1. No category

KISA 2010 Proceedings
Proceedings
of the
Second Annual Convention,
Ewha Womans University, Seoul,
11 & 12 November 2010.
Matthias Maass & Kim Hee (compilers)
Yonsei University, GSIS
Conference Organizing Committee: Dr. Brendan Howe, Dr. Matthias Maass
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KISA 2010 Proceedings
Conference Schedule
Day 1: “North Korea in Context: Threats and Opportunities.”
Time
Event
Location
9:00 – 10:00
Registration
SK Convention Hall
9:30 – 10:00
Welcoming Remarks
SK Convention Hall
10:00 – 11:30
Panel T1: “Going Critical? North Korea’s Nuclear International
Policy and the Issue of Reunification.”
Education
Building, rm. 1002
Chair: Matthias Maass
Presentations:
1. Myriam
Cransac.
humanitarian
help
“How
in
can
North
EU’s
Korea
contribute to its goal of nuclear nonproliferation?”
2. Dennis Florig. “The Illusions of Hegemony
and the North Korean Nuclear Issue.”
3. Min-Il Yeo. “Foreign Policy Aspects of
Korean Reunification.”
11:30 – 12:00
Book and Journal Exhibition opens
International
Introduction by KISA Organizers
Education
Building, rm. 1002/Lounge
12:00 – 13:00
Lunch Break
13:15 – 14:45
Panel T2: “Quo Vadis, Pyongyang? North Korean International
Leadership Succession, and Human Security.”
Education
Building, rm. 1002
Chair: Dennis Florig
Presentations:
1. Lee Sang Soo. “Leadership Succession in
North
Korea
and
the
Security
Environment on the Korean Peninsula.”
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KISA 2010 Proceedings
2. Park
Hyeong
Jung.
“North
Korea’s
transition to post-totalitarian sultanistic
tyranny.”
3. Kim Kah-ul. “Human Security in North
Korea.”
14:45 – 15:00
Coffee Break
15:00 – 16:30
Panel
T3:
“Managing
Governance,
Complexity
Development,
in
Human
Asia: International
Education
Rights, Building, rm. 1002
Integration”
Chair: Matthias Maass
Presentations:
1. Brendan
Howe.
“Asian
Governance,
Human Security, and Development.”
2. Joel Campbell. “The Future of East Asian
Integration:
Constructing
a
Political
Economic Community.”
3. Hans
Schattle.
“Kaesong
in
Contemporary Korean Politics.”
Day 2: “Emerging Issues in International Affairs, Asia and Beyond”
Time
Event
Location
9:00 – 12:00
Registration continued
International
Education
Building, 10th floor hallway
10:30
12:00
– Panel F1: “Conflict and Cooperation, Asia to the Middle International
East. ”
Education
Building, rm. 1002
Chair: Brendan Howe
Presentations:
1. John Mirikitani. “Tit-for-Tat: The Kashmir Conflict
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KISA 2010 Proceedings
of India and Pakistan.”
2. Askhat Safiullin. “Security and National and
Regional Identities in Security Cooperation. An
Analysis
of
State
Interaction
in
Shanghai
Cooperation Organization.”
10:30
–
Student Panel FS1: “US Foreign Policy Issues in Asia.”
12:00
International
Education
Building, rm. 1001
Chair: Matthias Maass
1. Radostina Nikolova. “The US Navy Fighting
Maritime Terrorism: Conflict of Interests in
Southeast Asia.”
2. Teodora Gyupchanova. “U.S.A's involvement in
Track II Diplomacy with North Korea - aiding or
harming American nuclear diplomacy in DPRK.”
3. Aaron Golden. “US Armed Forces in South Korea
and the Issue of Prostitution.”
12:00
– Lunch Break
13:00
13:15
– Panel F2: “Issues in Humanitarian Law and Politics.”
14:45
International
Education
Building, rm. 1002
Chair: Askhat Safiullin
Presentations:
1. Sarah Hasan. “Reexamination of Laws on
Migrant Workers.”
2. Ge Liu. “Humanitarian Call from Darfur: China’s
response and its critics”
3. Catherine B. Smart. “Ethnic Nationalism and
Elections in Bosnia: Implications for Progress.”
13:15
14:45
– Student Panel FS2: “Areas of Conflict, Past, Present, International
and Future.”
Education
Building, rm. 1001
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KISA 2010 Proceedings
Chair: Matthias Maass
Presentations:
1. Brandon Harkins. “China's Access to Essential
Resources and Commodities: Can there be such
a thing as ‘Peace Rise?’”
2. Amber Hicks. “The International Conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo: A Feminist
Critique.”
3. Vladimir Kim. “The Border Conflict Over the
Island Zhenbao/Damansky in 1969 Between the
PRC and the USSR.”
14:30
– Coffee Break
15:00
15:00
16:30
– Panel F3: “Politics, Culture, and Law: International International
Studies in the 21st Century.”
Education
Building, rm. 1002
Chair: John Mirikitani
Presentations:
1. Richard Shannon. “Globalization, International
Trade, Transport and Tourism in Busan, South
Korea: the Roles of Culture.”
2. Jisun Yi. “Human Security and Humanitarian Aid:
A Case Study of North Korea.”
3. Pan Xiaolin. “Transformation of the Subject of
Crime
against
Humanity:
Obstacles
and Activators.”
16:30
– Recognition of Best Student Paper and Runner Up
17:00
17:00
Education
Building, rm. 1002
– Closing Remarks
17:15
18:00
International
International
Education
Building, rm. 1002
– Dinner by Invitation
TBA
20:30
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KISA 2010 Proceedings
Myriam Cransac. “How Can the European Union’s Humanitarian Help Contribute to its
Goal of Nuclear Non-Proliferation?”
Myriam Cransac
Ewha Womans University
Institute for Development and Human Security
[email protected]
Paper Synopsis: “How Can the European Union’s Humanitarian Help Contribute to its Goal of Nuclear NonProliferation?”
Introduction
What is now the European Union started as a community of countries vowing to work together in order to
solve mainly economical and technical problems. The European Union has now become the most
integrated region in the world; therefore it is trying to adopt a coordinated position on more political issues.
One of the most important current challenges of the EU is the adoption of a common and coherent external
and security policy. In a document entitled “A Secure Europe for a Better World”, the former High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana declared that the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction is now a priority issue among the new threats to Europe and to the world in
particular. So far, the EU’s strategy to tackle this threat uses various instruments, including multilateral
treaties, political and economical levels (such as trade and development policies) or sanctions within the
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KISA 2010 Proceedings
UN framework.
This paper aims to take the case study of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North
Korea) and analyze the way that the EU manages to link its security policy with its development and
humanitarian aid activities in this country in order to meet its goal of nuclear non-proliferation and to
improve its international credibility.
A first section will briefly observe the general EU strategy for security, especially how it differs with the
United States’, along with the EU’s strategic interests in Asian and in North Korea in particular. A second
section will review and assess the EU’s current activities in North Korea.
The European Union’s Strategy
A different security policy compared with the United States
Each of both actors has its own way to deal with security issues. Those differences lie in objectives and
capacities, and are rooted in history and political choices. As many experts such as Robert Kagan and
Jeremy Rifkin have already pointed out, the United States emphasizes on the use of force and autonomy,
and has a rather Manichean vision of international relations. On the other side, after two world wars, the
European countries and the European Union as a single actor have become more reluctant concerning the
use of force. The EU now brands its external activities with a footprint of peacekeeping and cooperation.
In spite of its limitations and compromises within the framework of NATO, the EU has a real
strategy and vision for its Security and Defense Strategy. As exposed by Javier Solana, one of its priorities
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is now the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. If the EU does not possess the capacity of
the United States to implement its security policy, it should wield it by other means. American former
Assistant Secretary for Defense and Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye declared that states can exercise
power by attraction rather than coercion or payment. He calls this “soft power”. An article from the
European Council on Foreign Relations presented the results of 2007 edition of Voice of the People, the
world’s largest survey of public opinion. According to hose results, among the rise of ‘herbivorous powers’
such as Brazil, India and South Africa whose power is not linked to military might, the EU benefits from the
highest rate of favorable opinion, 25% of the respondents wishing for an increase of its power, whereas
countries more prone on hard power such as the US, China and Russia provoked more negative reactions.
The EU’s interests in North Korea
In 1994, Europe began to realize the strategic importance of Asia, politically and economically. In a
communication entitled “Towards a New Strategy in Asia”, the European Commission stated the need for
Europe to ensure its presence in the region. The communication gave some guidelines articulated around
four axes: strengthening Europe’s economic presence in Asia to maintain the Union’s leading role in the
world economy, contributing to stability in Asia through international cooperation, participating in poverty
alleviation and sustainable development and promote democracy, rule of law and human rights in the
region.
In 2001, the European Commission adopted a new strategy in a communication entitled “Europe and Asia
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Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership” which mentioned North Korea for the first time. The
Commission promoted inter-Korean reconciliation and declared that it would extend its assistance activities
in order to encourage North Korea’s economic reforms and opening to the world. The framework for the
EU’s assistance was provided in the ‘North Korea Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004’. This assistance is
mainly technical and concerns institutional framework and capacity building, sustainable management and
use of natural resources, and finally reliable and sustainable transport sector.
The Case Study of North Korea
Review of the EU’s recent activities in North Korea
Firstly, the European Union’s main contribution to non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula lied in its
participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The KEDO was created
in 1995 under the US and North Korean Agreed Framework of 1994, its founding members being Japan,
South Korea and the US. Its primary purpose was to provide North Korea with a light-water reactor and
heavy fuel oil to meet its interim heating and electricity production needs. That help was supplied under the
conditions that North Korea freezes and finally dismantles its nuclear unsecure installations. Other
countries such as Australia, Canada or Indonesia joined the organization in the course of the 1990s, and
the European Union joined the executive board in 1997. The Union’s cumulative contribution amounted to
115 million Euros. In 2001, the EU renewed its membership for another five years and signed an
agreement between KEDO and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The KEDO
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activities on the light water reactor project were terminated in 2006, following North Korea’s failure to
comply with the conditions stated by the KEDO-DPRK Supply Agreement. Although its activities came de
facto to an end, KEDO was considered as a major initiative to promote non-proliferation and peace in the
Korean peninsula, and experts often called for the creation of another similar organization following up with
KEDO’s past activities.
Another participation of the EU in the North Korean issue was made within the frame of the Asia-Europe
Meeting (or ASEM). The ASEM is an informal dialogue forum established in 1996 in order to fill the missing
link between Europe and Asia. ASEM members include the 27 EU members, the European Commission,
the ASEAN members, the ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, New
Zealand and Australia. The discussions are articulated on political, economical and social/cultural axes.
The ASEM 3 meeting which took place in 2000 in Seoul was a privileged place to host dialogue on the
situation in North Korea. This resulted on the Seoul Declaration for Peace in the Korean Peninsula. This
was the occasion for the EU to show its support for the South Korean President’s Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine
Policy. The meeting was followed in 2001 by the visit of European Council President Persson,
Commissioner Patten and High Representative Solana to Pyongyang which led to commitments and
assurances from Kim Jung Il. More recently, during ASEM 8 meeting in Brussels in October 2010, South
Korean President Lee Myung Bak called for support for Seoul G20 as well as South Korea’s policy on North
Korea. This proved that ASEM can still be a platform of dialogue on the situation in the Korean peninsula.
Concerning the humanitarian and development aid, from 1995 to 2005, the EU provided 370 million Euros
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KISA 2010 Proceedings
of humanitarian aid. From 2007 to 2010, the EU supplied a structural food security program of 35 million
Euros and established an agricultural rehabilitation project. The French NGO Premiere Urgence is an
example of NGO funded by the European Program Support, whose purpose is to improve the North Korean
population’s access to health services and to finally transfer those competences to the North Korean
authorities.
Trade exchanges between the EU and North Korea are negligible. From 1995 to 2005, trade exchanges
amounted between $200 and $400 annually. The most visible gesture of cooperation so far was the
European Business Association Pyongyang, which consisted in joint ventures with tobacco, IT, shipping,
brewery and pharmaceutical companies.
Assessment of effectiveness and future prospects
The EU’s action on the nuclear issue in North Korea is indeed limited. The question is, as Javier Solana
once said, whether the EU is “a player or only a payer”. Brussels’ statements limit themselves to a few
declarations without real strength. Its action is mainly limited within the United Nations framework. It also
expresses its support to the Six Party Talks, without asking for participation. Its action is restrained to
economic and social help. Obviously EU’s position on nuclear issues is still very limited, and nuclear and
humanitarian questions are treated separately.
Concerning future prospects, the Six Party Talks seem to be the preponderant framework for negotiations.
Very recently, China and North Korea, as well as Russian President Dimitri Medvedev during the Seoul
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G20 meeting on November 2010, called for the resume of the negotiations within the framework of the Six
Party Talks. However, in spite of its failure, an institution such as KEDO was considered as a satisfactory
multilateral platform which produced very positive outcomes. Consequently many experts called for KEDO
follow-up or the establishment of a similar organization. As EU is already a significant and reliable third
party in what concern economic and humanitarian issues, it could play a further role in contributing to North
Korea’s energy security along with other political, economic and security measures.
In any case, a real security strategy towards North Korea would enhance the credibility of Brussels’ global
foreign and security policy.
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Dennis Florig. “The Illusions of Hegemony and the North Korean Nuclear Issue.”
Dennis Florig
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
Division of International Studies
dflorig.com
Paper Abstract: “The Illusions of Hegemony and the North Korean Nuclear Issue.”
The United States has been negotiating with the DPRK over denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula for
nearly two decades yet North Korea’s nuclear weapons program continues to develop. U.S. North Korea
policy has been beset by several illusions that have made progress in complicated negotiations with the
truculent North Korean regime even more difficult. Some of the most important include: 1. the illusion that
denuclearization of North Korea can be bought with aid only, 2. the illusion of regime change, 3. the illusion
of effective punishment of the DPRK, and 4. the illusion that the U.S. perspective is universal.
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Min-Il Yeo. “Foreign Policy Aspects of Korean Reunification.”
Minil Yeo
University of Bonn
[email protected]
Paper Synopsis: “Foreign policy aspects of a Korean reunification.”
Introduction
Due to its location, the Korean peninsula is of great geostrategic importance to the Northeast Asian region.
Throughout Korean history, foreign powers have tried to conquer or influence the country. Currently, the
United States of America (USA), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and the Russian Federation
have great strategic interest in the Korean peninsula.1 A reunification of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK) with the Republic of Korea (ROK) would have a tremendous impact on the security
politics system in the region.2
The agreement between the two Koreas specifying that unification should be obtained independent
from foreign influences will most likely be unattainable in the event of a rapid unification.3 In fact, the
inclusion of the four regional powers in a Korean unification process seems inevitable.
Kim, Samuel/ Lee, Tai Hwan [Ed.]: North Korea and Northeast Asia, Lanham 2002, p. 5.
Cieslik,Thomas: Wiedervereinigungen während und nach der Ost-West Blockkonfrontation, Ursachen der
Teilung-Grundlagen der (fehlenden) Einheit, Marburg 2002, p. 237.
3
Köllner, Patrick [Ed.]: Korea 2002, Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Hamburg 2002, p.248.
1
2
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1. The USA
Geographically the United States is the farthest away from the Korean peninsula, but due to its influence in
Northeast Asia, it can still be regarded as a regional power. Its enormous economic and military resources
would make it the most important power to be included in the event of a reunification with the North.
Furthermore, the US is a close ally of the ROK, and unlike the other three regional powers, it has troops
stationed on the peninsula.4
Even though the United States has officially recognized the Korean people’s right to reunification,
the US has so far shown very little interest in it. Unification could mean the end to US military presence in
Korea. With the disappearance of the North Korean threat, the reason for US forces to be stationed in
Korea would be called into question.5 Since the ROK is sharing the cost of the presence of US forces, the
Korean people could demand a troop withdrawal in order to free up tax money for the reconstruction of the
North. Furthermore, a surge in nationalistic feeling could pressure the South Korean government to
renounce the presence of foreign troops in the country. Such sentiment is already evident in South Korea
and would be greatly amplified through unification.6 The United States’ position is that the presence of its
forces does not only stabilize the region but also increases US influence in Asia as a whole.7
The US government regards the DPRK as a rogue state8; therefore, it could support unification
Kim/ Lee: North Korea, p. 35.
