Foreword
Foreword The Honorable Thomas M. Reavley United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit In 1984, a young man named Bryan Garner, the grandson of my erstwhile and esteemed colleague on the Supreme Court of Texas, Justice Meade F. Griffin, joined my Fifth Circuit chambers as one of my law clerks. I knew he had a scholarly bent, but at one point he surprised me with a huge file of index cards that he’d been compiling since his first week of law school—a cache of linguistic jottings that ended up being enshrined in the book you’re now reading. An interesting hobby, I thought, until the representative of a Boston publisher sought my help to persuade this 25-year-old Mr. Garner to accept a significant advance payment and allow publication of his book (losing out, I soon discovered, to Oxford University Press). It then dawned on me that I might have a remarkable lexicographer in my office. The years have verified this and have seen his ongoing achievements. I have watched Bryan closely as he has marched on in a career of prodigious creativity and productivity. He is the acknowledged authority when it comes to legal language and legal rhetoric. Since this book on legal usage first appeared in 1987, he has transformed Black’s Law Dictionary into the most authoritative law dictionary ever published. He has taken both English usage and (with this book) legal usage to new heights. It is with pride and gratitude that I can herald another contribution by the legal world’s most eminent writer and master of language. Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage not only defines a wealth of terms and expressions but also offers an abundance of clear, concise directions for their correct and effective use. Although legal terms here receive special attention, the scope of these directions on usage remains as broad as the language itself, whether one’s community be that of American English or British English. The dictionary clearly defines many misused or confusing words, legal and nonlegal, and contains much useful information on syntax, pronunciation, and spelling. Here may be found up-to-date information and practical guidelines on language and style—including discussions of obstacles and pitfalls in communication—all directed toward improved legal writing, whether in judicial opinions, briefs, pleadings, or letters. The entries on generic writing problems, such as split infinitives, fused participles, misplaced modifiers, and titular tomfoolery, draw copious examples from legal opinions, briefs, and law-review articles. Garner examines problems peculiar to legal writing, such as biblical affectation, law reviewese, citation of cases, and the handling of case references. These discussions are generally entertaining as well as informative, and many of these topics have never been treated so extensively in a book on legal-writing style. Lawyers, law students, and general readers interested in clear expression or convincing argument will all find this to be a valuable resource. What is the best noun corresponding to the verb to recuse? Do you say you confected a pleading? Do you confront issues before a judge? Do you imply intention from someone’s actions, or, as a judge, do you imply terms into a contract? Are you fond of using meaningful and hopefully and mental attitude? Are you prone to employ as to or to prefer conclusional over conclusory? Have you forgone discovery and stated the gravamen of your argument? What do you understand the meaning of Lochnerize to be? In the judgment of an appellate court, what are the correct objects of reverse and remand? Should you have questions ix x Foreword or hesitation about the use of these or other expressions in legal writing, the Dictionary of Legal Usage offers clear-cut and judicious guidance. Along with explanations of legal meanings of otherwise ordinary English words, Garner includes law terms that have historically been omitted in the standard unabridged dictionaries, such as adversarial, conclusory, enjoinable, litigational, pretextual, quashal, recusement, and veniremember. Also recorded are many words having legal meanings that are neglected in the standard dictionaries, such as duplicitous, imply, judicial, probate, remote, and supersede. Garner pinpoints differences between any number of near-synonyms: collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion) and res judicata; compel and impel; concurrent jurisdiction and pendent jurisdiction; fictitious, fictive, and fictional; incident to and incidental to; material and relevant; quantum meruit and quantum valebant, and hundreds of similar sets of words. Most of us will find entries that renew explanations of terms and expressions learned in law school and long since forgotten. We may likewise encounter distinctions and nuances that are new to us. Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage helps lay to rest some of the linguistic superstitions that many of us grew up with, such as blanket prohibitions against split infinitives, against beginning sentences with and or but, against using between with more than two objects, and so on. Language is rarely if ever governed by absolute proscriptions (see forbidden words and phrases), and Garner is careful to lead the reader to discriminate and differentiate, rather than to latch on to oversimple formulas that can so easily displace true thought about what constitutes good writing. Surely one of the missions of this book is precisely to foster such thought. The meaning that language carries, and the spirit it arouses, are the product of words and phrases, comprehensible words and phrases. Excess language misdirects. Ambiguous language confuses. Errors in grammar, in diction, in spelling, as well as in fact or logic, distract and destroy confidence. No writer can afford to underestimate the importance of precise, well-placed words. Compiled with the writer’s interests in mind, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage is not only an essential reference but also a lively, personal commentary on legal language as used today. Preface to the Third Edition In this new edition, Oxford University Press has given what used to be A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage a new name: Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage. With the name change comes an equally sweeping development of the content. The idea with this edition was to bring the book into the 21st century with newer (and more) citations—and to replace all the uncited illustrative quotations with citable examples. This undertaking alone involved a monumental effort, and the book has benefited from it both by improved copiousness of illustration and by enhanced accuracy of verbal asssessments. I have continued to resist the lobbying efforts of certain writers to have citations to their work removed. (Yes, some have actually tried to pressure Oxford University Press with letter-writing campaigns.) Why have I done this? I believe that I should remain dispassionate in citing my evidence. In fact, the indexes at the back of the book have made it easier than ever to know what writers I have cited, and whether those citations are favorable or unfavorable. (They’re occasionally neutral.) I persist in believing that the citations confer scholarly value on the work. And let me point out again, as I do on page xiii, that I have cited erroneous usages by my beloved grandfather, my great friend and mentor Charles Alan Wright, and myself. And I have cited my close friend and coauthor, Justice Scalia, unfavorably. As he might well say, “Get over it!” The purpose is never to ridicule, but to educate: I feel an obligation to illustrate points with actual examples, not made-up ones—even though doing so has compounded my own labors. Dozens of new entries have been added. Two of the most notable appear in the letter I: indemnify (a) and interpretation, modes of. For anyone who wonders how serious a revision this work is, reading those entries will give you a good indication. As with all my other books, I am indebted to many people who have contributed ideas for this one. In addition to those cited on pp. xiv–xv (whose contributions endure), I am grateful to the following scholars and lawyers: Nancy Burkoff Christopher Camardello Shayla R. Edwards Alexandra B. Garner Caroline B. Garner Karolyne H.C. Garner Ruth Bader Ginsburg Tiger Jackson Melissa Lin Jones Thomas B. Lemann Morris D. Linton (the late) Sir Robert Megarry Brian Melendez Gary Muldoon Jeff Newman Thomas M. Reavley (the late) William Safire Antonin Scalia Ann Taylor Schwing Eliot Turner Edward T. Wahl Peter Walsh (the late) Charles Alan Wright Kyu Ho Youm Dean John Attanasio created the Garner Law Scholars program at the Southern Methodist University School of Law. The GLSers (as they’re known) have helped tremendously in researching, cite-checking, and proofreading. Many thanks to Ann R. Chao, Levi Dillon, JoAnn Dodson, Kevin R. Grubbs, Angeline Houghtlin, Timothy Martin, Arrissa K. Meyer, Carrie Nie, Laurie M. Velasco, and Ben A. West. At Oxford University Press, my editors Casper Grathwohl and Damon Zucca gave invaluable guidance and support as I decided the direction in which to take this third edition. And their colleagues in marketing—Jennifer Quigley, Susan Fensten, and Megan Kennedy—approached the practicalities of publication with enthusiastic verve xi xii Preface to the Third Edition and savvy insight. At the printing house, Lachina Publishing Services of Cleveland, Ohio, both Jeff Lachina and Jennifer Bonnar ensured a high degree of accuracy and editorial consistency, which are all-too-rare qualities in book publishing today. My much-trusted colleagues at LawProse, Inc.