1. law, govt and politics
2. politics

REGIME CHANGE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
By Mihaela Racovita
PRESENTATION OUTLINE
1.
2.
3.
4.
Definitions, concepts,
typologies
Process of Regime
change
Facilitating and
Impeding Factors
Empirical Cases
Regime
change
Causal
processes
Conceptual
clarity
1.1 DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

What is a regime? How is it different from state, and govt ?
State = the community organized for political purposes;
Govt = the individual or teams of indiv. who take decisions;
“govts succeed each other, the state endures” – Calvert

Existing definitions of ‘political regime’:
IR theorists
Lawson
• Krasner
• “principles, norms and
decision-making
procedures around
which actors converge
around issue areas”
• Domestic politics?
• Regime = the way
power is used
• how and under what
conditions and
limitations the power
of the state is
exercised
• incorporate the norms
and principles of the
political organization
Linz and Stepan
• What they mean by
“political regime” is
left unclear
• They use the term to
define types of
regimes without first
clarifying its meaning
1.2 TYPOLOGIES: 2, 3 OR MORE?

What type of typology do we need?
- dichotomous (Lawson)


Construction of elaborate, formal typologies is not necessary
to describe basic regime types;
Proposed typology: democracy - totalitarianism
- tripartite (Linz, 1964)



Dominant since 1960s;
it introduced authoritarianism (nondemocratic, yet
fundamentally different from totalitarianism)
Problem:
D
A
T
actually
Dem
Authoritarianism
Tot
- quintuple (Linz and Stepan, 1996)

Democracy, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, plus two
additional types: post-totalitarianism, sultanism
1.3 DEMOCRACY

What is democracy?- the term has lost meaning (Lawson)



Dogmatic?
Discursively distorted after CW
Evaluative not just descriptive concept (Lawson)

What's In A Name? That Which We Call A Rose By Any Other Name Would Smell
As Sweet.’ (W. Shakespeare) ?– Not for ‘democracy’ – it has iterative capacity;
=> instrumentality (Orwell)

it is less useful to define it as a continuum (Linz and Stepan) in terms of
conceptualization (the continuum model helps more in empirical analyses) –
Lawson;

scholars concentrate on elaborating ‘how to’ guides rather than analyzing the
meaning and nature of democracy (Dawisha)

Can democracy be anything? (Sartori) – according to Lawson democracy
requires certain minimal conditions

Cannot specify sufficient conditions for democracy to exist – but can have
necessary ones (Lawson)
1.4 TOTALITARIANISM

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

Antithesis to democracy
Totalitarianism = also lost a lot of its
meaning – becoming a universal term of
condemnation
Includes a unified, homogenized view of
society – an organic view of society and
the state - through ideology, symbolism
and rhetoric
Government = regime= party= leader
One-party states: Cultural difference or an
excuse? (Lawson)
E.g. Soviet Union under Stalin, Nazi
Germany
Totalitarianism
Democracy
Messianic
leader
Plural
parties
No
opposition
Opposition
Destroys
rule of law
Preserves
rule of law
Breaks
down
institutions
Preserves
institutions
Destroys
sub-state
associations
Values
private life
1.5 IN BETWEEN OR IN ADDITION?


For Lawson – the in-btw is unhelpful
For Linz and Stepan: 3 additional subtypes of non-democratic regimes :
 Authoritarianism (Auth);
 Post-totalitarianism (PT): early Pt, frozen PT (Czechoslovakia 1977-1989)
and mature PT (Hungary 1982-1989)
 Sultanism (Sul); e.g. Romania under Ceausescu
Based on the scores of 4 variables:

Pluralism (fully to non-existing)
Pl -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Non Pl
Dem
Auth
PT
Sul
Tot

Ideology (elaborate & pervasive vs. no ideology)
NL-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FL
Dem
Auth
Sul
PT
Tot

Mobilization (autonomous to forced)
NM------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FM
Dem
Auth
Sult
PT
Tot

Leadership (constitutional leadership vs. personal leadership)
CLD-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PLD
Dem
PT
Auth
Tot
Sul
1.6. CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSION OF TYPOLOGIES

Typologies – still ideal types – empirical use? Generalization?
Concepts still unclear and contested; authoritarianism – a historical regime
explanation rather than good typology (Linz, 2000)

Linz and Stepan - disaggregate the concept of regime only to aggregate
them again into complex typology – self-defeating?

