NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY
Patrick DeAlmeida
Presiding Judge
R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
P.O. Box 975
Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0975
(609) 292-8108 Fax: (609) 984-0805
October 16, 2014
Edna M. Ryan
2335 Sparrow Drive
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29732
Jeremy M. Vaida
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Law
R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
P.O. Box 106
25 Market Street
Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0106
Re:
Edna M. Ryan v. Director, Division of Taxation
Docket No. 008833-2014
Dear Mrs. Ryan and DAG Vaida:
This letter constitutes the court’s opinion in the above-referenced matter in which
plaintiff challenges the final decision of the Director, Division of Taxation denying her
application for a homestead property tax reimbursement for tax year 2012. For the reasons
explained more fully below, the Director’s decision is affirmed.
*
I. Procedural History and Findings of Fact
Because the facts giving rise to this matter are not in dispute, the court agreed to
plaintiff’s request that the matter be submitted for decision without trial. R. 8:8-1(b).
Plaintiff Edna M. Ryan was a longtime resident of New Jersey, having lived in
Burlington County for more than fifty years. On January 15, 2013, plaintiff and her husband
sold their Evesham Township residence and relocated to South Carolina.
According to the undisputed submission of Mrs. Ryan, the couple did not receive in the
mail at their South Carolina address a 2012 property tax reimbursement application. On an
unspecified date in 2013, Mrs. Ryan contacted the New Jersey Division of Taxation and
requested that a 2012 property tax reimbursement application be sent to her. The Division
complied with plaintiff’s request.
Plaintiff filed her 2012 property tax reimbursement application with the Division of
Taxation on December 5, 2013. Because the Director, Division of Taxation had established a
September 16, 2013 deadline for 2012 property tax reimbursement applications, plaintiff’s
request for a property tax reimbursement was denied as untimely.
On February 6, 2014, the Division issued a notice to plaintiff informing her that her
property tax reimbursement application had been denied because it was received by the Division
after the September 16, 2013 filing deadline. Plaintiff was informed that the Division would
reconsider its decision if plaintiff submitted medical evidence that she was incapacitated and
unable to file her application by the deadline or evidence that she attempted to file her
application prior to the deadline.
It appears that plaintiff thereafter made an inquiry at the Division through a State Senator.
In a February 21, 2014 written response to that inquiry, a Division employee again informed
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plaintiff that her 2012 property tax reimbursement had been denied because her application had
been received by the Division after the September 16, 2013 filing deadline. The February 21,
2014 letter reiterated that the Division would reconsider its decision if plaintiff submitted
medical evidence that she was incapacitated and unable to file her application by the deadline or
evidence that she attempted to file her application prior to the deadline.
On March 5, 2014, plaintiff wrote the Division. She did not submit evidence of a
medical condition that rendered her unable to file the 2012 property tax reimbursement
application in a timely fashion. Nor did she submit evidence that she attempted to file the
application on time. Plaintiff offered only one explanation for having filed a late application:
“We never received our 2012 Property Tax Reimbursement application.”
On May 8, 2014, the Director issued a written determination reaffirming the denial of
plaintiff’s 2012 property tax reimbursement due to the late filing of plaintiff’s application.
On June 13, 2014, plaintiff filed a Complaint in this court challenging the Director’s
denial of her 2012 property tax reimbursement application.
As noted above, the matter ultimately was submitted for decision without trial. R. 8:81(b).
II. Conclusions of Law
The court’s analysis begins with the familiar principle that the Director’s interpretation of
tax statutes is entitled to a presumption of validity. “Courts have recognized the Director’s
expertise in the highly specialized and technical area of taxation.” Aetna Burglar & Fire Alarm
Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 16 N.J. Tax 584, 589 (Tax 1997) (citing Metromedia, Inc. v.
Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 327 (1984)). The scope of judicial review of the
Director’s decision with respect to the imposition of a tax “is limited.” Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v.
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Director, Div. of Taxation, 387 N.J. Super. 104, 109 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 577
(2006). The Supreme Court has directed the courts to accord “great respect” to the Director’s
application of tax statutes, “so long as it is not plainly unreasonable.” Metromedia, supra, 97
N.J. at 327. See also GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 306 (1993)
(“Generally, courts accord substantial deference to the interpretation an agency gives to a statute
that the agency is charged with enforcing.”)
