Vol. 2013, No. 5 May 2013 Michael C. Sullivan, Editor-in-Chief Best Practices in Drafting Independent Contractor Agreements Inside This Issue Best Practices in Drafting Independent Contractor Agreements RAYMOND W. BERTRAND, HALEY M. MORRISON & BRIT K. SEIFERT .............................................. 147 By Raymond W. Bertrand, Haley M. Morrison & Brit K. Seifert In an Era of Mandatory Arbitration, Don’t Forget the Board PEDER J. V. THOREEN ...................................... 157 The Fair Employment and Housing Commission’s Final Act - New Disability Regulations - Is a Not-So-Fond Farewell for Employers CAROLYN RASHBY & SHIVA SHIRAZI DAVOUDIAN...................................................... 163 BOTH SIDES OF THE BAR Will Gentry Survive Concepcion? A Discussion with Two Prominent Practitioners Regarding How the California Supreme Court May Answer This and Related Questions ZACHARIAH H. ROWLAND ................................. 169 CASE NOTES .............................................. 174 Damages Under FEHA............................. 174 Donning And Doffing................................ 175 Federal Employment................................. 176 Federal Tort Claims Act........................... 176 Merit Systems Protection Board .............. 177 Protected Concerted Activity ................... 178 Sovereign Immunity .................................. 178 Seniority .................................................... 179 Wage and Hour......................................... 180 Wal-Mart Class Actions ........................... 181 CALENDAR OF EVENTS ......................... 182 EDITORIAL BOARD AND AUTHOR CONTACT INFORMATION..................... 184 Introduction In a recent national survey, more than 40 percent of companies reported that they had increased their use of independent contractors over the previous two years.1 This trend is likely to continue. Companies can hire independent contractors to complete specific tasks or projects without investing time and resources into training, and without facing thorny issues related to employee terminations. Use of independent contractors can also provide financial certainty: companies can agree to pay workers for services rendered without worrying about extra costs like overtime compensation, expense reimbursement, vacation pay, workers’ compensation insurance, unemployment insurance, or payroll taxes. Use of contracted workers is also likely to grow as businesses respond to the Affordable Care Act’s2 health insurance mandates, which do not apply to independent contractors. In sum, the independent contractor business model offers companies an edge in a competitive global marketplace. As business reliance on contracted workers increases, however, a worrisome parallel movement continues nationwide. Federal and state governments, and contractors themselves, are increasingly claiming that 1 Press Release, Right Management, Two in Five Firms Use More Independent Contractors (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.right.com/news-and-events/press-releases/ 2011-press-releases/item21314.aspx. 2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (‘‘PPACA’’ or ‘‘Affordable Care Act’’), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23, 2010). (Continued on page 149) CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 148 EDITORIAL BOARD Michael C. Sullivan, Editor-in-Chief Matthew Jedreski, Executive Editor Deborah J. Tibbetts, Associate Editor Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton LLP San Diego Nancy L. Abell Paul Hastings LLP Los Angeles Ray Bertrand Paul Hastings LLP San Diego Nicole A. Diller Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP San Francisco Barbara A. Fitzgerald Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP Los Angeles Lynn Matityahu Frank Frank & Feder San Diego Joshua Henderson Seyfarth Shaw LLP San Francisco Lynne C. Hermle Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP Menlo Park Alan Levins Littler Mendelson, P.C. San Francisco Tyler M. Paetkau Hartnett, Smith & Paetkau Redwood City William B. Sailer QUALCOMM Incorporated San Diego Charles D. Sakai Renne, Sloan, Holtzman & Sakai San Francisco Arthur F. Silbergeld Dickstein Shapiro LLP Los Angeles Walter Stella Miller Law Group San Francisco Peder J. Thoreen Altshuler Berzon LLP San Francisco Bill Whelan Solomon Ward Seidenwurm & Smith, LLP San Diego M. Kirby Wilcox Paul Hastings LLP San Francisco May 2013 REPORTERS Travis Anderson Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP San Diego G. Samuel Cleaver Proskauer Rose LLP Los Angeles Michael J. Etchepare Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton LLP San Diego Paul M. Huston Paul Plevin Sullivan & Connaughton LLP San Diego Jolene Konnersman Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP Los Angeles April Love Littler Mendelson, P.C. Houston Bernadette M. O’Brien Floyd, Skeren & Kelly, LLP Calabasas Brian M. Ragen Seltzer Caplan McMahon Vitek San Diego Lena Ryan Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP San Francisco Angela T. Mullins Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton LLP San Diego Brit K. Seifert Paul Hastings LLP San Diego Donald P. Sullivan Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP San Francisco COLUMNISTS Brian M. Ragen Seltzer Caplan McMahon Vitek San Diego Corrie J. Klekowski Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton LLP San Diego Phyllis W. Cheng Director, Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. From the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations. A NOTE ON CITATION: The correct citation form for this publication is: 2013 Bender’s Calif. Lab. & Empl. Bull. 147 (May 2013). EBOOK ISBN 978-0-3271-6747-1 Copyright ß 2013 LexisNexis Matthew Bender. LexisNexis, the knowledge burst logo, and Michie are trademarks of Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., used under license. Matthew Bender is a registered trademark of Matthew Bender Properties. Note Regarding Reuse Rights: The subscriber to this publication in .pdf form may create a single printout from the delivered .pdf. For additional permissions, please see www.lexisnexis.com/terms/copyright-permission-info.aspx. If you would like to purchase additional copies within your subscription, please contact Customer Support. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 149 May 2013 Best Practices in Drafting Independent Contractor Agreements By Raymond W. Bertrand, Haley M. Morrison & Brit K. Seifert (Continued from page 147) companies are ‘‘misclassifying’’ these workers as independent contractors, rather than as employees, in order to evade payroll taxes and other employment-related expenses.3 If successful, a misclassification challenge can expose the company to significant liability under multiple tax and employment laws.4 Given these competing trends, it is essential for any organization relying on an independent contractor to 3 The federal and state governments are stepping up misclassification enforcement efforts. President Obama’s proposed 2012 budget included a request for more than $15 million plus 107 full-time positions to target, investigate and prosecute independent contractor misclassification. U.S. Dep’t of Labor (‘‘DOL’’), FY 2012 Department of Labor Budget in Brief, at 47, available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2012/PDF/ FY2012BIB.pdf. Fourteen states have signed memoranda of understanding with the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division to share information about companies using independent contractors and coordinate enforcement efforts. News Release No. 122496-KAN, DOL Wage & Hour Div., US Labor Department, Iowa Workforce Development Sign Agreement to Reduce Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/ press/whd/WHD20122496.htm. States have similarly enacted laws aimed at worker misclassification. For examples, California law has added civil penalties ranging from $5,000-$15,000 per employee for ‘‘willful’’ independent contractor misclassification, and $10,000-$25,000 per employee for a ‘‘pattern and practice’’ of misclassification. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.8. 4 Such liability may include the following: federal and state income tax payments, Social Security (or Federal Insurance Contributions Act (‘‘FICA’’) taxes, Medicare and Federal Unemployment Tax Act (‘‘FUTA’’) taxes, and penalties and interest for failing to withhold and pay taxes; liability for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘‘FLSA’’) for failure to pay minimum wages or overtime pay; liability for employee benefits, vacation and sick pay, stock options and pension plan contributions, and vesting; liability for unreimbursed business expenses; liability for failure to pay state workers’ compensation insurance; and a variety of penalties. Non-financial consequences also are serious. Responsible company officials may be held personally liable for some such payments, and some laws impose criminal sanctions (including incarceration) on company officers or agents for intentionally misclassifying workers. take steps that carefully establish and preserve that relationship. And the first such step is a carefully reasoned independent contractor agreement. This article addresses the best practices for drafting such independent contractor agreements, including, the importance of having a written, customized agreement, the overriding legal considerations and how they drive the drafting process, and essential and optional provisions. Is a Written Independent Contractor Agreement Really Necessary? Yes, a written contract is necessary, and it should be customized to the particular relationship, for several key reasons. First, a written contract defines the terms of the engagement so both sides are clear on the nature of the relationship and the parties’ expectations. In contrast, an oral agreement carries with it the risk that the parties had different understandings, and will provide little help if a later dispute results in a legal proceeding. Second, the very fact that a written agreement exists is evidence that the parties intended to create an arrangement different from most employment arrangements. A contractor’s express agreement that he or she intends to work as an independent contractor under specified terms can, under the right circumstances, be exceedingly powerful against any later claim that he or she believed that he or she was an employee. It should be customized, however, and not a form contract. Courts give little credence to form agreements in this context, generally finding them not a very meaningful indicator of the parties’ own understandings. Third, the exercise of crafting the agreement can, in and of itself, help the parties think through key aspects of the relationship. The process enables the parties to discuss the reasons for certain provisions, and what they mean for the day-to-day work relationship. Finally, a customized contract enables the parties to include additional provisions that are important to them, such as requiring the contractor to protect and preserve CA Labor & Employment Bulletin confidential and proprietary information, requiring assignment of inventions, and refraining from unfair competition. The Business Must Understand the Contract’s Limits There are limits to even the most carefully written independent contractor agreement. If the company treats the contractor like an employee, the written agreement will be of little use. Courts ignore or give little weight to written agreements and the titles they use if the parties’ daily activities suggest an employment arrangement. There are also certain ‘‘hot-spot’’ industries and/or jurisdictions where a particular industry or position is presumed to use employees. In such cases, it will be exceedingly difficult to overcome that presumption even with an extremely well-considered, carefully written agreement. For example, in certain locales, such as New York and Pennsylvania, state laws create a presumption that construction workers are employees, not independent contractors.5 In other words, an independent contractor agreement is essential to safeguarding a true independent contractor relationship. It cannot, however, serve as a panacea if the facts or applicable law preclude the characterization. Legal Considerations That Drive the Drafting Process A well-written contract of any kind takes into account legal issues, and independent contractor agreements are no exception. In order to establish the relationship and guard against future misclassification challenges, these contracts should be written with particular focus on the factors that the Internal Revenue Service (‘‘IRS’’) or another government agency will examine to assess proper classification. This is easier said than done, however, as no single, uniform test governs independent contractor status. Different tests apply depending on the law that is implicated. 5 See N.Y. Lab. Law § 861-c; H.B. 400, Pa. Gen. Assemb. 194th Sess. (Act No. 2010-72) (mandating employee treatment of construction workers unless specific criteria are met, and imposing monetary penalties and incarceration against employers or their officers or agents for misclassifying such workers as independent contractors and failing to make unemployment and workers compensation payments or contributions). 150 May 2013 For example, the IRS analyzes twenty factors6 grouped into three categories. These factors indicate (1) ‘‘behavioral control’’ (whether the company had the right to direct and control how the individuals perform their job tasks), (2) ‘‘financial control’’ (whether the contractor has unreimbursed business expenses, is free to advertise and seek out other business opportunities, payment terms, and can realize a profit or loss), and (3) the ‘‘type of relationship’’ (whether a written contract describes the intended relationship, if employee benefits are provided, the permanency of the relationship, and if the work performed is a key aspect of the company’s regular business).7 The separate ‘‘economic reality’’ test applies to a court or Department of Labor (‘‘DOL’’) challenge asserting employee status for Fair Labor Standards Act (‘‘FLSA’’)8 purposes.9 This 6 See Internal Revenue Manual, Chapter 4600 Employment Tax Procedures, Exhibit 4640-1 (1986) (‘‘Internal Rev. Man. Ex. 4640-1’’). The 20 factors are instructions; training; services integration; services rendered personally; hiring, supervising, and paying assistants; whether the relationship is a continuing one; whether work hours are set; if full-time is required; if work is performed on company premises; if work must be performed in a certain order or sequence set; if oral or written reports are required; if payment is by the hour, week, or month; which party pays business and traveling expenses; which party furnishes tools and materials; if the worker has a significant financial investment; if the individual realizes a profit or loss from the deal; if the individual works for more than one company at a time; whether the contractor makes services available to the general public; whether the company can ‘‘discharge’’ the individual; and if the contractor can terminate the relationship without liability. Internal Revenue Ex. 4640-1. 7 Internal Rev. Man. Ex. 4640-1, supra note 6. 8 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 9 See, e.g., Wal-Mart May Face Wage Suit from Contracted Workers, Law360 (Jan. 8, 2013) (reporting that the court in Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics Inc., No. 2:11-cv08557 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013), tentatively allowed a motion to amend the complaint to add Wal-Mart as a defendant in an FLSA case brought by employees of a contractor hired by Wal-Mart to run certain warehouses; plaintiff’s counsel reported as saying: ‘‘We contend that Wal-Mart is a joint employer and the principal on whose behalf the other contractors acted as agents, and that it was an aider and abettor of their violations and was negligent in retaining the other contractors, knowing of their violations, . . . Its role in these warehouses is the same as its role in the 100 percent Wal-Mart run warehouses, which is to minutely scrutinize every activity that occurs in the warehouse. . . . As a matter of economic reality, Wal-Mart is liable for the wage violations inflicted upon the workers.’’). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin test examines whether, as a matter of economic reality, the individual is economically dependent upon the company for which it renders services or, whether he or she is in business for himself or herself, instead.10 Yet a different analysis applies if the contractor or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (‘‘EEOC’’) (or similar state agency) later sues the company for discrimination under federal law. To bring these claims, the individual must qualify as an ‘‘employee’’ as evaluated under the anti-discrimination laws,11 which generally rely on common law agency principles of master/servant.12 The overarching issue is ‘‘the hiring party’s right to control the manner and 151 May 2013 means by which the product is accomplished.’’13 State laws may also employ their own analyses.14 Choosing just one such test and writing the contract to address its elements is risky because this approach could still fall short under a different analysis. Someone may qualify as an independent contractor under the IRS’s test for federal income tax purposes, but be deemed an employee under the DOL’s ‘‘economic realities’’ inquiry. There is also no guarantee regarding which test may be implicated. Generally, the contract is written long before a worker status challenge arises, and when it is still impossible to know whether it will be the IRS, DOL, contractor, or another entity claiming misclassification. Finally, none of the tests are easy-to-apply, nor do they have ‘‘bright-line’’ rules. Multiple factors make up each 13 10 Five factors guide the ‘‘economic realities’’ inquiry: (1) the degree of control exercised by the company; (2) the extent of relative investments by the individual and company; (3) the degree to which the individual’s opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the company; (4) the skill and initiative required in performing the job; and (5) the permanency of the parties’ relationship. These factors are nonexhaustive and no one factor controls. Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008) (reciting these principles and noting that ‘‘each factor is a tool used to gauge the economic dependence of the alleged employee, and each must be applied with this ultimate concept in mind’’). 11 See, e.g., Ernster v. Luxco, Inc., 596 F.3d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 2010) (‘‘alleg[ing] age discrimination in violation of the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act (‘‘ADEA’’)] and the [Iowa Civil Rights Act]. Both statutes protect employees but not independent contractors.’’). 12 The United States Supreme Court in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992), held that when a federal statute defines ‘‘employee’’ in a manner that ‘‘is completely circular and explains nothing,’’ then courts are to use the common-law test, derived primarily from the Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 220(2) (1958). This common law test, or some version of it, also has been applied to decide ‘‘employee’’ status under other federal statutes. See, e.g., Berger Transfer & Storage v. Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 85 F.3d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying the test on an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (‘‘ERISA’’) claim). Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24. Factors examined are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the length of time for which the individual is engaged; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects; the extent of the contractor’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment (e.g., by the time or by the job); whether the contractor is in business; whether the work performed is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether employee benefits are provided; and the tax treatment of the contractor. 14 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148B (one of the most stringent state-level independent contractor statutes, this statute places the burden on the company or organization to demonstrate that a worker satisfies each of the three prongs of the so-called ‘‘ABC’’ test in order to be classified as an independent contractor; the worker must (a) be free from the company’s control and direction in performing the service, ‘‘both under his contract for the performance of service and in fact’’; (b) the services provided must be rendered outside of the company’s usual place of business; and (c) the individual must be engaged in an independent trade, occupation or business of the same nature as the company); Or. Rev. Stat. (‘‘ORS’’) § 670.600(2) (for purposes of state revenue department and licensing boards, an ‘‘independent contractor means a person who provides services for remuneration and who, in the provision of the services: (a) Is free from direction and control over the means and manner of providing the services, subject only to the right of the person for whom the services are provided to specify the desired results; (b) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, is customarily engaged in an independently established business; (c) Is licensed under ORS chapter 671 or 701 if the person provides services for which a license is required under ORS chapter 671 or 701; and (d) Is responsible for obtaining other licenses or certificates necessary to provide the services.’’). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 152 May 2013 will render - but should not dictate how the services will be performed on a day-to-day basis. It helps to state that the contractor is responsible for determining when, where and how he or she will carry out the work, or that the contractor is responsible for the method, manner and means of delivering the final product or result. Caveat: as noted earlier, however, simply saying that the contractor is free to perform without supervision will not make it so. The parties’ actions must mirror this provision.16 test, and no guidance exists as to how many (or which) factors must be satisfied to tip the balance one way or the other. At the same time, when drafting the agreement, it is important to bear in mind that the key determinant of independent contractor status across most employment and tax laws is the company’s degree of control over the individual worker. The more control the company retains whether or not that control is actually exercised - the more likely the individual will be found to be an ‘‘employee.’’ As the IRS says: ‘‘In determining whether the person providing service is an employee or an independent contractor, all information that provides evidence of the degree of control and independence must be considered.’’15 This standard should guide the process of writing the contract, too. Contract Terms To Be Sure to Include - and Language To Be Sure to Exclude Certain provisions should be included in virtually all independent contractor agreements, unless a unique reason makes it unwise. Also, the language used in each provision should be carefully considered because certain words bear legal significance and should be used only if they help to establish contractor status. Titles and Names: The agreement should be properly-titled. Here, and throughout, the nomenclature matters. The document should be called something like ‘‘Consulting Agreement,’’ ‘‘Independent Contractor Agreement,’’ or ‘‘Services Contract,’’—but not ‘‘Employment Agreement.’’ Likewise, the parties should be properly identified and characterized. Nowhere in the document should the individual contractor be referred to as an ‘‘employee’’ nor the company referred to as the ‘‘employer.’’ The contract should affirmatively state that the contractor is engaged as an independent contractor. Once a complete draft of the contract exists, it should be reviewed from start to finish solely to eliminate any ‘‘employment’’sounding language. Nature of Contract Services and Contract Specifications; No Directions and No Control: The contract should specify the particular purpose for the engagement - the services the contractor 15 See IRS, Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/ Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Independent-Contractor(Self-Employed)-or-Employee%3F. Term/Duration of Engagement: Generally speaking, an engagement for a specific period of time, or for the duration of a particular project, suggests independent contractor status. Engagements for long or indefinite periods of time or with no stated end-date, suggest employment status. For this reason, the independent contractor agreement should describe the finite term of the engagement, and if possible, state that it will terminate upon conclusion of the project. Any penalties for prematurely ending the contract should be listed. Less convincing for contractor status, but an option, is a term allowing either side to terminate on 30 days’ notice (e.g., so the company can locate a replacement contractor). The contract should not reserve the right to terminate at any time, however; such a provision smacks of an at-will relationship, which is generally found in the employment context. 16 Pay/Compensation: Contractor payments should be treated in a manner consistent with independent contractor status - and inconsistent with employment status. Payments should be in the form of a lump sum, as agreed upon as the cost of a job, or in the form of lump-sum payments as progress is made or using piecework payments. Periodic (hourly, weekly, or monthly) payments should be avoided because they look like wages. The company should consult a tax advisor to secure professional advice regarding tax treatment. In many cases, this may mean that the See, e.g., ‘‘An Advisory from the Attorney General, Amendments to Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law,’’ Advisory 2008/1, at p. 3 (‘‘An employment contract or job description indicating that an individual is free from supervisory direction or control is insufficient by itself to classify an individual as an independent contractor under the Law.’’). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin contractor will complete an IRS Form W-9 Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and Certification;17 the company will not make employment-related withholdings for taxes (e.g., FICA, FUTA, etc.); and the company will issue a Form 1099-MISC, which is most commonly used to report payments made to contractors for services. Non-Exclusivity: Restrictions on a contractor’s ability to work for other companies suggests control and employment status, not independent contractor status.18 Consequently, the contract should not provide for an exclusive engagement and, if possible, should expressly state that the contractor is free to undertake other work arrangements during the term of the contract (subject to the confidentiality, non-compete and related obligations addressed below), and may continue to make his or her services available to the public. If an exclusive arrangement is desired, a company may be able to accomplish it in fact by establishing an ambitious timeframe for completion of the project, so as to prevent the contractor from taking on other work simply due to time constraints. The fact that he or she could have taken on additional work can shore up the independent contractor characterization if it is later challenged. Hours: If possible, the contract should expressly grant the contractor’s right to work those hours he or she deems necessary to perform under the contract, as this discretion shows the contractor is in control, not the company.19 Location of Worksite or Performance of Services/Premises: If possible, the contract should leave to the contractor the decision of where to perform the work, again, to demonstrate control by the contractor. 17 Expenses: The contract should expressly state that the contractor is responsible for paying business expenses related to furnishing services under the contract, such as the cost of equipment, tools, office space and support services. The company should limit reimbursement for Available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw9.pdf. 18 See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (‘‘An independent contractor is free to work when and for whom he/she chooses.’’). 19 See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (‘‘The establishment of set hours of work by the person or persons for whom the services are performed is a factor indicating control.’’). 153 May 2013 those expenses to the greatest extent possible, as reimbursement suggests employee status. One negotiating point if the contractor objects to assuming business expenses is to write up the overall contract payment amount to cover the costs of the reasonably foreseeable expenses. Provisions Protecting Company Property, Trade Secrets and Inventions: Unfortunately, independent contractor agreements often include no mention of a company’s confidential information, trade secrets and inventions. Yet consultants may have as much, or possibly even more, access than employees to such valuable intellectual property and confidential data. Thus, it is important to address these issues. Non-disclosure/Confidentiality: This provision basically states that the contractor (and his or her delegates or assistants) will not disclose or use confidential (including proprietary) information during or after the contract term, other than as required in course of engagement. Inventions: This provision addresses the company’s ownership of inventions, discoveries, developments, etc. by the contractor in the course of performing the services, and assigns any contractor rights to such inventions and discoveries to the company. The contract should also establish the same obligations and rights as to any delegates or assistants engaged by the contractor to perform the contract. The company should be careful to ensure that the above-listed provisions are drafted in compliance with the applicable state law(s). Some companies may already have separate agreements addressing these matters. Such outside agreements may be used with independent contractors so long as certain protections are in place. For example, the outside agreement should not use employment-type language, such as referring to the individual signing it as an ‘‘employee.’’ Also, the independent contractor agreement should not state that it sets forth the entire agreement of the parties as to the relationship. Instead, it should expressly reference the separate confidentiality/inventions agreement(s). Any such agreements may be presented to the contractor for signature along with the independent contractor agreement at the outset of the arrangement. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin Optional Provisions 154 May 2013 Other potential disclaimer provisions include: Though not essential, the following additional provisions may be appropriate: Assistants/Right to Delegate: In appropriate contexts, a contract may expressly state that the contractor may hire delegates to assist in performing all or some of the services under the contract. Such a provision bolsters independent contractor status.20 If this topic is addressed, the contract should also expressly state that the contractor, not the company, bears full responsibility for hiring, overseeing and paying such assistants/delegates. Indemnification: An issue that may trigger negotiation between the parties is whether to include an indemnification clause. The clause may be narrowly drafted to cover a specific issue. Or, it may be broader, and require the contractor to indemnify the company, perhaps up to a stated financial amount, for losses or damages resulting from the contractor’s services. There is no right or wrong rule here. If a company desires indemnification, then it should want to take steps to verify the financial ability of the contractor to fulfill an indemnification promise, e.g., proof of valid insurance coverage, the contractor’s affirmance in the agreement that he/she will continue to carry such insurance, etc. Disclaimers and Language Expressly Denying Certain Aspects of the Relationship Affirmatively addressing a feature of the relationship may not always be enough. It is therefore important that the contract state what the relationship is not. For example, actually stating that the worker is engaged as an independent contractor and is not being hired as an employee, can be powerful proof later if there is a dispute about the contractor’s status. To further bolster this distinction, the contract may go on to state that the parties - and particularly, the individual - understand the difference between a contractor role and an employee role, and would not have entered into this arrangement had it been an employment arrangement. Having the contractor ascribe his/her initials next to these provisions, indicating his/her understanding, is also prudent. 20 See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (stating that if services must be rendered personally, then presumably, the company is interested in the methods and not just the end result). No employee benefits: The common law masterservant test, in particular, examines whether employee benefits were provided by the company to the contractor.21 Expressly stating that the contractor is not eligible for, nor provided, such benefits meets this factor head-on. No training/meetings: If true, the contract should expressly state that there is no requirement that the contractor undergo training by the company, nor attend workplace employee meetings, in order to provide services under the contract.22 No progress reports: If possible, expressly stating that no periodic or regular written or oral progress or status reports will be required from the contractor to the company can bolster contractor status. The decision as to whether to include disclaimer provisions should be based on factors such as the particular services being provided, the work history between the parties, the relative likelihood of a challenge to the worker’s status, the company’s past practices, the industry in which the company does business, and unique aspects of the governing law. Conclusion It has never been riskier for companies to use independent contractors, yet businesses are increasingly turning to this worker model because of the relative independence and efficiency that it offers, among other things. Starting off on the right foot with a tailored, wellanalyzed, and clearly written independent contractor 21 Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) (‘‘In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are . . . the provision of employee benefits’’) (internal citation omitted). 22 See Department of the Treasury, IRS, Independent Contractor or Employee?, IRS Publication 1179 (3-2012) (‘‘Training - if the business provides you with training about required procedures and methods, this indicates that the business wants the work done in a certain way, and this suggests that you may be an employee.’’). On a related note, to the extent the contractor possesses certifications, such as a professional license, etc., required to perform under the contract, it is helpful to reference those pre-existing credentials, either in the body of the agreement or in the opening recitals. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin agreement can safeguard the relationship and offer the company important protections. Raymond W. Bertrand, Esq., is a partner in the Paul Hastings Employment Law practice whose practice focuses on leading large and complex litigation matters in state and federal courts, in cases involving all aspects of employment law, including wage-hour, wrongful termination, breach of contract, trade secrets, discrimination, harassment and retaliation. Mr. Bertrand can be reached at raymondbertrand@ paulhastings.com. Haley M. Morrison, Esq. is an associate in the Paul Hastings Employment Law practice who represents employers in a wide variety of employment-related 155 May 2013 matters, including employment discrimination, harassment, and wage and hour cases, in both single plaintiff and class action litigation. Ms. Morrison can be reached at [email protected]. Brit K. Seifert, Esq. is an attorney in the Paul Hastings Employment Law practice who counsels and represents employers in connection with day-to-day workforce talent management issues, including the onboarding process, disciplinary issues and terminations, and compliance with federal, state and local employment laws. Ms. Seifert can be reached at [email protected]. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 156 Martindale-Hubbell Connected Õ is an online, global network—designed exclusively for legal professionals—leveraging the unsurpassed reach of the Martindale-Hubbell database of more than one million lawyers and law firms. Expand your professional network and share your knowledge with a global audience and benefit from the expertise of the community. Simply connect with the people you know and the people who your connections know to build your network quickly and easily. From legal and risk management to IP, restructuring and employment law, you can tackle today’s emerging issues, collaborate globally through online groups, blogs and forums: Groups: Join or start groups with co-workers or legal professionals who share your interests or current practice area. Blogs: Hear what thought leaders are saying and voice your opinion—even write your own blog! Forums: Keep up on legal issues when you want, where you want with those who share your interests and practice area. Get Connected today—it takes just a few minutes to get started! Go to www.martindale.com/connected. Also from Matthew Bender: California Employers’ Guide to Employee Handbooks and Personnel Policy Manuals, by Morrison & Foerster LLP 2012 Revisions by Paul Hastings LLP This handy volume and accompanying CD offers an all-inclusive roadmap to writing, revising and updating employee handbooks. More economical than competing guidebooks, this volume is a vital reference that helps you draft appropriate content, speeding additional research with cross-references to the Wilcox treatise, California Employment Law. Sample policies cover the following: technology use and security; blogging; cell phone use; company property, proprietary and personal information; employment-at-will; anti-harassment policies; work schedules and overtime; and much more. Order online at Lexis.com or by calling 1-800-223-1940. May 2013 CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 157 May 2013 In an Era of Mandatory Arbitration, Don’t Forget the Board By Peder J. V. Thoreen Introduction In an era in which the United States Supreme Court has increasingly protected employers’ ability to enforce arbitration agreements that they require as a condition of employment, the National Labor Relations Board (‘‘NLRB’’ or ‘‘Board’’) has re-invigorated the National Labor Relations Act1 (‘‘NLRA’’ or ‘‘Act’’) as a source of employee rights to challenge such agreements. Recently, in Supply Technologies LLC,2 the Board reaffirmed that arbitration agreements perceived to restrict employees’ right to access the Board’s processes are unlawful. The decision arguably extends the relevant jurisprudence beyond prior decisions, potentially requiring employers to expressly inform employees when signing an arbitration agreement that by doing so, they are not waiving their right to petition the Board for relief. This article discusses the Supply Technologies decision in the context of the trends in related Supreme Court cases and earlier Board decisions. Discussion Conflicting Currents Mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements, often required as a condition of employment, have garnered much attention from the Supreme Court in recent years. In a series of decisions, the Court has strongly endorsed employers’ right to impose such agreements on employees and to insist that they be enforced according to their terms, including broad definitions regarding the types of claims subject to mandatory arbitration and limitations on the manner in which arbitration must proceed, such as prohibitions on class or joint arbitration.3 For example, in 2009 in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,4 which held that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement requiring the arbitration of federal statutory claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act5 (‘‘ADEA’’) was enforceable, the Court distanced its own statements in prior cases ‘‘that were highly critical of the use of arbitration for the vindication of statutory antidiscrimination rights.’’6 It noted that these were based on ‘‘a misconceived view of arbitration that this Court has since abandoned.’’7 Indeed, as long ago as 1989 the Court recognized that earlier case law ‘‘rest[ing] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, . . . has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.’’8 This perspective has recently been evident in the Court’s 2011 decision holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (‘‘FAA’’)9 preempts a state law rule prohibiting class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements where they effectively exculpate the defendant from its own wrongdoing,10 and its 2012 decision holding that a federal statute’s right-to-sue language was insufficient to guarantee the right to a judicial forum.11 4 556 U.S. 247 (2009). To view Supreme Court briefs related to the 14 Penn Plaza LLC case, go to 2007 U.S. Briefs 581 on Lexis.com. To view oral argument transcripts, go to 2008 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 71. 5 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 6 Pyett, 556 U.S. at 265. 7 556 U.S. at 265. 8 The Supreme Court has expressly recognized this trend away from an historical judicial hostility to arbitration. 1 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 2 359 NLRB No. 38 (2012). 3 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (noting the ‘‘outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration’’ and the erosion of ‘‘ ‘the old judicial hostility to arbitration’ ’’ (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)). 9 For more on this trend, see Peder J. V. Thoreen, Alienable Rights? The Past, Present & Future of the Prohibition Against Private FLSA Settlements, 2012 Bender’s Cal. Lab. & Empl. Bull. 405, 411-12 (Dec. 2012). 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. 10 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) . 11 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin At the time of this writing, the Court is considering whether the FAA ‘‘permits courts, invoking the ‘federal substantive law of arbitrability,’ to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.’’12 The Court also currently has before it the question whether ‘‘an arbitrator acts within his powers under the Federal Arbitration Act . . . by determining that parties affirmatively agreed to authorize class arbitration, . . . based solely on their use of broad contractual language precluding litigation and requiring arbitration of any dispute arising under their contract.’’13 If recent history is a guide, it is likely that these questions will be answered in the negative. The Board, however, famously bucked this trend with its 2012 decision in D.R. Horton, Inc.14 In that case, the Board considered the validity of a mandatory arbitration agreement prohibiting class arbitration in light of Section 7 of the NLRA. Section 7 guarantees workers’ rights ‘‘to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.’’15 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer ‘‘to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in’’ Section 7.16 158 May 2013 the extent that it prohibited employees from pursuing disputes on a joint, class or collective basis.17 The maintenance of the class prohibition thus constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1). It is against this backdrop that the Board issued its decision in Supply Technologies and re-affirmed another doctrine impeding efforts by employers to channel all disputes with their employees into private, individual arbitration. Supply Technologies Unlawful Policies Impairing Access to the Board The broader context for the decision in Supply Technologies is Board law regarding the circumstances in which workplace policies unlawfully impair employees’ NLRA rights. In Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia,18 the Board considered when workplace rules may violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because they ‘‘reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.’’19 The Board began with the uncontroversial conclusion that, where a rule ‘‘explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7 . . . we will find the rule unlawful.’’20 The Board then established three circumstances in which a workplace rule violates Section 8(a)(1) even though it does not expressly restrict Section 7 activity, holding that such violation depends on a showing that: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.21 The Board in D.R. Horton held that the employer’s arbitration agreement violated employees’ Section 7 right to engage in ‘‘concerted protected activity,’’ to Thus, for example, the Board in Lutheran Heritage concluded that workplace rules prohibiting abusive or profane language did not violate Section 8(a)(1) because (a) they ‘‘do not expressly cover Section 7 activity,’’ (b) there was ‘‘no basis for a finding that a 12 See Brief for Petitioner, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No. 12-133, United States Supreme Court (Dec. 21, 2012), at i, available at http://www.americanbar. org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/ briefs-v2/12-133_pet.authcheckdam.pdf. 13 See Brief for Petition, Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, No. 12-135, United States Supreme Court (Jan. 2013), at (i), available at, http//www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12-135_ pet.authcheckdam.pdf (quotation marks and internal citation omitted). 14 15 16 17 D.R. Horton is currently on appeal in the Fifth Circuit. Oral argument took place on February 5, 2013. At the time this article was submitted for publication, no opinion had been issued. For more on how class action prohibitions interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights, see Peder J. V. Thoreen, Class Action Prohibitions in Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Employees’ Section 7 Rights, 2011 Bender’s Cal. Lab. & Empl. Bull. 97 (Apr. 2011). 18 343 N.L.R.B. 646 (2003). 357 NLRB No. 184 (2012). 19 343 N.L.R.B. at 646. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 20 343 N.L.R.B. at 646. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 21 343 N.L.R.B. at 647. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin reasonable employee would interpret a rule prohibiting such language as prohibiting Section 7 activity,’’ and (c) there was no evidence that the challenged rules ‘‘have been applied to protected activity or that [they were] adopted . . . in response to protected activity.’’22 Among the specific types of activities protected by Section 7 is access to the Board’s processes.23 Thus, an employer commits an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) if it impairs employees’ access to the Board. Supply Technologies addressed whether a mandatory arbitration agreement could have this impermissible effect. The Decision, Its Antecedents, and Its Implications Supply Technologies involved a grievance-arbitration program, called ‘‘Total Solutions Management’’ or ‘‘TSM,’’ pursuant to which employees were required to arbitrate all claims relating to [their] application for employment, [their] employment, or the termination of [their] employment; claims under any federal[,] state, or local statute (including, but not limited to, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sections 1981 through 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code, ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act), Worker Adjustment Relocation and Notification Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Labor Standard[s] Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Equal Pay Act and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act . . . .24 Only three types of claims were expressly excluded from TSM – criminal matters, claims for workers’ compensation, and claims for unemployment compensation benefits.25 159 May 2013 requirement that federal statutory claims must be brought under TSM, reasonable employees reading the Agreement would understand it to restrict their right to file unfair labor practice charges or otherwise access the Board’s processes.’’26 The Board noted that although the NLRA was not specifically identified as one of the statutory claims subject to arbitration, all of the statutes identified in the nonexhaustive list are, like the NLRA, ‘‘concerned with workplace rights,’’ while the ‘‘short description of excluded claims states that they are the only claims excluded.’’27 Although the TSM expressly preserved the parties’ right to ‘‘file a charge or complaint with a government agency’’ and left them ‘‘free to cooperate with a government agency that might be investigating a charge or complaint,’’ the Board held that this was insufficient.28 It noted that, in contrast to the language specifically naming the statutes expressly covered by TSM, ‘‘no statute or government agency is named here. Nor does this language explain that filing an administrative charge is intended to be an exception to the broad and nonexhaustive list of claims that, according to [other provisions] of the Agreement, ‘must’ be brought in TSM.’’29 In the end, the Board held that ‘‘the language leaves the scope of TSM ambiguous, at best.’’30 It held that such ambiguity should be resolved against the drafter, the employer, noting that when it intended to make a provision clear and unambiguous – such as the language making clear that employees’ continued employment was conditioned on signing the agreement – it did so.31 For all of these reasons, the Board concluded that ‘‘reasonable employees would understand TSM as interfering with the right to file unfair labor practice charges or otherwise access the Board’s processes,’’ and that its maintenance therefore violates Section 8(a)(1).32 As the Board noted,33 its decision finds support in a line of prior NLRB cases. In 2006 in U-Haul Co.,34 for The Board concluded that in light of TSM’s ‘‘broad scope, its three limited exceptions, and its specific 22 26 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 2. 27 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 2. 28 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 2. 29 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 2. 30 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 3. 31 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 3-4. 32 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 4. 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 2. 33 See 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 3. 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 2. 34 347 N.L.R.B. 375 (2006). 343 N.L.R.B. at 647. 23 See, e.g., Braun Elec. Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 1, 3 (1997) (‘‘[T]he rights secured by Section 7 include ‘the right to unionize, the right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, and the right to utilize the Board’s processes.’ ’’ (quoting Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740 (1983)). 24 25 CA Labor & Employment Bulletin example, the Board held that a mandatory arbitration policy requiring arbitration of numerous specified statutory claims as well as ‘‘any other legal or equitable claims and causes of action recognized by local, state, or federal law or regulations,’’ violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act.35 While the policy did not expressly restrict employees from resorting to the Board, ‘‘the breadth of the policy language, referencing the policy’s applicability to causes of action recognized by ‘federal law or regulations,’ would reasonably be read by employees to prohibit the filing of unfair labor practice charges with the Board.’’ 36 The NLRB held that language explaining that arbitration was limited to claims that a ‘‘court of law’’ could adjudicate was insufficient to clarify that the policy did not extend to the filing of charges with the Board.37 A year later, in Bill’s Electric, Inc.,38 the Board held unlawful another mandatory grievance and arbitration policy. In that case, the policy informed job applicants that participation in the grievance and arbitration process did not constitute a waiver of any Board requirements for timely filing of unfair labor practice charges. But the Board noted that the employer emphasized that grievance and arbitration was the exclusive method of dispute resolution, subject only to limited judicial review, and any applicant or employee seeking to pursue a charge before the Board before completing the arbitration process would have to pay the costs of any litigation to compel compliance with that process.39 The Board concluded that such a policy ‘‘would reasonably be read by affected applicants and employees as substantially restricting, if not totally prohibiting, their access to the Board’s processes.’’40 In 2011, the Board rejected another mandatory arbitration agreement in 2 Sisters Food Group, Inc.41 In that case, the policy was expressly limited to claims ‘‘that may lawfully [] be resolve[d] by arbitration.’’ 42 Although it was urged that this language salvaged the 35 347 N.L.R.B. at 377-78. Section 8(a)(4) makes it an unfair labor practice ‘‘to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.’’ 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). 36 347 N.L.R.B. at 377. 37 347 N.L.R.B. at 377-78. 38 350 N.L.R.B. 292 (2007). 39 350 N.L.R.B. at 296. 40 350 N.L.R.B. at 296. 