Lee, Ko Wun: The Role of the United States in the Korean Reunification Process: Multilateral Security
Relations of the Four Major Powers in Northeast Asia, Seoul 1999, pp. 31-32.
6
Bogusky, Richard: The Impact of Korean Unification on Northeast Asia: American Security challenges and
Opportunities, in: Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 10, No. 1, pp 49-73, p. 67.
7
Lee: The Role, p. 32.
8
Cieslik: Die Wiedervereinigungen, p. 167.
4
5
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through absorption to achieve regime change in North Korea under the preconditions that US forces would
remain in the country and that the unified Korea would pose no threat to its neighbors.9
2. The PRC
The PRC is the most important political, military, and economically of the DPRK. It has also had ongoing
political relations and extensive economic cooperation with the ROK since 1992. A unified Korea would
pose no threat to China.10 Therefore, the PRC officially supports a slow reconciliation that would hopefully
lead to a unification on equal terms between the two Koreas. It also believes that possible conflicts between
North and South Korea should be resolved through peaceful dialogue. According to its self-perception as a
regional power, the PRC wants to be involved in such talks as a constructive mediator. 11
However, the Chinese government seems to favor the status quo and continues to support the
North Korean regime in order to maintain the DPRK as a buffer against the US and Japanese spheres of
influence. Consequently, Chinese policy on North Korea may aim to delay unification.12 A reunification of
the two Koreas would most likely be met with great reservation from the PRC.
A sudden collapse of the DPRK could trigger a mass migration of North Koreans to the PRC.
Fearing this, the Chinese government might intervene in the events of a massive internal crisis to sustain
the regime in the North.13 If unification was inevitable, the PRC would most likely demand a limitation on the
9
10
11
12
13
Lee: The Role, p 32.
Lee: The Role, p. 34.
Kwak, Tae Hwan [Ed.]: The Four Powers and Korean Unification Strategies, Seoul 1997, pp. 78, 82.
Kim/ Lee: North Korea, p. 35.
Lee: The Role, p. 35.
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United States’ influence on the peninsula and the denuclearization of the unified Korea.14
3. Japan
Japan’s relations with the two Koreas are tainted by its history of colonial rule over the peninsula.15 Many
North and South Koreans still harbor deep animosity towards the former colonial power. Even though
Japan officially supports unification, it most likely prefers the continued division of Korea. It is concerned
that a possible influx of Korean nationalism could amplify existing anti-Japanese sentiment. Within the
Japanese government, there are those concerned that Korea could become a direct competitor to Japan. 16
Unification could also end the alliance enjoyed between Japan and the ROK, as the common threat of the
DPRK would disappear.17
However, the Japanese government may support unification to end this military threat.18 It might also seek
to be involved in a Korean unification to prevent Chinese intervention in North Korea.19
4. The Russian Federation
The Soviet Union was greatly involved in the creation of the DRPK and was its most important trading
partner until its collapse. Distracted by internal turmoil and economic problems, the Soviet Union was
14
15
16
17
18
19
Kim/ Lee: North Korea, p. 35.
Lee: The Role, p. 35.
Cieslik: Die Wiedervereinigungen, p. 201.
Akaha, Tsuneo [Ed.]: The Future of North Korea, London 2002, p. 18.
Kim/ Lee: North Korea, p. 31.
Lee, Young Sun/ Okonogi, Masao [Ed.]: Japan and Korean Unification, Seoul 1999, p.31.
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temporarily unable to pursue a Korea policy, which led to a demise of its influence on the Korean
peninsula.20 It was only when President Vladimir Putin came to power that the Russian Federation, as the
successor state of the Soviet Union, began to engage in a balanced Korea policy. 21 The Russian
Federation attempted to forge better relations with North Korea while seeking economic cooperation with
the ROK. Officially, it promotes the idea that unification should be based on the free will of the Korean
people and that it should be achieved by democratic and peaceful means.22
In the case of Korean reunification, the Russian Federation may attempt to seek active involvement
in the unification process in order to regain influence in the Northeast Asian region. Economic interests may
also encourage Russian cooperation in a Korean unification. As a neighboring country, it could benefit
from the economic potential of a unified Korea as a market for Russian oil and gas.
The Russian
Federation may also hope that a unified Korea would repay the approximately $3 billion of outstanding debt
owed to it by North Korea.23 Even though the Russian Federation has been weakened by the collapse of
the USSR, it should still be included in a Korean unification. It has good connections with the North Korean
regime and is also a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Its main demand would
most likely be its inclusion in the unification process.24
20
21
22
23
24
Chang, Man Chul: Korean Unification, The Implications for Regional Security, Monterey 1994, p. 47.
Cieslik: Die Wiedervereinigungen, p. 201.
Kwak: The Four, pp. 39-41, 46-47.
Kim/ Lee: North Korea, p. 38-39.
Lee: The Role, p. 40.
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5. The International Negotiations of the German Unification
Upon German unification, the four victors of the Second World War, the USA, the USSR, Great Britain, and
France, began to reemphasize their special rights and authority over Germany, which were founded on the
unconditional surrender of the German forces in 1945. These rights created a unique legal situation that
made the victors’ participation in the German unification process inevitable. The USSR, France, and Great
Britain were even of the opinion that their rights enabled them to be active participants in the process of
German unification. However, the German government, with American support, was of the position that the
right of self-determination took precedence over the claims of the three nations. In the beginning of 1990,
all parties agreed that steps towards reunification had to be made with consideration to the Potsdam
Agreement, especially in regard to the status of the city of Berlin, the presence of allied forces, the borders
of the country, and the NATO membership of a unified Germany.
During the “Two-Plus-Four” negotiations, the two Germanys and the four powers came to an agreement on
the foreign policy aspects of unification. On February 13, 1990, the intent to begin negotiations was
announced at the conference of NATO and Warsaw Pact states in Ottawa. In the framework of the “TwoPlus-Four” negotiations, all legal details of unification were clarified. The key to success, however, was
bilateral talks that were held in parallel with the negotiations. In February 1990, Chancellor Kohl and
President Bush Sr. agreed on a joint strategy in which the United States would focus on security policy
issues while West Germany would address the Soviet Union’s economic problems. The United States took
over the responsibility of ensuring that France and Great Britain would oppose the Soviet Union and remain
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aligned with the US and German position. In July 1990, the last foreign policy hurdle was cleared when
Kohl and Gorbachev agreed on the NATO membership of the unified Germany. Finally on September 12,
1990, the foreign ministers of the six parties signed the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to
Germany,” which went into effect on March 15, 1991 after it was ratified by all participating states. In
accordance with the treaty, the Potsdam Agreement, which had already been suspended on October 3,
1990, ceased to exist and the unified Germany regained its full sovereignty. Through international
negotiations, the objections towards unification held by Germany’s neighboring countries were overcome
swiftly.25
6. The International Negotiations of a Korean Unification
Unlike the German case, a Korean unification would not require international agreements or treaties
because the four regional powers hold no legal authority on the peninsula.26 However, the geostrategic
location of Korea as well as the foreign policy interests of the USA, the PRC, Japan, and the Russian
Federation make international negotiations over Korean unification inevitable.27 The ROK would also need
the political, financial, and material support of these powers to successfully absorb the North. Furthermore,
the security policy impact of a Korean unification may lead to conflict among the regional powers, which
would disrupt the unification process on the peninsula.
Weidenfeld, Werner/ Korte, Karl-Rudolf [Ed.]: Handbuch zur Deutschen Einheit, 1949-1989-1999, Bonn
1999, pp. 794-802, 824-825.
26
Cieslik: Die Wiedervereinigungen, p. 159.
27
Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) [Ed.]: The Future of North Korea, Implications for the Korean Peninsula and
Northeast Asia, Seoul 1998, p. 56.
25
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The South Korean government should strive for multilateral conferences before and during the
unification process. These conferences would allow the four regional powers to voice objections and
interests in a similar format to the “Two-Plus-Four” negotiations of the German unification. The political
situation in North Korea during unification would dictate whether a North Korean delegation could
participate in such a conference or if the ROK would have to represent the interest of both Koreas. The
negotiations could be based on the six-party talks that were initiated in 2003 to quell the second North
Korean nuclear crisis. Both Koreas and the four regional powers take part in these talks.28 In regard to the
German experience, bilateral talks with the regional powers, as an augmentation to multilateral conferences,
would be advantageous.29 The ROK government should seek close cooperation with the United States, its
closest ally and the most dominant regional power.30
To ease reservations about unification, the South Korean government should offer to limit its
military forces to an acceptable level, renounce weapons of mass destruction, and completely dismantle
the existing North Korean nuclear facilities.31 This would specifically cater to Japanese security interests. A
compromise over the continued presence of US forces in the unified Korea would also need to be
determined. The United States would probably insist on keeping its forces stationed on the peninsula while
the PRC would most likely demand their withdrawal. By limiting the presence of the US troops to the South
28
212-213.
29
30
31
Maull, Hanns/ Maill, Ivo: Im Brennpunk, Korea, Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, München 2004, pp.
Weidenfeld: Handbuch, p. 800.
Akaho: The Future, p. 23.
IFA: The Future, p. 57.
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Korean territory, an agreement similar to that of the German unification could be reached.32 Additionally, a
reduction of the US military presence in the ROK could be considered.33
In preparation for such international negotiations, the South Korean government should further
build up its alliance with the United States and together define a joint course of action. Moreover, joint
preparations for a crisis in North Korea should be intensified. It must be insured, however, that the United
States will not assume command over the joint forces in the event of the collapse of the North Korean
regime. This would violate the sovereignty of the ROK and could provoke a Chinese intervention. 34 The
ROK also needs to strengthen its diplomatic relations with the PRC, Japan, and the Russian Federation.
Conclusion
Any Korean reunification will need the backing of the USA, PRC, Japan, and Russia, which makes
multilateral talks inevitable. The ROK would most likely occupy the weakest position in such talks from
which the South Korean government would need to ease the reservations of the four regional powers.
Therefore the South must be the first party to take the foreign policy initiative and engage with the four
countries with a flexible diplomacy as soon as a Korean unification begins to materialize. The right timing
will be of the essence.
The ROK should also strive for close cooperation with the US
to strengthen her position in
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS:) [Ed.]: The Korean Peninsula and the Northeast
Asian Security, Seoul 1998, p. 87.
33
Cheong, Young Rac [Ed.]: International Economic Implications of Korean Unification, Seoul 1997, p. 84.
34
Jung, Sung Ki: S. Korea, US Agree on Contingency Plan for N. Korea, in:
http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=balancer++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/nation/200506/kt20
05060517373911950.htm&media=kt.
32
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multilateral- and bilateral talks. Even full US support, however, would most likely not be enough to fully
compensate for the delicate position of the ROK during negotiations. Hence, the South must be prepared to
make even great concessions to the four regional powers in order to secure their approval and to ensure a
successful Korean reunification.
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References
1. Akaha, Tsuneo [Ed.]: The Future of North Korea, London 2002.
2. Bogusky, Richard: The Impact of Korean Unification on Northeast Asia: American Security
Challenges and Opportunities, in: Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 10, No. 1.
3. Chang, Man Chul: Korean Unification, The Implications for Regional Security, Monterey 1994.
4. Cieslik,Thomas: Wiedervereinigungen während und nach der Ost-West Blockkonfrontation,
Ursachen der Teilung-Grundlagen der (fehlenden) Einheit, Marburg 2002.
5. Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS:) [Ed.]: The Korean Peninsula and the
Northeast Asian Security, Seoul 1998.
6. Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) [Ed.]: The Future of North Korea, Implications for the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia, Seoul 1998.
7. Jung, Sung Ki: S. Korea, US Agree on Contingency Plan for N. Korea, in:
http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=balancer++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/n
ation/200506/kt2005060517373911950.htm&media=kt.
8. Kim, Samuel/ Lee, Tai Hwan [Ed.]: North Korea and Northeast Asia, Lanham 2002.
9. Köllner, Patrick [Ed.]: Korea 2002, Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Hamburg 2002.
10. Kwak, Tae Hwan [Ed.]: The Four Powers and Korean Unification Strategies, Seoul 1997.
11. Lee, Ko Wun: The Role of the United States in the Korean Reunification Process: Multilateral
Security Relations of the Four Major Powers in Northeast Asia, Seoul 1999.
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12. Lee, Young Sun/ Okonogi, Masao [Ed.]: Japan and Korean Unification, Seoul 1999.
13. Maull, Hanns/ Maill, Ivo: Im Brennpunk, Korea, Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, München
2004.
14. Weidenfeld, Werner/ Korte, Karl-Rudolf [Ed.]: Handbuch zur Deutschen Einheit, 1949-1989-1999,
Bonn 1999.
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Lee Sang Soo. “Leadership Succession in North Korea and the Security Environment on
the Korean Peninsula.”
Lee, Sang Soo,
National Defense University
[email protected]
Paper: “Leadership succession in North Korea and security environment in Korean peninsula.”
I.
Introduction
II.
Process of Regime succession
III.
The Scenario of Regime succession
1. Success
2. Power struggle
IV.
Process of Scenario development in case of power struggle
1. 1. China’s Role
2. 2. US and South Korea’s Role
V.
Conclusion
The Purpose of this paper to look into the North Korea’s Regime succession scenario and specify security
threats surround power transfer. The upcoming power transfer may mark the beginning of the end but it
remains to be seen how it will play out.
In the wake of Cheonan worship sinking, there were many theories surrounding the incident. Someone
says that it was North Korea’s intention to turn South Korean government’s policy in order to get more
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economic assistance. But it is gaining weight that the North Korean’s attack on South Korea warship is part
of its succession strategy to earn military support in the process of power succession process. To evade
inner complaints of power transfer, Kim Jong-un perpetuate torpedo attack on cheonan warship. It may be
a grim sign of North Korea’s aggressive action to come. North Korean leaders, their confidence boosted by
their possession of nuclear weapons, might try to distract their public through aggressive acts abroad.
Junior Kim’s position as heir-apparent is vulnerable to any domestic sociopolitical resistance to him.
In the process regime transition in North Korea, weaker young leader may choose a limited warfare so as
to bolster his political power. Cheonan incident may be the tip of an iceberg.
This may be the threatening factors but there can be also opportunity factors. Young leader of North Korea
may have much more globalized mind enjoying basketball as an avid NBA fan. So It may be an opportunity
for the U.S. to share common basketball culture with the young leader of North Korea. It may be a good
chance to open up North Korea to international community.
Meanwhile the U.S has to undertake strategic dialogue with the China over how North Korea’s WMD might
be handled, whether China might allow South Korea and United States to enter North Korea in case of
contingency.
Accordingly South Korea needs to map out national strategy to handle a crisis caused by North Korea.
Introduction
In the wake of Cheonan worship sinking, there were many theories surrounding the incident. Someone
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says that it was North Korea’s intention to turn South Korean government’s policy in order to get more
economic assistance. But it is gaining weight that the North Korean’s attack on South Korea warship is part
of its succession strategy to earn military support in the process of power succession process.1 To evade
inner complaints of power transfer, Kim Jong-un perpetuate torpedo attack on Cheonan warship. It may be
a grim sign of North Korea’s aggressive action to come. North Korean leaders, their confidence boosted by
their possession of nuclear weapons, might try to distract their public through aggressive acts abroad.
The Purpose of this paper to look into the North Korea’s Regime succession scenario and specify security
threats surround power transfer. The upcoming power transfer may mark the beginning of the end but it
remains to be seen how it will play out.
Process of Regime succession
Kim Jong-un have spent his childhood in Wonsan, Kangwon province, He reportedly flew to Switzerland
where he enrolled at boarding school under a false name as the child of employees of the North Korean
embassy to the country. There he learned to speak English and German for several years up to around
2000. Without completing the course in the Swiss school, he returned home to study military science at Kim
Il-sung Military University for five years up to 2006.2 During the period, he has practiced his leadership skills
1
“Cheonan’s sinking is part of N. Korea’s succession strategy: Gates,” The Korea Herald available at
http://www.koreahed.com (accessed on Oct. 29, 2010)
2
Oh Seok-min, “Who is heir apparent Kim Jong-un,” Vantage Point, November 2010, P. 14
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to take over from his father.
