IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. LONNIE DAVID CLEARY, Appellant. No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0532 Filed October 10, 2014 THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. NOT FOR PUBLICATION See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24. Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20121911001 The Honorable Howard Fell, Judge Pro Tempore AFFIRMED COUNSEL Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix By Alan L. Amann, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee STATE v. CLEARY Decision of the Court Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender By Katherine A. Estavillo, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson Counsel for Appellant MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Howard and Judge Vásquez concurred. K E L L Y, Presiding Judge: ¶1 Following a jury trial, Lonnie Cleary was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent, presumptive terms of imprisonment, the longer of which was 10.5 years.1 Cleary argues the court abused its discretion by including a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication because no evidence supported giving that instruction. He also contends the court erred by failing to vacate his conviction for aggravated assault. For the following reasons, we affirm his convictions and sentences. Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts. State v. Haight-Gyuro, 218 Ariz. 356, ¶ 2, 186 P.3d 33, 34 (App. 2008). Cleary fired a gun at L.E.’s vehicle while L.E. was driving in central Tucson in May 2012. One of the bullets hit L.E. in the lower left side of his back. Cleary was charged with attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault. 1Cleary also pled guilty to one count each of theft of property and production of marijuana. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment on both counts. Those convictions and sentences are not at issue in this appeal. 2 STATE v. CLEARY Decision of the Court ¶3 After the jury found Cleary guilty of both charges, the trial court sentenced him as described above. Cleary timely appealed. Discussion ¶4 Cleary first argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding voluntary intoxication. The reference to voluntary intoxication was part of the instructions defining “recklessly” in connection with the instruction that a person could commit aggravated assault if the person “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes any physical injury to another person or intentionally places another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury and the person uses a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.” The court’s instruction for “recklessly” stated, “‘Recklessly’ means, with respect to a result or a circumstance, that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. .... A person who creates such a risk but is unaware of such risk solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect to such risk. Cleary objected to the portion of the instruction that referred to voluntary intoxication, because “there’s no evidence of that.” The court declined to remove the voluntary intoxication instruction, stating, “there’s no prejudice to the defendant since there’s no evidence of anybody being intoxicated.” ¶5 The state concedes “there was no evidence of intoxication presented at trial” and “the voluntary intoxication instruction should not have been given.” The state argues, however, that the instruction was “only harmless and does not require 3 STATE v. CLEARY Decision of the Court reversal.” We assume without deciding that the voluntary intoxication instruction was erroneous. “Erroneous jury instructions are subject to a harmless error analysis.” State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, ¶ 18, 74 P.3d 231, 239 (2003). “Harmless error review places the burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.” State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 18, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). “If no rational jury could find otherwise even if properly instructed, ‘the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed.’” Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, ¶ 18, 74 P.3d at 239, quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). ¶6 As an initial matter, we note that neither the state nor Cleary presented evidence that Cleary was intoxicated or referred to intoxication. However, in addition to giving the instruction on voluntary intoxication, the trial court also instructed the jury that it was to “determine the facts only from the evidence produced in court” and that it “should not guess about any fact.” The court instructed the jury that, after it had determined the facts, it “may find that some instructions no longer apply.” We presume jurors follow their instructions. State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 439, 924 P.2d 441, 443 (1996). Cleary offers no evidence to suggest the jurors disregarded these instructions, and we will not assume they based their guilty verdict on a factual scenario that was not supported by the evidence. Cf. