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Vol. 49, No. 1-2 • Spring 2014
Contents
1
From the Editor
2
Framing the Jos Crisis in Nigeria: A Comparative
Analysis of the Punch, the Guardian and Thisday
By Li Zeng, Ngozi Agwaziam & Zhiwen Xiao
21
Grilling the Leaders of Rogue States: U.S. TV Coverage of
Ahmedinejad and Gaddafi During the 2009 UN Assembly
Sessions
By Jaesik Ha & Shin Haeng Lee
48
A ‘Tidal Wave of Revolt: ’How World Editorials Framed
the 2011 Egyptian Revolution
By Yu-li Chang & Dale E. Zacher
75
Book Review
78
Recent Publications
ISSN 2153-9707
International Communication Research Journal
Volume 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
ISSN 2153-9707
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International Communication Research Journal
From the Editor
As we prepare this issue for print production, the search for our
next journal editor is in progress. Yes, my five-year term as editor is
up and I have decided not to seek reappointment. So as I write -30on my editorial role, I’d like to thank our division and its leaders as
well as AEJMC for trusting me with the editorship of our journal. I
couldn’t have done my job without the reliable and expert support
of our editorial board as well as the numerous ad hoc reviewers that
were recruited from our division or from other AEJMC divisions. It
truly was a pleasure working with you. I wish the new editor every
success.
In this edition, the observed pattern of publishing media framing
research continues. Our lead article is an insightful examination of
how the media in Nigeria framed the reporting of the Jos Crisis. Li
Zeng, Ngozi Agwaziam and Zhiwen Xiao, in a comparative analysis
of the coverage of the Punch, Guardian and Thisday, found that the
intertwining of media and politics has manifested in the practice
of “advocacy journalism” by the three newspapers in favor of the
Nigerian government.
Shifting to television, Jaesik Ha and Shin Haeng Lee show, in
their study of U.S. television coverage of Ahmedinejad and Gaddafi
during the 2009 UN Assembly Sessions, that U.S. leaders focused
on policy issues while American journalists directed more attention to human-rights abuses by Iran and Libya. As expected, the
U.S. government and journalists accused Ahmedinejad and Gaddafi
for propagating terrorism and leaders of “rogue states” attributed
responsibility for the conflicts to the West, particularly the U.S.
The third article by Yu-li Chang and Dale Zacher reports that the
world’s press framed the Egyptian uprising as caused mainly by
domestic political and economic problems during Mubarak’s 30year rule. The content analysis of 190 English-language newspaper
editorials also noted that the wave of discontent might spread to
other dictatorial regimes.
Our book review on Michael Kamber’s Photojournalists on War:
The Untold Stories from Iraq ties in quite well with this edition’s
theme on war and conflict reporting by the world’s media. Kirk
Stone wrote in his review that while Kamber’s work is not a scholarly book it reminds “professors and their students that many exceptionally devoted journalists still risk their lives to give the public the
news a democracy requires.”
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
1
Framing the Jos Crisis in Nigeria:
A Comparative Analysis of the Punch, the Guardian
and Thisday
By Li Zeng, Ngozi Agwaziam & Zhiwen Xiao
Nigeria is a nation known for recursive socio-political crises. Since
2001, a series of violent clashes between groups of residents in Jos city
claimed more than 4,000 lives and are widely referred to as the most
severe crisis since the Nigerian civil war in the late 1960s. Not surprisingly, the crisis has received intensive media attention. This study
seeks to provide some insights on the Nigerian media landscape by
comparing how the online version of three influential Nigerian daily
newspapers, the Punch, the Guardian and Thisday, covered the 20102011 Jos crisis. A total of 300 stories were systematically and randomly
selected during the lifespan of the crisis over a four-month period from
December 2010 to March 2011. The findings suggest that a strong
interplay remained between the Nigerian government and the media.
The three newspapers continued to practice “advocacy journalism” by
focusing on the government. However, the Punch and Thisday were not
as strong advocators as the Guardian. Specifically, the Punch tended
to rely more heavily on wire services. Thisday was more information driven, by focusing dominantly on the actions of the crisis, and
presenting relatively neutral information on the actions rather than the
analysis of reactions.
Introduction
When a crisis occurs, the public is in great need of information
in order to reduce uncertainty. Media frames of crises, therefore, are powerful mechanisms that may influence the public’s
thoughts and perceptions (Olutokun & Seteolu, 2001; Tedesco,
Zeng is an associate professor in the Department of Media at Arkansas
State University.
Agwaziam is a Ph.D. student in the College of Mass Communication
and Media Arts at Southern Illinois University - Carbondale.
Xiao is an assistant professor at the University of Houston.
2
International Communication Research Journal
2001), as they evaluate the cause, attribute responsibilities and
understand consequences. Past research has examined media framing of crises of different nature, ranging from natural
disasters (e.g., Lin, 2012; Littlefield & Quenette, 2007) to social
and political crises (e.g., Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). However, very
little research has focused on crisis coverage in Nigeria, a nation known for recursive socio-political crises (Chilunwa, 2011).
Bello, Adejola and Jamiu (2012) called for research on news
reporting by traditional and mainstream media in Nigeria.
This study seeks to fill the research gap by examining how
the Nigerian press covered a major violent conflict, the Jos crisis,
which first broke out in 2001 between Muslim and Christian
residents in the tin-mining city of Jos. The crisis has resulted in a
series of violent clashes between the two major religious groups,
claiming more than 4,000 lives. The crisis also has attracted
intensive media attention for more than a decade and is widely
referred to as the most severe domestic crisis since the Nigerian
civil war in the late 1960s. Widely known as the 2010-2011 Jos
crisis, the deadliest clash in Jos happened between December
2010 and March 2011 with a record number of over 1,200 people
killed within four months. Using media framing as the theoretical framework, this study focuses on the coverage of the 20102011 Jos crisis in three leading Nigerian newspapers, the Punch,
Guardian and Thisday.
Theoretical Framework: Media Framing of Crises
Media framing refers to the process during which news topics
are selected and packaged (Iyengar, 1991). It essentially involves
applying salience through: 1) selection of some topics while
leaving others out, and 2) portrayal of some elements of reality
while undermining others (Entman, 1993). As a “schemata of
interpretation” (Goffman, 1974), a media frame allows the media
to simplify, prioritize and structure the narration of events, thus
allowing individuals to quickly sort out, interpret and evaluate
the events (Norris, et al., 2003).
Various scholars have examined how the media frame crises
(e.g., Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012; Littlefield & Quenette, 2007;
Muschert, 2009). The most important aspects of media framing
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
3
include themes, source attribution, tones and bylines of news
coverage.
Themes
As the subject matter of a news story, a news theme helps
define a news event, which in consequence allows individuals
to interpret and evaluate the event. Researchers have identified
different themes in media framing, such as actors in an event,
actions, reactions and consequences. For example, Muschert
(2009) found that reactions were the most prominent theme in
U.S. newspaper coverage of the Columbine school shooting.
Zeng and Tahat (2012) identified various themes in terrorism
coverage by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, including conflict, international cooperation and terrorism effects on the community,
among others.
Source attribution
Sources are essential components of a news story. Journalists
often depend on credible sources for information they do not
know personally. Shoemaker and Reese (1991) noted the tremendous effect that sources may have on a news story, by providing
the context within which other information may be evaluated.
They also pointed out that sources could monopolize the journalist’s time so as not to allow him/her to seek alternative views.
Journalists tend to rely on certain types of sources, such as
government officials, individuals with expertise, witnesses, etc.
According to Zoch and Turk (1998), government representatives
are quoted because they add credence and authenticity to the
story. In addition, government sources are preferred by journalists due to government officials’ availability for interviews and at
press conferences. In a study of television news coverage of the
Persian Gulf War, Steele (1995) found expert sources were used
because of their wealth of knowledge of the subject matter.
Tone
As an important aspect of news framing, tones used in news
reporting vary and carry different connotations, thus implying
4
International Communication Research Journal
negativity or positivity and affecting how the information is
perceived. Teng’O (2008) pointed out that Western media tend
to use the neutral tone in news reporting, which is in line with
the objectivity standard for good journalism. On the other hand,
Brunken (2006) noted that news media use certain descriptive
words to establish an accurate and detailed perspective of print
media’s influence.
Instead of focusing on the positive versus negative dichotomy
of tones, Picard and Adams (1991) argued that what matters
most is whether the tone is subjective or objective. Therefore,
they created two categories, nominal versus descriptive, in their
analysis of terrorism coverage. According to their definition,
nominal labels are neutral and portray little subjective evaluations, while descriptive labels are more detailed, weighty and
carry more connotative meanings that are either negative or
positive. In addition, while most researchers tend to treat sources
and labels as two separate variables, Picard and Adams (1991)
found that government officials tend to use more descriptive
terms that are inflammatory or contain strong connotations.
Bylines
The byline of a news story refers to who writes it. Traditionally, most newspapers are known to depend on their own staff in
news reporting (Reich, 2010). As a consequence of commercialization of the news industry, however, news agencies nowadays
play an important role in providing news materials, particularly
when a news organization cannot afford to hire correspondents
in the locale of a remote news event. The U.S media, for example,
have been known as heavy users of wire services due to cost
efficiency and objectivity concerns (Rampal, 2007). However, in
an analysis of African news on the websites of five Western news
organizations and an African news aggregator, Teng’O (2008)
found that the six organizations mostly relied on their own staff
writers. Similarly, Ekeanyanwu (2007) reported that four Nigerian newspapers’ in-house staff wrote nearly two-thirds of the
news stories about political crises and conflicts during 2003-2007,
while only 5.1% of the stories came from news agencies.
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
5
Mass Media in Nigeria
It is difficult to understand the mass media in Nigeria without taking into consideration the strong interplay of media and
politics. Nigerian politicians have long recognized the power of
the press as a tool for propaganda (Uka, 1989), which explains
why some prominent politicians strive for control of the media.
For example, Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first president of Nigeria,
controlled 10 newspapers and Obafemi Awolowo, his rival, had
14 (Ekeanyanwu, 2007).
In the 1990s, media ownership in Nigeria underwent tremendous changes. While the government still owned and controlled
some media corporations (such as Daily Times and Nigeria Tribune) to advance government ideals, the ones that were privately
owned promoted the ideals and political views of their owners
(e.g., Concord Group of Newspapers, which supported the winning candidate in the 1993 presidential election). The annulment
of the 1993 presidential election marked the true beginning of
private media ownership and media resistance in Nigeria. However, this was accompanied by increased media ownership by
politicians and ex-military personnel (Nwachuku, n.d.).
In addition to directly owning or controlling the media, the
government exerts strong influence on the media through a
number of means, including law enforcement, coopting and
appellations. The government is quick to enact laws to restrain
and control the media. Certain loopholes or ambiguous portions of government decrees are often used against the media
(Nwachuku, n.d.). Influential journalists are swayed toward the
governments’ leanings through bribes or preferential treatment
(Abonyi, 2010; Olutokun & Seteolu, 2001). Executives of media
organizations, public or privately owned, are appointed in top
government offices. As a consequence, these media owners and
managers are indirectly indebted to the government and choose
to implement self-censorship. In addition, appellations are used
to create hierarchy among media stations (Udeajah, 2006). Access denial to certain places is another method the government
uses to restrict press freedom (Omu, 1978). In the worst scenario,
media houses are shut down for opposing the government.
6
International Communication Research Journal
Research Questions
This study focuses on the coverage of the 2010-2011 Jos Crisis
in three leading Nigerian daily newspapers: the Punch, Guardian
and Thisday. The Punch is one of the most widely-read newspapers in Nigeria. Historically known for appealing to the working
class, it is popular among people with basic literacy. Since 2000,
the paper has been repositioning itself to “appeal for a more
up-market audience,” which helps boost its advertising revenue
(Rap21, 2004). It is now a popular national daily, particularly
among politicians and businessmen.
Popular among young readers such as college students, the
Guardian boasts itself as an objective newspaper independent
of any political party, ethnic community or interest/religious
group. It focuses on business content and appeals to the most
educated section of the elite while maintaining independent and
sober views (Olutokun & Seteolu, 2001).
A relatively young newspaper, Thisday grew within a short
period of time to establish its name among the leading newspapers in Nigeria. Known for its business and political reporting
and for breaking big news stories, it has won several awards,
including Newspaper of the Year for three consecutive years
(About us, 2013). As a high-profile newspaper, it is preferred
among business, political and diplomatic elites, particularly the
younger generations.
This study asks the following research questions:
RQ 1: Did the Punch, Guardian and Thisday differ in themes
when covering the 2010-2011 Jos crisis?
RQ 2: Did the three newspapers differ in sources when covering the Jos crisis?
RQ 3: Did the three newspapers differ in tone when covering
the Jos crisis?
RQ 4: Was the type of dominant sources associated with the
tone used in the coverage?
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
7
RQ 5: Did the three newspapers differ in their reliance on
their own staff writers and news agencies?
Method
Data Selection
The researchers used the keyword “Jos” to search the online
archives on the websites of the Punch, Guardian and Thisday from
December 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011. A total of 5,451 articles were
retrieved, with 3,700 from the Punch, 1,251 from the Guardian
and 500 from Thisday. Using a systematic random sampling
procedure, the researchers selected every 37th article from the
Punch, every 13th article from the Guardian and every 5th article
for Thisday. Four additional articles were systematically and
randomly selected from the rest of the Guardian articles. This
sampling procedure yielded a total of 300 articles for this study,
with 100 from each of the three newspapers.
Measures
Themes. Four major themes were coded: 1) actions, if a story
focused on the actual clash such as damaging houses, hurting
people, etc.; 2) reactions, for example, reactions from the government, community or individuals; 3) actors, for example, perpetrators of the crisis; 4) consequences of the crisis, such as the
destructive effects of the crisis on Jos or preventive measures to
forestall a reoccurrence, etc.
Source attribution. Four types of news sources were coded:
1) government representatives; 2) involved individuals, such as
witnesses, victims, suspects and their families; 3) affiliated individuals, such as representatives of non-governmental organizations, traditional and religious leaders and politicians who were
not government representatives but affiliated with particular
organizations; 4) other individuals. The frequency of each source
type was first recorded for each story. The source type with the
highest frequency was coded as the dominant source for the
story. In case two source types ended up with equal frequency,
8
International Communication Research Journal
the type that appeared first in the story was coded as the dominant one.
Tone. Tone was coded as either nominal or descriptive. Nominal tone included articles that were neutral, void of judgment,
and those that only presented the fact. For example, an article
was coded as using a nominal tone if it reported the incident
without stressing any particular angle or attempting to add
analysis to it. Descriptive tone featured labels that were positive
or negative, optimistic, logical, hostile, conflicting, or with aggressive language. They contained deeper meanings and leaned
toward particular angles or perspectives.
Bylines. Bylines were coded into three categories: 1) staff: inhouse staff such as reporters, correspondents, editors and other
news workers hired by the newspaper; 2) wire service: News
Agency of Nigeria (NAN), Reuters, Associated Press and other
news agencies; 3) other.
In addition, the publication date and the length (measured as
the number of words) of each story were recorded.
Inter-coder Reliability
Inter-coder reliability was measured between one of the researchers and a graduate student who was trained to code. Thirty stories were randomly selected from the stories not included
in the sample of 300 stories. Based on the coding instructions
provided by the researchers, the two coders coded independently. A Holsti’s (1969) inter-coder reliability of 1.00 was reached for
date and length, 0.97 for bylines, 0.93 for dominant sources and
0.87 for themes and tones.
Findings and Discussion
The average length of all 300 stories in the sample was 731
words. With a total number of 5,451 stories on the topic, this
reflected the intensive media attention the 2010-2011 Jos crisis
attracted during the four months, thus indicating the importance
and salience of the crisis on the Nigerian media agenda.
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
9
20.70%
20.00%
pr
co
no
10.00%
Themes
0.00%
0.00%
T1
T2
T3
T4
RQ1 asked whether the three papers differed in themes.
Analysis of the themes revealed significant differences among
Note:( χ2 =
44.25,dfdf==6,6,
< .001
the three newspapers
= 45.71,
p <p .05)
(see Table 1).
The Guardian reported reactions much more frequently than the
other two papers,
more than
two-thirds
(68%)
of =
itsPeriod
articles 3; T4 = Period
T1with
= Period
1; T2
= Period
2; T3
focusing on reactions. The reaction theme also dominated in
the Punch, accounting for nearly half (48%) of the 100 stories in
the sample. For example, a Punch story focused on the reactions
of an Islamic group to the December 24th bombing in the Jos
Plateau, for which the group claimed responsibility (Adepegba
& Soriwei, 2010).
In contrast, only a third (33%) of the stories in Thisday were
about reactions, while slightly more (37% of the total) stories
focused on actions, making actions the dominant theme in Thisday. For instance, a story (Adinoyi, 2010) described the killing in
Nwachukwu village in Kwal, Miango, Bassa Local Government
Area of Plateau State as “a fresh attack,” in which seven people
were killed and four injured. The article further reported that
“the attack was suspected to be a reprisal of the alleged killing of
a Fulani herdsman in Gero village of Jos South LGA of the state,
marking the fifth of such attacks in two months” (Adinoyi, 2010).