Kim Jong-un is virtually unknown even to the North Korean people, although the propaganda machine is
gearing up for the heir apparent. Since 2009, North Korea has apparently established a propaganda song
praising the state’s heir apparent as a regular theme during public events. “Footsteps” written by top
composer Ri Jong-O, has been widely interpreted by North Korea watchers in Seoul as extolling the
valiance of Jong-un.3 But he has failed to have enough time to be groomed as successor largely because
Kim Jong-il’s poor health has hastened the preparation.
Fobes magazine has predicted that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il die in 2011 at the age of 70 and his
son Jong-un, 29 will succeed him to rule the country. Kim Jong-il is currently ill after suffering a minor
stroke and has noticeably emaciated since then.
In the North Korean Party delegates’ Assembly, Kim Jong-il’s third son, Kim Jong-un, was selected as one
of two vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party.4 Kim Jong-un emerged as a
potential heir just two years ago, immediately after his father had a stroke in the summer of 2008. While the
existence of the heir apparent had remained in obscurity until his debut at the ruling party’s conference in
September, he accompanied his father on many “field guidances.”
3
Tony Chang, “Process of making Kim Jong-un heir apparent,” Vantage Point, November 2010 P. 9.
4
It was the first major party event since the 23rd full assembly of the 6th legislature of the central party committee in
December 1993.
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The regime has consistently and secretly made efforts to help him capture the crown by attempting to get
the public to idolize him. It is still remained to be seen how the power transition will unfold as the heir
apparent does not win support from the public.
North Korea’s political and military figures in support of leader Kim Jong-il’s son, Jong-un, were given key
posts during the recent Workers’ Party conference.
Kim Kyong-Hui, the younger sister of the North Korean leader who has been promoted to four-star general,
was named the party’s politburo member, further backing speculation that she will serve as patron of her
nephew Jong-un. Her husband, Jang Song-thaek, who was earlier promoted to vice chairman of the
National Defense Commission, was named an alternate politburo member. As the Workers’ Party’s director
of administration, the second most powerful post in the ruling party, Jang is tasked with heading the police,
judiciary and other areas of internal security. His promotion, however was overshadowed by his wife who is
younger sister of Kim Jong-il. The Kim-Jang couple would play a key role in facilitating the power
succession to Jong-un by protecting nephew within the military. Simultaneouly, the Woker’s Party would be
managed by Kim Kyong-Hui and her husband, Jang song-thaek. In this context, Kim Jong-un may follow
the order of first obtaining control of the military through the party and then using the military to take general
power.5
North Korea most likely faces an unstable future. The cost of maintaining internal order will continue to rise
5
Lee Kwang-ho, “Guardian group for the Crown Pince,” Vantage point, November, 2010. p. 6.
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as the system’s fundamental defects force the new leader to confront stark new challenges.6
Two Scenarios of Regime succession
Success (opportunity)
North Korean supreme People’s Assembly decisions may lay a crucial stepping stone for the eventual
power transfer from its leader Kim Jong-il to his son Jong-un 7 . To protect the structure of regime
succession, the parliament promoted Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law Jang Song-thaek, head of a Workers’
Party department, to vice chairman of the National Defense Commission(NDC). But considering that Jang
became a member of the 12-person NDC only last year, the swift promotion indicates pyongyang’s efforts
to accelerate the father-to- son power succession process. Given this kind of managed leadership
succession process is successful, it reduces the likelihood of reform and makes the leadership even more
conservative and inward-focused. Kim Jong-un or collective leadership would continue to focus on
consolidating internal political control and on utilizing nuclear weapons pursuits to extract economic
benefits from the international community.8 In this case, China’s possibility to engage in the process of
power transfer may be marginal. Kim Jong-un is known to be an avid NBA fan and basketball player. So it
seems he shares at least some common cultural interests with Western nations such as the U.S. basketball.
6
Yoon Young-Kwan, a new approach to North Korea, The Korea Herald, available at http://www.koreaherald.com
(accessed on Oct. 29, 2010)
7
Jong-un was born in 1984 to dancer Koh Young-hui, who died abroad, most likely in Russia, in 2004.
8
Scott Snyder, “Kim Jong-il’s Successor Dilemmas,” The Washington Quarterly, January 1010. P. 42.
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It may be an opportunity for the U.S. to share common basketball culture. The U.S president Barack
Obama, is also an avid basketball fan and former player in college. But prospect for reform and opening-up
is grim. A former sushi chef to the Kim family said that “Reform and an open-door policy will be difficult.”9
Power struggle (threat)
The contested succession scenario poses the greatest possibility that external powers might be drawn into
possible conflict if North Korea’s neighbors perceive various factions as distinctly favorable to their own
interests. In this case, China may intervene in the process of power transfer. China tries to expand its
political influence on the North Korea while protecting Kim Jong-il’s eldest son Jong-nam. He currently lives
in Macau and Beijing. Kim Jong-nam said that he was opposed to his country’s third-generation hereditary
succession in an interview by TV Asahi.10 Kim Jong-un has been implicated in assassination attempts on
his older sibling and one-time purported rival for the job.11
Despite being the eldest son of Kim Jong-il, Jong-nam12 was squeezed out of the competition to become
the country’s next leader by losing his father’s favor after being caught trying to enter Japan with a fake
passport to visit Tokyo Disneyland in 2001. Second son Jong-chol is wildly expected to assist his younger
9
Kim Young-Jin, “North Korea will collapse soon,” The Korea Times, available at http://www. koreatimes.co.kr
(accessed on Oct. 28 2010)
10
Kim So-hyun, “Heir’s brother opposes N.K. succession,” Korea Herald, available at <http://www.koreaherald.com>
(accessed on Oct. 29, 2010)
11
Bloomberg, “Kim’s eldest son opposed to hereditary power shift,” available at <http://www.koreaherald.com>
(accessed on Nov. 2, 2010)
12
Jong-nam was born in 1971 to Kim Jong-il and former actress Song-Hye-rim, who died in 2002.
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brother Jong-un as they have the same mother and also because he is said to have less of what it takes to
become successor.
In a lengthy interview given to Japanese broadcaster TV Asahi on the 9th, Kim Jong Nam told the world,
“Personally, I am opposed to the third generation succession,” adding of his younger half-brother’s
succession, “There is nothing to regret,” “I don’t care about it at all,” and, “I hope my brother will do his best
for the good life of North Korea and for the North Korean People.”13 He apparently believes the Stalinist
regime could collapse amid a power transfer to his younger brother.14 Lee Gi-taek, the head of Seoul
National Unification Advisory Council, spoke with a close friend of the 38-year old Kim during a trip to
Macau, where Kim lives. During a lecture in Berlin on North Korea policy, Lee said the friend had asked
Kim whether he would visit the North to see his father health is reportedly flagging after suffering a stroke in
2008.
“Why should I go there? I’m not interest in the succession,” Lee quoted him as saying. “North Korea will
collapse soon. How long can this regime last?”15
Despite most of the Western media’s criticism of “grotesque power succession” has been poured, North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il has officially started the process of transferring power to his third son by
appointing Kim Jong-un as vice chairman of the central military commission of the workers’ Party. Kim
13
Park Hyun- min, “Jong Nam: North Korea’s Fall is Not Far Off” The Daily N.K., available at< http://www.
Dailynk.com> (accessed on Nov. 1, 2010)
14
Kim Young-Jin, “North Korea will collapse soon,” The Korea Times, available at http://www. koreatimes.co.kr
(accessed on Oct. 28 2010)
15
Kim Young-Jin, “North Korea will collapse soon,” The Korea Times, available at http://www. koreatimes.co.kr
(accessed on Oct. 28 2010)
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Jong-un was also named a Central Committee member at the party’s first conference in 30 years.
If Kim Jong-un takes over as scheduled, North Korea will become the first country in modern history to
allow power to be transferred to the third generation of the ruling family. But it is quite uncertain how the
anachronistic hereditary power succession scheme will unfold. There are three reasons. First, the heir
apparent does not enjoy support from the public. Second, many North Koreans reportedly regard him as
too young and inexperienced to become leader. Third, he has not yet secured a firm grip on the military.
His appointment as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission appears to be designed to help him
tighten the control of the military. When Kim Jong-un was named vice chairman of the central military
committee of the North Korean Workers’ party late last month, many a fresh entourage were promoted as
well just as shown below(Table 1).
(Table 1. Kim Jong-un’s entourage)
Ri Yong-ho
Advanced to vice marshal: Artillery Export
Hong Sok-hyong
Newly appointed as director of financial planning: Finance export
Pak Do-Chun
Newly named as party secretary and candidate member of the
Workers’ Party politburo: In charge of munitions industry
Mun Kyong-dok
Newly won three titles as a candidate member of the Politburo,
secretary of the Secretariat and a member of Central Committee.
Source: Korea Herald , 2010. 10. 29
To compensate for negative undercurrents towards his third son, Kim jong-il seems to have devised a
power structure to make sure that his son’s fragile leadership is protected and supported by his relatives
and close aides. In this line, he bestowed the title of four-star general to his sister, Kim Kyoung-hui and four
other loyal aides.
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In the post-Kim Jong-il era, the third son is unlikely to be able to exercise power. He has high possibility to
act as principal regent with power actually exercised by his aunt and her husband, Jang song-thaek, who
was named to the National Defense Commission in June 2010. Jang is widely viewed as the North’s de
facto No. 2 leader.
The new power structure leaves room for internal power struggle among powerful factions because Jang
and his wife’s control of the military is shaky. It may further destabilize the regime which is already highly
vulnerable due to food shortages, economic distress and international sanctions associated with its nuclear
programs. It is uncertain that how longer they would maintain stable power structure in the post Kim Jong-il
era which shares power among the small royal family. The alternative scenarios include a coup by
disgruntled generals and ultimately a revolution from below. Provoking a war against the South by the
rulers feeling threatened by popular discontent cannot be ruled out.
In this case, it may be threat to the U.S. and South Korea by casting shadow of war. Without support of the
China, North Korea’s unilateral attack may be suicidal for its regime. Therefore the role of China will remain
a critical factor in the stability of the Korean Peninsula.
Process of Scenario development in case of power struggle
North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity says that a popular North Korean children’s song has been changed to
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include satirical references to the Kim family dynasty. The re-written lyrics of the song are as follows:
“Three bears in a house, pocketing everything; grandpa bear, papa bear and baby bear. Grandpa Bear is
fat, Papa Bear is fat, too, and Baby Bear is a doofus.”16 According to NKIS, in one case students from
Haebang Senior middle School were caught and beaten overnight by National Security Agents because
they sang the song to the tune of guitar. A North Korean power struggle would mark a historic event that
would determine the Northeast Asian regional order and security of the Korean peninsula. As long as Kim
Jong-il regime is grip on power there will be no contingency in the North Korea. But a lack of experience
and reputation among the people would lead to a bumpy way for the young Kim to rise to the top post and
run the state in the future. If a power struggle breaks out in North Korea after death of Kim Jong-il, China
would be compelled to intervene, driven by a need to secure certain stakes for its own domestic stability as
well as external security and strategic balance.17
China’s Role
China may dispatch military forces to North Korea to establish pro-china regime in North Korea. In Chinese
perspective Kim Jong-nam may be an alternative to establish pro-china regime in the North Korea. He is
currently in the protection of Chinese authority. China’s ultimate goal is to expand its political influence to
16
Park Sung-kook, “Satirical Song Causing Consternation,” The Daily N.K. available at http://www.dailynk.com
(accessed on Nov. 2, 2010)
17
Park Chang-hee, “ North Korean Contingency and Prospects of China’s Military Intervention,” Working paper Series
Ilmin International Relations Institute October 2010, p. 2.
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the North Korea. There is still room for power struggle in the North Korea. Because Kim Jong-un’s
entourage Jang Seong-thaek’s grip on military circle is quite limited and unstable. If there is a military
uprising in the North Korea, China may intervene to settle down. China’s strategy would ultimately be to
forestall the emergence of a pro-US, anti-China regime in North Korea and establish a pro-china, anti-US
regime instead.18
There can be three types of Chinese military intervention; independent intervention, Multilateral intervention,
and UN-led intervention. The goals of the Chinese government’s stabilization operations will include
dividing up North Korea, blocking off mass influxes of North Koran refugees, securing WMD, maintaining
public order and offering humanitarian assistance, establishing a new North Korean government, reining in
the North Korean military, and promoting political and social stabilization.19 Among the three types of
Chinese military intervention, UN-led intervention in a North Korean contingency would be the most
equitable and legitimate way to receive recognition.20
US and South Korea’s Role
If power struggle in North Korea developed into contingency, the US may raise with the UN the danger of
18
John J. Tkacik, Jr., “How the PLA Sees North Korea,” p. 163.
19
Park Chang-hee, “ North Korean Contingency and Prospects of China’s Military Intervention,” Working paper Series
Ilmin International Relations Institute October 2010, p. 18
20
Park Chang-hee, “ North Korean Contingency and Prospects of China’s Military Intervention,” Working paper Series
Ilmin International Relations Institute October 2010, p. 18
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North Korea’s WMD leaks and move toward solitary intervention in North Korea. The U.S may ask help for
China to settle down the problem. But This scenario may not be favorable for China because China cannot
take initiative in tackling the North Korean issues for its own national interest. The U.S is currently stuck in
the Afganistan and Iraq. So, may be there is little power potential for the U.S to handle contingency in the
Korean Peninsula. The UN role may be marginal by taking example of the Chenan incident. In the process
of power succession in North Korea, Rok-US alliance forces should guard against a possible North Korea’s
surprise attack on the key military headquarter in South Korea.
Conclusion
This essay has so far dealt with the North Korea’s Regime succession scenario and specify security threats
surround power transfer. As mentioned above, junior Kim’s position as heir-apparent is vulnerable to any
domestic sociopolitical resistance to him.
In the process regime transition in North Korea, weaker young leader may choose a limited warfare so as
to bolster his political power. Cheonan incident may be the tip of an iceberg.
This may be the threatening factors but there can be also opportunity factors. Young leader of North Korea
may have much more globalized mind enjoying basketball as an avid NBA fan. So It may be an opportunity
for the U.S. to share common basketball culture with the young leader of North Korea. It may be a good
chance to open up North Korea to international community.
Meanwhile the U.S has to undertake strategic dialogue with the China over how North Korea’s WMD might
Page 38 of 175
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be handled, whether China might allow South Korea and United States to enter North Korea in case of
contingency.
Accordingly South Korea needs to map out national strategy to handle a crisis caused by North Korea.
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Park Hyeong Jung. “North Korea’s Transition to Post-totalitarian Sultanistic Tyranny.”
Park Hyeong Jung
Senior Research Fellow
Korea Institute for National Unification
[email protected]
Paper Abstract: “North Korea’s Transition to Post-totalitarian Sultanistic Tyranny.”
North Korea’s political system can be characterized as totalitarianism cum sultanism till the end of 1980s. It
has transformed into post-totalitarian, sultanistic tyranny since early 1990s. Two changes were responsible
for the demise of ‘ever-present total control over the individual’ and transformation to post-totalitarianism:
the demise of plan economy and ration system due to the economic hardship since 1990s and, as its
aftermath, the collapse of organizational-ideological penetration and control carried by party organizations.
Less restrained by both support and limitation by totalitarian mechanisms, the sultanistic aspects of North
Korean rule have strengthened their marks in the political system. In addition, the totalitarian strong state
has relapsed into the post-totalitarian tyranny. On one hand, the totalitarian provision of basic human needs
has deteriorated into abject state failure. On the other hand, the regime has strengthened security agencies
and drastically increased exemplary state violence to bolster its weakening control as it has transformed to
post-totalitarian rule.
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Kim Kah-ul. “Human Security in North Korea.”
Kim Kah-ul
Institute for Development and Human Security
[email protected]
Paper: “Human Security in North Korea.”
