a Marruecos para pescar en el Sáhara. Público. Dostopno na: http://www.publico.es/internacional/394621/la-ue-encubre-a-marruecos-para-pescar-en-el-sahara. Fishelsewhere, 2013: Marruecos: »La Eurocámara es un dinosaurio que dificulta el acuerdo«. Fishelsewhere.eu. Dostopno na: http://www.fishelsewhere.eu/a158x1414. Fishelsewhere, 2011: La UE encubre a Marruecos para pescar en el Sáhara. Fishelsewhere.eu. Dostopno na: http://www.fishelsewhere.eu/a158x1326. Gaube, Aleš, 2011: Slovenski blagoslov za nadaljnje leto ribarjenja evropskih bark v vodah Zahodne Sahare. Dnevnik. Dostopno na: http://www.dnevnik.si/svet/1042425091. 50 Longoria, Álvaro, 2012: Sons of the clouds, the last colony. DVD. Malak, 2008: La esperanza del Sahara Occidental, Poesía. Embajada de la República Árabe Saharaui Democrática en México. Dostopno na: http://www.embajadasaharauimexico.org/rasd-enmexico/poesia-y-narrativa/25-la-esperanza-del-sahara-occidental-poesia.html Soto, Daniela, 2011: España pide indemnización a la UE tras el veto a acuerdo de pesca con Marruecos. BíoBíoChile. Dostopno na: http://www.biobiochile.cl/2011/12/15/espana-pide-indemnizacion-a-laue-tras-el-veto-a-acuerdo-de-pesca-con-marruecos.shtml. Vajgl, Ivo, 2011: Zmaga človekovih pravic: Evropski parlament zavrnil podaljšanje ribiškega sporazuma z Marokom. Dostopno na: http://ivovajgl.eu/komentar/2145/zmaga-clovekovih-pravicevropski-parlament-zavrnil-podaljsanje-ribiskega-sporazuma-z-marokom. Valenčič, Erik, 2010: Igranje z mirom. Mladina, 45. Dostopno na: http://www.mladina.si/52307/. Vasev, Boris, 2013: Zahodna Sahara: EU v precepu med odgovornostjo in koristmi. RTV SLO. Dostopno na: http://www.rtvslo.si/svet/zahodna-sahara-eu-v-precepu-med-odgovornostjo-inkoristmi/306628. Western Sahara Resource Watch, 2011: La Comisión y Marruecos firman la ampliación del acuerdo de pesca. WSRW. Dostopno na: http://www.wsrw.org/a205x1882. Western Sahara Resource Watch, 2011: La UE vota a favor del robo del pescado saharaui, 2006. WSRW. Dostopno na: http://www.wsrw.org/a194x1988. Western Sahara Resource Watch, 2013: Recogen firmas para detener la pesca de la UE en el Sahara Occidental ocupado. TerceraInformación. Dostopno na: http://www.tercerainformacion.es/spip.php?article45715. 51 52 III. Religija, kultura, politika 53 Alen Hajdarević Zahodna Sahara pod okupacijo Zahodna Sahara je dežela, večno pod tujo okupacijo. Aleš Skornšek-Pleš (2012) v svojem članku Zahodna Sahara, zadnja kolonija v Afriki pravi, da se je kolonialna doba v Zahodni Sahari zaradi neugodnega podnebja in neatraktivnosti ozemlja začela šele leta 1884, ko je Španija po berlinskem kongresu razglasila protektorat nad področjem Río de Oro in ustanovila svoje prve naselbine. Omeni tudi, da je bila španska prisotnost sprva omejena predvsem na obalni pas in mesto Villa Cisneros, medtem ko so ljudstva v notranjosti ostala praktično neodvisna. Kaže se, da je bilo od nekdaj veliko zanimanje za obalni pas Zahodne Sahare, o katerem je še dandanes veliko govora predvsem zaradi bogatih območij z ribami. Aleš Skornšek-Pleš (2012) nadaljuje in pravi, da so desetletja kasneje, po zavzetju Smare leta 1934, španske enote prevzele nadzor nad celotnim zahodnosaharskim ozemljem in da je leta 1958 Španija zaradi vojaškega pritiska tedaj že samostojnega Maroka, saharske osvobodilne armade in nekaterih beduinskih ljudstev, spojila obe pokrajini španske Sahare, to je Sagui el-Hamra (Rdeča dolina) in Río de Oro (Zlata reka), v povezano upravno enoto in jo razglasila za eno od španskih provinc. Kot pravi Aleš Skornšek-Pleš (2012) je hotela Španija s priključitvijo Zahodne Sahare matični državi dokončno rešiti vprašanje tega ozemlja in s tem obiti pravico do samoodločbe v procesu dekolonizacije. Špancem se, razen obalnega pasu, kjer je cvetel ribolov, ozemlje ni zdelo posebej zanimivo in so se 26. februarja 1976 dokončno umaknili. S tajnim madridskim dogovorom sta takrat deželo okupirali Maroko in Mavretanija. Maroko je zavzel dve tretjini Zahodne Sahare, Mavretanija je okupirala južni del, od koder se je po več vojaških porazih proti Polisariu umaknila leta 1979. Lahko vidimo, da je osvobodilno gibanje Polisario imelo zelo močno voljo do osvoboditve in je s silo prišla do tega, da jim je Mavretanija prepustila južni del Zahodne Sahare. Polisario Saharsko osvobodilno gibanje Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y del Rio de Oro), široka koalicija intelektualcev, sindikatov, kmetov, študentov in drugih družbenih skupin, je nastalo 10. maja 1973. Razglasilo se je za edinega predstavnika zahodnosaharskega naroda in razglasilo Saharsko arabsko demokratično republiko, ki jo je do danes priznalo več kot 80 držav. Okupacija Maroko je v času okupacije, natančneje med letoma 1980 in 1987, postopoma izgrajeval okoli 2300 kilometrov dolg zid, ki loči ozemlje pod nadzorom Maroka od skoraj nenaseljene osvobojene puščavske notranjosti pod nadzorom Polisaria. Zid je obdan z 54 bodečo žico in minskimi polji, s čimer je Maroko Polisariu omejil možnosti za vojaške napade iz Mavretanije in juga Alžirije. Maroko je načrtno, s fizično prepreko deloval na ta način, da bi čim bolj onemogočil kakršen koli upor Polisaria. »Maroko je leta 1981 načeloma sicer privolil v izvedbo referenduma na zasedenem ozemlju. Leto kasneje je posebej za to vprašanje ustanovljeni odbor v Organizaciji afriške enotnosti izdelal načrt za izvedbo referenduma, vendar je organizacija istega leta zaradi različnih stališč držav članic glede vprašanja Zahodne Sahare zašla v krizo. 12. novembra 1984 je Zahodna Sahara postala polnopravna članica Organizacije afriške enotnosti (danes Afriška unija), Maroko pa je istega dne iz nje protestno izstopil z argumentom, da v primeru Zahodne Sahare ne gre za mednarodno priznano državo oziroma, da je Afriška unija priznala neobstoječo državo. Maroko ostaja edina afriška država, ki ni članica Afriške unije« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2012). Kot vidimo se je Maroko na vse načine, tako s fizičnimi preprekami, kot v tem primeru s političnimi potezami trudil, da bi čim bolj onemogočil kakršno koli priznanje in omenjanje Zahodne Sahare na mednarodnem prizorišču. Šele leta 1988 je prišlo do sporazuma med Polisariom in Marokom, ki je pripeljal do osnove za pogajanja in prekinitev spopadov, ki velja od 6. septembra 1991. Leta 1989 je takratni generalni sekretar OZN Perez de Cuellar predlagal mirovni sporazum in referendum o samoodločbi, ki bi ga realizirali v razdobju desetih let od podpisa mirovnega sporazuma. Temu je sledil prihod delegacije OZN za izvedbo referenduma v Zahodni Sahari, imenovane MINURSO. Kljub naporom in ogromnim stroškom do njegove izvedbe vse do danes ni prišlo, saj so bili vsi poskusi zaradi oviranja in zavlačevanja Maroka neuspešni. Gospodarstvo in izkoriščanje Za sedanje in pretekle kolonizatorje Zahodne Sahare je najzanimivejši del atlantska obala, ki velja za ribolovno eno najbogatejših območij na svetu. Evropa unija je z Marokom že pred leti podpisala ribiški sporazum, po katerem Maroku plačuje za koncesije, da evropski (prevladujoče španski in francoski) ribiči lovijo na območju zahodnosaharske obale. Prebivalci Zahodne Sahare od takega sporazuma, kot navaja Aleš Skornšek-Pleš (2012), vrednega 36 milijonov evrov, nimajo koristi, jasno pa je, da Evropska unija posredno prispeva k izkoriščanju zahodnosaharskega naravnega bogastva in tako legitimira okupacijo, nasilje in izkoriščanje Zahodnosaharcev. Če bi Združene države Amerike, Evropska unija in širša mednarodna skupnost odmislile svoje geopolitične in ekonomske interese, bi morale ugotoviti, da je okupacija nelegalna, trpljenje in izkoriščanje Zahodnosaharcev etično nesprejemljivo in da je edini legitimni in potrebni korak takojšnje priznanje polne neodvisnosti in suverenosti Zahodne Sahare. Tudi Erik Valenčič v svojem članku Igranje z mirom (2010), omenja to težavo in pravi, da je samo vprašanje časa do kdaj bodo Zahodnosaharci čakali in trpeli to izkoriščanje, saj bo treba vprašanje Zahodne Sahare kmalu rešiti. 55 Posebej indikativen je v tem pogledu podatek, ki ga omenja Aleš Skornšek-Pleš (2012) v svojem članku, ko navaja španski časopis El País, ki na podlagi analize maroškega ekonomista Fouada Abdelmoumnija ocenjuje, da sta okupacija in vzdrževanje okupacijske 360.000 glave maroške vojske na območju Zahodne Sahare Maroko od okupacije 1975 stale več kot 95 milijard dolarjev (približno 70 milijard evrov). V takšno oceno pa niso všteti stroški civilne maroške uprave, ki znašajo dodatnih 25 milijard ameriških dolarjev (18,6 milijard evrov). V znesek ni vštet niti strošek, ki ga ima maroška kraljevina, ko plačuje svojim državljanom, ko jim plačuje, da se preselijo na okupirano območje, jih finančno spodbuja z dodatki k plačam in s pomočjo v osnovnih živilih. Iz teh podatkov lahko vidimo koliko finančnih sredstev je Maroko vložil v to, da bi ohranil nadvlado nad okupiranem ombočju. Situacija danes Danes bi težko našli Zahodnosaharca, ki mu maroški režim ni zaprl ali ubil vsaj enega člana družine. Tisti, ki jim ni uspelo prebežati, živijo v eni najbolj represivnih, policijskih držav na svetu. Aretacije in zaporne kazni za prestopke, kot so pogovor s tujcem, posedovanje česarkoli povezanega s Polisariom, so vsakodnevna praksa. Posebej grozljiva so izginotja oseb, ki predstavljajo prevladujoč vzorec zapiranja ljudi v okupirani Zahodni Sahari. Izginulih oseb, o katerih svojci ne morejo dobiti nobenih informacij, naj bi bilo vsaj tisoč. Poleg stalnih groženj in ustrahovanja se Zahodnosaharci v svoji deželi soočajo s sistematično diskriminacijo na področju izobraževanja, zdravstvene oskrbe in ekonomskih možnosti. Marginalizacija Zahodnosaharcev se stopnjuje z intenzivnim priseljevanjem Maročanov, ki ga obilno sponzorira država s premišljeno politiko ugodnih kreditov in davčnih olajšav (Skornšek-Pleš, 2012). Na takšen slikovit način je Aleš Skornšek-Pleš (2012) opisal dogajanje, trpljenje in izživljanje nad Saharci. Tudi sami lahko v različnih medijih zasledimo takšne namige, da se v Zahodni Sahari dogajajo stvari, kot so kršenje človeških pravic itd. in na to vse pogosteje opozarjajo različne organizacije, vendar pa zaradi močnih lobijev to ne prihaja do tolikšnega izraza, da bi se ustrezne organizacije odzvale v najkrajšem možnem času. Pred tem vprašanjem si zatiskajo oči in to težavo odrivajo na stranski tir. Francija, močna podpornica Maroka, se na vse pretege trudi, da bi se čim manj govorilo in omenjalo človeške pravice Zahodnosaharcev. Zanimiv podatek je, da kar 600 francoskih podjetij sodeluje in deluje na območju Maroka. Tako da je popolnoma logično, da Francija podpira Maroko, saj ima največ koristi od tega. Tudi zadnji politični incident, ko je bil poslanec Ivo Vajgl s člani delegacije Evropskega parlamenta za Zahodno Saharo, izgnan iz Maroka takoj po prihodu na letališče v Casablanci, nakazuje kako daleč so pripravljeni iti, da bi zakrili resnično stanje v Zahodni Sahari. 56 Upori Danes glavnino upornikov predstavljajo mladi Zahodnosaharci in Zahodnesaharke, ki so bili rojeni približno v času okupacije. Mlada generacija je radikalnejša od stare, gre za generacijo, ki je okusila maroško administracijo, hodila v njihove šole in bila prisiljena častiti maroškega kralja. To je generacija, ki danes vodi demonstracije, zažiga maroške zastave, gladovno stavka in se poslužuje drugih oblik upora in odpora. Maroko bi se iz tega lahko kaj naučil. Čas je na strani konsolidacije saharskega nacionalizma. Zaključek Vse kaže, da Maroko ne namerava popuščati niti za milimeter in je pripravljen na nadaljevanje okupacije Zahodne Sahare. Prepričan sem, da bi morali poznavalci, civilna družba in demokratične institucije zahodnih držav, vključno s Slovenijo, o problematiki čim več pisati, izobraževati in osveščati. Iz navedenih primerov vidimo, da so Maročani pripravljeni storiti preprosto vse, da bi se o tem problemu čim manj govorilo, zato se moramo temu upreti in to temo dati v ospredje na vseh področjih. To je edini način, da prepričamo širšo domačo in mednarodno javnost, da je okupacija in trpljenje Zahodnosaharcev nesprejemljivo, krivično in v nasprotju z vsemi vrednotami, ki jih delimo v demokratičnem svetu. Slovenska politika, če se omejim na domače okolje, bi morala prepoznati, da je nastopil čas za slovensko priznanje Zahodne Sahare, za obsodbo maroške okupacije in represivne politike, čas za solidarnost in pravičnost, ki jo je, četudi majhna članica Evropske unije, dolžna izkazati v mednarodni skupnosti. Ni nemogoče, da bi se takšni načelni drži Slovenije pridružile druge države in bi morda sprožili premik tako na ravni EU kot tudi Združenih narodov in tako prispevali k čimprejšnji izvedbi referenduma, kjer bi imeli prebivalci in prebivalke Zahodne Sahare priložnost povedati, v kakšni in čigavi državi si želijo živeti. Viri Skornšek-Pleš, Aleš, 2012: Zahodna Sahara, zadnja kolonija v Afriki. Razpotja, 8, 67–71, Solkan: Društvo humanistov Goriške. Dostopno na: http://www.razpotja.si/zahodna-sahara-zadnjakolonija-v-afriki/ Valenčič, Erik, 2010: Igranje z mirom. Mladina, 11.11.2010. Dostopno na: http://www.mladina.si/52307/ Zahodna Sahara, 2013. Wikipedia. Dostopno na: http://sl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zahodna_Sahara Žerjavič, Peter, 2013: Daleč je Zahodna Sahara. Delo, 7.3.2013. Dostopno na: http://www.delo.si/novice/politika/dalec-je-zahodna-sahara.html 57 Almin Ljutić Religija in politika v arabskem svetu: primer Zahodne Sahare Zakaj je to moj problem? Pri obravnavanju problema Zahodne Sahare se je praktično nemogoče izogniti vprašanju o upravičenosti našega posredovanja in vprašanju o naši moralni odgovornosti za posredovanje. Zakaj bi se ravno mi morali ukvarjati z Zahodno Saharo? Zakaj se to tiče nas v Sloveniji? Vsa ta vprašanja si po vsej verjetnosti zastavi povprečen Slovenec, ko se sreča s problemom Zahodne Sahare. Na svetu obstaja veliko vplivnejših držav in naddržavnih organizacij, ki so se sposobne s tem problemom spoprijeti veliko bolje od nas. Organizacije kot so Združeni narodi, Evropska unija, Afriška unija in Arabska liga naj bi bile zmožne te težave reševati na globalni ravni in logično bi bilo sklepati, da bi ravno te vpletene politične zveze morale ukrepati v primeru Zahodne Sahare. Tudi velesili kot sta ZDA in Rusija bi lahko s svojim posredovanjem pomagali pri reševanju trenutne situacije, če se vpletata že na drugih (gospodarsko, strateško in politično bolj privlačnih) območjih. A kot vemo stvari niso tako enostavne, saj države in naddržavne organizacije primarno delujejo v svojo korist in v prid svojemu statusu, kar pripelje do mreže različnih političnih nasprotovanj in medsebojnih obračunov političnih organizacij, posledično pa ne daje nikakršnih pomembnejših rezultatov. In ni samo politična raven tista, ki vpliva na dogajanje v določeni družbi ali državi. Med najvplivnejše dejavnike sodijo tudi gospodarstvo, geografska lega države, naravna bogastva, raven (formalnih in neformalnih) odnosov v družbi, medijska prepoznavnost, pa tudi religijska opredelitev. Glede na to, da so tako Saharci kot tudi Maročani v veliki večini sunitski muslimani (po podatkih CIA, The World Factbook) in gre torej za dve pretežno muslimanski državi, bi lahko sklepali, da se bo problema lotila širša arabsko-muslimanska skupnost. Velika večina pripadnikov obeh narodov je muslimanov, zato bi lahko sklepali, da bosta oba naroda, ki sledita islamu, poskušala delovati v skladu z islamskimi prepričanji. Islam kot vera, lahko bi rekli tudi islamski svet sam po sebi, je v družbo vpleten na veliko več nivojih kot, na primer, krščanstvo, saj je islamsko šeriatsko pravo obenem tudi državno pravo. Ker religija v primeru Maroka in Zahodne Sahare predstavlja velik del družbe, moramo njenemu vplivu posvetiti več pozornosti. Z analizo dejanskega vpliva religije in hkrati politike bomo lahko prišli do odgovora na vprašanje, zakaj smo tudi mi, v Sloveniji, moralno odgovorni za pomoč Zahodnosaharcem, saj, kot bomo spoznali v nadaljevanju, pomoč ne prihaja s strani tistih, ki bi lahko pomoč ponudili, ampak s strani tistih, ki imajo čut za sočloveka in človeško trpljenje. 58 Muslimani ali »muslimani« Da sta religija in politika v islamskih državah severne Afrike tesneje povezani, kot sta na primer povezani v evropskih državah in evropskih naddržavnih institucijah, v svojem članku »Religion and Politics: taking African epistemologies seriously« poudarjata tudi Stephen Ellis in Gerrie Ter Haar. Pri obravnavanju primera Zahodne Sahare moramo upoštevati, da so pogledi vpletenih strani na družbo, torej tudi na religijo kot integralni del te družbe, drugačni od naših »evropocentričnih« predstav o tem, kaj naj bi religija v družbi oziroma pri posameznikih predstavljala (Ellis in Ter Haar, 2007: 386). V primeru držav severne Afrike z islamsko večino ter preostalega arabsko-islamskega sveta namreč lahko ena oseba predstavlja državno in versko avtoriteto, saj sta lahko obe funkciji neposredno povezani, s tem pa bi odločitev, ki bi jo nek izvrševalec oblasti izrekel, predstavljala odločitev, zasnovano na obeh temeljih. To moramo upoštevati pri obravnavanju vseh vpletenih strani, saj bomo le tako lahko pravilno razumeli delovanje take družbe. Pri tem moramo poudariti, da se ne glede na dejanski vpliv religioznih prepričanj pri sprejemanju odločitev, povezanih z zavzemanjem strani v konfliktu, v družbah, kjer so religiozna prepričanja direktno vpletena v sistem, te odločitve predstavljajo kot posledica religioznih prepričanj. S tem se v javnost prikazuje (lahko tudi lažno) podobo, da so vse odločitve v skladu z verskimi zakoni in da ne kršijo nikakršnih moralnih vrednot ali človekovih osnovnih pravic. Če hočemo poglobiti naše razumevanje dogajanj v Zahodni Sahari moramo bolj natančno analizirati, kaj naj bi religijska prepričanja vpletenih sploh predstavljala. V primeru Zahodne Sahare, Maroka ter ostalih držav severne Afrike in Arabskega polotoka govorimo o religiji, ki v teh državah dosega največji odstotek verujočih – islamu. Islam je religija, ki pri vseh vpletenih prevladuje, ne samo pred ostalimi oblikami verovanja, temveč tudi glede na celotno prebivalstvo omenjenih območij, saj je verujočih v teh državah tudi do 99 % (primer Maroka). Nekatere izmed držav imajo celo v svojem imenu in v svoji zastavi islamske simbole, ki so zaradi arabskih korenin islama še toliko bolj izpostavljeni. Glavni steber verovanja pri muslimanih je islamska sveta knjiga – Koran. V Koranu, ki za muslimane predstavlja božjo Besedo, se na kar nekaj mestih poudarja povezanost vseh vernikov, ne glede na njihovo nacionalno, rasno ali katerokoli drugo pripadnost te vrste. Kot enega izmed pomembnih virov sunitski muslimani (med katere sodijo tudi Zahodnosaharci in Maročani ter velika večina muslimanov v prej omenjenih državah z islamsko večino) upoštevajo tudi hadise, kar bi v grobem lahko prevedli kot izreke in dejanja božjega poslanca Mohameda, ki so bili zapisani. Tudi ti izreki pričajo o enotnosti in povezanosti vseh muslimanov ter ne puščajo prostora diskriminaciji. V islamu je med večjimi grehi opredeljeno tudi kršenje pravic drugih, pravice drugih pa so: pravica do zasebne lastnine, časti, družine, zdravja in življenja ter svobode, ki ne ogroža pravic drugih ljudi (Muminhodžić, 2001). V skladu s tem bi torej od držav s sunitsko večino, pri katerih ima religija velik pomen, pričakovali, da bodo delovale po svojih, na državni ravni priznanih, predpostavkah. 59 Ker Maroko s svojo vojaško zasedbo in izvajanjem represije nad prebivalstvom Zahodne Sahare, ki se etnično ne opredeljujejo na enak način kot Maročani, neposredno krši te islamske predpostavke, se pod vprašaj postavlja dejanski vpliv religije in moralnih vrednot pri sprejemanju odločitev, povezanih z Zahodno Saharo in njenim ljudstvom. Maroko na ta način izkorišča svojo gospodarsko in vojaško premoč za izvajanje represije nad ljudstvom, ki zaradi omejene gospodarske in vojaške moči brez pomoči ni sposobno braniti svojih interesov (Pinto Leite in drugi, 2006). S svojimi dejanji je Maroko pokazal, da politične zahteve prevladajo nad religioznimi prepričanji, s tem pa religijo, ki je uradno integrirana v politični sistem, spravlja v sekundarno pozicijo oziroma prikazuje religiozno osnovo kot neke vrste kamuflažo, za katero se skrivajo nereligiozna dejanja. To je več kot očiten dokaz, da religija pri odnosih med dvema nasprotujočima stranema nima odločilnega vpliva, še posebej, če je ena izmed vpletenih strani močnejša od druge (v našem primeru Maroko) in to premoč tudi izkoristi. V tem tako vidimo dodatno potrditev dejstva, da kljub uradno velikem (tudi medijsko vsiljenem) vplivu religije na delovanje držav, le-ta ne vpliva v tolikšni meri, saj je obravnavana sekundarno. Začarani krog politike Neuspeli poskusi reševanj težav na podlagi skupnih religijskih prepričanj na območju Magreba in širšega arabskega sveta nas tako pripeljejo do naslednjega temeljnega elementa, ki vpliva na odnose med državami – politike. Če na odnose med omenjenimi državami religija nima večjega vpliva, obenem pa tudi politika naddržavnih institucij kot so Združeni narodi ni zmožna rešiti problema (Zoubir in Pazzanita, 1995), moramo raziskati še možnost regionalnega reševanja problema na nereligiozni podlagi. Pri tem moramo analizirati politična stališča in poskuse držav v regiji. Situacija v Zahodni Sahari tako še vedno ni rešena tudi »zahvaljujoč« drugim državam arabskega sveta, ki, ko pride do mednarodnih odnosov med državami z islamsko večino, prav tako ne delujejo v skladu z islamskimi prepričanji, ki naj bi predstavljala podlago njihovemu političnemu sistemu. Med poskusi reševanja problema Zahodne Sahare na politični ravni pa moramo omeniti poskus gospodarske združitve severnoafriških arabskih držav, kjer podlago za ustanovitev predstavljata politična in gospodarskogeografska podobnost držav Magreba. Arabska Magrebska Unija je bila organizacija, ustanovljena februarja 1989, ki je stremela h gospodarskemu sodelovanju in politični združitvi arabskih držav Magreba, med katerimi so bile Maroko, Libija, Mavretanija, Tunizija in Alžirija. Ravno Alžirija je bila tista, ki je podala predlog o sodelovanju, v sklopu tega pa so hoteli rešiti tudi problem okupacije Zahodne Sahare. Toda maroški kralj Hassan II. je vztrajal pri svoji trditvi, da je Zahodna Sahara del Maroka in od tega ni želel odstopiti, saj bi ga morebitno priznanje Zahodne Sahare lahko stalo prestola. Ker Alžirija ni hotela odstopiti od reševanja problema Zahodne Sahare je Arabska Magrebska Unija hitro prenehala s svojim delovanjem (Zoubir, 1990). Ta regionalni poskus reševanja ni uspel zaradi več razlogov, ki jih bomo analizirali v nadaljevanju. 60 Poleg Maroka, ki je leta 1975 okupiral del ozemlja Zahodne Sahare, se je v boje za to ozemlje vključila tudi Mavretanija, ki pa je leta 1979 podpisala premirje z gibanjem za neodvisnost Zahodne Sahare - POLISARIO - in se od takrat naprej ni več aktivno vmešavala v odnose med Zahodnosaharci in Maročani. Velike stroške Maročanov, ki so jih imeli v borbi s Saharci, je v največji meri z donacijami plačevala Savdska Arabija, v nekoliko manjši meri pa tudi Kuvajt, Katar in Združeni Arabski Emirati (Damis, 1983). Iz tega lahko vidimo, da so bile države, ki so podpirale Maroko, predvsem monarhične, kraljeve države, enako kot Maroko, s kraljem Hassanom II. na čelu. Te so v podpori Maroku videle upravičenje svoje kraljeve vladavine in reprodukcijo svojega monarhičnega političnega sistema. Zaradi naklonjenosti Maročanom se Zahodni Sahari ni uspelo vključiti v Arabsko ligo, ki posledično nima interesa za reševanje problema Zahodne Sahare na način, ki bi bil naklonjen okupiranem ljudstvu. Kot smo prikazali s primerom Arabske Magrebske Unije, je bila največja pobudnica reševanja problema Zahodne Sahare takratna socialistična Alžirija, ki obenem predstavlja tudi največjega regionalnega zaveznika Saharcev. Alžirija se sicer ni neposredno vključevala v boje med Zahodnosaharci, torej gibanjem POLISARIO in Maročani oziroma maroško vojsko, vendar je Zahodnosaharcem nudila ogromno podporo, v smislu oskrbe z orožjem, hrano in surovinami, na primer z gorivom. Obenem jih je podpirala finančno, pa tudi na področju diplomacije, ter se zavzemala za njihovo vključitev v Afriško Unijo, kar jim je na koncu tudi uspelo. V prvih desetletjih bojev z okupatorjem je pomoč Zahodnosaharcem, v obliki orožja in financ, nudila tudi Libija. Edina regionalna država, ki je v vseh teh sporih ostala nevtralna je bila Tunizija (Damis, 1983). Ker je bila največja podpornica Zahodne Sahare takratna socialistična Alžirija, se konzervativne arabske države niso hotele opredeljevati na način, ki bi podpiral drugačne politične sisteme, kar je Alžirijo osamilo v politični borbi za Zahodno Saharo in onemogočilo kakršenkoli napredek pri reševanju spora. Zato je to moj problem! (Zato se moramo ukvarjati s problemom Zahodne Sahare!) Kot smo s pomočjo prejšnjih poglavij uspeli prikazati, se je mednarodna politična skupnost neuspešno spoprijela z reševanjem problema Zahodne Sahare. Tudi enotnost držav z islamsko večino se ni pokazala kot realna rešitev, saj, kot smo pokazali, religija v arabskem svetu nima tako velikega vpliva pri reševanju nastale situacije, države z islamsko večino pa delujejo vse prej kot v skladu z islamom. Tudi regionalna politična rešitev tu ne pride v poštev, saj se Maroko ne želi odreči okupiranemu ozemlju, po drugi strani pa Alžirija kot pomemben akter ne dopusti popolne nadvlade Maroka. Ta negotova situacija najbolj škodi prebivalcem Zahodne Sahare, saj se njihovo življenje pod okupacijo ne izboljšuje v nobenem pogledu. In ravno v tem tiči naša upravičenost do posredovanja in naša moralna odgovornost za posredovanje. Na ravni Evropske unije ni mogoče doseči sporazuma, saj se tako kot v arabskem svetu različne politične sile trudijo za uresničitev različnih, nasprotujočih si ciljev. Zato imamo tudi mi, prebivalci Slovenije, 61 moralno odgovornost, da združimo svoje sile in pomagamo na različne načine, ki bodo vodili do končne rešitve in ki bodo omogočili normalno življenje v tej t.i. zadnji afriški koloniji. Čeprav se na prvi pogled zdi, da nimamo možnosti poseči v svet, ki ga kroji svetovna politika, pa lahko s svojo vztrajnostjo in osveščanjem vseh ljudi dosežemo, da se ta svetovna politika spremeni. Naš glas mora postati tako glasen, da ga več ne bo mogoče preslišati in ga bo potrebno brezpogojno upoštevati. Za dobrobit ljudi v Zahodni Sahari, za dobrobit vseh ljudi, saj si vsi zaslužimo svobodo. Viri Central Intelligence Agency, 2013: The World Factbook, Morocco. Dostopno na: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html, 26.4.2013. Central Intelligence Agency, 2013: The World Factbook, Western Sahara. Dostopno na: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wi.html, 26.4.2013. Damis, John, 1983: The Western Sahara Conflict: Myths and Realities. Middle East Journal, 37(2): 169– 179. Ellis, Stephen, Ter Haar, Gerrie, 2007: Religion and Politics: taking African epistemologies seriously. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 45(3): 385–401. Leite P., Pedro in drugi, 2006: The Western Sahara Conflict: The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Muminhodžić, Redžep, 2001: Ta'limu-l-islam. Sarajevo: El-Kalem. Zoubir H., Yahia, Pazzanita G., Anthony, 1995: The United Nations' Failure in Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict. Middle East Journal, 49(4): 614–628. Zoubir H., Yahia, 1990: The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 28(2): 225–243. 62 Tatjana Košak Ženske v Zahodni Sahari Vloga žensk v Zahodni Sahari Kot navaja Aleš Skornšek-Pleš v svoji diplomski nalogi z naslovom Položaj in vloga žensk v Zahodno Saharskih begunskih taboriščih, je zahodnosaharska družba »specifična zaradi posebne triangularne medklanske strukture (vojščaki, modreci, sveti možje, obrtnice in obrtniki ter podložniki in podložnice) in drugačna od ostalih nomadskih skupin v Sahari zaradi svojstvene družbene in kulturne identitete, ki je posledica skupne zgodovine bojev in zavezništev za kontrolo nad produkcijskimi sredstvi (voda, pašniki, krma, trgovske poti …). Pri raziskovanju saharske družbe in žensk nam je na voljo nekaj pisnih virov, vendar je pri tem potrebno upoštevati tudi ustna izročila saharskih žensk oz. prednic. Prav ti ustni viri so ključni za razumevanje razmer, iz katerih so Zahodnosaharke krenile v proces pridobivanja in obnavljanja zgodovinske identitete« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 18). Zahodnosaharke so vedno skrbele za dom in gospodinjstvo - šotor - in bile »priviligirane skrbnice lastne kulturne tradicije« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 19). Skrb za gospodinjstvo je v takih pogojih kot jih najdemo v Zahodni Sahari vse prej kot enostavna, saj vključuje večkratna postavljanja šotora, nabavo in preskrbo z živili in drugimi življenjsko potrebnimi potrebščinami, skrb za otroke in podobno. Skornšek-Pleš pravi, »da na ta način ženske prevzemajo družbeno in ekonomsko vlogo, ki je integrirana v moških aktivnostih izkoriščanja in iskanja virov preživetja« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 19). V zahodnih družbah je normalno, da ženske sodelujejo pri vseh sferah življenja enakopravno z moškimi, kar je različno od islamskih družb, ki ženske (z izjemo nekaterih agrarnih družb, kjer so ženske del delovne sile) izključujejo. To ne velja za zahodnosaharske ženske, ki imajo, kot pravi Skornšek-Pleš, »prav poseben pomen v družbenem življenju. Še posebno pomembno je, da v tem skupnem običaju skoraj po celotnem območju, naseljenem z Zahodnosaharci in Zahodnosaharkami, razlika med arabskim in berberskim vplivom v tem pogledu ni tako pomembna. Položaj žensk dokazuje njihovo kulturno enakost in delovanje družbene kohezije, kar je bilo še posebej očitno v obdobju množičnega eksodusa po maroški okupaciji leta 1975. To določa položaj, po katerem se Zahodnosaharci in Zahodnosaharke lahko začnejo uveljavljati tako zunaj kot znotraj kot narod v modernem pomenu« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 19). Pomembna plat je tudi kulturna. Kot pravi Skornšek-Pleš, »kultura ne identificira le skupine, ampak tudi ohranja njene posebnosti« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 19). Pri tem so ženske tiste, ki pogosteje prenašajo ustno izročilo iz roda v rod in so hkrati tudi tiste, ki ohranjajo ples, petje ipd. Skornšek-Pleš pravi »da Saharsko družbo lahko tipiziramo kot družinsko« (SkornšekPleš, 2004: 20). Ženska je tista, ki je odgovorna za življenje in preživetje družine. 