The Punch and Guardian each reported actions in only about
12% of their articles. In fact, actions were not the second dominant theme in the Punch and Guardian. Rather, the second dominant theme in the Punch was consequences, appearing in 24% of
the stories. Although the second dominant theme in the Guardian
was actors, it appeared less frequently in the Guardian than in the
Punch (15%) or Thisday (15%). Very few of the stories (5%) in the
Guardian focused on consequences.
Consistent with Muschert’s (2009) finding that reactions were
60.00%
the prevalent theme in the coverage of the Columbine school
56.90%
shooting in the U.S. press,
the dominance of the reactions theme
in both the Punch and Guardian highlighted a massive acknowl44.80%
edgement of the 50.00%
Jos crisis among the public, thus emphasizing
the event’s salience. Though the crisis was one with recurring actions over time, actions did not wind43.10%
up as the dominant theme
41.70%
in the Punch and40.00%
Guardian, nor did the theme of actors.
10
38.20%
29.20%
International Communication
Research Journal
25.80%
30.00%
29.20%
36.00%
20.00%
20.70%
34.5
Table 1 Themes by Papers (N = 296)
Table 1: Themes by Newspapers
Paper (n = 296)
Themes
Punch
Guardian
Thisday
Reactions
48 (48%)
68 (68%)
33 (33%)
Actions
12 (12%)
12 (12%)
37 (37%)
Actors
15 (15%)
13 (13%)
15 (15%)
Consequences
24 (24%)
5 (5%)
14 (14%)
98 (98%)
99 (99%)
Total
99 (99%)
χ2 = 45.71, df = 6, p = .001
Note: The total does not add to 100% because “other” themes were
excluded in the analysis. These “other” themes were related to other
activities in Jos such as the presidential election campaigns.
The finding about lack of attention to actors in the conflict
raises the question why. No story in the sample focused on security officers making arrests. As noted in the Punch (Eze, 2010),
“violence always persists in the country because perpetrators
always go unpunished.” In fact, the government did not attempt
to punish those behind the atrocities even when certain groups
claimed responsibility for violent activities. For example, a
Muslim group claimed responsibility on a website for the attack
on December 25, 2010 (Adinoyi & Ogunmade, 2010). However,
no follow-up report was available about tracing the perpetrators
by any means. Instead, the Plateau State Commissioner of Police
brushed off comments on the site, calling the acknowledgement
a decoy to distract the police force (Adepegba & Soriwei, 2010).
Compared to the Punch and Guardian, Thisday focused on the
actions more often than on reactions. This was a deviation from
the norm in the literature, which might be explained by Thisday’s
style and policy. With the youth as the majority of its target readers, Thisday might have adopted this deviation as a way of distin-
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
11
30.00%
36.00%
25
20.00%
guishing itself through communicating current situations of the
10.00%
crisis to its audience. From this perspective, Thisday
seemed to be
more information-driven than analysis-driven.
0.00%
0.00%
Dominant Sources
T1
T2
RQ2 asked about possible differences in the dominant sources
used by the three newspapers. Analysis of the dominant sources
Note:( χ2 == 23.03,
44.25, df = 6, p < .001
by individual papers showed significant differences
df = 4, p < .05) (see Table 2). While government representatives
were most frequently cited as dominant sources in all three
T1 = Period 1; T2 = Period 2; T
dailies, Thisday was more likely to cite government sources
(60%) than the Guardian (48%) and the Punch (39%). For all three
papers, the next dominant category was affiliated individuals,
but with varying frequencies. While the Guardian quoted affiliated individuals in nearly two-fifths (39%) of its articles, Thisday
(30%) and the Punch (26%) quoted affiliated individuals less frequently. Most importantly, the Punch cited involved individuals
as the dominant source in one out of five (20%) of its articles, far
more frequently than the Guardian (3%) and Thisday (7%).
Table 2 Sources by Papers (N = 272)
Table 2: Sources by Newsapers
Papers (n = 272)
Sources
Punch
Guardian
Thisday
Government
39 (39%)
48 (48%)
60 (60%)
Affiliated individuals
26 (26%)
39 (39%)
30 (30%)
Involved individuals
20 (20%)
3 (3%)
7 (7%)
Total
85 (85%)
90 (90%)
97 (97%)
χ2 = 23.03, df = 4, p = .001
Note: The total does not add to 100% because “other” sources were excluded in
the analysis.
60.00%
56.90%
50.00%
12
International Communication Research Journal 43.10%
40.00%
30.00%
36.00%
3
25.80%
29
Not surprisingly, government officials were the main sources
in the coverage of the Jos crisis, a finding in line with past
research (e.g. Bennett, 1990; Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005).
As Shoemaker and Reese (1991) noted, heavy reliance on government officials may be viewed as political propaganda and
Figure 1. Different Types of Legi
highlights the power of politicians and politics. The government depends on the media to create in the minds of its citizens
a perception of its devotion and commitment
to duty. On the
60.00%
other hand, the media are open to government sourcing.
56.90%As a
consequence, the media serve as a tool to promote government
positions and sentiments. Ekeanyanwu (2007) pointed out that
50.00%
the Nigerian media usually practice “advocacy journalism”
when reporting political conflicts and crises. This might be due
in part to ready funds from the government, licensing, recogni-43.10%
40.00%
tion and ease of scheduling press conferences.
This might also be
38.20
explained by Zoch and Turk’s (1998) suggestion that the media
36.00%
2
depend on government sourcing for believability and credence.
30.00%
It is worth noting that the Punch distinguished
itself from
its competition by using involved individuals as the dominant
25.80
sources in 20% of its stories. This might be explained by its long
tradition of serving the working class. Despite
its shift in focus
20.00%
during recent years to a more “up-market” readership (Rap21,
2004), it is possible that the Punch still remains a media outlet
that addresses the concerns of the average people, which may
10.00%
explain why it continues to lead in circulation among all Nigerian newspapers.
0.00%
Tone
0.00%
T1
T2
RQ3 asked whether the three papers differed in the tone
of their Jos crisis coverage. Significant differences were found
= 44.25,
df = 6, p < .001
among the individual papers in the type of Note:
tones ( χ2 =8.67,
df=2,
p < .05) (Table 3). In the Punch and Guardian, majority of the
articles (59% each) used descriptive tones, while
T1 = Thisday
Periodused
1; T2 = Period 2; T3 =
nominal tones in most of its stories (59%). A possible explanation
is that the Punch and Guardian focused more on reactions, which
tended to involve expressions with more connotations, while
Thisday focused more on actions, which would more likely be
reported using a neutral tone.
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
13
60.00%
56.90%
50.00%
43.10%
40.00%
36.00%
Table
3: Tone
by by
Newspapers
Table
3 Tones
Papers (N = 300)
30.00%
Tone
Papers (n = 300)
Punch
Guardian
Thisday
Nominal
41 (41%)
41 (41%)
59 (59%)
Descriptive
59 (59%)
59 (59%)
41 (41%)
100 (100%)
100 (100%)
100 (100%)
Total(N)
χ2 = 8.67, df = 2, p = .013
38.20%
29
25.80%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
0.00%
T1
T2
RQ4 asked about the association between the type of dominant sources and tone. A cross tabulation of tones and types of
Note:( χ2 == 39.09,
44.25,dfdf= = 6, p < .001
dominant sources showed statistical differences
2, p < .05) (see Table 4). Nominal tones were used in about twothirds (67%) of the articles in which government
representatives
T1 = Period
1; T2 = Period 2; T3 =
were the dominant sources. For example, when reporting a clash
that killed seven people, an article cited the state Police Command, who tried to calm down the situation by first confirming
the killings and then reassuring the people that “investigations
are in top gear to track down the perpetrators” (Adinoyi, 2010).
In contrast, descriptive tones were used in nearly three quarters (74%) of the articles where affiliated individuals were cited,
and stories citing involved individuals as the dominant sources
were also more likely to employ a descriptive tone (53%) than a
nominal one (47%). In a Thisday article about the December 25th
bomb blasts, for example, witness Munir Nasidi, a businessman
who was in a hotel opposite the church when the blast occurred,
described that “people were running around. Everyone was crying. They were bringing out casualties. Nobody was getting near
the building as there was a fire” (Nwosu, et al., 2011). The article
continued to report that “eye witnesses said windows of nearby
houses had been shattered by the explosion.”
A possible explanation is that government sources might
use the nominal tone to avoid further uprising and deteriorating reactions from the public. Government sources, who are
14
International Communication Research Journal
60.00%
56.90%
often cited when giving prepared speeches, are usually highly
selective of their words. On the other hand, the other types of
sources, especially affiliated and involved individuals, might be
antagonistic of how the government handled the crisis, thus they
tended
use the
descriptive
tone(N
frequently.
Table to
4 Tones
by Dominant
Sources
= 272)
Table 4: Tone by Dominant Sources
Figure 1. Different Types of Legitimacy Disputes durin
Tone
Dominant Sources (n = 272)
60.00%
56.90%
Government
Representatives
50.00%
Affiliated
Individuals
Involved
Individuals
99 (67%)
25 (26%)
14 (47%)
Descriptive
48 (33%)
40.00%
70 (74%)
Total
147 (100%)
Nominal
χ = 39.09, df = 2,30.00%
p = .001
2
Bylines
20.00%
43.10%
9536.00%
(100%)
44.80%
41.70%
38.20%
30 (100%)
29.20%
16 (53%)
25.80%
29.20%
20.70%
34.50%
RQ5 asked how the three newspapers differed in their bylines.
pr
Consistent with what Teng’O (2008) found about African news
co
10.00%
on foreign media websites, analysis of bylines showed that inhouse staff wrote the majority0.00%
of the stories in all three newsno
papers. This might be explained by a sense of patriotism (not
relying on foreign 0.00%
news agencies) and a lack of confidence in the
only domestic news agency, News
Nigeria, which
T1Agency ofT2
T3 is
T4
affiliated with the Nigerian government.
However, significant differences were found among the three
Note:( χ2 ==95.83,
44.25,dfdf= 4,
= p6,<p.05)
< .001
dailies in their bylines
(see Table 5).
Both the Guardian and Thisday depended almost exclusively on
their own staff, with the vast majority of the stories written by
T1 = Period 1; T2 = Period 2; T3 = Period 3; T4 = Period
their in-house staff (86% in the Guardian and 91% in Thisday),
and the others by freelancers and general readers. None of the
articles in the Guardian or Thisday came from a wire service. In
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
15
contrast, the Punch displayed a relatively balanced reliance on
their in-house staff and wire services, with the former contributing 48% of all stories and the latter 40%. As Reich (2010) noted,
a combination of staff and wire authorship may help reduce
personality factors and individual choices during news reporting. Moreover, it conveys a sense of objectivity. In this sense, the
Punch distinguished itself by using both its own staff and wire
services for relatively more objective reporting.
Table
Bylines by
(N = 300)
Table
5: 5Bylines
by Paper
Newspaper
Bylines
Papers (n = 300)
Punch
Guardian
Thisday
Staff
48 (48%)
86 (86%)
91 (91%)
Wire Service
40 (40%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
Other
12 (12%)
14 (14%)
9 (9%)
Total
100 (100%)
100(100%)
100(100%)
χ = 95.83, df = 4, p = .001
2
Conclusions, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
This study is an exploratory effort to understand how the Nigerian press portrays socio-political crises. Using media framing,
this study provides valuable insights on the current media landscape in Nigeria, particularly in situations where local recursive
violent conflicts are involved. At least two conclusions can be
drawn from the findings.
First, the strong interplay remains between the government
and the media. Nigerian media, at least the three newspapers
selected in this study, continue to practice “advocacy journalism” by focusing on the government. The media are more tilted
toward portraying the government and its reactions than those
involved in a crisis, such as victims. The three newspapers in this
study cited more government sources than involved individuals
and the actors. The media’s support for the government may re-
16
International Communication Research Journal
flect their efforts to receive possible economic, social or political
benefits that the government offers, or simply to gain recognition for growth. Furthermore, the media’s choice of government
sources may be related to feelings of inferiority versus superiority. That is, some gatekeepers in the news-making process may
view government representatives as superior and legitimate
sources that should be included in news stories, while victims
are considered inferior and thus not worthwhile sources.
On the other hand, although most media organizations are
now privately owned and operated, the government still has
substantial control over the media. The Nigerian government
uses the media as a propaganda tool to convince the public of its
efforts to salvage the crisis situation. Using nominal tones frequently, government officials left the public with the impression
that the government held an unbiased position, and was at the
same time concerned about its citizens’ welfare when little was
done to improve the situation. With the help of the media, the
government deliberately diverted attention from the perpetrators of the crisis. As Ekeanyanwu (2007) put it, the newspapers
“operated more as active players in political crises and conflicts
than as an impartial judge” (p. 64). Therefore, a lot needs to
be done before the press can serve as a voice for the Nigerian
public.
Secondly, among the three newspapers, the Punch and Thisday
performed slightly better in providing information for their
readers. Thisday was more information driven. Aside from focusing dominantly on the actions of the crisis, Thisday presented
relatively neutral information on the actions rather than an
analysis of reactions. This reflects the newspaper’s attempt for
objectivity, leaving the audience to reason for themselves. The
Punch’s objectivity is reflected in its news authorship that combined staff and wire services. By following the media practice
in more developed countries, the Punch distinguished itself as a
leading newspaper in Nigeria.
Caution should be drawn when interpreting the findings
from this study. A major limitation of this study is the purposive
sample. Influential as they are in the nation, all three newspapers
are based in the southwestern part of Nigeria (Lagos), where the
headquarters of most of the largest Nigerian media organizaVol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
17
tions are located. Due to their distance from the location of the
Jos crisis, the three dailies can by no means represent the overall
Nigerian press. In addition, this distance might have influenced
how the three papers framed the crisis. Therefore, analysis of
other newspapers that are nearer to Jos may help reveal press
coverage in the locale of the crisis.
Future research should also study media coverage of other
crises in Nigeria, including crises of other nature, such as the
Niger Delta crisis from the 1990s or the 1993 presidential election
crisis, both of which still have long-term impact on Nigeria.
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International Communication Research Journal
Grilling the Leaders of Rogue States:
U.S. TV Coverage of Ahmedinejad and Gaddafi
During the 2009 UN Assembly Sessions
By Jaesik Ha & Shin Haeng Lee
This study examines sound bites on U.S. television which contained
statements by U.S. government officials, U.S. broadcast journalists and
the leaders of rogue states (Iran’s Ahmedinejad and Libya’s Gaddafi)
during the 64th session of the United Nations Assembly in 2009. The
study shows that the Obama administration focused on policy-related
issues such as Iran’s nuclear armament program, the Afghan war and
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while American journalists were more
interested in the repression of human rights by rogue states, such as
the Iran government’s crackdown on dissidents, Libya’s role in the
Lockerbie bombing and Ahmedinejad’s denial of the Holocaust. There
is also a big difference in the responsibility frames employed. While
U.S. government officials and journalists accused the leaders of rogue
states of perpetuating terrorism and war, the rogue state leaders blamed
the U.S., its allies and the news media for the origins of conflicts and
terrorism.
Communication scholars have claimed that American mainstream media tend to consistently follow their government’s
policies in foreign affairs issues such as terrorism and war (Bennett, 2009; Paletz & Entman, 1981). One of the reasons for this is
that journalists consider official sources to be newsworthy and
authoritative (Henderson, 2004). Cohen (1963) pointed out that
public officials are considered “prime sources of news merely by
virtue of their positions in government” (p. 28). In their coverage of anti-terrorism efforts since September 11, 2001, the U.S.
Ha is a visiting assistant professor in the Journalism Department at
the University of Wisconsin-River Falls.
Lee is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication at the
University of Washington.
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
21
media have relied heavily on their own government officials as
their news sources (Bennett, 2009). This has led to the criticism
that the U.S. media do not play their proper role as government
watchdogs when covering American foreign policies, such as the
Iraq War (Bennett, 2009; Bennett, et al., 2006; Entman, 2003, 2004).
In this regard, the media’s reliance on government officials as
their authoritative sources has not changed, even since the end
of the Cold War (Bennett, 2009).
In particular, since September 11, 2001, the anti-terrorism
frame has functioned as a powerful ideological tool in much the
same way as the Cold War frame was prevalent and authoritative beginning in the 1950s (Bennett, 2009; Barnett & Reynolds,
2009). It has been one of the most prominent frames that the U.S.
news media use when its government officials try to portray
anti-terrorism as an urgent issue on their agendas (Nacos, 2007).
Barnett and Reynolds (2009) claim that “Terrorism became a
part of the daily news cycle in the United States after September
11, and it entered into some of the routine questions journalists
asked at disaster and other crime scenes” (p. 47).