They look at democratization as a multistep process; a continuum – yet they
still code their variables dichotomously

Is it new? – some argue that Hannah Arendt thought of the division in
Origins of Totalitarianism

forcing the different types of authoritarianism into a uni-dimensional
continuum can restrain one’s ability to understand authoritarian politics.

Typology – still geographically laden - how to explain Asia? Africa?; only
modern era

1.7 HISTORIC TYPOLOGIES – NO LONGER APPLICABLE?
Historic Typologies:
 Plato:
tymocracy – oligarchy – democracy –
tyranny
ideal: republic of philosophers
 Aristotle:
monarchy – aristocracy – democracy
 Tacitus:
principatus ( / res publica) ; dominatio
 Machiavelli:
republica – monarchy
 De Tocqueville:
aristocracy – democracy (danger)
In Boesche, R. Theories of Tyranny. From Plato to Arendt,
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.
Graph by Capelli, O, “Pre-modern State-Building in Post-Soviet Russia,”
Journal of Communist and Transition Studies, 24(4), 2008
2.1 PROCESS OF REGIME CHANGE

How does regime change work?



Internal & external processes;
Path-dependency - by previous regime type (Linz & Stepan)
Unclear how the changes would work for Linz and Stepan
2.2 OTHER VARIANTS OF REGIME CHANGE
The Hadenius- Teorell
Typology:
monarchy
military regimes
One party regime
No party regime
Democracy
Hybrid regime
Regime change:
2.3 CRITICISMS
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Transition? – can everything be transition?
transition from a regime X (totalitarianism, authoritarianism, sultanism) to
the regime Y (democracy) as a shift from one clearly identifiable point of
departure to the other distinct arrival point (Linz and Stepan)
How far back? Only look at previous regime type as determinative – or a
longer historical view? (Elster & Offe)
Transitology neglects incomplete character of any socio- political change
(changements inachevés, Dobry, 1986) and treats the temporal dimension
as linear instead of recognizing its multiple moves- linear, circular, chaotic
(Matonyte).
They fail to specify HOW the causal path would work, by which a regime
would determine the path of transition – cannot move beyond the simple
identification of the (possibly) causal condition
They often explain the particular cases discussed rather than the broader
attempts at generalization
Vicious circle? – inescapable path-dependency?
2.4 REGIME CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Features of Constitutional Design

Not initiation, but
consolidation of regime
change
System of govt (Dawisha & Dawisha):
•Parliamentarian vs. presidential
Electoral system: (Dawisha & Dawisha)

Institutions & Constitutions
= have ‘lock-in’ effect

Establishes the rules &
procedures, the limitations
of power
•Direct vs. indirect presidential election
•Parliamentary electoral system: PR, FPTP, mixed
•Exceptions: minority protection rules (quotas?)
•Frequency of elections
Type of Parliament:
•Bicameral vs. unicameral
State organization


Beyond re-establishing
former institutions?
(Horrowitz)
•Federal vs. unitary; power-sharing
•Centralized vs. decentralized
Not everything can be
factored in
•Multipartitism (Lawson)
•Separation of power
•Franchise
• codifying rights and responsibilities of citizens and government
Principles of organization
2.5 DISCUSSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Structural
 Codification – regulating all? – grey areas –
possibilities for abuse OR lack of flexibility

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
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
Declaring and ending state of emergency
Succession in crisis
Immunity of heads of state/ Parliament
Ambiguities in separation of powers
2.6 CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND STATE-BUILDING
Challenges in statebuilding constitutional
design:
Balance?
Constitution- making (a
façade?- Sartori)
 account for contextual
factors ?
Principles + incentives
for conciliation
(Horowirz)
Amendments – against
‘spirit of constitution
3.1 IMPEDING FACTORS
3.2 FACILITATING FACTORS
• Previous favorable constitutional structure
• Legacy of democratic norms and practices
(pluralism, contestation)
• federal (where ethnic divisions) – Horrowitz
• Input of leaders (in constructivist and sociological
theories)
• Legal and symbolic
• Re-institutes rule of law
• Reconciliation?
3.3 THE CASE FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Temporary : short-term process with long-term aims (Sriram, 2007)

