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Mobile Device Security
- Reading Material
Adam C. Champion and Dong Xuan
CSE 4471: Information Security
Based on materials from Tom Eston (SecureState),
Apple, Android Open Source Project, and William Enck (NCSU)
Organization
• Quick Overview of Mobile Devices
• iOS/Android Threats and Attacks
• iOS/Android Security
Overview of Mobile Devices
• Mobile computers:
– Mainly smartphones, tablets
– Sensors: GPS, camera,
accelerometer, etc.
– Computation: powerful
CPUs (≥ 1 GHz, multi-core)
– Communication: cellular/4G,
Wi-Fi, near field
communication (NFC), etc.
• Many connect to cellular
networks: billing system
• Cisco: 7 billion mobile
devices will have been sold
by 2012 [1]
Organization
Organization
• Quick Overview of Mobile Devices
• iOS/Android Threats and Attacks
• iOS/Android Security
iOS/Android Malware
• iOS malware: very little
• Juniper Networks: Major increase in Android
malware from 2010 to 2011 [18]
• Android malware growth keeps increasing ($$$)
• Main categories: [19]
–
–
–
–
Trojans
Monitoring apps/spyware
Adware
Botnets
• We’ll look at notable malware examples
iOS Malware
• Malware, “fake apps” have hit iOS too
– iKee, first iPhone virus, “rickrolled” jailbroken
iDevices [25]
– Example “fake/similar” apps:
•
•
•
•
Temple Run: Temple Climb, Temple Rush, Cave Run
Angry Birds: Angry Zombie Birds, Shoot Angry Birds
Not to mention “walkthroughs,” “reference” apps, etc.
Google Play banned such apps…
– iOS, Android hit with “Find and Call” app
• SMS spammed contacts from central server
• Removed from App Store, Google Play
Android: DroidDream Malware
• Infected 58 apps on Android
Market, March 2011
• 260,000 downloads in 4 days
• How it worked:
– Rooted phone via Android
Debug Bridge (adb)
vulnerability
– Sent premium-rate SMS
messages at night ($$$)
• Google removed apps 4 days
after release, banned 3
developers from Market
• More malware found since
Android: Fake Angry Birds Space
• Bot, Trojan
• Masquerades as game
• Roots Android 2.3
devices using
“Gingerbreak” exploit
• Device joins botnet
Source: [20]
Android: SMS Worm
• Students in previous information security classes wrote
SMS worms, loggers on Android
• Worm spreads to all contacts via social engineering,
sideloading, etc.
• Logger stored/forwarded all received SMS messages
– Only needed SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS, READ_SMS
permissions
– Can send 100 SMS messages/hour
– One group put SMS logger on Google Play (removed it)
Android: Google Wallet
Vulnerabilities (1)
• Google Wallet enables
smartphone payments
– Uses NFC technology
– Many new mobile devices
have NFC
• Some credit card info
stored securely in secure
element
– Separate chip, SD card,
SIM card
• Unfortunately, other data
are not stored as securely
Android: Google Wallet
Vulnerabilities (2)
• Some information can be recovered from
databases on phone: [21]
–
–
–
–
Name on credit card
Expiration date
Recent transactions
etc.
• Google Analytics tracking can reveal customer
behavior from non-SSL HTTP GET requests
• NFC alone does not guarantee security
– Radio eavesdropping, data modification possible [22]
– Relay attacks, spoofing possible with libnfc [23]
Android: Sophisticated NFC Hack
• Charlie Miller’s Black Hat 2012 presentation: Nokia,
Android phones can be hijacked via NFC [24]
– NFC/Android Beam on by default on Android 2.3+,
Android 4.0+
– Place phone 3–4 cm away from NFC tag, other NFCenabled phone
– Attacker-controlled phone sends data to tag/device, can
crash NFC daemon, Android OS
– For Android 4.0–4.0.1, can remotely open device browser
to attacker-controlled webpage
Organization
• Quick Overview of Mobile Devices
• iOS/Android Threats and Attacks
• iOS/Android Security
iOS System Architecture (1)
• Boot sequence:
– Bootloader, kernel,
extensions, baseband
firmware all have
cryptographic signatures
– Root of trust: burnt into
boot ROM at the factory
– Each component’s
signature is verified
– If any signature doesn’t
match, the “connect to
iTunes” screen is shown
Icons from Double-J Design, IconBlock
iOS System Architecture (2)
• Software updates
– Cannot install older version of iOS on an iDevice;
e.g., if device runs iOS 5.1.1, cannot install iOS 4
– Device cryptographically “measures” components,
sends to Apple install server with nonce, device ID
• Nonce: value used only once
• Prevents attacker from “replaying” the value
– Server checks measurements; if allowed, server
adds device ID to measurements, signs everything
iOS Apps and App Store
• All iOS apps signed by Apple (not developer)
• Third-party apps signed only after:
– Developer ID verification (individual, company)
– Review: bugs, work correctly (program analysis)
• Each app sandboxed in its own directory
– Cannot communicate with other apps
– Apps need signed “entitlements” to access user data
• Further app protection:
– Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) for all apps
– ARM eXecute Never (XN) bit set for all memory pages
iOS Data Protection Measures
• Each iDevice has hardware-accelerated crypto
operations (AES-256)
• Effaceable Storage: securely removes crypto keys from
flash memory
– “Erase all content and settings” wipes user data using
Effaceable Storage (locally or remotely)
– Interact with mobile device management (MDM),
Exchange ActiveSync servers
– Developers can use APIs for secure file, database storage
• Passcodes
– Admins can require numeric, alphanumeric, etc.