Since the 1980s, five countries — Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya and
North Korea — have been consistently called “rogue” by American government officials (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2007). Thus,
these countries have been considered to be serious threats to
the peace and stability of international society. For instance, in
January 2002, in his State of the Union address, President George
Bush selected Iraq, Iran and North Korea as members of an “axis
of evil,” claiming that these three nations “constitute an axis of
evil, aiming to threaten the peace of the world” (Kessler & Baker,
2006). President Bush’s characterization of these three countries
as an “axis of evil” has not only been reflected in his administration’s foreign policies, but has also functioned as a symbolic
term frequently used to disparage those countries during his
presidency (Ha, 2010). President Barack Obama (2009) also said
in his inaugural address that “Our nation is at war against a farreaching network of violence and hatred…. With old friends and
former foes, we’ll work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat.”
This study investigates what kinds of issues and frames were
put forward by three groups of political elites during the annual
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International Communication Research Journal
meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in September
2009: (1) U.S. President Obama and other high-ranking U.S. officials; (2) U.S. broadcast journalists who interviewed Iran’s President Ahmadinejad and Libya’s leader Gaddafi; (3) Gaddafi and
Ahmadinejad themselves. Specifically, it compares the difference in the framing employed by these elites by examining not
only whom they attempted to blame for international conflicts,
but also what kinds of angles they highlighted in presenting an
issue. In order to do this, this study analyzed sound bites from
U.S. TV news programs which contained statements by U.S.
officials, TV journalists and the leaders of the so-called “rogue
states.”
In the area of foreign affairs, the annual meeting of the United
Nations General Assembly is a worldwide event where confrontations among the leaders of countries are often dramatically
staged. The 64th session of the UN Assembly began in New York
on September 15, 2009 and the final debate was held on September 28-29, 2009. During this event, one of the most contentious
issues discussed was whether or not Iran had clandestinely
developed a nuclear weapon. In a meeting with France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy and the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister
Gordon Brown, President Obama (2009) criticized Iran’s secret
efforts to manufacture nuclear weapons, saying that “The existence of this facility underscores Iran’s continuing unwillingness
to meet its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions
and IAEA requirements.”
In the UN General Assembly, Iran’s Ahmadinejad and Libya’s
Gaddafi received more attention than any other leaders. President Ahmadinejad was a controversial figure because of concern
about the Iranian nuclear weapons program and his suppression
of dissidents and Iranian citizens after the disputed presidential
election of June 2009. Hundreds of protesters expressed their
anger at President Ahmadinejad outside the UN building, saying
that Ahmadinejad had stolen Iran’s election (Landler & Fathi,
2009). In his address, President Ahmadinejad defended the election as “glorious and fully democratic” (Landler & Fathi, 2009).
Libya’s Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s first appearance in the UN
after 40 years in power culminated when he tore up and threw
away the UN charter during his speech, which took 90 minutes
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
23
instead of the allotted 15. In this address, he advocated “the right
of the Taliban to establish an Islamic emirate” (MacFarquhar,
2009).
Literature Review
The independence of the U.S. press from its government
during the Cold War has often been questioned (Herman, 1993;
Herman & Chomsky, 2001; Rachlin, 1988). Foreign events during
this period were often framed within the government’s interpretations and resonated with larger cultural themes (Entman, 1991;
Kim, 2000; Rachlin, 1988). Coverage of foreign issues was most
often determined by the Cold War confrontation and the ideological rivalry with the communist Soviet Union (Entman, 1991).
The U.S. media have been found to rely on government officials
in not only their daily coverage of foreign issues, but also in their
presentation of issues and frames (Bennett, 2009). Now that the
ideological confrontation between East and West has abated
somewhat, we might ask whether the coverage of foreign issues
by news media changed. Have the U.S. media become more
independent from their government? This study takes faming
theory as its theoretical base and, more specifically, focuses on
the frame-building process.
Framing Theory
Framing theory has functioned as a useful context in which
to examine media texts. Framing theory focuses on the particular ways in which issues are presented (Weaver, 2007, p. 184).
This theory is concerned with “the way interests, communicators, sources and culture combine to yield coherent ways of
understanding the world, which are developed using all of the
available verbal and visual symbolic resources” (Reese, 2001, p.
11). Thus, framing works “to select some aspects of a perceived
reality and make them more salient” and can “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, p. 52).
In particular, when journalists and politicians present an issue or
event, they necessarily highlight or exclude certain parts of real-
24
International Communication Research Journal
ity (Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Nelson, et al., 1997). As a result,
they “make decisions or frame a story such that it propagates a
particular version of reality” (Hickerson, et al., 2011, p. 790).
Journalists are dependent on certain frames not only to “organize the world” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7), but also to package and
present their news stories (Price, et al., 1997). When journalists
also present an issue to their audiences, they tend to present
that issue within certain frames (Gamson, 1992). These frames
“reflect broader cultural themes and narratives” and “supply
citizens with a basic tool kit of ideas they [may] use in thinking about and talking about politics” (Price et al., 1997, p. 482).
One of the reasons why framing matters is that it functions as a
powerful device for a different portrayal of the same event or issue (Nelson et al., 1997). Divergent representations of same issue
are made possible by the words, phrases, images and “angles”
which journalists choose to employ (Entman, 1993; Nelson et al.,
1997).
The Frame Building Process
Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) assert that frame building
encompasses “the question of how frames get established in societal discourse and how different frames compete for adoption by
societal elites and journalists” (p. 22). They emphasize that frame
building takes place in three areas: “journalistic norms, political actors, and cultural contexts” (2009, p. 22, emphasis added). That is,
frame building refers to the production and flow of frames that
exert a powerful influence on social discourse.
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) presented five distinct layers that
influence the content of the media: the individual level, media
routine level, organizational level, extramedia level and the
ideological level. This broad framework includes various kinds
of influence from social ideology to the values held by individual
journalists. Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) maintain that frame
building is shaped by “macroscopic mechanisms that deal with
message construction rather than media effects” (p. 12). They
add, “The activities of interest groups, policymakers, journalists and other groups interested in shaping media agendas and
frames can have an impact on both the volume and character of
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
25
news messages about a particular issue” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 12).
Framing studies may be classified according to whether
the frames were used as independent or dependent variables
(Scheufele, 1999). This study sets frames as the dependent
variable. Scheufele (1999) points out that “Studies of frames as
dependent variables have examined the role of various factors in
influencing the creation or modification of frames” (p. 107).
In particular, this study attempts to examine the dynamic relationship between media and government. At the governmental
level, frame building is influenced by the elite groups: government officials and other political actors, including congressmen
(Bennett, 2009; Edelman, 1977; Rottinghaus, 2008). At the media
level, media framing is influenced by social norms, organizational pressure or situations, professional routines, relationships
with political groups, including the president (Scheufele, 1999;
Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978).
Framing and Terrorism
U.S. journalists are frequently criticized in their news coverage of war and terrorism because they tend to support their
government’s stance on foreign policy issues (Bennett, 2009;
Entman, 1991; Herman & Chomsky, 2001; Kim, 2000). Herman
(1993) analyzed the Gulf War news coverage and concluded that
“U.S. mass media coverage was to an extraordinary degree a
servant of official policy” (p. 45). Rachlin (1988) also claimed that
U.S. media coverage is influenced by the U.S. government. News
articles on international issues “seem shaped more by images
and understanding originating in an American society/political/economic ecology than by the events themselves” (Rachlin,
1988, p. 127).
Due to his position as the foremost source of news, the U.S.
president plays a powerful role in the building of news agendas and frames (Graber, 2010); and the president’s influence on
the news media is more dominant in the area of foreign affairs
because the news media tend to be more dependent in that area
on government officials, including the president (Bennett, 2009;
Entman, 2003, 2004). McCombs, et al. (1982) examined Richard
26
International Communication Research Journal
Nixon’s 1970 State of the Union address and found that the
agenda of 15 issues emphasized in the address influenced the
American media’s agendas in the following month.
After analyzing the news coverage of the September 11 attack, Williamson (2003) points out that “Journalists quickly
abandoned all pretense of objectivity and became the uncritical
mouthpiece of the U.S. state” (p. 177). Ravi (2005) examined coverage of the Iraq war in five major newspapers from the United
States, United Kingdom, Pakistan and India. He found that the
“American war frame, with its emphasis on the overall military
strategy, dominated the American and the British newspapers,”
while the newspapers in Pakistan and India covered more
frequently the Iraqi perspectives and civilian deaths (Ravi, 2005,
p. 45).
Bennett’s indexing theory highlights the consistent failures
among U.S. journalists to question the U.S. government’s foreign
policies due to the news media’s tendency to follow elite perspectives. Bennett (2009) claims that, even since the end of the
Cold War, the news media is still limited in its challenging of the
government’s framing. He points out that the U.S. media did not
properly confront President Bush and his government officials
who had promoted the Iraq war in 2002 and 2003. Also, previous studies showed that enemy countries’ rulers are depicted as
merciless, dictatorial and inhumane in news coverage by the U.S.
media (Ha, 2009; Herman & Chomsky, 2001; Obad, 2003; Parenti,
1993). Iyengar and Simon (1993) pointed out that the U.S. media
portrayed Saddam Hussein as “a modern Hitler, bent on annexing Kuwait and controlling the world supply of petroleum”
(p. 382).
Entman (2003, 2004) proposes the “cascading activation”
model as a framework for explaining government-media relations after the end of the Cold War. Entman (2004) claims that,
even after the attacks of September 11, “one thing it did not
change was the news media’s traditional promotion of patriotic
rallies around presidents when America appears [to be] under
attack” (p. 2). However, Entman (2004) claims that the news
media “are not entirely passive receptacles for government
propaganda, at least not always” (p. 428). He contends that the
news media can cultivate their own independent and critical
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
27
frame, sometimes moving away from the government’s framing
of issues. According to Entman (2003, 2004), in the post-Cold
War era, there are opportunities for a journalist, expert or citizen
at the lower levels to propose their own counterframes and challenge the government’s interpretation of issues or events.
Hypotheses and Research Question
In framing studies of media discourse, the examination of
issues or themes is a useful way to detect a frame in news texts
(Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; Cogan, 2005; Hanson, 1995; Sandberg, 2008). Prince (1984) defined “theme” as “a macrostructural
category or frame allowing for the unification of distinct (and
discontinuous) textual elements” (p. 5). In this context, this study
examines what kinds of issues are more prominently accentuated in statements by U.S. government officials, U.S. journalists
and the leaders of rogue states. Thus, this study asks the following research question:
RQ 1: What kinds of issues did U.S. officials, American
broadcast journalists and the leaders of rogue states
emphasize during the 64th session of the UN General
Assembly?
Politicians and journalists tell their audience “which aspects
of the problem are most important to think about when making
a judgment” (Kim, et al., 2011, p. 294). Their intention is to help
their audiences make an attribution of responsibility (Kim, et
al., 2010). There are two types of attributions of responsibility:
causal and treatment responsibilities (Iyengar, 1989). Causal responsibility concerns the origin of the problem, while treatment
responsibility refers to who is accountable for alleviating that
problem (Kim et al., 2010, p. 565). Therefore, the framing of an
issue entails both who causes a problem and who is responsible
for fixing the problem (Entman, 1991, 1993; Lee & Yang, 1996;
Tankard, et al., 1991).
Journalists often regard their own country’s national interest to be one of the most important criteria of newsworthiness
(Herman, 1993; Herman & Chomsky, 2001; Lee & Yang, 1996;
28
International Communication Research Journal
Rachlin, 1988). This tendency is particularly true in foreign news
coverage involving their home country (Entman, 1991; Kim &
Lee, 2003; Lee & Yang, 1996; Novais, 2007). In this regard, Lee
and Yang (1996) claim that, in the coverage of foreign affairs,
national interest “often transcends or subsumes partisan rifts
which are characteristic of domestic politics” (p. 2).
Therefore, what causes the problem and who is responsible
for solving it could be both important in the public statements
made by three groups of political elites: U.S. officials, American
TV journalists and the leaders of rogue states. Thus, during the
64th session of the UN General Assembly, American officials and
journalists were likely to blame the rogue states and their leaders
for various terrorist activities, including the pursuit of nuclear
weapons. By contrast, it is likely that the leaders of rogue states
will attribute global conflicts to the U.S. and its allies. Thus, the
following hypothesis is proposed:
H 1: U.S. officials and journalists will assign the responsibility
for conflicts to rogue states, while the leaders of rogue
states will frame the West, including the U.S., as being
responsible.
Frames have both individual and media components
(Scheufele, 1999). The individual frame refers to the mental index
upon which an individual processes information, while media
frames are more formalized for the identification and classification of information. Media frames are further subdivided into
issue-specific and generic frames (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).
Issue-specific frames basically deal with the angle through which
an issue is examined. This could be from the human angle, its
moral component, conflict, or its policy/issue implications. To
justify their stance on foreign affairs and present themselves as
sensible policy-makers, politicians may be expected to put more
emphasis on issues or policies in their public statements than
on other aspects. However, human interest is one of the most
important criteria in journalists’ news value judgments (Bennett,
2009; Campbell, et.al., 2011). One possible result of U.S. journalism’s tendency to favor human interest-focused reporting is the
personalization of events or issues (Bennett, 2009). Therefore,
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
29
it is probable that American TV journalists use human interest
angles when interpreting the issues as a way to appeal to their
audience and to represent themselves as advocates of humanitarian causes. Thus, this study proposes the following hypothesis.
H 2: Among the issue-specific frames, U.S. broadcast journalists will prefer using the human interest frame, while
U.S. government officials will more frequently use the
issue/policy frame.
Method
This study analyzed the transcripts of sound bites which were
found in U.S. broadcast news reporting during the 64th session
of the UN General Assembly. In order to compare the issues and
frames emphasized by three groups of political elites (U.S. government officials, U.S. TV journalists and rogue state leaders),
this study examined the original texts of sound bites from these
elite groups. Data collection was done in two ways.
First, to collect the sound bites of U.S. officials as part of a TV
news report, the transcripts of news stories from NBC and CNN
were retrieved from the Lexis-Nexis database, using “United
Nations” as the keyword. The time period searched was from
Sept. 15, 2009 (the opening day of the 64th session of the UN
Assembly) to Sept. 29, 2009 (when the 64th session’s final debate
ended). The search yielded 196 news articles. By identifying the
U.S officials’ sound bites relating to the UN General Assembly,
we were able to collect and analyze 56 sound bites of highranking U.S. officials. These sound bites were mostly statements
by President Obama, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and UN
Ambassador Susan Rice during the 64th session of the General
Assembly. Each sound bite containing an official’s statement was
analyzed as a unit of analysis.
Second, to collect the sound bites of American TV journalists
and rogue state leaders, transcripts from U.S. TV journalists’
interviews with Ahmadinejad and Gaddafi were obtained from
the Lexis-Nexis database. The time period was the same as that
of the U.S. officials’ sound bites. Ahmadinejad and Gaddafi were
30
International Communication Research Journal
both interviewed on Larry King Live between Sept. 15 and Sept.
29, 2009. Ahmadinejad was also interviewed by NBC’s Ann Curry on Sept. 17, 2009, CBS’s anchorwoman Katie Couric on Sept.
23, 2009 and PBS’s Charlie Rose on Sept. 28, 2009. Among these
interview transcripts, each question or answer was chosen as a
unit of analysis. As a result, the number of sound bites chosen
for analysis featuring U.S. journalists was 121. The total number
of sound bites by Ahmadinejad and Gaddafi was 124.
Coding
Each sound bite was coded in three ways, depending upon
how international conflicts as well as the rogue states and their
leaders were portrayed. The coding categories were developed
by extensively reviewing the news stories covering the 64th session of the UN General Assembly and examining previous framing studies of public issues (Kim, 2000; Kim et al., 2010, 2011;
Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).
First, the major issues described in each sound bite were
coded into the following categories: (1) weapons of mass destruction, (2) the Afghan war, (3) the Lockerbie bombing and
Gaddafi, (4) the Iran election and democracy in rogue states, (5)
the Iraq War, (6) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, (7) the Holocaust, (8) the duties of UN members, (9) President Obama, (10)
U.S.’responsibilities, (11) the UN’s role in international affairs
1
and (12) Other .
Second, each sound bite was classified according to who is
responsible for a specific controversial issue and was coded as
(1) rogue states and their leaders, (2) the U.S. and its leaders (e.g.,
President Obama or President Bush), (3) England, France and
Israel, (4) news media, (5) all countries and the UN, (6) Iranian
2
dissidents and (7) Other . For example, if the topic is Iran’s
nuclear armaments and incurring international criticism, it was
coded as blaming a rogue state. On the other hand, if the topic is
1
Other refers to a case in which a sound bite mentions no issue in our coding
categories or several issues at the same time.
2
Other refers to a case in which a sound bite does not specify any responsible
object or actor of an issue.
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
31
how the U.S. is infringing on Iran’s sovereignty, it was coded as
accusing the U.S. If it was not clear who should be responsible, it
was coded as “Other.”
Third, issue-specific frame was coded into five categories: (1)
human interest frame, (2) issue/policy frame, (3) conflict frame,
(4) morality frame and (5) other 3. The human interest frame focuses on the human aspect of a story or an emotional angle in order
to catch the reader or viewer’s eye. The issue/policy frame refers to
the significance or outcome of certain policies. The conflict frame
emphasizes conflicts among parties, groups and/or individuals
(Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). This frame focuses on disagreements between countries or leaders. The morality frame deals
with the issue from a moral perspective.