-- Draft. Please do not cite without the author’s express written permission --
Introduction
The 1994 Human Development Report laid out the two interdependent components of human security,
‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’, and emphasized that it should not be simply equated with
human development.1 At the same time, the seminal report establishing a link between the two since
progress or failure in one area increases the chances of progress or failure in the other. 2 Human security
in this respect is a broad concept which includes “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and
repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether
in homes, in jobs or in communities”.3 Even the proponents of a ‘narrow’ concept of human security focused
on violent threats to individuals recognize that these threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of
1
UNDP, ‘1994 Human Development Report’, p23
2
UNDP, ‘1994 Human Development Report’, p23
3
UNDP, ‘1994 Human Development Report’, p23
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state capacity and various forms of socio-economic and political inequity. Hunger, disease and natural
disasters kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined and sources of threat to human
security include both traditional and non-traditional factors which are all interlinked. As the former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed in his Report, In Larger Freedom, “we will not enjoy security
without development, development without security, and neither without respect for human rights. Unless
all these causes are advanced, none will succeed”.4
Concurrently, there is a growing international consensus that a state which cannot or is unwilling to protect
its own people falls short of its responsibilities and may even be considered the source of such threat. The
state, which has been the traditional focus of threat and security analysis, no longer holds a monopoly on
the security imperative and thus security as a concept has been reconstituted in the paradigm of human
security.
Drawing from methodologies and analysis of a number of research fields such as strategic
studies, human rights, international relations, and development studies, human security exists at the point
where these disciplines converge on the concept of protection from threats to the individual.5
Human security is more noticeable when it does not exist, as in the case of North Korea. The country lags
behind in terms of human development and it would be an understatement to say that North Korea fares
poorly when it comes to respect for basic human rights and civil liberties. Misguided by its warped dual
policies of juche (self-reliance) and sonkun (military-first), the government itself is a major source of threat
4
Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (Report of the UN
Secretary-General 2005).
5
Brendan Howe, ‘Rethinking Traditional and Non-traditional Security in North Korea’,
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to its own people. Economic mismanagement, governance failure, negligence and oppressive behavior by
the state has had grave consequences for ordinary citizens and the country remains deep in distress
despite recent, debauched attempts at reform and the inflow of international aid.
This paper will first examine the human insecurity and development challenges in North Korea and apply
the human security concept broadly to identify the different sources of threat to North Koreans. Then,
policies of aid agencies, donor states, international organizations, and international community as a whole
that failed to engage North Korea in addressing the insecurity of its people will be discussed and possible
remedies derived from this analysis will be suggested.
Human Security and Development Challenges in North Korea
By far, the most pressing problem face by North Koreans is chronic shortage of food. Although the true
extent of the record setting famine in the 1990s is still being debated by supporters of humanitarian aid, a
minimum of 580 thousand and up to 1.12 million people are thought to have died from hunger and other
famine related causes from 1994 to 2000.6 Today, people continue to die of starvation at a steady rate
even though North Korean police and village offices do not report the cause of these deaths as
malnutrition,7 and according to a joint FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply assessment Mission (CFSAM)
6
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2009’, Korea Institute for National Unification, July 2009, available
online at http://www.kinu.or.kr
7
The official top three causes of death for all ages is ischemic heart disease, lower respiratory infections, and cerebral
vascular disease, WHO Mortality Profile: DPRK (2002); Good Friends, North Korea Today No. 339 April 2010
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conducted in late 2008, there has been only a marginal improvement in household food security in recent
years.8 As many as 300,000 people is estimated to have violated the state ban on travel and fled to China
to escape hunger, where they live in constant fear of getting caught and forcibly repatriated.9
The state of North Korean human development gauged in terms of indexes used to measure conformance
to the Millennium Development Goal is disturbing. Life expectancy at birth for North Koreans is around 67
years which is considerably low compared to that of South Koreans which averages around 79 years.10
The gap in indicators is even more pronounced for particularly vulnerable groups such as women and
children: infant mortality rate, under five mortality rate, and maternal mortality rate in the North is estimated
to be around 42, 55, and 77 per 1,000 live births while the numbers are 5, 5, and 18 for the same
categories in the South. 11
Approximately 33 percent of the population is undernourished and the
percentage of under-fives suffering from moderate to severe stunting is around 45 percent,12 a whopping
figure that will have enduring effect for the next generation.
To be fair, North Korea scores surprisingly well when it comes to other categories. It is estimated that 100
percent of urban and rural population is using improved drinking-water sources and that 58 percent of
8
WFP Official Website, page on DPRK, available online at: http://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-
republic-dprk
9
Freedom House: Freedom in the World – North Korea (2010). According to Freedom House measurements (1 to 7
scale), North Korea’s status is “not free” and its Political Rights Score and Civil Liberties Score are both 7.
10
This figure is just below the world average of 69 years with sub-Saharan Africa scraping the bottom with a regional
average of 52 years. Refer to UNICEF, “The State of World’s Children 2010”, Special Edition, November 2009, and
WHO, ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Health Profile’, 2007.
11
WHO, Global Health Observatory, country files for ‘Republic of Korea’ and ‘DPRK’, and UNICEF, “The State of
World’s Children 2010”, Special Edition, November 2009
12
World Food Programme, Country Profile for ‘DPRK’ and WHO database
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urban and 60 percent of rural population has access to improved sanitation facilities.13 With the aid of
international medical assistance, the percentage of population receiving vaccination is thought to be nearly
90 percent.14 Virtually all of the population is literate and 11 years of free formal education (1 year of preschool, 4 years of elementary and 6 years of middle school) is mandatory for all citizens. 15 Although job
security in a socialist country like North Korea has a different meaning from one that outsiders are normally
familiar with and will be discussed more in detail later, most people in North Korea have some form of
employment.
This juxtaposition of indicators which are poles apart would make anyone question what has gone amiss
and a brief account of North Korean developmental history and social security system will shed some light.
With the end of WWII, Korea was placed under temporary UN protectorate-ship after being released from
thirty years of colonial rule by imperial Japan. Divided by ideologies and mindful of the growing Cold War
spheres of influence, the Security Council was unable to come to an agreement over the path towards an
independent Korean nation and the peninsula was arbitrarily split at the waist.
In 1948, the Soviet
administered northern part of the country established a communist type regime headed by Kim Il-Sung and
the south held democratic elections under US guidance. Hopes of unification was put on indefinite hold
when civil-war broke out in 1950 which ended with an armistice, a ceasefire that came short of ending the
13
WHO, ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Health Profile’
14
KDI Review of North Korean Economy, May 2010 Issue. Director General of WHO, Dr. Margaret Chan, quoted by
Yonhap News.
15
For more on higher education, adult education, and “social education” in North Korea, refer to studies by: ‘북한
의무교육제도와 보육제도’ [Obligatory Education System and Childcare System of North Korea], 곽노의 [No Ui Kwak]
and 이용자 [Yong Ja Lee], 한국유아교육학회 [Korean Society for Early Childhood Education] 2006
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conflict for good.
As a newly established country, North Korea was arguably in better shape than its southern counterpart.
Historically, the mountainous northern part of the country was more industrially developed and was
endowed with more natural resources such as coal. Unlike the capitalists in the South who pursued exportled growth, the North Korean government sought economic prosperity based on the socialist mode of
production and distribution, refraining from participating in the global market and pursuing juche.
Nevertheless, it continued to receive heavy economic assistance from the Soviet Union and later from
China after the former’s demise. Aided by its ideological allies and initial industrial advantage, North Korea
was able to achieve a high growth rate of over 20% during the post-war period of mid-1950s and 1960s
until leveling off around 5% in the 1970s and 1980s and was able to maintain a well-budgeted, strong
military.16
However, being cut off from the agrarian south which had traditionally been the breadbasket posed a
serious challenge to food security over time especially after agricultural reform in the 1970s and 1980s
failed to increase farmland.17 Only about 22.4% of land is arable in the North and deforestation resulting
from poorly planned land conversion policies lead to topsoil erosion and river silting. 18 This proved
disastrous in a country where seasonal flooding is a fixture and in time floods destroyed crop and damaged
farmlands thereby further reducing yield. To make matters worse, agricultural policy also failed to rotate
16
Bank of Korea statistics, database available online at www.bok.or.kr
17
Refer to study by Korea Rural Economic Institute (KREI), ‘북한의 농업부문 개혁 개방 정책과 남북협력’ [North
Korean Agricultural Policy Reform and North-South Cooperation], Research Report R471, December 2004;
18
Statistic from CIA World Fact Book, DPRK Land Use (Last updated on September 29, 2010)
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crops and soil depletion intensified as farming became heavily dependent on chemical fertilizers which then
had to be imported from the outside to meet the high domestic output demand for food.19 Unable to reach
self-sufficient level of cereal production domestically, commercial import of food and outside aid eventually
became unavoidable and the government began to cut back on rations.
A growing food shortage was speculated as early as the late 1980’s when the North Korean government
reduced daily food rations following the end of Soviet support and became even more suspect as the ‘let’s
eat two meals a day’ policy was implemented in 1991. However, the North Korean government did not
make a straightforward appeal for international assistance until a series of natural disasters in 1995 made it
politically viable to ask for outside aid without losing face.20 While bad weather may have exacerbated the
situation, North Korean leadership is guilty of mismanagement and negligence before and during the crisis
which is the real source of threat to food security for ordinary people in North Korea. Once international aid
began to flow in, North Korea continued its antithetical behavior toward the well-being of its people by
redirecting aid and reserving rations for priority groups such as government officials and the military. To
top it all, Pyongyang made an almost draconian policy choice of cutting off the northern most provinces
where food shortage is believed to be the most acute in order to stop the word on starvation and famine
19
‘Failure to Protect: The Ongoing Challenge of North Korea’, p.4
20
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, 2005, ‘Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea’,
U.S. committee for Human Rights in North Korea, Washington D.C., available online at:
http://hrnk.org/download/Hunger%20and%20Human%20Rights.pdf
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related death from reaching the rest of the population and abandoned people to fend for themselves.21
The gravity of such government failure and neglect in a highly controlled and centrally planned country
such as this cannot be grasped completely without discussing its social security structure and restrictions
on individual coping strategies. North Korean rations system known as the Public Distribution System
(PDS) is a multipurpose mechanism designed to do more than just distribute scarce resources. It is one
pillar of a wider social security scheme and population control mechanism.22 Along with the State Social
Insurance which included the Industrial Accident Compensation System as a secondary social safety net,
PDS distributes food, clothing and shelter as a type of an income guarantee system in which there is both
cash payments and in kind payments. 23 The crème de la crème of this centrally planned welfare
arrangement is the “free medical treatment” system that North Korea boasts as being superior to any health
care policy that has been put forth by developed nations. Under this system, the government provides
doctors and hospitals with “medical payment” in the form of medical supplies. 24 Unfortunately, these
instruments were too good to be true as they required tremendous commitment for which the North Korean
government lacks both resources and capacity to provide. 25 As the country experienced increasing
economic difficulties, adjustments were made to down-size PDS and large portions of the social security
21
Amnesty International, ‘Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (North Korea)’, January 2004, p.13
22
Kim Yeon-Jung, ‘A Study on the establishment of welfare system and the change of character in North Korea’,
Doctoral Thesis, Ewha Womans University, North Korean Studies 2010
23
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, 2009, p. 15
24
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, 2009, p. 305
25
Kim Yeon-Jung, ‘A Study on the establishment of welfare system and the change of character in North Korea’,
Doctoral Thesis, Ewha Womans University, North Korean Studies 2010
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system were abolished in July 2002. The “free medical treatment” system, for example, has completely
stopped operating and patients must purchase their own medicines and meals.26
However, in addition to the breakdown of state guaranteed social security and extreme food insecurity,
human security of North Koreans is uniquely handicapped by prohibitions that severely limit the coping
strategies of the people.
To be more specific, the 2002 overhaul of management systems shrunk
government assurance of welfare and increased individual responsibility to provide for oneself but left in
tacked the ban on free movement and limitation on market participation. In North Korea, Traveling from
one town to another as well as buying and selling goods at permitted markets both require permission from
above which usually requires bribery. Unable to relocate to regions where the PDS is still functioning,
many people in rural and mountainous regions where rations have been discontinued were trapped. There
is also a legal ban on small plot farming and trade without authorization which means that even the act of
growing one’s own food and selling them is restricted.27
Even in Pyongyang where the situation is comparatively less grim, economic hardship has made it difficult
for many people to live on their normal income alone. For example, an increasing number of “8.3 workers”
who bribe their supervisors so that they can be absent without leave to take up a more profitable
supplementary activity has been observed.28 In North Korea, everyone must join and report to some form
of organization so that the right to labor and duty to work is essentially one and the same. Rather than
26
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, 2009, p. 15
27
Good Friends, North Korea Today No. 337 March 2010, ‘Four reasons causing death by starvation’
28
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2009’, p. 16
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choosing an occupation based on individual preference and aptitude, all citizens are assigned a workplace
according to the personnel supply-demand plans of the Party.29 As in the case of rations, preferential
treatment such as better paying jobs are given based on “degree of loyalty” to the Party.30 Thus, violating
the prohibition on alternative means of survival outside the given system such as seeking another job or
traveling to escape hunger can result in the offender being sent to North Korea’s infamous gulags or labor
camps for punishment and intensive ‘rehabilitation’ where they are over-worked without rest or adequate
food and shelter.
In essence, the government failed to provide for its people while also restricting individuals from seeking
whatever means necessary to cope with economic hardship, leaving ordinary citizens caught between a
rock and a hard place: starve or break the rules at the risk of severe punishment. As desperadoes resort
to extreme measures, there has been a reported increase in incident rate for both violent crimes such as
homicides and non-violent ones such as raids on food storage facilities.31 Community security is also being
threatened and the affect this has had on the North Korean society and family is alarming.32 Children who
have been orphaned by dead parents or abandoned by parents who can no longer care for them are
banding together in city slums and creating a phenomenon called “kkojebi”.33 Break down of family is
intensifying and as traditional source of community and family protection wither, personal security is
29
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2009’, p. 16, 326-327
30
North Koreans are formally classified into three groups: loyal, wavering, or hostile to the government.
31
Good Friends, North Korea Today No. 367 September 2010
32
이순형, 김창대, 진미정 “탈북민의 가족해체와 재구성” [The Breakdown and Reconstitution of North Korean Family];
33
Good Friends, North Korea Today No. 367 September 2010
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exposed to threats such as increasing crime and poverty.34
Rising violence against women and under aged girls in particular is worth noting. During the food crisis
most North Korean women started vending, peddling, and trading to support their families which they carry
on under constant threat and fear of being pilfered, robbed, human trafficked, and sexually assaulted.35
Incidences where officials demand sex from women who have committed minor offences in markets and
trains are believed to have increased although exact figures are unavailable as they are under-reported. In
addition, human trafficking of women and girls who are forcibly abducted, enticed with false promises, or
volunteer to support their family has come to the fore as a serious cross-border problem.36 In 1999, the
ratio of men and women who cross the China-Korea border was roughly the same but by 2006 women
were outnumbering men three to one.37 Sexual violence against North Korean women who are forcibly
repatriated to North Korea from China is particularly heinous; in addition to rape and torture, those women
who return pregnant by Chinese men are beaten until the fetus is aborted to prevent mixing of races.38
Sexual violence is not the only threat to women’s health in North Korea. Women and girls who die from
pregnancy related complications is estimated up to 370 per 1,000 live births which is the highest in East
34
이애란, ‘왜 북한의 여성 탈북자가 많은가?’, 한국논단 Vo. 249, pp. 118-123
35
White paper p.354
36
White paper p.347
37
‘Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond’, International Crisis Group, 26 October 2006
p.5
38
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2009’, p. 354
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Asia; the same indicators for Mongolia is 46, China 45, South Korea 14 and Japan 6.39 Resorting to
commercial and survival prostitution exposes women to further risks since contraceptives are difficult to
obtain in North Korea. In addition to being exposed to sexually transmitted disease, premarital and extramarital sex is illegal by state law, and many women perform dangerous, self-administered abortions to
avoid punishment.40 The health risks of starvation, malnutrition, pregnancies, childbirth, child rearing, and
abortion against the background of added physical stress and psychological burden of supporting their
family is believed to account for the significant number of increase in number of North Korean women
suffering from various illnesses such as cancer and diabetes.41
Therefore, North Koreans are neither ‘free from fear’ nor ‘free from want’, and threats to their security come
from diverse economic, social, and political sources. Whether the North Korean state, with its over-sized
military and nuclear leverage, is a strong or a weak state is up for debate yet it is certainly a failed state that
endangers its own people. Even the recent government reform measures such as the currency reform
aimed at restructuring the economy has cause more harm than good to ordinary citizens. Since the famine
of 1990’s and the collapse of PDS, people adopted coping strategies such as stashing cash and buying
food from small and large scale entrepreneurs who left the state sector and became food suppliers. 42
When latest currency reform which took place on 30 November 2009 issued new currency and set the
39
KDI 북한경제리뷰 [KDI Review of North Korean Economy], Korea Development Institute, May 2010 available online
at http://www.kdi.re.kr
40
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2009’, p. 354
41
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2009’, p. 354
42
International Crisis Group, 2010, ‘North Korea under Tightening Sanctions’, International Crisis Group Asia Briefing
No. 101, Seoul/Brussels, 15 March 2010, p.8-9
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conversion rate of the old won to new won at 100:1, it had the effect of confiscating excess savings, further
lowering the purchasing power of ordinary people, and wiping out the assets of small scale traders who
hadn’t managed to convert to foreign currency as large-scale operators have done.43
Still, there may be hope for change yet. Earlier this year, on May 26th, 2010, the Party deviated from its past
attitude of insisting that everything is under control and announced that “the government cannot take any
immediate measures due to the worse than expected food situation” and released directives including
blanket permission to open markets albeit with some restrictions and instructions for safety authorities not
to regulate commerce by people.44 A government official quoted by Good Friends commented that “I think
this action is an improvement. People who only look up to the governmental distribution will die waiting.