—Jeff Newman, Tiger Jackson, Shayla R. Edwards, Becky R. McDaniel, and Eliot Turner (see p. vi)—proved enormously helpful in supplying illustrative quotations, double-checking their accuracy, proofreading the text, and supplying the indexes at the back of the book. My undergraduate summer intern, Joshua Fuller, helped track down many original sources. As always, my copyeditors—first and foremost Karen Magnuson of Portland, Oregon, but also Amy Schneider of Wautoma, Wisconsin, and Emily Pfaff of Carrboro, North Carolina—saved the book from many an editorial glitch. The absence of error, being a negative virtue, is often taken for granted by readers. Yet as I’ve mentioned, it is a rara avis (see latinisms) today because of the exigencies of modern book publishing, and I am deeply grateful especially to Karen Magnuson for helping me achieve a high degree of accuracy in all my publications. This book is dedicated to my wife, Karolyne, whose cheerful enthusiam and contagious smile contributed as much as her thorough knowledge of intellectual-property law. The late William Safire asked me incredulously, after having lunch with the two of us, “Where in the world did you find her?” I often ask myself nearly the same question, but it starts with how. Anyway, it was at a LawProse seminar—always a good place to be. And I thank my lucky stars. B.A.G. Dallas, Texas January 2011 Preface to the Second Edition Although there is much new material in this second edition, little need be said by way of introduction. I therefore confine this space to a word about citations and a listing of my literary debts. Readers familiar with the first edition will note that I have added several thousand new illustrative quotations, with full citations. This represents a significant change in approach. When writing the first edition, I omitted citations for four reasons. First, I was following the model of H.W. Fowler’s Modern English Usage (1926), which simply quotes sentences from anonymous sources. (His earlier work, The King’s English (1906), which he cowrote with his brother, F.G., named sources such as The Times but gave no detailed citation.) Second, because the quotations merely reflected what I was reading at the time, they came predominantly from judicial opinions issued by Texas courts and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; having just completed a Fifth Circuit clerkship as I finished the manuscript in 1985, I thought it would not be particularly gracious of me, in a work of this kind, to cite a disproportionately high percentage of Fifth Circuit opinions. Third, since I had begun practicing law in Texas, it seemed imprudent to cite the work of judges before whom I might appear. Finally, the lawyers’ briefs from which I drew quotations did not lend themselves to citation. Although I still quote briefs without citing them, other sources are now fully cited. Why? I now think it helpful to show sources—helpful both legally and lexicographically—so I reject Fowler’s approach. Further, the citations in this second edition represent a breadth that was unattainable for the first edition, so I am satisfied that the sources from Texas and surrounding states are only slightly overrepresented, if at all. Finally, I am satisfied that the lexicographic value of citations outweighs the risk of offending someone who has written something that might offend against the language. I have tried to be dispassionate in my approach to citations. This means, for example, that I have unfavorably cited my own work (see bequest, vb.), the work of my grandfather (see ✳feoff (c)), and the work of my mentor, Charles Alan Wright (see disinterest). Of course, in Wright’s case, there are dozens of other instances in which I quote him favorably. One more thing about citations. I collected many of them before 1991, when the Bluebook began to require first names for authors of books and articles. This caused me no end of needless work, but there were finally a few elusive citations for which neither I nor my research assistants—nor, indeed, my allies in law libraries—could fill in the blanks. In those few instances, I made concessions to the shortness of life and followed the pre-1991 Bluebook form. Readers will find that this edition is much enriched with quotations not only from cases, but also from books and other sources. The shame is that it is not more enriched than it is, for in January 1991 a small lexicographic catastrophe occurred—an event that will no doubt bedevil me for as long as I care about lexicography. That month, I arranged to ship some 40 lawbooks from my office at the University of Texas to the American office of the Oxford Dictionary Department. These books had been thoroughly marked up for excerpting thousands of illustrative quotations, and they represented several years of work. Mysteriously these books—which were to be returned to me for use in preparing this edition—disappeared. They have never been accounted for. And the work that went into marking them can probably never be duplicated. That loss, though, has been greatly outweighed by the tremendous help I have received from dozens of friends and colleagues. My debts are vast. I must merely list them as an insolvent debtor might do, in schedule form. Some of these friends have simply sent me comments and suggestions without my ever having met them face-to-face. Others xiii xiv Preface to the Second Edition I have known for many years, and I merely prevailed upon them to look over several entries within their areas of expertise; luckily for me, no one ever seemed prevailed upon—in fact, quite the opposite. They have all helped in splendid ways: David Anderson Michèle M. Asprey Hans W. Baade J.H. Baker Griffin B. Bell John A. Bell Vicki V. Bonnington A.W. Bradley Jeffrey B. Brawner John Browning Robert W. Burchfield Jenny Burg Beverly Ray Burlingame Peter Butt Thomas Cable Lauren