63 Skornšek-Pleš navaja tudi, »da begunska taborišča danes funkcionirajo tako, da ženske skrbijo za lastno gospodinjstvo, pa tudi širše od lastnega šotora. Beduinska tradicija je v zahodnosaharski populaciji veljala kot potreben dejavnik upora in kot sredstvo, po katerem ocenjujemo, kako doseči spremembe. To tradicijo so po spominu obnovile ženske, ki so želele prenašati kulturo iz roda v rod. Na ta način se ohranja socialna povezanost, ki je podobna trenutni situaciji, v kateri je pridobitev narodne identitete pogojena s splošno zavrnitvijo preteklosti, ki se začne s procesom delne dekulturalizacije, ki jo je težko ustaviti« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 20). Prav tako je naloga saharskih žensk, kot pravi Skornšek-Pleš »da izkoristijo trenutni položaj in soustvarjajo moderni narod in državo. To se odraža v tem, da je materinstvo politična nujnost in dolžnost, saj bi le-to prineslo pozitivne posledice državi. Kljub vsemu pa so Zahodnosaharke daleč od žensk v zahodnem svetu. Najbolj izstopajo močne predstavnice nežnejšega spola, katerih individualnost pa se izraža v skupnosti, ki ima vedno prednost pred posameznikom. Velik vpliv na posameznika ima družina, saj velja, da je le-ta proizvod družine, ki bo zanj vedno skrbela. Tradicionalne strukture sicer ne dovoljujejo individualnosti žensk, upravičeno ali ne, zaradi njihove varnosti. Tudi v zdravstvu imajo ženske prevladujočo vlogo, razširjena je tudi alternativna terapevtska praksa, ki se prenaša iz roda v rod in temelji na zdravljenju s pomočjo rastlin. Ta praksa sicer ni del uradne medicine, jo pa ohranjajo zaradi tradicionalne vloge« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 20). Ženske so se zavedale, da lahko svojo emancipacijo dosežejo le z osamosvojitvijo, zato so začele z antikolonialnim bojem, prav tako so prevzele vlogo v mnogih uporih in bojih. Bile so aktivne na številnih demonstracijah za neodvisnost, ki so se začele 17. junija 1970 v ElAaiunu in katerih cilj je bil oslabiti kolonialni sistem. Mnoge demonstratorke in demonstratorji so bili ubiti, mučeni in/ali zaprti, kar pa jim ni zlomilo močne volje. Še en dogodek, ki je dokaz moči Zahodnosahark je oborožen upor, ki se je zgodil 20. maja 1973, deset dni po ustanovitvi Polisaria. Bile so tudi del tajne politične organizacije, pri kateri so sodelovale z razdeljevanjem letakov, časopisnim obveščanjem, izobešanjem zastav, itd. Bile so pomemben del Ljudske armade zahodnosaharske osvoboditve, saj so skrbele tako za oskrbo z orožjem in strelivom kot tudi za vojake in ranjence. Izkazale so se tudi, ko se je španski kolonializem že poslavljal. Ponovno so bile v prvih vrstah med obiskom preiskovalne komisije Združenih narodov maja in junija 1975, zavračale so španski kolonializem in zahtevale neodvisnost. Branile so osamosvojena mesta La Guera, Bir Enzaran in Tichla in zagotavljale varen umik civilistom na zbirna mesta Oum Dreiga, Guelta in Tifariti, ki jih je maroška vojska bombandirala. (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 21–22). Moč saharskih žensk Zaradi begunstva in dajanja velikega pomena izobrazbi s strani Polisaria, so ženske postajale močne, samozavestne in izobražene na mnogih področjih življenja, tako doma kot v šolah, v nacionalni vladi in predstavništvih Polisaria po svetu. Medtem ko so bili 64 moški na bojiščih, je na ženskah obstala velika odgovornost, saj so bile prisotne in vodilne skorajda povsod. Njihovo življenje ni bilo več vezano le na dom, kar so odobravali tudi moški, ki so priznavali ženskam pomembno vlogo in sposobnost. Ženske so se nenadoma znašle v vlogi delavke, matere, žene, enakopravne članice družbe, kar je bilo naporno usklajevati. Moški so izgubili del svoje avtoritete. Eden od dokazov povečane moči žensk je bila tudi sprememba poimenovanja, saj je bil otrok pred tem običajno sin oz. hči očeta. Če je bil oče Mohameda Ahmed in mati Fatma, se je sina imenovalo Mohamed, sin Ahmeda. V času moške odsotnosti, v vojni pa se je to spremenilo in je bil tako otrok poimenovan npr. Mohamed, sin Fatme. To je imelo velikanski pomen in se morda ne bo dolgo obdržalo, a je vseeno zelo pomembno (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 30). Bolj kot so ženske izobražene, bolj se jim zdi pomembno delo. Zaposlena ženska je manj pod vplivom družinskih in družbenih tradicionalnih navad. To podpirajo tudi starejše generacije žensk, ki so zadovoljne, da njihove hčere in vnukinje uživajo dobrine kot je izobrazba, saj njim to ni bilo omogočeno (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 31). Zveza saharskih žensk Kot navaja Skornšek-Pleš, »je bila Zveza saharskih žensk (UNMS - Union Nacional de Mujeres Saharaui) ustanovljena leta 1979 in deluje tako na narodni kot mednarodni ravni. Vanjo so vključene skoraj vse polnoletne ženske iz taborišč, na osvobojenih območjih, pa tudi tiste, ki so ostale pod maroško okupacijo. V begunskih taboriščih in ozemljih, ki jih nadzoruje Polisario je cilj zveze svetovanje in dvig zavesti Sahark. Tako kot vsa druga politična telesa so predstavnice zveze voljene na rednih demokratičnih volitvah. Najvišji organ, generalni kongres Zveze, je sklican vsako tretje leto, na njem ocenijo minulo obdobje in si zastavijo nove cilje. V nasprotju z nacionalno politiko, ki je mnogokrat preveč načelna in premalo elastična, je Zveza pragmatična in usmerjena v postopno doseganje ciljev. Aktivno sodeluje z vladnimi in nevladnimi ženskimi organizacijami po svetu, predvsem na področju človekovih pravic, boja proti seksizmu, rasizmu, promocije saharskih prizadevanj in pridobivanja sredstev za humanitarne akcije. Na domačem terenu je glavni cilj zasidranje pridobljenih državljanskih in spolno specifičnih pravic v zakonodaji Zahodnosaharske republike. Pri tem jih pogosto omejujejo negativno naravnani predstavniki predvsem starejših moških« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 33). Prav tako so ženskam, za razliko od mnogih drugih islamskih dežel, naklonjeni tudi zakoni ter navade, saj so ženske zaščitene v smislu nedotakljivosti; nasilje nad njimi je lahko razlog za ločitev. Zahodnosaharska družba je zelo usmerjena v miroljubno reševanje vseh vrst sporov. Organizacija dela Zveze se širi tudi na s strani Maroka okupirani del Zahodne Sahare, in sicer s pomočjo radija, preko katerega poročajo o dosežkih saharskih žensk. Saharke so imele sicer že od nekdaj pomembno vlogo v družbi, že kot nomadke so bile glavne pri oskrbi šotora in s tem družine in širše družbe. Ta pomembnost jim je ostala še danes, prav tako tudi pravica do razveze zakona. Lahko 65 ohranijo očetov priimek, dota, ki jo je za nevesto moral plačati zaročenec, postala njena last. V večini islamskih družb razvezana ženska postane družbena izobčenka, v saharski družbi pa je taka ženska še bolj privlačna in spoštovana zaradi izkušenosti in zrelosti. Izbira partnerja je svobodna in poroka je možna tudi brez odobravanja družin, dogovorjenih porok skorajda ni več (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 33–35). Poroka je eden največjih dogodkov v življenju skupnosti in slavje traja več dni. Prevzem moževega priimka ni nujen. V primeru razveze mora oditi mož in ženi pustiti vse premoženje, hkrati je dolžan skrbeti za bivšo ženo in otroke, v primeru ponovne poroke pa le še za otroke. Saharska družba prakticira monogamijo, poligamija je zelo redka, a dovoljena. Spolnost pred poroko ni zaželjena in velja za nespodobno. Uporabljajo kontracepcijo, splavi so dovoljeni, a redki. Saharke večinoma rojevajo doma, a se zaradi dviga ozaveščenosti povečuje število tistih, ki se odločijo za rojstvo v bolnišnicah. Sedmi dan po porodu pripravijo veliko slavje, pri katerem stari starši, tete in strici otroku izberejo ime tako, da imena napišejo na paličice, mati pa miže potegne eno od njih in tako poimenuje otroka (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 36). Skornšek-Pleš tudi pravi, da je »pomemben dejavnik, ki priča o priviligiranem položaju žensk v saharski družbi, gotovo tudi njihova enakopravna vloga pri odločanju« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 37). Prihodnost Vprašanje je, če se bodo vsi dosežki, spremembe in moč saharskih žensk obdržali ali jih bo premagala tradicija. Moški so bili priča ženskim prizadevanjem za osamosvojitev in emancipacijo, ženski sposobnosti biti dejaven na več področjih, moči in trdni volji. Po premirju leta 1991 so se moški začeli vračati iz bojišč in prevzemati ženske vloge in službe. Zveza zahodnosaharskih žensk zato pogosto organizira konference, na katerih razpravljajo o tem, kako svoj položaj ohranjati in izboljševati (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 42). Nekdaj je bila vloga ženske določena že ob rojstvu - žena, mati, gospodinja. Bile so vezane le na dom in gospodinjstvo, ne zavedajoč se dogodkov izven tega. Kolonizacija in maroška okupacija sta prinesli tudi nekatere zahodne vzorce ženskih in moških vlog, ki so podpirali izobraževanje in s tem čedalje večjo ozaveščenost žensk o svojem položaju. Tako vidimo, kako zelo je lahko drugačna »ženska tukaj« od »ženske tam«. Viri: Skornšek-Pleš, Aleš, 2004: Položaj in vloga žensk v Zahodno saharskih begunskih taboriščih [diplomsko delo]. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Skornšek-Pleš, Aleš, 2003: Osamosvojile so se v izgnanstvu: Saharske ženske-glas iz peska. 66 Klara Vrhovec Življenje in kulturne značilnosti prebivalcev Zahodne Sahare Zahodnosaharci so potomci Arabcev, Afričanov in Berberov. Prihajajo iz dvaindvajsetih različnih plemen, kar danes ne igra več tako pomembne vloge kot jo je pred stoletji. Govorijo enega izmed arabskih dialektov, t.i. jezik »hassaniya«, ki ga uporabljalo tudi prebivalci severne Mavretanije. Pred prihodom španskih kolonialistov so Zahodnosaharci živeli nomadsko življenje, potovali so od centralne Mavretanije do južnega Maroka ter vzhodne Alžirije, večinoma so se preživljali z vzrejo kamel in koz. Prebivalci Zahodne Sahare so se že od nekdaj zavzemali za svojo neodvisnost. Nomadi so se z željo po zavarovanju svojega ozemlja pred španskimi in portugalskimi raziskovalnimi odpravami povezovali in združevali že v 17., 18., in 19. stoletju. Na Berlinskem kongresu leta 1884 je Španiji navkljub tovrstnim ambicijam Zahodnosaharcev uspelo razglasiti protektorat nad ozemljem Zahodne Sahare, ustanavljati so pričeli prva naselja, ozemlje naj bi postopoma postalo prepoznano kot Španska Sahara. Španski kolonizatorji pri tem niso imeli lahkega dela, saj sta znanje in dobro poznavanje terena lokalnemu prebivalstvu omogočila dolgotrajno skrivanje in upiranje. To jim je uspevalo vse do leta 1930, ko so Španci s pomočjo Francozov vendarle uspeli ukrotiti in podrediti Zahodnosaharce. V 50. letih so Španci na okupiranem območju odkrili velike zaloge fosfatov in začeli investirati v infrastrukturo in iskanje delovne sile. Da bi Zahodnosaharce motivirali za delo v rudnikih s fosfati, so začeli graditi šole in preproste barake v večjih mestih, blizu nahajališč teh rudnikov, zaradi česar je pomemben segment prebivalstva opustil nomadski način življenja in se preselil v mesta (Skornšek-Pleš, 2012). Begunska taborišča v Alžiriji V času maroške in mavretanske okupacije Zahodne Sahare je velik del prebivalstva pobegnil v begunska taborišča v Tindouf v Alžirijo. Po statističnih podatkih Demokratične arabske republike Sahare v šestih taboriščih, ki so poimenovana po šestih mestih Zahodne Sahare, prebiva približno 165.000 ljudi. Številke Združenih narodov so še bolj zastrašujoče, saj po njihovih podatkih v begunskih taboriščih živi celo 200.000 ljudi, 70.000 pod maroško okupacijo in približno 26.000 v Mavretaniji (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004). Fronta Polisario, zahodnosaharsko osvobodilno gibanje, ki vodi in upravlja ter organizira življenje v taboriščih, se zavzema za izboljšanje socialnega, ekonomskega in družbenega položaja beguncev, poudarja pomen izobraževanja in emancipacije žensk, ki v taboriščih igrajo zelo pomembno vlogo, saj zaradi odsotnosti moške populacije, ki so v veliki večini pripadniki Fronte Polisario in zato večino časa odsotni zaradi vojaških obveznosti, skrbijo za vodenje begunskih taborišč. Kot rečeno velja kot enega 67 najpomembnejših aspektov organizacije v begunskih taboriščih izgradnja in delovanje izobraževalnega sistema. Kljub dejstvu, da se sistem sooča s pomanjkanjem finančnih sredstev in posledično pomanjkanjem primernih učnih gradiv, pripomočkov in materialov, so uspeli v begunskih taboriščih doseči izjemno visoko pismenost prebivalstva. V preteklih letih in desetletjih so v taboriščih ustanovili zavidljivih 29 izobraževalnih ustanov za najmlajše otroke, 31 osnovnih in 7 rednjih šol. Po podatkih Fronte Polisario je danes v taboriščih pismenih približno 90 % populacije, kar je izjemen uspeh glede na podatek, da je bilo ob ustanovitvi taborišč pismenega približno 5 % prebivalstva. Ob tem še podatek, da je več kot 1000 posameznikov in posameznic deležnih tudi univerzitetnega izobraževanja, kar predstavlja eno od oblik socialne pomoči s strani drugih držav. Življenje pod Maroško oblastjo Saharci, ki jim ni uspelo pobegniti v Alžiriji, živijo v enem najbolj represivnih okolij na svetu. Z zaporno kaznijo so kaznovani že za »prestopke« kot so denimo pogovor s tujci ali širjenje kakršnih koli informacij, ki se referirajo na Polisario. Velik problem predstavljajo množična izginotja oseb, o katerih ni nobenih dostopnih podatkov, poleg kršenja pravic na področju svobodne izražanja in združevanja pa so Zahodnosaharci pod Maroško oblastjo deležni tudi sistematične diskriminacije na področju izobraževanja, zdravstvene oskrbe in političnih ter ekonomskih pravic. Intenzivno priseljevanje Maročanov, za kar skrbi oblast s premišljeno politiko davčnih olajšav in ugodnih kreditov, Zahodnosaharce postavlja v še bolj marginaliziran položaj (Skornšek–Pleš, 2012). Kulturne značilnosti Saharcev Čeprav danes večina Zahodnosaharcev živi bolj modernizirano in urbanizirano življenje, pogosto tudi kot posledica maroških strategij poselitve, še vedno najdemo skupine, ki ostajajo zavezane tradicionalnim oblikam življenja, nomadizmu, tradicionalnim kmetijskim in živinorejskim praksam. Tudi vsakdanje življenje pomembnega dela Sahark in Saharcev sledi tovrstnim praksam, denimo oblačila (modri »daraa«, črn turban pri moških in barvite celopostavne obleke »melfas« pri ženskah). Čajni ritual Po poročanju spletne strani Cultural website of the Sahara, enega najznačilnejših tradicionalnih običajev pri Zahodnosaharcih predstavlja priprava in pitje čaja. Večkrat dnevno se družine, sodelavci ali prijatelji zberejo skupaj, skuhajo pravi čaj in ga posrkajo v treh krogih. Prvi je, kot pravijo, grenek kot življenje, drugi gladek kot smrt, tretji pa sladek kot ljubezen. Pri pripravi čaja Saharci govorijo o treh »J – jih«. Prvi J predstavlja »Jama ah«. S tem izrazom označujejo neko skupino, s tem pa hočejo povedati, da je pitje čaja bolj prijetno v čim večji skupini, več kot je ljudi, bolj je prijetno. Drugi »J« pomeni 68 »Jarr« oz. podaljševanje. Pravijo namreč, da dlje časa ko čajni ritual traja, več prednosti ima, saj se lahko ljudje dlje časa družijo, izmenjujejo informacije, se pogovarjajo o težavah in rešitvah. Z izrazom »Jamr« pa sporočajo, da se da do najboljšega čaja priti le na odprtem ognju s pomočjo žerjavice. Celoten proces lahko traja več ur, Zahodnosaharci pa so na koncu ponosni na svoj izvrsten talent priprave odličnega čaja. V preteklosti je čaj igral pomembno vlogo, saj je nomadom pomagal pri preprečevanju dehidracije, preživljanju samotnih dni in izmenjevanju novic in zgodb, pomembno vlogo pa je imel in ima tud danes, predvsem pri vzpostavljanju in ohranjanju dobrih družinskih in prijateljskih odnosov (Cultural website of the Sahara, 2013). Glasba in literatura Prebivalci in prebivalke Zahodne Sahare o svojih čustvih in doživetjih govorijo preko različnih pesmi in zgodovinske literature, dobro pa se znajdejo tudi na področju pravljic, pregovorov in ugank. Kljub tej raznovrstnosti literarnih stilov se najpogosteje poslužujejo poezije. Ta je zelo razvejana, saj govori tako o problemih prebivalcev Zahodne Sahare, kot o njihovih običajih, tradicijah, delu in čustvih. Pesmi igrajo pomembno vlogo tudi na področju izobraževanja in zabave, saj se jih učijo in prepevajo v šolah, vključujejo pa jih tudi v razne družabne in kulturne dogodke. Tudi pregovori igrajo pomembno vlogo, saj predstavljajo vir modrosti in posredujejo moralne nauke, ki izvirajo iz kolektivnih in individualnih izkušenj starejših, mlajšim generacijam. Zahodnisaharci pomembno mesto v svojem družbenem in družabnem življenju namenjajo instrumentalni glasbi, enako kot pri obredu pitja čaja tudi glasba predstavlja sredstvo združevanja, povezovanja in upor proti maroški nadvladi. Njihova glasba je unikatna, med dva najznačilnejša inštrumenta sodita t.i. »tbal«, ki spominja na doma narejene bobne in pa »tidinit«, katerega izgled spominja na lutnjo peščene oblike s štirimi strunami (Cultural website of the Sahara, 2013). Domača obrt Domača obrt v življenju Zahodnosaharcev igra pomembno vlogo. Izdelki imajo tako uporabno kot tudi dekorativno vrednost, kar iz njih naredi uspešen tržni produkt, saj jih kupujejo tako domačini za vsakdanjo uporabo, kot tujci, ki jim izdelek predstavlja okras in spominek. Nabor tovrstnih uporabnih in okrasnih izdelkov je raznovrsten, omeniti velja »asarmi«, ki je nekakšna fino vezana usnjena blazina z dekorativnimi okraski, škatlice in posodice, ki jih uporabljajo za shranjevanje parfumov in nakita, domačini tudi za shranjevanje pomembnih dokumentov, rokopisov, premoženjskih in poročnih pogodb. Razvoj tovrstnih obrti je povezan s kulturno dediščino nomadov, ki so v veliki meri odvisni od reje kamel, koz in ovac, ki poleg hrane omogočajo tudi izdelovanje izdelkov, kot so denimo usnjeni podplati, preproge ter preprosti šotori, ki jih nomadi uporabljajo kot prenosna prenočišča. 69 Zaključek Kultura v življenju prebivalcev in prebivalk Zahodne Sahare igra zelo pomembno vlogo, saj preko nje izražajo svoje nezadovoljstvo z družbenim položajem pod maroško nadoblastjo, hkrati pa skozi njo opisujejo svoje življenjske značilnosti in navade, ter tako ohranjajo svojo edinstvenost in jo delijo s svetom. Vloga kulture pa ni le v identifikaciji skupine, ampak tudi v ohranjanju njenih značilnosti. Te se brez ljudskih običajev in navad, kamor sodijo tudi čajni ritual, domača obrt ter ljudske pesmi in plesi, ne bi ohranile do danes, s tem pa bi bil izbrisan zgodovinski razvoj kulture Zahodnosaharcev, kar bi maroški nadvladi olajšalo vsiljevanje lastne kulture, to pa bi postopoma pripeljalo do propada edinstvene zahodnosaharske kulture. Viri Cultural website of the Sahara, 2013. Dostopno na: http://www.saharaculture.com/Default.aspx?alias=www.sahara-culture.com/eng Maps of World, 2013: Western Sahara. Dostopno na: http://www.mapsofworld.com/countryprofile/western-sahara.html Mercer, J., 1979: Sahrawis of Western Sahara. London: Minority rights group. Music of Western Sahara, 2013. Wikipedia. Dostopno na: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Music_of_Western_Sahara Polisario Front, 2013. Wikipedia. Dostopno na: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polisario_Front Sahrawi refugee camps, 2013. Wikipedia. Dostopno na: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_refugee_camps Skornšek-Pleš, Aleš, 2004: Položaj in vloga žensk v Zahodno saharskih begunskih taboriščih [diplomsko delo]. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Skornšek-Pleš, Aleš, 2012: Zahodna Sahara, zadnja kolonija v Afriki. Razpotja, 8, 67–71, Solkan: Društvo humanistov Goriške. 70 Anja Čuš Umetniško ustvarjanje v Zahodni Sahari Leta 1976, medtem ko se je bližal čas smrti generala Franca, so zadnji španski vojaki zapustili območje Zahodne Sahare, ne da bi zahtevali referendum o samoodločbi zahodno-saharskega prebivalstva. Državi Mavretanija in Maroko, z željo po posedovanju neizmernega naravnega bogastva Zahodne Sahare, sta to nemudoma izkoristili. Ker Fronta Polisario ni mogla ustaviti tujih čet, je v naslednjih mesecih umrlo na tisoče Zahodnosaharcev - polovica se jih je razselila in okrog dvesto tisoč jih je bilo izgnanih v taborišča province Tindouf v Alžiriji. Kot odgovor na zmage Polisaria, je leta 1982 prišlo do umika Mavretanije, medtem ko je maroška država s severa obkolila Zahodno Saharo in oblikovala nove vojaške strategije. S šestimi vojaškimi formacijami je razširila nadzor nad puščavo ter zgradila 2700 metrov dolg zid, ki ga je obdala s stražo 130.000 maroških vojakov in minskim poljem, ki je obsegal več milijonov min. Nekdanjo špansko kolonijo je razdelila na dva dela; dve tretjini je spadlo pod okupacijo Maroka, preostali del pa pod nadzor gibanja Polisario in samooklicane SADR (Saharsko Arabske Demokratične Republike), priznane s strani članic Afriške unije in Latinskoameriških držav. Prebivalstvo begunskih taborišč v Tindoufu prežema neizmerno upanje in želja po zapolnitvi praznine, ki jo je povzročila neodgovornost Španije kot nekdanje zahodnosaharske kolonizatorke, kar se izaža preko umetnosti. Poezija v Zahodni Sahari Poezija v Zahodni Sahari je povezana z literaturo ekvatorialne Gvineje, skupaj s katero tvori dinamično novo afriško-špansko literaturo. Je orožje (prihodnosti), saj se, kot vse ostale umetniške oblike v Zahodni Sahari, opira na teme boja in upora, s katerimi odgovarja na številne potrebe in politične okoliščine, ki so povzročile, da so španski beduini potonili v zgodovino (Poesía saharaui, 2008). Kastiljščina kot jezik je znotraj kompleksne institucionalne strukture, ki so jo ustvarili, velikega pomena. Čeprav se v splošnem spodbuja uporaba španskega jezika, je identiteta tamkajšnjih ljudi precej hibridna, saj gre za mešanico španske, arabske, afriške in islamske tradicije. Nova poezija Zahodnosaharcev prekinja s tradicionalnimi literarnimi oblikami ter se pojavlja v španskem jeziku. Zaradi tega se zdi, da gre za špansko in ne arabsko kulturo. Za zahodnosaharsko poezijo so velikega pomena odnosi med izgnanim prebivalstvom in prebivalstvom Latinske Amerike. V sedemdesetih in osemdesetih letih naj bi na tisoče mladih Zahodnosaharcev prečkalo Atlantski ocean ter obiskalo šole na Kubi in Karibih. V puščavo se se, kot nekakšno novo urbano pleme, vračali pod vplivi kubanskega narodnega heroja Martija, Generacije 27, Pabla Nerude in Benedittija. Tako imenovani 71 Los Cubarauis so v celoti zaznamovali zahodnosaharsko življenje in kulturo, saj so se po vrnitvi zaposlili v saharskih vladnih službah, bolnišnicah in šolah. Leta 1991 je prišlo do uradnega premirja. Varnostni svet OZN je ustanovil Misijo OZN, ki naj bi se zavzemala za referendum v Zahodni Sahari. Dogodek, ki pa ni sprožil miru, je vplival tudi na poezijo. Večina pesmi je bilo napisanih s strani pesnikov, ki so bili del političnega konteksta. Pomembna je Generacija prijateljstva, kamor spadajo pesniki, rojeni v šestdesetih in sedemdesetih letih. Le-ti so preživeli vojno in izgnanstvo v puščavo, zaradi česar je prišlo do določenih frustracij v zvezi z izgradnjo nacionalne pripadnosti. Vse do danes jih je veliko emigriralo v Španijo. Zahodnosaharska poezija je zbrana v antologijah Bubisher (2001), El Aaiun (2006) in Un Dreiga (2007). Pomembna je 31. dvojezična antologija zahodnosaharske uporniške poezije v španščini (2007), ki vsebuje krasne kastiljsko-angleške verze. Ti verzi so doprinos zgodovine ustnega izročila v saharski literaturi. Vzpostavljajo dialog med tradicijo v španskem jeziku in intervencijo politične poezije. Za poezijo Generacije prijateljstva sta značilna dva trenda: mikro-politične pesmi, v katerih se prepletajo motivike življenja, trpljenja in upanja posameznega pesnika ter makro-politične pesmi, ki vsebujejo konkretne nacionalne zahtevke in nastopajo v vlogi diplomatske poezije. Nova špansko-saharska poezija zajema epske in lirske prvine, skozi katere se prelivajo verzi frustracij in politične volje izgradnje nacionalne pripadnosti, ki so »goreči kot opoldanski pesek v puščavi... « (Poesía saharaui, 2008). Pesem si ti Ženska za rešetkami je zavpila: Kaj je pesem? In poet v izgnanstvu je odgovoril: Si ti. Mi, naša moč, razlog za verz in pesem. Bahia Mahmud Awah Že Sartre je opozarjal na nezmožnost prave in avtentične poezije. O politični moči umetnosti je kritično razglabljal tudi teoretik Theodor Adorno v delu Estetska teorija. Zahodnosaharski verzi so zaradi svoje političnosti vsekakor »avtentični« verzi. 72 ARTifariti ARTifariti je Mednarodni festival umetnosti in človekovih pravic Zahodne Sahare, ki se v politično razburkanem okolju odvija od leta 2007. Nastal je v mestu Tifariti v Zahodni Sahari. Ta se danes nahaja v bližini zidu sramote. V mestu Tifariti je v času zahodnoaharske vojne (med leti 1975 in 1991) potekala vrsta bojev. Tam se je nahajalo pomembno vojaško oporišče obeh strani, maroške vojske in Fronte Polisario. Danes Tifariti spada med osvobojena mesta Zahodne Sahare. V tem mestu, zaznamovanem z dolgoletnimi pokoli in bombnimi napadi na saharsko ljudstvo, je zahodnosaharska vlada SADR (Saharske Arabske Demokratične Republike) ustvarila »prostor interakcije in komunikacije, ki presega umetnost samo«. Lahko bi rekli, da je nastanek festivala pomenil simbolično razstrelitev zidu sramote - kot le enega izmed mnogih svetovnih zidov (Berlinski, Palestinski). Leta 2011, ob 35. obletnici SADR, se je festival preselil na območje begunskih taborišč, v Tindouf v Alžiriji. Ta umetniško-politični festival si prizadeva za širšo prepoznavnost politične situacije zahodnosaharskega ljudstva, ki že četrto desetletje živi pod maroško okupacijo ali v izgnanstvu. Avtentična umetnost preko umetniških praks opozarja na elementarne človekove pravice do zemlje, kulture in svobode. Kot je zapisano na spletni strani festivala ARTIfariti, želijo ustvarjalci festivala ustvariti prostor brez omejevanja svobode, saj se zavedajo pomembnosti podpore ljudstva. Sodelujejo z mnogimi institucijami in organizacijami, vendar se njihovo delovanje opira predvsem na delo prostovoljcev: umetnikov, filmskih ustvarjalcev, prijateljev Zahodne Sahare in zagovornikov človekovih pravic. Festival je 20. maja 2013, ob 40. obletnici ustanovitve Fronte Polisario, organiziral veliko razstavo, ki je na ogled v Muzeju umetnosti v mestu Tifariti. Med letošnje zanimivejše projekte spada tudi izdaja časnika !AHLAN!, projekta madridske vizualne umetnice Nurrie Carrasco, ki je na svojstven način spodbudila razmislek o neugodnem položaju zahodnosaharskega ljudstva. !AHLAN! je predelana kopija časnika !HOLA!, ki se formalno in vsebinsko odmika od originala. Ponatis !AHLANA! je namenjen mednarodnemu ozaveščanju in prebivalstvu begunskih taborišč, kateremu bo umetnica namenila zaslužek od prodaje (Carrasco, 2013). Drugi novejši projekt je delo vizualne umetnice Marie Sanchez, ki se ukvarja s sociološko-kulturološkimi raziskavami socialnih omrežij. Zanimajo jo novodobne oblike komunikacije in širjenje kulture preko izkoriščanja novih povezav ter digitalnih platform. Splet 2.0 vidi kot priložnost za novejše oblike doseganja pravic, zato spodbuja in uči novih veščin komunikacije v Zahodni Sahari, prevzela pa je tudi upravljanje ARTIfariti v zadnji izdaji. ARTIfariti je odprt prostor, namenjen preoblikovanju realnosti in realnih družbenih odnosov na območju Zahodne Sahare. Primer take javne umetnosti nastopa kot model, ki izpodbija sistem produkcije in distribucije sodobne kulturne industrije ter umetniških praks, ki temeljijo na zasebni potrošnji. Z javno umetnostjo se upirajo pojavu lastninjenja 73 idej, ki nastopajo kot blago na trgu, ter namesto tega ustvarjajo interdisciplinarno zlitje državljanov in umetnosti skozi kreacijo nove situacije ter konstrukcije multikulturnega tkiva. ARTIfariti je srečanje in prepletanje glasbe, zgodb, performativne akcije in celo umetnosti elektronske pošte. Pomembnejša nosilca združenja ARTIfariti sta Ministrstvo za kulturo Saharske arbske demokratične republike in Združenje prijateljev Sahare v Sevilli (ARTifariti, 2013). Veliki umetniški pečat je leta 2011 v saharski puščavi pustil španski grafitar Manuel Mesa Delgado, poznan pod umetniškim imenom M-E-S-A. M-E-S-O, ki v hiperrealističnem slogu ustvarja grafitne portrete in stenske poslikave velikega formata, že od nekdaj zanimajo slabo poznane in skrivnostne površine, ki jih je potrebno poiskati ali odkriti. Očitno so bila begunska taborišča v Sahari več kot primerna za ustvarjanje. M-ES-A se je pridružil programu ARTifariti v letu 2011 in potoval v saharsko puščavo z namenom spoznavanja saharskih družin v begunskih taboriščih. »Čista in surova realnost«, s katero se je srečal, je pri tem spremenila njegov umetniški pogled. Zaradi desetletja trajajočih kršitev človekovih pravic, ki zadevajo tamkajšnje ljudstvo, je Manuela prevzela trdnost in vztrajnost izgnanega ljudstva ter njihov miroljuben boj za svobodo. To ga je umetniško inspiriralo in pripeljalo tudi do spoznanja, da umetnost lahko spreminja svet (Designwars, 2012). Viri Poesía saharaui - Lucha y resistencia en el Sahara occidental, 2008. Confines, Arte y la Cultura Desde la Patagonia. Dostopno na: http://www.confinesdigital.com/conf15/poesia-saharaui.html. Carrasco, Nuria, 2013: ¡AHLAN! Lanzanos. Dostopno na: http://www.lanzanos.com/proyectos/ahlan/. ARTifariti, 2013. Dostopno na: http://artifariti.blogspot.com/. DesignWars, 2012. Dostopno na: http://www.designwars.com/graffiti_streetart/mesa-graffiti-muralsperspective/ 74 For Western Sahara 75 76 Damjan Mandelc, Tjaša Učakar For Western Sahara - editorial “A paintbrush is a weapon of struggle, freedom and expression; and goes further than the missile, because it reaches people's hearts, bringing life.” Moulud Yeslem The current situation in Western Sahara is not (sufficiently) known to the world, or the Slovenian public. A few years ago, a number of us from the Unit of General Sociology, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Arts at the University of Ljubljana joined the collaboration and organization of an international symposium on the topic for the first time. Since then, we have established contacts with colleagues from the Department of Romance Languages and Literatures, as well as with the civil society, journalists, representatives of Polisario for Slovenia and the Western Balkans and Sahrawis, living in Slovenia. Our cooperation soon grew into friendship and commitment to put every ounce of our effort to contribute in raising the general public's awareness, to pressure national and European institutions and to the greater sensitivity of the Slovenian media. In the harsh conditions of the economic crisis – as we had established with colleagues, supporters of Western Sahara, in the past year – attractting the general public's attention to specific problems and situations that occur in geographically and culturally distant places is no easy feat. There are certainly those, who are sufficiently vigilant to global ecological, social, security and economic situation, however, in times when solidarity is lacking on the inside, it is possible to understand that international solidarity is not the first preoccupation of most. In this regard, notes and warnings about the situation and problems of a relatively small community, somewhere between the African desert and the Atlantic ocean, are difficult to penetrate people's collective consciousness. If international diplomacy and high politics are not the ideal medium for raising awareness, which strategy should therefore be taken to bring this issue closer to the general public? Our answers were culture, ethics and education, accompanied by cosmopolitan attitude, solidarity and international justice. If ever, then now, at a time when the collective itself is faced with adversity and crisis, can the Slovenian public fully start to understand the situation in Western Sahara; refugee women and refugee children, political prisoners, young people without a future. If anyone, then the Slovenian public can understand the dimension of fighting and the deep desire for the right to self-determination – this, specifically, is an experience that we share with the Sahrawis and in which the outcome, due to multilayered circumstances, was more favorable to the Slovenian sovereignty and country than Sahrawi's. The booklet in your hand was created within an initiative of the undersigned editors and 77 full prof. dr. Ksenija Vidmar Horvat, the main lecturer of the course Management in Culture at the Department of Sociology. With the exception of the first contribution, the remainig articles are the effort of students from all levels of