Instead, the government is being considerate and states that people need to find their own solution.”45
Although the effect of this so-called “5.26 measure” remains to be seen, it is merely a temporary measure
and a more fundamental change needs to occur if the human security of ordinary North Koreans is to be
addressed.
Policy Failures and Possible Prescriptions
Engaging North Korea in human security dialogue is challenging in many ways. Pyongyang is
43
International Crisis Group, 2010, ‘North Korea under Tightening Sanctions’, International Crisis Group Asia Briefing
No. 101, Seoul/Brussels, 15 March 2010, p.8-9
44
Good Friends report: North Korea Today No. 340 June 2010
45
Good Friends report: North Korea Today No. 340 June 2010
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suspicious of outside interference which it considers to be intruding on its sovereignty and does not belong
to any organizations that can provide comprehensive technical assistance in a relatively depoliticized
manner such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank.46 While it
accepts help from international aid organizations and NGOs, the government constricts their operation and
has asked them to leave on occasion. More importantly, when it comes to peace and security on the
Korean peninsula, traditional security issues such as denuclearization dominate the discussions. Bilateral
and multilateral political negotiations are complicated by different geo-political interests of the invested
parties in the region and non-traditional security issues are often subsumed under other overriding political
agenda at hand.
To begin, it is worth discussing the policy of giving any form of aid to North Korea at all. Many have
suggested that international aid is keeping the existing regime afloat indirectly by ameliorating the suffering
of the masses to a manageable level thereby removing the motivation for a revolution from below, and
directly by allowing resources intended for those in need to be diverted to those less deserving such as
government officials and the military. While this is an argument worth rehearsing, it is morally untenable to
prescribe a solution that involves standing by and doing nothing in the face of suffering of such magnitude
in the hopes that things will deteriorate to a critical point needed for a desirable political outcome to come
about in the future. Even if there is a sure guarantee that regime collapse or fundamental reform will occur
relatively right away, there still remains the question of collateral damage and whether any political triumph
46
Haggard and Noland ‘Famine in North Korea’, p. 231
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would ever justify the sacrifice needed in the process.
Thus, international community as a whole did the right thing in promptly stepping up to North
Korea’s call for assistance in the mid-1990s although it is unfortunate that aid has since then declined. In
the first ten years of the Consolidated Appeals by WFP, FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, OCHA, UNFPA, and
various NGOs, total humanitarian assistance to North Korea amounted to 2427.10 million USD, and this
does not include the bilateral and multilateral commitments made by US, China, Japan and South Korea. 47
However, donations started to dwindle by 2005 and yet another series of floods devastated the nation in
2006. The WFP which feeds nearly one third of the population spoke out in 2008 about the increasing
difficulty of getting donations and a senior UN official warned that the Pyongyang office risked closure if
more funding was not forthcoming.48 Currently, WFP is assisting 65 districts in 7 provinces, including parts
of the northeast, although access to the population is still severely hampered and it struggles to operate
while adhering to its principle of ‘no access, no food’.49
If giving aid as a policy is to succeed in improving the food security of the North Korean people, there
needs to be a more constructive relationship between the recalcitrant North Korean government and the
donor community. At the moment there is distrust on both sides that hamper the effectiveness of aid and
cause donor fatigue. Unlike the food aid which WFP distributes to selected target groups such as flood
victims and pregnant or nursing women, the aid that passes through local PDS warehouses before being
47
Haggard and Noland ‘Famine in North Korea’, Appendix 2.1.
48
‘Donor fatigue threatens aid for North Korea’, Financial Times, 3 March 2010
49
WFP Official Website, page on DPRK, available online at: http://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-
republic-dprk
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distributed via schools, orphanages and hospitals are subject to diversion which exasperates donors. 50 At
the same time, North Korean government distrusts aid agencies and restricts their operation by demanding
long notice periods before visiting rural areas and banning the use of translators not provided by the
government. If both parties concede, that is, if the donors accept the reality that a certain level of diversion
will occur for which the central North Korean government may or may not have full capacity to control while
the later steps up to the internationally recognized obligation of aid recipient country to facilitate the
operation of aid agencies, this will prevent disruption of aid at the very least and WFP will get both the
funding from donors and access to population it needs.
For this to occur, a consensus among donor countries to empower the existing aid frame work made up by
WFP and other international organizations and NGOs who operate under the same norm is needed.
Agreeing to empower the existing aid framework means that bilateral donors should also attach the
condition of ‘no access, no food’ to arrangements they strike with North Korea. Admittedly, the pros and
cons of conditional aid is a long standing controversial issue within the aid community in both theory and
practice which this paper readily recognizes. Nonetheless, a coordinated policy that enables the continued
delivery of food aid while simultaneously interacting with North Korea in a manner consistent with
internationally recognized norm is the most responsible policy choice for building trust.
Haggard and Noland, for example, have caused controversy by arguing that China and South Korea
50
‘Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea’, p.24
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channel a greater portion of their concessional food assistance through the WFP.51 They pointed out that
the two countries’ policy of bypassing WFP and providing concessional sales or grants of food with little or
no condition and monitoring undermines the efforts of the aid community and that “if China and South
Korea remain suppliers of last resort, the North Korean government gains the opportunity to weaken the
multilateral regime that is in place and to challenge the WFP’s most basic mandate; in mid-2005, that is
exactly what Pyongyang did by asking the WFP to leave”.52 However, deals between the vested state
actors in the region have complications on a higher political level separate from the fundamental goal of
food aid which is to free people from the want of food and fear of starvation and thus tying bilateral aid to
aid agencies may not always be possible or desirable. Nevertheless, their point remains valid that bilateral
donors should not undermine international effort.
Another approach that was tried and failed was the carrot and stick method of alternating between aid and
sanctions. During the fifth and sixth rounds of the Six-Party Talks in 2005 and 2007, five Working Groups
were created to address various sub-issues with the intent of “normalizing North Korea’s relationship with
countries around the world” and this was considered particularly important for the purpose of addressing
human rights and humanitarian concerns. 53 However, despite the stated purpose of addressing nontraditional security issues, the resulting agreement reached in February 2007 effectively made economic,
51
Haggard and Noland ‘Famine in North Korea’, p.232
52
Haggard and Noland ‘Famine in North Korea’, p.233
53
Vaclav Havel et al., 2008, ‘Failure to Protect: The Ongoing Challenges of North Korea’, DLA Piper US LLP, U.S.
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, and the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights, available online at:
http://hrnk.org/download/F2P%20(North%20Korea)%209-19-08%20English.pdf p.13
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energy, and humanitarian assistance dependent on North Korea’s compliance with the disarmament of
nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and declaration of all its nuclear programs.54 The political success of this
approach was mixed since North Korea partially complied by disabling only a portion of the Yongbyon
facility and submitting a less than comprehensive declaration of its nuclear programs past its deadline. The
delivery of promised aid was likewise partially executed; the US sent 60,000 tons of food aid out of the
5000,000 tons promised.55 South Korea also withheld vital food and fertilizer aid following North Korea’s
July missile test and October nuclear test in 2006 until agreement was reached at the Six-Party Talks in
2007.56 Meanwhile no improvement of human lives was observed.
Sanctions also had the effect of merely paying lip service to human security concerns. Following the
October 2006 testing of nuclear warhead by North Korea, Security Council adopted Resolution 1718.
Among the numerous reasons cited in the resolution for imposing sanctions was North Korea’s failure to
address the humanitarian concerns raised by the international community while at the same time stating
that these sanctions were not meant to preclude humanitarian aid to the North Korean people.57 Not
surprisingly, North Korea scoffed-off the resolution. As far as engaging North Korea to take its obligation to
provide for its people seriously are concerned, these policies were neither genuinely committed nor
effective.
Here, the politics surrounding the promotion of human rights needs a brief mentioning. Policy debates on
54
Vaclav Havel et al., 2008, ‘Failure to Protect: The Ongoing Challenges of North Korea’, p.14
55
Vaclav Havel et al., 2008, ‘Failure to Protect: The Ongoing Challenges of North Korea’, p.16
56
Citation needed
57
Vaclav Havel et al., 2008, ‘Failure to Protect: The Ongoing Challenges of North Korea’, p.17
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this matter is divided by those who argue that human rights are secondary to life and death matters and
others who argue that separating human rights from humanitarian considerations is deeply flawed.58 The
long list of human rights atrocities already committed by and is still continuing to this day at the hands of the
North Korean government has been expounded on by civil-society, academics, practitioners, and the media
elsewhere and will not be reproduced here. For the purposes of examining the different engagement
policies with North Korea, human rights can be said to be a mine field that keeps exploding. So far the
hardliner approach taken by the US and the constructive engagement policy of the EU has not yielded
much result.59 Furthermore, the right of North Korean refugees, or ‘economic migrants’, in China to receive
international assistance has also been a thorny topic. Only a portion of those who make it out eventually
find safe passage to new host countries, most of them in South Korea, and yet they still face discrimination
and legal issues arising from their escapee status after resettlement. So far, efforts to deal with the human
rights situation in North Korea has been complicated by politics other than basic human security concern of
freeing people from fear and want and more effort needs to be made to separate the issues.
The UN Secretary General’s attempt to reel in North Korea to recognize the doctrine of Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) has also been less than successful so far. The R2P concept was first presented by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001 and was
58
John Feffer, ‘Prospects for Pragmatic Engagement on Human Rights with North Korea’, Policy Paper, Improving
Regional Security and Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Policy Interests and Options’; Stephan Haggard and
Marcus Noland, 2005, ‘Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea’; 이성우 ‘북한의 인권현황과
한국의 인권외교정책’ [Status of Human Rights in North Korea and South Korea’s Human Rights Foreign Policy], Jeju
Peace Institute, 2009;
59
이선필, ‘유럽연합의 대북한 정책에서 인권정책의 의미와 역할’, 국제지역연구 제 13 권 제 2 호, 2007
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endorsed by the UN General Assembly with the adoption of Resolution A/RES/63/308 in September 2009.
In the process, Secretaries General Kofi Annan and Ban Gi-moon paved the way for the concept to be
integrated into UN’s fabric and policies. In July 2009, UN General Assembly held an Interactive Informal
Dialogue and plenary sessions on the R2P which was successful in getting the Asia-Pacific region, a
previously unsupportive region of the concept due to a strong sovereignty norm, to endorse the concept
nearly unanimously, all except North Korea.60
It is important to note that, following the agreement reached by heads of state and government in the 2005
World Summit, R2P specifies that states have the primary responsibility to protect its own people from the
four crimes and violations made explicit in the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005: genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that ‘RtoP applies only to a relatively narrow field
of human security’.61 It is regrettable then that even the narrowest application of human security to be
adopted into policy while still preserving the norm of sovereignty was unable to enlist positive response
from North Korea. Still, the Dialogue did have a minor breakthrough: with regards to whether the second
pillar of R2P is consistent with the principles of sovereignty, equality and non-interference, North Korean
delegation’s response was cautious, acknowledging that ‘the international community can encourage and
assist states in their efforts to fulfill their responsibility to protect their own people’ yet still adding that ‘it
60
‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Asia-Pacific in the 2009 General Assembly Dialogue’, Asia-Pacific
Center for the Responsibility to Protect, October 2009; see also ‘Human Security in Southeast Asia: Viable Solution or
Empty Slogan?’, Yukiko Nishikawa, Security Dialogue, 2009, Vol 40 No. 213
61
‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Asia-Pacific in the 2009 General Assembly Dialogue’, Asia-Pacific
Center for the Responsibility to Protect, October 2009, p.7
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cannot act like a master in place of their governments’.62 To the explanation that there is a distinction
between R2P and ‘humanitarian intervention’, the North Korean delegation responded by pointing out that it
can still be used as a pretext for coercive measures, specifically mentioning the ‘war on terror’ as infringing
upon sovereignty. It would appear that the biggest obstacle to engaging with North Korea is, once again,
distrust.
A possible way for the international community to encourage the North Korean government to fulfill its
responsibility to protect its own people, a concept which it does not wholly dismiss at least at diplomatic
tables, without provoking its paranoia about losing its sovereignty is to enable it to ‘purchase’ the much
needed food by artificially lowering the world grain price temporarily. According to the FAO, North Korea
would need to import 1.10 million tones of cereal for the marketing year 2009/10 (November/October) to
meet the needs of about 24 million people.63 At the same time the country is currently experiencing severe
financial problems due to the fact that it does not have a foreign exchange reserve to draw upon and the
earnings from arms exports and illicit activities is not enough to offset a trade deficit of about 1 billion USD
per year.64 If even a token amount of what is needed can be covered by the North Korean government as
opposed to its past action of using international aid as substitute for commercial imports rather than
62
‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Asia-Pacific in the 2009 General Assembly Dialogue’, Asia-Pacific
Center for the Responsibility to Protect, October 2009, p.19
63
Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) on Food and Agriculture, DPRK Country Brief, September
1, 2010, available online at: http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=PRK&lang=en
64
International Crisis Group, 2010, ‘North Korea under Tightening Sanctions’, International Crisis Group Asia Briefing
No. 101, Seoul/Brussels, 15 March 2010, available online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-eastasia/north-korea/B101%20North%20Korea%20under%20Tightening%20Sanctions.ashx
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supplement to local production,65 it would still something to build on.
65
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, 2005, ‘Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea’,
U.S. committee for Human Rights in North Korea, Washington D.C., available online at:
http://hrnk.org/download/Hunger%20and%20Human%20Rights.pdf p. 16
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Brendan Howe. “Asian Governance, Human Security, and Development.”
Brendan M. Howe
Ehwa Womans University
[email protected]
Abstract: “Asian Governance, Human Security, and Development.”
Governance looks to reconcile conflicting interests in order to protect the weak from unjust exploitation
through the rule of law, and introduce security for all. Governance is also a process through which
collective good and goods are generated so that all are better off than they would be acting individually.
Thus governance implies a concern by those who govern with both the human security and development of
those who are governed. On the whole, Asian countries have prioritized economic development over social
or political development. While this econophoria, whereby the solution of all societies’ ills is sought through
economic development has contributed to remarkable patterns of economic growth, it has also seen the
rise in importance of challenges to human security in both absolute and relative terms. This paper
examines the close and complex relationship between human security and development in Asia,
addressing the responsibilities of regional governments to provide for both sets of human needs and
entitlements, and also raises the question of what can be done if national administrations fail in their duties.