Coding was done separately by the author of this study and
by a graduate student in mass communication. Wimmer and
Dominick (2003) recommend that a sample of 10-25% of stories
is sufficient to establish inter-coder reliability. In this study, 11%
of the stories were used to establish inter-coder reliability. The
following results were obtained from this process, using Cohen’s
Kappa which corrects for agreement by chance: Issues frame (.85),
Responsibility frame (.75) and Issue-specific frame (.69). Landis
and Koch (1997) claim that Cohen’s kappa figures of between 0.61
and 0.81 are acceptable for any quantitative research.
Findings
Selection of Issues (RQ1)
RQ 1: What kinds of issues did U.S. officials, American
broadcast journalists and the leaders of rogue states
emphasize during the 64th session of the UN General
Assembly?
RQ1 examined what kinds of issues three political elite groups
— U.S. officials, American TV journalists and the leaders of
3 Other means a case in which a sound bite does present no pre-defined issue-
specific frame or several issue-specific frames at the same time.
32
International Communication Research Journal
20.70%
20.00%
pr
co
no
10.00%
0.00%
0.00%
rogue states — emphasized in their
Table
T1 public statements.
T2
T3 1
shows that there is a significant difference in the ways the three
elite groups stressed the major issues during the 64th session of
Note:(χ2 =
44.25, df = 6,p<.01).
p < .001
the General Assembly
(df=22)=82.245,
T4
Table 1: Issues Emphasized by three actors
Table 1: Issues Emphasized by Three Actors
T1 = Period 1; T2 = Period 2; T3 = Period 3; T4 = Period
Issue
U.S. Gov’t
(n = 56)
U.S.
Journalists
(n = 121)
Rogue State
Leaders
(n = 124)
Nuclear weapons
48%
24%
20%
Afghan War
16%
6%
4%
Israel-Palestine
conflict
7%
3%
6%
Duty as UN
member
7%
0%
1%
US’ Responsibility
5%
2%
3%
UN’s role
4%
0%
7%
Iran’s election
2%
28%
36%
Lockerbie
bombing
0%
17%
8%
Iraq War
0%
1%
1%
Holocaust
0%
7%
7%
President Obama
0%
3%
2%
11%
5%
Other
60.00% 11%
56.90%
χ2 (df = 22) = 82.245, p < .01
50.00%
44.80%
In the statements by U.S. officials, 48% of the sound bites were
coded in the category of nuclear weapon
armament, while the
43.10%
41.70%
U.S. broadcast journalists
40.00% and rogue state leaders selected this
38.20%
category at a rate of 24% and 20%, respectively (Table 1). There
30.00%
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
20.00%
36.00%
29.20%
25.80%
29.20% 33
20.70%
34.5
Figure 1. Different Types of Legitimacy Disputes during U.S.
60.00%
56.90%
50.00%
44.80%
are also some notable differences between the government officials’ statements, on the one43.10%
hand, and statements by41.70%
broadcast
journalists40.00%
and rogue state leaders, on the 38.20%
other hand (Table 1).
For example, while U.S. officials
put more emphasis on Iran’s
36.00%
34.50%
nuclear armaments and the Afghan war than on29.20%
other issues, the
30.00%
U.S. broadcast
journalists and the leaders of rogue states
high29.20%
lighted three issues (nuclear weapons, Iranian
elections
and
the
25.80%
Lockerbie bombing) more evenhandedly.
20.70%
20.00%
Attribution of Responsibility (H1)
H 1: U.S. officials and journalists will assign the responsibility
10.00%
for conflicts to rogue states, while the leaders of rogue
states will frame0.00%
the West, including the U.S., as being
responsible.
pragma
cognitiv
normati
0.00%
The findings show thatT1
there are significant
differences
in T4
T2
T3
the attribution of responsibility among the public statements
presented by U.S. officials, American journalists and rogue state
Note:
44.25, df = 6, pp<.01).
< .001
leaders (Table
2, χ2 =
(df=12)=233.323,
Table 2. Responsibility Frame
Table
2:T1
Responsibility
= Period 1;Frame
T2 = Period 2; T3 = Period 3; T4 = Period 4
U.S. Gov’t
n=56
U.S.
Journalists
n=121
Rogue State
Leaders
n=124
46%
74%
2%
23%
0%
1%
4%
0%
12%
U.S. & its leaders
0%
1%
23%
News media
0%
0%
6%
Iranian dissidents
0%
0%
18%
Other
27%
26%
39%
Responsibility
Rogue states
All countries &
UN
England, France,
Israel
χ2 (df = 12) = 233.323, p < .01
34
International Communication Research Journal
Table 2. Responsibility Frame
Responsibility
U.S. Government U.S. Journalists Rogue State Leaders
n=56
n=121
n=124
U.S. journalists and officials attributed terrorism to rogue
states and their leaders by ratios of 74% and 46%, respectively.
By contrast, rogue state leaders most prominently blamed the
Different
Types
of also
Legitimacy
U.S and its leadersFigure
in 23% 1.
of the
sound bites.
They
frequent- Disputes duri
ly attributed responsibility to Iranian dissidents and Western
news media, as shown
in Table 2.
60.00%
The three groups of political
56.90%elites have significant differences
in their presentation of the responsibility frame, and thus H1 is
supported. As Table 3 shows, American officials and journalists
50.00%
44.80%
mostly accused the rogue states and their leaders (officials, 46%;
journalists, 74%).
43.10%
41.70%
38.20%
29.20%
40.00%
Table3:
3. Responsibility
Responsibility
Frame
by by
U.S.U.S.
Official
and Rogue
Table
Frame
Officials
and State Leaders
36.00%
Rogue State Leaders
30.00%
Responsibility
Rogue states
West & U.S.
Other
U.S.
Journalists
(n = 121)
U.S. Gov’t
(n = 56)
20.00%
46%
74%
4%
10.00%
50%
χ2 (df = 4) = 155.058, p < .01.
0.00%
Rogue State
Leaders
25.80%
(n = 124)
2%
1%
36%
26%
63%
0.00%
T1
T2
29.20%
34.50
20.70%
T3
By contrast, the leaders of rogue states prominently accused
the West, including the U.S., England and France, as being reNote:
= 44.25, df = 6,p<.01).
p < .001
sponsible (36%) (Table
3, χ2 (df=4)=155.058,
p
c
n
T4
Table 3. Responsibility
Frame by U.S. Official and Rogue State Leaders
Issue-Specific
Frame (H2)
Responsibility
T1 = Period 1; T2 = Period 2; T3 = Period 3; T4 = Perio
U.S. Government U.S. TV Journalists Rogue State Leaders
H 2: Among the issue-specific
frames,
U.S. broadcast journaln=56
n=121
n=124
istsstates
will prefer using
interest frame, while
Rogue
46%the human 74%
2%
West
including
U.S.
4%
1% frequently use36%
U.S.
government
officials
will more
the
Other
50%
26%
63%
issue/policy frame.
Note: χ2 (df=4)=155.058, p<.01).
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
35
prag
cogn
norm
10.00%
0.00%
0.00%
T1
T2
T3
The findings show that there is a significant difference in the
employment of issue-specific frames by U.S. officials and U.S.
Note:4, χ2 (df=4)=21.003,
= 44.25, df = 6,
p < .001
journalists (Table
p<.01).
1. Different
TableFigure
4 Issue-specific
frame
T4
Types of Legitimacy Disputes during U
Table 4:
T1Issue-specific
= Period 1;Frame
T2 = Period 2; T3 = Period 3; T4 = Period 4
60.00%
56.90%U.S. Gov’t
Frame
TV Journalists
(n = 121)
Officials
(n = 56)
50.00%
Issue/policy
71%
56%
40.00%
Human
interest
4%
33%
Conflict
30.00%
43.10%
36.00%
2%
Morality
20%
Others
4%
20.00%
41.70%
38.20%
1% 29.20%
7%
25.80%
3%
χ2 (df = 4) = 21.003, p <.01.
44.80%
34.50%
29.20%
20.70%
prag
cogn
norm
10.00%
Among the statements by U.S. officials, only 4% used the human interest frame, while 0.00%
33% of the sound bites by U.S. journalists applied
frame. However,
U.S. officials
Tablethe
4 human interest
Issue-specific
frame
0.00%
presented the issue/policy
frame more prominently than did
Frame
U.S. Government Officials TV Journalists
T1n=56
T2support H2;
T3 there
T4
U.S. journalists (71% vs. 56%).
The findings
n=121
is a significant
difference
in
the
usage
of
both
the
human
interIssue/policy
71%
56%
est frame
and the
issue/policy4%
frame between U.S.33%
officials and
Human
interest
Note:5, χ2 (df=2)=20.583,
= 44.25,
p < .001 1%
journalists
(Table
p<.01).
Conflict
2% df = 6,
60.00%
Morality
20%
56.90% 4%
Others
Discussion
T1 = Period 1; T2 = Period
Note: (χ2 (df=4)=21.003, p<.01).
2;
7%
3%
T3 = Period
3; T4 = Period 4
50.00% from Rogue States
Fears of Terrorism
44.80%
This study shows that the overall
selection of issues by U.S.
43.10%
41.70%
government officials
40.00%and broadcast journalists follows a similar
38.20%
trend. Almost half (48%) of the U.S.
officials’ formal
statements
36.00%
on foreign affairs deal with concern over Iran’s nuclear
arma29.20%
30.00%
36
25.80%
29.20%
International Communication Research Journal
20.00%
10.00%
20.70%
34.50%
Table 5 Human interest and issue/policy frames
Table 5: Human Interest and Issue/Policy Frames
U.S. Gov’t
Officials
(n = 56)
TV Journalists
(n = 121)
Issue/policy
71%
56%
Human interest
4%
33%
Others
25%
11%
Frame
χ2 (df = 2) = 20.583, p < .01
ments. Similarly, the issue of Iran’s nuclear armaments was the
primary issue (24%) emphasized by the U.S. journalists. The
findings indicate that Iran’s nuclear armament program was
Table 5
Human interest and issue/policy frames
one of the key themes which U.S. journalists tried to highlight
Framewith Iran’s President
U.S. Government
Officials
TV Journalists
in interviews
Ahmadinejad
and Libyan’s
n=56
n=121
leader Gaddafi. More importantly, the findings show that
Issue/policy
71%
56%
American journalists regarded Iran’s attempts to acquire nuclear
Human
33% threat
armaments
as a interest
serious concern4%
because of the possible
Others
25%
11%
to world peace and
stability. This study illustrates that the key
p<.01).
Note: (χ2 (df=2)=20.583,
theme encompassing
U.S. officials’
statements and the storylines
found on U.S. TV is fears of terrorism originating from rogue
states.
The News Media’s Emphasis on Humanitarian Issues
The findings also indicate that the Obama government officials put an emphasis on policy-related issues, such as Iran’s
nuclear armament, the Afghan war and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. However, the U.S. journalists are more attentive in the
democratization movements and human rights issues within
the territories of the so-called rogue states than are U.S. officials.
Specifically, in the interviews with Ahmedinejad and Gaddafi, the U.S. journalists highlighted Iran’s elections (28%), the
Lockerbie bombing (17%) and the [denial of the] Holocaust (7%)
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
37
as prominent themes. However, such issues are rarely mentioned in statements by U.S. government officials.
In particular, U.S. journalists repeatedly spotlighted the Iranian government’s crackdown on its citizens. CNN’s Larry King
(2009) asked President Ahmadinejad, “Didn’t it concern you that
these people were complaining that this was fraud?” CBS’ Katie
Couric (2009) brought up the story of the 27-year-old woman
named Neda, who was shot to death during the protests. She
challenged, “Here is a shot of that cell phone picture, which I’m
sure you’ve seen. Correct? What would you say to her family?”
American journalists also underscored the PanAm Flight 103
incident, in which a civilian plane was destroyed by a bomb over
Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, killing 190 Americans. The convicted bomber was released from prison in Scotland in August 2009.
White House spokesman Robert Gibbs criticized Libya’s cheering, flag-waving welcome of the bomber, calling it “outrageous
and disgusting” (CBS, 2009). Iran’s President Ahmadinejad was
also criticized for his denial of the Holocaust. Ahmadinejad asserted at Tehran University at the end of an annual anti-Israel
“Qods (Jerusalem) Day” rally that “The pretext [the Holocaust]
for the creation of the Zionist regime (Israel) is false.... It is a lie
based on an unprovable and mythical claim” (Hafezi & Sedarat,
2009). It seemed likely that the U.S. journalists wanted to convey
Ahmadinejad’s provocative views about the Holocaust to their
viewers.
The U.S. journalists’ emphasis on Iran’s election, the Lockerbie
bombing and its denial of the Holocaust might have also come
from the journalists’ judgment that those issues have high news
value, because they contain humanitarian interest or concerns.
This study does not claim that these issues became important
agendas in American society because of the framing by American TV journalists during the 2009 General Assembly sessions.
However, undoubtedly, the U.S. journalists highlighted those
humanitarian issues than other policy issues.
The findings show that U.S. journalists’ interviews of rogue
state leaders seemed not only to lay rogue states’ leaders open to
attack, but also to bring up human and moral issues. Broadcasting is basically an intimate medium that “invites a personal, self-
38
International Communication Research Journal
disclosing style” (Jamieson, 1988, p. 84). It tends to rely on anecdotes and personal disclosure, since it is effective in facilitating
emotional connections with its audience (Levasseur, et al., 2011).
Television can enhance “a process which produces group cohesion and transform audience members into agents of change”
(Dow & Tonn, 1993, p. 289). As shown in the findings of this
study, American TV journalists framed international conflicts by
focusing on humanitarian and moral components through their
interviews with rogue state leaders on their news programs.
This study also shows that, while the U.S. president and government officials have more power to bring up a certain issue or
frame in the national debate, television’s face-to-face interview
programs can also have the capabilities to present some frames
as substantial public issues. In this respect, the media do not stop
mirroring or indexing the opinion of public officials and elite
groups, as is claimed by indexing theory. Rather, as Entman’s
cascading activation model suggests, the news media might
have independent and critical functions by reflecting the voices
of social activists or civil organizations or by imposing their
autonomous views on the processes of frame building. In the
post-Cold War era, the news media’s capacities to cultivate their
independent frames might have expanded, as Entman (2003,
2004) claims.
Divergent Attribution of Responsibility
This paper also deals with the extent to which the attribution
of responsibility plays out in the coverage of the rogue states
and their leaders. The attribution of responsibility “presents an
issue or problem in such a way as to attribute responsibility for
its cause or solutions to either government or to an individual or
group” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95). Attributing responsibility to the other side entails suspecting or assailing the other
side’s positions and morality. Our findings indicate that U.S.
officials and journalists questioned the rogue state leaders’ unaccountable attitudes, whereas the rogue state leaders criticized the
West as being at the root of conflicts among other countries.
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
39
When President Ahmadinejad was questioned about his
denial of the Holocaust by Larry King, he defended himself
repeatedly blaming Israel, the U.S. and the Western news media.
He said, “Why is it that the Palestinian people should be, uh,
subjected to genocide?” and “Unfortunately, my work has been
distorted by the media” (King, 2009). He also emphasized, in his
interview with CBS’s Katie Couric (2009), that “So what does this
have to do with the Palestinian people?” Especially, whenever
Ahmadinejad was asked about his government’s crackdown on
dissidents, opposition leaders and journalists after the election
in June 2009, he attributed the street demonstrations and the
democratization movement to some radical dissidents and to
Western countries. He answered as follows: “We are very sorry
that one of our fellow citizens has been killed…as a victim of an
agitational circumstance. An agitation that was carried out with
the support of some American politicians, the Voice of America
and the BBC that actually promoted these agitations” (Couric,
2009).
Thus, there was, to some degree, “a clash of frames” between American officials and journalists, on the one hand, and
rogue state leaders, on the other. The U.S. officials and journalists ascribed terrorism to rogue states. In his interview with
Gaddafi, Larry King (2009) mentioned that “By the mid-1980s,
Gaddafi was treated as a pariah by many in the West, accused
of bankrolling terrorist activities around the globe.” In a video
clip, Larry King Live aired former President Ronald Reagan’s
statement, “Mr. Gaddafi must know that we will hold him fully
accountable for any such actions” (King, 2009).
In contrast, the rogue state leaders claimed that the responsibility for terrorism should be put on the U.S. and other Western
countries such as France and England. In the interview with
CNN’s Larry King Live, President Ahmadinejad counterattacked: “Now, nobody can forget how Mr. Tony Blair encouraged Mr. Bush to carry out militaristic actions. Were the measures taken in favor of the United States of America? Were they
in favor of the world? Do they benefit the world?” (King, 2009).
The findings show that now that the Cold War has ended, terrorism has become another point of collision and confrontation
among the nations of the world.