university education, PhD, MA and BA students. The publication is divided into three main sections; the first section presents an international perspective, where the authors deal with political dimensions of Western Sahara's struggle, the role of the United Nations and the European Union in its (non)resolution; the second section consists of contributions contextualizing the environmental impact, problems of natural resource theft and other related factors that influence the adverse conditions in the occupied zone as well as in refugee camps; the third and final section includes contributions that address conditions in the Sahrawi society; cultural, religious, artistic and other practices, the status of women and a debate on the extent of Moroccan occupation. Since our publication is intended for the widest possible audience, our aim was to provide plainly communicated key information and circumstances surrounding Sahrawis on their arduous journey from the Spanish colonies, the war with Morocco and Mauritania, their armistace, occupation, segregation, poverty, lives of generations in the refugee camps, the fight for the recognition of the right to self-determination on the one hand, while on the other we find infinite hope, solidarity, resourcefulness, courage, lifeblood and a will for freedom, which is equally alive today as it was decades ago. We are proud that the publication on Western Sahara will be brought to life on 14th October 2013, when the safeguard of Slovenian culture, Cankarjev Dom, will be hosting a prominent cultural-humanitarian and civil society manifestation entitled Color of Sand, where, in the company of Sahrawi friends and in a day of creation, tradition, culture and dialogue, we will celebrate Western Sahara. Through cooperation, we managed to unite the Unit of General Sociology, Department of Romance Languages and Literatures, Cankarjev Dom, Polisario representative, Malinc publishers, and with assistance of the company Sodexo, the Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and numerous other individuals, we managed to conceive a series of events, including workshops for preschool children, primary and secondary schools, a tea ceremony, the atmosphere of a Bedouin tent, an impressive exhibition of photographs and artwork from Western Sahara and the refugee camps in Algeria, “Sons of the Clouds” - a documentary by Javier Bardem, a panel discussion and a concert by Western Saharan musicians Estrella Polisaria. We hope that the collection of contributions will be read by a multitude of readers in Slovenia and abroad - due to the international dimension of the themes, we have prepared a bilingual, English-Slovenian issue. Residents of Western Sahara need and expect our help, understanding and engagement. The first step in this direction is for us to get to know them. We wish you an engaged reading. For Western Sahara! Dr. Damjan Mandelc, Tjaša Učakar 78 I. Western Sahara and the international community 79 Damjan Mandelc Dangerous justice, forgoten solidarity and the colour of foreign sand Western Sahara is a country in the North-West Africa, it lies between Morocco, Mauretania and Atlantic Ocean, and in its far Northeast it also reaches Algeria. Its geographic location defines it as one of the driest and inhospitable landscapes in the world, the coastline continues into flat dessert, where it reaches hills of approximately 600 metres high above sea level. More then its difficult climate conditions Western Sahara is defined by its complex political situation. In this article we refer to inhabitants of Western Sahara as Saharawis, also Western Saharawis, which is more of a national as ethnic labelling. Ethnic and cultural background of Saharawis is similar to other Sahara peoples, mixed; it is a combination of Arab, Berbers and black-African features. Western Saharawis, nation of approximately half a million people – exact number is hard to determine – live partly in the occupied territory, in smaller numbers in the liberated land while a large portions live in refugee camps in Algeria. Most Saharawis speak Hassaniya Arabic dialect. Saharawi liberation struggle until 1973 was against Spanish colonial domination, after 1975 against Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation, after Mauritanian retreat the struggle under the leadership of internationally recognized and legitimate representative organization, Polisario Front, continues against Morocco. Polisario Front, representing the government of Saharawis and was recognized as such also by the United Nations, operates in refugee camp in Tindouf (Algeria). After the period of armed conflict the ceasefire insists since 1991. I. “Anger is reason for resistance!” wrote a writer, diplomat and a person with experience of the concentration camp from the Second World War, Stéphane Hessel (2010: 26). When we are angry, he continues, we become pugnacious and strong, we act and we flow into the mighty stream of history, stream that flows towards greater justice and freedom. On December 1 1955 Rosa Parks in US city of Montgomery initiated such course of history when she refused to leave her seat to a white citizen. Authorities imprisoned her and the conviction triggered a magnificent movement against racial discrimination, followed in the coming years in most of the United States. As Martin Balluch (2011: 85) summarizes in his book, the 5 December of same year a total boycott of bus lines in Montgomery started, with such economic pressure protesters wanted to launch a final defeat against racism and racial discrimination. From the outset Martin Luther Kind was a leader and organizer of this movement. 80 From 1955 until 1968 authorities arrested time thirty times and imprisoned him for more than twenty times. For society of that time he was dangerous, denoted as Communist, traitor and scumbag. His passion for freedom and fearlessness made him the leader of African-American human rights movement, he had such influence for twelve years until he was killed on 4 April 1968 by an escaped prisoner. In 1964 King received the Nobel Peace Prize, and after 1986 U.S. celebrates Martin Luther King Day; legalized racial discrimination in the United States has become history. On 10th October 2010, twenty thousand Rosa Parks and Martin Luther Kings in Gdeim Izik1, about 20 kilometers from El Aaiun, the occupied capital of Western Sahara, raised a protest camp of about 6,000 protests tents. After four days, the Moroccan troops invaded the camp and opened fire, their attack was completed in early November of the same year, when they brutally destroyed the camp and drove out the protesters. Due to information blockage, the data on deaths and wounded is not available, the Polisario Front estimates that around 40 protesters were killed, 723 injured and 163 arrested. The resistance did not bring about a breakthrough, did not end the occupation and there is a high probability that the brave individuals will not be remembered even by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, when it will ponder on future Nobel Prize winners. Even so, the resistance of Gdeim Izik is extremely important. It signals that the population of occupied Western Sahara, thirty-five years after Morocco occupied their country by military force in 1979, has not yet abandoned the desire for freedom, anger and fight for justice. The prominent linguist and another brave representative of humanity, Noam Chomsky, marked the uprising in Gdeim Izik as the beginning of the Arab uprisings, and it is necessary to underline that Gdeim Izik was not only a classic rebellion against tyrannical regimes and poverty, as was the case in other Arab and Middle Eastern uprisings in recent years. It was also and above all, a protest against occupation. II. The Preamble of The Declaration of ensuring independence of colonies and their peoples2 (adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 14th 1960) commands the respect of equal rights of all peoples to self-determination. The Declaration of the seven principles (24 October 1970), adopted a decade later, comprehensively addresses the issue of self-determination and accords the UN a mandate that requires its members to comply with the rules and principles applicable in international law and the rules of the UN. At this point, some of these principles are worth repeating, while you, the reader, can determine the extent, to which the global organizations (and its members) adhere to such rules. 1 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-741_en.htm 2 http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/dicc/dicc.html 81 1) All nations have the right to freely determine their political status. 2) Each nation has the duty to respect this right and to promote its implementation. 3) Each nation has the duty to refrain from any coercive action that would deprive nations of this right. 4) Nations, resisting such violence are entitled to seek and receive assistance in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 5) On the basis of the UN Charter, the territory of a colony or other self-governing territory has a status, which is different and separate from the status of the country that operates this territory. Three influential countries, each with its own motives and interests, shape the fate of Western Sahara by maintaining close alliance with Morocco - France, Spain and the USA. Although they perhaps bear the most responsibility for the fact that decades of conflict have not ended, we can condemn the entire international community for its continuous silence and ignorance of the severe human rights violations in Western Sahara. The international community is cynically ignoring the rules and decisions of the United Nations (such as resolution no. 690 from 1988, which requires a referendum on selfdetermination), original sin can be attributable to Spain (and its then fascist government), which, on 14th November 1975 secretly signed the so-called Madrid Agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, renouncing responsibility of its former colony. Such unilateral withdrawal was illegal (Ruiz, 2007), and such claim was repeatedly confirmed by the United Nations, calling on Spain to take responsibility (de iure Western Sahara remains its administrative territory). At this point, it would be necessary to further delineate the relationship and responsibility of France, but it should be enough to mention that France has been a long-standing ally of Morocco and has repeatedly vetoed the UN, thereby preventing multiple attempts to restrict human rights violations in Western Sahara. In such a controversial and unethical manner, France simultaneously defies its former colony Algeria, which represents Western Sahara's closest ally in the region. Algeria has offered the Sahrawi refugees its desert in the southwestern part of their country, so that they can adjust their lives as they have not been able to return to their homes for several decades. According to estimates of the UN Committee for Refugees and migrants (www.unhcr.org, a report from 2009) refugee camps provide shelter to more than 165,000 Sahrawi refugees. In the tough desert conditions they have created alternate homes, the headquarters of their government in exile is there, recognized by the international community and represented by the Polisario Front, while their fellow countrymen who remained in the occupied territory are still victims of repression and massive human rights violations. At the same time, Morocco exploits (steals) their natural resources, and has built a wall, secured with military patrols and landmines in the area between occupied territory and the narrow zone next to Mauritania, which is under supervision of Polisario Front, the official and 82 recognized representative organization of Western Sahara. This wall is reminiscent of the Berlin Wall, its function can be compared with the Israely-built wall between Israel and Occupied Palestine. There is no other word for it than The Moroccan wall of shame . The mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission - MINURSO3, which is further discussed by one of the authors in this booklet, was agreed upon by both parties involved in the conflict, and remains the international community's only way of monitoring in the occupied territory, whereby Morocco persistently breaches the terms of the agreement and prevents the peace-keeping mission from reaching its key purpose, ie. the preparation and assistance in activities, related to the referendum in which Sahrawis could decide between independence and integration into the Kingdom of Morocco. The referendum is obviously far away, as Morocco consistently blocks progress, inhabits Moroccans into Western Sahara to change the population's demographic structure, and to carry out the plebiscite in their favour through extortion. The conflict in Western Sahara and the fact of the occupation also affects several regional transnational organizations. While the African Union set itself on the side of Western Saharawi people right away (when Western Sahara was given full membership in the African Union in 1984, Morocco resigned from the organization in protest), two other regional associations, the Arab League and the European Union, play a less honorable role. The first, on the basis of political calculations and internal policy reasons, supported the Moroccan demand (occupation) of Western Saharan territory, the latter (EU) has had an ambivalent, even schizophrenic and extremely problematic role for the Sahrawis. The European Union on the one hand calls for the respect of human rights and respect for UN resolutions, with statements without substance, such as that “the EU reaffirms full support of the United Nations and encourages both parties to achieve a just, lasting political solution in favor of the parties involved, leading the people of Western Sahara to self-determination in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions”4. Such a position of the European Union, repeated after its High Representative Catherine Ashton, is of course unprecedented hypocrisy, because it is given on behalf of the EU, whose member state is also Slovenia, and should be strongly protested against. In all honesty, Morocco has been preventing the referendum for decades, has inhabited its population into occupied territory, has been stealing Sahrawi's natural resources and has been preventing progress in the regulation of the status of Western Sahara. The European Union, instead of granting Western Sahara the right to independence and full sovereignty, rather babbles diplomatically and even dares to state a formulation that “the EU repeatedly urged all parties to refrain from violence and respect human rights”. Why not target Morocco, which is the only one carrying out violence and which violates basic standards of human rights in the occupied territory? Probably because the European Union does not have the 3 https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/mandate.shtml 4 http://allafrica.com/stories/201306051487.html 83 courage to play an honorable and fair role in this dispute. In the same statement, Ashton writes that the European Commission will “take into account the European Parliament's resolution” concerning the new fisheries agreement with Morocco and “try” to implement a clause, which includes the requirement to respect human rights, in the event, however, that Morocco “seriously violates” human rights, the EC “can” cancel the agreement. Translated from diplomatic lingo, the High Representative announced that the European Parliament resolution opposing the fisheries agreement will not be taken into account, Morocco can apparently “mildly” (as opposed to “seriously”) violate human rights, and even in this case the European Union's termination of the agreement is not written confidently, but rather as a “threat”, articulated in the form of the conditional “can”. On 24th July 2013, The European Commission publicly announced5 that a new 4-year protocol to the fisheries agreement with the Kingdom of Morocco was signed. It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned agreement will bring Morocco 36.1 million euros annually until February 2015, and that the European Commission did not revoke the agreement in the past, despite the evidence that Morocco does not share the resources with Sahrawis, the rightful owners of the shore and fishing rights in the coastal zone, that Morocco flagrantly breaches Sahrawi human rights, which is why fierce protests by the civil society and the people of Western Sahara, condemning the agreement 6 and describing it as fraud and theft7, come with no surprise. III. The Economist's, a British newspaper, properly classified the occupation of Western Sahara as a classic Anschluss (Arts et al., 2007: 11), a violent merger. The tragic fate of the territory is a historic precedans and a statement of the failure of civilization of the human community. One hundred and thirtieth years have passed since the Berlin Conference, which was hosted in 1884 by Otto von Bismarch, which forced Western Sahara into Spanish hands. As a Spanish protectorate by 1961, and thereafter as a nonself-governing territory (Chapter XI. of UN Charter) under de facto Moroccan occupation, Western Sahara is still waiting to achieve the right to their own destiny and decide to hold a nationwide democratic referendum (Knop, 2002). For decades, Sahrawis have shown will and determination, confidence and organization in refugee camps8, where they have established a working (parallel) society, education, health and humanitarian system, have achieved full participation of women in managing common affairs, the literacy rate, which, from only 3% in the first refugee settlements in 5 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-741_en.htm 6 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/morocco/index_en.htm 7 http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/saharawi-fishermen-condemn-eu-mo-news-530059 8 More on the organisation structure of refugee camps at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_refugee_camps 84 Algeria, has now climbed to over 90%. When the international community starts wondering whether Sahrawis are able to live independently in their own country, its representatives should visit four refugee (city) camps, named after four occupied cities in Western Sahara - Laayoune, Smara, Awserd and Rabouni, all nearby the Algerian city of Dakhla, the headquarters of Polisario, the Sahrawi's formal government. Four refugee sites and their population of nearly 200,000 refugees, living in fear and uncertainty, as they read reports about kidnappings, torture in Moroccan prisons, repression, discrimination against their compatriots in occupied homeland on a daily basis. Many of them have not seen their relatives, parents, children and friends since the day they were forced to flee. The nation is divided into two parts, firstly of the occupated area, the second part are the refugee camps, and The Moroccan wall of shame in between. As the title of the paper attempts to show, for Sahrawis the call for justice is dangerous (the victims of Gdeim Izika are proof of this), international solidarity in the form of humanitarian aid is present, as well as involvement of global civil society. However, such calls can not and must not replace the responsibility of the international community, especially its most powerful actors, namely the European Union, its decisive member states, the UN and the U.S. to act firmly and immediatelly and through sanctions (political and economical) force Morocco to start complying to commitments, international law and the UN Security Council Resolution. In the past, countries have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to compel a member of the international community to respect the rules of the game. However, they most often expressed these intentions when they had immediate interests of their own, such as the desire for oil or any other raw materials. A patch of desert in the always troubled Arab and African world is apparently not reason enough for them to carry out their moral and political duty . In this respect, Slovenia is shyly hiding behind the excuse of its minute size and limited impact. While in 1991, it was this very nation that called the international community for help and urged them to respect the principles of international law and norms in order to achieve its own international legal entity and the plebiscite expressed will of the citizens, realized in the form of our own sovereign state. Today it is forgetting about the call it made 22 years ago, avoiding its responsibilities and its foreign policy, betraying the values of the Slovenian Constitution and applying double standards (it recognized Kosovo, while it remains silent in the case of Western Sahara and Palestine). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia is so frightened and feeble, that instead of accepting representatives of Western Sahara in Mladika, the edifice of the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it instead prefers nearby cafes, as noticed by the undersigned. The Slovenian Parliament, in contrast to Swedish, which since 12th May 20129 supports the recognition of Western Sahara (this must now be decided by the 9 www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/29989 85 Swedish Government), does not have the courage to clearly and fairly express itself on this issue, instead it transfers its powers and responsibilities to a common European foreign policy, which - as we have seen above – acts in a surprisingly similar manner. Slovenia shows that, beyond the 500 kilometer radius and axis Trieste - Vienna - Zagreb, its foreign policy is incapable and nonexistant. The time has come for citizens, the civil society and the profession to clearly state our need for change. It should not come as a redundant reference, that on 28th November 1984 the Yugoslav foreign policy recognized the Arab Republic of Western Sahara, and their recognition dissolved only after the collapse of that country. Albania, perhaps under pressure (or possibly due to a good business agreement with Morocco?) withdrew its recognition on 11th November 2004. For all we know, recognition from smaller member states of the European Union could potentially launch a “domino effect” and European institutions and influential Member States would consequently also consider their dishonorable role. Such a series of recognition would put tremendous political pressure on Morocco, which, analysts asses, should also face international economic sanctions. Political power in liberated territories and in refugee areas in Algeria, with the assistance of non-governmental organizations and friendly countries, should immediately begin a recording of voters, willing to participate in the referendum on the future status of Western Sahara. If such administrative criteria were met (Mandelc, 2013: 139), there would be a real possibility that Morocco, under pressure from important nations, would succumb and accept commitments under UNSCR no.690. IV. I hope and believe that my readers will forgive me if I add some personal experiences at the end of this record. My first direct contact with Morocco was a student trip in 2005. With a backpack on my shoulders and a Lonely Planet guide in hand, we explored the magic of this African country. In the following order, we were impressed by Marrakech, Rabat, Fez, Casablanca and other Moroccan cities, heritage, culture, cuisine and landscape. Even before we departed, we read a section of the guide on hazards and cancelled the planned route to the capital of Western Sahara. My ignorance and lack of knowledge at that time were to blame, that I never brought up the question of Western Sahara in otherwise pleasant evening discussions with the locals. I do not know if I would have put myself in danger through such conversing; however, the Moroccan men and women that we met on the way were all open to discussions about politics, culture, religion, women's rights, the problems facing the country and I never had the impression that these topics were making them uncomfortable. Should we ever repeat this trip, there is no doubt in my mind that I would try to find out more about how the general population sees the injustice, caused by the Moroccan government to the people of occupied Western Sahara. In my humble opinion, this should be the task of all travellers to Morocco, a 86 country, which, with every year, depends more on the arrival (and money) of foreign tourists. And, had the Moroccans gone so bravely onto the streets during the Arab Spring and achieve political success (the democratic modification of the Moroccan Constitution, et al.) in the absolutist monarchy, there is no doubt that pressure from the democratic Moroccan public would begin to unravel the Sahrawi story. With the Arab uprising, Moroccans have lost some fear of their autocratic power, so it is reasonable to expect that they will listen to news of injustice, being caused to Sahrawis by their government on their behalf. Today, the media blockade in both Morocco as well as Western Sahara is exceptional, but there are other tools, such as social networks, objective information on the Web, direct contact . Personally, I was deeply moved by the courage of protesters from Gdeim Izika. The same goes for decades of perseverance and effort of Sahrawi men and women. Their motivation is an inspiration to all of us to help them. Today, albeit from a safe distance, we, the activists, academics, researchers around the world, are all included in their project and battle. Absolutely nothing else than freedom and justice FOR Western Sahara will be the final outcome of this fight. We are flowing into a powerful stream of history. Resources Arts, Karin, Pinto Leite, Pedro (eds), 2007: International Law and the Question of Western Sahara. Oporto: IPJET (International Platform of Jourists for East Timor). Balluch, Martin, 2009: Upor v demokraciji. Državljanska nepokorščina in konfrontacijske kampanje. Ljubljana: Krtina. Corbyn, Jeremy MP, Simanowitz, Stefan, 2011: A new dawn? Western Sahara and the Arab Spring. Available at: www.newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2011/09/14/western-sahara-independenceresistance/ (accessed 5. 9. 2013) EC – Fisheries, 2013: Morocco - Fisheries Partnership Agreement. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/morocco/index_en.htm (accessed 20.9. 2013) EurActiv, 2013: Saharawi fishermen condemn EU-Morocco fishing treaty ‘fraud’. Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/saharawi-fishermen-condemn-eu-mo-news-530059 (accessed 20. 9. 2013) Gdeim Izik - The Sahrawi Resistance Camp, 2012. Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=z034H97gvN8 (accessed 10. 9. 2013) Hessel, Stephane, 2011: Dvignite se! Ljubljana: Založba Sanje. Kenworthy, Peter, 2012: Swedish parliament wants government to recognise Western Sahara. Available at: www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/29989 (accessed 6. 5. 2013) Knop, Karen, 2002: Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mandelc, Damjan, 2013: Arabska vstaja – kontekst, perspective in učinki. In: Časopis za kritiko znanosti, domišljijo in novo antropologijo. XL (252), 137–151. Ljubljana: Študentska založba. 87 Minurso, 2013. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/mandate.shtml (accessed 10. 9. 2013) Ruiz, Miguel Carlos, 2007: The Self-Determination Referendum and the Role of Spain. In: International Law and the Question of Western Sahara. Arts, Karin in Pinto Leite, Pedro (eds). 305–318. Oporto: IPJET. Sahara Press Service, 2013: Morocco: European Union Reaffirms Full Support for Western Sahara's People Right to Self-Determination. Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201306051487.html (accessed 15. 9. 2013). Sahrawi refugee camps, 2013. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_refugee_camps (accessed 10. 9. 2013) The King Center, 2013. Available at: www.thekingcenter.org (accessed 5. 9. 2013). 