Traditionally Asia has been seen as a zone of non-intervention where state prerogatives, as the definitive
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embodiment of political community and shared values, are seen to trump individual human rights. However,
while the constitutive documents of Asian international organizations and codified positive international law
continue to reflect a non-interventionary position which accords well with what is often described as ‘Asian
values’ this stance has come under increasing pressure from the customary elements of international law
embodied in the customs and usages of civilized nations, and the works of jurists and commentators,
culminating in acknowledgement of a responsibility to protect. Yet given that non-violent threats to lives and
livelihoods endanger more human beings in Asia than war, terrorism and ethnic cleansing combined, this
paper also considers the extent to which the regional community has a ‘responsibility to provide.’
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Joel Campbell. “The Future of East Asian Integration: Constructing a Political Economic
Community.”
Dr. Joel R. Campbell
Troy University, Pacific Region
[email protected]; [email protected]
Abstract: “The Future of East Asian Integration: Constructing a Political Economic Community.”
The process of creating a regional integration framework for all of East, Southeast, and South Asia has
taken several major steps forward since the Asian financial crisis. The ASEAN+3 process has brought the
major nations of Northeast Asia together with ASEAN members in regular meetings, and efforts to forge
bilateral and multi-lateral free trade agreements have made significant progress. Now, India, Australia, and
New Zealand have been brought into that process, and the eventual result could be a pan-regional
common market within a generation—or so the optimists believe. The road to such a common destiny,
however, is strewn with obstacles, as geopolitics, great power interests, territorial disputes, and jealously
guarded sovereignty may prevent the forging of a common Asian identity. Meanwhile, Asian businesses
have used the process of globalization to create an informal regional integration on their own.
This paper looks at the major issues involved in the creation of any pan-Asian common market. It suggests
that the success or failure of this undertaking will depend on creation of a new structure for ameliorating
regional disputes. While the Japan-China conflict is the most serious obstacle to be overcome, a host of
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bilateral disputes throughout the region make Asian regional relations as tricky as ever. The two giant
Northeast Asian nations must seek a “Grand Bargain” that involves setting aside some of their most
habitual political posturing, and due to a long history of mutual suspicion, this will not be easy.
The paper also considers which of the major regional integration theories best describes the formation of
an Asian economic community. While neo-functionalism captures the essence of the “ASEAN way” that
balances cooperation and non-interference throughout Southeast Asia, functionalism may provide the most
useful way forward as the disparate Asian nations seek improved mechanisms for solving a range of thorny
economic and especially political issues.
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Hans Schattle. “Kaesong in Contemporary Korean Politics.”
Dr. Hans Schattle
Yonsei University,
Department of Political Science and International Studies
[email protected]
Abstract: “Kaesong in Contemporary Korean Politics.”
This paper proposes the creation of a deliberative forum that would establish and uphold standards related
to human rights and transparency at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the only remaining joint economic
initiative still in operation between South Korea and North Korea. By providing an analysis of ongoing
developments and drawing upon recent scholarship on deliberative democracy, I argue that for Kaesong to
reach its full potential and gain international credibility, its governance must be strengthened. The most
promising way to achieve this aim, despite the seemingly long odds, is to launch a permanent forum in
which representatives of all constituencies at Kaesong shape policy together through a sustained and
inclusive process of public reasoning.
For the full manuscript, contact Hans Schattle at [email protected]
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John Mirikitani, Hallym University: “Tit-for-Tat: The Kashmir Conflict of India and Pakistan.”
Elisabeth Bui,a, Korea University
Steven J. Jordan,b KAIST
John Mirikitani,c,d Hallym University
a Graduate
School of International Studies, Korea University, Anam-dong, Seongbuk-Gu, Seoul, Korea 136-701.
b Kaist Graduate School of Finance, 207-43 87 Hoegi-ro, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul, Korea 130-722.
c International Studies, 39 Hallym University St., Kangwon-do, Chuncheon-si, Okcheon-1dong, South Korea, 200-702.
d Corresponding Author: International Studies, 39 Hallym University St., Kangwon-do, Chuncheon-si, Okcheon-1dong,
South Korea, 200-702. Email: [email protected], Tel: +82-33-248-1880
Abstract: “Tit-for-Tat: The Kashmir Conflict of India and Pakistan.”
Leaders of Pakistan and India met in the historic Agra Summit of 2001 to resolve long-standing issues,
notably that of Kashmir. Kashmir is sandwiched between India, Pakistan, and China, all of which claim
sovereignty. This is an illustration of a ‘fault line clash’ Huntington (1996) -- war, and possibly nuclear war,
is the predicted outcome. The present paper shows that the ‘Tit-for-Tat’ strategy of Axelrod (1984) has
been used to achieve cooperation, when the players have repeated interactions, despite the fact that the
static 1-shot Game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Thus, Kashmir presents a ‘natural experiment’ to test the
predictions that ‘Tit-for-Tat’ will eventually lead to cooperation in a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma – even in
the intractable case of a fault line conflict in which both sides possess Nuclear Weapons.
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Askhat Safiullin. “Security and National and Regional Identities in Security Cooperation. An
Analysis of State Interaction in Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”
Askhat Safiullin, PhD Candidate
Yonsei University, GSIS
[email protected]
Abstract: “Security and National and Regional Identities in Security Cooperation. An Analysis of State
Interaction in Shanghai Cooperation Organization
This paper looks at the present state of regional cooperation in Central Asia, particularly in the field of
security, and examines the reasons behind the limited progress of regional initiatives, specifically Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). Despite the present functional needs and financial and moral support for
regional cooperation in Central Asia, real progress is lacking. This paper claims that part of the reason
behind this lies with the missing well developed national and regional identities – a required component for
transferring the necessary loyalties to any social group. Due to the negative connotation ‘Central Asia’ has
unpopular political discourse, as well as the perception of the ‘Central Asia’ as the periphery. Largely
deficient national identities create tensions between the states in the region and within the states
themselves. All this makes security cooperation even less likely, since discourse causes competition
against one’s neighbors rather than cooperation. Finally, the SCO as an institution causes regional
cooperation to be seen in instrumental terms and a secondary stage for politics in countering ‘large powers’
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stage. The regionalism, created by China, as a feature of its diplomacy, allows it to maximize its benefits
versus the benefits of smaller states in the region.
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Radostina Nikolova. “US – China Rivalry in Southeast Asia – A Game with a Zero-sum
Outcome.”
Rodostina Nikolova, M.A. Candidate
Yonsei University
[email protected]
Paper: “US – China Rivalry in Southeast Asia – A Game with a Zero-sum Outcome.”
Just like in the beginning of the Cold War when Roosevelt thought there were chances that the US and the
Soviet Union might cooperate on certain issues, Obama administration started out thinking that they could
have partnership with China. This, however, was in the beginning, almost two years ago when the new
president of the United States of America and his team believed that their new platform and ideas would
reach heights that the previous administration never managed to seize upon. The dynamism of the last two
years, however, proved the saying that not everything that glitters is gold and the pedestal that the
American economy has been set on for the last five decades and more crumbled away in no time. The
repercussions that those events brought had to prove only one thing – this was a game with a zero-sum
outcome – the weaker the US got, the stronger China became. As a result the US had to take a new
approach and thus the purpose of this project is to research how far it would go and what would the
implications for the equilibrium in Southeast Asia be. The topic of my research is “US – China Rivalry in
Southeast Asia – A Game with a Zero-sum outcome. The hypothesis I am trying to prove is: Obama
administration is not likely to confront China on security issues in Southeast Asia.
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This hypothesis is based mainly on three official documents. Those are The National Security Strategy of
the United States of America released in March 2006 (NSS 2006), The National Security Strategy from May
2010 and the 2010 China Military Power Report and to be more precise the DoD Background Briefing on
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. The comparison between the
two NSS reports aims at proving the change in the foreign policy objectives in Obama and Bush
administration and to further examine how the objectives introduced in the 2010 NSS are currently being
implemented.
Based on facts derived from the two documents I draw the conclusion that Obama administration’s new
interests are in the Southeast Asia region. Based on data from the same source, however, I also argue that
the US have expressed their ambitions in the region but have no clear strategy of how to pursue them.
At the ASEAN regional forum in Vietnam in July this year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton shocked the
Chinese by announcing that “the US intends to play a prominent role in a new regional effort to create a
framework for resolving territorial disputes in the waters near East and Southeast Asia” 1 . The
announcement followed months of diplomatic negotiations behind the scenes and provoked an angry
reaction from the Chinese government and the state media.
“The United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various
1
Rogin, J. (2010, August 6). Is the Obama administration getting tough on China? Retrieved November 10, 2010,
from http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com:
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/08/06/is_the_obama_administration_getting_tough_on_china
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territorial disputes without coercion. We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant,”2 Clinton further
stated the American position without explicitly mentioning China’s name.
As soon as she came out with this new South China Sea initiative there were speculations that this might
be the new Clinton Doctrine. No such official stance has been made yet though.
The purpose of this statement was very simple – the US wanted to demonstrate a more assertive approach
to the region in the face of increased Chinese aggressiveness as well as to claim their ambition to be
leading players in Southeast Asia, this would guarantee them a long term stay in the region.
And this is explicitly stated in President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy report. The opening
sentence of Chapter II named Strategic Approach says:
“The United States must renew its leadership in the world by building and cultivating the sources of our
strength and influence”3.
Both NSS 2010 and NSS 2006 identify the same most urgent threats that the US society faces and both
are citing almost identical challenges, agendas and objectives. Such similarities lead to a lot of criticism
from some scholars that point out that the 2010 NSS is too similar to the previous one4. Here I should say
2
Ibid.
3
Department of Defense . (2010, May). National Security Strategy - 2010. Retrieved November 2010, from
www.whitehouse.gov: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, p. 7
4
Feaver, P. (2010, May 27). Obama’s National Security Strategy: real change or just ‘Bush Lite?'. (F. Policy,
Producer) Retrieved November 4, 2010, from http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com:
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/27/obama_s_national_security_strategy_real_change_or_just_bush_lite
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that I agree only partially with such criticism. And I would further elaborate on my argument by saying that
since both the greatest threat and respectively the greatest challenges (namely WMD and their proliferation)
in 2010 are the same as those in 2006 it is very likely that both reports will be very similar. This has only to
prove one more time how consistent actually the US foreign policy is.
My criticism, however, is a little more different. Perhaps the biggest difference is that Obama’s NSS uses a
obscure and rather “gentle” approach where Bush’s NSS was more sharply structured. And this is clear
from the first opening sentences of both the reports. The 2006 Bush NSS starts with:
“My fellow Americans, America is at war”5
In contrast Obama’s catch phrase sounds like the beginning of an ancient myth or a fairytale:
“Time and again in our Nation’s history, Americans have risen to meet – and to shape – moments of
transition.”6
The report continues in the same rhetoric. I will not go further since this is not the purpose of this research.
Instead What I will try to make a brief comparison between the same sections in the two reports since this
is where from I would try to draw my conclusions for the current implications of the US foreign policy that
we are observing now. For this purpose I will have to very briefly go through the last chapters in both
5
Department of Defense. (2006, March). National Security Strategy of the United States of America - 2006. Retrieved
November 2010, from http://merln.ndu.edu: http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2006.pdf
6
Department of Defense . (2010, May). National Security Strategy - 2010. Retrieved November 2010, from
www.whitehouse.gov: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf
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reports prior to the conclusion part called International Order in Obama’s NSS and Develop Agendas for
Cooperative Action with the other main centers of Global Power, in other words the ones dealing with the
US foreign relations.
It is striking how in a document that long Obama’s NSS barely touches on the US strategy in Southeast
Asia. Considering that economists around the world agree that this is going to be the source of global
economic growth for the next decade and beyond and therefore it is absolutely safe to project that this is
where US’s main interests would be too.
Still in the 2010 NSS it is much more improved in comparison to the 2006 report. In Bush’s NSS within the
same chapter there is an East Asia section as well as South and Central Asia sections. However, there is
not explicitly divided Southeast Asia section and countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam are
mentioned only once in parentheses as examples of ASEAN member states.
The 2010 Obama NSS does not have a separate Southeast Asia section either but it touches upon the
majority of the countries in the region.
Whether a strategy, pure logistics or just a coincidence but it is an interesting fact that the order of the
countries that President Obama visits during his 10-day, four-nations tour in Asia is the same as the way
they appear in the NSS 2010.
Among the countries that are of interest for us first in the schedule of the president comes India. According
to the NSS India, along with China and Russia is one of the “21st Century Centers of Influence”7, a clear
7
Ibid., p. 43
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recognition of the growing statute and role of India.
President Obama spent 3 days in India. During his visit he announced that America supports India to have
a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Demonstrating warm relationship and obvious support it was
somehow difficult to convince the Chinese and the rest of the world that this trip was not a part of a master
containment plan against China.
However, the truth is that India, like the other fellow Asians is not really willing to go beyond containment
with China – at least for now. Sure India and China are at odds over borders and Pakistan, but China is
now India’s largest trading partner.8 Also, one should never forget that the Indian foreign policy has a long
history of non-alignment. What is more for India and for the other Asian countries it is clear that here we are
talking about zero-sum outcome – if the Chinese are rising, the Americans are fading – and it does not look
like the Americans are going to fix their problems any time soon.9
The next stop for president Obama was Indonesia. One would say that winning Indonesia for the US side is
for sure. It turned out that this should have not been taken for granted though.
Indonesia is important for the US for a number of reasons: this is the fourth-largest country in the world; the
third-largest democracy; the country with the largest number of Muslim population; the incoming ASEAN
chair and anchor – since it is at least twice as big in terms of both population and economy than the next
8
FRIEDMAN, T. L. (2010, November 9). Containment-Lite. (The New York Times) Retrieved November 2010, from
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/opinion/10friedman.html
9
Ibid.
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largest Asean country. On the bright side the fact that president Obama has actually lived there might be
crucial in Indonesia’s decision to be on the US side. On the other hand however, President Obama’s
popularity among the local people drastically dropped since he had cancelled three other visits to Indonesia
before this one actually took place.
In addition to that the Chinese have been doing their best in order to lure Indonesia. Less than a day before
President Obama touched down on Jakarta on Tuesday, a high-level Chinese delegation wrapped up a
three-day official visit by announcing that Beijing would invest $6.6 billion in desperately needed
infrastructure improvements.10
Similar initiatives on Chinese behalf may provide for an explanation why Indonesia signaled recently that
there were limits to how close it would get to the United States. In Sptember, Mr. Yudhoyono conspicuously
skipped a meeting in New York between the US and ASEAN, when Obama was seeking support in
pressing China for a resolution to disputes in the South China Sea. The explanation was that Mr.
Yudhoyono was too busy attending to domestic issues, but his absence was interpreted differently in New
York.11
China internal dynamics create external ambitions. Simply by securing its economic needs China is shifting
10
ONISHI, N. (2010, November 9). Obama and China Play Rival Suitors to Indonesia. Retrieved November 12, 2010,
from http://www.nytimes.com:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/world/asia/10indo.html?scp=1&sq=obama%20and%20china%20play%20rival%2
0suitors%20for%20indonesia&st=cse
11
Ibid.
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the balance of power in the Eastern hemisphere and that definitely concerns the US. 12
Therefore when Beijing elevated its claim to territory in the South China Sea to the level of a core national
interest, along with Tibet and Taiwan this raised considerable anger among the other countries in the
region that also claim ownership of piece of the sea.
Thus Obama administration overall strategy is to expand and strengthen regional
mechanism. This is
meant to counter China’s desire to deal with smaller countries on a bilateral basis, where Beijing can exert
more pressure.
The notion of multilateralism, the awareness of how dependent the local states on China are, adding to that
US own dependence on trade with China are some of the factors that make me support the argument that
at least in the near future (and by near future I mean the end of the first mandate of the president) I would
argue that
Obama administration is not likely to confront China on security issues in Southeast Asia.
This research, however, is far from completed and this is just a preliminary conclusion. All eyes are on
President Obama and his administration and the ASEAN countries are more than eager to see if the Korea
US FTA will be successfully finalized. This would mean that the US has serious intentions in the region
which would definitely play a role for the future US –ASEAN countries relationship.
12
Kaplan, R. D. (2010, May/June). The Geography of Chinese Power. Foreign Affairs .
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Teodora Gyupchanova. “The U.S.A's Involvement in Track II Diplomacy With North Korea
– Aiding Or Harming American Nuclear Diplomacy in the DPRK.”