40
International Communication Research Journal
Officials’ Preference for the Issue/Policy Frame
American officials and journalists used somewhat differently
issue-specific frames which referred to the point of view through
which an issue is presented. American officials presented the
issue/policy frame more often than did TV journalists. It is probable that U.S. officials employed the issue-policy frame not only
to indicate logical flaws in the rogue states’ foreign policies, but
also to emphasize their own positions’ superiority over rogue
states’ policies. However, the U.S. journalists conspicuously used
the human interest frame more than the issue/policy frame. This
human interest frame stressed the inhumane and irresponsible
attitudes of those leaders.
In the television interviews with rogue state leaders, the
journalists and the leaders exchanged verbal condemnations by
raising human rights issues. In some respects, the interviews
with the rogue state leaders were intended to subject them to a
grilling by asking questions which would be uncomfortable to
them. The interviewers’ questions were more likely to contain
human interest perspectives than issue/policy perspectives. On
the other hand, the government officials’ statements were likely
to use issue/policy frames in order that their foreign policies
could be seen to be based on rational and balanced judgment.
This study has some limitations. First, it did not look into how
the government frames caused the media frames and how the
news media frames shaped public opinion about the rogue states
and their political leaders. Thus, it cannot claim to have found
evidence of causal influence from the government to the media
and the public. Second, this study was not able to provide a clear
idea of why the U.S. government officials, the U.S. journalists
and the rogue state leaders more frequently employed some
frames over other frames. In future studies, it would be useful to
conduct a survey of journalists covering foreign issues. In spite
of these limitations, this study provides a good opportunity to
show not only how the frame-building by officials and journalists about rogue state leaders plays out, but also how the frames
between the West and the rogue states clash in worldwide
forums such as the General Assembly meetings.
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
41
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Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
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A ‘Tidal Wave of Revolt: ’How World Editorials
Framed the 2011 Egyptian Revolution
By Yu-li Chang & Dale E. Zacher
This article first examined how the world editorials framed the
Egyptian uprising by looking into three aspects of framing analysis
--- causal responsibility, moral judgment and treatment responsibility. It then investigated how three extrinsic factors in international
communication research -- political freedom, religion and geopolitical
regions affected the frames. Most editorials framed the Egyptian uprising in this way: It was mainly caused by the political woes inherent
with the Mubarak dictatorship; it served as a moral lesson in that the
uprising could trigger political, social or economic repercussions in
other countries, especially countries with dictators; and Egypt’s future
could be secured by the new government starting democratic reforms
immediately. The three extrinsic factors examined in this study affected
in various degrees how the editorials framed the Egyptian uprising,
especially in moral judgment – the lessons to be learned from the events
in Egypt.
The uprising caused by a young man’s immolation in Tunisia
in late 2010 not only toppled the Ben Ali dictatorship but also
awakened millions of Egyptians to rise up against their dictator,
Hosni Mubarak. This tidal wave of revolt drew the world’s attention to Egypt. As the Cyprus Mail opined:
When a young vegetable seller in a provincial Tunisian town
doused himself in petrol and burned himself to death after
police seized his cart back in December, no one would have
Chang is an adjunct faculty in the School of Mass Communication at
the University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
Zacher is an associate professor in the School of Mass Communication
at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
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International Communication Research Journal
thought this act of despair would unleash a tidal wave of
revolt across the Arab world. In just a few weeks, the protests sparked by his death had overthrown President Ben Ali
in Tunisia, sweeping away his cronies and much of the old
regime. Now copy cat demonstrations in Egypt --- the region’s
most populous state and bellwether of political trends --- have
brought President Mubarak to the brink (“Arab Democracy
Need Not Threaten Western Interests,” February 6, 2011).
As this editorial from the Cyprus Mail newspaper noted, the
swift current of political change in the Middle East that became
known as the “Arab Spring” surprised most observers, especially when it came to the streets of Egypt. Within 18 days, a peoplepower uprising in Egypt ended President Hosni Mubarak’s 30year dictatorship. Fueled by basic demands for political freedom,
calls for respect of human rights and a revulsion against the corrupt dictatorship, protestors took only 18 days from late January
to early February 2011 to win the Egyptian army’s support and
force Mubarak to abdicate his presidency.
Mass demonstrations against the Mubarak regime began on
Cairo’s Tahrir Square on January 25. Because of the scope of this
uprising and its implications for regional and world politics, the
Egyptian uprising drew a great deal of media attention from
around the world. As the world audience struggled to understand the unexpected turn of events, journalists moved quickly
to provide meaning by analyzing and interpreting the causes
of this uprising, solutions to the crisis and lessons to be learned
from this event. While journalists may or may not realize that
their interpretations help “frame” the uprising in certain ways
(Gamson, 1989), political scientist Entman (2004) has pointed out
that “framing is an inescapable feature of representation and that
increases the political influence of the media” (p. 21). In addition,
framing strategies should be most explicit in political editorials
because they are written to express opinions on important issues
without being bound by the conventional norm of objectivity
(Chang & Chang, 2003; Eilder & Lüter, 2000; Gamson, 1989).
The purpose of this study is first to determine what frames
were used by the world’s English-language newspaper editori-
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
49
als to interpret the Egyptian uprising to their readers. Instead
of focusing on certain newspapers from a handful of countries
such as the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc., this study
takes a broader approach by including English-language newspapers from all over the world. The reason is mainly because the
“Arab Spring” has become a movement that has commanded
media attention from every corner of the world, and the future
development of this movement will have profound impact on
global politics. English-language newspapers are chosen because
English is the lingua franca of the world and their readers include
the expatriates and the elite, diplomatic community, and in some
cases government ministerial overseers, who all serve as opinion
leaders; therefore, these papers are often among a nation’s most
influential (Merrill, 1991; van Leeuwen, 2006). In addition, these
newspapers also symbolize or showcase their countries to the
world stage (Messner & Garrison, 2006).
This study also aims to provide some understanding into
what factors might have affected the frames world editorials
used to analyze the Egyptian revolution. Scheufele (1999, p. 115)
referred to this step of investigation as frame building, in which
“the key question is what kinds of organizational or structural
factors of the media system, or which individual characteristics
of journalists, can impact the framing of news content.” Rather
than investigating these micro-level factors, this study borrows
concepts from international communication research, in which
macro-level extrinsic factors such as geographic proximity, language ties, political system, political freedom, etc. have been investigated. Due to the political nature of the Egyptian uprising,
this study will examine the following political factors: political
freedom, religion and geopolitical region.
Theoretical Framework
Using Framing to Study World Opinion
Most framing studies distinguished between two types of
frames --- media or news frames and audience or individual
frames (Druckman, 2001; Scheufele, 1999). Media frames refer
to “attributes of the news itself,” while audience frames refer
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International Communication Research Journal
to “information-processing schemata” of individuals (Entman,
1991, p. 7). In other words, mass media actively set the frames of
reference that readers use to interpret and discuss news events,
and the way media frame certain issues can affect people’s perceptions of those issues and influence public opinions (Eilders
& Lüter, 2000; Gamson, 1992; Iyengar, 1991; McClosky & Zaller,
1984; Tuchman, 1978). At the same time, audiences process the
media’s frames of reference using preexisted meaning structures or schemas (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Entman, 1991;
Friedland & Zhong, 1996; Gitlin, 1980; Gamson, 1992; Kosicki &
McLeod, 1990) or individuals’ general personality traits (Matthes, 2009). Individual frames, according to McLeod et al. (Cited
in Scheufele, 1999), describe how the audience makes sense of
political news and are defined as cognitive devices that “operate
as non-hierarchical categories that serve as forms of major headings into which any future news content can be filed” (p. 10).
This study investigated only the news frames. A news frame
can be defined as “a central organizing idea or story line that
provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events…. The frame
suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue”
(Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p.143), or as working routines
for journalists or news organizations to organize, interpret and
present information for efficient relay to their audience (Entman,
1993; Gamson, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Framing theory suggests that journalists use news frames to simplify,
prioritize and structure the narrative flow of events. By selecting to prioritize some facts or developments of an event over
others, journalists promote a particular interpretation of that
event (Entman, 1993). Pan and Kosicki (2005) also stated that in
newspapers writers have limited space to get their ideas across,
so “framing” an issue capitalizes on the fact that readers hold
distinctive values and strive for coherent understanding of that
issue. In short, media framing studies examine “the selection
and salience of certain aspects of an issue by exploring images,
stereotypes, metaphors, actors and messages” (Matthes, 2009, p.
349).
Matthes (2009), after conducting a comprehensive study of
media framing research, found that Entman’s (1993) definition of
media frames was the most influential among various definitions
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
51
of framing. Entman (1993) defined “media frames” as referring
to some aspects of a perceived reality made more salient in a
communication text to “promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). In other words, news
framing in the media’s coverage of political events has four basic
functions -- defining the problem, identifying causes, conveying moral judgment and prescribing remedies (Entman, 2004).
In a similar line of thinking, Snow and Benford (1988) said that
a political story line is often organized through diagnostic and
prognostic framing. A diagnostic frame deals with identification
of the problem and attribution of causal responsibility. A prognostic frame suggests the remedy to an issue.
Using Entman’s (1993, 2004) definition of news framing, this
study first examined three aspects of framing, namely: (1) assigning causal responsibility, (2) stating a moral judgment and (3)
suggesting a treatment remedy in reaction to the event. In other
words, three questions were asked: What did the world’s newspaper editorials say caused the uprising? What lessons did they
say could be learned from Egypt’s experience? What did they
say should be done now that Egypt had ousted its long-standing
dictator?
Using Editorials with Framing Analysis
This study used editorials instead of news reports because
political “framing” is most obvious in editorials. Gamson (1989,
p. 158) argued that to “identify frames, the information content of news reports is less important than interpretative commentary that surrounds it.” The distinction between news and
editorials corresponds with the distinction between information
knowledge and opinion. News reports are represented by the
newspaper’s interpretation of reality based on factual accounts
or summaries of events; editorials express opinions and give
evaluations of reality or map the reality for their readers (Rupar,
2007). Reese (2007, p. 148) also noted that “framing suggests
more intentionality on the part of the framer and relates more
explicitly to political strategy.” Editorials are the only place in a
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International Communication Research Journal
newspaper where the views of the paper as an organization are
represented. In freely selecting and presenting issues according
to their own agenda, editorials take an active role in engaging
the public in the deliberations and discourse of politics (Firmstone, 2008).
Because editorials are written to express opinions and are
intended to lead mass opinion, the ideas, positions and arguments articulated or “framed” by editorial writers have the
potential to structure the thoughts of a wider public. Therefore,
editorial opinions constitute an area of research that can make a
significant contribution to our understanding of the relationship
between the press and politics (Chang & Chang, 2003; Eilder &
Lüter, 2000; Firmstone, 2008; Rojecki, 2008; Ryan, 2004).
Using Theory and Methods from International Communication Research
In a global media event like the Egyptian uprising, theory
and methodology related to international news coverage can
help us understand what factors might have affected the editorials’ framing of the protests. International communication
scholars have studied two lines of factors affecting international
news coverage: “intrinsic” or “event-related” factors, referring
to newsworthiness of the event such as human interest, deviance, prominence/importance, conflict/controversy, timeliness
and proximity (Chang et al, 1987; Cooper-Chen, 2001; Wanta &
Chang, 2001) and “extrinsic” or “context-related” factors, referring to extra-media components such as trade relations, diplomatic and military ties, cultural similarities, or political variables
(Adams, 1986; Ahern, 1984; Gaddy & Tanjong, 1986; Ishii, 1996;
Kim & Barnett, 1996; Nnaemeka & Richstad, 1980; Robinson &
Sparkes, 1976; Rosengren, 1974, 1977; Wu, 2000).
Among the extrinsic factors, political variables such as political freedom and press freedom were found to be strong predictors of international news coverage (Ahern, 1984; Kim & Barnett,
1996; Robinson & Sparkes, 1976; Nnaemeka & Richstad, 1980).
Chang and Chang (2003) also found religion as a factor of international editorials’ coverage of the September 11 attacks. Other
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
53
factors were also found to be good predictors, but in an inconsistent manner. Kim and Barnett’s (1996) findings supported
geographical proximity and language ties as determinants of
international news flow. Adams (1986), analyzing the nightly
U.S. television coverage of 35 natural disasters around the world,
concluded that where the earthquake occurred made a big difference. The effect of geographic proximity did not surface in
Chang et al.’s (2000), Cooper-Chen’s (2001), Gaddy and Tanjong’s (1986), Ishii’s (1996) and Wu’s (2000) studies, however.
Due to the political nature of the Egyptian uprising, this study
focused on three political variables -- degree of political freedom,
religion and geopolitical region. Geopolitical region was added
as a variable because countries in a region often share some common religious, political or ethnic origins and often share similar
strategic interests. The Arab Spring itself shows how ideas can
spread through a geopolitical region. The mass protests in Egypt
gained momentum after Tunisia ousted its president in the
Jasmine Revolution. The uprising in Egypt likewise was widely
regarded as a possible catalyst for reforms in the Middle East,
where similar problems existed after decades of authoritarian
rule and economic stagnation.
Research Questions
This study includes two sets of data – a content analysis of
frames based on the world’s English-language editorials and
extrinsic factors related to international communication research.
This study seeks to answer these two research questions:
RQ 1: What were the frames used by English-language
newspaper editorials from 43 countries in the following aspects: causal responsibility, moral judgment and
treatment responsibility?
RQ 2: What factors, including political freedom, religion and
geopolitical region, may have affected how these editorials framed the Egyptian uprising?
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International Communication Research Journal
Method
Sampling
Content analysis was used to examine the frames used by
the world’s newspaper editorials in response to the massive
demonstrations in Egypt in January and February 2011. World
editorials in English were drawn from the Lexis-Nexis Academic
database using the search words “Egypt” and “editorials” with
the dates set between January 25, the beginning of the protests,
and February 15, three days after the fall of Mubarak. Editorials
were also drawn from the World Press Review website, which provides links to newspapers around the world, and from Google
by searching English-language newspapers in a certain country. Most newspaper websites would allow archival search of
editorials or display editorials published several weeks or even
months before; some, however, do not have these functions. In
such cases, the researchers had to forego those newspapers.
Only articles identified as editorials were collected; regular
news stories, news analysis pieces or other opinion pieces were
excluded. This means that all opinion columns with the author’s
byline were left out. For countries such as the United States, Britain, Canada and South Africa with larger numbers of Englishlanguage newspapers, only four newspapers from each of these
countries (16 total) were chosen for analysis. Those chosen had
the largest circulations and had at least a national focus in their
coverage. They were also chosen because of their availability
online. After eliminating those articles that mentioned Egypt but
were not related to the uprising, 190 editorials representing 43
countries were retained for analysis. All but four were originally
published in English. The four non-English articles were translated into English by BBC Worldwide Monitoring.
Twenty-six editorials were drawn from Africa, representing
seven countries -- Kenya (n = 5), Namibia (n = 1), Nigeria (n = 3),
South Africa (n = 14), Tanzania (n = 1), Uganda (n = 1) and Zambia (n = 1). Asia contained 55 editorials represented by 16 countries -- Afghanistan (n = 1), Australia (n = 6), Bangladesh (n = 1),
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
55
China (including Hong Kong) (n = 5), India (n = 9), Indonesia (n
= 1), Japan (n = 2), Korea (n = 1), New Zealand (n = 1), Malaysia
(n = 2), Pakistan (n = 7), the Philippines (n = 1), Singapore (n =
3), Sri Lanka (n = 6), Taiwan (n = 2) and Thailand (n = 7). Thirtyfour editorials came out of Europe, representing eight countries
-- Bulgaria (n = 1), Cyprus (n = 2), Ireland (n = 10), Lithuania (n =
1), Malta (n = 3), Portugal (n = 1), Turkey (n = 2) and the United
Kingdom (n = 14). Thirty editorials were drawn from seven
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, including Egypt
(n = 2), Israel (n = 4), Lebanon (n = 10), Qatar (n = 7), Saudi Arabia (n = 4), Yemen (n = 2) and United Arab Emirates (n = 1). The
Americas were represented by 45 editorials from five countries
-- Canada (n = 13), Trinidad and Tobago (n = 2), Jamaica (n = 1),
Guyana (n = 3) and the United States (n = 26).
Editorial Frames
This study dealt with issue-specific frames -- frames that are
specific to the Egyptian uprising and, therefore, may not apply to other issues. These issue-specific frames were derived by
following Matthes’ (2009) suggestion of conducting an initial
exploratory analysis of a sample of the world’s editorials.
Causal Responsibility. This variable referred to the editorial’s opinions about the cause or causes of the Egyptian uprising. Some articles mentioned the lack of freedom and the abuse
of power under the 30-year rule of Mubarak. Some editorials
covered aspects of a failing economy that brought plight to
the public ---rising food prices, widespread poverty and mass
unemployment. Others blamed the United States for propping
up the Mubarak regime by pumping billions of dollars of aid to
Egypt and ignoring its human-rights record in exchange of the
peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Of course, some editorials mentioned a combination of these causes. Four categories
of causal responsibility were used for this study: (1) domestic
political woes inherent with dictatorship, (2) domestic economic
woes, (3) international, especially U.S., complicity and (4) other.