41 42 160 May 2013 policy because employees would understand that the policy did not prohibit filing of charges with the Board, the NLRB disagreed: ‘‘[T]he limiting language in the Respondent’s arbitration policy does not by its terms specifically exclude NLRB proceedings, and ‘most nonlawyer employees’ would not be sufficiently familiar with the limitations the Act imposes on mandatory arbitration for the language to be effective.’’43 But while Supply Technologies’ general holding is, thus, well grounded in prior cases, the dissent argued that the decision pushed the doctrine importantly beyond existing case law. The dissent found the majority opinion ‘‘particularly disturbing’’ for two reasons.44 First, the dissent argued, the opinion allegedly distorts the first prong of the second stage Lutheran Heritage test, i.e., whether employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity. Under the majority’s approach, ‘‘in a nonunion setting, an individual mandatory arbitration agreement for the resolution of employment disputes will be deemed ambiguous and unlawful unless (a) it expressly exempts claims arising under the Act from its coverage, or, possibly, (b) it covers such claims but expressly states without qualification that employees may still pursue such claims and gain relief through the Board’s processes.’’45 ‘‘In other words,’’ the dissent urged, the test [under Supply Technologies] is not whether ambiguous language would reasonably tend to interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights. The test is simply whether the language is ambiguous. If it is – that is, if it fails to expressly guarantee the right to file unfair labor practice charges with the Board and to access the Board’s processes – nothing can save the language from being unlawful.46 The dissent complained that this approach ‘‘goes far beyond even the most strained out-of-context majority readings in recent cases of work rules found unlawful under the first prong of the Lutheran Heritage secondstep test.’’47 Second, the dissent found 43 357 NLRB No. 168, slip op. at 2 (quoting U-Haul, 347 N.L.R.B. at 378). 44 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 4. 45 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 5. 46 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 5. 47 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 5. 357 NLRB No. 168 (2011). 357 NLRB No. 168, slip op. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin even more disturbing . . . the apparent continuing antipathy of the Acting General Counsel and a Board majority towards private mandatory dispute resolution programs in the nonunion setting. Although the Board has never so held, it is difficult to avoid the implication from this case that any private dispute resolution system for individual employees in a nonunion work force is unlawful unless it is [] nonmandatory[.]48 Quoting the Supreme Court, the dissent concluded that this supposed ‘‘reluctance to sanction any form of mandatory dispute resolution in nonunion work forces cannot be reconciled with the well-recognized ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’ ’’49 48 49 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op. at 5. 359 NLRB No. 38, slip op at 5 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)). 161 May 2013 Conclusion Regardless of whether the Board’s decision in Supply Technologies is as radical as the dissent suggests, it represents a significant re-assertion of the Board’s influence and a stand against the trend of Supreme Court cases broadly enforcing the terms of mandatory predispute arbitration agreements. However, much remains uncertain as Supply Technologies and D.R. Horton wend their way through the appellate process, and we await the Supreme Court’s decisions in other arbitration-related cases currently pending before it. Peder Thoreen is a partner at Altshuler Berzon LLP in San Francisco, a litigation firm that specializes in labor and employment, environmental, constitutional, campaign and election, and civil rights law. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 162 SUBSCRIPTION QUESTIONS? If you have any questions about the status of your subscription, please call your Matthew Bender representative, or call our Customer Service line at 1-800-833-9844. May 2013 CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 163 May 2013 The Fair Employment and Housing Commission’s Final Act - New Disability Regulations - Is a Not-So-Fond Farewell for Employers By Carolyn Rashby & Shiva Shirazi Davoudian Introduction Prior to its demise at the close of 2012, the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission (‘‘FEHC’’) approved new disability regulations under the Fair Employment and Housing Act1 (‘‘FEHA’’). The regulations, which took effect on December 30, 2012, make a number of significant changes and clarifications to the then-existing disability rules, and provide important guidance for employers on the duty to provide reasonable accommodations and to engage in the interactive process. This article provides an overview of the key changes and highlights of the new regulations to assist California employers in understanding their new obligations. Broad Definition of Disability The Statement of Purpose to the new regulations specifies that the definition of disability should ‘‘be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage’’ for employees and applicants.2 In keeping with this, the regulations state that the ‘‘primary focus’’ in FEHA cases is no longer on whether the employee is, in fact, disabled but on whether the employer has provided reasonable accommodation, and whether all parties have complied with their obligations to engage in the interactive process.3 The regulations also expand the definition of ‘‘disability’’ by including some new protected categories. For example, the regulations now include a ‘‘special education’’ disability, which is a health impairment or disorder that requires or has required special education or related services.4 It covers difficulties in the acquisition and use of listening, speaking, reading, writing, reasoning or mathematical abilities.5 The regulations also include a new category for ‘‘perceived potential’’ disabilities – that is, when the employer regards, perceives or treats the employee as having a disability that has no present 1 disabling effect but may become a disability in the future.6 In short, as a result of the expanded definition of disability and these new categories, it will be easier for an individual to establish that he or she is disabled for purposes of coverage under the FEHA. The new regulations also provide useful guidance on the existing FEHA requirement that, in order to rise to the level of a disability, a physical or mental impairment must ‘‘limit’’ a ‘‘major life activity.’’ The regulations explain that the impairment ‘‘limits’’ a major life activity if it makes the achievement of that major life activity ‘‘difficult.’’7 The determination of what meets the standard of ‘‘difficult’’ requires an individualized assessment considering, for example, what most people can perform with little or no difficulty; what the individual’s peer group can do with little or no difficulty; and what the individual would be able to do with little or no difficulty in absence of the disability.8 What’s An Essential Job Function? Under the FEHA, to be considered a ‘‘qualified’’ individual with a disability, the employee or applicant must be able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. The determination of whether certain duties are essential requires a fact-intensive analysis, but the regulations provide practical guidance on what are considered ‘‘essential job functions.’’9 In particular, a job function may be considered essential because, for example, it is the reason the position exists, there are a limited number of employees among whom performance of that function can be distributed, or the function is highly specialized, so that the employee is hired for his or her expertise to perform that function.10 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq. 6 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(d)(6). 2 2 C.C.R. § 7293.5(b). 7 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(l)(3). 3 2 C.C.R. § 7293.5(b). 8 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(l)(3)(A). 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(d)(3). 9 See 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(e). 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(d)(3). 10 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(e)(1). 4 5 CA Labor & Employment Bulletin The regulations also list various types of ‘‘evidence’’ that should be considered to determine whether a particular function is essential, including: the employer’s judgment; the amount of time spent performing the function in question; the work experience of past incumbents in the job; the current work experience of employees in similar jobs; reference to job functions in performance reviews; the legitimate business consequences of not requiring the individual to perform the function; and ‘‘accurate, current job descriptions.’’11 164 May 2013 accommodation that is effective.16 The employer cannot require an employee to accept an accommodation, but may inform the employee that refusing an accommodation may render the employee unable to perform the essential job functions and, therefore, unqualified.17 The regulations also provide new guidance on some specific types of accommodations, as follows: Practically speaking, the emphasis on ‘‘accurate’’ and ‘‘current’’ job descriptions means that employers should be careful to regularly update their job descriptions to reflect the realities of each position’s job duties. Employers should also ensure that annual performance evaluations focus on the employee’s performance of essential job functions. Focus on Reasonable Accommodation The regulations clarify that an employer has an affirmative duty under the FEHA to make a reasonable accommodation for the known disability of an applicant or employee, unless the employer can establish that, after engaging in the interactive process, the accommodation would be an undue hardship on the employer.12 The regulations also make a number of other clarifications and changes to the reasonable accommodation requirement. For example, the regulations include a laundry list of examples of reasonable accommodations, such as transfers, job restructuring, modifications to policies or supervisory methods, additional training, leaves of absence, reassignment to a vacant position, additional training, and more.13 The regulations also clarify that while employers do not have to eliminate or lower quantity or quality standards as a reasonable accommodation, an employer is required to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable a disabled employee to meet the quality and quantity standards.14 Furthermore, an employer must consider any and all reasonable accommodations of which it is aware or which are brought to its attention by the employee, except accommodations that create an undue hardship.15 The employer must consider the employee’s preferred accommodation, but has the right to select another 11 Leaves of absence. When a disabled employee cannot presently perform the job’s essential functions or otherwise needs time off for treatment or recovery, holding a job open for the employee while on leave may be a reasonable accommodation. The new regulations, however, make it clear that leave is a reasonable accommodation only where it will likely allow the employee to return to work at the end of the leave with or without further accommodation, and employers do not have to provide an ‘‘indefinite’’ leave as a reasonable accommodation.18 Furthermore, when an employee can continue to work with a reasonable accommodation, the employer cannot require that the employee take a leave of absence.19 On the other hand, an employer is not required to provide leave when an alternative accommodation would be just as effective.20 The regulations also underscore that leaves beyond the 12-week limit under the Family and Medical Leave Act21 (‘‘FMLA’’) and California Family Rights Act22 (‘‘CFRA’’) may be required as a reasonable accommodation. There is no specified amount of leave that must be provided, and requests for leaves beyond the 12-week FMLA/CFRA period must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.23 Reassignment to a vacant position. The regulations elaborate on when reassignment to a vacant position is a reasonable accommodation. In particular, reassignment is an accommodation when the employee cannot perform the essential functions of his or her own job even 16 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(e). 17 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(f). 18 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(c). 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(c). 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(e)(2). 19 12 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(a). 20 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(c). 13 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(p)(2). 21 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(b). 22 Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12945.2, 19702.3. 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(e). 23 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(c). 14 15 CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 165 May 2013 a traumatic brain injury or a mental disability like depression.32 Assistive animals may be any trained animal, not just dogs. with an accommodation; accommodating the employee in his or her own position is an undue hardship; the employer and employee agree that reassignment is preferable to other accommodations; or the employee requests reassignment in order to be closer to medical treatment.24 Employers may require that assistive animals be free from offensive odors, display appropriate habits for the work environment, not engage in dangerous behavior and be trained to provide assistance for the employee’s disability.33 And if an employee requests permission to bring an assistive animal to work, the employer may require a letter from the employee’s healthcare provider explaining ‘‘why the animal is necessary as an accommodation to allow the employee to perform the essential functions of the job.’’34 When reassignment is a reasonable accommodation, the employer’s duty is to first look to vacant comparable (in terms of pay, benefits, etc.) positions for which the employee is qualified. If no such comparable jobs are available, the employer can look to lower grade or lower paid positions.25 The employer is NOT required to create a new position for disabled employees, unless the employer does this in other situations.26 Finally, the regulations emphasize that a disabled employee is entitled to preferential consideration of reassignment to a vacant position over other applicants and existing employees.27 This means that an employee is not required to compete for the vacant position. On the other hand, an employer is not required to ignore a bona fide seniority system.28 ‘‘Fully healed’’ policies. The regulations specify that employers may not impose ‘‘fully healed’’ or ‘‘100 percent healed’’ policies that require an employee to be free of work restrictions in order to return to work following an illness or injury.29 Rather, the employer must conduct an individualized assessment of the employee’s ability to perform the essential functions with or without an accommodation.30 The Interactive Process Failure to engage in the interactive process violates the FEHA - separate, apart from, and in addition to a violation of the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation. The new regulations stress the importance of the interactive process and provide lengthy guidance on the interactive process obligations of employers and employees. The regulations underscore that an employer’s failure to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process to identify or implement a reasonable accommodation for a disabled employee may result in legal proceedings and liability. Here are some highlights: Initiating the interactive process. The employer must initiate the interactive process when 1) an employee with a known disability requests an accommodation; 2) the employer otherwise becomes aware of the need for accommodation; or 3) the employer becomes aware of the need because the employee has exhausted protected leave and indicates the need for continued accommodation.35 The employer must grant the individual’s requested accommodation, or reject it ‘‘after due consideration’’ and initiate discussions with the individual regarding alternative accommodations.36 Engaging in the interactive process. When the need for accommodation is not obvious, the Assistive animals. Allowing an assistive animal in the workplace may be a reasonable accommodation.31 ‘‘Assistive animals’’ includes guide, signal and service animals, as well as ‘‘support’’ animals that provide emotional or other support, such as where the employee has 24 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(d)(1). 25 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(d)(2). 26 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(d)(4). 27 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(d)(5). 32 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(a)(1). 28 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(d)(5). 33 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(a)(2). 29 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(i). 34 2 C.C.R. § 7294.0(e). 2 C.C.R. § 7293.9(i). 35 2 C.C.R. § 7294.0(b). 2 C.C.R. § 7293.6(p)(2)(B). 36 2 C.C.R. § 7294.0 (c)(1). 