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991) (when jurors “have been left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory,” there is “reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from” relying upon that theory, “since jurors are well equipped to analyze the evidence”) (emphasis omitted). ¶7 Cleary argues that the voluntary intoxication instruction was “particularly prejudicial” because it may have prevented the jury from deciding he shot at L.E. only because of fear that L.E. had a weapon. Although Cleary did not argue to the jury that he acted in self-defense, the trial court instructed the jury that certain conditions can justify the use of physical force in selfdefense. Cleary argues that “[b]y submitting a ‘voluntary intoxication’ instruction to the jury, the trial court was, in effect, 4 STATE v. CLEARY Decision of the Court giving [the jurors] an alternative theory for [Cleary’s] actions besides self-defense.” He asserts that “[t]he jury likely relied on this instruction to conclude that [Cleary’s] decision to shoot was not based on fear from seeing a gun, but rather on fear induced by intoxication.” ¶8 The state presented evidence that L.E. was driving in central Tucson looking for rental houses. He was driving slowly to read rental signs and had made several u-turns to get a closer look at the signs. When L.E. saw Cleary, a pedestrian, enter the roadway, he stopped his vehicle. After L.E. and Cleary made eye contact, Cleary “gesture[d] towards his waist,” produced a gun, and began shooting at L.E. L.E.’s hands were on the steering wheel, and he did not have a weapon or make any threats to Cleary while he was driving. ¶9 Cleary told police he believed L.E. had a gun, but he could not explain how he knew that. Cleary also told police L.E.’s hands were on the steering wheel when Cleary first fired his gun at L.E.’s vehicle, and he could not “explain any threat he perceived from the victim.” Cleary stated he saw L.E. duck into the passenger side of the vehicle after he fired the first shot and continued shooting. No gun was found in L.E.’s vehicle or in the area. Based on this evidence, we conclude that the jury would not have accepted the self-defense theory even if the court had not given the voluntary intoxication instruction and the error therefore was harmless. ¶10 Cleary next argues the trial court erred in failing to vacate his conviction for aggravated assault because the conviction for attempted first-degree murder arose out of the same conduct. He concedes he did not raise this issue in the trial court. Therefore, we review only for fundamental, prejudicial error. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d at 607. ¶11 Cleary cites State v. Canion, 199 Ariz. 227, 16 P.3d 788 (App. 2000), and State v. Williams, 232 Ariz. 158, 302 P.3d 683 (App. 2013), in support of his argument. He characterizes the question before this court in those cases as “whether a trial court should vacate a lesser conviction when there is only one incident of violence by the defendant against the victim.” However, the issue before us 5 STATE v. CLEARY Decision of the Court in Canion and Williams was not simply whether a court should vacate any lesser conviction when there is only one incident of violence by the defendant; instead, the question was whether a defendant may be convicted of two murder charges when there is only one victim. ¶12 In Canion, the defendant was charged with first-degree felony murder and first-degree premeditated murder. 199 Ariz. 227, ¶ 5, 16 P.3d at 790. The indictment was “imprudently worded to place the two alternative theories of first degree murder in alternative counts, rather than simply charging first degree murder under two alternative theories in the same count.” Id. ¶ 22. The jury found Canion guilty of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder and felony murder. Id. ¶ 7. The trial court determined the convictions for felony murder and second-degree murder “merged,” and it sentenced Canion only for felony murder. Id. ¶ 8. We noted that “a finding of guilt of felony murder and second degree murder are not inconsistent” because the state proved the necessary elements to secure convictions for both crimes. Id. ¶ 20. We observed that, because the result of the two separate crimes was the same—the death of another human—the trial court “prudently” refused to impose multiple sentences. Id. Noting the trial court’s “unfortunate” use of the word “merger,” we stated that “the better procedure would have been to simply vacate the second degree murder conviction, as opposed to ‘merging’ the two convictions.” Id. Thus, we vacated Canion’s second-degree murder conviction. Id. ¶13 In Williams, the defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder and second-degree murder for the homicide of a single victim. 232 Ariz. 158, ¶ 3, 302 P.3d at 684. Relying on Canion, we described the “shared question” in Canion and Williams as “whether a trial court should vacate a lesser murder conviction when there is only one victim.” Id. ¶ 6. We concluded that “the crime of murder of a single victim necessarily results in one conviction and one sentence,” id. ¶ 10, and we vacated Williams’s conviction and sentence for second-degree murder. Id. ¶ 11. ¶14 The reasoning in Canion and Williams does not apply here, where Cleary was convicted of first-degree attempted murder and aggravated assault. Unlike premeditated murder and felony 6 STATE v. CLEARY Decision of the Court murder, first-degree attempted murder and aggravated assault are different crimes with different results; they are not simply two forms of the same crime that can be charged under alternative theories. See A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1) (defining first-degree premeditated murder); § 13-1001 (defining attempt); § 13-1203(A) (defining assault); § 13-1204(A) (defining aggravated assault). By shooting at L.E., Cleary took a “step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in commission” of first-degree murder, see § 13-1001(A)(2), and by striking L.E. with a bullet fired from a gun, he caused physical injury to L.E. using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, see §§ 13-1203, 13-1204(A). Thus, Cleary properly could be convicted and sentenced for both crimes. We conclude that the trial court did not commit fundamental error by not vacating the conviction for aggravated assault. Disposition ¶15 For the foregoing convictions and sentences. reasons, 7 we affirm Cleary’s
© Copyright 2024