56
International Communication Research Journal
Moral Judgment. This variable referred to the editorial’s
stance on what can be learned from the mass protests from
Egypt. Some emphasized that this uprising meant corrupt or
unresponsive governments ultimately fail, that governments
must listen to the people or that change is inevitable. Some
editorials thought that the Egyptian uprising served as a model
for non-violent social change or as a demonstration of people
power demanding change from within. Some editorials focused
on the hypocrisy or showed distrust of the West, especially
American foreign policy toward the Middle East and demanded
policy readjustment. The category of “self-reflections” also appeared in many editorials. It connected the lesson learned from
Egypt to the editorial’s country of origin, the country’s response
to the Egyptian uprising, or the uprising’s effects on the editorial’s country of origin. In summary, six categories fell under the
moral responsibility variable: (1) corrupt governments ultimately fail, (2) Egypt as a model for non-violent social change,
(3) watch out for ripple effects in other countries, (4) U.S. policy
toward the Middle East needs readjustment, (5) self-reflection
and (6) other.
Treatment Responsibility. This variable looked into the
editorials’ opinions about what can be done to bring solutions
to the Egyptian crisis. Some editorials asserted that the solution
lay in immediate reforms that could lead to democracy, or they
expressed trust that the new government was able to assure
peaceful transition to democracy. Some editorials viewed solving economic problems inherent or due to the unrest was the answer to the crisis. Some editorials encouraged the international
community, especially the United States, to get involved to help
Egypt rebuild. While some editorials lobbied for the involvement of the international community in helping shape the future
of Egypt, others warned against international involvement on
the grounds that what was happening was an internal affair and
should be treated as such by the international community. A few
editorials also warned against hasty democratization because
it takes time to build up the system for democracy to function
well. Overall, six categories were generated for this variable:
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
57
(1) reform now or more toward self-government and democracy,
(2) solve economic problems, (3) involve international community, especially the United States, (4) no international or U.S.
involvement, (5) no hasty democratization and (6) other.
Extrinsic Factors
This study examined three extrinsic factors --- degree of political freedom, religion and geopolitical region.
Political Freedom: The level of political freedom in a country
was determined by the Freedom House’s rankings of that nation’s political rights and civil liberties. Countries were categorized as “not free,” “partly free” and “free.”
Religion: Data on religion was obtained from the CIA’s World
Factbook, which contains information of each country’s religious
profile. In countries where multiple religions prevail, the religion
with the highest percentage of believers was chosen to represent that country’s religion. The world religions are classified
into five categories based on Religion on File 1990: Hinduism;
Buddhism or other Asian religions, including Confucianism,
Taoism, Shinto, Jainism, Sikhism; Judaism; Islam and Christianity, including Protestantism, Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox. Due to the limited number of editorials originated from
countries with Hinduism as the dominant religion, this category
was combined with Buddhism to become one category. Editorials originated from countries practicing Judaism were also few,
therefore, this category was grouped together with Christianity.
The reason for this kind of grouping is based on the historical
connection between Buddhism and Hinduism and between
Christianity and Judaism. Even though the number of editorials
originated from atheist countries was low, too, this category was
retained because it doesn’t make sense to group it with any other
categories. In short, the religion variable contains four categories:
“Buddhism and Hinduism,” “Christianity and Judaism,” “Islam” and “atheist.”
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International Communication Research Journal
Geopolitical Region: Countries were grouped into five geopolitical regions by using the World Press Review’s classifications:
Sub-Sahara Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East and North Africa
and the Americas.
Statistical Procedures
The study unit is the editorial. The recording unit is the entire
editorial for the following variables: extrinsic variables, including level of political freedom, religion and geopolitical region;
and framing variables related to whether an editorial assigned
causal responsibility, gave moral judgment, or prescribed treatment remedy. The recording unit is the occurrence or mention of
the references to variables under the categories of causal responsibility such as “political woes,” “economic woes” and “U.S.
complicity”; moral judgment such as “corrupt governments
ultimately failing,” “Egypt as a model for non-violent social
change,” etc.; and treatment responsibility, including “starting
reforms now,” “solving economic problems,” etc.
Two coders (the authors of this manuscript) coded 19 randomly selected articles (10% of all editorials) to test intercoder
reliability on the framing variables. The results yielded 81% of
agreement on causal responsibility assignment, 92% agreement
on moral judgment and 80% agreement on treatment responsibility assignment. The overall agreement for the framing variables is 84%.
Findings
For this study, 190 editorials were found--- 26 (13.7%) from
Africa, 55 (28.9%) from Asia, 34 (17.9%) from Europe, 30 (15.8%)
from the Middle East and North Africa, and 45 (23.7%) from
the Americas. If categorized by Freedom House rankings of the
political freedom of the nations where the editorials originated,
22 (11.6%) were published in countries listed as “not free,” 50
(26.3%) in “partly free” countries, and 118 (62.1%) in “free”
countries. Grouped by religion, the editorials yielded 29 (15.3%)
from “Buddhist and Hindu” countries, 107 (56.3%) from “Christian and Judaic” countries, 44 (23.2%) from “Islamic” countries,
and 10 (5.3%) from “atheist” countries.
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
59
Nation’s
political
freedom
Political/dictatorship
problems
Economic
problems
Failed foreign
policy esp. by U.S.
Other
Total
Not Free
9 (40.9%)
7 (31.8%)
5 (22.7%)
1 (4.5%)
22 (100%)
Partly
Free
25 (44.6%)
18 (32.1%)
12 (21.4%)
1 (1.8%)
56 (100%)
Table 1: How did Editorials from Nations with Different Levels
Free of Political
54 (50.1%)
37 (34.3%)
4 (3.7%)
Freedom Frame
the Cause(s)13of(12%)
the Egyptian
Revolt ?
108 (100%
Nation’s
Political
Freedom
Political/
Dictatorship
Problems
Economic
Problems
Failed
Foreign
Policy esp.
by U.S.
Other
Total
(n = 186)
Not Free
9 (40.9%)
7 (31.8%)
5 (22.7%)
1 (4.5%)
22 (100%)
Partly
Free
25 (44.6%)
18 (32.1%)
12 (21.4%)
1 (1.8%)
56 (100%)
Free
54 (50.1%)
37 (34.3%)
13 (12%)
4 (3.7%)
108 (100%)
Among the 105 (55.3%) editorials that dealt with causal responsibility, there were 186 mentions of the causes in which “political woes inherent with dictatorship” took the lead (n = 88, % =
47.3), followed by “economic woes” (n = 62, % = 33.3) and “U.S.
complicity” (n = 30, % = 16.1). A large number of articles (n =
158, % = 83.2) provided one or more moral judgments. Among
the 293 mentions of moral judgment, 23.5% (n = 69) cautioned
about “watching out for ripple effects in other countries,” 21.8%
(n = 64) asserted that “corrupt or unresponsive governments
ultimately fail,” and 17.4% (n = 51) dealt with “self-reflections.”
Moral judgments on “U.S. or international policy toward Israel
and the Middle East needs adjustment” and on “Egypt as a model of non-violent social change” accounted for 15.4 % (n = 45)
and 11.3% (n = 33) respectively. Almost two-thirds (n = 129, % =
67.9) of the editorials discussed treatment responsibility. Among
the 173 mentions of treatment responsibility, 60.7% (n = 105)
prescribed that “reform must start now or self-government/democracy is the answer.” The treatment remedy of “international
community, especially the U.S., needing to exercise influence
or lend a helping hand” ranked second (n = 23, % = 13.3), and
“solving economic problems” ranked third (n = 20, % = 11.6).
“Let Egyptians decide their future without international interference (n =11, % = 6.4)” trailed behind other treatment remedies.
60
International Communication Research Journal
Table 2: How did Editorials from Nations with Different Levels of Political Freedom Frame the Moral
The frequency results,
broken down by the level of political
Judgments to be Learned? (n = 293)
freedom in each country, showed that most attributed “political
Natio
Watch
for U.S.
Self-reflection:
Other –
Total
woes”Corrupt
as the Egypt
dominant
cause
for foreign
the revolution
(“not free”
is
ripple
policy toward Our nation’s
n’s
gov’ts
40.9%, “partlymodel
free” –effects
44.6%,
“free”
– 50.1%),
followed by “ecoin
Egypt and
politi
response to
nomic
woes”
(“not free”
“partly free”
32.1%,
“free”
will
fail for
other – 31.8%,
Mid-East.
cal
uprising–or
its
– 34.3%).
social
nations
must change
freed
effect on our
change moral judgments, “not
omWhen conveying
nation
free” and “partly
free” countries
“watch out for 2ripple
effects9in
other
Not
7
5 mentioned
11 (27.5%) 6 (15%)
(5%)
(22.5%) 40
countries”
free” – 27.5%, “partly free” – 23.9%) and “cor- (100%)
Free
(17.5%) (“not
(12.5%)
rupt governments ultimately fail” (“not free” – 17.5%, “partly
free” – 31.8%) as the two dominant lessons to be learned, while
Partly
28
88
8 (9%)
21 (23.9%)
11 (12.5%) more
15 on
(17%)
5 (5.7%)
the “free”
countries
(n
= 165) focused
“watching
out for
Free
(31.8%)
(100%)
ripple effects” (22.4%) and “self-reflections” (20.6%).
Free
29
20
37 (22.4%)
28 (17%)
34 (20.6%)
17
165
Table(17.6%)
2: How(12.1%)
did Editorials from Nations with Different
Levels(100%)
(10.3%)
of Political Freedom Frame the Moral Judgments to be
Learned?
Watch for
Ripple
Effects in
Other
Nations
U.S. Foreign
Policy
Toward
Egypt &
Mid-East.
Must Change
SelfReflection:
Our Nation’s
Response to
Uprising or
Its Effect on
Our Nation
Other
Nation’s
Political
Freedom
Corrupt
Gov’ts
Will Fail
Egypt is
Model
for Social
Change
Not Free
7
(17.5%)
5
(12.5%)
11
(27.5%)
6
(15%)
2
(5%)
9
(22.5%)
40
(100%)
Partly
Free
28
(31.8%)
8
(9%)
21
(23.9%)
11
(12.5%)
15
(17%)
5
(5.7%)
88
(100%)
Free
29
(17.6%)
20
(12.1%)
37
(22.4%)
28
(17%)
34
(20.6%)
17
(10.3%)
165
(100%)
Total
(n = 293)
All groups of countries indicated “reform, self-government
or democracy must start now” (“not free” – 33.3%, “partly free”
– 57%, “free” – 66.1%) as the most important remedy for Egypt,
but the emphasis on “reform or democracy” weighed much less
in editorials from “not free” countries. For “not free” countries,
“solving economic problems” (20%) and “no international interference” (20%) and “move slowly to democracy” (20%) were also
regarded as important. Contrary to the emphasis on “no international interference” from “not free” (20%) and “partly free”
(14.3%) countries, “free” countries suggested “international,
especially U.S. involvement” (18.3%) as a treatment remedy.
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
61
government
decide
existing
institutions
Not
Free
5 (33.3%)
3 (20%)
0
3 (20%)
3 (20%)
1 (6.7%)
15 (100%)
Partly
Free
28 (57%)
10 (20.4%)
3 (6.1%)
7 (14.3%)
0
1 (2%)
49 (100%)
Free
72 (66.1%)
7 (6.4%)
20 (18.3%)
1 (0.9%)
6 (5.7%)
3 (2.8%)
109
Table 3:
What did
Editorials
from Nations
with
Different
levels
(100%)
Table 4:of
How
did Editorials
from Suggest
Nations with
Different Religions Frame the
Political
Freedom
as Solutions/Treatments
toCause(s) of the Egypti
Revolt ?the
(n =Crisis?
186)
Swift MovePolitical/dictatorship
Nation’s
Economic
to
International
Nation’s
Problems
problems
religion
Democratic
Help, esp.
Political
Must be
U.S. needed
Freedom
SelfAddressed
Government
Buddhism5
17 (43.6%)
3
(33.3%)
(20%)
&
Not Free
Partly
Free
Free
0
No
Economic
International
Interference.
problems
Let
Egyptians
Decide
12 (31.9%)
3
28
(57%)
10
(20.4%)
3
(6.1%)
(20%)
7
(14.3%)
72
(66.1%)
7
(6.4%)
20
(18.3%)
1
(0.9%)
Hinduism
Christianity 50 (51%)
Grouped
&
Judaism by religion,
Move Slowly
Failed
to
Democracy.
policy
Build on
U.S.
Existing
Institutions
foreign
esp.
by
Other
83 (20.5%) 1
(20%)
(6.7%)
1
0
(2%)
15 2
(100%)
49
(100%)
6
(5.7%)
3
(2.8%)
109
(100%)
34 (34.7%)
Other
(n = 173)
12 (12.2%)
(5.1%)
2 (2%)
the editorials did not exhibit differences
in their emphasis on causal responsibility. All regarded “political
woes inherent with dictatorship” as the main cause (“Buddhism
and
Hinduism”
– 43.6%, “Christianity
and Judaism”
– 51%, “Is- 2 (4.7%)
Islam
18 (41.9%)
13 (30.2%)
10 (23.3%)
lam” – 41.9%) and “economic woes” as the second cause (“Buddhism and Hinduism” – 31.9%, “Christianity and Judaism” –
34.7%, “Islam” – 30.2%).
Atheist
3 (50%)
3 (50%)
0
0
Table 4: How did Editorials from Nations with Different Religions Frame the Cause(s) of the Egyptian Revolt ?
Political/
Dictatorship
Problems
Economic
Problems
Failed
Foreign
Policy esp.
by U.S.
Other
17
(43.6%)
12
(31.9%)
8
(20.5%)
2
(5.1%)
39
(100%)
50
(51%)
34
(34.7%)
12
(12.2%)
2
(2%)
98
(100%)
Islam
18
(41.9%)
13
(30.2%)
10
(23.3%)
2
(4.7%)
43
(100%)
Atheist
3
(50%)
3
(50%)
0
0
6
(100%)
Nation’s
Religion
Buddhism
& Hinduism
Christianity &
Judaism
62
Total
Total
Total
(n = 186)
International Communication Research Journal
39 (100%
98 (100%
43 (100%
6 (100%)
Nation’s
religion
Corrupt
gov’ts
will fail
Buddhis
m&
10
(20.8%)
Egypt is
model
for social
change
Watch for
ripple effects
in other
nations
U.S. foreign
policy
toward
Egypt and
Mid-East.
must
change
Self-reflection:
Our nation’s
response to
uprising or its
effect on our
nation
Other
Total
6 (12.5%)
14 (29.2%)
8 (16.7%)
4 (8.3%)
6 (12.5%)
48 (100%)
Hinduis
m
In the area of moral judgment, editorials originated from
“Buddhist and Hindu” countries and “Islamic” countries focused on either “watch out for ripple effects” (“Buddhism and
Christiani 32
16
32 (20.4%)
26 (16.7%)
37 (23.5%)
14 (8.9%) 157 (100%)
Hinduism”
– 29.2%,
“Islam”
– 24.1%)
or “corrupt
governments
ty &
(20.4%)
(10.2%)
ultimately fail” (“Buddhism and Hinduism” – 20.8%, “Islam” –
Judaism
25.3%). Editorials from “Christian and Judaic” countries placed
slightly more emphasis on “self-reflections” (23.5%) than on
Islam
20
11
19 (24.1%)
10 (12.7%)
(11.4%)
10
79 (100%)
“watch out
for ripple
effects”
(20.4%)
and 9“corrupt
governments
(25.3%)
(13.9%)
(12.7%)
ultimately fail” (20.4%).
Atheist
2 (22.2%)
0
4 (44.4%)
1 (11.1%)
1 (11.1%)
1 (11.1%)
Table 5: How did Editorials from Nations with Different Religions Frame the Moral Judgments to be Learned?
Watch
for
Ripple
Effects in
Other
Nations
U.S. Foreign
Policy
Toward
Egypt &
Mid-East.
Must Change
SelfReflection:
Our Nation’s
Response to
Uprising or
Its Effect on
Our Nation
Other
9 (100%)
Nation’s
Religion
Corrupt
Gov’ts
Will Fail
Egypt is
Model
for Social
Change
Buddhism
& Hinduism
10
(20.8%)
6
(12.5%)
14
(29.2%)
8
(16.7%)
4
(8.3%)
6
(12.5%)
48
(100%)
Christianity
& Judaism
32
(20.4%)
16
(10.2%)
32
(20.4%)
26
(16.7%)
37
(23.5%)
14
(8.9%)
157
(100%)
Islam
20
(25.3%)
11
(13.9%)
19
(24.1%)
10
(12.7%)
9
(11.4%)
10
(12.7%)
79
(100%)
Atheist
2
(22.2%)
0
4
(44.4%)
1
(11.1%)
1
(11.1%)
1
(11.1%)
9
(100%)
Total
(n = 293)
While all three groups of editorials regarded “swift political reform, self-government or democracy” (“Buddhism and
Hinduism” – 59.3%, “Christianity and Judaism” – 66%, “Islam” –
51.4%) as the most important treatment remedy for the Egyptian
crisis, they had different ideas about the second remedy. “Buddhist and Hindu” countries emphasized “addressing economic
problems” (18.5%). “Christian and Judaic” countries valued
“providing international help, especially help from the United
States” (18.4%). “Islamic” countries, however, chose “no international interference and let Egyptians decide” (20%).