30 31 CA Labor & Employment Bulletin employer may request ‘‘reasonable medical documentation’’ of the need for the accommodation.37 However, the employer may not inquire about the underlying medical cause of the disability.38 Also, when needed to advance the interactive process, the employer should analyze the job and its essential functions, as well as consult experts to assess a requested accommodation or alternatives.39 The employer, in consultation with the employee, must identify potential accommodations and assess the effectiveness of each one in enabling the individual to perform the essential job functions.40 Finally, if an employee is unable for physical or mental reasons to engage in the interactive process, that will not amount to a breach of the interactive process obligation on the part of the employee or employer.41 This could arise, for example, if the employee has a physical or mental impairment that makes it difficult to communicate. Medical documentation. The regulations explain that ‘‘reasonable medical documentation’’ will include a confirmation that there is a disability and a need for an accommodation.42 Where necessary to help with the interactive process, it may also include a description of the physical or mental limitations that must be met to accommodate the employee. Medical documentation, however, need not disclose the nature of the disability.43 In addition, employers are reminded that any medical information it obtains through the interactive process must be kept confidential and separate from the employee’s personnel file.44 Burdens of Proof and Defenses While much of the emphasis in the new regulations is on expanding employers’ obligations and employees’ rights, the regulations also expressly provide that it is the employee (or applicant) who has the burden of proof to establish that he or she ‘‘is a qualified individual 166 May 2013 capable of performing the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.’’45 Notably, the regulations specify that to prevail on a claim of disability discrimination, an employee must only establish by preponderance of evidence that his or her disability was ‘‘one of the factors that influenced’’ the challenged employment action.46 Since the regulations were approved, however, the California Supreme Court has upped the ante on an employee’s burden of proof in ‘‘mixed motives’’ cases. In Harris v. City of Santa Monica, the supreme court held that where an employee demonstrates that discrimination was a ‘‘substantial motivating factor’’ for an employment decision, and the employer proves that it would have made the same decision anyway, the employee cannot recover damages, backpay or reinstatement.47 A court, however may still award the employee injunctive or declaratory relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The regulations also address the ‘‘health and safety’’ defense to a failure to accommodate claim. An employer may assert this defense only after it has engaged in the interactive process and determined that there is no reasonable accommodation that allows the individual to perform the job in a manner that would not endanger the health or safety of the employee or others because the job imposes ‘‘an imminent and substantial degree of risk’’ to the employee or others, as applicable.48 The regulations make clear that asserting a ‘‘future risk’’ to health and safety is not a defense.49 Additionally, the regulations set forth several factors to help evaluate the merits of the health and safety defense, including the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood and imminence of the harm occurring, and relevant information about an employee’s past work history.50 The regulations require an analysis of these factors based on ‘‘a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge’’ and/or ‘‘objective evidence.’’51 However, in light of the prohibition on inquiring about the underlying medical condition for a disability, employers may find it difficult to obtain the 37 2 C.C.R. § 7294.0(c)(2). 38 2 C.C.R. §§ 7294.0(c)(2), (3). 45 2 C.C.R. § 7293.7(a). 2 C.C.R. §§ 7294.0(c)(5), (6). 46 2 C.C.R. § 7293.7(b). 56 Cal. 4th 203, 232-33, 235 (Feb. 7, 2013). 39 40 2 C.C.R. § 7294.0(c)(7). 47 41 2 C.C.R. § 7294.0(d)(3). 48 2 C.C.R. §§ 7293.8(a)-(c). 42 2 C.C.R. § 7294.0(d)(1). 49 2 C.C.R. § 7293.8(d). 2 C.C.R. § 7294.0(d)(1). 50 2 C.C.R. § 7293.8(e). 2 C.C.R. § 7294.0(g). 51 2 C.C.R. § 7293.8(e). 43 44 CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 167 May 2013 medical evidence needed to support a health and safety defense in a particular situation. 2. Update job descriptions to reflect essential and marginal job functions, and regularly review them to ensure that they are current. Pre-employment Inquiries 3. The new regulations prohibit the following pre-employment inquiries, regardless of whether they are made on an application form, on a pre-employment questionnaire, in a job interview, or any other time before a job offer is made.52 Ensure that written performance evaluations assess an employee’s performance of essential job functions. This documentation can be important evidence to help establish whether a particular task qualifies as an essential function. 4. Take the obligation to engage in the interactive process seriously and view the process as employer-driven. 5. Keep careful records of the company’s accommodation efforts and communications with the employee or applicant. 6. Explore any and all reasonable accommodations of which the company is aware or which are requested by the employee, bearing in mind that the undue hardship defense is difficult to establish. 7. Remember that an employer is not required to grant the employee’s preferred accommodation so long as there is another effective accommodation. 8. Use care surrounding the medical documentation process – do not request information regarding the medical condition underlying a disability, and keep medical information confidential and separate from the employee’s personnel file. 9. Train managers regarding the reasonable accommodation and interactive process obligations. Do you have any disabilities? Have you been treated for [certain] diseases or conditions? Are you receiving or have you received workers’ compensation? What prescription drugs are you taking? Have you ever had a job-related injury? Have you ever left a job due to physical or mental limitations? Have you ever been hospitalized? Have you ever taken medical leave? Employers may ask, however, whether an applicant can perform the job’s essential functions. Also, if an applicant requests accommodation or the employer has a reasonable belief that an applicant requires an accommodation, the employer may make ‘‘limited inquiries regarding such reasonable accommodation.’’53 10 Best Practices While the regulations impose a number of new obligations on employers and create new rights for employees, they also provide important compliance guidance for employers on how to navigate the reasonable accommodation process. Here are best practices employers can follow to help ensure a smooth accommodation process, and avoid disputes: 1. Keep in mind that the definition of disability is broad. In many cases the existence of a disability will be obvious or confirmed by a health care provider – in which case it is important promptly to switch gears to the reasonable accommodation process. 52 2 C.C.R. § 7294.1(b)(2). 53 2 C.C.R. § 7294.1(b)(3). 10. Finally, all employers, and particularly those that are faced with the need to explore reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee, are encouraged to take the time to read the new regulations to gain a clear understanding of their rights and obligations in the accommodation process. Carolyn Rashby is Special Counsel with Miller Law Group, where she represents and counsels management on a wide range of employment matters, including wage and hour, leaves of absence, discrimination, harassment, and employee handbooks and personnel practices. She has written hundreds of articles and employer compliance materials touching on all aspects of California employment law and is a regular presenter in the firm’s Employment Law Update webinar series. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin Shiva Shirazi Davoudian is an Associate with Miller Law Group. She defends employers on a wide range of employment law matters, including discrimination, sexual harassment, disability, and wage and hour claims. Ms. Davoudian also represents employers in disputes involving unfair competition and misappro- 168 May 2013 priation of trade secrets, and has defended clients in traditional labor law matters before the National Labor Relations Board and arbitrated disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 169 May 2013 BOTH SIDES OF THE BAR Will Gentry Survive Concepcion? A Discussion with Two Prominent Practitioners Regarding How the California Supreme Court May Answer This and Related Questions By Zachariah H. Rowland Background The enforceability of class-action waivers in arbitration agreements has been a hotly debated legal topic since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.1 Among other things, Concepcion expressly held that California’s ‘‘Discover Bank Rule,’’2 finding class-action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements unconscionable, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act3 (‘‘FAA’’) because it specifically disfavored or interfered with the enforcement of arbitration agreements.4 Additionally, Concepcion held that requiring class arbitration of such claims, absent the parties’ agreement to do so, likewise interfered with the streamlining purpose of arbitration and was, therefore, also preempted by the FAA. Two years after its decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,5 the California Supreme Court separately addressed the viability of class-action waivers in the context of arbitration agreements dealing with statutory employment claims in Gentry v. Superior Court.6 The Gentry Court held that trial courts should examine a number of factors to determine whether ‘‘disallowance of the class action will likely lead to a less comprehensive enforcement of overtime laws.’’7 If so, according to Gentry, the trial court should invalidate the class-action waiver in the agreement in order to ensure that the employees can ‘‘vindicate their unwaivable rights . . . .’’8 Whether Concepcion overruled Gentry is an open question, at least for the moment. Last year, the California Supreme Court granted review of two appellate decisions that provide contradictory answers.9 In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, the Second Division of the Second District Appellate Court held that Concepcion overruled Gentry and, therefore, the trial court ‘‘properly declined to apply the Gentry test [] by enforcing the arbitration agreement according to its terms.’’10 In contrast, in Franco v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc.,11 the First Division of the Second District Appellate Court found that Gentry was unaffected by Concepcion and still good law. Specifically, the Franco Court noted that Gentry survived because it ‘‘is not a categorical rule gainst class action waivers but is a multifactor test. . . .’’12 The supreme court’s consideration of Franco has been deferred pending the Iskanian decision.13 With respect to Iskanian, the California Supreme Court has presented the general issues as follows: (1) Did 8 1 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). To view Supreme Court briefs related to the AT&T Mobility, LLC case, go to 2007 U.S. Briefs 976 on Lexis.com. To view district court motions, go to 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 1167. For pleadings, go to 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 7280. 2 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005). 42 Cal. 4th at 463. 9 Compare Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 206 Cal. App. 4th 949, review granted, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 8925 (Sept. 19, 2012) with Franco v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc., 211 Cal. App. 4th 314 (2012), review granted, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 1762 (Feb. 13, 2013). 10 206 Cal. App. 4th 949, 961 review granted, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 8925 (Sept. 19, 2012). 3 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. 4 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51. 211 Cal. App. 4th 314 (2012), review granted, briefing deferred, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 1762 (Feb. 13, 2013). 5 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005). 12 6 42 Cal. 4th 443 (2007). 13 7 42 Cal. 4th at 463. 11 Franco, 211 Cal. App. 4th at 372. Franco v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc., No. S207760, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 1762 (Feb. 13, 2013). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 170 May 2013 Court noted that it ‘‘had no occasion in Discover Bank to consider whether a class action or class arbitration waiver would undermine the plaintiff’s statutory rights.’’ Arguably, the Court is signaling that the holding of Concepcion does not directly control that of Gentry because the latter rule is distinguishable. Concepcion ‘‘impliedly overrule’’ Gentry ‘‘with respect to contractual class action waivers in the context of nonwaivable labor law rights?’’; (2) Does Concepcion ‘‘permit arbitration agreements to override the statutory right to bring representative claims under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004’’ (‘‘PAGA’’);14 and (3) Did the employer-defendant ‘‘waive its right to compel arbitration?’’15 TIM WILLIAMS: Gentry was founded on the idea that statutory rights serving important public policies – e.g., ensuring proper payment of minimum and overtime wages to employees required by the Labor Code – are not waivable by contract, and that neither California law nor the FAA permit waivers of such rights to be enforced. Discover Bank, by contrast, banned class-action waivers in the consumer context (1) under an unconscionability analysis, and (2) for rights that were not arising from statute. The California Supreme Court recognizes this distinction, and appears focused on the core issue of whether Concepcion applies broadly, or is limited in its application and does not reach the Gentry rule. It is also possible that the supreme court will consider the application of the federal National Labor Relations Act’s18 prohibition against contracts of employment that seek to prohibit workers from pursuing collective actions in furtherance of exercising their rights to engage in concerted activities. In anticipation of the Court’s ruling later this year, we sought the opinions of respected practitioners from the plaintiffs and defense bars - Tim Williams of Pope, Berger & Williams and Meryl Maneker of Wilson Turner Kosmo, respectively, on these and related issues. 1. What does the California Supreme Court mean by ‘‘non-waivable labor law rights’’ with respect to the first issue in Iskanian, and why would the question be tailored so narrowly? MERYL MANEKER: This is a reference to the key holding of Gentry - that a class action waiver should not be enforced if it ‘‘implicates unwaivable statutory rights’’ and, after an assessment of several factors the Gentry Court identified, a determination that proceeding as a class action ‘‘is likely to be a significantly more effective practical means of vindicating’’ the rights of the employees.16 The specific factors are the modest size of any potential recovery, the potential for retaliation against potential class members, the potential lack of knowledge of their rights on the part of absent class members and any other obstacles to a vindication of the rights asserted. 2. The issue is framed in this manner in order to distinguish Gentry and Iskanian from Concepcion. In the latter case, the United States Supreme Court held that California’s ‘‘Discover Bank rule’’ - which ‘‘classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable’’ - was preempted by the FAA. 17 In Gentry, the California Supreme 14 TIM WILLIAMS: The Discover Bank rule failed because the FAA makes agreements to arbitrate claims generally enforceable, but Discover Bank categorically invalidated consumer contracts that contained class-action waivers and was, as a result, inconsistent with the FAA. By contrast, the FAA does not enforce agreements that serve to waive claims. Under Gentry, arbitration agreements that prevent effective vindication of unwaivable statutory Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq. 15 See California Courts, Appellate Courts Case Information, Supreme Court, Case Summary, Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, No. S204032, available at http://appellatecases. courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist=0 &doc _id=2019694&doc_no=S204032. 16 17 In Franco, California Court of Appeal held that Concepcion does not overrule Gentry because ‘‘[Gentry] is not a categorical rule that invalidates class-action waivers.’’19 Is the holding of Gentry really different from Discover Bank such that Concepcion does not overrule it? If so, how? Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 451, 463. 18 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. 19 Franco, 211 Cal. App. 4th at 368. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 171 May 2013 ‘‘class arbitration is inconsistent with the FAA.’’23 If the so-called ‘‘Discover Bank rule’’ is preempted by the FAA, as the Supreme Court held in Concepcion, the rule articulated in Gentry, which the California Supreme Court stated was a clarification of its holding in Discover Bank,24 is as well. rights are unlawful, and nothing in the FAA operates to save such contracts just because they happen to concern arbitration. While Concepcion held that states may not prevent the enforcement of class-action bans in arbitration agreements if class proceedings are unnecessary to ensure vindication of rights, Concepcion did not supplant the FAA principle that some arbitration agreements may be unlawful and unenforceable. 3. Additionally, Concepcion did not address whether a class action ban is enforceable when it prevents vindication of unwaivable statutory rights; instead, it held that the FAA prohibits bans if individual arbitration assures vindication of rights. In fact, the Supreme Court has previously held that arbitration agreements that operate as ‘‘a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies’’ are against public policy.20 Further, the Court found that a party agreeing to arbitrate claims does not waive ‘‘the substantive rights afforded by the statute.’’21 Lower courts have similarly invalidated arbitration agreements that seek to undermine statutory rights. The Second Circuit in In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation (‘‘In re American Express’’),25 held that Concepcion does not apply in the context of a class action lawsuit brought to vindicate a federal statutory right where pursuit of the claim on an individual basis would be economically infeasible. How does the economic feasibility analysis play out in the context of statutory labor law rights, as opposed to the consumer context analyzed by the Court in Concepcion? MERYL MANEKER: The issue of economic feasibility should have the same impact in the employment context - it is not a basis to enforce class-wide arbitration. In the consumer context, the Concepcion Court rejected the argument that class arbitration was necessary ‘‘to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system,’’ holding that ‘‘[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.’’26 Arguably, employment claims are more economically feasible than consumer claims as they can result in far greater recoveries. MERYL MANEKER: I have to respectfully disagree with that statement. While the Gentry court did not ‘‘say categorically that all class arbitration waivers . . . are unenforceable,’’22 that has been the practical effect of its ruling. Most of the cases since Gentry that have considered whether a particular class-action waiver is enforceable have found it is not. TIM WILLIAMS: California public policy favors the full and prompt payment of wages due an employee. The California Supreme Court has emphasized that because of the economic position of the average worker, it is essential to the public welfare that a worker promptly receive his earned pay. ‘‘[W]ages are not ordinary debts . . . [and because] of the economic position of the average worker, and in particular, his dependence on wages for the As to the question of whether there is a difference between the Gentry and Discover Bank cases, in my view, there is not. Both cases invalidated a class-action waiver or provided a basis for doing so. In addition, both cases endorsed and would allow the pursuit of class claims in arbitration. However, the Supreme Court was quite clear in Concepcion that the FAA embodies a strong policy favoring arbitration and 20 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637, n.19 (1985). 