88 Ana Ješe Perković The role of European Union in solving the status of Western Sahara: comparison with Kosovo When we find an article about Western Sahara in the media, which is rarely and mostly in foreign media, the territory is often addressed as the last colony of Africa (Abelson, 2012; Skornšek-Pleš, 2012). The process of decolonization in Africa started after the end of World War II.,1 because Africa was divided between the European colonizers only after the end of World War I. The process ended in the seventies of the 20th century, except for one territory: Western Sahara did not succeed in gaining independence and is still fighting for the right to self-determination. The problem of the Western Sahara conflict is in its very poor tractability. There are only few books written about this conflict, therefore this volume will certainly contribute to a better understanding of the issue in Slovenia and globally. In this article we will look at what kind of impact have European union and its actors on the status of Western Sahara. To make the case more illustrative for the Slovene reader, we shall compare it with a similar case from South-East Europe, that is with the independence of Kosovo. For easier understanding of this article, we need to explain first two main definitions: decolonization and the right to self-determination. Decolonization is a process, when colonies gain their independence peacefully or with violence or the colonizer retreats from the occupied territory and hands over the governance to a local administration. The right to self-determination is a fundamental right of every nation to freely decide about its sovereignty and political status, which is also written in the UN Charter (The UN Charter, 2013). In 1960 United Nations signed a declaration that ensures independence to colonies and their peoples (Declaration on the Granting of Independence…, 1960) and specifically emphasizes the right to self-determination of these peoples. The International Court of Justice as well as UN General Assembly with Resolution 1514 have confirmed that Sahrawi people have the right to self-determination and a referendum to exercise this right. However, this has not yet been put into practice, due to the fact that the UN peace process, which started in the nineties of the 20th century, has not brought any results, hence Morocco continues with its aggressive politics of settlements on the territory of Western Sahara, and the territory is divided by a long impassable wall built by Moroccans in the eighties of the 20th century. If we compare the process of gaining independence of Kosovo with the efforts of Western Sahara, we can see how the perception of certain actors in the public has 1 Other bigger decolonization processes were for example in Latin America after the collapse of Spanish empire in 19th century or the break up of big European empires after the WWI: German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman. 89 influenced the international community and its support for the independence. Kosovo Albanians demanded the self-determination on the basis of the breakup of former Yugoslavia and emergence of new states from Yugoslav republics. Badinter’s Arbitration Commission, which consisted of European lawyers, gave opinions on the platform of international law on major legal questions that were raised at the breakup of Yugoslavia. On the basis of Badinter’s Commission and the constitution of Yugoslavia Kosovo Albanian politicians demanded independence with two reasons: 1. the right to selfdetermination and 2. status of autonomous region within Yugoslavia with clearly defined internal and external borders. Additional legitimacy for Kosovo independence was given by a war between Kosovo Albanians and Serbian army in 1999, which ended by international military intervention with bombardment of bigger Serbian cities. Big efforts were invested to gain independence of Kosovo, such as political lobbying as well as recognition of the problem in the media, which resulted also in big financial input. Most of the times Serbs were presented in the public as aggressors; already in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and later in the war in Kosovo. European public opinion as well as majority of European politicians (except for those countries with problems of territorial integrity) but also United States of America were in favor of Kosovo Albanians. In 2008 Kosovo Assembly without representatives of Serbian minority unanimously declared independence of Kosovo. Serbia, which at that time already had pro-European government, decided to object this act by legal means. International Court of Justice ruled that the declaration of Kosovo independence was not illegal. By mid 2013 Kosovo has been recognized by 105 countries, of which 23 states from European Union. Kosovo has not been recognized by Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia and Romania, and we can assume that the reasons for that lay in their own problems with territorial integrity: some Spanish provinces have tendencies to independence, the most active of all is Catalonia; Cyprus is a so-called frozen conflict, because the island is divided in Greek and Turkish part and the Greek Cypriot government does not acknowledge the divide, moreover they are strongly supported by Greece; Slovakia and Romania have big Hungarian minorities with tendencies to bigger autonomies. In the case of Western Sahara the picture is a bit different. When Spain withdrew from North Africa, Sahrawi people were less politically organized then Kosovo Albanians, hence they had less international support. The problem of Western Sahara is rarely presented in the media and has low international visibility. On the one hand the interest of the media and the wider public is small or non-existent, on the other hand Morocco has good international reputation as ordered African state with good EU and USA relations. Moreover, in 1987 Morocco applied for EU membership, but the application was denied on the basis of geographical non-compliance – Morocco is not on European continent. However, this act indicates positive relations with EU, hence Morocco has many economic agreements with EU, such as permission for European ships to fish in the Moroccan sea, open airspace for European aircrafts and many trade agreements, in return for substantial European monetary aid. According to Zunes and Mundy (2010) in 90 order to understand the issue of Western Sahara it is necessary to look in detail the internal politics and history of Morocco. Moroccan territorial claim to Western Sahara is based on the nationalistic belief in the recovery of the lost empire combined with gaining additional legitimacy for the current political regime, which already experienced two coup attempts (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). The occupation of Western Sahara did not strengthen only Moroccan nationalism but has also encouraged Sahrawi nationalism (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). With the persistence of the conflict the nationalism has strengthened and deepened, it encouraged people to organize in a political system and Polisario Front emerged – political representation of Sahrawi people. Zunes and Mundy believe that Washington bares the most guilt for the intractability and persistence of the conflict, because it allowed the Moroccan occupation in 1975 and all the following US administrations nourished good relations with Moroccan king, because they saw him as an ally in the war on terror, hence USA have so far done nothing to solve the status of Western Sahara. However, these authors look at the problem from the American standpoint, from the European standpoint we can show the finger on Spain, which did not handed over the governance to the local administration when leaving the territory in 1975, or France, which strongly supports Morocco and lobbies for it in the EU. Moreover, EU members do not protest and continuously overlook the violation of human rights in Morocco and Western Sahara. They do not exercise any pressure on the Moroccan government to allow Sahrawi people to organize referendum on the independence and EU continues to cooperate with Morocco. In 2008 under the framework of the European neighborhood policy Morocco gained “advanced status”. In 2010 a Summit between EU and Morocco was organized for the first time, and this was the first summit between EU and an African or Arabian country. At the Summit the politicians discussed about a privileged status of Morocco, which would be written down also in contractual form in the near future. To show that also high-level European politicians have a more critical perception of Morocco and Western Sahara conflict, we have to point to an example of a group of European members of parliament that wanted to visit refugee camps in Western Sahara in spring 2013 and to check the situation there, but were denied the entrance to Morocco at the Casablanca airport.2 After returning to Europe, the MEPs publicly protested, but there was no bigger media or political response, also no consequences for the Moroccan government from the EU side followed. If we compare Western Sahara and Kosovo, we can say that to gain independence a legitimate right to self-determination and an approval of UN Council or International 2 According to the majority of Slovene media also Slovene MEP Ivo Vajgl was in the delegation. Ana Čefarin, “Vajgl o maroškem incidentu: to je primitivizem, če ne bo posledic, potem smo papirnati tiger.” Dnevnik, 7. marec 2013. http://www.dnevnik.si/svet/vajgl-o-maroskem-incidentuto-je-primitivizem-ce-ne-bo-posledic-potem-smo-papirnati-tiger 91 Court of Justice are not enough, what matters is international politics, support of the main actors and a wide media presence with a high public support. Without these factors all efforts for gaining independence are in vain or the process takes too long and looses its initial momentum. References Abelson, Jenn, 2012: Western Sahara: Why Africa's last colony can't break free. Boston Globe, 16 June 2012. Available at: http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/06/15/western-sahara-why-africa-lastcolony-can-break-free/87jACxXfU5bVUtqEe6uyrM/story.html Čefarin, Ana, 2013: Vajgl o maroškem incidentu: to je primitivizem, če ne bo posledic, potem smo papirnati tiger. Dnevnik, 7 March 2013. Available at: http://www.dnevnik.si/svet/vajgl-o-maroskemincidentu-to-je-primitivizem-ce-ne-bo-posledic-potem-smo-papirnati-tiger Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960. The United Nations and Decolonisation. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml Skornšek Pleš, Aleš, 2012: Zahodna Sahara, zadnja kolonija v Afriki. Razpotja, 30 October 2012. Available at: http://www.razpotja.si/zahodna-sahara-zadnja-kolonija-v-afriki/ The UN Charter, 2013. Wikipedia. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selfdetermination#The_UN_Charter Zunes, Stephen, Mundy, Jacob, 2010: Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution. New York: Syracuse University Press 92 Monika Štumpfl The role of United Nations in Western Sahara conflict Decolonization of Western Sahara and its fight for self-determination remains unsolved for almost five decades. The issue concerning this conflict is directly linked with the United Nations (UN) as the decolonization of the Western Sahara has become a permanent fixture on the UN's agenda after 1963 when the General Assembly (GA) labeled it as a non-self-governing territory (Epstein, 2009: 1). I will try to determine the attitude of the UN towards Western Sahara, and its past, current and future status from the aspect of involvement and intervention of the UN in this conflict. Numerous documents, mechanisms, frameworks and modus operandi of this international organization will serve as the basis of my research. I will argue that the current undefined status of the Western Sahara is in fact a consequence of the lack of operative and progressive work inside of the UN, indicator of dominance of superpowers inside of the UN (i e. Unites States of America (USA) and France), and the UN inclination to organized hypocrisy and decision-making, which essentially characterizes the UN. The first part of the article will present historical background and the role of the UN in establishing an independent country in Western Sahara. I will determine the main processes that took place in the UN and highlight the documents, which were adopted concerning this matter. Secondly, I will address the issue of the UN in Western Sahara from the viewpoint of organized hypocrisy in general, which I will later apply to the case of the UN in Western Sahara. The main emphasis will be on insufficient implementation of the UN bodies decisions. Lastly, I will summarize my findings on this case and present my point of view of the Western Sahara issue and the UN's role in it. Historical background and the role of the UN “Spanish Sahara”, Western Sahara's former moniker, was colonized by Spain in 1884. The indigenous people date back to the 12th century, when Arab tribes from Yemen migrated to the region. They mixed with the local Berber population and African groups from south of the Sahara. During this time the Kingdom of Morocco was a colony of France, which achieved its independence in 1955. In the 1960s, Spain began taking advantage of the abundant phosphate resources in Western Sahara for its own economic benefit. The 1960s also saw the emergence of Sahrawi nationalism, as the nomadic Sahrawi's settled in the region. The Polisario Front (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro) was created on May 10, 1973 by Sahrawi students in Rabat. The Polisario Front established itself as the representative of the people of Western Sahara and the government-in-exile, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (Epstein, 2009: 4–5). 93 On 16th of December 1965, when the GA adopted its first resolution on what was then called the Spanish Sahara, the UN’s involvement in the issue began in earnest (Omar, 2008: 46). In fact it was Spain's unwillingness to decolonize the territory of Western Sahara that has brought greater involvement of the UN in this issue, as Spain became subjected to different kind of rules and principles related to decolonization of foreign territories when it joined UN in 1955. Spain claimed that Western Sahara is not its colony but its province, where their 'African brothers' are well treated. The main reason for this stance was Spain's reluctance to waive its rights to the Western Sahara territory, particularly in the light of the possibility of the commercial exploitation of phosphate deposits at Bu Craa (Munene, 2004: 82, 111). Between 1966 and 1973, the GA adopted seven more resolutions on the territory, all of which affirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. The resolutions also reiterated the need to hold a referendum on self-determination while reaffirming Spain’s responsibility as an administering power. In August 1974 Spain finally declared that it was prepared to organize a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara in early 1975. To that end, it conducted a census of the local population. In response to Spain’s decision, King Hassan II of Morocco announced that his country could not accept a referendum that included the option of independence for the Western Sahara. Mauritania, for reasons of self preservation, also joined Morocco in claiming Western Sahara and in calling for arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to decide on the precolonial legal status of the territory (Omar, 2008: 46–47). Both anticipated the ruling of ICJ would find sufficient legal ties among Western Sahara and their territories, under which they could legitimately annex the Western Sahara territory. However, ICJ issued its advisory opinion, in which it stated that no legal ties of territorial sovereignty were found between Morocco, Mauretania and Western Sahara, with which it rejected any legal possibility of legitimate annexation of Western Sahara territory to Morroco and Mauretania. It reiterated the Sahrawi right for a referendum on self-determination through the expression of free will of indigenous peoples (ICJ, 1975). The ICJ advisory opinion’s groundbreaking ruling continues to constitute the main legal framework in which the question of Western Sahara has been dealt with by the UN and its relevant bodies (Omar, 2008: 48; Novais, 2009: 61). In spite of listed facts, a secret deal was discussed in Madrid between the governments of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. On 14th of November 1975 the Madrid Tripartite Agreement was signed by officials of the three countries, where Spain agreed to institute a temporary tripartite administration in the territory which would include representatives from Morocco, Mauritania and Spain. The Madrid agreement was then brought before the UN, whose reaction to the agreement was very unconvincing. On 10th of December 1975, the GA ambiguously adopted Resolutions 3458 A (XXX) and 3458 B (XXX), which, notwithstanding their different wordings, both affirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination, but did nothing in relation to the agreement signed between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. Therefore, as a result of previously signed Madrid agreement, on 14th of April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania signed another agreement in which 94 Western Sahara was partitioned with the northern part given to Morocco and the southern part to Mauritania (ibid.). The mentioned case indicates that in spite of clear dictation of the UN and the GA, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania did not comply with guidelines of ICJ and previous GA resolutions. Thus, as Omar (2008: 50) states, a situation occurred, where the logic of realpolitik was clearly allowed to displace international law, and where international community did not intervene to forestall the consequences of the agreement. This eventually led to the forcible and illegal annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania in 1975, followed by period of armed confrontations between Polisario Front and Morroco. This was followed by period of new resolutions, where the GA strongly deplored the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of the Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of that occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania. In its resolutions the GA reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence while also recognizing the Frente POLISARIO as the representative of the Sahrawi people. In particular, the Frente POLISARIO was called upon to participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution to the question of Western Sahara. This recommendation would later constitute the cornerstone of the UN policy when it again took up the question of Western Sahara and its peace process at the end of the 1980s. In afore mentioned peace process the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were actively cooperating and had their main goal set on a free and fair referendum under the UN supervision, in which the Sahrawi people could exercise their right to selfdetermination in choosing between independence and integration into Morocco (Omar, 2008: 46–52). After fifteen years of armed conflict, a peace agreement was eventually sealed on 6th of September 1991 between Polisario and Moroccan authorities which was to be followed by a referendum on self-determination based on the 1974 census (only people who were labeled as inhabitants of Western Sahara in 1974 could vote on referendum, census of which was done by Spanish colonial authority). To achieve it, the UN sent a mission to supervise the ceasefire and to prepare the referendum: the UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). The MINURSO’s tasks involved identifying eligible voters, overseeing the withdrawal of Moroccan troops and monitoring if the Polisario units were in the pre-agreed areas (Novais, 2009: 61). However, MINURSO did not succeed, its main obstacle being Morocco with its unwillingness to accept the agreed upon electorate and with building Morrocan settlements on the territory of Western Sahara with intention to contaminate the voting pool (Omar, 2008: 52). Despite the numerous resolutions and interventions of the UN in the past to better the situation in Western Sahara, it is evident from the historical point of view that the conflict in Western Sahara stagnates, or as Zoubir (2007: 158) claims, falls into “the category of forgotten or frozen conflicts”. 95 Even with a sealed peace process between Morroco and POLISARIO front, deployed MINURSO troops in 1991 (Zoubir and Pazzanita, 1995: 614), beginning of the electorate identification for the potential referendum and expeditions of special representatives to the Western Sahara, the UN were unable to provide functional framework inside of which the decision on self-determination of the Sahrawi nation could be made. Moreover, in addition to Spain, France and the USA had a big impact on how things were going to be determined in Western Sahara. As Zoubir and Pazzanita (1995: 620) say, the last days of 1991 were defined by intensive diplomatic activity in the UN Security Council (SC). French policymakers resisted the idea of a Sahrawi state, fearing that the Sahrawi victory would bring down the monarchy and destabilize the Moroccan state. Nevertheless, the UN SC on 31st of December 1991 passed a Resolution 75, the wording of which was purposely ambiguous to preserve unanimity and again only urged further efforts to resolve the dispute. On the other hand, as Saidy (2011: 87) streessed, the USA has taken multiple approaches toward the Saharan conflict that illustrate without ambivalence or apathy its interests in the Maghreb region. In fact, distinctions can be drawn between the American stance and the foreign policy that it directs toward the conflict. The first is based on two constant elements: on one hand, the United States endorses the Madrid Accords of 1975, which means that it recognizes Moroccan administrative authority without sovereignty over Western Sahara, while on the other hand, the US is convinced that an independent ‘‘mini state’’ would be a source of instability in the Maghreb region and the Mediterranean area as a whole. The second stance varies according to whether the administration is Democratic or Republican, as do responses to the effects of international and regional changes. However, during the post-Cold war period and more specifically after the 9/11, successive US administrations have declared that the only viable solution is political compromise. Moroccan manipulations with the Western Sahara settlements, which inadvertently remind us of the ones in the West Bank in Gaza, Palestine (settling of Moroccan nationals in Western Sahara territory, with intention to increase the number of inhabitants that would vote for annexation of Western Sahara to Morroco) and unwillingness/ unpreparedness to recognize the new complexity of the situation, has shown the UN being a weak and powerless international organization. While it otherwise promotes the ideals of democracy, freedom and equality under the international law it cannot resist interference from individual member states pushing on the agenda their own interests. In addition, the USA and France are a longtime allies of Morroco (Munabe, 2004: 111) and do not wish to accept, especially after the 9/11 and later declared war on terrorism, a newly established state in the Maghreb region. The current situation in the Western Sahara thus begs the question of what use it is to have the support of the UN when powerful countries such as the US, France, and Spain are either indifferent or actively oppose the Sahrawi's legitimate right to selfdeterrmination (Pitts in Epstein, 2004: 107). 96 The UN, organized hypocrisy and policy of double standards When determining the role of the UN as an organization in establishing the independent country in Western Sahara, it is important that we look upon the structure of the organization and nature of its processes and decision-making practices. This will highlight the ways of management and (non)intervention of the UN in the case of Western Sahara. As Brunsson (2007: 111) argues, decisions can be seen as a special type of talk that indicates a will to act and a choice of action. In traditional decision theory, a decision is taken to be indicative of a corresponding action that will occur in the future, or at least that the decision is assumed to increase the probability of such an action. But there is also talk without decisions. Management presents visions, business concepts, objectives, policies, or political programes that are not decisions regarding specific actions but aimed at convincing members of the organization to act in accordance with management talk. According to traditional administrative wisdom, this kind of talk is expected to have the same effect as decisions - it is assumed to increase the probability for corresponding action (Brunsson, 2007: 111–112). But in reality it is not always the case that traditional theory and wisdom reflect realities. There are not always strong connections between talk, decisions, and actions - neither for individuals nor for organizations. To talk is one thing; to decide is a second; to act is yet a third (Brunsson, 2007: 112). It is possible to act without making a decision or talking about it, and it is possible to talk and decide without actually acting on it. So there is reason to suspect that there will often be discrepancies between what is said, what is decided, and what is done – however, it is also possible to act contrary to what one has said or decided (ibid.). The result is hypocrisy – a concept which is always related to actors; only actors can be hypocritical. There are two types of actors in modern society: individuals and organizations (Meyer et al. in Brunsson, 2007: 112). In Western culture actors are assumed to be bounded, coherent, coordinated, and sovereign entities with intentions, who are able to talk, decide, and act, and who control their own actions. Hypocrisy is therefore a kind of inconsistency within an actor. Inconsistencies among actors in society are generally seen as routine and are not necessarily perceived to be problematic. Inconsistencies within actors, however, seem less ordinary and more problematic (Brunsson, 207: 113). The general norm is that actors should be consistent in what they say, decide, and do. Thus, hypocrisy is usually deemed to be a problem. But on the other hand, hypocrisy can even challenge moral norms. At first sight, a hypocrite is assumed to be acting in a morally indefensible way (Brunsson, 2007: 113). However, these ideas about hypocrisy are open to debate as hypocrisy sometimes is not necessarily a problem but a solution, especially in the case of organized structure of actors. In regards to this, it is essential that we establish a model with two basic assumptions: one regarding conflict, and one regarding the output of organizations (ibid.). 97 Hypocrisy is a response to a world in which values, ideas, or people are in conflict - a way in which individuals and organizations handle such conflicts. Organizations are routinely exposed to conflict. People have different and often contradictory ideas about how an organization should work and what it should achieve, and to satisfy one demand fully may be to satisfy poorly or to fail to satisfy another (Friedlander and Pickle in Brinsson, 2007: 113). Modern organizations are particularly inclined to pretend that they can satisfy a series of conflicting demands. Sometimes they seem to do so as a response to external or internal pressures, and sometimes managements seem to actively and voluntary make such pretenses (Brunsson, 2007: 113). On the other hand, organized hypocrisy may enable the UN, or regional organizations, to manage irreconcilable pressures that might otherwise render the organization incapable of effective action and threaten its survival (Lipson, 2007: 5). Considering this, hypocrisy is meaningful only if talk and decisions have an intrinsic value. A central but often implicit assumption in traditional decision theory is that action is the focal point of interest, and that talk and decisions have no value or interest per se; their only value is in paving the road to a predicated action. But this assumption does not seem to fit modern organizations, where policy in general seems to revolve around ways of talking and of presenting decisions (Brunsson, 2007: 114). Moreover, organizations rarely need to go begging for attention - mass media interest is high for organizational planning, strategies, programes, opinions, and decisions. Thus, talk and decision seem to have value as a kind of output created by organizations. As we can see, organizations are often valued not merely for their actions but also for what they say and the decisions they make. Thus, publicity is often as important as the product, if not more (Brunsson, 2007: 114–115). The framework of organized hypocrisy can be clearly applied in the case of Western Sahara in relation to the UN (and with different outcomes in some other cases, such as self-determination of Kosovo), where we can see that during the years authorities of the UN discussed and even decided in favour of the Sahrawi people and their right to selfdetermination (i. e. opinion of ICJ, numerous resolutions of the UN GA and SC), but have not effectively implemented these determinations and decisions in practice. Therefore, we can stress the fact that concrete matters, which would have meaningful consequences and outcomes for the final solution of Western Sahara situation, have not been transposed into practice. Furthermore, we can argue that the UN is being paralyzed by its numerous membership or to be more explicit – national interests of its member states, especially superpowers, where divergence between achievement of defined UN goals and wishes of its member states (and non-organizational, bilateral relations between states, for example between the US and Morroco, France and Morroco, etc.) is evident. However, it must be acknowledged that an organization such as the UN is interlinked with global, even universal membership, where it is hard to imagine it would always act in matters on which it talks and decides, especially when 98 structure and constitution of states are so diverse. Nevertheless, the UN should follow key norms and rules written in its fundamental and founding documents, such as those in the Charter of the United Nations, where an Article 1 distinctly promotes respect for self-determination of peoples and equality of peoples in accordance with the principles of justice and international law (UN Charter, 1945). This is of great importance, especially in circumstances of conflicting agony of decolonization that endures from year to year for the last five decades, and where Western Sahara is referred to by the UN as “Africa’s last colony” (Mundy, 2009: 115). The UN has often been accused of hypocrisy, i.e. failing to act in accordance with the ideals it espouses. Such inconsistency can arise from afore mentioned organized hypocrisy in which organizations respond to conflicting pressures in external environments with contradictory actions and statements. International organizations such as the UN are subject to conflicting demands to reach normative standards and effective coordinated actions. These pressures make way for organized hypocrisy, which observes and describes reactions of organizations to these conflicting pressures (Lipson, 2007: 5). Organized hypocrisy can thus have dysfunctional effects, decoupling organizational behavior from its stated purposes and eroding institutional legitimacy (Lipson, 2006). Moreover, the involvement of the UN in Western Sahara is also topical for current challenges that the organization is facing in the 21st century, where the Charter of the UN is, as Köchler (2006: 324) argues, itself based on a compromise between power and law, combining two contradictory elements or procedures: (a) the international rule of law is ensured through a system of collective security guaranteed by the SC’s enforcement powers under Chapter VII; whereas (b) the authority of the SC, guaranteeing the rule of law, is inseparably linked to the veto power of the permanent members - a privilege which mainly serves their individual security interests and exempts them de facto from the application of the very rule of law they are supposed to ensure. Ever since its foundation, this state of affairs has condemned the world organization, in particular the SC, to a modus operandi that is characterized by a policy of double standards. In the case of UN's role in Western Sahara it is therefore evident that organized hypocrisy is essentially linked to politics of double standards. Pursuit of superpowers' and bilateral alianses' interests is taking the UN hostage, who is in fact trying to reach a compromise between POLISARIO and Morroco with various resolutions, but cannot, with the exception of rare bright spots in the past (i .e. peace process between POLISARIO and Morroco) end the conflict in Western Sahara. Conclusion in the article I have addressed the dynamics of and the important role of the UN in (un)resolving the conflict in Western Sahara, where the stagnant issue of Western Sahara deems the UN's actions powerless and hypocritical. Contextualisation of Western Sahara issue from the aspect of the UN's role determines that the UN has appropriate 99 framework for taking action (GA, SC, ICJ, etc.) with which the basis for the resolution of the conflict can be established; however, it is commonly overpowered by specific member states' – superpowers' – national interests. Western Sahara conflict with Morroco is a representative case of organizational incapability of the UN to end decolonization processes in Africa, where the lion's share of blame falls unto organizational hypocrisy of the UN and its politics of double standards, which is crippling the functioning of the organization since its establishment. It is evident that the UN tried to negotiate and decide in favour of the Sahrawi people and independent state of Western Sahara, but was always stopped by the dominance of USA and France, who stayed loyal to Morroco and its interests. Issue of Western Sahara thus endures and remains a pressing problem in the present time, whereas staying silent and at the brink/on the edge of international community arena, where possibilities for actual implementation of the referendum on self-determination and establishment of a new independent state in region are getting smaller every year. If there is still a possibility for an independent state in Western Saharam it seems it can only be achieved if Sahrawi people would have a superpower at their side, speaking up for their interests in the UN in front of USA and France. Until this issue, also in the framework of the UN, does not shift from talking and negotiating to serious actions and clear 'no' to Morrocan illegal occupation of the territory it, alas, seems that the best-case scenario for Western Sahara is limited autonomy under Morroco, most allegiant advocates of which are France and the USA. References Brunsson, Nils, 2007: The Consequences of Decison-Making. New York: Oxford University Press. Epstein, Pamela, 2009: Behind Closed Doors: “Autonomous Colonization” in Post United Nations Era – The Case for Western Sahara. Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law. 15 (1): 1–37. Generalna skupščina Združenih narodov, 1965: Resolucija 2072, A/RES/2072/(XX). Available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2072(XX)& Lang=E&Area= RESOLUTION (10. 9. 2013). Generalna skupščina Združenih narodov, 1979: Resolucija 34/37, A/RES/34/37. Available at: http://www.un.org/ en/ga/ search/ view_doc.asp? symbol =A/RES /34/37& Lang=E&Area= RESOLUTION (10. 9. 2013). Generalna skupščina Združenih narodov, 1980: Resolucija 35/19, A/RES/35/19. Available at: http: //www.un.org/ en/ga/ search/ view_doc.asp? symbol=A/ RES/ 35/19&Lang=E&Area = RESOLUTION (10. 9. 2013). Köchler, Hans, 2006: The United Nations Organization and Global Power Politics: The Antagonism between Power and Law and the Future of World Order. Chinese Journal of International Law. 5 (2): 323–40. Lipson, Michael, 2007: Peacekeeping – Organized Hypocrisy? European Journal of International Relations. 13 (1): 5–34. 100 Lipson, Michael, 2006: Organized Hypocrisy and Global Governance: Implications for United Nations Reform. Available at: http:// citeseerx .ist.psu. edu/ viewdoc/ download?doi=10.1.1.118.8845&rep=rep1& type=pdf (5. 9. 2013). Meddržavno sodišče, 1975: Zahodna Sahara, svetovalno mnenje. Available at: http:// www.icj-cij.org/ docket/files/61/6195.pdf (21. 2. 2013). Mundy, Jacob, 2009: Out with the Old, in with the New: Western Sahara back to Square One? Mediterranean Politics. 14 (1): 115–22. Munene, Macharia, 2004: History of Western Sahara and Spanish colonisation. Available at: http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/faculties/law/docs/04munene.pdf (10. 9. 2013). Novais, Rui Alexandre, 2009: An Unfinished Process: The Western Sahara as a Post-Scriptum of the Colonial Period. Africana Studia. 12, 59–66. Omar, Sidi M, 2008: The right to self-determination and the indigenous people of Western Sahara. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 21 (1): 41–57. Saidy, Brahim, 2011: American Interests in the Western Sahara Conflict. American Foreign Policy Interests 33(2): 86–92. United Nations, 2008: The United Nations Today. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information. Ustanovna listina Združenih narodov – United Nations Charter, 1948. Available at: http:// www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (15. 4. 2013). Zoubir, Yahia H. in Anthony G. Pazzanita, 1995: The United Nations' failure in resolving the Western Sahara. The Middle East Journal. 49(4): 614–628. Zoubir, Yahia H, 2007: Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality. Middle East Policy. 14(4): 158–177. 101 102 II. Environment and natural resources 103 Matic Vehovec Western Sahara in numbers For Europeans Africa still remains a mysterious continent. If we exclude experts and scholars, we would be hard pressed to find anyone who can name even ten African countries. If we take this into account we shouldn’t be surprised that Western Sahara’s problems are far from the mind of the average citizen of the European Union. When we mention Western Sahara most people think of the western-most part of the Saharan desert and are somewhat confused about whether it is a region or a country. Ironically, this brings us to the core of the issue; today, the political situation of Western Sahara is among the most complex and controversial in the world. If we wish for the situation in Western Sahara to improve we must understand what is happening inside its borders. It is important to acknowledge the intolerable situation within Western Sahara, because “a lack of acknowledgment or an incorrect acknowledgement can cause serious damage; we can understand it as a form of oppression, a way of trapping individuals or groups of people into an incorrect, warped and limited way of being” (Taylor, 2007: 291). In the interest of informing the public I will continue by presenting and interpreting some statistical data concerning Western Sahara. I would like to point out that this data is not undisputable. The majority of the data which I will be using comes directly from the POLISARIO front. Because of this my data may be drastically different from those, presented by organisations and governments which support Western Sahara’s occupation. In cases where data comes from other sources the sources shall be specifically mentioned. Geography Western Sahara is located within the Sahara desert in the northwest part of Africa. In the north it borders Morocco, in the south and in the east it borders Mauritania and in the northeast Algeria. The entire country covers an area of 266,000 square kilometers. Climate is subtropical and dry. Within Western Sahara we can distinguish two regions, dating back to colonial times: Saguía el Hamra is the northern, more fertile and densely populated province, and Rio de Oro is the less fertile and more sparsely populated south province. These two provinces are where the POLISARIO front takes its name from (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro). The capital of Western Sahara has always been the city of El-Aaiún/Laayoune (sometimes also referred to as: Laayoune, Laayoune, La'youne...). This city lies along the 104 Atlantic coast, relatively close to the Canneries. The position of Western Sahara is strategically significant, as it has been at the crossroads of trade for centuries. Vast caravans of camels, carrying precious merchandise once stretched throughout its territory, they can still be seen today, albeit in a lesser extent. Western Sahara’s coast is open to the Atlantic and is well suited for naval traffic. Population Western Sahara contains two main ethnic groups: the Arabs and the Berbers, there is no major ethnic tension between them. Islam is the dominant and practically exclusive religion in the area, the official language is Hassaniyan Arabic, but Moroccan Arabic and Spanish are also spoken. The traditional Sahrawi society was strongly hierarchical and tribal, inside each tribe there were three main casts: the warriors, the priests and the shepherds. Due to a lack of water and poor fertility of the soil, the Sahrawi tribes were predominantly nomadic. Camels and grazing animals still represent an essential source of income for many Sahrawis. The data on population size varies depending on whether one counts the Moroccan settlers and the Sahrawis who live outside the borders of Western Sahara. This country has been victim of forced demographical changes by Morocco, which has populated the occupied area with a large amount of its own citizens in the hope of legitimating its occupation. In 1974 Western Sahara had a population of only around 70.000 people (Olsson, 2006: 20). A year later in the Green march, 350.000 Moroccan volunteers crossed the border, not all of them remained in Western Sahara since the movement was primarily a political gesture. However, over time the number of Moroccans settling in Western Sahara grew steadily. For a country with such a small population this was a demographic revolution, the Sahrawis quickly became a minority in their own country. They were forced to the margins, literally into border territories (which are still under control of POLISARIO) and figuratively in the sense of marginalization for those Sahrawis who stayed in newly Moroccan occupied territory. Data from 1999 shows that back then the entire population numbered at around 307,000 people, of which 120,000 were living in Morocco occupied territory and 187,000 in refugee camps outside the country. However, those numbers did not include around 200,000 Moroccan occupiers. Taking these figures into account we can estimate that by 2010 the entire population increased to around 443,000 (the population growth in Western Sahara is 3.4% per year). The CIA world fact book estimated that by July 2013 the population had grown to 538,811 people. The population density within Western Sahara is only 1.15 inhabitants per square kilometer as the hardships of occupation, coupled with harsh natural conditions, have caused more Sahrawis to live outside their own country than inside it. Despite the fact that Western Sahara is thirteen times larger than Slovenia its population is at least four times smaller. 105 Many statistical data bears witness to the crisis in Western Sahara, as a sample I shall name just a few: 25% of the adult population is illiterate. Only 0.2% of the population has access to a telephone. Only 0.1% of the population has access to a radio or a television. 18% of the population does not have access to drinking water. Only 15% Sahrawis live in cities (this is mostly the result of Moroccan occupation, which has forced many into refugee camps outside the cities). • The government of the Canaries estimates that it had prevented the immigration of more than 42.000 people between 2005 and 2007 alone. 80% of those immigrants were from Western Sahara or southern Morocco (The CODESA report, 2007: 48). • The highest standard of living within Western Sahara is enjoyed by Moroccan settlers; in the occupied lands the Moroccan government has set up massive programs for improving living conditions. The plan was to make a large Moroccan population legitimize the occupation (Olsson, 2006: 20). • • • • • Natural resources As the dry and inhospitable climate in Western Sahara makes agriculture almost impossible the Sahrawis still focus on raising grazing animals. These animals represent an essential source of income (around 19% of the land area is devoted to constant grazing). But the true wealth of Western Sahara lies in other sources. The Moroccan occupiers did not come for sand; instead they claimed the richest coastal part of the country. POLISARIO controls only a small section of inhospitable land on the southern and eastern borders with Algeria and Mauritania. Because of the occupation, the original Sahrawi inhabitants were forced to retreat into either the most inhospitable part of their own country or into Algerian refugee camps. One of the most relevant topics concerning Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara is the fact that they are exploiting one of the richest fishing areas in the world. In the 1960s Morocco was catching only around 200.000 tons of fish per year, but by 2001 that number had risen to over a million tons per year. This stunning increase was mainly due to their seized access to the rich waters of Western Sahara. The Moroccan fishing industry employs around 400.000 Moroccans and generates an annual profit of more than a billion US dollars (Olsson, 2006: 17). Along with the rich fishing waters Morocco’s occupation also gave them access to the Bu-Craa phosphate mine (also known as Boucraa), which is known to contain one of the richest phosphate deposits in the world. In 1962 the newly established national mining company ENMINSA estimated that there were around 10 billion tons of phosphate ore in 106 Western Sahara and the Bu-Craa mine alone was known to contain 1.7 billion tons of high quality (75 – 80% pure) phosphate ore. By 1974 phosphate mining profits reached 4.7 billion former Spanish pesetas. Had Western Sahara achieved independence and control over its own natural resources at that time, it is safe to assume that due to its small population Sahrawis could have reached the living standards of Western Europe or the gulf oil countries (Hodges, 1984: 83-84). Morocco also began searching for oil in the area of occupied Western Sahara and it seems likely that they will find vast amounts of it, but just as with fishing and mining, Morocco will take the largest share of the profits and the benefits for local inhabitants will be minimal (Olsson, 2006: 19). The fact that in spite of all this natural wealth most of the indigenous population of Western Sahara lives outside its homeland in desperate poverty, is bitterly ironic. Everything we have seen leads us to believe that in the absence of Moroccan occupation, Western Sahara could have developed its own highly successful economy and reached the living standard of first world countries. Conclusion Western Sahara is a land of contradictions. It is a colony in a postcolonial world; it is a third world country, which could be a first world country. It is a place where political and ideological borders create a gap between the privileged occupiers and the oppressed locals. It is a place where the uninvited guests sleep on a king sized bed while the owners of the house are forced to take the couch or seek the hospitality of their neighbors. The problems of Western Sahara are grave and their solution will not be easy or fast. Even if the Sahrawis attained independence tomorrow their problems would not disappear overnight. They would still be faced with the several hundreds of thousands of Moroccan settlers. In the decades following the occupation they have sprung deep roots, and deep roots cannot be removed without causing pain. By now, many of the Moroccans who came as occupiers had grown old and have raised their own children within Western Sahara. Forcing them from their homes may seem just but it can hardly be considered morally unambiguous. On the other side, peaceful coexistence with the Moroccan settlers would also pose a great challenge. But all these questions lie in the (hopefully not too distant) future; for now the Sahrawis are still fighting for freedom from oppression and the long, unfulfilled dream of having a country of their own. References CIA World Factbook, 2013. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/wi.html, 10.5.2013. 107 Hodges, Tony, 1984: The Western Sahara File. Third World Quarterly, 6(1): 74–116. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3991228, 11.5. 2013. Olsson, Claes (ed.), 2006: The Western Sahara conflict - The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization. Available at: http://www.wsrw.org/files/dated/2008-1022/claes_olsson_2006_natural_resources.pdf, 4.5. 2013. Poročilo CODESA (Kolektiv saharskih braniteljev človekovih pravic), 2007. Available at: http://www.arso.org/CODESAreport2007.pdf, 4.5. 2013. Poročilo fronte Polisario – Predstavništvo za Slovenijo in Zahodni Balkan. Taylor, Charles, 2007: Politika priznavanja. In: Zbornik postkolonialnih študij, Jeffs, Nikolai (ed.), Ljubljana : Krtina, 291–337. 108 Tjaša Učakar The occupation of Western Sahara in the light of natural resources At first sight, the territory of Western Sahara is not a lush oasis in the desert, nor is it the promised land of mountain springs, heavenly beaches and lush vegetation. But the 266,000 km2 of hot and dry desert territory to the west of the Sahara Desert, oppositely surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean, whose cold currents create dense fogs and dew, comprises a number of natural resources, which explains the main reasons for the Moroccan occupation of the territory, which range much further than just their dream of a “Grand Morocco”. Natural resources of Western Sahara are without a doubt one of the main reasons for the interest in this part of the world. Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara has otherwise occurred for several reasons, but its wealth of natural resources is one of the central motives as to why the state of occupation continues today. Through the occupation Morocco assures itself access and utilization of these resources, and thus reinforces its presence in the occupied area. As in many other parts of the world, exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara brings important source of income for the occupying force, as well as numerous employment opportunities for its populace. This perpetuates the status quo and legitimizes the occupation, despite its violation of international law. Morocco justifies its plundering of natural resources in an illegally occupied area with the argument that they assist the economic development of the otherwise desert area of Western Sahara by investing in infrastructure and by creating jobs. Cities in Western Sahara are being modernized, networked, connected with the Moroccan transportation, electricity and telephone networks. Larger cities do not cope with slums, as is typical of Moroccan cities. Schools and hospitals are being built, access to drinking water is provided, the capital of El Aaiun has two desalination station and an effective port (Lewis, 2011). The area of Western Sahara receives more investments that the rest of Morocco. In the last 35 years, the economic investment in Western Sahara has attracted a lot of northeners, mostly Moroccans, who, according to some sources, already account for about three quarters of the population in this area (Shelley, 2006). Morocco has encouraged migration through subsidies and lower taxes, affordable housing and related social benefits, the majority of immigrants have found employment in the fishing industry (Lewis, 2011; Hagen, 2008). Over the years, the demographic picture has completely changed. This goes in favor of Morocco, as, in the event of a referendum on the independence of Western Sahara, Moroccan majority would vote against the Sahrawis’ right to have their own country. As mentioned above, proponents of Morocco's occupation argue that Morocco invests 109 most of the assets from all its regions into Western Sahara. However, this argument should be examined further. Even if we leave aside the question of whether economic development replaced the possibility of autonomy and self-determination, the reason for Moroccan investments lies elsewhere, as not even benefits to the local population are comparable to their losses. It is true that Morocco’s investsments in the development of Western Sahara are high, but compared to the amounts received on account of exploiting natural resources, it clearly does not benefit the indigenous Sahrawis, but rather the Moroccan authorities (Smith, 2011). Statistically, it is true that Western Sahara has a higher share of access to drinking water and electricity than Morocco, has built more roads, ports, public buildings, residential areas (Shelley , 2006), but Sahrawis are being discriminated against and marginalized on a daily basis. They supposedly have employment opportunities in the phosphates and fishing industry, but a variety of organizations that support Western Sahara point out that Sahrawis are being marginalized and socially and economically discriminated against (Lewis, 2011). Numerous institutions have pointed out the problems concerning exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural resources. Among other things, the exploitation of natural resources in areas and nations without their own country, has also been identified by the United Nations with its Resolution 1803, which provides for the right of peoples who do not have their own state the permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. In the case of Western Sahara, this resolution is being violated because Sahrawis do not agree to Moroccan exploitation of resources, neither are they receiving benefits, greater than the damage caused (Permanent Sovereignty ... 1962, Smith, 2011). The main organization that draws attention to Moroccan exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural resources is the Western Sahara Resource Watch, which highlights the four types of natural resources that are at the heart of the territorial dispute between Morocco and Western Sahara: occasional removal of coastal sand from the coast of Western Sahara to the coast of the Canary Islands, pursuit of oil on land and in the continental shelf of Western Sahara, coastal fishing and extraction of phosphate rocks nearby Bu Craa (Smith, 2011). Fish, phosphates and possible reserves of oil and natural gas also represent one of the major reasons for the territorial dispute between Morocco and Western Sahara. Below we will analyze the various natural resources and Morocco’s role in their exploitation. Fishing By occupying Western Sahara, Morocco ensured itself access to 1,150 km of coastline on one the richest fishing grounds in the world. Fishing in Western Sahara is important to Morocco for three reasons. Fishing is an important generator of Moroccan income and employment, global demand for seafood is on the rise, Western Saharan waters are still plentiful and represent a significant 110 proportion of Moroccan catch. From the 1960s, when it was about 200,000 tons, it increased to over one million tonnes in 2001. The fishing industry employs about 400,000 Moroccans, revenues from fish exports represent around 15% of their total exports (Shelley, 2006). Fishing contributes to about 6.5% of Moroccan jobs, a share they want to increase significantly in the next eight years. Almost 40% of national fishcatching comes from the area around the city of El-Aaiun in Western Sahara (Lewis, 2011). Due to overfishing, the Moroccan waters have already been exhausted, especially the north coast of the Mediterranean Sea, further increasing the importance of Moroccan fishing in the coast of Western Sahara. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the share of sardines caught in Moroccan waters fell by 80%, while the stocks in the waters of Western Sahara remained healthy. In addition, 80 to 90% of revenue from fishing comes from cephalopods, which are located almost exclusively in Sahrawi waters (Shelley, 2006). According to some estimates, as much as 70-90% of Moroccan catch landed in Western Sahara’s ports, which have become technologically well equipped by Moroccans who have also built a number of plants for processing, freezing, packaging, etc. (Hagen, 2008). In recent years, intensive and uncontrolled fishing in Western Sahara has started to cause overexploitation, overfishing and a significant reduction in fish abundance. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture, the entire fishing area in West Africa is being threatened by overfishing, mainly at the expense of local fishermen whose own vessels can’t compete with modern fishing boats, equipped with the latest technology by the being sent to exploit the waters of West Africa by the EU. Its heavily subsidized fleet in the waters of Western Sahara and Mauritania annualy catches 235,000 tonnes of pelagic species. This area is becoming one of the main hunting grounds of the European Union, which catches 25 % of fish in the waters of developing countries, thereby weakening the local economy that is existentially dependent on fishing. In Senegal, the catch declined by 75% in the last ten years. Governments have become dependent on revenue from sale of fishing rights to foreign corporations and countries while the local population is facing a shortage, which is why some analysts warn that West Africa is not far from Somalia’s aftermath (Vidal, 2012). Fishing, with the exception of the southern regions, was not a traditional Sahrawi activity, but today almost the entire fishing industry of Western Sahara is under Moroccan control (Hagen, 2008). Sahrawi’s benefit from the development of fishing is insignificant, only few can afford to buy a boat and fishing equipment or find employment in ports, while Morocco grants business licenses only to those wealthy Sahrawis, who show a friendly relationship with Morocco (Shelley, 2006). With issuing fishing rights, Morocco is trying to control the catch and control the fish stocks, but it is estimated that there are as many illegal fishing boats as there are those with permits, which further promotes overfishing and decreases fish stocks (Shelley, 2006). 111 Foreign fishing in the waters of Western Sahara has a long history, for centuries fishermen from the Canary Islands and Spain also fished there. When Spain left the colonial rule over Western Sahara it preserved the right to small-scale fishing in its waters. When Spain joined the European Union, it spread those rights into the wider European community, while it still controls the negotiation processes with Morocco concerning fishing (Hagen, 2008). On March 1st in 2006 Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Morocco came into force, with the protocol to be rebuilt every year. For €36 million, more than 100 of EU's ships gained access to Morocco's territorial waters. The agreement stipulated validity in the waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco. Critics accused the Agreement of illegality, since the United Nations do not recognize Moroccan authority over Western Sahara, in addition to the fisheries agreement being of no benefit to the Sahrawis. The initiative to exclude the waters of Western Sahara from the agreement was to no avail, as the European Commission replied that such steps were unnecessary, since the agreement was in line with the legal opinion of the United Nations. According to a Swedish Member of the European Parliament, 74% of the EU fleet operates in the waters of Western Sahara, while people from this area have no say in the matter. Through the fisheries agreement with the EU, Morocco legitimizes its occupation of Western Sahara, and the EU is involved in taking part in this activity. In 2011, with 326 votes against and 296 in favor, MEPs rejected the renewal of the agreement, which led to its suspension (Lewis, 2011; Hagen, 2008). In December 2011, the EU ceased fishing activities in the area of Morocco, and launched negotiations for the adoption of a new protocol. Some EU countries advocated for the adoption of a new protocol as soon as possible, as some segments of their fleets found themselves in trouble, but on the other hand, a number of delegations stressed the importance of the inclusion of human rights clauses, the necessity of composing a protocol in line with the international law and with a commitement to ensure sustainable use of resources (Council of the European Union, 2013). In addition to foreign fishing vessels which have an agreement with Morocco, the waters of Western Sahara are also being exploited by large fishing boats, owned by private companies, which liaise with Moroccan companies for the benefit of sailing and fishing under the Moroccan flag (Hagen, 2008). According to the Western Sahara Resource Watch, Morocco annually receives around 50 million euros through fishing agreements with the European Union and Russia (Smith, 2011). Phosphate mines Phosphate mines, located in the desert interior of Western Sahara, are mostly owned by Morocco, which exports these excavations through Western Sahara's ports. Phosphate 112 rock is used primarily for the production of agriculture fertilizers, and demand for it is growing in accordance with the intensification of global agriculture. Stocks of phosphate are becoming increasingly valuable due to global increase in demand for fertilizers. The widespread use of phosphates in agriculture has enabled tremendous growth in productivity of agriculture land, on the other hand, it has also resulted in eutrophication and pollution overflow. Global reserves of phosphate are decreasing, demand for food is increasing, which is why phosphate mines have become of utmost strategic importance. The phosphate industry represents a strategically important sector for Morocco, for example in 2008, phosphates accounted for 33% of the country's exports, around 10% of which were procured from the occupied territory of Western Sahara. If this territory belonged to Western Sahara, Morocco would be facing a strong competitive supplier, which could lower global prices of phosphates. Prices of phosphates in the global market have been growing, especially since 2008. According to Hagen (2008), this price growth is associated with the growth of biofuel production, which ironically requires a greater use of fertilizers, with the dwindling of global phosphate supplies and a rising demand of food, due to the increase in world population and changes in eating practices. Western Sahara has one of the richest deposits of phosphate rock in the world, namely the area of Bu Craa. To illustrate how important this particular phosphate repository is, an American journalist wrote, that on an almost daily basis most of us will consume food that was grown on fields, fertilized with phosphates from this mine (Pearce, 2011). With annual excavations of phosphate rock reaching a few million tons, the contents of this vast mine, with the help of a 150 km long conveyor belt – the longest in the world, are unloaded at port El-Aaiun, where the rock is washed, dried, stored, and then shipped around the world for processing into fertilizer. The Bu Craa repository was discovered in the 1940s by Spaniards, who equipped it with the necessary infrastructure, while Moroccans, through the occupation of Western Sahara, continue digging its ore. The Bu Craa repository and other deposits in Western Sahara and Morocco are of global importance, approximately 15% of annual global mining of phosphate rock, which is around 170 million tons, comes from the deposits in Morocco and Western Sahara. While the United States and China have larger deposits, they both use the majority of their excavations for domestic purposes, making Morocco by far the largest supplier of phosphates in international markets. In addition, according to some estimates, global stocks of phosphate rock are most abundant in Western Sahara, while stocks elsewhere are decreasing (Pearce, 2011; Hagen, 2008). The United States are the largest importer of phosphates, originating from Moroccan, with 99% of their imports coming from Morocco and Western Sahara (Hagen, 2008). According to the Western Sahara Resource Watch, from its three million tonnes of mined phosphate rock, Morocco receives over €400 million annually. When we compare this with the figure of about €600 million worth of development aid Morocco in Western Sahara, within five years, these investments are not as large as the gains from 113 Morocco natural resources of Western Sahara are very large (Smith, 2011). Hagen (2008) has calculated that the value of a cargo ship, fully loaded with phosphate rock, is worth the same as all the annual multilateral humanitarian aid to refugee camps put together. Although the development and success of the Bu Craa repository could mean job opportunities for Sahrawis, this is not the case as they are systematically marginalized. In 1968, a few years before Moroccans took control of the deposits, the majority of the 1600 workers were Sahrawis, while in 2008 the Sahrawis represent only around 200 of the 2000 employees, the rest are Moroccan immigrants (Hagen, 2008). Phosphate mines are another example of a natural resource exploited by Morocco while Sahrawis have very little benefit from the development in this sector. It is true that Morocco