“a pragmatic balancing of ideal justice with political realism that
instantiates a symbolic rule of law capable of constructing liberalizing
change” (Tietel, 2002)

Can consolidate democracy (cement regime change) – promoting justice,
de-legitimizing previous leaders, enforcing rule of law, promote norms of
inclusiveness

Types: domestic or international trials, truth-telling, amnesty, reconciliation
(both a subtype and a goal)

Cases of successful TJ: South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
the Rwandan Gacaca courts, etc.
Cases of unsuccessful TJ (?): Uganda (LRA- ICC)

3.4. DISCUSSION OF CAUSAL FACTORS

Causality
Plural causation (Linz and Stepan)
 Endogeneity?
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Excluded variables?

Historic conditions -
Path- dependency?
 Structure vs agency debate
 Existing variables:
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Political leadership = black box variable
4.1 EMPIRICAL CASES
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From ideal types to real situations
Comparison – Africa? Western/ Eastern divide?
Romania
Iraq
Source: BBC News timeline
ROMANIA UNDER CEAUSESCU: SULTANISTIC REGIME
Sultanistic regime traits (beginning in the 1970s):
Personality cult – Ceausescu and wife Elena
(Orwellian), dynastic tendency
Regime& state fusion
Absolute power (Roper)
Narrow social basis
Increasing perversion of communist ideology
Alienating the Communist nomenklatura –
promoting clientelism
Fusion of private and public life – the
Securitate
Absence of rule of law – spread of corruption
Regime change
a. From totalitarianism to sultanism
b. Sultanism to democracy? – transition,
disputed revolution – coup d’etat? – what
initiated it?
Legacies of Sultanism – Path of transition:
• Widespread corruption and clientelism
• Societal vacuum
• Low public mobilization
flickr.com and wikipedia.org
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SULTANISTIC REGIMES

Brownlee argues that
many exits are
possible for sultanistic
regimes, but also nonexits

Case of nontransitions = high
endurance of these
types of regimes

The role of externally
imposed constraints
IRAQ
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Regime type: authoritarian or
sultanistic?

Features:
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Dynastic, clientelistic
Ba’athism – Saddam’s personal
will, not ideology
Cult of personality
Absent rule of law and economic
Pluralism
Only occasional mobilization
Transition – trigger= external
factors
Source: BBC News timeline: Iraq under Saddam
IRAQ – TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

Dawisha & Dawisha’s solution – constitutional design
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split executive power btw a weak presidency (symbolic power, unitary
figure) and a PM; or a constitutional monarchy
indirect presidential elections would ensure that minorities were not
neglected
Parliamentary elections = mixed voting system, no quotas, bicameral
Parliament
Facilitating factors = UK model parliamentary system, experience
with some political pluralism (unlike scholars claiming sultanistic
regime)
Horrowitz’s solution – rule and norm creation
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Beyond restoring former institutions
Electoral rules – to create incentives for interethnic cooperation
Federalism or regional autonomy - where large concentrations
Conciliation rules
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Which are more successful in ensuring regime transition - ‘How to’ guides
to state building or serendipitous approaches?
How much of the direction a transition takes can be determined through
constitutional design?
Is Iraq an authoritarian or a sultanistic regime? How would that definition
affect our understanding and expectations as to its transition path?
Is sultanism a particularly difficult regime to change? Why/why not?
What is the best regime typology? 2, 3 – more? Historical, or
contemporary frameworks?
What is democracy/ totalitarianism today? Have the meanings evolved and
if so, how?
Does the previous regime variable create inescapable path dependency?
Can transitional justice mechanisms help consolidate regime change?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Dawisha Added and Karen (2003) “How to Build a Democratic Iraq” Foreign Affairs May/ June 2003 82 (3)
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