Chadwick Neil H. Cogan Charles Dewey Cole Jr. Kirsten L. Concha Edward H. Cooper Daniel R. Coquillette Sir Brian Cubbon Robert O. Dawson A. Darby Dickerson Lance E. Dickson Robert Eagleson Frank H. Easterbrook Eric B. Easton David Elliott Stephen F. Fink Betty S. Flowers Alexandra B. Garner Caroline B. Garner Gary T. Garner (the late) Thomas Gibbs Gee Lord Goff of Chieveley Erwin N. Griswold R.J. Grogan, Jr. Alan Gunn (the late) Alan M.F. Gunn David Gunn Robert W. Hamilton Trevor C. Hartley John L. Hauer Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. Nathan L. Hecht Dewey R. Hicks Jr. William B. Hilgers Nancy Hoagland William Terrell Hodges Peter W. Hogg Steve Holmes Tony Honoré Hadley Huchton Lynn N. Hughes Laird Hunter Stanley Johanson Robert H. Johnston III Michael E. Keasler Robert E. Keeton William Keffer Elizabeth S. Kerr Joseph Kimble N. Stephan Kinsella Kenneth S. Klein Karen Larsen Douglas Laycock Clyde Leland Thomas B. Lemann Sanford Levinson David J. Luban Joseph R. Lundy Peter G. McCabe Neil MacCormick Becky R. McDaniel Thomas O. McGarity Lord Mackenzie-Stuart Joseph McKnight Nanneska N. Magee Karen Magnuson John Mann Thomas Mayo Sir Robert E. Megarry Roy M. Mersky Ernest Metzger Richard H. Miller Fred Misko Jr. B. Prater Monning James E. Moore Frederick Moss Ron Moss R. Eric Nielsen John T. Noonan Jr. James A. Parker David Peeples Kenneth L. Penegar Richard W. Pogue Rick Prahl George C. Pratt Jonathan Pratter Jack Ratliff Alan Rau Hal R. Ray Jr. Thomas M. Reavley Charles Rembar Christopher Ricks Kenneth F. Ripple Marlyn Robinson Kimberly Rogaliner C. Paul Rogers III David W. Schultz Fred Shapiro David J. Sharpe Christopher Simoni A.W.B. Simpson Katherine Smith David Simon Sokolow Bruce S. Sostek Joseph F. Spaniol Martin Stanford Mark E. Steiner Alicemarie Stotler Michael Sturley Pat Sullivan Barbara M. Tearle Linda Thomas Randall M. Tietjen Michael Tigar John R. Trimble John W. Velz Richard S. Walinski David M. Walker Patricia H. Webb Russell J. Weintraub Carla Wheeler Julie J. White Sir David G.T. Williams William R. Wilson Jr. Sir Harry Woolf Charles Alan Wright Custis Wright Suzanne F. Young Mark G. Yudof Preface to the Second Edition xv If I’ve omitted anyone, as I must have, my apologies. Perhaps my vastest debts are to David M. Walker, of Glasgow, and Beverly Ray Burlingame, of Dallas. These fine scholars read the whole of my first draft and gave detailed comments in the margins. I doubt that there is a page in the book that hasn’t been improved by their work. Law librarians have repeatedly come to my aid. I’ve received the most help from Roy M. Mersky and his staff at the Tarlton Law Library in Austin. David Gunn in particular has generously run down countless sources for me, with uncommon skill and verve. Likewise, the Southern Methodist University Law Library has been extremely helpful. I cannot overstate how important it was to my research when the director, Gail Daly, gave me two card catalogues for storing lexicographic cards. (That may sound quaint in the age of computers, but index cards remain indispensable to lexicographers everywhere.) Finally, Barbara Tearle and R.G. Logan of the Bodleian Law Library, in Oxford, kindly helped me track down some sources that were otherwise inaccessible. As you might guess, I have never met a law librarian I didn’t like. I’m grateful to Dean Paul Rogers of S.M.U. Law School for allocating research-assistant funds that made it possible for me to have all quotations and citations verified. I don’t know another dean who would extend this courtesy to a former faculty member, but S.M.U. is a special place. I’ve benefited enormously from the teaching I’ve done in continuing legal education, primarily through LawProse, Inc. From my LawProse colleagues—Betty S. Flowers and John R. Trimble, both English professors at the University of Texas at Austin—I have learned a great deal. Many of the new entries show the influence they have had on me: from Betty I have learned more about the writing process, and from John I have learned more about effective editing. John has also contributed useful terminology, such as “miscues,” and is largely responsible for my about-face on the subject of contractions. I’ve also learned from the thousands of lawyers who have participated in LawProse workshops on legal writing and legal drafting. Through questions and comments, many of these participants have given me a deeper understanding of specific legal-linguistic issues. The members of the H.W. Fowler Society—a loose organization I founded in order to monitor modern usage—have contributed dozens of examples and ideas for headwords. Most notably, John W. Velz, a great Shakespearean scholar and professor emeritus of English at the University of Texas at Austin, has faithfully sent me hundreds of so-called gleanings. I would not have entries such as the ones on while away and ✳wreckless if it weren’t for him. This edition owes much to Claude Conyers and Nancy Hoagland of Oxford University Press. Time and again, Claude approved my requests for extraordinary assistance of one kind or another. And Nancy is the author’s dream of what a production editor should be: perfectionist and highly proprietary in