1. No category

The Rise of the RMB
as an International Currency:
Learning from Historical Precedents
Jeffrey Frankel
Harpel Professor of Capital Formation & Growth
• The possibility that the renminbi is joining
the ranks of international currencies
has generated much excitement.
• Indeed some claim that the RMB
could even overtake the $ by 2020:
• Subramanian (2011a, b).
• But there are good reasons to doubt it.
Rise in Use of Yuan for Trade Settlement (reported)
from 2.5% of China’s international trade in 2010 to 9% in 2011
Sources: PBoC (2011), Yu (2012, p.12, 15), Zhang (2012).
587
493
billion RMB
525
311
263
79
0
2
2010 Q1
2010 Q2
2010QIV
2010Q4
2011Q1
2011Q2
2011Q3
2011Q4
• We can look to the past for help in evaluating
the RMB’s prospects in the future.
• The three best precedents in the 20th century:
– the rise of the $ from 1913 to 1945,
– the rise of the DM from 1973 to 1990,
– and the rise of the ¥ from 1984 to 1991 .
• But first: what is an international currency?
What is an international currency?
• Definition:
An international currency is used by non-residents.
• The prospects for a country’s status as an international
currency is not the same as its exchange rate prospects.
• Example: 1993-95
– The dollar depreciated strongly, reaching an all-time low
against the yen, among much hand-wringing.
– And yet its international currency use rose during that period.
5
Roles of International Currency
Table B
Adapted from tables of Kenen and Cohen
Function
of
money:
Store of
value
Medium
of
exchange
Unit of
account
Governments
International reserve
holdings
Vehicle currency
for foreign exchange
intervention
Anchor for pegging
local currencies
Private actors
Currency substitution
(private dollarization)
Invoicing trade and
financial transactions
Denominating trade and
financial transactions
Central bank holdings of reserves is the most easily quantified,
and probably the most important, of the various measures.6
International reserve currency determinants
What suits a currency for international use?
Determinant
Empirical proxy:
1. Size
GDP
2. Rate of return
inflation,
(or trade)
(or trend depreciation
or exchange rate variance)
3. Depth of financial
markets
FX turnover
in main financial center
7
Determination of international currency status, continued
• People use a given currency
– when everyone else is using it,
– not just because of its intrinsic characteristics.
• English became the international lingua franca
– not because of its beauty (French),
– nor its simplicity (Esperanto),
– nor even the number of native speakers (Chinese).
• => Network externalities.
8
Determinants of reserve currency standing, continued
Network externalities
=> Tipping
captured by:
1) Inertia
lags
2) Nonlinearity
in determinants
logistic functional form
or
dummy for leader GDP
Source: Chinn & Frankel (2007)
9
Currency share vs. GDP (market rates).
The relationship is not linear, but “ogive.”
SHARE vs. RATIOY
.8
.7
Shares
of major .6
currencies
In central .5
bank
.4
reserve
.3
holdings
SHARE
}
Tipping
point
.2
.1
.0
(GDP using market rates)
-.1
.0
Source: Chinn & Frankel (2007)
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Size of currency’s home economy10
RATIOY
Historical illustration of the lag:
£ ‘s loss of premier international currency status
in 20th century
• By 1919, US had passed UK in
1. output (1872)
2. trade (1914)
3. net international creditor position (1914-19)
• But the $ passed £ as #1 reserve currency
only with a lag
11
Explaining currency shares econometrically
logit, pre-euro, 1973-98
GDP
Inflation
[2]
[4]
[7]
2.77
3.69
1.04
[0.64]
[0.92]
[0.29]
-2.64
-2.86
[1.16]
[1.16]
Depreciation
-1.10
trend
Ex rate variance
FX turnover
[0.59]
-0.98
-1.40
-1.25
[0.57]
[0.64]
[0.34]
0.45
0.58
0.43
[0.29]
[0.30]
[0.15]
-0.22
GDP leader dummy
[0.16]
Lag logit:
log(share t-1 / 1 - share t-1)
0.85
0.85
0.96
[0.03]
[0.03]
[0.01]
12
Boldface = statisticallySource:
significant:
size, returns, turnover, and lag
Chinn & Frankel
Does China have the will for financial liberalization
that would be necessary to achieve the rapid
RMB internationalization it seems to want?
• Dissecting China’s internal politics is hard.
– The officials may not know the answer themselves.
• Let’s look to the historical precedents.
Precedent (I): The Rapid Ascent
of the Dollar after 1913
• In 1913, the £ was on top,
• the same as in 1899:
– ≈ 60 % of the world’s trade invoicing
– ≈ 2/3 of known forex holdings of official institutions,
• > twice the total of the next nearest competitors,
• the French franc & German mark.