– Wipe device after 10 failed login attempts
iPhone Configuration Utility
Miscellaneous iOS Security
• Built-in support for
SSLv3, TLS, VPNs
• Extensive administrative
controls:
– Password policies
– Disable device features,
e.g., camera
– Disable Siri
– Remote wipe
• Apps can access contacts
without permission (fixed
in iOS 6)
Source: [8]
iOS Jailbreaking
• Circumvents Apple’s iOS
security mechanisms
– Violates iDevice’s terms of use
– Allows installation of apps
from alternative app stores,
e.g., Cydia
– Removes app sandbox
– Usually replaces kernel with
one accepting non-Apple
signatures
– Tools: redsn0w, Absinthe, etc.
• Legal in U.S. under DMCA
2010 exemption
Google Android Platform
• Android: Linux-based
mobile handset platform
• Developed by Google,
Open Handset Alliance
for handset manufacturers
– Includes T-Mobile, Sprint
Nextel, Google, Intel,
Samsung, etc. [29]
– Free, open mobile handset
platform for industry [30]
• Flagship: Google Nexus 4
Android Architecture
Android Features and Software
• Features
–
–
–
–
3D: OpenGL ES 1.0
SQLite: Database engine
WebKit: Web browser
Dalvik: Register-based VM
similar to Java VM [32]
– FreeType: Bitmap and vector
font rendering
– Connectivity: Bluetooth,
802.11, GPS
• Core Applications
– Email, SMS, calendar, Google
apps, browser, etc.
– Written in Java
• App Framework
– Full access to same
framework APIs
– Architecture designed for
component reuse
• Runtime
– Core C++ library
– Multiple Dalvik VMs run in a
process, rely on Linux kernel
for process isolation [32]
Android Security (1)
• Android built on Linux kernel, which provides
– User permissions model
– Process isolation
• Each app is assigned unique user/group IDs, run
as a separate process ⇒ app sandbox
• System partition mounted read-only
• Android 3.0+ enables filesystem encryption using
Linux dmcrypt (AES-128)
• Device admins can require passwords with
specific criteria, remote wipe devices, etc.
Android Security (2)
• Android device
administration (3.0+):
–
–
–
–
Remote wipe
Require strong password
Full device encryption
Disable camera
Android Security (3)
• Other protection mechanisms:
– Android 1.5+: stack buffer, integer overflow protection;
double free, chunk consolidation attack prevention
– Android 2.3+: format string protection, NX, null pointer
dereference mitigation
– Android 4.0+: ASLR implemented
– Android 4.1+: ASLR strengthened, plug kernel leaks
• Capability-based permissions mechanism:
– Many APIs are not invoked without permission, e.g.,
camera, GPS, wireless, etc.
– Every app must declare the permissions it needs
– Users need to allow these permissions when installing app
Android Security (4)
• All Android apps need
to be signed: by the
developer, not Google
• Google Play app store
less regulated
– Apps available rapidly
after publishing
– Bouncer service scans
for malware in store [11]
Google Play permissions interface
Android Device Diversity (1)
• Android runs on various
devices
– Different devices run
different OS versions
– Device manufacturers often
add their own custom UIs,
software
– Mobile operators add their
own software
– Not all devices are updated
to latest Android version!
• Security challenges…
Android devices accessing Google Play,
August 2012. Some devices are not always
updated to the latest version. These devices
tend to have security vulnerabilities targeted
by attackers.