invests in the development of the area, but it took over most of the industry from Spain, the former colonial power, while Sahrawis are largely excluded from management and employment in the sector. The largest consumers of phosphate likely have an interest in maintaining the status quo, as their relations with Morocco are satisfactory and the creation of a new state in the already troubled Megreb and West Africa region would mean more uncertainty and a re-establishment of relations of power. Renewables Since Morocco has no oil or natural gas supplies of its own, finding renewable sources of energy is of great importance. Western Sahara’s location in the subtropical zone, and consequently its dry climate and high insolation, provides suitable conditions for the utilization of solar energy. Moreover, a cold Atlantic sea current running along its coastal region provides stable wind energy. Solar and wind power in the occupied area of Western Sahara represents 5.5% of the energy used by Morocco from renewable sources, the Western Sahara Resource Watch predicts the figure will rise to 26.4% by 2020. Morocco intends to build solar and wind farms there, with a total capacity of over 1,000 megawatts (Morocco: Green Energy ..., 2013). In 2013, Morocco plans to build five wind farms, two of which would operate in the area of Western Sahara, in El-Aaiun and Boujdour. The Western Sahara Resource Watch is constantly prompting the international community and companies about the ongoing building in the occupied territory of Western Sahara and urges companies not to participate in the occupation. In the summer of 2013, General Electric aborted participation in the construction of wind farms in the occupied area (Morocco: General Electric ..., 2013). On the other hand, in 2012, Siemens, together with the Moroccan holding Narev competed for emission coupons on a United Nations' Clean Development Mechanism tender, projected for the construction of wind turbines near the town of ElAaiun in Western Sahara. Their application was rejected precisely because they planned 114 their construction in an area outside of Moroccan territorial borders (Siemens starting up ..., 2013). Through the construction and ownership of industrial and power plants, Morocco increases its presence in the occupied territory. Employment in these industries mainly accrues to Moroccan immigrants, while profits flow into Moroccan coffers. Foreign companies, delivering technology and the know-how, quietly support Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara through their passivity, ignorance and avoidance of an international conflict. Oil Unlike its eastern neighbors, Morocco does not have oil stocks and in 2001 began intensively exploring the area of Western Sahara, both on land and at sea. Their search began to pick up after the discovery of oil reserves off the coast of neighboring Mauritania, whose geological structure is similar to Western Sahara’s, which are projected to be a potential oil zone, stretching from the Gulf of Guinea to the north (Shelley, 2006). Morocco has granted French and U.S. companies permission to investigate this territory, sparking fierce protests from Polisario, as these explorations are contrary to the legal opinion of the United Nations Secretariat from 2002. The mentioned document clearly states that any exploration and exploitation of natural resources, which will not be in accordance with the wishes and interests of the Sahrawis is in direct violation of international law (United Nations Security Council, 2002). Although some companies have already withdrawn from the area, stating that there is no oil in Western Sahara, new companies are arriving to continue the pursuit (Hagen, 2008). The discovery of oil would only further strengthen Morocco’s commitment to annex Western Sahara. At the same time, benefits from oil would once again go solely into Morocco’s pocket, which now funds research to contribute to infrastructure deployment. At present, the pressure form NGOs is preventing certain companies to take an active part in the operations in the area, but other companies, uninterested in the illegal state of affairs between the two countries, are arriving and pursuing their business interests, while silently and concurently supporting Moroccan occupation. Desalination of sea water Due to climatic conditions (drought, desert and semi-desert climate), the lack of fresh water in southern Morocco and Western Sahara is to be expected. One way of obtaining fresh water is through a sea water desalination process. In addition to the need for drinking water, fresh water is needed especially in the processing of phosphates mining. OCP, Morocco’s state-owned phosphate company, obtains phosphates in the occupied territories of Western Sahara, but requires fresh 115 water for their export, with which unprocessed phosphate rock is washed before sending it to ships, waiting at the port of El-Aaiun. Morocco also builds installations for desalination of sea water on occupied territory of Western Sahara. Companies from other countries, such as Norwegian Aqualyng participate in construction and the supply of technology. Norwegian organizations which support Western Sahara, have pointed out to Aqualyng that the area where they want to build the plant is currently an occupied teritory and urged the company to reconsider and withdraw from cooperation with Morocco (Controversial Norwegian PR ..., 2008). Norway is among the countries that pays close attention to highlighting potentially controversial investments to companies. Even the website of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which normally helps Norwegian companies win business abroad, warns and urges companies not to partake in business operations in the territory of Western Sahara, as this territory is engaged in territorial dispute with Morocco. Among the suppliers of desalination plants is Veolia, a French company which proudly references a desalination plant in Laayoune, which it states is located in Morocco, while in actuality the plant operates in the occupied territory of Western Sahara (Desalination.com, 2013 ). Export of sand For decades Western Sahara has been a major exporter of grit and sand, most exports go to the Canary Islands and Madeira, where the sand is used for construction, tourism and maintenance of beaches (Hagen, 2008). Sand from Western Sahara was already being shipped in to the Canary Islands by Spaniards at the time of their colonialism. The Canary Islands began to maintan their artificial beaches with the sand from Western Sahara, which was cheaper and more accessible than the dark volcanic sand from their archipelago (The dirty sand ..., 2011). No record of accurate data on the transport of sand from Western Sahara exists, as ports that import this sand record merely that the sand arrived from Africa. In 2008, the Western Sahara Resource Watch launched a monitoring of sand exports and concluded that it takes place continuously and in large quantities (Sand Exports ..., 2013). Agriculture Since 2004, the southern part of Western Sahara, in the area around the city of Dakhla, has developed an intensive fruit and vegetable production, which uses local fresh groundwater resources. According to some information (Dakhla farms depleting ..., 2013), the water pumped for irrigation of vast agricultural lands in the area is already threatening stocks of underground aquifers. Given that it is an aquifer with fossil water (meaning that there is no replenishment) intensive pumping is not a sustainable solution and some are fearful that the water supplies will be depleted before the conflict between 116 Morocco and Western Sahara resolves. As WSRW states (Dakhla farms depleting ..., 2013), a study of the exact capabilities of the aquifer was promised, but in the interests of the arable land owners it won’t be made public for the time being, as it could lead to a significant reduction in production in the event that the aquifer is found to not be powerful enough, or an increase in competition in the event that the study reveals an abundant underground water source. Besides water pumping, the water source is also threatened by pollution from fertilizers. The local water agency warns that city of Dakhla could face a huge shortage of fresh water by 2030 if the exploitation of the water source remains unchanged (Dakhla farms depleting ..., 2013 ). Water consumption is not the only problem that the agriculture in the area faces. The sector has employed several thousand new Moroccan immigrants, while the crops are mainly being exported to the European market (Hagen, 2008). Local residents again lose out on many levels. They are not presented with new employment opportunities, are not involved in the production, do not receive benefits from the crops, grown on their land, nor do they receive the produce as it it intended for export. At the same time, their most precious natural resource – water, is being exhausted. Conclusion The official opinion of the United Nations states that the exploitation of natural resources in non-autonomous areas should be performed exclusively for the benefit of the local population. With the growing immigration of Moroccans in the area of Western Sahara, an important question arises as to who should therefore be regarded as a local resident? Only those who lived in the area before 1975, or new immigrants as well, with a right to vote in a possible referendum on self-determination, should a peace treaty be established (Shelley, 2006). Moroccan exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural resources are in stark contrast to the equitable, peaceful and legally compliant solution for Western Sahara. Trade in natural resources provides Morocco with legitimization of the occupation, a significant cash inflow which makes the occupation easier to finance, and more importantly, by exploiting natural resources, Sahrawis are being deprived the use of these resources in the future. By exploiting Western Sahara’s natural resources, Morocco provides employment to thousands of Moroccans, who migrate to the occupied area, and feeds its national budget. At the same time, the international community, whilst supporting the UN resolution on the right of Sahrawi self-determination, cooperates through trade with Morocco and thus accepts the current situation, therefore, the state of occupation. 117 Resources Controversial Norwegian PR in occupied Western Sahara, 2008: Støttekomiteen for Vest-Sahara, 24.04.2008. Available at: http://www.vest-sahara.no/a104x890. Dakhla farms depleting underground water reserves? 2013: WSRW, 06.04.2013. Available at: http://www.wsrw.org/a106x2557. Desalination.com, 2013: Veolia Water Solutions & Technologies. Available at: http://www.desalination.com/suppliers/med-epc/veolia-water-solutions-technologies. Hagen, Erik, 2008: The role of natural resources in the Western Sahara conflict, and the interests involved. International conference on multilateralism and international law, with Western Sahara as a case study, Pretoria, 04. in 05.12.2008. Available at: http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/faculties/law/docs/15hagen.pdf. Lewis, Aidan, 2011: Morocco's fish fight: High stakes over Western Sahara. BBC News, 15.12.2011. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16101666. Morocco: General Electric Pulls Out of Tender for Building Wind Farm in Western Sahara, 2013. Sahara Press Service, 06.07.2013. Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201307082255.html. Morocco: Green Energy to Uphold Moroccan Occupation in Western Sahara (ong), 2013. Sahara Press Service, 31.08.2013. Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201308310605.html. Pearce, Fred, 2011: Phosphate: A Critical Resource Misused and Now Running Low. Yale Environment 360, 07.07.2011. Available at: http://e360.yale.edu/feature/phosphate_a_critical_resource_misused_and_now_running_out/2423/. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 1962: General Assembly resolution 1803. New York, 14.12.1962. Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ga_1803/ga_1803.html. Sand exports from occupied Western Sahara to Las Palmas continue, 2013: WSRW, 27.08.2013. Available at: http://www.wsrw.org/a105x2639. Shelley, Toby, 2006: Natural resources and the Western Sahara. In: Claes Olsson (ed.) The Western Sahara Conflict: The role of natural resources in Decolonization. Current African Issues No. 33, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala. Available at: http://nai.divaportal.org/smash/get/diva2:240540/FULLTEXT02.pdf. Siemens starting up controversial wind project on occupied land, 2013. WSRW, 05.03.2013. Available at: http://www.wsrw.org/a106x2527. Smith, Jeffrey, 2011: The Question of Western Sahara and the Natural Resources of the Territory. Submissions to the United Nations General Assembly, Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee). New York, 4.-6. oktober 2011. Available at: http://arso.org/WSRW4Committee2011JSmith.pdf. Svet Evropske unije, 2013: Sporočilo za javnost, 3225. Zasedanje Sveta – Kmetijstvo in ribištvo. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/SL/agricult/136199.pdf The dirty sand of Canary Islands’ beaches, 2011. WSRW, 05.10.2011. Available at: http://wsrw.org/a204x2103. United Nations Security Council, 2002: Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2002/161, 12.02.1992. Available at: http://www.wsrw.org/files/pdf/olaeng.pdf. Vidal, John, 2012: Is the EU taking its over-fishing habits to west African waters? Guardian, 10.04.2012. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/apr/02/eu-fishing-west-africamauritania. 118 Nika Sirk Rigler Trade in fish or human rights? The West African fishing area is, among other things, one of the most important and richest fishing sites in the world, given the amount of fish shoal alongside the 150,000 km2 long coastal area of Western Sahara which is estimated at 10 tons per square kilometre. Another feature worth mentioning is its biodiversity, with over 200 different kinds of fish, 70 molluscs species, various species of squid, cuttlefish, crab, shrimp, etc., of which the annual catch exceeds two million tons. Thus it is not surprising that the World Bank pronounced the continental shelf of Western Sahara as the richest part of the entire Maghreb region, to which the abundance of phosphate, mineral, uranium, water, and potential oil and natural gas sites contributes a great deal. In May 2006, the European Union concluded the fisheries agreement with Morocco which permitted European ships to fish in waters of occupied Western Sahara, despite the lack of approval and involvment of the indigenous population. The only country that expressed its disagreement with the policy was Switzerland, while the support of Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands was conditioned by the annexation of the coastal part of the sea called Gran Maghreb. Traditionally, this is the name for the westernmost part of the Arabic world in North Africa that encompasses the countries of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, and nowadays also Mauritania, Libya and Western Sahara. Despite the mentioned circumstances, the agreement got 409 votes in favour and 169 against, while 66 voters abstained. Some time ago, the Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) launched a camapaign entitled “Stop the EU fisheries in occupied Western Sahara” with the intention of encouraging the civilian population to express their disagreement with the renewal of the fisheries agreement in 2013. Legally speaking, the question whether Morocco has the right to trade with the riches of this occupied territory arises, due to the fact that it opposes both moral and legal rights of the Sahrawi people. Therefore, the international campaign Fish Elsewhere (¡Pescado saharaui!) called for the European Union to cease approving and supporting such immoral acts, hence, fishing in the waters of Western Sahara, as long as the conflict in the last African colony that has been lasting for almost 40 years, remains unresolved. The campaign also appeals to the European Commission for Fisheries to act within the framework of international peace, thus endorsing the efforts of the United Nations for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, given the fact that the aspirations of the indigenous peoples regarding the organization of an independence referendum have not yet been granted. According to international law, Morocco's exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara can be performed only under the condition that the wants and interests of 119 Sahrawis are in accordance with signing the agreement. Moreover, there is another resolution drafted by the commission that has to be considered when dealing with such issues. Namely, the recipient country receiving the money has to allocate some of it to those who have become disadvantaged due to the policy, in this case this applies to the Saharan community. The requirement therefore demands that the latter also benefit from the fishing taking place in their own waters. This is being completely disregarded by Morocco, since nearly 95% of Moroccans are involved in the fishing industry as a means of reducing unemployment in the country. More than a year later the Moroccan authorities supplied the requested information to the European Union. At this point it is worth mentioning that the authorities did not present any information of this nature in the first three years, during which the agreement was being implemented. The European Union’s request for Morocco to provide documentation on ways the implementation had been beneficial to the local community is also downright absurd, as the agreement should have been constructed on the basis of cooperation and consultation not only with the local, but also the indigenous population. What is more, the data gathered could be easily distorted, as Morocco has populated the occupied territories with thousands of people previously residing in Morocco. Regardless, the part of the report describing the “socio-economic impact” consisted of only three pages, where it was stated that 20.700 new jobs formed in this region south of the Atlantic; however, the document did not provide any information on how, when or in which companies this came about. Additionally, the data about the number of Sahrawis holding these positions was not stated either. Despite the possiblility of this figure being credible, it is still impossible to deduce whether the Sahrawi populace has actually enjoyed any benefits, as the indigenous peoples living on this territory, plagued by the never-ending story of colonization, have actually become a minority. Although the document did indicate the construction of the Bojador port and the expansion of the Dajla port in Sahrawi towns (that are actually marked as Moroccan), the stated explanations should be considered inessential, since infrastructure construction does not necessarily bring advantage to the population. In February of 2010, exactly a year before the expiration of the four-year agreement, the European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Maria Damanaki inquired Aziz Akhannouch, the Moroccan minister of agriculture and marine fisheries, about the benefits the Sahrawi community had from the agreement. The question was not answered, which resulted in the uncertain future of the one-year extension of the agreement proposed by the European Comission to EU member states. The agreement was called into question also because of the amount of money allocated by the European Union to Morocco for purposes of financial compensation that were in accordance with the (recently still existing) arrangements for fishery rights in its sea which includes the waters of Western Sahara. Morocco has been receiving 36 million 120 euros annually, of which 13,5 million euros was to be intended for the development of the Moroccan fisheries sector. According to European sources, the offer of the European Union at the signing of the extension revolved around 25 million euros, while Morocco sought to elevate the offer to a higher amount of 38 million euros. On top of this, the agreement caused a loss, as each euro invested made a reimbursement of merely 83 cents. According to fomer Austrian foreign minister Erwin Lawrence, “we need to realise that this way, we are directly supporting the occupation of Western Sahara and are jointly responsible for what is happening in the desert within the desert” (Longoria, 2012). In other words, the renewal of the agreement was, and still is questionable due to the conflict in Western Sahara, as it clearly approved of the occupation. Morocco's occupation efforts, as well as its attempts for the EU to endorse the presented agreement, are purely economic in nature, as the Moroccan monarchy has little natural resources of its own and instead lives off tourism, emigration and particularly illegal drug trade. It is no secret that Morocco has control over the entire hasish trafficking business in the North African territory. Despite the fact that Brussels supplied the information demanded by Member States for the purpose of endorsing the renewal of the agreement, the opinion of the countries remained divided until the very end. Additionally, the proposal made by the EU was supposed to also be in accordance with a qualified majority; however, it failed to do so. Spain and France were at the forefront of countries that strove for the quick approval of the agreement and cautioned the reluctant and suspicious Sweden and Denmark that only a one-year postponement was at stake. Two years ago, on 14th December 2011, the European Parliament at last rejected the renewal of the fisheries agreement between the European Union and Morocco with a narrow majority of votes, while at the same time freezing military aid, provided to resolve the situation of the continuous and grave violation of human rights. Reports made for the European Commission had proven that compensation payments allocated to Morocco for the fishing of the EU in Western Sahara presented a waste of Member States' taxpayer money. Additionally, the legal service of the European Parliament decided that the agreement was in violation of international law, since Western Sahara is not a part of Morocco, and since the population living on this territory never concurred with the fisheries agreement. Following this final outcome the fleet of the European Union was ordered to immediately stop fishing in Western Sahara’s waters and return to port. The European Union has no benefit whatsoever from the current situation in this land, the victim of its own riches. Sahara, if independent, could utilise and trade its natural resources (fish and phosphates) itself, the main difference being that the Saharan populace could finally free itself from distress. This is especially important for the young, who are educated, hard-working and tired of waiting for the peaceful resolution of the conflict; they demand the right to employment, the right to housing and the right 121 to have their own natural resources available for use. As a result, illegal emigration to the Canary Islands would decrease, for its primary purpose is escaping the cruel fate marked by poverty, illiteracy, corruption, violence and killings, to list but a few. As the representative of the movement Frente Polisario for the Balkans Malinin Mohamed states, “Europe would gain a lot with the independence of Western Sahara – first peace and stability in the region, then national resources” (Vasev, 2013). One year before the expiry of the agreement, the Spanish government asked the European Commission for the aforementioned temporary – one-year – extention of the agreement in order to devote more time to negotiating the terms of the new agreement without the need to stop the fishing in the area. And it was precisely Spain, named by the United Nations as the former colonial power responsible for the deconolization of Western Sahara, that profited the most from the agreement, given that it acquired at least 100 out of the 119 fishing licences and mostly handed them out to fishermen from Andalucia (42) and the Canary Islands (37). This data testifies that 80% of the fishing in Spain took place in the waters of Western Sahara, where deep sea fishing and the catching of bluefin tuna, sharks, sardines, sea bream, anchovies and swordfish are at the forefront (the catch referring to the last category was approximately 60.000 tons). Therefore it is not unusual that the Spanish parliament, together with the representatives of the shipwrights, expressed their frustration and anger over the results of the last vote. These have undoubtedly come as a surprise, for during the course of the years, Morocco had always recorded victory in Strassbourg. The Secretary General of the Spanish Fisheries Confederation (CEPESCA) Javier Garat stated that the trade blockade was a “big mistake” and “bad news”, as it could lead to loss of employment, jobs and the fishing activity in Spain. At the end of the same year, Spain already demanded from the EU to pay for the harm the European Parliament’s veto, regarding the extension of the fisheries agreement with Morocco, caused to its fleet. Around 70 ships and over 500 direct jobs were said to have been affected, and the authorities promised that the crew employed on fishing vessels would be given a part of the compensation awarded. Spain and Morocco will undoubtedly ask for a new mandate for the fishing agreement bulit on a new and different basis that will be economically, ecologically and socially supported; however, the European Commissioner for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs Maria Damanki answered that “we do not know if a new fishing agreement with Morocco is at all possible […] In any case, convincing answers to key topics have to be included, for example environmental development, economic profit and international legality” (Soto, 2011). The latter was overlooked with the acceptance of the agreement in 2006 by the European Parliament, which shamefully placed economic profit and certain commercial interests above human rights, and thus ran over the principles of international law. 122 Not long ago we witnessed the enunciation of Moroccan diplomat Youssef Amrani who pronounced “the cooperation with the European Union as extremely difficult, for the Europan Parliament is a dinosaur that curbs all progress – i.e. the conclusion of a new fisheries agreement between the EU and Morocco” (Vasev, 2013). He clearly expressed his government's desire for the renewal of the agreement that would allow European ships to cast their nets into the sea north of Africa, as one and a half years had passed since they were forced to vacate the zone where the conflict arose. Another country affected by the termination of the agreement was France, which shares Spain’s belief that trade is unfolding according to plan and the problem of the unextended agreement needs to be solved promptly. After all, “in Morocco, there are more than 600 French companies present, so France is the one truly in charge of Morocco”, said Frente Polisario's representative for Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, Malainin Mohamed (Vasev, 2013). In Slovenia Ivo Vajgl, a Member of European Parliament (who is also the vice president of the group for Western Sahara in the Europan Parliament) and Franco Juri, the now former member of the Slovenian Parliament and member of the party Zares, are the ones who fight against extending the agreement. They appealed to the Slovene government not to give its blessing to the continuation of illegal fishing in the waters of Western Sahara, as they viewed this as an opportunity for Slovenia to show its integrity and further its involvment in the situation by helping to solve the status quo in the land forgotten by all. Nonetheless, Slovenia deemed the extension of the agreement to be a suitable and reasonable temporary solution. In conclusion, Malainin Mohamed still appeals to Slovenian authorities saying that “Slovenia should form a clear stance upon the support given to the peoples of Western Sahara, as the majority of other EU members have. We would like to object to further agreements with Morocco, such as the agreement on fisheries, which includes the territorial waters of Western Sahara, for these agreements support occupation, and we would like to help alleviate the suffering of Sahrawi people with humanitarian aid” (Vasev, 2013). Only time will show what will be the answer to the question of what we can expect from Slovenia and from the possible resolution of the conflict that has now lasted for almost 40 years. “What seemed as a sea of sand is a land full of hope, inspirited by its people.’’ (Malik: Hope of Western Sahara) 123 References Agencia EFE, 2013: La CE no quiere pagar más a Rabat por el acuerdo de pesca y aún ve problema en el Sáhara. Terra España. Available at: http://noticias.terra.es/mundo/europa/,034e27251c21d310VgnCLD2000000dc6eb0aRCRD.html. Basteiro, Daniel, 2011: La Eurocámara anula el acuerdo de pesca con Rabat por el Sáhara. Público. Available at: http://www.publico.es/412140/la-eurocamara-anula-el-acuerdo-de-pesca-con-rabatpor-el-sahara. Deiros, Trinidad, 2011: La UE encubre a Marruecos para pescar en el Sáhara. Público. Available at: http://www.publico.es/internacional/394621/la-ue-encubre-a-marruecos-para-pescar-en-el-sahara. Fishelsewhere, 2013: Marruecos: “La Eurocámara es un dinosaurio que dificulta el acuerdo”. Fishelsewhere.eu. Available at: http://www.fishelsewhere.eu/a158x1414. Fishelsewhere, 2011: La UE encubre a Marruecos para pescar en el Sáhara. Fishelsewhere.eu. Available at: http://www.fishelsewhere.eu/a158x1326. Gaube, Aleš, 2011: Slovenski blagoslov za nadaljnje leto ribarjenja evropskih bark v vodah Zahodne Sahare. Dnevnik. Available at: http://www.dnevnik.si/svet/1042425091. Longoria, Álvaro, 2012: Sons of the clouds, the last colony. DVD. Malak, 2008: La esperanza del Sahara Occidental, Poesía. Embajada de la República Árabe Saharaui Democrática en México. Available at: http://www.embajadasaharauimexico.org/rasd-enmexico/poesia-y-narrativa/25-la-esperanza-del-sahara-occidental-poesia.html Soto, Daniela, 2011: España pide indemnización a la UE tras el veto a acuerdo de pesca con Marruecos. BíoBíoChile. Available at: http://www.biobiochile.cl/2011/12/15/espana-pide-indemnizacion-a-la-uetras-el-veto-a-acuerdo-de-pesca-con-marruecos.shtml. Vajgl, Ivo, 2011: Zmaga človekovih pravic: Evropski parlament zavrnil podaljšanje ribiškega sporazuma z Marokom. Available at: http://ivovajgl.eu/komentar/2145/zmaga-clovekovih-pravicevropski-parlament-zavrnil-podaljsanje-ribiskega-sporazuma-z-marokom. Valenčič, Erik, 2010: Igranje z mirom. Mladina, 45. Available at: http://www.mladina.si/52307/. Vasev, Boris, 2013: Zahodna Sahara: EU v precepu med odgovornostjo in koristmi. RTV SLO. Available at: http://www.rtvslo.si/svet/zahodna-sahara-eu-v-precepu-med-odgovornostjo-inkoristmi/306628. Western Sahara Resource Watch, 2011: La Comisión y Marruecos firman la ampliación del acuerdo de pesca. WSRW. Available at: http://www.wsrw.org/a205x1882. Western Sahara Resource Watch, 2011: La UE vota a favor del robo del pescado saharaui, 2006. WSRW. Available at: http://www.wsrw.org/a194x1988. Western Sahara Resource Watch, 2013: Recogen firmas para detener la pesca de la UE en el Sahara Occidental ocupado. TerceraInformación. Available at: http://www.tercerainformacion.es/spip.php?article45715. 