her approach to the book, but respectful on those rare occasions when I perversely resisted her improvements. When DMLU came out in 1987, my daughter Caroline had just been born some six months earlier. There is a funny photograph of her sitting beside the one-foot-tall pile of manuscript. Now she is eight, and her sister, Alexandra, is three; meanwhile, the manuscript pile has doubled in size. As my girls continue to grow, I’m rather hoping that DMLU has reached its full maturity. But I somehow doubt it. Preface to the First Edition In 1921, an article in the American Bar Association Journal called for a book on “writing legal English.”1 The author of that article, Urban A. Lavery, pointed out that lawyers rarely consult a book on grammar or composition even once to the hundreds of times they consult lawbooks; and yet, as he observed, when convincing argument is to the fore, or clearness of expression is desired, the elements of good writing are often more important than piled-up citations of cases.2 Since Lavery proclaimed this judgment, many books on “writing legal English” have been published, but none with the broad scope or easy accessibility that might allow readers to resolve at a glance the many grammatical and stylistic questions that arise in legal writing. Filling that gap is the goal of this book. Anglo-American law has a language of its own, consisting in a vocabulary with an unusually large number of foreign phrases, archaic words and expressions, terms of art, and argot words. Its formal style reflects the dignity and solemnity with which the profession views its mission. These distinctive qualities of legal language—evident alike in the speech and the writing of lawyers—are well enough documented. What has remained uncollected and unscrutinized in any systematic way is the vast body of legal usage. For a specialist language, the language of law remains remarkably variable, largely because it has been incompletely recorded and mapped. In this respect it is analogous to English before 18th-century grammarians attempted to reduce its variability and make logical its many quiddities. This is not to say, of course, that the language of the law has the malleable capacity of Elizabethan English, which, in the hands of a creative genius like Shakespeare, could be supremely expressive and evocative. Quite the opposite. Stare decisis remains at the core of our system of law—so much so that the continual search for precedents often discourages legal writers from straying beyond precisely how things have been said before. As a result, many locutions have become fossilized in legal language over generations. And the inheritors of that language cannot always distinguish mere form from necessary substance, to the extent that form and substance are ever separable. Legal traditionalists may be justified in not wanting to throw over too readily what has long served well. Yet tradition alone is not sufficient reason for retaining outmoded forms of language. Modern legal writers must strike a difficult balance in the quest to simplify legal English. They should not cling perversely to archaic language, which becomes less comprehensible year by year, for its own sake. Nor should they seek to jettison every word or phrase that bears the stamp of legal tradition. As for students of law, they learn the technical language that they will need—the quirks of legal jargon, the peculiar idiomatic expressions, the grammatical idiosyncrasies, the neologisms that cannot be found even in the most current unabridged dictionaries— largely by osmosis. These linguistic matters are, for the most part, seldom discussed by lawyers or law professors; rather, they are part of the spoken and written legal discourse that neophyte lawyers absorb every day and learn to use unconsciously. This casualness in acquiring the language frequently leads to variable and contradictory linguistic habits that need explicating, codifying, and, in some instances, taming. Granted these basic facts of legal language—the course of its growth, the challenge of its use, the pattern of its acquisition—this book aims at serving three primary functions. First, it helps lawyers chart their way through the bogs of legal language. In the past, 1. Lavery, The Language of the Law, 7 A.B.A. J. 277 (1921). 2. Id. at 280. xvii xviii Preface to the First Edition anyone wanting such a guide has had to make do with general writing manuals. Though this dictionary lays no claim to comprehensiveness, it offers the legal writer guidance on hundreds of specific points of usage. The advice it gives is generally on the conservative side of usage and grammar, for the simple reason that lawyers generally write in a relatively formal context. Lapses from what has come to be accepted as correct irritate and distract the educated reader, and they make the writing less persuasive. Yet the conservative approach exemplified in these pages aspires to be an informed conservatism, one that neither battles hopelessly against linguistic faits accomplis nor remains blind to the inevitable growth and change that occur in language. Second, the dictionary addresses a great many usage problems that do not ordinarily arise in