Teodora Gyupchanova, M.A. Candidate
Yonsei University
[email protected]
Abstract: “The U.S.A's Involvement in Track II Diplomacy With North Korea – Aiding Or Harming American
Nuclear Diplomacy in the DPRK.”
Since the stalling of the six-party talks after the end of 2007 and the provocative actions of North Korea
including launching of missiles, testing a nuclear weapon and sinking a South Korean military ship, there
has been no official interaction between the U.S.A and DPRK. There have been however many unofficial
meetings of representatives of both countries for that period. They are part of the international efforts to
engage North Korea and bring it back to the negotiations. Track 2 approaches in diplomacy clearly have
their limitations but they also have the potential to transform policies and facilitate cooperation. One such
example of a successful Track 2 action was former American president Jimmy Carter’s mission during the
1994 North Korean nuclear crisis. Therefore the potential of Track 2 initiatives for influencing official
diplomacy should be further studied and documented.
Track 2, as a term, is introduced for the first time by Dr Joseph Montville - former Director of Preventive
Diplomacy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. According to his
formulation Track 2 is “the unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations
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that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion and organize human and material resources in
ways that might help resolve their conflict”.
Another much more direct definition of Track 2 diplomacy was given by former U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Perry, who defines it as “the dialogue between non-officials of nations designed to make up for the
perceived shortcomings in the official dialogue”.
Regardless of the different interpretations and wordings of the term, Track 2 diplomacy has had highly
controversial record. It is either praised (successes such as the Northern Ireland conflict and the PalestineIsrael conflict) or considered irrelevant. Many officials regard Track 2 activities as non-important and as
having no effect whatsoever on official processes. However, when explored from a constructivist point of
view, Track 2 diplomacy has important ideational implications:
It provides an opportunity for exchange of ideas
It is a highly valued confidence building measure
It creates a network for the people investing their efforts in the conflict resolution process
This research aims to find proof that the USA’s involvement in Track 2 diplomacy actually has favorable
effect on achieving even temporary developments in the six party talks and is an important supplementary
tool for the policy makers in the White House. Currently there are several non-governmental organizations,
think tanks, university departments and individuals in the USA that are active in the Track 2 diplomacy with
North Korea. This paper analyzes the activities of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy
(NCAPF), Northeast Asia Cooperative Dialogue (NEACD) and the Council for Security Cooperation in
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Northeast Asia (CSCAP).
The research method used to test the hypothesis of the paper is mainly qualitative content analysis – a
thorough exploration of the reports and conference proceedings from the Track 2 events held from 2003
through 2008 and their comparison with the official record of the six-party talks, with the State Department’s
documents on US foreign policy towards North Korea and with any official exchanges between North Korea
and USA that took place in that period. The emphasis falls on the initiatives, which were held directly before
some of the official rounds of the six-party talks so that it can be tested whether there are direct
consequences of the Track 2 process in the form of ideas, decisions, change in attitude, etc.
The paper concludes that on the one hand, there are many activities at the non-governmental level that
produce interesting ideas and prospective projects for dealing with the denuclearization of North Korea,
which unfortunately do not get transferred to policy makers at the official level. On the other hand there are
Track 2 initiatives and academic conferences that become forums for transmission of ideas to government
officials who have the capacity to transform them into actual policies. Despite some evidence that
institutionalized Track 2 conferences and security dialogues have had some apparent effect on the U.S.A.’s
nuclear diplomacy towards North Korea, more research should be conducted for better understanding of
the process through which some Track 2 activities manage to affect Track 1 diplomacy, while others are
unsuccessful in doing so.
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Aaron Golden. “US Armed Forces in South Korea and the Issue of Prostitution.”
Aaron Golden, M.A. Candaidate
Yonsei University
[email protected]
Project Paper: ““US Armed Forces in South Korea and the Issue of Prostitution.”
I propose to do my analytical paper on whether or not the United States military with regards to foreign
policy, still dictates the rules and regulations of prostitution in South Korea or has its policy changed to a
secondary role in which the South Korean government now has taken full control over?
In following up my proposal:
I believe that with the help from the South Korean government, the United States controls and persuades
Korean governmental policy in reacting, limiting, and regulating prostitution. Without the oversight from the
U.S., South Korean policy towards prostitution would take a back seat to many more important issues
surrounding their industrialization.
Additionally:
Along the lines of foreign policy and to confirm my idea that the U.S. policy on South Korea prostitution has
improved since the establishment of the Republic of Korea, I will investigate the U.S. Department of
Defenses Combat on prostitution in persons as per the Investigator Generals report.
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Along with historical facts that surrounded the U.S. military’s presence in South Korea, I will begin to
discuss a few important issues that shaped U.S./Korean Policy towards prostitution and their affects on
present day policies that ultimately changed South Korean peoples perspective on foreigners and their
governments policy abroad.
1. Human rights- Along with Prostitution, there were many reported cases of “Camptown Workers”
being harassed, beaten, or even killed. It wasn’t until the U.S. military started to threaten the
Korean government, did things change in these areas.
2. Racism
a.
a. Racism between Koreans is a very critical issue in regards to their
social,
economic, and educational status.
b. Racism inside the U.S. military between the whites and the blacks.
c. Racism between Koreans and the U.S. military.
3. The introduction of Venereal Diseases (VD’s) and how their effects have lingered on the minds of
Koreans since the establishment of the Republic of Korea.
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Sarah Hasan. “Reexamination of Laws on Migrant Workers.”
Sarah Hasan, Ph.D Candidate
The Academy of Korean Studies, The Graduate School of Korean Studies
Paper: “Reexamination of Laws on Migrant Workers.”
Labor migration is a universal phenomenon and it revolves around the push and pull factors between the
labor sending and receiving countries. The reason behind the increase in labor migration in South Korea
(hereinafter referred to as Korea) is its rapid industrialization and demographic situation. Despite the
intense efforts by the Korean government to expand the domestic labor pool, shortage of labor persisted
which in turn led the government to adopt statutes to bring in and to regulate the influx of migrant workers
to the country.
This paper will focus on the dynamic process of policy making and examine the vital policies-both
immigration and labor – for importing semi-skilled and unskilled migrant workers to Korea and will work on
the hypothesis that these policies have various deficiencies which resulted to several problems particularly
an increased number of unauthorized migrant workers and heightened vulnerability of migrant workers to
human rights abuses. The paper is divided into four sections: the first section deals with the background of
labor migration in Asia as well as its origin and causes in Korea. The second section deals with migrant
related laws in Korea in the past 20 years. The third section deals with the effects of the policies on migrant
workers and beyond while the final section will deal with suggestions and concluding remarks.
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Background of Labor Migration in Asia
Several features have come to characterize Asian labor migration. First, all destination countries in
the region have a policy to keep it temporary. Second, much of international migration in Asia is
intraregional. Third, the numbers of undocumented migrants is relatively high. Fourth, the share of
women participating in labor migration has increased sharply.1
Labor Migration Trend in Korea: Origin and Causes
Starting from 1963, Korea exported its first batch of labors to Germany in mining and nursing. In the
following years, sixty one percent of the Korean migrant workers went to the Middle East as construction
workers. However, Korean workers seem to have lost the incentive to go abroad for employment due to
Korea's rapid wage increase and the rapid economic growth since the late 1980s.2 With improved wages
and working conditions for the local workers a gap appeared in certain sectors of industry where these
Koreans stopped taking up jobs. Factors like change in demographic conditions, chronic labor shortages
and unwillingness to work in 3-D job sector created room for a steady increase of foreign workforce in
Korea.
1
For a more detailed overview of the quantitative and qualitative evolvement of labor migration in Asia since the
1970s, see Asis (2008).
2
Par, Young Bum, ‘The turning point in international migration and economic development in Korea’, Asian Pacific
Migration Journal, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 149-74.
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Source: Korea Immigration Office
To deal with the growing number of foreign workers, restructuring of policies in different sphere is
continuously taking place.3 To talk about these policies, first I will give a brief profile of the migrant workers
in Korea.
Profile of Migrant Worker in Korea
Inherent differences in migrants include nationality, gender and age, whereas differences imposed by the
government, which are often more important, include type (expatriate or unskilled and semi-skilled), status
(authorized (legal) or unauthorized), and occupational sector (manufacturing, construction, services or
fisheries etc.).
Figure1. Composition of Foreigners as of June 2010.
3
Skeldon, Ron (1992); “On Migration Transitions in East and Southeast Asia” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal,
1(2) P.3 [220-249.]
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Source: Ministry of Labor and Employment
Migrant Related Laws in Korea (1993-2008)
The entire system since its start in 1990s can be divided into roughly three phases. Phase I (1987–
1997) corresponds to the period before liberal economic consolidation, Phase II (1998–2002) to the period
of economic transformation, and Phase III (2003–present) to the development of liberal and ethnic
immigration policies.4
Table 2: Low-Skilled Migrant Worker Policy Changes in Korea
4
Nora Hui-Jung Kim, “Korean Immigration Policy Changes and the Political Liberals’ Dilemma”International Migration
Review. Vol.42 Number 3 (2008):576–596
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Source: Nora Hui Jung Kim (2008)
Foreign Residents in Korea by Nationalities (Source: Korea Immigration Office)
With the growing of number migrant workers strict policies and goals were set but inconsistencies and lack
of implementation of these policies further added to the problem. In the next section these policies are
taken into consideration.
Kim Young-Sams’ Administration (1993-1998)
Industrial Training Program for Joint Ventures (JVTP) was the first scheme of its kind that was introduced
in1991 was in place before Kim came into power. It originally intended to upgrade the skills of foreign
workers employed by overseas subsidiaries of Korean corporations. Their duration of stay was six months,
but could be extended up to six additional months.
Industrial Technical Training Program (ITTP) was a modified version JVTP, enacted in 1993 and it called
for easing labor shortages for small and medium sized firms with 300 or less employees for a period of one
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year but their period of stay was extended to two years and their number and area of work were increased.5
A rally organized by a group of Nepalese migrant workers in front of Myeong Dong Cathedral in 1995 drew
nationwide attention and in its response, a directive on the management and protection of industrial
trainees was enacted: trainee’s pay increase and health insurance were added besides some other rights
protected by the Labor Standards Act. The unauthorized migrant workers were also eligible for the
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance.
Problems within ITTP include the low wages of the trainees than those of the undocumented
foreign workers; most foreign trainees came to Korea with the expectation that they could learn or develop
some skills and knowledge through training. However, they were used as substitute to Korean workers who
do not want to do the 3-D jobs; foreign trainees had a strong incentive to flee from their workplaces since
undocumented workers were not caught easily; flawed recruitment process the diplomatic problems with
sending countries because the foreign trainees felt cheated.
2.2. Kim Dae-Jung’s Administration (1998-2003)6
His administration made more decisive changes such as overhauling of the ITTP. After getting
criticism from all different spheres, ITTP was overhauled by Work After Training Program (WATP)
implemented in 1998. The main difference in WATP for foreigners was a system to permit changes in their
5
SooBong and Yoo,Kilsang, “Immigration and Labor Market Issues in Korea” Korea Labor Institute. Paper prepared
for the “Workshop on International Migration and Labor Markets in Asia” Tokyo Japan, February, 2001.
6 In May 1999, KDJ in a message to his cabinet he said “Discrimination against foreign workers in Korea and
violations of their rights are a serious and shameful problem from a point that we are aiming to become a nation that
respects human rights (Korea Times, May 25, 2000).
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status to stay.7 At first, the timeframe was “two years as a trainee followed by a year of employment,” but
with the amendment the timeframe was adjusted to “one year as a trainee followed by two years of
employment.” Through WATP, foreign workers became entitled to the Labor Standard Act, the Medical
Insurance Law, and the Industrial Accident Insurance Law, as well as receiving severance pay and various
other allowances.8
Even under the WATP trainees cum workers had to work long hours and night shifts, had their
wage withheld and had to bear abusive behavior of their employers because under the permit they were
prohibited to change their work place. WATP still fell short of critically reducing human rights abuses.
Roh Moo-Hyuns’ Administration (2003-2008)
Employment permits system (EPS) came into effect on August 17, 2004. This made Korea the third
country in Asia, after Singapore and Taiwan, that adopted the Employment Permit System (EPS), in which
foreign workers were entitled to bonus allowance, retirement pay and the three basic labor rights of
unionizing, collective bargaining and collective action.9
The law was designed to grant 227,000 unregistered foreign laborers legal status. With this bill, the
number of foreign workers, including legal employees and industrial trainees, increased from 340,000 in
7
Joon K Kim, (2004), “Towards a Formulation of the Republic of Korea’s Foreign Worker Policy: Lessons
from Japan and Germany” Asia-Pacific Population Journal Vol.19 No.2 pp 41-68
8 Korea Herald, July 14, 2000. Yoo 2002.
9
http://www.eps.go.kr
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December 2002 to 541,000 in December of 2004.
Table: Undocumented Foreign Workers (1999-2009)
Source: The Immigration Office
EPS has gone under several revisions since its promulgation and the latest revision was
implemented in April 2010, anyone can employ a foreign worker provided they show evidence that despite
efforts they have been unable to find a Korean worker. The period of an employment contract with their
visa status under E-9 shall, in principle, be three years, but may be extended to another two years without
going overseas.
The number of foreign workers to be received under the Employment Permit System, their fields of
employment, and sending countries are to be determined by the Foreign Workers Policy Commission.
Applicants must have passed the Korean language test and the medical test.10
Changes in EPS over the years
10
Lee Kyu Yong. “Changes in Policies for Migrant Workers and Recommendation.” Labor Review Mac 2007. Korea
Labor Institute.(2007)
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Lee, Myung Baks’ Administration (2008 – present)
When Lee, Myung Bak came into power he said, “We will create an open society for all.” Under the
Ministry of Justice, the First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (FBPI, 2008~2012), laid the foundation for
implementing a long-term and consistent immigration policy with a focus on openness and assimilation. 11
Ministry of Justice has adopted various measures to improve the working conditions and now are
considering granting residence visa status for those with the specific skills and capabilities that Korean
industry needs most. One-step employment application procedure at the employment support center,
improved re-employment methods and loosening the limit on employment contract are a few factors that
are taken up.
11
The First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (FBPI) 2008-2012. p.11
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International Legal Framework
In Korea aside from several legal instruments related to foreigners such as the Immigration Control
Act, Act on Treatment of Foreign Workers, Act on the Employment, etc.of Foreign Workers, Labor Standard
Act, The Minimum Wage Act, Industrial Safety and Health Insurance Act they have rights under
international law as well. A large array of international instruments also exist to provide parameters for the
regulation of international migration and standards for human and labor rights including the following which
Korea is a party to:
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights – ICESCR
Art. 13, 14
Acceded: 10 April 1990
International
Covenant
on
Civil
and
Political
Rights
-
ICCPR
Acceded: 10 April 1990
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination - CERD
Ratified: 5 December, 1978
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CEDAW
Ratified: 27 December, 1984
Convention on the Rights of the Child - CRC
Ratified: 20 Nov, 1991
International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities -CRPD
Signed: 30 March, 2007
Korea is also a party to ILO conventions no. 81 (Labor Inspection), No. 111 (Discrimination in Employment
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and Occupation), No. 155 (Occupational Safety and Health), and No.187 (Promotional Framework for
Occupational Safety and Health). Regardless of ratification, the ILO in 2004 concluded that “ILO
instruments apply to all workers, including irregular migrant workers.”
Effects of Policies on Migrant Workers and Beyond
Recruitment programs of the Korean government have various deficiencies that led to an increase in
unauthorized workers at a large scale, the human rights violations and failure in management of foreign
workers.
Crackdowns, Deportation and More
Korean immigration office conducts heavy crackdowns twice a year. These crackdowns have
resulted in many serious injuries to migrants and, in some cases, even death. Amnesty International (AI)
and Korea’s Human Rights Commissions have documented it as a primary strategy for tackling irregular
migration. According to AI, immigration officials accompanied by the police, have conducted mass
crackdowns on workplaces, on the streets, in markets, train stations, and private homes of migrant workers
and have reported instances of arbitrary arrests, collective expulsions and violations of law
enforcement procedures, including excessive use of force during these raids. These mass crackdowns
have also put pressure on 23 detention facilities nationwide, contributing to problems of overcrowding, poor
living conditions and delayed access to medical treatment.