• The $ was not even in the top 3.
The international status of the $ rose
rapidly after 1913
• The traditional view is that, due to inertia, the $
did not surpass the £ until after World War II,
– a half-century + after the US economy passed the UK economy
– E.g., Krugman (1984).
• Eichengreen (2011) now claims it happened earlier: 1924.
• Either way, the $’s rise to majorinternationalcurrency
status was fast, once the conditions were in place.
The conditions for international currency status
• Prior to 1913,
– The US satisfied Criterion #1 (Size)
– Criterion #2 was in some doubt
due to history of financial crises
• It lacked a central bank.
– And Criterion 3 was definitely lacking:
deep, liquid, dependable & open financial markets.
.
Putting the conditions in place
• These conditions
for $ internationalization were put in place
– without political support for greater global stature,
– nor business support for an internationalized $.
• To the contrary, popular opinion was highly
suspicious of the “Eastern banking conspiracy.”
• So a tiny elite quietly mid-wifed
the new international currency.
The conspirators
• Sen. Nelson Aldrich convened the meeting
of 6 “duck hunters” on Jekyll Island in 1910
(the Aldrich Plan produced the Fed in 1913),
• chaired by Paul Warburg,
• incl. Benjamin Strong (representing John Pierpont Morgan),
– who later became the 1st NY Fed president, 1914-28,
– nurtured the dollar in the 1920s,
& promoted American lending to Europe.
• & Frank Vanderlip, president of Nat. City Bank of NY,
opened international branches & expanded $ lending.
• Little government representation
– Treasury Asst.Secy. (A.Piatt Andrew)
Sources: Ahamed (2009), Broz (1997, 99),
Eichengreen (2011), Eichengreen &18
Flandreau (2010), Karmin (2008).
Precedent (II): The Ascent of the DM
after 1973
• Short life of the DM:
– The Bundesbank was not founded until 1957,
– though Erhard had created the DM in 1948 currency reform.
– The DM disappeared into the euro in 1999.
• In between, the DM was pressed into service
as an alternative to the $,
– after US inflation rose
– & Nixon took the $ off gold in 1971.
– The DM met the criterion of keeping its value.
• unlike the $.
19
Central banks’ reserve holdings
The $ share has been on a downward trend since 1975
(with the exception of the 1990s).
80
USD share
75
USD + 0.6 Unalloc.
share (COFER)
70
65
60
55
50
Source: Chinn & Frankel (2007)
45
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
00
05
10
20
• But Germans were not pro-internationalization.
– Leaders were averse to strutting the world stage.
– The powerful manufacturing sector feared
upsurges in the demand for DM
• => real appreciation => lost export competitiveness.
• Frankfurt as a financial center
never developed like London.
• DM share in CB reserves peaked in 1989
– at ≈ 20 %.
• In the 1990s Germany euthanized its beloved currency.
21
Looking back, one might wonder
what the fuss was about
.8
.7
USD
.6
.5
.4
.3
DEM
.2
EUR
ECU
.1
JPY
FFR
NLG
.0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
GBP
1995
SFR
2000
22
Precedent (III): The Brief Ascent
of the Yen after 1984
• 1980s: international use of ¥ trended up
– as Japan reluctantly opened financial markets,
– though domestic politics were opposed
– and government policy was at best neutral:
– Again, Japan feared that increased demand
for its money would hurt export competitiveness.
23
The Brief Ascent of the Yen
•
• After 1990s: policy sought actively
to promote internationalization
.
• But it was too late:
– economic fundamentals had already turned around,
dominated by the shrinking economy.
• Today, the ¥ only ranks similarly to the £.
24
How does China rank, by determinants of
international currency status?
1. Size
• Chinese economy passed Japan in 2010,
to attain 2nd ranking.
• Some projections claim it will pass the US soon.
• But
– What matters here is GDP (& trade) compared
at market exchange rates, not PPP-adjusted.
– Euroland’s GDP is still substantially bigger than China.
– Chinese growth will slow down,
• well before it reaches per capita equality with the West.
25
China’s rank, by determinants of international currency status,
cont.
2. Rate of return
• A financial crisis probably still lurks
– somewhere down the road.
• Nevertheless, it is likely that the rate of return
to holding RMB over the next ten years will be high.
• Indeed that is the reason since 2004 for
the strong portfolio capital inflows.
– Prasad & Wei.
• As of 2012, the PBoC appears to have met successfully
the inflation threat that had revived in 2010.
26
China’s rank, by determinants of international currency status, concl.
3. Depth of financial markets
One the one hand…
• China is starting to use RMB in international trade
• The IFC & ADB can issue “panda bonds,” since 2005.
