Quick-Look Report
Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna,
Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka,
22 October 2008
Synopsis
On 22 October 2008 three LTTE suicide-operated water-borne IEDs (WBIEDs) were used in an
attack on two merchant vessels carrying supplies to the government-controlled Jaffna Peninsula
in northern Sri Lanka. Action by Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) personnel aboard the merchant vessels
resulted in the destruction of two of the attacking suicide craft and the capture of the third. One
of the merchantmen was damaged when a suicide craft exploded in close proximity to the vessel,
although there are contradictory reports of the level of damage sustained. This is the first reported
WBIED used by the LTTE since May 2007.
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Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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The Targets
Jaffna, although a Tamil area, has been controlled by the Sri Lankan government since 1995 but
it was cut off from the rest of the island by LTTE-held territory. As a result, the Jaffna Peninsula
is totally reliant on maritime and aviation assets for its re-supply. Ships carrying supplies to Jaffna
have come under frequent attack.
Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence
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The targets of this attack were two Sri Lankan-registered merchant vessels carrying supplies to the
government controlled Jaffna Peninsula from the capital Colombo. The vessels were named
MV Nimalawa and MV Ruhuna. Both vessels have a history of shipping humanitarian aid to Jaffna,
with MV Nimalawa having previously been chartered by the Core Group for Business for Peace
Initiative in September 2007. The Core Group is a Sri Lankan non-government organization that
attempts to create the environment for conflict resolution by stimulating commerce. Its records
from the time, describe MV Ruhuna as having a cargo capacity of 3,200 tonnes. MV Ruhuna is
recorded as carrying food and school books to Jaffna since at least 2006.
MV Ruhuna
Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence
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MV Nimalawa
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A pro Tamil website, Tamilnet, has claimed that MV Nimalawa was carrying military and
other supplies at the time of the attack and although the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry has not
categorically denied this, it has described the vessels as carrying essential supplies for civilians.
HMS COMMENT: It is not surprising that the pro LTTE commentary seeks to justify the attack by
claiming the vessel was carrying military supplies. COMMENT ENDS
The Attacks
The attack occurred at 05:10hrs when three LTTE suicide craft were detected approaching the
two merchant vessels off Kaankeasanthurai Harbour with the intention of attacking them. SLN
personnel aboard, engaged the attackers with effective machine gun and canon fire resulting in
two of the WBIEDs functioning prematurely. One of the attackers was in sufficiently close range to
MV Nimalawa to cause superficial damage to the vessel. Some reports stated that Sri Lankan shore
batteries also opened fire on the attackers. The third LTTE craft was captured although the suicide
operative manning it was killed. A Sri Lankan Defence official said at least six LTTE militants had
been killed during the attack. Tamilnet named only two dead militants: Lt Col Ilakkiyaa, identified
as the deputy commander of the female wing of the LTTE’s maritime division, the Sea Tigers, and
a Lt Col Kuperan. Both were described as Black Tigers meaning suicide operatives. There were no
casualties amongst the merchant seamen or escorting military personnel.
Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence
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Photograph showing the damage to the MV Nimalawa following a suicide WBIED attack on 22 October 2008
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HMS COMMENT: Initial reports had claimed that MV Nimalawa was catastrophically damaged
and was sinking. However, later reporting stated that both vessels had berthed in Kaankeasanthurai
Harbour and were unloading. Previous LTTE suicide WBIED attacks have employed numerous
vessels in a swarming tactic to overwhelm the target ships. With only three attack craft, to two
armed target ships, protected by well armed SLN escort vessels, the chances of success were reduced
in this case. COMMENT ENDS
LTTE swarming attack
Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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The Devices
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No details of the explosive devices have been published other than that they were explosives-laden
suicide craft which intended to ram the target vessels. Photographs of the captured vessel show
what appears to be a capsized inflatable craft of around 5m length.
LTTE suicide WBIED captured during attack on 22 October 2008
HMS COMMENT: The LTTE has a well documented history of using suicide-initiated WBIEDs.
These have ranged from relatively sophisticated craft employing improvised ‘stealth’ technology
to avoid radar detection with contact horn-type initiators on the bow designed to function when
ramming the target. Other methods of attack include small motorboats with improvised directional
landmines attached to the gunwales and small craft containing a concealed, cased explosive charge
initiated by a suicide operative in close proximity to the target. Less frequently used are sub-surface
attack techniques including explosives-laden free-swimming suicide scuba divers and improvised
manned/powered underwater craft, where the explosives charge is integral with the vehicle used.