In addition, the Appellate Division has instructed this court to construe the statutes
defining eligibility for homestead rebates narrowly. MacMillan v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
180 N.J. Super. 175, 178 (App. Div. 1981), aff’d, 89 N.J. 216 (1982). “[T]ax preference
provisions are strictly construed against those claiming exemption. This is so with regard to
local property taxes. It is also true with respect to state taxes.” Ibid. (citations omitted). Where
the homestead rebate “statute is outspoken and unambiguous” its terms must be strictly applied.
Id. at 179. Accord Fedders Fin. Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 96 N.J. 376, 384-86 (1984);
Vavoulakis v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 12 N.J. Tax 318, 329 (1992) , aff’d o.b., 13 N.J. Tax
322 (App. Div. 1993).
In 1975, our Constitution was amended to authorize the enactment of laws to allow
homeowners and residential tenants “a rebate or a credit of a sum of money related to property
taxes paid by or allocable to them at such rates and subject to such limits as may be provided by
law.” N.J. Const. (1947) Art. VIII, §1, par. 5. Since that time, the Legislature has enacted a
series of homestead rebate programs for resident homeowners and tenants.
Vavoulakis v.
Director, Div. of Taxation, supra, 12 N.J. Tax at 323-24. Although the programs have had
various names and eligibility requirements, the purpose of the programs has consistently been
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“the beneficent purpose of alleviating the heavy realty tax burden.” Rubin v. Glaser, 83 N.J.
299, 307, app. dis., 449 U.S. 977, 101 S. Ct. 389, 66 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1980).
A homestead property tax reimbursement is available to any person sixty-five or more
years of age or who is disabled who meets certain income limits and who, as a “homeowner, has
made a long-term contribution to the fabric, social structure and finances of one or more
communities in this State, as demonstrated through the payment of property taxes . . . on any
homestead . . . used as a principal residence in this State for at least 10 consecutive years at least
three of which as owner of the homestead for which a homestead property tax reimbursement is
sought prior to the date that an application for a homestead property tax reimbursement is filed.”
N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.67. The amount of the reimbursement is the difference between the amount of
property tax due in the year for which the reimbursement is claimed and the amount due in the
“base year.” Ibid. The “base year” is tax year 1997 or the first year in which a claimant
becomes eligible for a reimbursement after December 31, 1997. Ibid.
“An application for a homestead property tax reimbursement . . . shall be filed with the
director annually on or before June of the year following the year for which the claim is being
made . . . provided, however, that the director may, by rule, designate a later date as the date by
which the application shall be filed or waive the requirement for filing an annual application for
any year or years subject to any limitations and conditions the director may deem appropriate.”
N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.70. “The director shall administer the homestead property tax reimbursement
program,” N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.71, and has the authority to enact regulations implementing this
authority, N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.73. As noted above, the Director exercised his authority to establish a
filing deadline of September 16, 2013 for the 2012 homestead property tax reimbursement
program.
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This court has determined that N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.62a, which provides that the Director
“shall, for good cause shown, extend the time of any applicant to file a claim for a homestead
rebate or credit for a reasonable period . . . .” applies to the homestead property tax
reimbursement program. The statute provides:
For the purposes of this subsection, in order to establish good
cause to extend the time of any applicant to file a claim for a
homestead rebate or credit the applicant shall provide to the
director either medical evidence, such as a doctor’s certification,
that the claimant was unable to file the claim by the date prescribed
by the director because of illness or hospitalization, or evidence
that the applicant attempted to file a timely application. Except as
may be established by medical evidence of inability to file a claim,
good cause shall not be established due to a claimant not having
received an application from the director.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
The Legislature expressly provided in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.62a that the claimant’s having not
received an application from the Director shall not be good cause for extending the filing
deadline for a rebate.
This court is bound by the statute’s plain language.
Property tax
reimbursements are, in effect, a government grant. The parameters of that grant are defined by
the Legislature. According to the State Constitution, the Legislature may impose on property tax
reimbursements “such limits as may be provided by law.” Here, the Legislature granted the
Director the authority to establish a deadline for 2012 property tax reimbursements and to extend
that deadline for good cause. The Legislature also expressly defined good cause as not including
a taxpayer’s having not received a reimbursement application from the Director. With this
statutory provision the Legislature placed on the taxpayer the onus of filing a timely property tax
reimbursement application, whether or not the taxpayer receives such an application from the
Director.
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In light of these conclusions and the clear language of the statute, this court cannot
conclude that the Director’s denial of plaintiff’s 2012 property tax reimbursement was
unreasonable. The court will enter a Judgment affirming the Director’s decision.
Very truly yours,
Patrick DeAlmeida, P.J.T.C.
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