• Foreign central banks can hold RMB since Aug. 2010
– Malaysia’s CB went first, buying RMB bonds for its FX reserves.
– Swap arrangements with 13 emerging-market CBs
(Yu, July 2012).
• RMB market developing in Hong Kong
– Foreigners have been able to issue “dim sum” bonds since 2007,
» Corporations including MacDonald’s & Caterpillar.
» Bank of China HK launched an index Dec. 31, 2010.
» Issues reached RMB 34 b in 2010, and then 54 b in 1st 8 months of 2011.
27
– RMB deposits reached RMB 280b by end-2010.
In Hong Kong
banks, yuandenominated
deposits quadrupled
in 2010.
“RMB goes viral,” Financial Times, Jan. 4, 2011
28
China’s rank, by determinants of international currency status,
cont.
On the other hand…
• Liquidity, breadth & openness still have a long way to go.
• China’s financial markets still rank far behind others:
• still highly regulated,
– domestic system still “financially repressed.”
– Cross-border capital flows still subject to heavy controls;
– foreign companies cannot borrow in China.
• RMB bonds & deposits in HK are small as a fraction.
– Of course HK itself, tho part of PRC, is still firmly tied to US$.
• There are signs that the “offshore” strategy for
internationalization is running into problems.29
Yuan deposits held in Hong Kong
peaked in November 2011
Deposits reached RMB 580b ($90b) in July 2011
and 622 b in September 2011,
but then unexpectedly peaked..
2007
2008
2009
2010
Sources: Yu (2012), Zhang (2012).
2011
Jan.
2012
Recent glitches in the internationalization strategy
• The big growth in RMB trade settlement was for imports
– = 11 x use for exports, in Q4 of 2010.
• Explanations for this asymmetry:
– (i) Foreign exporters want RMB, in expectation of appreciation;
– (ii) “Importers” really want the RMB to arbitrage between CNY & CNH
• <= RMB settlement > RMB invoicing.
• So the PBoC has been stuck with even more international reserves.
• Has brought asymmetry down since 2011.
– Which also explains recent turnaround in Hong Kong RMB deposits .
• Yu, Yongding (July 2012).
• PBoC reserve accumulation has also turned around in 2012
• probably due to end of one-way bet on future RMB appreciation.
• In any case, it is a symptom of the difficulties of internationalizing
the RMB if the government lets financial liberalization lag.
The Chinese government’s strategy of
seeking RMB internationalization offshore
• China first established special economic zones
– in a few provinces in the 1980s
– to experiment with opening to international trade.
– It worked spectacularly, and the SEZ experiment
was expanded to more & more regions.
• It is trying the same with RMB:
– starting with Hong Kong (then Taiwan, eventually Shanghai…)
– to experiment with international use of the currency.
• But segmentation of financial markets is harder,
– because arbitrage is easier, than with merchandise trade.
My candidate who has played the role
of the Jekyll Island “duck hunters”:
Zhou Xiao Chuan of the PBoC
• The internationalization of the renminbi is the will of the
market rather than a government-backed move, People's Bank
of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan was quoted as saying….
• "It is the result of the growing power of the nation and its
financial market boom ... though there is still much to do
considering the low level of development and openness," Zhou
said in an interview with China Business News.
• According to Zhou, China needs to …further open the nation's
financial market. "In general, we should do our homework, and
let the market decide which currency should be used," he said.
China Daily, June 5, 2012
Conclusion: China’s ascent
in the currency rankings will be gradual
• Why?
Criteria #1 & #2 are in place.
• But internationalization also requires:
– domestic financial liberalization,
– full currency convertibility,
– and a move toward floating –
• which China is probably not yet ready to accept.
34
• One theory: officials like Zhou want to use international
liberalization to force the pace of domestic liberalization.
– David Pilling, FT, Sept. 6, 2012.
– This is the sequence Japan & Indonesia tried.
– It did not work well.
– The usual sequence is domestic liberalization before international,
• and for good reason.
• A guess: the RMB will take a decade to rival the ¥.
and much longer to rival the €, let alone the $.
35
References by the speaker underlying this talk
• Frankel, “Internationalization of the RMB and Historical Precedents,”
July 2012; forthcoming, Journal of Economic Integration.
• “Historical precedents for the internationalization of the RMB,” Nov.2011
workshop in Beijing of the Council on Foreign Relations & the China
Development Research Foundation. CFR Working Paper.
• Summaries at RIETI & Vox, Oct. 2011.
International Currency Rankings
•
“Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Leading International Reserve Currency?”
•
with Menzie Chinn, in G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment, R.Clarida, ed.
(U. Chicago Press), 2007. NBER WP No 11510.
The Dollar's Demise? Future of the Dollar as the World's Principal Reserve Asset," H.W.Brock, ed., SED, 1997.