the writing of persons untrained in the law, and therefore that are not addressed in standard writing guides. Certainly it covers territory common to general guides, as inevitably it must. But one of its chief uses should be in pointing out divergences between legal and lay usage, many of which have previously gone unrecorded. To this end, the dictionary serves lawyers and nonlawyers alike, for it can help both groups bridge the linguistic gulf that separates them, to the degree that is possible. The greater effort here needs to be made by lawyers, who in recent years have become increasingly aware of the importance of using legal language that is simple and direct. Indeed, simplicity and directness, two of the touchstones of good writing, are advocated throughout this dictionary in an effort to tag and to discard legalese and highfalutin jargon. Third, this work may serve, to some extent, as an instrument of reform. Where lawyers and judges use terms imprecisely or ambiguously (or, indeed, incorrectly), this dictionary often presents standards that will enhance rather than destroy valuable nuances. If ever a prescriptive approach to language is justified, it is in law, where linguistic precision is often of paramount concern, and where ambiguity and vagueness (except when purposeful) are intolerable. Within its compass, the dictionary thus seeks to preserve the rich differentiation in our legal vocabulary, to set out some of the important grammatical usages and traditional idioms, and to oppose slipshod usages that blur well-developed distinctions. Of course, no work of this kind can be a panacea for the problems that occur in legal writing. But such a work can realistically seek to make legal writers sensitive to the aesthetic possibilities of their prose, to goad them into thinking more acutely about what works in a given context, and what does not. Modern Legal Usage is arranged so that the legal writer, unsure of or puzzled by a particular word or point of grammar, can consult a specific entry addressing the problem at hand. Virtually all the sentences quoted to illustrate legal usage, including linguistic pitfalls, originated in judicial opinions. A few come from statutes, fewer still from lawyers’ briefs and other sources. The authors of the quoted specimens generally remain anonymous because ordinarily it’s unimportant who made a particular mistake. Attention should be focused on the mistake itself, and how to remedy it. Where stare decisis is the ruling principle, citations are necessary; in a dictionary of usage they are not, except of course when documenting usages that are lexicographically noteworthy. Whenever specimens do receive attribution, the importance of that fact lies in documenting the source, not in giving context to the quoted matter; hence subsequent histories of cases cited are not given. Undertaking to write a dictionary of this kind is a precarious task. For by setting oneself up as an arbiter of usage, one also sets one’s prose before the magnifying glasses of readers, who are certain to find blemishes of one sort or another. Such was H.W. Fowler’s Preface to the First Edition fate in his Dictionary of Modern English Usage (1926), a work that has served me as both exemplar and caution. For whatever may be amiss or at fault in this dictionary, I readily acknowledge full responsibility in advance. As my manuscript swelled, any number of friends and colleagues looked on with far more than a polite interest. Several have actively contributed to whatever merit the final product has. Randall K. Glover of Austin and Kelly Bowers of Seattle called problematical words to my attention almost daily during the year we worked side by side for Judge Thomas M. Reavley. The judge himself, whose approach to life and law cannot but inspire, gave me advice and encouragement that emboldened me to persevere. Several fellow lawyers undertook to read large portions of the manuscript and made expert comments throughout. My learned friends Dr. Betty S. Flowers, David Radunsky, Michelle D. Monse, Roy J. Grogan Jr., Hal Roberts Ray Jr., Joe W. Pitts III, Alfredo Estrada, Roger Arnold, Lindsay H. Lew, Kenneth S. Klein, Lisa M. Black, Laura Cale, Sim Israeloff, and Jeffrey B. Brawner have all left the work sharper than they found it. I am indebted also to the late John N. Jackson, whose comments reflected years of thought on the subject of legal-writing style. The Honorable Robert W. Calvert, formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, generously read and marked up a prototypical draft of the work; he kept me on the reader’s path and gave me a number of useful ideas. I am grateful to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor for corresponding with me on some of the stylistic practices of the United States Supreme Court. Edmund S.C. Weiner, the accomplished Oxford lexicographer, and Martin S. Stanford, an extremely knowledgeable and thoughtful editor in New York, minutely read the full manuscript and made innumerable improvements. To these two scholars I am especially beholden, as I am to my father, Dr. Gary T. Garner, who spent many hours reading galleys. xix
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