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
63
Hinduism
Christianity
& Judaism
68 (66%)
7 (6.8%)
19 (18.4%)
1 (0.9%)
6 (5.8%)
2
(1.9%)
103
(100%)
Islam
18 (51.4%)
6 (17.1%)
1 (2.9%)
7 (20%)
1 (2.9%)
2
(5.7%)
35
(100%)
Atheist
3 (37.5%)
2 (25%)
0
1 (12.5%)
2 (25%)
0
8 (100%)
Table 6: What did Editorials from Nations with Different Religion Suggest as Solutions/Treatments to the Crisis?
Nation’s
Religion
Swift Move
to
Democratic
SelfGovernment
Economic
Problems
Must be
Addressed
International
Help, esp.
U.S. needed
No
International
Interference.
Let
Egyptians
Decide
Move Slowly
to
Democracy.
Build on
Existing
Institutions
Other
Total
(n = 173)
Buddhism
& Hinduism
16
(59.3%)
5
(18.5%)
3
(11.1%)
2
(7.4%)
0
1
(3.7%)
27
(100%)
Christianity
& Judaism
68
(66%)
7
(6.8%)
19
(18.4%)
1
(0.9%)
6
(5.8%)
2
(1.9%)
103
(100%)
Islam
18
(51.4%)
6
(17.1%)
1
(2.9%)
7
(20%)
1
(2.9%)
2
(5.7%)
35
(100%)
Atheist
3
(37.5%)
2
(25%)
0
1
(12.5%)
2
(25%)
0
8
(100%)
The frequency results, broken down into geopolitical regions,
showed that editorials from all regions except the Middle East
and North Africa attributed most of the causal responsibility to
“political woes inherent with dictatorship” (“Africa” – 46.4%,
“Asia” – 46.2%, “Europe” – 48.4%, “Americas” – 57.1%) and then
to “economic woes” (“Africa” – 32.1%, “Asia” – 29.2%, “Europe” – 32,3%, “Americas” – 37.1%). Editorials from the Middle
East and North Africa had slightly more mentions of “economic
woes” (40.7%) than “political woes” (37%). Compared with the
rest of the regions, editorials from the “Americas” had the fewest mentions of “failed U.S. foreign policy” as one of the causes
(“Africa” – 21.4%, “Asia” – 20%, “Europe” – 12.9%, “Middle East
and North Africa” – 18.5%, “Americas” – 5.7%).
The editorials from different geopolitical regions did frame
moral responsibility differently. For “Africa,” “corrupt governments” (34.1%) and “self-reflections” (29.3%) topped the chart.
For “Asia,” the “Middle East and North Africa,” “ripple effects”
had the most mentions (“Asia” – 28.7%, “Middle East and North
Africa” – 23.9%), followed by “corrupt governments” (“Asia” –
22.3%, “Middle East and North Africa” – 21.7%). “Europe” also
put the most emphasis on “ripple effects” (28.3%), but “U.S. or
international policy toward the Middle East needs readjustment”
(19.6%) ranked second. The “Americas” contained 33.3% dealing
with “self-reflections” and 18.2% with “ripple effects.”
64
International Communication Research Journal
Europe
15 (48.4%)
10
(32.3%)
4 (12.9%)
2 (6.5%)
31 (100%)
Mid-East
10 (37%)
11
(40.7%)
5 (18.5%)
1 (3.7%)
27 (100%)
Americas
20 (57.1%)
13
2 (5.7%)
0
35 (100%)
Table 8: How did Editorials from Geopolitical Regions Frame Moral Judgments to be Learned from
(37.1%)
the Egyptian
Revolt?
= 293)
Table
7: How
did(n Editorials
from Geopolitical Regions Frame the
Regio
n
Cause(s)
Egyptian
Corrupt
Egyptof
is the
Watch
U.S. Revolt?
foreign
Self-reflection:
model for for ripple policy toward
gov’ts
Our nation’s
social
effects in
Egypt and
response to
will fail
change
other
Mid-East.
uprising or its
Failedeffect on our
must change
Political/ nations
Economic
Foreign
nation
Region
Africa
14
(34.1%)
Dictatorship
Other
Problems
Policy esp.
Problems
1 (2.4%)
6 (14.6%)
3 (7.3%) by U.S.
12 (29.3%)
5
13
(46.4%)
21
Asia (22.3%)
12
30
(12.8%)
(46.2%)
15
(48.4%)
Europe
Europ 8 (17.4%)
e Mid-East
6 (13%)
Mid10
Americas
East
(21.7%)
7 (15.2%)
20
Ameri
cas
7 (10.6%)
11
(16.7%)
Total
Total
(n = 186)
(12.2%)
Africa
Asia
Other
10
(37%)
9
(32.1%)
27
(28.7%)
6
(21.4%)
15 (16%)
41
(100%)
28
(100%)
0
10 (10.6%)
9
94
19
(29.2%)
13
(20%)
10
(32.3%)
4
(12.9%)
2
(6.5%)
11
(40.7%)
5
(18.5%)
1 (10.8%) 27(100%)
(3.7%)
(100%)
13
(28.3%)
9 (19.6%)
3
65
(9.6%)
(100%)
(4.6%)
(100%)
5 (10.8%)
11
13 7 (15.2%)
2 2 (4.3%)
(57.1%) (23.9%)
(37.1%)
(5.7%)
12
(18.2%)
11 (16.7%)
0
22 (33.3%)
5
31
(100%)
46
9
3546
(19.6%)
(100%)
(100%)
3
(4.5%)
66
(100%)
Table 8: How did Editorials from Geopolitical Regions Frame
Moral Judgments to be Learned from the Egyptian
Revolt?
Corrupt
Gov’ts
Will Fail
Egypt is
Model
for Social
Change
Watch
for
Ripple
Effects in
Other
Nations
U.S.
Foreign
Policy
Toward
Egypt &
Mid-East
Must
Change
SelfReflection:
Our Nation’s
Response to
Uprising or
Its Effect on
Our Nation
Other
14
(34.1%)
21
(22.3%)
1
(2.4%)
12
(12.8%)
6
(14.6%)
27
(28.7%)
3
(7.3%)
15
(16%)
12
(29.3%)
10
(10.6%)
5
(12.2%)
9
(9.6%)
41
(100%)
94
(100%)
Europe
8
(17.4%)
6
(13%)
13
(28.3%)
9
(19.6%)
5
(10.8%)
5
(10.8%)
46
(100%)
Mid-East
10
(21.7%)
7
(15.2%)
11
(23.9%)
7
(15.2%)
2
(4.3%)
9
(19.6%)
46
(100%)
Americas
11
(16.7%)
7
(10.6%)
12
(18.2%)
11
(16.7%)
22
(33.3%)
3
(4.5%)
66
(100%)
Region
Africa
Asia
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
Total
(n = 293)
65
Table 9: What did Editorials from Geopolitical Regions Suggest as Solutions/Treatments to the Crisis? (n = 173)
Region
Swift
moves to
democra
tic selfgovernment
Economic
problems
must be
addressed
33
4 (7.7%)
Internation
al help,
esp. from
U.S. is
needed
No
internationa
l
interference
. Let
Egyptians
decide
Move slowly
to
democracy.
Build on
existing
institutions
Other
9 (17.3%)
1 (1.9%)
3 (5.8%)
2
Total
While all geopolitical regions put “political reform, selfgovernment or democracy” as the priority for treatment responAfrica
11 (“Africa”
2 (13.3%)– 73.3%,
0
2 (13.3%)
0
0
15
sibility
“Asia”
– 62.2%,
“Europe”
– 67.6%,
the
(73.3%)
(100%)
“Americas” – 63.5%), “Middle East and North Africa” contained
the lowest
percentage
(37%). The
second
most important
treatAsia
28
7 (15.5%)
4 (8.9%)
3 (6.7%)
2 (4.4%)
1
45
ment(62.2%)
for “Africa,” “Asia,” the “Middle East and(2.2%)
North(100%)
Africa”
went to “addressing economic problems,” even though the
percentages were not high (“Africa” – 13.3%, “Asia” – 15.5%,
Europ
23
1 (2.9%)
9 (26.5%)
0
1 (3.1%)
0
34
and the
e “Middle
(67.6%)East and North Africa” – 22.2%). For “Europe”
(100%)
“Americas,” their editorials emphasized “international help,
especially
the United
second2most 27important
Mid10 (37%) from
6 (22.2%)
1 (3.7%) States”
5 (18.5%)as the
3 (11.1%)
East
(7.4%)
(100%)
treatment remedy (“Europe” – 26.5%, “Americas”
– 17.3%).
Ameri
cas
52
(3.8%)
(100%)
Table(63.5%)
9: What did Editorials from Geopolitical Regions
Suggest
as Solutions/Treatments to the Crisis?
Swift Move
to
Democratic
SelfGovernment
Economic
Problems
Must be
Addressed
International
Help, esp.
U.S. needed
No
International
Interference.
Let
Egyptians
Decide
Move Slowly
to
Democracy.
Build on
Existing
Institutions
Other
Total
(n = 173)
Africa
11
(73.3%)
2
(13.3%)
0
2
(13.3%)
0
0
15
(100%)
Asia
28
(62.2%)
7
(15.5%)
4
(8.9%)
3
(6.7%)
2
(4.4%)
1
(2.2%)
45
(100%)
Europe
23
(67.6%)
1
(2.9%)
9
(26.5%)
0
1
(3.1%)
0
34
(100%)
Mid-East
10
(37%)
6
(22.2%)
1
(3.7%)
5
(18.5%)
3
(11.1%)
2
(7.4%)
27
(100%)
Americas
33
(63.5%)
4
(7.7%)
9
(17.3%)
1
(1.9%)
3
(5.8%)
2
(3.8%)
52
(100%)
Region
Discussion
The 190 world editorials selected for this study framed the
Egyptian uprising as mainly caused by “domestic political woes
inherent with the dictatorship” of Mubarak’s 30-year rule. These
editorials argued that the imposition of emergency law, lack of
freedom, abuse by police and security forces, rigged elections
and possible succession of Mubarak’s son all contributed to the
uprising in Egypt. These editorials also attributed the causal
66
International Communication Research Journal
responsibility to “domestic economic woes” for a large percentage of the Egyptian population who earned less than $2 a day
and for the youth who had education but could not find employment. The failed economic policy that only benefited the rich and
enlarged the gap between the rich and the poor was also blamed.
Most of the editorials provided readers with a moral judgment about lessons learned from Egypt. Among the variables
under moral judgment, “ripple effects” was prominent -- revolution in Egypt could spread to other nations. The contagious
nature of Egyptians’ demand for political and economic reforms,
triggered by the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia, led world editorial writers to caution against possible uprisings in other countries
with autocrats, especially countries in the Middle East. Likewise,
“corrupt governments ultimately fail and/or reform must start
now” was also a moral lesson. Mubarak’s fall as Egypt’s last
pharaoh served to remind the world that unresponsive governments that ignored the people’s desire for a better political and
economic system will fail. His resignation also prompted the
world editorials to moralize on the importance of swift democratic reform in Egypt to respond to the newly restive, newly
empowered young generation that yearned not just for food but
for basic human rights, respect and dignity. Moreover, the Egyptian uprising provided room for countries around the world
to “reflect upon how their governments had responded to the
uprising and what impact the uprising had on their countries.”
About two-thirds of the world editorials also dealt with
treatment responsibility -- what can be done to solve the crisis
in Egypt. They overwhelmingly recognized the importance of
“starting the reform now” to establish a democratic political
system that can represent the will of all Egyptians, and they also
urged the new government or expressed confidence in the new
government to assure a peaceful transition to democracy.
Differences Related to Political Freedom
The degree of political freedom, an extrinsic factor, did not
affect how the editorials framed causal responsibility of the
Egyptian uprising. All groups of extrinsic factor countries mentioned “political woes” as the dominant cause and “economic
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
67
woes” as the second cause. In assigning treatment responsibility, most editorials regarded immediate “political reforms” as
the most important remedy for the future of Egypt. Even so, the
percentage of this category among “not free” countries is much
lower than “partly free” and “free” countries.
This factor, however, had an impact on how these editorials
framed the moral judgments – lessons to be learned from the
Egyptian revolution. Editorials from “not free” and “free” countries tend to warn against the “ripple effects” triggered by Egypt,
while “partly free” countries stressed the lesson about “corrupt
governments ultimately fail.” The reason for “free” countries,
mostly represented by the West, to opt for “ripple effects” was
probably because they had more of a global strategic view of
the events that unfolded in Egypt, and this view led them to
express conservative optimism about the prospect of democracy
spreading in the Middle East. The “not free” countries, mostly
represented by authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and
North Africa, felt the repercussions of Egyptian uprising closely
enough to become introspective in their opinions. The “partly
free” countries, having a limited level of freedom to criticize
their governments, felt compelled to use this historical moment
to warn their governments of the consequences of not heeding to
people’s desire for more freedom.
Differences Related to Religion
Religion, another extrinsic factor, did not affect how the editorials framed the causal responsibility. They all attributed it first
to “political woes” inherent with Mubarak’s dictatorship and
second to “economic woes” experienced by the Egyptians under
the corrupt Mubarak regime. These editorials also prescribed
“swift move to reform or democracy” as the dominant treatment
remedy for the future of Egypt.
The religion factor affected slightly how the editorials framed
the moral judgments. For countries of “Buddhist and Hindu”
and “Islamic” religions, the moral lessons were found in “watching out for ripple effects” and “corrupt governments ultimately
failing.” While “Christian” and “Judaic” countries also emphasized “corrupt governments ultimately failing,” they put more
68
International Communication Research Journal
emphasis on “self-reflections” of those countries’ responses
to the uprising or the uprising’s effect on those countries. The
reason of this difference may be because the editorials from
“Christian and Judaic” countries were largely represented by
the United States and the Britain in the Western block, and their
responses to the uprising were deemed influential in the Middle
East.
Differences Related to Geopolitical Regions
Geopolitical regions, the third extrinsic factor, slightly affected how the editorials framed the causal responsibility. All
regions, except the “Middle East and North Africa,” attributed
“political woes inherent with dictatorship” as the dominant
cause for the uprising and “economic woes” as the second cause.
Editorials from the “Middle East and North Africa” had slightly
more mentions of “economic woes” than “political woes.” This
result may be explained by the fact that most countries in this
region have authoritarian regimes that would want to divert
the world’s attention from politics that directly challenged their
legitimacy with economic problems. The same kind of mentality
was reflected in the regions’ framing of the treatment responsibility. While all regions framed “swift moves to democratic
reform” as the most important treatment remedy, the “Middle
East and North Africa” lagged behind with their percentage.
The geopolitical regions variable also affected the editorials’ framing of moral judgments. Those from “Asia,” “Europe”
and the “Middle East and North Africa” emphasized “watching out for ripple effects” as the dominant moral lesson while
also recognizing the lesson of “corrupt governments ultimately
fail.” For “Africa,” “corrupt governments ultimately fail” ranked
first and “self-reflections of the uprising’s effects on the nation”
ranked second. Many African nations have long been entangled
in government corruption, so they used Egypt’s revolution to
reflect upon their own struggles and warn against their ruling
class about the consequences of not heeding people’s needs and
aspirations. For the “Americas,” which was largely represented
by editorials published in U.S. newspapers, “self-reflections on
the country’s response to the uprising” was the most important
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
69
moral lesson to be learned. The influence of the United States in
global politics was again demonstrated in these editorials’ framing of moral responsibility.
Conclusion
Overall, most world editorials framed the Egyptian uprising
in this way: It was mainly caused by the political woes inherent
with Mubarak’s dictatorship; it served as a moral lesson in that
the uprising could trigger political, social or economic repercussion in other countries, especially countries with dictators; and
Egypt’s future could be secured by the new government starting
democratic reforms immediately.
The three extrinsic factors examined in this study affected in
various degrees how the editorials framed the Egyptian uprising, especially in moral judgment -- the lessons to be learned
from the events in Egypt. The editorials from “partly free”
countries deviated from those from “free” and “not free” countries by framing the moral lesson mainly as “corrupt governments ultimately fail.” The dominant moral lessons for editorials
from “Buddhist and Hindu” countries and “Islamic” countries
focused on “watching out for ripple effects” and “corrupt governments ultimately fail.” The lessons for “Christian and Judaic”
countries were “corrupt governments ultimately fail” and “selfreflections.” Editorials from “Africa” and “Americas” deviated
from the other geopolitical regions by stressing the importance
of “corrupt governments ultimately fail” and “self-reflections on
the country’s response to the uprising,” respectively.