•
"The SDR, Reserve Currencies, and the Future of the International Monetary System"
•
•
with Barry Eichengreen, in The Future of the SDR in Light of Changes in the International Financial
System, M.Mussa, J.Boughton, & P.Isard, eds. (IMF), 1996.
"Still the Lingua Franca: The Exaggerated Death of the Dollar," Foreign Affairs 74, no.4, 1995
"On the Dollar," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance (MacMillan), 1992.
Some papers by others on RMB internationalization
•
•
Yu, Yongding, “Revisiting the Internationalization of the Yuan,” ADBI Working Paper Series No. 366, July 2012.
Zhang, C. 2012. “The Development of the Offshore RMB Business,” presentation, ADBI, Tokyo. Feb.
•
Eswar Prasad & Le (Sandy) Ye, 2012, The Renminbi’s Role in the Global Monetary System (Brookings).
•
Subramanian, Arvind. 2011a. “Renminbi Rules: The Conditional Imminence of the Reserve Currency Transition.” WP s
No. 11-14 (Peterson Institute for International Economics, September).
Subramanian, Arvind. 2011b. Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance (PIIE).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Marcel Fratzscher & Arnaud Mehl, “China’s Dominance Hypothesis and the Emergence of a Tri-polar
Global Currency System.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 8671 (London), Nov. 2011.
Chen, Hong Yi, Wenshen Peng & Chang Shu. 2011. “The Potential of Renminbi as an International
Currency,” in Currency Internationalisation: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis and Prospects for
the Future in Asia and the Pacific, BIS Papers No. 61, Dec. 2011.
Gao, Haihong, & Yongdin Yu, 2011, “Internationalisation of the Renminbi,” BIS Papers No. 61.
Chen, Hong Yi, Wenshen Peng & Chang Shu. 2011. “The Potential of Renminbi as an International
Currency,” in BIS Papers No. 61, December, pp. 125-148.
Chen, Xiaoli, &Yin-Wong Cheung, “Renminbi Going Global,” HKIMR Working Paper No. 08/2011.
Robert McCauley, 2011. “The Internationalisation of the Renminbi.” HKIMR.
Masahiro Kawai & Shinji Takagi, “The RMB as a key International Currency: Lessons from the
Japanese Experience,” AEEF conference, Paris, January 2011.
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Jean Pisani-Ferry, “What international monetary system for a fast-changing
world economy,” AEEF, January 2011.
Yung Chul Park & Chi-Young Song, “RMB Internationalization: Prospects and Implications for
Economic Integration in East Asia,” 2010, Asian Economic Papers.
Jong-Wha Lee, “Will the RMB Emerge as an International Currency?” workshop, ADB & CCER, 2010.
•
Wu, Friederich, Rongfang Pan, & Di Wang, 2010, “Renminbi’s Potential to Become a Global Currency,” China and the
World Economy 18(1): 63-81.
•
•
Takatoshi Ito, “China as Number One: How About the RMB?”Asian Economic Policy Review, 2010, 5.
Chen Yulu, Wang Fang & Yang Ming “Currency Internationalization as a National Competitive
Strategy: US Dollar's Empirical Evidence—And a Study on the Issue of Renminbi,” Ec.Res.J., 2005.
References on yuan exchange rate by the speaker
• "The Renminbi Since 2005," in The US-Sino Currency Dispute: New Insights
from Economics, Politics and Law, edited by S.Evenett (CEPR: London) 2010.
• “New Estimation of China’s Exchange Rate Regime,” in Pacific Economic
Review 14, no.3, August 2009. NBER WP no. 14700.
• “Comment on ‘China’s Current Account and Exchange Rate,’ by Yin-Wong
Cheung, Menzie Chinn & Eiji Fuji,” in China’s Growing Role in World
Trade, NBER, edited by Feenstra & Wei (University of Chicago Press, 2010).
• “Comments on Cline and Williamson’s ‘Estimates of the Equilibrium Exchange
Rate of the Renminbi?’,” in Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy, M.Goldstein
& N.Lardy, eds. (Peterson Institute for International Economics), 2008.
• "Assessing China's Exchange Rate Regime," with Shang-Jin Wei, Economic
Policy 51, July 2007. Video interview. Vox summary. NBER WP 13100.
• "On the Yuan: The Choice Between Adjustment Under a Fixed Exchange Rate
and Adjustment under a Flexible Rate," in Understanding the Chinese Economy,
edited by G. Illing (Oxford U. Press), 2006. NBER WP 11274.
• “On the Renminbi,” CESifo Forum, 6, no.3, Autumn 2005 (Ifo Institute for
Economic Research, Munich).
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jfrankel/