Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 Sune Liisberg (Aarhus University, Denmark) Affective Minds in a Social World To a Phenomenological Reinterpretation of Kantian Anthropology I According to Michel Foucault, the threshold of our modernity is not situated in the historical moment where one wanted to employ objective methods to the study of man, but in the moment where an ‘empiric-transcendental doublet called man was constituted’ (Foucault 1966: 330). Foucault is, of course, referring to the philosophical work of Immanuel Kant, and his thesis implies, in effect, that Kant’s entire critical project should be interpreted as a historically new form of anthropology. If we take a look at Kant’s late work on Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798/1800), we will find that Kant himself actually demonstrates the consequence that can be drawn from Foucault’s point. In the first part of this manuscript, which is also the most extensive part, Kant employs the tripartition of his three Critiques, i.e. man’s ability of knowing, of feeling pleasure and displeasure, and of desiring.1 The first part is entitled 1 Kant presents the abilities in this order in his Anthropology. The chronological order of the three Critiques is of course knowledge, desire (will), and the feeling of pleasure/displeasure. Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 1 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 ‘anthropological didactics’ for which the three abilities from the Critiques serve as an organizing principle. The second part is entitled ‘anthropological characteristics’. It deals with the natural dispositions of man, his temperament and the question of his moral character (1798/1800: B 254). The first two of these three categories of character examine what man can be determined to be due to his dispositions, his temperament and further, in Kant’s perspective, also his nationality. The third category, i.e. the one that concerns man’s moral character, addresses the question of what man is prepared to determine himself to be. These three categories comprise what anthropology from a pragmatic point of view is about in the overall perspective, insofar as Kant already in the introduction establishes that anthropology from a pragmatic point of view is the study of man, not as a physiological but as a free acting creature that determines himself to be in one way or another in respect to what he can and ought to determine himself to be (1798/1800: IV).2 In the introduction Kant also defines man as a creature which is endowed with reason; in this respect, man is his own purpose (1798/1800: III). In the closing, Kant follows up on this by stating that the purpose of mankind as a species is the idea of a cosmopolitan society, which is a regulative principle for what we ought to 2 The Greek word ‘pragma’ denotes a doing and more specifically it denotes the doings of human beings in their everyday life. Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 2 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 determine ourselves to endeavour beyond ourselves (1798/1800: B 330). Kant points out that the idea of a cosmopolitan society is not a constitutive principle for an actual matter of fact. For if the idea of a cosmopolitan society was a constitutive principle, one would have not only to endeavour and hope for, but to expect actual peaceful interaction (1798/1800: B 329-30). But as a matter of fact, humans, according to Kant, in general are characterized by two inclinations: On the one hand, we want to be part of social life because it makes us feel more human; on the other hand, sociality involves the interference of others, which gives us a tendency to isolation. Kant calls this lived paradox the ‘unsociable sociability’ of man (ungesellige Geselligkeit3). We therefore, in effect, have no other choice than to put our hopes in regulative principles that designate the normative dimension that we ought to live by. Accordingly, from the perspective of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology this normative dimension4 is so crucial that man as a person and as a species would be wiped out without it. The purpose that man is in and by himself – his dignity – is the very fundament of humanity in Kant’s philosophy (1785). But regulative principles are not just mere objectives; they are always regulative principles for someone, and this subjective side, so to speak, of the regulative principle of a cosmopolitan society, can 3 4 Kant (1784), 37; cf. 1798/1800: B 315, 323, 329. Hegel later called this the ‘bad infinity of oughts’ (das Sollen); cf. Hegel (1812), 155. Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 3 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 hardly be any other than the citizen of the world, which is a notion that Kant introduces in the preface to his Anthropology. He employs this notion in most of his late manuscripts and articles, though. For instance in his lectures On Pedagogic: In our soul there is something that makes us take an interest, firstly in ourselves; secondly in others, together with whom we have grown up; and then, thirdly, there must also be taken an interest in what is best for the world. One has to make the children aware of this interest, so that they can warm their souls with it. They should have delight in what is best for the world, also when it is not an advantage to their mother country or something they will gain from personally. (Kant 1803: 145-146; my transl.) The idea of a cosmopolitan society must somehow be lived concretely as a personal ethos. In this respect the citizen of the world – and not the cosmopolitan society as such – must be real in some sense, i.e. real in the form of an attitude of a subject. But as I have indicated with Kant, we must always also conceive of human subjects as instances of the general human category of the ’unsociable sociability’ – though, in this respect, there are considerable individual differences as regards preferences due to temperament (1798/1800: B 255 ff.). I also note an argument which the German sociologist Ulrich Beck has put forth, namely that “there is no cosmopolitanism without localism” (Beck 2002: 19).5 5 Becks ‘dialogic imagination’ as the internalized other of ‘cosmopolitanization’ within traditional nation-state societies (Beck 2002: 18); contains the problem of our ‘unsociable sociability’ (Kant); it Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 4 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 I don’t think that we could – or should – dismiss the idea of the citizen of the world if we want to grasp the overall argument in Kant’s Anthropology. The question is on what grounds we are to conceive the possibility and actuality of such a subject who is guided by the idea of world-citizenship. In this regard my idea basically is that we should distinguish between being a citizen of the global world, respectively, being a citizen of the phenomenal world. The former leads to political issues, whereas the latter leads us to take our point of departure in human affectivity. I have divided the rest of my presentation in two. First I go more into Kant’s theory of ideas inspired by the German psychiatrist and philosopher, Karl Jaspers who interprets Kant ‘existentially’. I then take up the question of affection in Kant’s Anthropology in light of some phenomenological achievements in the 20th Century, which I finally consider in relation to Beck’s statement that there is no cosmopolitanism without localism. II In his Psychology of World Views (Psychologie der Weltanschauungen), Karl Jaspers remarks, that ‘One cannot conceive ideas otherwise, than by realizing that one is living in them’ (Jaspers 1919: 477; my transl.). The ideas, Jaspers is referring to, are the Kantian ideas. Jaspers continues: also casts new light on, what might be happening today in Benedict Anderson’s so called ‘imagined communities’. Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 5 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 If one wants to grasp the ideas directly, instead of indirectly in the medium of finitude and singularity, one is lead to figments of the imagination and thereby to nothingness. (ibid.; my transl.) One of Jasper’s efforts as concerns the Kantian theory of ideas is that he, by way of his existentialist interpretation and reorganisation that he believes to make ‘without being un-Kantian’ (1919: 470), lets us see that the ideas – in spite of their regulative character – are real in the sense that we live in them. This implies Jasper’s reorganisation of the ideas such that they at the same time have theoretical and practical significance as concerning, respectively, the totality of directedness of our experiences and the singularity of this directedness. Let me take the idea of the world as a first example. The unity of the world as a mechanical whole is a regulative idea (Jaspers 1919: 471; cf. Kant 1781/1787 B 674). I never have a complete intuition of the world as such and since the spontaneous categories of the mind (Verstand) must refer to intuition in order to form an experience (1781/1787: B 74-75) they cannot form an experience of the world as a whole. Nevertheless I presume the world as a whole in my finite and singular existence, in the sense that the idea of the world forms the unifying principle for the limited horizon of my proper experiences. Jasper’s existential reinterpretation of this now consists in that I first and foremost live in this presumption, i.e. I live in the Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 6 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 directedness of a process that guides me or moves me, but which I cannot bring to a completion. The same is true of the idea of life in relation to which, biologically speaking, the ‘organism’ is a regulative principle which unifies and systematizes our knowledge of life as an infinity of purposes (Jaspers 1919: 471), while the third main idea is that of personality or the soul, which organises and directs human psychology. I think that we know from our own lives that we actually do not reflect upon these regulative ideas or hold them up for our minds eye all the time; so I think Jaspers has a point in arguing that we primarily live in the ideas as a guided directedness which, insofar as we live it, must be knit together with our human reality. Now, as concerns the idea of personality, I will argue that Kant in effect replaces the philosophical psychology of his predecessors (Descartes, Locke, Hume) with his anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. I think this is also what Michel Foucault implies in his statement about the threshold of our modernity, which I read at the beginning of my presentation. The Kantian idea of personality implies, in actuality, that human psychology cannot constitute an objective experience of personality as such, but must examine singular personalities. Consequently, according to Kant, human psychology, which in this respect is empirical, i.e. resides in the world of phenomena, would not succeed in establishing the identity of a person. The identity of a human subject, i.e. the question of who one is, takes place at the moral level, Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 7 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 not at the psychological level (Kant 1792/93: 155). This means that personal identity is a purely intellectual enterprise. If this is true, I will add that the question of personal identity is a question of what Kant in his Anthropology calls the moral character of man, which is not something that one has by nature, but something that one must acquire through an event in one’s intellectual life (1798/1800: B 268). Kant surprisingly formulates the foundation of a moral character in a person as something which happens to him or her, and compares this happening with a rebirth, an explosion or a revolution entailing an ‘absolute unity of the inner principle of one’s way of life as such’ (1798/1800: B 269). This seems to me to suggest a kind of selfaffection in the formation of a character. But I will leave that suggestion without further comment here. Important in relation to Jasper’s is that the ‘inner principle of one’s way of life as such’ would itself have to be an idea that one lives in – it would be the lived answer to the question of who one is. The reason why I have addressed Jasper’s existential reinterpretation of the Kantian theory of ideas as “something” we live in is that it forms a first step in my attempt to shed light on Kantian anthropology from the perspective of phenomenology. III In his Anthropology Kant initially makes an important distinction between knowing the world and having the world (1798/1800: VII). Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 8 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 This distinction is the key to my attempt to reinterpret Kant phenomenologically. The distinction says that when you know the world you understand a play (Spiel) of nature or of culture that you merely have been watching, whereas having the world presupposes that you have participated in the play, i.e. that you have been coplaying (mitgespielt). This is the reason why the noble world, to take Kant’s example, is hard to study for the anthropologist, for it conceals more than it reveals, i.e. its circles are more or less closed and outside of reach. I understand Kant such that the having of this world is not an option, and that this implies that I can hardly evaluate it on its own premises. Hence, my empirical knowledge of the noble world will be correspondingly poor. To Kant the distinction between knowing and having the world primarily concerns a methodological problem for the anthropologist comparable to the difference between being spectator and being actor. This was later to become a crucial problem also for sociologists. Pierre Bourdieu (1974) for instance remarks that the cohesiveness of the world of fashion is not endangered by a fashion journalist who is critical to the collection of this season, because that’s a part of the game in the world of fashion. But if the journalist suddenly calls in question the value of fashion, which is a sociological question, then he is out of business – he is no longer a co-player of the world of fashion. So a considerable methodological problem for the anthropologist (as well as for the sociologist) seems to be the problem of how to Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 9 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 reproduce a model of the ‘having of a world’ of others. Or, to put it in other words, how do individuals live in the idea of the world, what does it mean to them more specifically? This problem can only be solved philosophically by taking one’s point of departure in a general theory of man, which is what Kant does in his Anthropology, though he also acknowledges empirical material, such as descriptions of travelling, world history, biographies, and literature (1798/1800: IXXII). But it is the general knowledge of man from the pragmatic perspective of the citizen of the world which, according to Kant, is of interest of the philosophizing anthropologist. Otherwise all we would achieve would be a fragmentary little of this, little of that (1798/1800: B IX). In his Anthropology Kant for instance defines affect in general as an astonishment vis-à-vis a sensation by which the composed mind is incapacitated. A distinguishing mark of affect therefore is that it is rash and non-reflective, irrational. Affect is a feeling of either pleasure or displeasure in a present state, but as opposed to the aesthetic judgment of taste, which also relies on the feeling of pleasure/displeasure and furthermore has a distinctive social function, the deliberation of whether it would be sound or not to yield to the actual feeling is laid up when it comes to affect.6 So in 6 Kant treats affect under the ability of desire/appetite. He is aware that, insofar affects concern feelings of pleasure and displeasure, they should be treated under this very ability, but on the other hand affects are closely related to the passions, and – as abilities of desiring – they both display the autonomic power of a subject to produce its own future objectives (Kant 1798/1800: B 176; 202). Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 10 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 what sense do I, in the case of affect, have the world as a social coplayer in it? Again one can ask how individuals, in their finitude and singularity, do live in the idea of the world, what does it mean to them? Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenological attempt to found a general anthropological theory in his Sketch to a Theory of the Emotions (1939) is here worth noting. To Kant, our general knowledge of man must be unfolded a priori in the tripartition of our abilities of knowing, of feeling pleasure and displeasure, and of desiring. Sartre’s phenomenological theory of man takes another point of departure, namely in a combination of Husserl’s theory of consciousness and Heidegger’s theory of ‘humanreality’ (la réalité-humaine = Dasein). But he, too, aims at an a priori definition of man. Sartre thereby establishes a discussion with the empirical psychology of his time which, according to him, has no chance of founding a general theory of man. Because of the empirical methods they use, psychologists have only fragmentary knowledge of the human subject. What we need is an a priori concept of the essence of man, and this is where Sartre draws on the phenomenological concept of consciousness according to which human facts, for instance emotions, are conscious intentional phenomena that have a meaning or signify something to the person having the emotion. Heidegger’s phenomenology, on the other hand, delivers a more specific notion of man, according to which all research into the Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 11 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 human reality is different from other types of research because of the privileged circumstance, as Sartre remarks, that human-reality is ourselves (Eng. transl. 2004 p.8). This is not a truism, for it entails in effect that, ‘Emotion is not an accident, it is a mode of our conscious existence, one of the ways in which consciousness understands (in Heidegger’s sense of Verstehen) its Being-in-the-World’ (Sartre 1939: 116; Eng. transl. 2004: 61): From this point of view, Heidegger thinks that, in every human attitude – in emotion, for example […] – we can rediscover the whole of human reality, for emotion is the human reality assuming itself and ‘emotionally-directing’ itself towards the world. Husserl, for his part, thinks that a phenomenological description of emotion will reveal the essential structures of consciousness, seeing that an emotion precisely is a consciousness. (Sartre 1939: 22-23; Eng. transl. 2004: 10) On the background of this, Sartre argues that phenomenology actually delivers an a priory concept of man. Emotion is thus an organized and directed form of our conscious being-in-the-world, and this is not a way in which we know the world, but, arguably, a way in which we have the world, i.e. a way in which we are affective coplayers in it not mere spectators. This is even stronger emphasised where Sartre speaks of the seriousness of the emotional attitude which comes from the fact that we are always also bodily ‘traumatized’ when we reinterpret a situation emotionally. Emotion is a response to the world changing its character of being an order of Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 12 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 utility, which we can organize practically or rationally, and instead making – and taking – it to be of a ‘magical’ order that for Sartre designates the way in which we reorganize the world emotionally as a means of coping with certain difficulties that compromise our practical and intellectual freedom in the situation (cf. also Kant 1798/1800: B 176). As regards Sartre’s critique of empirical psychology he has a programmatic kinship with Kant since they both transform psychology into philosophical anthropology founded in an a priori conceptualisation of man. Further, the sense in which Kant understands the phenomenon of having the world is actually similar to the way in which Heidegger talks of the being-in-the-world of human reality, though in a much more elaborated and profound sense. As co-players we thus have the world beforehand of knowing the world. This addresses anew the question of whether ‘who one is’ can be a purely intellectual enterprise. In his Phenomenology of Perception Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who explicitly criticises the Kantian intellectualism in stating, for instance, that normativity is already born at the level of perception (1945: 74), argues that affectivity actually is the very beginning of our conscious being in the world: If […] we want to bring to light the birth of being for us, we must finally look at the area of our experience which clearly has significance and reality only for us, and that is our affective life. (Merleau-Ponty 1945: 180; Eng. transl. 