The LTTE has used explosives from a number of sources during their attacks including the use of
military ammunition such as artillery shells.
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LTTE suicide stealth boat with main charge concealed in the hull enhanced with artillery shell
Main charge recovered from a previous LTTE suicide WBIED attack
The photograph shows the exposed high explosive, (possibly TNT) with an NEQ of 80–100kg and
manual initiation system
Considering the nature of vessels under attack on this occasion, it is assumed that each of the
WBIEDs would have held a charge of between 100 and 300kg of high explosives, where the
intention would have been to ram the ship around the mid-section. The explosive charge would
be primed to detonate on contact with the vessel in order to achieve intimate contact between
Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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Undated photo of LTTE suicide craft
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the explosives and the ship’s hull, thus increasing the likelihood of causing catastrophic structural
damage. Any air gap between the ship and the explosive charge at the moment of detonation would
reduce the effectiveness of the explosives. COMMENT ENDS
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Motivation and Responsibility
This attack was certainly carried out by the suicide wing of the LTTE navy, the Sea Tigers.
The LTTE has always sought to disrupt life for the Tamil population living under Sri Lankan
government control in the Jaffna peninsula, in order to ferment anti-government sentiment and
increase unrest.
HMS Assessment
This attack has come at a time when the LTTE is under increasing pressure from Sri Lankan
government forces who are reported to be close to the LTTE capital Kilicnochchi. While
the LTTE is putting up dogged resistance to the government advance, it is also expanding its
operations with terrorist attacks in Colombo and the south and will, no doubt,
attempt to mount other spectacular types of operation in an effort to relieve pressure on its
northern strongholds. This latest attack however, does suggest that its maritime capability is
somewhat degraded.
Whereas its previous successful attacks have involved either multiple craft in swarming
tactics or smaller numbers of low-profile stealth craft, the resources applied to this attack
were more limited in terms of craft numbers and tactics employed. However, it would be a
mistake to write off the Sea Tigers based on one partially successful attack, as the LTTE is
one of the most innovative and resilient of all terrorist groups.
Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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HMS Assessment continued
This attack, although only partially successful on this occasion, is a reminder of the
vulnerability of shipping to attack from fast moving, explosives-laden surface craft. Without
armaments or other deterrent methods, commercial ships, whether underway or at anchor,
will continue to suffer from this type of attack as long as the will and capability of terrorist
groups to mount such attacks exists.
Key Points
1. Multiple suicide WBIED attack
2. Merchantmen carrying supplies to Jaffna targeted
3. One target vessel damaged
4. First suicide WBIED since May 2007
5. Attack thwarted by onboard security force action
6. Resources used suggest decreasing LTTE maritime capability
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Previous LTTE Maritime Incidents
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10 May 2008: A 65m (213ft) naval cargo ship, MV Invincible (A-520), sank following an
underwater explosion while it was berthed on the Ashroff jetty in Trincomalee Harbour. The Sri
Lankan government said it believed the attack was conducted by a Sea Tiger suicide operative
possibly swimming in from the nearby Kadawana area. This theory was supported by the discovery
of diving equipment and the lower portion of a body in the sea near to the attack site. No casualties
were reported onboard the vessel and conflicting reports differ on the vessel’s cargo state at the
time of attack. An LTTE statement posted on Tamilnet said that commandos from the Sea Tigers’
Kangkai Amaran unit carried out the operation.
HMS COMMENT: There have been several previous attacks attributed to suicide divers in Sri
Lanka since the 1990s, with divers swimming up to the hull of a vessel, clinging on and functioning
a body-borne device. Breaching a ship’s hull by explosives requires either a small directional charge
in contact with the hull (a limpet mine) or a larger non-directional charge underneath but not in
contact. Swimming with a traditional ‘suicide jacket’ would be very difficult to achieve over such
a distance as suggested by Sri Lankan authorities; a more likely explanation for this attack is that
the suicide diver carried a large explosive charge which was detonated close to the ship’s hull. This
would be achieved either with or without the use of an underwater tug. COMMENT ENDS
23 March 2008: A Sri Lankan Navy Dvora fast attack craft (FAC) sunk following an explosion
as it patrolled deep seas off Nayaru in north-eastern Sri Lanka. Six crewmen were rescued with
a remaining ten presumed dead. LTTE claimed responsibility saying the vessel was sunk during
a 45-minute confrontation with Black Sea Tigers in which three suicide operatives, including
two women, and 14 SLN sailors were killed. The SLN have refuted the LTTE’s claims, saying no
confrontation occurred and that the vessel was sunk by an undersea explosion caused by a mine or
‘some underwater weapon’.
Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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The FAC was part of a six-vessel patrol operating in pairs. The (SLN) is adamant that at the time
of the incident no hostile or unidentified craft were visible or electronically detected. Although
the exact location of the incident has not been revealed, Nayaru is close to the Sea Tiger base
at Maullaitivu. Improvised sea mines were discovered in this area in 2007 probably to deter a
sea-borne assault of the Maullaitivu base. A search of the area following the sinking of the FAC
recovered small pieces of plastic, burned polythene and a fibreglass shell. Some media reports
have suggested that the attack may have been a suicide operation carried out underwater by a
human torpedo.
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HMS COMMENT: The attack occurred in heavy rain at night so a suicide boat may not have
been observed and the LTTE does attempt to employ stealth technology in the design of its
suicide boats to avoid radar detection. However, it would be expected that SLN personnel with
their experience of the Sea Tiger threat are very tactically aware and would have picked up on any
approaching vessels. The Sri Lankan government too would have little to gain from denying that
a suicide boat attack had occurred – whereas the LTTE may seek to cover up any new sea mine
innovations by falsely claiming it was a suicide attack. The use of a suicide boat would be quickly
confirmed by the presence of wreckage and as none was reported it can be assumed that a suicide
boat was not involved.
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The use of a human torpedo, such as suicide diver on a sea scooter, carrying an IED, although
possible against a stationary vessel, would present enormous challenges when attempting to locate
and hit a fast-moving craft at sea. It is assessed that the use of a human torpedo-type weapon is
highly unlikely.
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A tethered buoyant sea mine is the most likely explanation for this incident. The LTTE has
previously used improvised sea mines in an offensive role with some success. Although the exact
location of the incident is unknown, the recovery of the float and associated debris supports the
use of an improvised mine. The photograph of the fibreglass float recovered does share some
similarities with other improvised contact sea mines discovered in Iraq in 2003.
Although the photograph shows the float intact, it has what appears to be a modification that
follows the design of a known sea mine, supporting the sea mine attack scenario. The use of
sea mines would be a significant increase in the threat to all shipping operating in that area.
COMMENT ENDS
24 May 2007: The Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) detected two LTTE vessels attempting to infiltrate the
naval base on Delft Island. SLN vessels engaged the LTTE craft and were, in turn, attacked by 16
LTTE Sea Tiger vessels including six suicide boats. The engagement lasted for four hours and
resulted in four suicide vessels being destroyed and the two others severely damaged. The SLN
reported 18 Sea Tigers killed and four SLN personnel killed and four injured. The LTTE claimed
that least 30 sailors were killed. A Dvora fast attack craft was destroyed and two other naval vessels
sustained damage.
04 May 2007: The SLN personnel destroyed eight LTTE boats off the coast of Mullaittivu killing
12 Sea-Tigers and injuring 15 others. Naval patrol crafts detected a cluster of 26 Sea-Tiger boats
consisting of ten large boats and 12 smaller boats, including four suicide boats, heading towards
Pulmudai from Nayaru in Mullaittivu and confronted the flotilla. During the confrontation, SLN
personnel sunk two large boats and severely damaged another six smaller
boats, officials informed, adding, rest of the boats retreated to Nayaru. Two sailors were also injured
in the incident.
Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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21 January 2007: An LTTE sea tiger boat packed with explosives rammed the City of Liverpool
cargo carrier off Point Pedro, Sri Lanka as it was leaving the Jaffna peninsula after unloading
wheat flour. Then a further cluster of Tiger boats continued to attack the ship while another
cluster engaged Sri Lankan navy gunboats. The Sri Lankan Air Force was called in and several
security force personnel onboard were returning rebel fire. Around 20 LTTE craft were involved
in the incident. At least three naval personnel sustained injuries while the militants had three craft
destroyed and six operatives killed.
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09 November 2006: The SLN foiled a major LTTE attack on the civilian passenger vessel Green
Ocean 1, which was carrying 300 civilians from Trincomalee to Jaffna. A flotilla of LTTE vessels
attacked the ferry in the sea off Nagarkovil/Point Pedro. An unspecified number of LTTE vessels
were destroyed, including three suicide boats, and the Navy claims to have killed around 40
militants. Twenty sailors were reported killed or missing in action. Two of the navy’s Dvora fast
attack craft, which were escorting the vessel, were rammed by suicide boats: one was destroyed
and the other was seriously damaged. The Green Ocean 1 was escorted to a safer area while the Sri
Lankan Air Force engaged LTTE vessels. There were no casualties to civilians on the ferry.