Source: [12]
Android Device Diversity (2)
• Notice many Android
devices are “orphaned”
without major updates
[13]
• Android developers
need to secure their apps
for many different
devices…
Android Device Diversity (3)
The OpenSignalMaps Android app sees almost 4,000 types of device clients. Source: [14]
Rooting Android Devices
• Android device owners can often get root access to
their devices
– Process can be as simple as unlocking bootloader
– Sometimes, exploit bugs to get root
– Result: install OS of choice, bypass device/operator
restrictions
– Legal under 2010 DMCA exemption
• Security problems:
– Voids device warranty (usually)
– Circumvents app sandbox: root can modify any app’s files
– Malware can root and own your device!
References (1)
1. Cisco, “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2011–
2016”, 14 Feb. 2012, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/
ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-520862.html
2. Samsung, “Exynos 5 Dual,” 2012, http://www.samsung.com/global/business/semiconductor/
product/application/detail?productId=7668&iaId=2341
3. Nielsen Co., “Two Thirds of All New Mobile Buyers Now Opting for Smartphones,” 12 Jul.
2012, http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/two-thirds-of-new-mobile-buyersnow-opting-for-smartphones/
4. K. De Vere, “iOS leapfrogs Android with 410 million devices sold and 650,000 apps,” 24 Jul.
2012, http://www.insidemobileapps.com/2012/07/24/ios-device-sales-leapfrog-android-with410-million-devices-sold/
5. K. Haslem, “Macworld Expo: Optimised OS X sits on ‘versatile’ Flash,” 12 Jan. 2007,
Macworld, http://www.macworld.co.uk/ipod-itunes/news/index.cfm?newsid=16927
6. Wikipedia, “iOS,” updated 2012, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/iOS
7. Apple Inc., “iPhone Developer University Program,”
http://developer.apple.com/iphone/program/university.html
8. Apple Inc, “iOS Security,” http://images.apple.com/ipad/business/docs/
iOS_Security_May12.pdf
9. Android Open Source Project, “Android Security Overview,” http://source.android.com/tech/
security/index.html
Presentation organization inspired by T. Eston, “Android vs. iOS Security Showdown,” 2012,
http://www.slideshare.net/agent0x0/the-android-vs-apple-ios-security-showdown
References (2)
10.
11.
12.
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14.
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A. Rubin, 15 Feb. 2012, https://plus.google.com/u/0/112599748506977857728/
posts/Btey7rJBaLF
H. Lockheimer, “Android and Security,” 2 Feb. 2012, http://googlemobile.blogspot.com/
2012/02/android-and-security.html
Android Open Source Project, http://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html
M. DeGusta, “Android Orphans: Visualizing a Sad History of Support,” 26 Oct. 2011,
http://theunderstatement.com/post/11982112928/android-orphans-visualizing-a-sad-historyof-support
http://opensignalmaps.com/reports/fragmentation.php
http://www.micro-trax.com/statistics `
Lookout, Inc., “Mobile Lost and Found,” 2012, https://www.mylookout.com/resources/
reports/mobile-lost-and-found/
K. Haley, “Introducing the Smartphone Honey Stick Project,” 9 Mar. 2012,
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/introducing-symantec-smartphone-honey-stickproject
Juniper Networks, Inc., “Global Research Shows Mobile Malware Accelerating,” 15 Feb.
2012, http://newsroom.juniper.net/press-releases/global-research-showsmobile-malware-accelerating-nyse-jnpr-0851976
References (3)
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20.
21.
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24.
25.
26.
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29.
F-Secure, “Mobile Threat Report Q2 2012,” 7 Aug. 2012, http://www.slideshare.net/fsecure/
mobile-threat-report-q2-2012
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/04/12/a ndroid-malware-angry-birds-space-game/
Via Forensics LLC, “Forensic Security Analysis of Google Wallet,” 12 Dec. 2011,
https://viaforensics.com/mobile-security/forensics-security-analysis-google-wallet.html
Proxmark, http://www.proxmark.org/
libnfc, http://www.libnfc.org
D. Goodin, “Android, Nokia smartphone security toppled by Near Field Communication hack,”
25 Jul. 2012, http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/07/android-nokia-smartphone-hack/
B. Andersen, “Australian admits creating first iPhone virus,” 10 Nov. 2009,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-11-09/australian-admits-creating-first-iphone-virus/1135474
R. Radia, “Why you should always encrypt your smartphone,” 16 Jan. 2011,
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2011/01/why-you-should-always-encrypt-your-smartphone/
Heritage Foundation, “Solutions for America: Overcriminalization,” 17 Aug. 2010,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/08/overcriminalization
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_device_forensics
C. Quentin, http://www.slideshare.net/cooperq/your-cell-phone-is-covered-in-spiders
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