1989: 154) Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 13 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 Both Merleau-Ponty, when he investigates love and desire (1945: 180 ff.), and Sartre, when he investigates emotion, think of affection as that, which has ‘significance only for us’. On the other hand, this significance implies that affectivity in the form of emotional directedness primarily is a social category. It is this category that Sartre conceives of as a kind of magical order of the world ‘that governs the interpsychic relations between men in society’ (1939: 108; Eng. transl. 2004: 56). For, according to Sartre, it is in the form of being a consciousness modified by passivity ‘that others appear to us’ (1939: 108; Eng. transl. 2004: 56). In this sense we are affective minds in a social world beforehand of being intellectual minds in a social world, which is to say that sociality is founded in affectivity and that the problem of the ‘unsociable sociability’, that we actually find again in Sartre’s analysis of intersubjectivity in Being and Nothingness as the essential conflict between human subjects, is a problem of affection rather than of intellection. Conclusion: Consequently, the question of who I am as a social coplayer is not restricted to a question of my moral character, because we are never fully transparent to ourselves (Sartre 1939: 21; Merleau-Ponty 1945: 398). Thus, being a citizen of the world is not just having a certain moral or political attitude. It is this too. But it is first and foremost, i.e. a priori, being a citizen of the phenomenal world, that is the world that Merleau-Ponty and Sartre address as our affective and emotional life, or – more generally – the world that Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 14 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 Edmund Husserl calls our ‘life-world’ (1936: § 28). This suggests that we also must regard Ulrich Beck’s (2002) thesis, that there is no cosmopolitanism without localism, from the existential perspective of the life-world as the localism of this localism, so to speak. So before we decide about what we normatively ought to determine ourselves to be, e.g. citizens of the world in the global, political sense, we must at the phenomenological level make ourselves clear what it means at all to have a world from the perspective of affective sociality, which presupposes the perspective of our embodiment. However, this does not lead to a self-sufficiency of personal localism – at least not ontologically. For Beck’s localism-thesis must imply that the lifeworld is always already knit together with the process of cosmopolitanization, which somehow assumes us whether we want to assume it or not. Much of our cross-national activities and understandings might not even be comprehensible to us if we did not live in the idea of a cosmopolitan society. [email protected] Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 15 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 References: Beck, U. (2002): ”The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies”. Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 19(1-2): 17-44. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE. Bourdieu, P. (2006 [1974]): ”Haute couture et haute culture”. In Questions de sociologie : 196-206. Paris: Ed. De Minuit. Foucault, M. (2005 [1966]): Les mots et les choses. Paris: Gallimard. Hegel, G.W.F. (1986 [1812]): Wissenschaft der Logik I. Werke, Vol. 5. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Husserl, Ed. (1992 [1936]): Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. In E. Ströker (ed.), Edmund Husserl - Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 8. Hamburg: Meiner verlag. Jaspers, K. (1994 [1919]): Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. München & Zürich: Piper. Kant, I. (1993 [1784]): ”Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht“. In Werkausgabe, Vol. XI: 33-50. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Kant, I. (1997 [1785]): Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Kant, I. (1997 [1781/1787]): Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Kant, I. (1965 [1792/93]): Die Metaphysik. In A. Kowalewski (ed.), Die philosophischen Hauptvorlesungen Immanuel Kants. Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung. Kant, I. (1995 [1798/1800]): Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. In Werkausgabe, Vol. XII. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 16 Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference 2010: Affect Brisbane, December 3-5 Kant, I. (1995 [1803]): Über Pädagogik. In Werkausgabe, Vol. XII. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2003 [1945]: Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1989 [1945]): Phenomenology of Perception. Transl. by Colin Smith. London: Routledge. Sartre, J.-P. (1995 [1939]): Esquisse d’une théore des émotions. Paris: Hermann. Sartre, J.-P. (2004 [1939]): Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Transl. by Philip Mairet. London and New York: Routledge Classics. Copyright © Sune Liisberg 2011 17
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