This study captures world opinion during a key event in the
Arab Spring -- the successful revolution in Egypt -- as expressed
in English-language newspaper editorials. This study, however, is limited in several aspects. First, many countries are not
represented in this study because they do not publish English
newspapers or their English newspapers are not available in
databases or available online. Second, while editorials in English
newspapers in non-English-speaking countries can mirror elite
opinions, they may not be a good representation of the overall public opinion. Third, the sample for the study is skewed
toward English-speaking countries such as the United States,
70
International Communication Research Journal
Canada, Britain, Ireland and South Africa because of the availability of English newspapers in those countries. Future studies
should look into Egypt’s continuing struggles to find its footing in the post-Mubarak years and world opinion during other
important moments such as the revolutions in Tunisia, Libya
and Syria to see if and how world opinion changes, especially
when the events are not always as positive or bloodless. Studies
of non-English papers, too, would give a fuller analysis of world
opinion. From a methodological standpoint, combining framing analysis in political communication with factors influencing
international news coverage has proved useful in answering not
only what the world opinion was but also why it was that way.
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Book Review
Kamber, Michael. Photojournalists on War: The Untold Stories from Iraq. (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 2013).
Riveting, often horrific, photographs and brutally frank personal stories combine here to expose the hellishness of war as experienced by a remarkable corps of photojournalists working in
Iraq. Readers will be struck by how dramatically the destructive
reality of war presented in this book differs from the sanitized,
virtually bloodless, version of the fighting -- no photographs of
dead or wounded soldiers -- that they read in their news media.
This difference is arguably the book’s central message. The
photojournalists blame their editors back home for much of the
censorship that prevented Americans from fully understanding
the gruesome reality of the vicious fighting: “Yes, there is censorship within the military, but more disturbing than that is the
censorship that comes from what is supposedly a free press.”
The book is organized around 39 in-depth interviews that
author Michael Kamber conducted with his conflict photography peers representing the New York Times, Agence France-Presse,
and other leading print news organizations. These previously
unpublished images showcase the war as experienced by soldiers and civilians. Intentionally, none of the photographs show
politicians or generals. More than 150 large, color photographs
printed on high-quality paper vividly testify that talented photojournalists have “a lightning-fast and deeply sensitive ability
to perceive the human predicament in a single moment and
capture it forever.”
Warning: Readers may be emotionally jolted by some of the
haunting photographs -- dozens of bodies lined up after being
recovered from mass graves; the severed head of a female suicide bomber; the reflections of children in a puddle of blood; and
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
75
an Iraqi woman, whose leg was amputated after an American
airstrike killed her unborn child and her sister.
With searing honesty, these photojournalists admit their fears,
“We’re dead. We’re going to die.” They discuss how unbearable
stresses sometimes escalated their drug and alcohol problems,
and they recount how their marriages imploded and they lost
touch with their children. These photojournalists explain why
they were sometimes so overwhelmed by the human tragedy
that their hands literally trembled when they tried to take photographs. Stunningly, one photojournalist reports how he instinctively picked up his camera and continued to snap pictures even
after he stepped on a land mine that blew off his legs.
A number of the visual images taken by the seven female
photojournalists powerfully present the devastating impact of
war on women and children. Readers will inevitably wonder if
male photojournalists could have, or would have, captured these
moments. One female photographer featured Halla, an Iraqi
woman, who turned to prostitution after her husband was shot
and killed: “My life sucks, and I shouldn’t have to sleep with
men to feed my children (ages two and four), so you can take
pictures and show everyone exactly what is going on.” One photograph reveals Halla being gently kissed by her older son while
the younger boy drinks milk from his bottle. Two others show
Halla entertaining a customer.
Back in the United States, another female photojournalist captured what should have been a joyous wedding day. The beautiful bride wears a white gown and holds a bouquet of roses, but
the reader’s eyes will inevitably focus on her Marine husband,
whose face was horribly disfigured after he was the victim of a
suicide bomb explosion. The husband and wife do not smile, do
not touch, and do not look at each other. Shortly after their wedding, the couple divorced.
This is not a scholarly book. Kamber does not advance communication theory. He offers no hypotheses to be tested and
presents no statistics, no index and no bibliography. In an age of
too many superficial journalists senselessly chasing infotainment
trivia, Kamber’s work does, however, remind professors and
their students that many exceptionally devoted journalists still
risk their lives to give the public the news a democracy requires.
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International Communication Research Journal
Kamber masterfully integrates the photographs and written
words, but presenting the interviews alphabetically as standalone pieces has its downside. Readers would benefit from more
context, especially a section that organizes the revealing insights
of the individual photographers into topical frameworks on such
concerns as embedding and the changes in news coverage that
occurred as the war progressed and financially imperiled print
media could no longer sustain the costs. Nevertheless, this excellent, much-needed work can enrich a broad range of courses,
especially visual communication and international communication.
With an eye to future war coverage, readers will want to
ponder the final sentence of the thought-provoking foreword
written by Dexter Filkins: “Photojournalism is today an embattled profession. When you read the testimonials here and peruse
these stunning photographs, you may find yourself wondering
whether the war in Iraq, for the men and women with cameras,
was the last of its kind.”
Kirk Stone, Associate Professor
College of Charleston
Vol. 49, No. 1-2 (Spring 2014)
77
Recent Publications
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Botma, G. (2013). Cultural Capital and Change: Afrikaans Arts
Journalism and the Democratic Transformation of South Africa. Ecquid Novi – African Journalism Studies, 34 (2), pp. 15 – 34.
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78
International Communication Research Journal
Nassanga, G.L., Manyozo, L. & Lopes, C. (2013). ICTs and Radio
in Africa: How the Uptake of ICT Has Influenced the Newsroom Culture among Community Radio Journalists. Telematics
and Informatics, 30 (3), pp. 258 – 266.
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Media Journal, 7 (2), pp. 201 – 225.
Roux, T., van der Waldt, D.L.R. & Ehlers, L. (2013). A Classification Framework for Out-of-Home Advertising Media in South
Africa. Communicatio: South African Journal for Communication
Theory & Research, 39 (3), pp. 383 – 401.
Schoonees, A., Young, T. & Volmink, J. (2013). The Advertising
of Nutritional Supplements in South African Women’s Magazines: A Descriptive Surveys. South African Journal of Clinical
Nutrition, 26 (2), pp. 12 – 8.
Asia
Abbott, J. (2013). Introduction: Assessing the Social and Political
Impact of the Internet and New Social Media in Asia. Journal
of Contemporary Asia, 43 (4), pp. 579 – 590.
Abdul Latif, R., Wan Mahmud, W. & Salman, A. (2013). A Broadcasting History of Malaysia: Progress and Shifts. Asian Social
Science, 9 (6), pp. 50 – 57.
Bo, L. (2013). The Manipulation of Images of Women in Translation in Early Twentieth Century Hong Kong Chinese Newspaper. Media History, 19 (3), pp. 270 – 283.
Cui, G., Liu, H.Y., Yang, X.Y. & Wang, H.Z. (2013). Culture,
Cognitive Style and Consumer Response to Informational vs.
Transformational Advertising among East Asians: Evidence
from the PRC. Asia Pacific Business Review, 19 (1), pp. 16 – 31.
Kaynak, E., Kara, A. & Chow, C. (2013). Time Orientation and
Attitudes toward Advertising in a High-Context Culture: An
Empirical Study of Macau. Journal of Asia-Pacific Business, 14
(2), pp. 88 – 106.
Khairiah, A.R. (2013). Life Imitating Art: Asian Romance Movies
as a Social Mirror. Pacific Journalism Review, 19 (2), pp. 107 –
121.
Liu, C.L., Lee, P.C. & Mangan, J.A. (2013). Guangzhou 2010:
Eastern Orwellian Echoes – Yang Shu-chun and a Taiwanese
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Patriotic Media Offensive. International Journal of the History of
Sport, 30 (10), pp. 1099 – 1112.
Matsue, J.M. (2013). Stars to the State and Beyond: Globalization,
Identity and Asian Popular Music. Journal of Asian Studies, 72
(1), pp. 5 – 20.
Mustafa, Z., Nasreen, R. & Shah, F. (2013). Children’s Understanding of TV Advertising: A Study of the Children in Delhi
and NCR. International Journal of Research in Commerce and
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Notley, T., Salazar, J.F. & Crosby, A. (2013). Online Video
Translation and Subtitling: Examining Emerging Practices
and Their Implications for Media Activism in South East Asia.
Global Media Journal: Australian, 7 (1), pp. 1 – 15.
Chin, S.J. (2013). The Historical Origins of the Nationalization of
the Newspaper Industry in Modern China: A Case Study of
the Shanghai Newspaper Industry, 1937-1953. China Review,
13 (2), pp. 1 – 34.
Martin, F., Lewis, T. & Sinclair, J. (2013). Lifestyle Media and
Social Transformation in Asia. Media International Australia,
147, pp. 51 – 61.
Singleton, C. (2013). Youth, Society and Mobile Media in Asia.
Information Communication & Society, 16 (10), pp. 1692 – 1693.
Europe
Aalberg, T., Blekesaune, A. & Elvestad, E. (2013). Media Choice
and Informed Democracy: Toward Increasing News Consumption Gaps in Europe? International Journal of Press/Politics,
18 (3), 281 – 303.
Baldini, G. (2013). The Evolution of Cognitive Radio Technology
in Europe: Regulatory and Standardization Aspects. Telecommunications Policy, 37 (2-3), pp. 96 – 107.
Berghoff, H. (2013). Blending Personal and Managerial Capitalism: Bertelsmann’s Rise from Medium-Sized Publisher to
Global Media Corporation and Service Provider, 1950-2010.
Business History, 55 (5-6), pp. 855 – 874.
Burri, M. (2013). Public Service Media and Policy in Europe.
Common Market Law Review, 50 (2), pp. 667 – 669.
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Coulter, C. (2013). Bringing the Citizens Closer to Europe: A Mission for the Media? ERA Forum, 13 (4), pp. 539 – 543.
Dogruel, L. & Joeckel, S. (2013). Video Game Rating Systems in
the US and Europe: Comparing Their Outcomes. International
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Golding, P. & Splichal, S. (2013). New Media, New Research
Challenges: An Introduction. Javnost-The Public, 20 (2), pp.
5–10.
Langley, T., Lewis, S., McNeil, A., Gilmore, A., Szatkowski, L,
West, R. et al. (2013). Characterizing Tobacco Control Mass
Media Campaigns in England. Addiction, 108 (11), pp. 2001–09.
Markelin, L. & Husband, C. (2013). Contemporary Dynamics of
Sámi Media in the Nordic States. Media International Australia,
149, pp. 70 – 81.
Mercille, J. (2013). European Media Coverage of Argentina’s
Debt Default and Recovery: Distorting the Lessons for Europe. Third World Quarterly, 34 (8), pp. 1377 – 1391.
Örnebring, H. (2013). Journalism as Institution and Work in Europe, Circa 1860. Media History, 19 (4), pp. 393 – 407.
Rantanen, T. (2013). A Critique of the Systems Approaches in
Comparative Media Research: A Central and Eastern European Perspective. Global Media & Communication, 9 (3), pp.
257–277.
Rasmussen, T. (2013). Internet-based Media, Europe and the
Political Public Sphere. Media, Culture & Society, 35 (1), pp.
97–104.
Síthigh, D.M. (2013). Death of a Convention: Competition
between the Council of Europe and European Union in the
Regulation of Broadcasting. Journal of Media Law, 5 (1), pp.
133 – 155.
Touri, M. & Rogers, S.L. (2013). Europe’s Communication Deficit
and the UK Press: Framing the Greek Financial Crisis. Journal
of Contemporary European Studies, 21 (2), pp. 175 – 189.
Van Dalen,A. & Van Aelst, P. (2013). The Media as Political
Agenda-Setters: Journalists’ Perceptions of Media Power in
Eight West European Countries. West European Politics, 37 (1),
pp. 42 – 64.
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Latin America
Arcila, C., Piñuel, J.L. & Calderín, M. (2013). The E-Research on
Media & Communications: Attitudes, Tolls and Practices in
Latin America Researchers. Comunicar, 20 (40), pp. 111 – 118.
Calvo, E. & Ponce, A.F. (2013). Meet the Producer: Exchange
Rate Shocks, Media Salience and the Legislative Importance of
Economic Sectors in Argentina. Studies in Comparative International Development, 48 (4), pp. 337 – 355.
De Albuquerque, A. (2013). Media/Politics Connections: Beyond Political Parallelism. Media Culture & Society, 35 (6), pp.
742–758.
De Albuquerque, A. (2013). Media and Politics in Latin America:
Globalization, Democracy and Identity. Journalism, 14 (4), pp.
564 – 566.
Do Nascimento Cunha, M. (2013). Opportunities and Limits for
Journalism and Citizenship Today. Media Development, 1, pp.
11 – 15.
Garcia-Ruano, K.J., Pacheco, A. & Suazo, D. (2013). The Use of
Digital Media for Social Mobilization in Marginalized Communities: The Case of a Mayan Socioenvironmental Movement in Guatemala. International Journal of Communication,
pp.1878 – 1882.
Hafner-Burton, E. & Ron, J. (2013). The Latin Bias: Regions, the
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Lopez-Preciado, L. (2013). Account Planning in the Mexican
Advertising Industry: A Snapshot of a Discipline in Growth.
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Lugo-Ocando, J., Guedes, O. & Canizalez, A. (2013). Framing
Revolution and Re-Framing Counter-Revolution, Journalism
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Puente, S., Pellegrini, S. & Grassau, D. (2013). How to Measure
Professional Journalistic Standards in Television News Coverage of Disaster? 27-F Earthquake in Chile. International Journal
of Communication, pp. 1896 – 1912.
Stein, E.A. (2013). The Unraveling of Support for Authoritarianism: The Dynamic Relationship of Media, Elites and Public
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Opinion in Brazil, 1972–82. International Journal of Press/Politics, 18 (1), pp. 85 – 107.
Ure, M. & Parselis, M. (2013). Argentine Media and Journalists
Enhancing and Polluting of Communication on Twitter. International Journal of Communication, pp. 1784 – 1793.
Waisbord, S. (2013). Democracy, Journalism and Latin America
Populism. Journalism, 14 (4), pp. 504 – 521.
Waisbord, S. (2013). Media Policies and the Blindspots of Media
Globalization: Insights from Latin America. Media, Culture &
Society, 35 (1), pp. 132 – 138.
Middle East
Anderson, J.W. (2013). Is Informationalization Good for the
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and Battling Stereotypes of Terror and Wars: Media Strategies
for Attracting Tourism to Middle Eastern Countries. American
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in the Middle East. Journal of International Communication, 19
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DeVriese, L. (2013). Paradox of Globalization: New Arab Publics? New Social Contract? Perspectives on Global Development &
Technology, 12 (1/2), pp. 114 – 134.
Dìrìöz, A.O. (2013). Twitter & The Middle East. Middle Eastern
Analysis / Ortadogu Analiz, 5 (59), pp. 67 – 75.
Duffy, M.J. (2013). ‘Cultures of Journalism’ in Arabic- and English-language Newspapers within the United Arab Emirates.
Journal of Middle East Media, 9 (1), pp. 24 – 45.
Eltantawy, N. (2013). From Veiling to Blogging: Women and
Media in the Middle East. Feminist Media Studies, 13 (5), pp.
765 – 769.
Gurcan, M. (2013). Theory or Attitude? A Comparative Analysis
of Turkish Newspaper Articles on Turkish Foreign Policy,
June 2008–June 2011. Turkish Studies, 14 (2), pp. 346 – 371.
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Ibroscheva, E. (2013). The First Ladies and the Arab Spring: A
Textual Analysis of the Media Coverage of the Female Counterparts of Authoritarian Oppression in the Middle East.
Feminist Media Studies, 13 (5), pp. 571 – 880.
Iskandar, A. (2013). Teaching the Arab Uprisings: Between Media Maelstrom and Pedantic Pedagogy. PS: Political Science &
Politics, 46 (2), pp. 244 – 247.
Kraidy, M. (2013). Contention and Circulation in the Digital
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14 (4), pp. 271 – 285.
Ramazani, V. (2013). War Fatigue? Selective Compassion and
Questionable Ethics in Mainstream Reporting on Afghanistan
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Vaughan, J.R. (2013). ‘Keep Left for Israel’: Tribune, Zionism and
the Middle East, 1937–1967. Contemporary British History, 27
(1), pp. 1 – 21.
Pacific
Driscoll, C. & Morris, M. (2013). Gender Modernity and Media in
the Asia-Pacific Introduction. Cultural Studies, 27 (2), 165 – 185.
French, S. (2013). Still Not There: The Continued Invisibility of
Female Athletes and Sports in the New Zealand Print Media.
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Values: Australia’s Media Engagement in the Asia Pacific and
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Journal of Consumer Research, 40 (1), pp. 104 – 121.
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(2013). Building the Case for Independent Monitoring of Food
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Advertising on Australian Television. Public Health Nutrition,
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McKnight, D. & Hobbs, M. (2013). Public Contest through the
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International
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Li, S. & Ronning H. (2013). Reporting Africa: Soft Power, Media
and Civic Engagement. China Media Report Overseas, 9 (3), pp.
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Li, S.B. & Ronning, H. (2013). Half – Orchestrated, Half Freestyle:
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International Communication Research Journal
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