124 III. Religion, culture, politics 125 Alen Hajdarević Western Sahara under occupation Western Sahara is a land that is always under a foreign occupation. In his article Western Sahara, the last colony in Africa, Aleš Skornšek-Pleš (2012) writes that the colonial period in Western Sahara was, due to the unfavourable climate and no attractiveness of the territory, launched only in 1884, when Spain after the Berlin Congress declared a protectorate over areas of Río de Oro and founded their first settlements. The Spanish presence was initially limited, especially on the coastal strip and the city of Villa Cisneros, while the people inside remained virtually independent. So, there has always been a lot of interest in the coastal zone of Western Sahara, which is still in the center of attention today, mainly due to the richness of fish. Aleš Skornšek-Pleš (2012) writes that decades later, after taking Smare in 1934, Spanish troops took control of the entire Western Sahara territory, and Spain in 1958, because of military pressure of the then independent Morocco Sahara liberation army and some bedouin peoples, merged both provinces of Spanish Sahara, Sagui el-Hamra (Red valley) and Río de Oro (Gold river), in the administrative unit - linked and declared one of the Spanish provinces. That way Spain wanted to definitely resolve the issue of territory, and thus bypass the right to self-determination in the process of decolonization. To the Spaniards, with the exception of coastal belt, where fishing flourished, the territory didn't seem particularly interesting, and they finally withdrew on 26.2.1976. Based on a hidden Madrid agreement, Morocco and Mauritania occupied the country. Morocco has taken twothirds of Western Sahara and Mauritania has occupied the southern part, from where after several military defeats against the Polisario Mauritania withdrew in 1979. Polisario liberation movement had a very strong will to liberation and they forced Mauritania to leave the southern part of Western Sahara. Polisario Saharan liberation movement Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia elHamra y del Rio de Oro), a broad coalition of intellectuals, trade unions, farmers, students and other social groups, was formed on 10th May 1973. They declared themselves as the sole representatives of the Sahrawi nation and proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, which has been recognised by more than 80 states up until today. Occupation During their occupation, and more specifically between 1980 and 1987, Morocco gradualy constructed around 2300 kilometres long wall that separates the territory under the control of Morocco from nearly uninhabited desert under the supervision of 126 Polisario. The wall is surrounded by barbed wire and minefields, with which Morocco limited the possibility for aggressions of Polisario from Mauritania and the south of Algeria. It was the aim of Morocco to construct a physical barrier, in order to prevent as much as possible any resistance of the Polisario. Morocco has, in 1981, agreed to carry out a referendum in the occupied territory. A year later, specifically for this issue, a Committee was established in the Organization of African Unity, who made a plan to implement the referendum, but the organization got into crisis in the same year due to different positions of the Member States on the question of Western Sahara. On November 12, 1984, Western Sahara became a full Member of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), Morocco, however, on the same day withdrew in protest, arguing that Western Sahara is not an internationally recognised state and that the African Union recognized a non-existent state. Morocco remains the only African country that is not a member of the African Union« (Skornšek-Pleš, 2012). As we can see, Morocco uses many ways, from physical barriers to political actions to block any possible recognition and mention of Western Sahara on the international stage. In 1988, there has been an agreement between Polisario and Morocco, which has led to the basis for negotiations and ceasefire, which is in force since 6th September 1991. In 1989, the UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar proposed a peace agreement and the referendum on self-determination, which was supposed to be realised in the span of ten years from the signing of the peace agreement. This was followed by the arrival of the UN delegation to conduct a referendum in Western Sahara, known as MINURSO. Despite the effort and great expense, the referendum did not take place, because all attempts were blocked by Morocco. Economy and exploitation For current and past colonizers of Western Sahara, the most interesting part is the Atlantic coast, which is considered to be one of the richest fishing areas in the world. The Europe Union has years ago signed a fisheries agreement with Morocco, under which it pays Morocco for a concession to allow european (predominantly Spanish and French) fishermen to fish in the Moroccan and Western Sahara waters. According to Aleš Skornšek-Pleš (2012), the value of the agreement is 36 million euros, from which the Sahrawis don't have any benefits. Thus it is clear that the European Union indirectly contributes to the exploitation of the natural wealth of the Sahrawis and consequently legitimizes the occupation, violence and the exploitation of the Sahrawis. If the United States, the European Union and the wider international community put aside their geopolitical and economic interests, they would realise that the occupation is illegal, the suffering and exploitation of Sahrawis ethically unacceptable and that the only legitimate and necessary step is the immediate recognition of the full independence and sovereignty of the Western Sahara. Also, Erik Valenčič in his article Playing with 127 peace (2010), mentions this problem and he states that it is only a matter of time until when Sahrawis will wait and suffer from the occupation, since the question of Western Sahara will sooner or later have to be solved. An interesting insight is given by Aleš Skornšek-Pleš in his article (2012), when he quotes the Spanish newspaper El País, where a callculation is made on the basis of the analysis of a Moroccan Economist Fouad Abdelmoumni, that estimates that the occupation and maintenance of 360,000 men in the army on the territory of Western Sahara since 1975 has cost Morocco more than 95 billion dollars (about 70 billion euros). This assessment, however, does not include the costs of the civil Moroccan administration of extra 25 billion dollars (18.6 billion euros). The amount does neither include the cost of the Kingdom of Morocco to support its citizens when they move to the occupied area, by financial encouragements and by basic foodstuffs supplys. We can see from these data, how much of financial resources Morocco is investing to maintain the control over the occupied state. Situation today Today it is hard to find a Sahrawi without someone in his family being imprisoned or killed by the Moroccan regime. Sahrawis, which failed to escape from the occupied territories, live in one of the most repressive police states in the world. Arrests and prison sentences for offences such as a conversation with a stranger, the possession of anything associated with Polisario, are a daily practice. Especially alarming is the disappearance of persons, which represents the dominant pattern of shuting away people in occupied Western Sahara. It is assumed that there are some thousand of these cases, where the relatives of the missing persons are unable to obtain any information. In addition to constant threats and intimidations, Sahrawis are faced with systematic discrimination in the fields of education, health care and economic opportunities. Marginalisation of Sahrawis is escalating with intensive imigration of Moroccans, due to state-sponsored policy of cheap loans and tax incentives (Skornšek-Pleš, 2012). In this way Aleš Skornšek-Pleš (2012) described the conditions and the suffering of Sahrawis. Same information can be seen in media, stating that serious violations of human rights are happening in the Western Sahara. Several organisations are trying to make these violations public, but because of strong lobbies, the information is not that severe to make international organizations react within the shortest possible time. They are still closing their eyes from these violations and pushing the issue away. France, a strong supporter of Morocco is desperately trying to talk as little as possible of the human rights of Sahrawis. But given that 600 French companies operate and cooperate in Morocco, it is logical that France is supporting Morocco, since it gets most advantages out of this. The last political incident, when the deputy Ivo Vajgl with members of the delegation of the European Parliament for the Western Sahara was deported from Morocco 128 immediately after arrival at the airport in Casablanca, indicates how far Morocco is willing to go in order to cover the real situation in Western Sahara. Resistance Today, the majority of the rebels are young Sahrawis, who were born around the time of the occupation. The young generation is more radical than the old, it is a generation that tasted the Moroccan administration, went to their schools and was forced to worship the Moroccan King. This is the generation that is leading today's demonstrations, burning up Moroccan flags, goes on hunger strikes and uses other forms of rebellion and resistance. Morocco could learn something from that. Time is on the side of consolidation of Sahrawi nationalism. Conclusion Everything is indicating that Morocco does not intend to lay down an inch and is ready for the continuation of the occupation of Western Sahara. Personally I believe that experts, civil society and democratic institutions of Western countries, including Slovenia, should write as much as possible on the problems, to educate and raise awareness. We can see that Morocco is ready to do everything in order to not talk about Western Sahara, therefore we should resist that and put this theme as a top priority on all fields. This is the only way to convince the wider domestic and international public that the occupation and the suffering of Sahrawis is unacceptable, unfair and contrary to all the values that we share in the democratic world. Slovenian politics, if we limit ourselves to the domestic environment, should recognize that it is time for the recognition of Western Sahara, for the condemnation of the Moroccan occupation and the repressive policies, and that it is time for solidarity and justice, which should be demonstrated to the international community, even by a small member of the European Union. It is not impossible that such a statement of Slovenia would be joined by other countries, which might trigger a move at the EU as well as UN level. We would thus contribute to the effective implementation of the referendum, where Sahrawi residents would have a chance to decide in which state they want to live. Resources Skornšek-Pleš, Aleš, 2012: Zahodna Sahara, zadnja kolonija v Afriki. Razpotja, 8, 67–71, Solkan: Društvo humanistov Goriške. Available at: http://www.razpotja.si/zahodna-sahara-zadnja-kolonijav-afriki/ Valenčič, Erik, 2010: Igranje z mirom. Mladina, 11.11.2010. Available at: http://www.mladina.si/52307/ Zahodna Sahara, 2013. Wikipedia. Available at: http://sl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zahodna_Sahara Žerjavič, Peter, 2013: Daleč je Zahodna Sahara. Delo, 7.3.2013. Available at: http://www.delo.si/novice/politika/dalec-je-zahodna-sahara.html 129 Almin Ljutić Religion and politics in the Arab world: the Western Sahara case Why should this be my problem? While confronting the Western Sahara problem the question we need to ask ourselves is whether our intervention is legitimate. There is also a question about our moral responsibility to intervene. Why should we care about Western Sahara? Why is Western Sahara a Slovenian problem? These are all questions that a Slovenian might ask himself while being confronted with Western Sahara situation. There are many influential countries and transnational organizations that are capable of dealing with this problem way better than us. Organizations like United Nations, European Union, African Union and Arab League are more qualified and capable to solve this kind of problems on a global level and it would be logical to assume that these international alliances should be involved in Western Sahara case. Also superpowers like USA and Russia could help in solving the current issue with their intervention, if they are already intervening on other (economically, strategically and politically more attractive) areas. As we all know, things are a bit more complicated. Countries and transnational organizations are primarily working in their own interests and in favor of retaining their status, which leads to variety of political oppositions and conflicts between different political organizations. Because of all these conflicts there is no progress in solving the issue. Also, we cannot put the blame on politics only, there are many other factors that influence the situation in certain society or state, like economy, geographical location of a country, natural resources, level of (formal and informal) social interactions, media visibility and religious identification. The vast majority of the Sahrawi people, as well as Moroccans, are Sunni Muslims (according to CIA, The World Factbook), so we could say these are two predominantly Muslim countries. If we take that into consideration we could presume that the wider Arab-Muslim community should deal with this problem. If both nations are followers of Islam, since the vast majority of both nations are Muslims, it would be logical to expect an Islamic-based way of behavior. Islam as a religion, but also Muslim world by itself, is much strongly intervened in society than, for example, Christianity. The reason for that lies in consolidation of Islamic sharia law with the state law. Religion, in case of Morocco and Western Sahara, represents a large part of society, so one should be more focused in researching its influence. With the analysis of religious influence we will be able to answer the question why are we, in Slovenia, morally responsible for helping Sahrawi people. As we will see, help does not come from those who could help, but from those who are willing to, are compassionate and ready to help those in need. 130 Muslims or “Muslims” Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar in their article Religion and Politics: taking African epistemologies seriously confirm that religion and politics are tighter connected in Islamic states of Northern Africa than they are, for example, in European countries and in transnational European institutions. While confronting a problem of Western Sahara we have to acknowledge that the views of the involved parties on society, where religion is an integral part of that society, are different from our “eurocentric” views, when it comes to meaning of religion to individual or to society (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2007: 386). In Northern Africa countries with Muslim majority and in other parts of the ArabMuslim world, one person can represent state authority as well as religious authority at the same time, because both functions can be directly connected. This means that every decision, imposed by an authority, represents a decision based on both fundamental parts of the law. If we want to truly understand how this kind of society works we have to take this fact into account. We also have to bear in mind that regardless of true influence of religious beliefs on decision making process – in countries where this beliefs are directly connected to the law – while taking sides in a conflict, these decisions are represented as consequences of religious beliefs. This way, (false) image can be launched in public, that all of the decisions are in conformity with the religious laws and that they are not breaking any kind of moral values or basic human rights. If we want to deepen our knowledge about Western Sahara conflict we have to specify what religious beliefs really mean to the involved sides. In case of Western Sahara, Morocco and other countries of Northern Africa and Arabian Peninsula we are talking about religion that represents the highest percentage of religious people – Islam. Islam is the major religion of involved countries that is not only prevailing over other kinds of religious beliefs but also among the population of these countries, since the number of believers is up to 99% (like Morocco). Some of these countries even have Islamic symbols in their names and on their flags, which are even more widely recognised because of the Arabic roots of Islam. Muslim beliefs are based on Islamic holy book – the Quran. The Quran represents the holy Word for Muslims and it mentions in many parts that all worshippers are equal, regardless of their nationality, race or any other kind of belonging. One of the most important sources for Sunni Muslims (Sahrawi people, Moroccans as the majority of Muslims in mentioned Muslim countries) are Hadiths, roughly translated as sayings and acts of God’s messenger Mohammad, that were written down. These sayings confirm that all Muslims have to be united and connected, and it leaves no room for discrimination. One of the biggest sins in Islam is a violation of human rights, which are defined as: right to private property, honor, family, health, life and freedom, that don’t affect the rights of other people (Muminhodžić, 2001). In accordance with this we could expect that, in countries with Sunni majority, these Muslims will base their way of living on state approved presumptions. 131 Morocco with its military occupation and oppression of Western Sahara people – those who are not ethnically defined as Moroccans – directly violates this Islamic presumptions, so we could rightfully ask if there is any real influence of religion and moral values on decisions that are related to the case of Western Sahara and its residents. Morocco uses its economical and military supremacy to maintain control over Sahrawi people, which is not capable of defending their own interests because of its limited economical and military power (Pinto Leite et al., 2006). Actions of Morocco speak for themselves. Their political demands prevail over their religious beliefs. Thus they ignore officially integrated religious beliefs and use them only for camouflage, so they can continue to work in their own, unreligious way. Actions like that only prove that religion is not the main factor when dealing with the two opposite sides, especially if one of them is stronger than the other. In our case Morocco is certainly taking advantage of its superior position. This confirms the fact that despite officially large (and also media exposed) influence of religion on certain country’s actions, its influence in reality isn’t that big, because religion is only of secondary importance. The vicious circle of politics Unsuccessful attempts in Maghreb and wider Arab world to solve this problem, based on mutual religious beliefs, lead us to our next important factor that influences the relations between countries – politics. If religion is not the main factor that defines relations and if politics of transnational institutions like United Nations are not capable of solving this problem (Zoubir and Pazzanita, 1995), we have to explore the possibility of regional solutions on unreligious grounding. Therefore we have to analyze political standpoints and attempts of regional states to solve this case. Situation in Western Sahara is still problematic “thanks to” other states of the Arab world, that – when it comes to relations with countries that have a Muslim majority – are also not working in accordance with Islamic beliefs, which should represent fundamental basis of their political system. However, we have to admit that there were some political attempts to economically unite Northern African Arab countries. The basis for its establishment was represented in form of political and economically-geographical similarity of the Maghreb states. Arab Maghreb Union was an organization, founded in February 1989, which aimed towards economical collaboration and potential political unity among Arab countries of the Maghreb. The countries included were Morocco, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia and Algeria. Algeria was the one that gave the proposition for collaboration. That was one of the ways they wanted to solve the problem of Western Sahara occupation, but Moroccan king Hassan II. insisted on claims that Western Sahara is part of Moroccan state and refused to withdraw from that. He was aware that the possible recognition of Western Sahara could cost him a throne. Because Algeria refused to close the question of Western Sahara, Arab Maghreb Union ceased to exist (Zoubir, 1990). This regional attempt to solve the problem didn’t succeed for multiple reasons that will be further analyzed. 132 Beside Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara territory in 1975, Mauretania also engaged in fights for Sahrawi’s territory, but later, more precisely in 1979, signed a treaty with the movement for independence of Western Sahara – Polisario front – and furthermore didn’t actively intervene in relations between Sahrawi people and Moroccans. Morocco received many donations from Saudi Arabia and in a lesser degree from Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emiratesans to support their war costs (Damis, 1983). We can observe that countries which supported Morocco were monarchies, royal countries, just like Morocco with its king Hassan II. These countries were, by supporting Morocco, justifying their royal regime and the reproduction of their monarch political system. Because of these countries supporting Morocco, Western Sahara was not able to become a part of Arab League, which consequently does not want to be involved in solving Western Sahara problem in a way, favored of Sahrawi people. As we have shown with the example of Arab Maghreb Union, former socialist Algeria was the biggest supporter of Western Sahara at the time, furthermore Algeria today represents the biggest regional ally of Sahrawi people. Algeria didn’t directly intervene in fights between Sahrawi people – the POLISARIO movement – and Moroccans or Moroccan army, but did offer Sahrawi people huge supplies in form of weapons, food and oil. Algerians financially supported Sahrawi people, they also supported them in the area of diplomacy and strived for Western Sahara’s integration into African Union – they succeeded in achieving this goal. Also Lybia was providing Western Sahara with weapon supplies and finances in the first decades of Sahrawi fight against their invader. The only neutral country in the region of Maghreb was Tunisia (Damis, 1983). Because former socialist Algeria was the most important ally of Western Sahara, conservative Arab countries didn’t want to support regimes of other kind than their own. This way Algeria was the only country that politically struggled for Western Sahara, which unfortunatelly wasn’t enough to make any progress. That is why this is my problem! As we showed above, international political scene failed in attempts to successfully deal with the problem of Western Sahara. Even the unity of countries with Muslim majority is not something one could count on, since religion in Arabic world is not the only relevant factor - even the countries with Muslim majority are not acting in line with Islamic teachings. Regional political solution is also not realistic, because Morocco continues their repression on occupied land, on the other side Algeria as an important factor will not tolerate hegemonic behavior of Morocco. This insecure situation puts at risk the lives of the Western Sahara residents – their life under oppression is not improving in any way. And that’s where we can find justification for our intervention and that is why we are morally obligated to intervene. We were also unsucessful in solving this problem on transnational level of European Union, because, just like in Arab world, different forces are insisting on their points of view and the realization of thier contradictory 133 views. That’s why we, residents of Slovenia, are morally obliged to join our forces and help in various ways towards a solution that will finally provide normal life in this, so called, last African colony. Even if it seems that we cannot intervene in this world, goverened by international politics, with an ease, we can – with persistence and regaining public consciousness – achieve that international politics changes. Our efforts must become so big, that they cannot be ignored anymore and that they have to be unconditionally taken into account. For the welfare of Western Sahara people, for the welfare of all people. We all deserve freedom. References Central Intelligence Agency, 2013: The World Factbook, Morocco. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html, 26.4.2013. Central Intelligence Agency, 2013: The World Factbook, Western Sahara. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wi.html, 26.4.2013. Damis, John, 1983: The Western Sahara Conflict: Myths and Realities. Middle East Journal, 37(2): 169– 179. Ellis, Stephen, Ter Haar, Gerrie, 2007: Religion and Politics: taking African epistemologies seriously. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 45(3): 385–401. Leite P., Pedro et al., 2006: The Western Sahara Conflict: The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Muminhodžić, Redžep, 2001: Ta'limu-l-islam. Sarajevo: El-Kalem. Zoubir H., Yahia, Pazzanita G., Anthony, 1995: The United Nations' Failure in Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict. Middle East Journal, 49(4): 614–628. Zoubir H., Yahia, 1990: The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 28(2): 225–243. 134 Tatjana Košak Women in Western Sahara The position of women in Western Sahara As Aleš Skornšek-Pleš states in his diploma The role of women in Western Saharan refugee camps (Položaj in vloga žensk v zahodno Saharskih begunskih taboriščih), “the Sahrawi society is specific due to its special triangular clan structure (soldiers, wisemen, sacred men, craftsmen and craftswomen, servants) and different from other nomadic groups in the Sahara region because of its specific social and cultural identity, which comes as a consequence of a common history of battles and unions designed to control the production means (water, pastures, trade ways, …). While there is some literature dealing with researching the society and women living in Sahara, we need to consider the oral tradition passed from Saharan women and ancestors. It is these oral tradition sources that are crucial for understanding the circumstances from which the Saharan women got into the process of obtaining and renewing historical identity” (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 18). The Sahrawi women have always been the ones taking care of their home and household. They were “the privileged caretakers of their own cultural tradition” (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 19). Taking care of the household is far from easy in conditions like Western Sahara’s, as it includes several re-buildings of the tent, buying and procuring food and other necessities of life, taking care of children etc. Skornšek-Pleš states that “thus, women are taking over the social and economic role integrated in men's activities of using and finding sources of survival” (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 19). In our society, as well as in the rest of western societies it is perceived as normal for women to equally co-operate with men in all spheres of life; this is different from Islamic societies, which tend to keep women out, with the exceptions of some agrarian societies where women are perceived as part of the work force. But this is not true for Sahrawi women, who have, as Skornšek-Pleš states “a special meaning in social life. It is especially important to know that the difference between the Arabic and Berber influence is not as important in this respect regarding this common tradition in almost all areas. The position of women proves their cultural equality and the workings of a social cohesion, which was particularly apparent in the period of multiple exoduses after the Moroccan occupation in 1975. This determines the position in which the Sahrawi people can start to assert themselves on the outside and on the inside as a nation in the modern meaning of the word” (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 19). An important part is the cultural side as well. As Skornšek-Pleš states “culture does not only identify a group but it preserves its specialities” (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 19). Regarding this, women are the more common carriers of the oral tradition from one generation to another, they are the ones preserving dancing, singing etc. 135 Skornšek-Pleš states “that the Sahrawi society can be standardized as a family society”. The woman is the one responsible for the life and survival of the family. Skornšek-Pleš states “that refugee camps today function in the following fashion: women take care of their own household as well as beyond their own tent. The Beduin tradition in Sahrawi population was seen as an important resistance factor and a means that helps us estimate how to achieve changes. This tradition was memorized and renewed by women who wanted to transmit culture from one generation to another. This way, the social connectedness, similar to the present situation – where obtaining the national identity is conditioned by a general refusal of the past, starting with the process of a partial deculturalisation which is hard to stop – is preserved” (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 20). Furthermore, it is the role of Sahrawi women, as Skornšek-Pleš states, “to take advantage of the momentary situation and help shape the modern nation and country. As a consequence, motherhood is a political necessity and duty, as only this can bring positive benefits for the country. Despite everything, the Sahrawi women are far from the women of the western world. The most prominent are the strong representatives of the softer sex whose individuality can be expressed in a community that always takes precedence over an individual. His or her family has a huge influence on an individual and it holds true that he or she is the product of the family, which will always take care of him or her. Traditional structures do not allow women to be individualist, which is, legitimately or not, for their own safety. Even in medicine, women have the ruling role. The alternative therapeutic practice carried from one generation to another and based on plant treatment is also widespread. This practice is not part of official medicine but is preserved because of its traditional role” (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 20). Women knew that the only way to achieve their emancipation was through attaining independence, which is why they