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The LTTE’s military spokesperson, Irasiah Ilanthirayan, stated that the clash started when SeaTigers engaged in training activities were provoked by the SLN vessels in the seas off Nagarkovil in
LTTE territorial waters. He also claimed that 25 navy personnel had been killed and a further four
had been captured alive; pictures of the captured sailors were later released on a pro-LTTE website.
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02 September 2006: The SLN sunk 12 LTTE boats and killed 80 of its militants in a sea battle off
the northern Jaffna peninsula. Five of the LTTE boats had been suicide vessels. Initially 20 LTTE
boats had attacked a patrol near the Kaankesanturai harbour, two navy vessels were damaged, two
sailors were injured and 30 were missing.
01 August 2006: The SLN repulsed a LTTE attempt to destroy a troop carrier transporting 854
unarmed military personnel when it was returning from Kaankesanthurai as it entered Trincomalee
Harbour. The SLN boats blocked a fleet of Sea-Tiger boats approaching the troop carrier, destroying
three and damaging another. The LTTE claimed that it destroyed a SLN boat, killing eight sailors.
28 June 2006: At least 12 LTTE militants and five SLN personnel were killed in the sea off Kalpitiya
in Puttalam district. The defence ministry said six SLN inshore patrol crafts sighted and engaged 20
approaching LTTE boats, including suicide vessels, and destroyed two boats, killing 12 Sea Tigers.
Five SLN personnel were killed and three others sustained injuries in the engagement which lasted
for over an hour.
11 May 2006: Fifteen SLN sailors were reported missing, believed killed, when the heavy troopcarrying vessel, the Pearl Cruiser, with 710 troops on board sailing off the coast of Vettilaikerni,
was attacked by LTTE Sea Tigers. The navy, with the assistance of the air force, claimed to have
destroyed five LTTE boats and disabled four others, killing approximately 40 Sea Tigers and forcing
the attackers to withdraw.
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01 May 2006: The Sri Lankan navy came under attack from the LTTE sea-wing when five armed
Sea-Tiger boats, including two suicide craft, approached one of navy’s vessels in waters off
Trincomalee on the north-eastern coast. Five sailors were injured in the attack.
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07 January 2006: Thirteen Sri Lankan Navy personnel were killed in a suspected suicide attack on
a navy gunboat by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam militants on 07 January 2006. Three sailors are
missing following the attack, which occurred outside Trincomalee Naval Harbour.
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Disclaimer
(a)This report is based on our interpretation of journalistic and other reports of events
produced by third parties. Elements of the information used by us to compile this report:
(i)have been obtained from a single source, or limited sources, and are therefore
uncorroborated; or
(ii)are limited by, or subject to, government control, propaganda, poor reportage,
subjective interpretation or misinterpretation; and in such circumstances, although
we will have used all reasonable endeavours to interpret the information in a
fair, balanced and accurate manner we cannot unequivocally assure you that the
content of this report and our interpretations of events set out herein, are fair,
balanced and accurate in all respects.
(b)If you intend to rely on any of our interpretations or conclusions reached in this report
and/or intend to take steps or develop operational responses in reliance thereon, we advise
that you obtain, possibly from classified sources, corroborative and up to date intelligence
to confirm the content and assessments within this report.
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Attributions
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Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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REPORT DATA
Title:
Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
Type:
Quick-Look Report
Series:
N/A
Information cut-off
date:
Contract code:
11:30hrs BST 22 October 2008
Reference:
HMS-Oct08-QLR-125
Issue date:
22 October 2008
Author:
CM
22 October 2008
QA check:
CC
22 October 2008
N/A
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HMS Ltd
PO Box 3204
Swindon
SN6 8WU
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This Quick-Look Report details the attacks on two merchant vessels off the coast of the
Jaffna Peninsula by three LTTE WBIED craft on 22 October 2008. The report is based
on open source media releases and as such details are liable to change as information
develops. The content has been collated and assessed by HMS technical analysts.
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©HMS Ltd., 2008. All rights reserved. Not for distribution beyond HMS clients. Onward
transmission except where explicitly authorized could result in legal action. We refer
readers to the disclaimer on the last page of this report.
Suicide WBIED Attack off Jaffna, Sri Lanka, 22 October 2008
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