23 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751. 24 Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 452. 21 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637, n.19). To view Supreme Court briefs related to the Preston case, go to 2006 U.S. Briefs 1463 on Lexis.com. 22 Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 463. 25 667 F.3d 204, reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012). 26 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 172 May 2013 whether it will be pursued.30 Similarly, Concepcion did not ban representative actions, nor did it foreclose employees’ right to bring certain types of claims. necessities of life for himself and his family, it is essential to the public welfare that he receive his pay promptly.’’27 The prompt payment of wages serves society’s interests through a more stable job market.28 Without a class vehicle, employees may be unable or unwilling to pursue claims for unpaid wages because the size of an award may be outweighed by the cost of litigation, because the employees face the prospect of retaliation by employers, and because many individuals have no idea that they are owed certain minimum protections afforded by California employment laws. As Gentry recognizes, only when those and other factors demonstrate that preventing a class action would operate to preclude effective enforcement of rights should class action bans be invalidated. 4. MERYL MANEKER: The Concepcion rule should operate the same in representative actions as it does in class actions. However, the California Supreme Court has held that representative actions brought on behalf of aggrieved employees under PAGA are not necessarily the same as class actions, and thus, may not be governed by the same procedural rules. This is because a representative action is ‘‘a substitute for an action brought by the government itself.’’31 For this reason, a representative plaintiff need not seek and obtain class certification in order to maintain a representative action under PAGA.32 Nonetheless, the principles underlying Concepcion - the strong policy and statutory scheme favoring arbitration, and the incompatibility of arbitration and class actions - are no less important in the representative action context and should govern. The second issue before the California Supreme Court in relation to Iskanian deals with ‘‘representative suits’’ brought under PAGA. Why would the Concepcion rule operate differently when applied to a claim brought under PAGA? 5. TIM WILLIAMS: PAGA representative suits allow private individuals to pursue rights as attorneys general on behalf of the State of California. Barring that type of representative action would absolutely eliminate a public benefit, and such an entitlement provided to the public is not waivable. PAGA claims are not subject to class certification, and thus, are not affected by a class-action waiver. PAGA claims are also not within the purview of the FAA because (among other reasons) the FAA does not bind non-party governmental agencies (here, the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency) to private arbitration agreements. The United States Supreme Court has long-recognized that the FAA operates as a forum-selection clause to determine where a claim will be pursued,29 not 27 Pressler v. Donald J. Bren Co., 32 Cal. 3d 831, 837 (1983), superseded on other grounds by Cal. Lab. Code § 98.2. 28 Fundamentally, is the class-action device a substantive right, a procedural mechanism that promotes efficient litigation, or some combination of both? MERYL MANEKER: That is a little bit of a trick question! While, technically speaking, class actions are procedural creations, the impact of the use of the device on a case and the possible repercussions - at least from a defense perspective - are so significant, that it really does affect the substantive positions of the parties, or at least that of the defendant. Specifically, the risks and resources involved in defending an individual claim for overtime pay are far less significant than those involved in defending a putative or actual class claim, or a representative claim for the same relief. TIM WILLIAMS: Class actions operate in federal and state courts only as a function of statute and rules that specifically create them to exist in civil cases. They are a clearly procedural right, but because the class device ultimately 30 EEOC v. Waffle House, 543 U.S. 279, 295, n.10 (2002). To view Supreme Court briefs and other documents related to the EEOC case, go to 1999 U.S. Briefs 1823 on Lexis.com. To view oral argument transcripts, go to 2001 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 57. Kerr’s Catering Serv. v. Dep’t of Industrial Relations, 57 Cal. 2d 319, 326-327, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962). 31 Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009). 29 32 See Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009). Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin operates to vindicate the rights of persons who cannot or would not take action to enforce their rights, class actions are absolutely also a substantive mechanism that provide remedies otherwise unattainable. In my practice, and having litigated dozens of class actions over the past 15 years, I have been told by scores of employee classmembers that they either had no idea an employer was violating the law, or they had no ability to take action. In either circumstance (or for many other reasons), without the recovery provided through a class action, the employer would have successfully violated labor laws without appropriate restitution. 6. If Gentry and In re American Express are eventually overruled, what will be the impact on class-action litigation in the employment context? TIM WILLIAMS: If Gentry is overruled entirely, including permitting the waiver of PAGA representative actions, then I would expect there to be a continuing increase by employers to implement arbitration agreements with class-action waivers. Gradually, it would likely become common practice for employers to establish, along with general company policies and procedures, agreements that ban class 173 May 2013 and/or representative actions with the expectation that employees will naturally consent to the waiver as a condition of employment. For employers, incurring the costs of arbitration proceedings might be far less expensive than fighting class actions and, as a result, employment class actions might become a rarity. MERYL MANEKER: If arbitration is enforced in both cases, I would anticipate that, over time, employers will implement arbitration agreements that satisfy the requirements of California and federal law, and that these will include class-action waivers. I would anticipate that we will eventually see a decline of employment class-action litigation, but I do not think it will be immediate and expect there will be numerous additional challenges to arbitration agreements and class-action waivers before we do. A decision in In re American Express is expected later this Spring and in Iskanian later this year. Mr. Rowland is an associate at Balestreri Potocki & Holmes who is interested in labor and employment law in California. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 174 May 2013 CASE NOTES DAMAGES UNDER FEHA Wynona Harris v. City of Santa Monica, No. S181004, Calif. Sup.; 2013 Cal. LEXIS 941. The California Supreme Court ruled on Feb. 7 that, under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), when a jury finds that unlawful discrimination was a substantial factor in the termination of an employee but the employer shows that the same decision would have been made absent such discrimination, a court may not award damages, back pay or an order of reinstatement but may award declaratory or injunctive relief and reasonable attorney fees and costs. Wynona Harris was hired as a bus driver trainee in October 2004 by Big Blue Bus, the Santa Monica, Calif., city-owned bus service. During Harris’ 40-day training period, Harris had an accident, which the city deemed ‘‘preventable.’’ No passengers were on the bus and no one was injured, but the accident cracked the glass on the bus’ back door. In November 2004, Harris successfully completed her training period, and the city promoted her to the position of probationary part-time bus driver. In that position, Harris was an at-will employee. At some point during her first three-month probationary evaluation, Harris had a second preventable accident in which she sideswiped a parked car and tore off its side mirror. On Feb. 18, 2005, Harris reported late to work and received her first ‘‘miss-out.’’ Big Blue Bus’ guidelines noted that most drivers get one or two late reports, or ‘‘miss-outs,’’ a year, but more than that suggested a driver had a ‘‘reliability problem.’’ The guidelines further noted that a miss-out would result in 25 demerit points and that probationary employees were allowed 50 demerit points. On March 1, 2005, Harris’ supervisor gave her a written performance evaluation covering her first three months as a probationary driver. Addressing Harris’ overall performance, her supervisor indicated she needed ‘‘further development.’’ On April 27, 2005, Harris received her second miss-out. She had accompanied her daughter to a juvenile court hearing and failed to timely notify her dispatcher that she would be late for her shift. Transit Services Manager Bob Ayer investigated the circumstances of Harris’ miss-out. In early May 2005, Ayer recommended to his supervisor, the assistant director, that the miss-outs remain in Harris’ file. Ayer claimed that the assistant director asked him to examine Harris’ complete personnel file. He did so and told the assistant director that Harris was not meeting the city’s standards for continued employment because she had two miss-outs and two preventable accidents and had been evaluated as needing ‘‘further development.’’ On May 12, 2005, Harris ran into her supervisor, George Reynoso. Harris’ uniform shirt was hanging loose, and Reynoso told her to tuck it in. Harris then confided in Reynoso that she was pregnant. Reynoso asked Harris to provide a doctor’s note clearing her to continue to work. On May 16, Harris gave Reynoso a doctor’s note permitting her to work with some limited restrictions. That same day, Reynoso attended a supervisors’ meeting and received a list of probationary drivers who were not meeting standards for continued employment. Harris was on the list. Her last day on the job was May 18, 2005. In October 2005, Harris sued the City of Santa Monica in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, alleging that she was fired because she was pregnant, a form of gender discrimination. The city denied her allegations and asserted as an affirmative defense that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to fire her as an atwill, probationary employee. The case was tried to a jury. The city asked the court to instruct the jury according to California Jury Instructions BAJI No. 12.26, which pertained to its mixedmotives defense. The court denied the request, and instead the jury was instructed according to California Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) No. 2500. This instruction directed the jury that Harris had to prove that her pregnancy was a ‘‘motivating factor/reason for the discharge.’’ ‘‘Motivating factor’’ was defined according to BAJI No. 12.01.1 as ‘‘something that moves the will and induces action even though other matters may have contributed to the taking of the action.’’ By special verdict, the jury found by a vote of 9-3 that Harris’ pregnancy was a motivating reason for the city’s decision to fire her. It awarded Harris $177,905 in damages, CA Labor & Employment Bulletin of which $150,000 were for ‘‘non-economic loss, including mental suffering.’’ 175 May 2013 DONNING AND DOFFING The city moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. The city argued, among other things, that the trial court’s refusal to give the jury a mixed-motive instruction deprived the city of a legitimate defense. The Superior Court rejected this argument. Harris then sought attorney fees, and the court awarded her $401,187. The city appealed. Clifton Sandifer, et al. v. United States Steel Corporation, No. 12-417, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1116 (February 19, 2013). A Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight, panel found that the requested instruction was an accurate statement of California law and that the trial court had committed prejudicial error. At the same time, the Court of Appeal determined that there was substantial evidence supporting the jury verdict that Harris had been fired because of pregnancy discrimination, and it remanded for a new trial. Harris then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review to decide whether BAJI No. 12.26’s mixed-motive instruction is correct. Clifton Sandifer, an employee of United States Steel Corp., filed a class complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against his employer on behalf of 800 former and current hourly workers. He alleged that U.S. Steel violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to compensate him and the putative class for the time they spend putting on and taking off their work clothes and walking from the locker room to their work stations and back. The California high court determined that the Court of Appeal was correct in overturning the damages verdict and remanding for further proceedings. The court noted that, given the variations in factual scenarios which might give right to a mixed-motives defense, it would not deliver an opinion on the type of evidence that would generally be sufficient to show that discrimination substantially motivated an adverse employment decision. However, in this case, the court held, the jury should have been instructed to decide whether discrimination was a substantial motivating factor or reason, and the trial court should decide on remand whether the evidence in Harris’s case warranted the related instruction. As to remedies, the court explained that if the plaintiff shows by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor, the employer may attempt to show that it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons that would have produced the same result. If it does so by a preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages, backpay, or reinstatement, but may be entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief. California Government Code section 12965 might also entitled the plaintiff to attorney’s fees and costs. References. See, e.g., Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 8, Leaves of Absence (Matthew Bender). The U.S. Supreme Court on Feb. 19 agreed to hear the appeal of a class lawsuit over what constitutes ‘‘changing clothes’’ under Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between U.S. Steel and the workers’ union does not require compensation for that time. However, Sandifer argued that the FLSA does, in fact, require the compensation, and overrides the CBA. Judge Robert L. Miller Jr. ruled that the FLSA does not require that the clothes changing time be compensated. However, he refused to dismiss the portion of the case seeking compensation for the travel time. U.S. Steel filed an interlocutory appeal. Sandifer cross-appealed. The Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals dismissed the cross-appeal, finding that Sandifer did not seek leave to appeal. The appellate panel then, in a May 8 opinion, ruled that Sandifer’s case had no merit and should be dismissed. Sandifer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court on Sept. 10. He argues that the FLSA requires employees to be paid from the time they first engage in a principal activity. He claims that donning and doffing safety gear required by the employer is a principal activity ‘‘when it is an integral and indispensible part of the activities for which the worker is employed.’’ However, under Section 203(o) of the FLSA, an employer doesn’t need to compensate a worker for time spent ‘‘changing clothes’’ if that time is expressly excluded from compensable time under the CBA. Sandifer asked the high court to decide several questions, including what constitutes ‘‘changing clothes.’’ The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal but limited it to the first question regarding the definition of ‘‘changing clothes’’ under Section 203(o). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin To view Supreme Court briefs related to the Sandifer case, go to 2012 U.S. Briefs 15243 on Lexis.com. To view motions, go to 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions. For pleadings, go to 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 664256. References. See, e.g., Wilcox, California Employment Law, § 3.01[7], Donning and Doffing Time (Matthew Bender). FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT Sheri Lynn Denney v. Office of Personnel Management, No. 2012-3094, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2753 (Fed. Cir. February 8, 2013). The Federal Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals on Feb. 8 upheld a decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) sustaining an Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) determination that extra pay, known as ‘‘availability pay,’’ should not be included in the calculation of a federal employee’s retirement annuity when that pay was not earned during the three consecutive years that the employee earned the most. Sheri Lynn Denney served as a criminal investigator or special FBI agent from 1983 until her retirement in 2008. From 1983 until early 2001, Denney was eligible for and received ‘‘availability pay’’ under 5 U.S.C. Section 5545(a). Availability pay is a form of premium pay equal to 25 percent of the rate of basic pay. To be eligible for availability pay, a criminal investigator must work at least 40 hours per week and actually work or be available to work an additional two hours per regular workday. Beginning Feb. 25, 2001, Denney began working parttime and was no longer eligible for, and no longer received, availability pay. The basic method for calculating an annuity for an employee such as Denney with full-time and part-time service is a two-step process. The average pay is determined by using the annual rate of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in the position. Then the benefit is computed by prorating the calculated average pay in accordance with the employee’s ration of fulltime to part-time service. In Denney’s case, the OPM determined that Denney’s last three years of service, from 2006 to 2008, were her ‘‘high three’’ years because those were the three consecutive years of creditable service during which she earned the most using annualized full-time basic pay rates. In calculating average pay over the high three years, OPM did not include availability pay because Denney was not eligible for and did not receive availability pay during that period of time. For the second 176 May 2013 step, the OPM calculated the ratio of Denney’s time spent in full-time service to time spent in part-time service at 85 percent. Denney did not challenge OPM’s ‘‘high three’’ determination or its full-time to part-time ratio calculation. However, she appealed OPM’s average pay calculation, and the administrative judge reversed, finding that OPM erred by not including availability pay during Denney’s high three years of service. OPM appealed to the MSPB, which sustained OPM’s annuity calculation. Denney appealed to the Federal Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, seeking a ruling on whether her ‘‘average pay’’ calculation should include availability pay. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Although Denney was eligible for and received availability pay under § 5545(a), the fact that she was ineligible during her ‘‘high three’’ years, OPM properly excluded availability pay from its annuity calculation, the court found. The panel also rejected Denney’s claim that she was penalized for working part-time during her high three years of service. Her full-time pay during the high three years was actually greater without availability pay than it had been during any of her earlier years of service with availability pay. If availability pay had been included during her high three years, it would not produce an ‘‘equal pay for equal service’’ result, and the statutory language does not support the method of calculation for which Denney argued. References. See, e.g., Labor and Employment Law, Chapter 79, Federal Employment (Matthew Bender). FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT Steven Alan Levin v. United States, et al., No. 11-1351, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1864 (March 4, 2013). A citizen may proceed with his lawsuit against the United States alleging medical battery by a Navy doctor acting within his scope of employment, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled March 4. Steven Levin claimed that he was injured as the result of a cataract surgery performed by a U.S. Navy doctor. Although Levin signed consent forms after discussing the surgery with his doctor, he claimed that he orally withdrew his consent in the operating room shortly before the surgery began. Levin initially filed an administrative claim. When his claim was not favorably resolved, he sued the United States for negligence and battery in the U.S. District Court for the District of Guam. He also named the Navy doctor as a defendant in his individual capacity. The government certified that the doctor was acting CA Labor & Employment Bulletin in the scope of his employment and moved to substitute the United States as defendant, based on the Gonzalez Act and the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act. The District Court granted the unopposed motion. The District Court then granted the government’s motion for summary judgment as to Levin’s negligence claim, in light of the absence of any expert evidence that the medical treatment failed to meet the relevant standard of care. Levin did not appeal that ruling. The only remaining claim was Levin’s battery claim against the United States under the FTCA. With regard to that claim, Levin argued that even if the doctor’s conduct was not negligent, the operation constituted battery because Levin had orally withdrawn his consent to surgery. The District Court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment on the battery claim on the ground that a genuine issue of material fact existed. However, it ultimately held that the claim was barred by 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h) and thus dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Levin appealed the dismissal of his battery claim. The Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate panel rejected Levin’s claim that 10 U.S.C. Section 1089(e) negates the FTCA’s preservation of sovereign immunity against battery claims in 26 U.S.C. Section 2680(n). The panel also concluded that Levin could not overcome the principle that waivers of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but ‘‘must be unequivocally expressed.’’ Levin then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted. The case was set for oral argument. Levin’s attorney, James A. Feldman of Washington, D.C., told the Court that ‘‘for cases covered by the Gonzalez Act; that is, cases of medical malpractice committed within the scope of employment by the doctors of the certain specified agencies that Congress has named for those cases, there is no intentional tort exception, and therefore, you can bring an action against the government.’’ Assistant to the Solicitor General Pratik A. Shah countered with an argument that Congress enacted the Gonzales Act ‘‘[b]ecause it was primarily concerned about conferring personal immunity. Every time the Senate Report talks about the purpose of the bill — it’s on page 1, heading: Purpose of the Bill — it says conferring personal immunity. Nothing about expanding the Government’s tort liability.’’ 177 May 2013 Writing for the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained that Section 1089(e) of the Gonzalez Act eliminates the FTCA’s intentional tort exception, allowing Levin to sue the United States for medical battery against a Navy doctor for acts performed within the scope of his employment. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s judgment was reversed. All justices joined in the entire opinion except Justice Antonin Scalia, who did not join in footnotes six and seven, which address the Senate Report on the Gonzalez Act. To view Supreme Court briefs related to the Levin case, go to 2011 U.S. Briefs 1351 on Lexis.com. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD Ricky Williams v. United States Postal Service, No. 2012-3200, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2886 (Fed. Cir. February 12, 2013). A former U.S. Postal Service (USPS) employee failed to prove his claim that he was the victim of discrimination when he was terminated after being absent without leave (AWOL), the Federal Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals ruled Feb. 12. Ricky Williams was employed by the USPS. Between March 3, 2008, and May 20, 2008, William was AWOL for a total of 28 days, and the USPS removed him from his position for failing to be in regular attendance. Williams appealed his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Before the MSPB, Williams did not dispute that he was absent for the amount of time identified by the USPS. However, he did argue that he had requested leave for his absences under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). He also alleged that the USPS discriminated against him on the basis of disability, that the agency discriminated against him on the basis of age and gender and that his removal was in retaliation for his having filed an equal employment opportunity complaint. The administrative judge affirmed the USPS’s action. Williams then petitioned the MSPB for review. The MSPB denied the petition. Finally, Williams appealed to the Federal Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. The Federal Circuit affirmed the MSPB decision, finding that it was free of legal error. It rejected Williams’ argument that the MSPB failed to consider some 41 pages of prehearing submissions. It also rejected his argument that the MSPB’s decision was defective because the MSPB allegedly both rejected and accepted the testimony of the attendance control supervisor. CA Labor & Employment Bulletin Finally, the appellate panel rejected Williams’ claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of age. Finding first that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the discrimination claim under Kloeckner v. Solis,1 the court ruled that there was no evidence on the record to support the claim. He had argued that two employees who were younger than him and also had an AWOL history had been treated more leniently than him, but the court found that they were not similarly situated to Williams. One had fewer absences and no AWOLs during the period of Williams’ AWOLs. 178 May 2013 complaint and notice of hearing on Nov. 30, 2012. The SPCA failed to file an answer. The acting general counsel then moved for default judgment. PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY The NLRB granted the motion, finding that the PSCA had violated section 7 of the NLRA by interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in exercising their rights under that section. It ordered the SPCA to cease and desist from engaging in unfair labor practices, offer Vane full reinstatement to her former job or a substantially equivalent position, make Vane whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits and compensate Vane for the adverse tax consequences in accordance with the NLRB’s decision in Latino Express, Inc.2 In addition, the NLRB ordered that the SPCA remove from its files any reference to Vane’s removal. SPCA in Cattaraugus County, Inc. and Linda Vane, No. 03-CA-090311, 2013 NLRB LEXIS 88 (February 22, 2013). References. See, e.g., Lareau, National Labor Relations Act: Law and Practice, Chapter 4, Employees’ Rights (Section 7 of the Act) (Matthew Bender). References. See, e.g., Labor and Employment Law, Chapter 79, Federal Employment (Matthew Bender). On Feb. 22, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that a New York animal shelter must reinstate a medical attendant who was fired after she complained several times about her pay and working conditions. SPCA in Cattaraugus County Inc. is a not-for-profit animal corporation in Olean, N.Y., that operates an animal shelter and provides animal control to municipalities. Since April 7, 2012, the SPCA has maintained a confidentiality policy that provides in part: ‘‘It is crucial to the Organization that Employees and Board Members do not publicly criticize, condemn or degrade other SPCA Board Members, other SPCA Employees, or SPCA policies.’’ On June 9, 10 and 15, 2012, SPCA employee Linda Vane sent emails to the SPCA, complaining about the wages, hours and working conditions at the SPCA and demanding that employees receive their paychecks. On June 15, Vane was removed from the position of medical attendant. Two days later, Vane was sent a letter by the SPCA threatening her with discharge if she continued to engage in these activities. Vane was discharged June 25. Vane filed an unfair labor practice charge against the SPCA, alleging violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The acting general counsel issued a SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY Kim Millbrook v. United States, No. 11-10362, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 2543 (March 27, 2013). At oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court on Feb. 19, the attorney for a federal inmate suing the United States for assault by corrections officers argued that Section 26809(h) of 28 U.S.C. clearly provides a waiver of sovereign immunity and ‘‘extends the waiver to any claim for one of the six enumerated torts committed by a Federal investigative or law enforcement officer acting within the scope of his or her employment.’’ Kim Millbrook is an inmate at the U.S. Penitentiary, Lewisburg Pennsylvania (USP-Lewisburg). He sued the United States in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), claiming that he was subjected to sexual assault while housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU) at USP-Lewisburg on March 5, 2010. He alleges that on that date he was taken to the basement of the SMU and forced to perform oral sex on one correctional officer while another officer held his neck and a third stood by the door and watched. The District Court concluded that the United States was entitled to summary judgment because Millbrook’s FTCA claim was precluded by Pooler v. United States.3 Millbrook appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling on 1 133 S. Ct. 596, 603-07 (2012). To view Supreme Court briefs related to the Kloeckner case, go to 2011 U.S. Briefs 184 on Lexis.com. 2 359 NLRB No. 44 (2012). 3 787 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1986). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin April 23, 2012. Millbrook then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The high court agreed to consider whether 28 U.S.C. Sections 1346(b) and 2680(h) ‘‘waive the sovereign immunity of the United States for the intentional torts of prison guards when they are acting within the scope of their employment but are not exercising authority to ‘execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of federal law.’ ’’ Assistant to the Solicitor General Anthony A. Yang, representing the United States (which reversed its position in December and supported the reversal and remand), told the high court that ‘‘[t]he text and structure of the law enforcement proviso in the Federal Tort Claims Act more generally makes clear that the proviso unambiguously waives sovereign immunity for claims arising under the six intentional torts listed for acts or omissions of persons qualifying as Federal law enforcement officers while acting within their scope of employment.’’ He added that nothing in the statute supports an argument by Jeffrey S. Bucholtz of King & Spalding in Washington, the court-appointed amicus curiae to present arguments in support of the Third Circuit’s decision, that such officers should be acting in a law enforcement capacity or exercising law enforcement authority. When asked by Justice Elana Kagan to explain what might meet the ‘‘scope of employment’’ test but not the ‘‘acting as a law enforcement officer’’ test, Yang replied, ‘‘It could mean various things. It could mean, for instance, something as limited as executing a search, seizing evidence or making an arrest. . . . It could be something incident to that, writing a report. . . . It could be other things. Law enforcement officers often aren’t doing the very things that we’re talking about. They go on patrol, they talk to kids in schools. There are all types of things that law enforcement officers might do that don’t fall within what . . . one might think of as what, you know, you see on television when officers are making contact with the public in rather high stakes incidents.’’ Bucholtz, in his arguments before the high court, asked that the Third Circuit decision be affirmed. ‘‘[I]n the first sentence of the proviso, the operative provision, Congress referred to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States. Congress didn’t say any acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers were covered. It didn’t say all were covered. It just said acts or omissions of law enforcement officers in the same way that the 179 May 2013 statute at issue in Lane4 referred to conduct of a federal funding provider. And so what this Court should do, we submit, is construe acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States as limited to acts or omissions of those defined— that defined class of persons in the relevant capacity, where they’re acting as law enforcement officers,’’ Bucholtz told the high court. To view Supreme Court briefs related to the Millbrook case, go to 2011 U.S. Briefs 10362. References. See, e.g., Labor and Employment Law, Chapter 79, Federal Employment (Matthew Bender). SENIORITY Teamsters Local Union No. 523 v. National Labor Relations Board, et al., No. 12-517, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1742 (February 25, 2013). On Feb. 25, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in a case concerning whether the placement of a previously unrepresented employee at the bottom of the seniority roster constituted an unfair labor practice. Kirk Rammage began working for Interstate Bakeries as a Dolly Madison bakery sales representative in the 1990s. In 1996-97, Interstate had purchased the Wonder Bread/Hostess product lines. Rammage was moved from a Dolly Madison warehouse to the Ponca City Wonder Bread/Hostess warehouse, but he continued to sell only Dolly Madison products. The other sales representatives at the Ponca City warehouse sold only Hostess and Wonder Bread products. Teamsters Local Union No. 523 represented Interstate Bakeries’ Dolly Madison and Wonder Bread/Hostess sales representatives in separate units with separate collective bargaining agreements. The Wonder Bread/ Hostess contract covered the sales representatives who sold those products, including all of the Ponca City sales representatives except Rammage. The Dolly Madison contract covered sales representatives who sold Dolly Madison products in Tulsa and Muskogee but not in Ponca City. As a result, Rammage was not represented by either unit and received company benefits instead of benefits provided under either union contract. In late 2005, Interstate Bakeries decided to stop differentiating between Dolly Madison and Wonder Bread/ Hostess routes, so that all sales representatives would deliver and sell all products. Interstate Bakeries and the union agreed that the separate collective bargaining 4 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin units would also be consolidated. As a result, the Wonder Bread/Hostess contract remained in effect, and the employees covered by the Dolly Madison contract were dovetailed according to unit seniority with the Wonder Bread/Hostess sales representatives. During this discussion, the union was informed of Rammage’s employment and the fact that he was not included in either bargaining unit. The parties agreed that Rammage should be included in the merged collective bargaining unit, but there was some debate over seniority. Rammage had the most seniority of any sales representatives in Ponca City. His employer wanted him to be dovetailed into the merged unit along with the other Dolly Madison employees. However, the union insisted that Rammage be placed at the bottom of the merged unit’s seniority roster. Interstate Bakeries ultimately agreed to that. As a result, Rammage was subsequently bumped from his position in Ponca City by a sales representative with higher union seniority and was forced to transfer to a location 70 miles away. Rammage filed unfair labor practice charges against his employer and the union, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) general counsel issued a consolidated unfair labor practice complaint. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that neither the employer nor the union violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by endtailing Rammage’s seniority. A two-member panel of the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ and concluded that the decision to endtail Rammage’s seniority constituted an unfair labor practice on the part of both the union and the employer. Interstate Bakeries did not object to this decision, but the union filed a petition for review with the 10th Circuit, which affirmed the NLRB’s decision. However, after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New Process Steel v. NLRB (130 S. Ct. 2635 [2010]), the NLRB’s decision was vacated, and the matter was remanded. On remand, a three-member NLRB panel reached the same result as the two-member panel. The union again filed a petition for review. The 10th Circuit found that the NLRB had reasonably concluded that the union acted unlawfully, holding that the dovetailing of the Dolly Madison employees alone did no more to compromise the seniority roster than if Rammage had also been dovetailed. The union violated the NLRA by merging the bargaining unit at the expense of a previously unrepresented worker for the sake of protecting seniority. The NLRB’s decision was therefore affirmed, and judgment was entered enforcing its order. 180 May 2013 The 10th Circuit panel also agreed to a sanction of $4,000 plus double costs against the union for its frivolous petition for review. Though it may have been appropriate for the union to try to persuade the threemember panel to change its mind, it had no objectively reasonable basis to believe it would do so by relying on the same arguments it had already raised. The union then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. To view Supreme Court briefs related to the Teamsters Local Union No. 523 case, go to 2012 U.S. Briefs 10289. References. See, e.g., Lareau, National Labor Relations Act: Law and Practice, Chapter 8, Employer and Union Discrimination Affecting Terms and Conditions of Employment (Sections 8(a)(3), 8(a)(4) and 8(b)(2)) (Matthew Bender). WAGE AND HOUR Joseph Timbang Angeles, et al. v. US Airways, Inc., et al., No. 12-5860, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22423 (N.D. Calif. February 19, 2013). A California federal judge on Feb. 19 partially granted a motion to dismiss a class complaint filed by former US Airways Inc. employees seeking unpaid overtime, wages for missed meal and rest periods and reimbursements for work-related expenses. Joseph Angeles and Noe Lastimosa filed a putative class action suit against US Airways, Inc. and 50 unnamed Does in the San Francisco County Superior Court, alleging wage and hour violations. They alleged that while they were employed as ramp agents for US Airways, their employer failed to provide proper compensation for all hours worked, meal periods and rest breaks, accurate wage statements, and reimbursement for work-related expenses. The plaintiffs also sought penalties based on these allegations, claiming that they constituted unlawful business practices. US Airways removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on Nov. 15, 2012. On Nov. 26, US Airways moved to dismiss seven of the employees’ eight claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). The motion did not address the plaintiffs’ allegation that they were required to use their cell phones for business purposes without reimbursement in violation of California Labor Code Section 2802. U.S. District Judge Charles R. Breyer granted the motion with respect to the company’s alleged failure to provide meal breaks while deducting a meal period CA Labor & Employment Bulletin from the workers’ pay in violation of the Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 9-2011, dismissing that claim with prejudice, but denied the motion to dismiss that same claim with respect to California Labor Code Section 510. Judge Breyer then dismissed claims two and three, alleging the failure to institute a uniform policy for meal periods and rest breaks, with prejudice. He also dismissed claim four, alleging the failure to provide accurate wage statements, but without prejudice. Finally, the judge denied in part and granted in part the motion to dismiss claims six through eight, which allege failure to pay all compensation due upon termination, violations of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 and violations of California’s wage and hour laws. References. See, e.g., Wilcox, California Employment Law, § 3.01[11], Meal Period Time (Matthew Bender). WAL-MART CLASS ACTIONS Lynne Wang, et al. v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., Nos. 08-55483 and 08-56740, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 4423 (9th Cir. March 4, 2013). On March 4, the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals vacated findings of commonality and predominance in a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit brought by newspaper employees and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.5 A number of employees, with Lynne Wang as the lead named plaintiff, filed a class complaint on March 5, 2004, against Chinese Daily News Inc. (CDN) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. They alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), California’s unfair business practices law and the California Labor Code. The plaintiffs claimed that CDN employees were made to work more than eight hours per day and more than 40 hours per week without overtime compensation. They also claimed that they were denied meal and rest breaks, accurate and itemized 5 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). To view Supreme Court briefs and other documents related to the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. case, go to 2010 U.S. Briefs 277 on Lexis.com. To view oral argument transcripts, go to 2011 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 30. 181 May 2013 wage statements and prompt payment of wages at termination. After the plaintiffs narrowed the class definition to include only nonexempt employees at the Monterey Park, Calif., facility, the District Court certified the FLSA claim as a collective action and certified the state law claims as a class action. After a 16-day jury trial and three-day bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. On Sept. 27, 2010, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The matter was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court., which vacated and remanded on Oct. 3, 2011 for reconsideration in light of its decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. Relying on Dukes, the Ninth Circuit panel reversed the District Court’s certification of the state law claims as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). The panel vacated the District Court’s finding of commonality under Rule 23(a) and predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) and also remanded for reconsideration in light of Dukes. While the Dukes class comprised 1.5 million and the present class includes only about 200 employees, the Ninth Circuit found that there may be significant differences among the class members. The Ninth Circuit instructed the District Court to decide whether there was a common question whose resolution would resolve an issue central to each of the plaintiffs’ claims. This would require them to produce significant proof that the employer operated under a general policy of violating the law, under Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.6 Plaintiffs were not required to show that every question in the case was susceptible to classwide resolution, the court explained; a single common question would satisfy the commonality requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). References. See, e.g., Wilcox, California Employment Law, Chapter 9, Wage and Hour Class Actions (Matthew Bender). 6 657 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (alteration omitted). CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 182 May 2013 CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2013 June 13 CALBAR: Business Law Section, Webinar: Franchise Relations: Independent Contractor or Employee Webinar, 12:00 PM 1:00 PM (PST) (415) 538-2570 June 18-19 NELI: California Employment Law Briefing Parc 55 Wyndham Union Square San Francisco, CA 94102 June 26-27 NELI: California Employment Law Briefing Omni Los Angeles Hotel Los Angeles, CA July 9 CALBAR: Workers’ Compensation Section, Webinar: Preparing for Doctor’s Depositions Post SB863 Webinar, 12:00 PM 1:00 PM (PST) Participation by computer (415) 538-2256. July 11-12 NELI: Employment Discrimination Law Update Westin St. Francis San Francisco, CA Aug. 22-23 NELI: Public Sector EEO and Employment Law Conference Westin St. Francis San Francisco, CA Aug. 26 NELI: California Disability Law Workshop Omni Los Angeles Hotel Los Angeles, CA Aug. 27 NELI: Americans with Disabilities Act Workshop Omni Los Angeles Hotel Los Angeles, CA Sept. 19 NELI: California Disability Law Workshop Parc 55 Wyndham Union Square San Francisco, CA Sept. 20 NELI: Americans with Disabilities Act Workshop Parc 55 Wyndham Union Square San Francisco, CA CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 183 May 2013 Oct. 9 NELI: Affirmative Action Workshop Westin St. Francis San Francisco, CA Oct. 10-11 NELI: Affirmative Action Briefing Westin St. Francis San Francisco, CA Dec. 5-6 NELI: Employment Law Conference Westin St. Francis San Francisco, CA CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 184 EDITORIAL BOARD Contact Information Michael C. Sullivan, Editor-in-Chief Matthew Jedreski, Executive Editor Deborah J. Tibbetts, Associate Editor Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton LLP San Diego [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Nancy L. Abell (Discrimination/Affirmative Action) Paul Hastings LLP Los Angeles [email protected] Ray Bertrand Paul Hastings LLP San Diego [email protected] Nicole A. Diller (ERISA/Employee Benefits) Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP San Francisco [email protected] Barbara A. Fitzgerald (Entertainment) Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP Los Angeles [email protected] Lynn Matityahu Frank (Alternate Dispute Resolution) Frank & Feder San Diego [email protected] Joshua Henderson Seyfarth Shaw LLP San Francisco, CA 94105 [email protected] Lynne C. Hermle (Retaliation/Whistleblowers) Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP Menlo Park [email protected] Alan Levins Littler Mendelson P.C. San Francisco [email protected] Tyler Paetkau (Unfair Competition/Trade Secrets) Hartnett, Smith & Paetkau Redwood City [email protected] William B. Sailer (In-House) V.P. & Senior Legal Counsel QUALCOMM Inc. San Diego [email protected] Charles D. Sakai (Public Sector) Renne, Sloan, Holtzman & Sakai San Francisco [email protected] Arthur F. Silbergeld (Class Actions) Dickstein Shapiro LLP Los Angeles [email protected] Walter Stella Miller Law Group San Francisco [email protected] Peder J. Thoreen (Labor) Altshuler Berzon LLP San Francisco [email protected] Bill Whelan (Wrongful termination) Solomon Ward Seidenwurm & Smith, LLP San Diego [email protected] M. Kirby Wilcox (Wage and Hour) Paul Hastings LLP San Francisco [email protected] May 2013 CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 185 May 2013 COLUMNISTS Contact Information Eye on the Supreme Court Profile DFEH Update Brian M. Ragen Seltzer Caplan McMahon Vitek San Diego [email protected] Corrie J. Klekowski Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton LLP San Diego [email protected] Phyllis W. Cheng Director, Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing REPORTERS Contact Information Travis Anderson (Discrimination) Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP San Diego G. Samuel Cleaver (Privacy) Proskauer Rose LLP Los Angeles [email protected] Michael J. Etchepare (Public Sector) Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton LLP San Diego [email protected] Paul M. Huston (OSHA/Cal OSHA) Paul Plevin Sullivan & Connaughton LLP San Diego [email protected] Jolene Konnersman (Sexual Harassment) Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP Los Angeles [email protected] Alan Levins (Labor) Littler Mendelson P.C. San Francisco [email protected] April Love (Labor) Littler Mendelson, P.C. Houston [email protected] Angela T. Mullins (ADA/Disability) Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton LLP San Diego [email protected] Bernadette O’Brien (Arbitration/ADR) Floyd, Skeren & Kelly, LLP Calabasas [email protected] Brian M. Ragen (Unfair Competition/Trades Secrets) Seltzer Caplan McMahon Vitek San Diego [email protected] Lena Ryan (Wrongful Termination) Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP San Francisco [email protected] Brit K. Seifert (Wage and Hour) Paul Hastings LLP San Diego [email protected] Donald P. Sullivan (ERISA/Employee Benefits) Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP San Francisco [email protected] CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 186 EDITORIAL STAFF Eve Arnold Director, Content Development Mia Smith Legal Editor Howard Ross Editor GUEST AUTHORS Shiva Shirazi Davoudian Miller Law Group Los Angeles, CA 90025 [email protected] Meryl C. Maneker Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP San Diego, CA 92101 [email protected] Haley M. Morrison Paul Hastings LLP San Diego, CA 92121 [email protected] Carolyn Rashby Miller Law Group San Francisco, CA 94104 [email protected] Zachariah H. Rowland Balestreri Potocki & Holmes 401 B Street, Suite 1470 San Diego, CA 92101 [email protected] Brit K. Seifert Paul Hastings LLP San Diego, CA 92130 [email protected] Timothy G. Williams Pope, Berger & Williams, LLP San Diego, CA 92103 [email protected] May 2013 CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 187 Martindale-Hubbell Connected Õ is an online, global network—designed exclusively for legal professionals—leveraging the unsurpassed reach of the Martindale-Hubbell database of more than one million lawyers and law firms. Expand your professional network and share your knowledge with a global audience and benefit from the expertise of the community. Simply connect with the people you know and the people who your connections know to build your network quickly and easily. From legal and risk management to IP, restructuring and employment law, you can tackle today’s emerging issues, collaborate globally through online groups, blogs and forums: Groups: Join or start groups with co-workers or legal professionals who share your interests or current practice area. Blogs: Hear what thought leaders are saying and voice your opinion—even write your own blog! Forums: Keep up on legal issues when you want, where you want with those who share your interests and practice area. Get Connected today—it takes just a few minutes to get started! Go to www.martindale.com/connected. Also from Matthew Bender: California Employers’ Guide to Employee Handbooks and Personnel Policy Manuals, by Morrison & Foerster LLP 2012 Revisions by Paul Hastings LLP This handy volume and accompanying CD offers an all-inclusive roadmap to writing, revising and updating employee handbooks. More economical than competing guidebooks, this volume is a vital reference that helps you draft appropriate content, speeding additional research with cross-references to the Wilcox treatise, California Employment Law. Sample policies cover the following: technology use and security; blogging; cell phone use; company property, proprietary and personal information; employment-at-will; anti-harassment policies; work schedules and overtime; and much more. Order online at Lexis.com or by calling 1-800-223-1940. May 2013 CA Labor & Employment Bulletin 188 May 2013 Customer Service: 1.800.356.6548 For all your labor and employment research needs, see the Labor & Employment Area of Law Page at Legal > Area of Law - By Topic > Labor & Employment on lexis.com ® LexisNexis, lexis.com and the Knowledge Burst logo are registered trademarks of Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., used under license. © 2010 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. LBE15191-1 1010º
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