started with an anti-colonial resistance and participated in many battles and mutinies. They were active at several political demonstrations for independence, starting July 17, 1970 in El-Aaiun, the goal of which was to weaken the colonial system. Many people taking part in the demonstrations were killed, tortured and/or put behind bars, but that did not break their strong will. Another event showing the power of Sahrawi women was an armed mutiny that happened on May 20, 1973, ten days after Polisario was set up. They were part of an underground political organisation, in which they participated by sharing flyers, putting articles in newspapers, putting out flags, and so on. They were an important part of the Liberal armada of the Sahrawi liberation as they took care of procuring weapons and ammunition and took care of soldiers and wounded people as well. Furthermore, they proved themselves when the Spanish colonialism was already saying goodbye. They were once more in the first rows when the United Nations court of inquiry paid a visit in May and June 1975, protesting against the Spanish colonialism and demanding independency. They defended the self-emancipated cities of La Guera, Bir Enzaran and Tichla and they guaranteed a safe passage for civilians to gathering places of Oum 136 Dreiga, Guelta and Tifariti, bombarded by the Moroccan army (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 21–22). The power of Sahrawi women Because of being refugees and giving great importance to education on the part of Polisario, women started becoming more powerful, self-conscious and educated in many areas of life at home and in school, in national governance and representative bodies of Polisario around the world. With their men at battlefields, the women had a great responsibility, as they were present and leading in almost everything. Their life was not bound only to home, which was also approved by men who acknowledged women’s important role and abilities. Women were suddenly put into the role of workers, mothers, wives, and became an equal part of a society, which was hard to adjust. Men lost part of their authority. Additionally, proof of women’s growing power was the change in giving names, as the child was usually the son or the daughter of the father. If the father of a certain Mohamed was named Ahmed and his mother was Fatma, the son was named Mohamed, son of Ahmed. In the time of men's absence during war this changed. The child was thus named Mohamed, son of Fatma. This had an enormous social impact and might not stay around for long, but it is nonetheless very important (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 30). The more educated the women are, the more important their work seems to be. A busy woman is less under the influence of family and social traditional habits. This is additionally supported by elder generations of women, who were happy for their daughters and granddaughters to be able to enjoy such goods as education, as they did not have the same opportunities (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 31). The union of Sahrawi women As Skornšek-Pleš states “the Union of Saharan women (UNMS - Union Nacional de Mujeres Saharaui) was founded in 1979 and operates both on a national and international level. It includes almost all adult women from camps, from areas that have been liberated, and the women still under Moroccan occupation. In refugee camps and areas controlled by Polisario the main goal of the Union was to counsel and raise awareness of Sahrawi women. Similar to all other political bodies, the representatives of the union are elected in regular democratic elections. The highest organ, the General Union Committee, is summoned every third year, where they review the past period and set new goals. In contrast with national politics, which is usually too principled and not compliant, the Union is pragmatic and oriented at a gradual gaining of their goals. It is actively working with governmental and non-governmental women organisations around the world, especially regarding human rights, the fight against sexism, racism, promotion of Saharan efforts and gaining means for humanitarian actions. In the domestic area, the main goal is to anchor the already gained civic and sex-specific rights 137 in the legislation of the Western Saharan republic. While doing this, they are often limited by negatively oriented members of especially older groups of men” (SkornšekPleš, 2004: 33). In contrast to many other Islamic countries, laws and habits are in favour of women, as women are protected in the sense of being untouchable; violence against women can be the reason for divorce. The Sahrawi society is very much in favour of peaceful resolving of all sorts of quarrels. The Union is starting to spread to the occupied part of Western Sahara by means of radio, with which they report news of Sahrawi women's achievements. The Sahrawi women have always had an important role in the society; they were the ones in charge of caring for the tent, the family and the wider society. This importance has stayed with them till today, as has their right to end marriage. They can keep the father's surname, as well as the dowry, paid for the bride by the fiancée at the time of their marriage. In most Islamic societies, a divorced woman can become a social outcast, but in Sahrawi society, such women are even more attractive and respected because they are considered experienced and mature. They have free will over chosing their partner and marriage can occur without the family’s consent. Arranged marriages almost do not exist anymore (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 33–35). Marriage is one of the biggest events in the life of a community and the nuptuals go on for days. It is not necessary to adopt the husband's surname. If they divorce, the husband is the one who has to move and leave all the wealth to the wife, and he is obligated to provide for his ex-wife and children. In the case of re-marriage, he is obliged to take care only for the children. The Saharan society practises monogamy, poligamy is rare, but allowed. Premarital sexual intimacy is not acceptable and is considered as vulgar. They use contraception, abortions are allowed, but rarely used. The Sahrawi women mostly give birth at home, but because of raised awareness the number of women who decide to give birth in a hospital is rising. On the seventh day after labour, they prepare a big celebration, where grandparents, aunts and uncles pick a name for the child in the following fashion: they put names on sticks, and the mother, with her eyes closed, picks one which consequently names her child (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 36). We agree with Skornšek-Pleš who states “that is an important factor that says a lot about the privileged position of women in the Sahrawi society, as well as about their equal role in decision-making” (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 37). The future The question remains whether all the achievements, changes, and the power of Sahrawi women will be preserved, or whether tradition will prevail. Men witnessed women's efforts to emancipate and become independent, women's ability to be active in several areas at once, their power and strong will. After the ceasefire in 1991, they started returning from war fields and take over the women's roles and work. This is why the 138 Sahrawi women's Union frequently organises conferences, where they discuss how to keep and better their situation (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004: 42). A woman's role used to be determined straight at birth – wife, mother, and housewife. They were bound only to home and their household, without realising the events happening outside these borders. Colonisation and the Moroccan occupation brought with it many Western patterns of women’s and men’s roles in support of education and with it, the growing awareness of women about their situation. In this respect we can see, how different “a woman here” and “a woman there” can be. References Skornšek-Pleš, Aleš, 2004: Položaj in vloga žensk v Zahodno saharskih begunskih taboriščih [diplomsko delo]. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Skornšek-Pleš, Aleš, 2003: Osamosvojile so se v izgnanstvu: Saharske ženske - glas iz peska. 139 Klara Vrhovec Life and culture of Western Sahara The Sahrawis are descendants of Arab, African and Berber people. They come from 22 different tribes, but that doesn't play as an important role as it did hundreds of years ago. They speak an Arabic dialect, “hassaniya”, which is also used by Mauritanians. Before the arrival of Spanish colonists, the Sahrawis were traditionally nomadic bedouins, moving from the centre of Mauritania to the south of Morocco and eastern Algeria. They earned their livelyhood mostly from breeding camels and goats. Sahrawi people have always been in pursuit of their independence. Striving to protect their land from Spanish and Potruguese explorations, the nomads were uniting and connecting throughout the 17th, 18th and 19th century. At the Berlin Conference in 1884, Spain finally managed to declare a protectorate over the territory of Western Sahara and began establishing trading posts and military presence. The territory was gradually going to become known as Spanish Sahara. Because the local people had more experience and knowledge about their land, they were able to hide and resist for many years, making it hard for Spanish colonists to completely conquer the territory. The Sahrawis succesfully defended themselves until 1930, when Spain, together with the help of France, finally managed to suppress them. In the 50s the Spaniards discovered large amounts of phosphates in the occupied area. They wanted to invest in infrastructure and started searching for new workforce. In order to raise a desire in the Sahrawi people to work in the phosphate mines, they began to build schools and simple huts in major cities near the sites of these mines. This is why many of the inhabitants abandoned the nomadic way of life and moved to the cities. With the Moroccan invasion in 1975, the Spanish colonizers were forced to resign, and the Sahrawi people continue to fight for their independence (Skornšek-Pleš, 2012). Refugee camps in Algeria During the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania, a large part of the population fled to refugee camps in Tindouf in Algiria. According to the statistical data of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, around 165,000 people live in six refugee camps, named after six cities in Western Sahara. The statistics from United Nations is even more daunting, since they estimate there are as many as 200,000 people living in the refugee camps (70,000 under the Moroccan occupation and about 26,000 in Mauritania) (Skornšek-Pleš, 2004). Polisario Front, a movement for the liberation of Western Sahara that governs these refugee camps, is committed to improve the social, economic, and social situation of the refugees. It also stresses the importance of education and emancipation of women, who 140 play an important role in the refugee camps and are responsible for their management, since the vast majority of the male population are members of the Polisario Front and are therefore absent most of the time, due to military obligations. An increasingly important role is attributed to shaping and functioning of the educational system as well. Despite the fact that the system suffers from a lack of financial resources and, consequently, the lack of adequate teaching materials, utilities and materials are managed in refugee camps to achieve an extremely high literacy of the population. The local authorities have remarkably managed to establish 29 educational institutions for children, 31 primary schools, and 7 secondary schools. According to the data of the Polisario Front, today around 90% of the population in the camps are literate, which is an enormous success, given that the number was clocking at merely 5% when these camps were established. Currently, over 1000 inhabitants have also obtained a university education, which presents a form of social support from other countries. Living under the Morrocan rule The Sahrawis that were not able to flee accross the border to Algeria are living under the rule of one of the most repressive countries in the world. They are punished with imprisonment merely for “transgressions”, such as conversing with strangers or spreading any information concerning the Polisario Front. A large problem are the mass disappearances of people, on whom there is nearly no information available. In addition to violations of their rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association, the Sahrawi people under the Moroccan authority experience systematic discrimination in education, health care as well as political and economic rights. An intensive immigration of Moroccans, ensured by a deliberate policy of tax incentives and favorable loans from the government, is putting the Sahrawi people in an ever more marginalized position (Skornšek-Pleš, 2012). Cultural characteristics of the Sahrawi people These days, despite the majority of the Sahrawis living a somewhat different, more urban-oriented lifestyle (to which some of them were forced by the Moroccan authorities), there still remain those, who are commited to a more traditional, nomadic lifestyle, which includes the breeding of camels and goats and the cultivation of plants in the arid desert. The traditional characteristics can be also seen in other areas of everyday life of the Sahrawi people, such as simple children's toys, made from natural materials and similar to those used by their grandparents. Traditional clothings have not changed significantly either. Men's clothing is characterized by a robe-like dress called “daraa” in blue colour and with a black turban, while the women wear colourful full figured dresses called “melfas”. 141 Tea ritual One of the most typical traditional customs of the Sahrawi people is the preparation and drinking of tea. Families, colleagues and friends gather together several times a day to prepare green tea and sip it in three rounds. The first round is, as they say, bitter as life, second round is sweet as love, and the third round is tender as death. When preparing the tea, the Sahrawi people talk about the three “J's”. The first “J” presents the “Jama ah”. This refers to a group, meaning that the bigger the group is, the more enjoyable tea drinking will be, e.i. more people, more fun. The second “J” stands for “ Jarr” or extension. In other words, the longer the tea ritual lasts, the more advantages it brings, since people can socialize more and exchange information, discuss problems and solutions. The term “Jamr” means that the best tea can be prepared only through ember of an open fireplace. The entire process can take several hours and at the end the Sahrawi people are proud of their great talent for preparing delicious tea. Historically, tea has played an important role, because it helped the nomads to prevent dehydration, helped spending lonely days, and exchange news and stories. Its role remains important to this day, especially in establishing and maintaining good relations with family and friends (Cultural website of the Sahara, 2013). Music and literature The inhabitants of Western Sahara express their emotions and experiences through a variety of songs and historical literature, and they are also skilful in the field of fairy tales, proverbs and riddles. Despite this diversity of literary styles, the Sahrawi people most commonly use poetry, which is diverse and addresses the problems of the people of Western Sahara as well as their customs, traditions, work and emotions. The songs play also an important role in the field of education and entertainment, as they learn and sing them in schools and include them in various social and cultural events. Even the proverbs play an important role as a source of wisdom by giving moral lessons deriving from the collective and individual experiences, passing from older to younger generations. The Sahrawi people also place great importance to instrumental music, whose role is not only to express one's feelings, but it also serves as a way of connecting people, and thus uniting them to fight against the Moroccan rule. Their music is unique, and two of the most typical instruments are the so-called “tbal”, which resembles a home-made drum, and the “tidinit”, which looks like a sand-shaped lute with four strings (Cultural website of the Sahara, 2013). Handicraft The handicraft plays an important role in the lives of the Sahrawi people. The products have a functional as well as a decorative value, which makes them a successful market product, since the locals purchase them for daily use and foreigners consider the product 142 primarily for its decorative and commemorative purposes. These useful and decorative products are diverse, such as “asarmi”, a sort of fine leather-bound cushion, full of decorative trinkets. They also produce a variety of small boxes and small receptacles for storing perfumes and jewelry, but the locals use them mostly for storing important documents, such as manuscripts, and property contract or marriage contracts. The development of this specific craft is connected to the cultural heritage of nomads, who are to a large extent dependent on the breeding of camels, goats and sheep, which not only present a source of food, but also enable them to produce products such as leather soles, carpets and simple tents, used by the nomads as portable sleeping accommodation (Cultural website of the Sahara, 2013). Conclusion Culture plays a very important role in the life of inhabitants of Western Sahara as it enables them to express their dissatisfaction regarding their social position under the Moroccan supremacy. At the same time, culture enables them to convey the characteristics of their life and customs, which helps preserve their uniqueness and sharing it with the world. The role of culture is not only in identification of the group, but in preserving its characteristics as well. Without folk customs and habits, including tea ritual, craft and folk songs and dances, these characteristics would not have been preserved until nowadays, and consequently the historical development of the Sahrawi culture would have been erased. This would facilitate the imposition of Moroccan superiority of their own culture and gradually lead to the decline of the unique culture of Western Sahara. References Cultural website of the Sahara, 2013. Available at: http://www.saharaculture.com/Default.aspx?alias=www.sahara-culture.com/eng Maps of World, 2013: Western Sahara. Available at: http://www.mapsofworld.com/countryprofile/western-sahara.html Mercer, J., 1979: Sahrawis of Western Sahara. London: Minority rights group. Music of Western Sahara, 2013. Wikipedia. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Music_of_Western_Sahara Polisario Front, 2013. Wikipedia. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polisario_Front Sahrawi refugee camps, 2013. Wikipedia. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_refugee_camps Skornšek-Pleš, Aleš, 2004: Položaj in vloga žensk v Zahodno saharskih begunskih taboriščih [diplomsko delo]. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Skornšek-Pleš, Aleš, 2012: Zahodna Sahara, zadnja kolonija v Afriki. Razpotja, 8, 67–71, Solkan: Društvo humanistov Goriške. 143 Anja Čuš Artistic creativity in Western Sahara In 1976, in time when general Franco's death was approaching, the last Spanish soldiers withdrew from the territory of Western Sahara without demanding a referendum on self-determination of Western Sahara's population. Mauritania and Morocco both wanted to own Western Sahara’s immense natural resources and took advantage of the situation. The Polisario Front couldn’t stop the invaders and in the next few months thousands of Sahrawis died, half of them were displaced and approximately 200,000 exiled to refugee camps in Tindouf, a province in Algeria. Following the Polisario victories, Mauritania withdrew from the territory in 1982, while the Moroccan army surrounded Western Sahara from the North and formed new military strategies. They extended their control over the desert by building six berms and a 2700 kilometres long sand wall, staffed by an army of 130,000 Moroccan soldiers, and heavily mined with millions of mines. Thus, the former Spanish colony was divided into two parts, two thirds occupied by the Moroccan army, and the rest controlled by Polisario and self-proclaimed SADR (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), recognized by the members of the African Union and Latin American countries. The people in the refuge camps in Tindouf were infused with immense hope and desire to fill up the emptiness caused by the irresponsible behaviour of Spain, the former Western Sahara's colonizer. Poetry in Western Sahara Poetry in Western Sahara is connected to literature of Equatorial Guinea and both form a dynamic new Afro – Hispanic literature. It is the weapon (of the future), and as all other art forms in Western Sahara, it bases upon subjects of struggle and resistance that answer to numerous needs and political circumstances, which caused the Spanish Bedouins to sink in history (Poesía saharaui, 2008). Inside the complex institutional structure they built, the Castilian language is of great importance. Generally, the use of Spanish language is encouraged, but the identity of the people is a hybrid as it is a mix of Hispanic, Arabic, African and Islamic tradition. The new poetry of the Sahrawi people has discontinued with the traditional literary forms and appears in the Spanish language. For this reason, it seems we are talking about Spanish, not Arabic culture. Of significant importance to Western Sahara's poetry are the relations between the banished population and the population of Latin America. It is said that in the 70s and 80s, thousands of young Sahrawis crossed the Atlantic ocean and paid a visit to the schools in Cuba and the Caribbean. 144 They returned to the desert as a new urban tribe, under the influence of Cuban national hero Marti, Generation of 27, Pablo Neruda and Beneditti. Los Cubarauis marked the Sahara's life and culture entirely when after returning home they took positions in the Sahara's government, hospitals and schools. In 1991 the official armistice was reached, the United Nations Security Council formed the United Nations Mission to strive for a referendum in Western Sahara. The event that did not provide peace also influenced poetry. The majority of poems were written by poets who were a part of the political context. The Friendship Generation was of significance, and included poets, born in the 60s and 70s. They survived the war and banishment in the desert, which caused certain frustration in building the national affiliation. Many have immigrated to Spain to this day. The Sahrawi poetry is collected in the anthologies Bubisher (2001), El Aaiun (2006) and Un Dreiga (2007). The 31st Bilingual Anthology of Sahrawi Resistance Poetry (2007) in Spanish is important because of its beautiful Castilian-English verses. The verses are a contribution of history of oral tradition in the Sahara literature. They build a dialogue between the tradition in the Spanish language and the intervention of the political poetry. The Friendship Generation poetry was characterized in two trends: micro-political poems, where motifs of life interlaced with motifs of suffering and individual poet’s hopes, and macro-political poems, containing concrete national claims, and playing the role of diplomatic poetry. The new Spanish-Sahara poetry has epic and lyric elements through which verses of frustration and political will for building the national affiliation pour, “burning like the noon sand in the desert ...” (Poesía saharaui, 2008). A Poem is You A woman behind bars screamed: What is a poem? And a poet in exile answered: It is You. Us, our strength, reason for a verse and a poem. Bahia Mahmud Awah Sartre already warned about the incapacity of real and authentic poetry. Theodor Adorno, a theorist, also critically discussed the political power of art in his work The Aesthetic Theory. Due to their politicality, Sahrawi verses are decidedly authentic. 145 ARTifariti ARTifariti is the international festival of art and human rights in Western Sahara and has been held in a politically turbulent environment since 2007. It first appeared in Tifariti, a town in Western Sahara, which is presently situated near the wall of shame. It is in Tifariti that several battles took place during the Western Sahara war (between 1975 and 1991). Both the Moroccan Army and the Polisario Front had their military base here. Currently, it is one of the liberated towns of Western Sahara. In this town, marked by long years of massacres and bombings of Sahrawi people, the government of SADR (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) created an “area of interaction and communication that surpasses art itself”. We could say that the beginning of the ARTifariti festival meant a symbolic blasting of the wall of shame – as merely one of many walls in the world (the Berlin Wall, the Palestine wall). In 2011, when SADR (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), celebrated its 35th anniversary, the festival moved to the territory of the refuge camps in Tindouf, Algeria. This artistic-political festival strives for a broader recognition of the political situation of the Sahrawi people, who have been living under Moroccan occupation or in exile for the past forty years. Through authentic artistic expression, attention is being drawn to the elementary human rights to land, culture and freedom. As stated on ARTifariti’s website, the organizers of the festival want to create a space without limitation of freedom, as they are aware of the importance of people’s support. They collaborate and cooperate with many institutions and organizations, but most of their work is cooperation with volunteers: artists, filmmakers, friends of the Sahrawi people and human rights defenders. On 20th May 2013, the 40th anniversary of establishment of the Polisario Front, the festival opened a large exhibition in the Art Museum in Tifariti. Among the more interesting projects is the publication of newspaper !AHLAN!, a project by Nurria Carrasco, a visual artist from Madrid. In her specific way, she encouraged contemplation about the adverse situation of the Sahrawi people. !AHLAN! is a reworked copy of the newspaper !HOLA!, and it differs from the original both formally and with in contents. The reprint of !AHLAN! is intended to encourage international consciousness and for the refugees from camps, who are expected to receive proceeds from the commercial sale (Carrasco, 2013). The next new project is a work by Maria Sanchez, a visual artist dealing with sociological-cultural research of social networks. She is particularly interested in contemporary forms of communication and spreading of the culture through state-ofthe-art means of connecting and digital platforms. She sees the Internet 2.0 as an opportunity for modern means of attaining rights, thus she encourages and teaches new skills of communication in Western Sahara. She also took over management of the latest ARTifariti edition. 146 ARTifariti is an open space, meant to reshape the reality and the real social relations in Western Sahara. An example of this public art appears as a model that challenges the system of production and the distribution of contemporary cultural industry and artwork, based on private consumption. Using public art, they resist the occurrence of claiming ideas, which take shape as market goods, and instead create an interdisciplinary flow of citizens and art through creation of new situations and construction of a multi-cultural tissue. ARTifariti is an assembly and interweaving of music, stories, performance and even the art of e-mail. Two important holders of the ARTifariti association are the Ministry of culture in SADR and the Association of Friends of the Sahrawi People in Sevilla (ARTifariti, 2013). In 2011, Manuel Mesa Delgado, a renowned Spanish graphite artist, known under the name M-E-S-A, left an important art contribution in Sahara's desert. M-E-S-A, who creates graphite portraits and large wall paintings in hyper realistic style, has always been interested in lesser known and mysterious surfaces that needed to be discovered or found. Seemingly, the refuge camps in Sahara were more than suitable for his creativity. M-E-S-A joined the programme ARTifariti in 2011 and travelled to the Sahara desert to meet the families living in refuge camps. In the process, the “pure and raw reality” he met on the way changed his artistic views. Owing to decades of human rights violations of the locals, Manuel was moved by the strength and persistence of the banished people and their peaceful struggle for freedom. It inspired him artistically and made him realize that art can change the world (Designwars, 2012). Resources Poesía saharaui - Lucha y resistencia en el Sahara occidental, 2008. Confines, Arte y la Cultura Desde la Patagonia. Available at: http://www.confinesdigital.com/conf15/poesia-saharaui.html. Carrasco, Nuria, 2013: ¡AHLAN! Lanzanos. Available at: http://www.lanzanos.com/proyectos/ahlan/. ARTifariti, 2013. Available at: http://artifariti.blogspot.com/. DesignWars, 2012. Available at: http://www.designwars.com/graffiti_streetart/mesa-graffiti-muralsperspective/ 147 Rdeča struga, zlata reka: sociološke refleksije o Zahodni Sahari Saguia el-Hamra, Río de Oro: sociological reflections on Western Sahara Urednika / Editors Damjan Mandelc, Tjaša Učakar Oblikovanje in prelom / Design Tjaša Učakar Slika na naslovnici / Picture on the cover Moulud Yeslem: El largo camino I. (olje na platnu) http://mouludyeslem.blogspot.com/p/galeria.html Izdal / Issued by Oddelek za sociologijo Založila/ Published by Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija Za založbo, Branka Kalenić Ramšak, dekanja Filozofske fakultete Naklada / Copies 100 izvodov Ljubljana, 2013 Prvi natis Publikacija je brezplačna / Publication is free of charge Dostopna je tudi v elektronski obliki na naslovu http://zahodnasahara.wordpress.com/ © Univerza v Ljubljani, Filozofska fakulteta, 2013. Vse pravice pridržane. Publikacija je nastala v okviru projekta Nova generacija raziskovalcev ved o življenju. Operacijo delno financirata Evropska unija iz Evropskega socialnega sklada ter Ministrstvo za izobraževanje, znanost, kulturo in šport. Operacija se izvaja v okviru Operativnega programa razvoja človeških virov v obdobju 2007-2013, 3. razvojne prioritete: »Razvoj človeških virov in vseživljenskega učenja«; prednostne usmeritve »3.1. Izboljšanje kakovosti in učinkovitosti sistemov izobraževanja in usposabljanja«. CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana 308(645.3/.5)(082) RDEČA struga, zlata reka : sociološke refleksije o Zahodni Sahari = Saguia el-Hamra, Río de Oro : sociological reflections on Western Sahara / uredila, edited by Damjan Mandelc in Tjaša Učakar. - 1. natis. - Ljubljana : Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, 2013 ISBN 978-961-237-608-6 1. Vzp. stv. nasl. 2. Mandelc, Damjan 269200384
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