These crackdown techniques are in violation of Foreign Workers Employment Act or the policies
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laid down in FBPI. Immigration officials on numerous occasions have not followed the procedures when
arresting the migrant workers including failure to be in uniform, identify themselves, and present a detention
order signed by a judge which is otherwise stipulated in Article 26-2 of the Act.12
Employing unauthorized workers is a common practice and that creates room for these workers to
take risks. Another interesting aspect of their employment and its economic implications for the host
country includes whether it boosts the underground economy or not and who actually benefits from their
employment?
Human Rights (HR) Violations
The differences in the migration experiences of workers affect the types and severity of human
rights violations they experience. Unauthorized workers are more vulnerable to human rights violations
because of the nature of their status and the type of jobs that they take up with a constant fear of
apprehension by the government. Further, because they work in isolation from the mainstream hence it
leads to difficulties in creating social relationships with fellow migrants. Those with legal status, though
covered by laws, can not benefit from them due to several factors such as their inability to understand the
language, access the information on legal help, specific provisions in contracts that hinders the use of their
right in full.
The list of common HR violations and complains include restrictions on change of work place,
12
EFWA, Chapter IV. Art. 26-2 p.107.
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lower wages compared to that of what the Korean workers get for the same job, withholding of wages, bad
working conditions, sexual harassment, lack of health and safety measures, medicare and inability to
access justice. Non-governmental organizations such as AI, Human Rights’ Commission of Korea, and
Joint Committee with Migrants in Korea have played a vital role by highlighted the plight of the migrant
workers and the abuse of their fundamental rights.
The Korean Constitution calls for the non discrimination principle in its Article 11, it stipulates that
“all citizens are equal before the law, and there may be no discrimination in political, economic, social or
cultural account of sex, religion or social status.” Even the Labor Standard Act13 (LSA) explicitly forbids
discrimination against foreign workers. It’s Article 6 to Article 11 calls for “Equal Treatment, Prohibition of
Forced Labor and Violence, Elimination of Intermediary Exploitation and Guarantee of Exercise of Civil
Rights” respectively. In particular, its Article 6 states that “No employer shall discriminate against workers
on the basis of gender, nationality, religion or status.” Legal experts argue that what makes situation worst
is the authority exercised by the officials of the immigration bureau.
Recommendations
It is incumbent upon the government to seek a balance between national concerns and the basic universal
human aspirations because by doing so there will be more gains than losses. Steps that need urgent
attention include:
13
Labor Standard Act- Act No. 5309, March 13. 1997 Last Amended by Act No.10366, June 10, 2010
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Management of the migrants through systems of proper documentation. It is in the interests of
both the government and of the migrants. Moreover, offering amnesties is important in order to e
ncourage illegal migrants to come forward, to be registered and leave.
Bilateral communication between countries needs improvement in order to reduce the incidence
s of illegal migration, accidents and so on. All the 15 countries on the list for importing workers
have the EPS related websites in their native language but more effective strategy must be
chalked out to cover the gap of post arrival training, work related briefings for the selected
candidates to avoid shortcoming later
Governments should consider enforcement through more effective legislation aimed at the empl
oyers of foreign labor rather than controls on the migrants themselves. Such an approach follow
s the "user pays" principle.
More freedom for foreign laborers and trainees to change jobs or status within their sector of allo
cation should be considered in order to discourage them from going underground if retrenched.
Effective networks need to be established to diffuse information to migrants regarding their right
s within the host society. Non-governmental organizations may provide a suitable platform for su
ch activities. Information on the rules, regulations and procedures relating to foreign labors need
s to be diffused to potential employers as well as to the migrants themselves.
Effective monitoring of existing recruitment program in order to prevent abuse, excessive fees a
nd unscrupulous practices is necessary.
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Particular attention must be paid to vulnerable groups, such as women, or to those who fall withi
n gray areas in labor related legislation.
Help Center for migrants can be vital but again they fall pray to inconsistency in laws, such as a
provision in the Immigration Control Act which states that a government official must report to
the immigration office in case they are contacted by an unauthorized worker thus denying them
justice.
NGOs for migrants (including church-based organizations) and migrants’ associations are an
important source of support and assistance to migrants. These organizations must be part of the
discussions on migration and must be considered as stakeholders in the migration process.
Consultations with migrants’ organizations are important to know the concerns of migrants and
to ensure their representation in policy deliberations.
Conclusion
Policies related to migrant workers have evolved over the years. They are changing for good but
still it seems that they set a stage of “us and them” while dealing with the semi-skilled, unskilled foreign
labor force. Our rights are intertwined with the rights of others; they are indivisible and non- hierarchical.
We must not ignore, or be indifferent to the rights of some while protecting the rights of the others. We must
not forget that these migrant workers are people –with dreams, aspirations and contributions to home, both
old and new. They deserve common standard of dignity, security and respect regardless of the reason of
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their dislocation and regardless of their status and their categories. There is a great potential in Korea to
bring such change, to stand out and to lead the world.
Reference
Books:
1. Bergsten, C. Fred and Choi, Inbom. eds. The Korean Diaspora in the World Economy.
2. Special Report 15. Washington, D.C: IIE, 2003.
3. Katherine, H.S Moon. Migrant Workers’ Movements in Japan and South Korea. In
Egalitarian Politics in the Age of Globalization, Edited by Craig N. Murphy,
New York: Palgrave, 2000
4. Kim, Yeong-Hyun, “Keeping the Gateway Shut: Regulating Global Citi-ness in Seoul”.
5. In Migrants to Metropolis: The Rise of Immigrant Gateway Cities. Edited by Marie Price
and Lisa Benton- Short. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008.
6. Analysis of the Unskilled Foreign Workforce and Labor Market. Seoul. Korea Labor
Institute. 2004.
7. Korea Immigration Service, Ministry of Justice, Korea. “Major Policy Guide” 2006.
Journals:
1. Abella, Manolo “Complexity and Diversity of Asian Migration.” Geneva: Unpublished, Manuscript.
2002
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2. Asis Maruja M.B. “International Labor Migration in Asia.” Sociological Quarterly, 49, (2008):423444.
3. Amnesty International. “South Korea: Migrant Workers are also Human beings.” 2009
4. Gray, Kevin. “Migrant Labor and Civil Society Relations in South Korea.” Asian and Pacific
Migration Journal 25, no.3 (2006):381-90.
5. Joan Fitzpatrick and Katrina R. Kelly. “Gendered Aspects of Migration: Law and
the
Female Migrant.” Hastings Law Review. (1998).
6. Kim, Joon K. “Toward a Formulation of Foreign Worker Policy in South Korea: Lessons from Japan
and Germany.” Asia-Pacific Population Journal, 19(2): (2004): 41-68.
7. Lee, Hye Kyung. “Gender, Migration and Civil Activism in South Korea.” Asian and Pacific
Migration Journal, 12(1/2). (2003): 127-153.
8. Lee, Young Wook and Park, Hye mee. “The Politics of Foreign Labor Policy in South Korea and
Japan.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 35(2) :( 2005): 143-165.
9. Lee Kyu Yong. “Changes in Policies for Migrant Workers and Recommendation.” Labor Review
Mac 2007, Korea Labor Institute.(2007)
10. Park, Young Bum. “The Turning Point in International Migration and Economic Development in
Korea,” Asian Pacific Migration Journal, vol. 3(1):(1997) pp. 149-174.
11. Skeldon, Ron. “On Migration Transitions in East and Southeast Asia.” Asian and Pacific
Migration Journal, 1(2): (1992) pp. 220-249.
12. Seol, Dong Hoon. “Past and present of foreign workers in Korea, 1987-2000.” Asia Solidarity
Quarterly 2,(2000): pp. 6-31.
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13. Nora Hui-Jung Kim, “Korean Immigration Policy Changes and the Political Liberal’s Dilemma.”
International Migration Review. Vol.42 Number 3 (2008):576–596
14. SooBong and Yoo,Kilsang. “Immigration and Labor Market Issues in Korea.” Korea Labor Institute.
February, (2001).
15. Joon K Kim. “Towards a Formulation of the Republic of Korea’s Foreign Worker Policy:
from Japan and Germany” Asia-Pacific Population Journal Vol.19 No.2
Lessons
(2004), pp 41-68
Online Sources:
www.immigration.go.kr
http://www.eps.go.kr
http://www.moel.go.kr
http://moj.go.kr
http://www.kli.re.kr/kli_home/main/main.jsp
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Ge Liu. “Humanitarian Call From Darfur: China’s Response and Its Critics”
Liu Ge
Ewha Womans University,
Institute for Development and Human Security
[email protected]
Paper Introduction: “Humanitarian Call From Darfur: China’s Response and Its Critics”
Martin Luther King, in his autobiography, remarked that man’s inhumanity to man is not only perpetrated by
the vitriolic actions of those who are bad. It is also perpetrated by the vitiating inaction of those who are
good (King 1963: 229). This paper examines China’s humanitarian response to the violence in Darfur which
happened in 2003 and lasts till now. If applying King’s discourse to China’s humanitarian response to
Darfur, there will be a blurring line to distinguish white from black because of Chinese self-contradictory
presence in the Darfur issue. On the one hand, China’s traditional emphasis in diplomacy is the principles
of sovereignty and noninterference, which proved to be lucrative in promoting economic deals in Sudan
(Holslag 2008: 72); On the other hand, China has already activated its unprecedented international role of
being more responsible. This can be revealed in China’s transformed stance on UN Peacekeeping
Operations changing from principled opposition and non-participation in the 1970s, towards a more
supportive attitude but nonparticipation in the 1980s, to support and participation in the 1990s by
dispatching its military observers for the first time to serve in the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization in 1989 (Choedon 2005: 39-41). China’s role in Darfur has put her into a situation full of
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controversies and criticisms in the international development community. In fact, since the Darfur crisis
broke out in 2003, China has contributed a significant amount of humanitarian aid to Darfur. By August
2007, China had sent five shipments of humanitarian aid to Darfur, consisting of pumps, tents, blankets,
generators, vehicles, medical and agricultural equipments and goods for Darfur schools, which amounted
to $11 million (Save Darfur Coalition 2007: 4). China believes that its efforts mainly fall into two categories.
On the one hand, it aimed at solving the long-term fundamental roots of the Darfur crisis which refers to the
extreme underdevelopment; On the other hand, it intended to function as a facilitator, or an honest broker,
between Sudan and the international community (Zhang 2008: 71). However, American former Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has contended, “China cannot be a full partner in the world community
until it respects international obligations and agreements on human rights, free and fair trading practices,
and strict controls on the export of destabilizing weapons and military technology” (Zhang 1996: 1). Linda
Jakobson, who is the China Programme Director of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, has
put forward a constructive argument that a policy of non-interference (in China) is not a credible policy for a
nation that wants to be respected as a responsible global power (Large 2008: 105). What is the main
problem with China’s humanitarian response in Darfur and what are the main criticisms of China’s activity in
Darfur? In this paper, the author argues that China’s involvement in Darfur, in particular after 2004, has
already challenged its unwavering foreign policy of non-interference. Moreover, China’s non-interference
policy towards Darfur resulted in substantial international criticism, which posed a threat to its international
image. The paper is structured into three main parts, excluding this introduction and the conclusion. The
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first part studies China’s foreign policy to Sudan in a historical context. The second part explains China’s
response towards Darfur and its critics in three contexts. The third part examines the justice of those critics.
The paper is based on secondary documents from journals, books as well as policy papers provided by
relevant governments and organizations as a main method of gathering information.
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Catherine B. Smart. “Ethnic Nationalism and Elections in Bosnia:
Implications for
Progress.”
Catherine Smart
Troy University
[email protected]
Paper: “Ethnic Nationalism and Elections in Bosnia: Implications for Progress.”
Ethnic Nationalism and Elections in Bosnia: Implications for Progress
Since the official end of armed conflict in 1996, the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH or
Bosnia) has remained relatively stable, largely due to the considerable involvement of the international
community. International participation in Bosnia is firmly established through agencies such as the Office
of the High Representative (OHR), the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO.
While it may be argued that such a trusteeship situation was necessary in the early years following the
Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), this dependent relationship must eventually cease so that Bosnia may
assume the reigns of self-governance.
Future progress to invigorate Bosnia's stalled post-war recovery is dependent on entry into the European
Union, which requires inter alia a positive assessment of the country’s political situation. The tenets of
decentralization and institutionalized power sharing in Bosnia engendered a situation that reinforces extant
rigid ethnic and territorial separatism within both the central state and its nominally subordinate entities.
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This paper employs the median voter theory to examine results of the Bosnian elections of 1998, 2000,
2002, and 2006 on the policy issue of ethnic nationalism. Analysis reveals that, while the aggregate
median position migrated over time toward less nationalist positions, the Republika Srpska historically
demonstrated much higher levels of ethnic nationalism than its fellow entity or the Bosnian central state.
Preliminary results from the October 3, 2010 election indicate a continuation of the same theme. Although
trends in election results and recent inchoate efforts to form a coalition at the national level suggest some
measure of progress, the Republika Srpska’s maintenance of separateness from its parent state heralds
continued political stagnation under the country’s current consociational model.
Several factors preclude a precipitous international departure from Bosnia, however.
The quality of
governance has deteriorated steadily since the country marked the tenth anniversary of its existence in
November 2005. Ethnic separatism continues to frame the debate on most issues.1 Political institutions
are at a virtual stalemate due to the intricacy of the BiH political system and the obduracy of the platforms
endorsed by fiercely nationalistic leaders at all levels.2 For much of 2008-2010, Bosnia’s respective ethnic
leaders traded rhetorical barbs with each other and with members of the international agencies highly
critical of their discriminatory practices.3 The tenets of decentralization and institutionalized power sharing
1Gerard
Toal, John O'Loughlin, and Dino Djipa, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: Constitutional Change
and Public Opinion," Eurasian Geography and Economics 47, no. 1 (2006): 61, 72.
2Patrice
C. McMahon,"Rebuilding Bosnia: A Model to Emulate or to Avoid?" Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4
(2004/2005): 570.
3
AFP, "EU envoy threatens Bosnia with sanctions over discriminatory constitution," EUbusiness. January 22, 2010,
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/bosnia-rights.2e5/ (accessed January 24, 2010).
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so essential to the ratification of the DPA in 1995 seem to have engendered a situation that validates,
rather than mitigates, rigid ethnic and territorial separatism.
Despite the indicators of Bosnian political retrenchment, there is hope for improvement. An otherwise
dismal 2009 Freedom House assessment shows that the BiH rating for electoral process has at least
remained constant, rather than backsliding.4 Additionally, the prospect of Bosnia becoming a member of
the European Union (EU), generally favored by a majority of its residents,5 offers an opportunity for Bosnia
to locate its political recovery solidly within the framework of regional association.
A first step in the
process would be to transition the OHR, the de facto trustee of the Bosnian state, to the Office of the EU
Special Representative (EUSR).6
There is significant conditionality attached to the EUSR transition.
In 2008, the international Peace
Implementation Council (PIC) mandated five objectives and two conditions that Bosnia must meet before
the EU would consider the move. Bosnia must resolve state and defense property disputes, as well as the
status of Brcko district. Additionally, the state must demonstrate fiscal sustainability and the entrenchment
of the rule of law. The two conditions are that Bosnia must sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA) with the EU, and receive a positive assessment of its political situation.7 While it is not possible
4
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009 - Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 June 2009,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a55bb3ac.html, accessed 10 November 2010.
5
Toal, O'Loughlin, and Djipa, Ten Years After Dayton, 69.
6
Sofia Sebastian, "Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina," FRIDE Democracy Backgounder. September 18, 2008.
http://fride.org/publication/492/elections-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina (accessed November 6, 2010).
7
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009.
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within the context and scope of this paper to address all five areas of necessary improvements, the
preliminary results of parliamentary elections held on 3 October 2010 offer a timely opportunity to examine
the subject of elections and reform as they influence the political situation in Bosnia.
The other PIC
objectives are best addressed by future research.
This paper will analyze the relationship between ethnic nationalism and electoral influence within Bosnia’s
political parties. This relationship is a significant one, considering the violent past from which the country’s
current manifestation derives its origins, as well as its continued abundance of ethnic nationalist parties and
policy. Because elections validate the policy platforms of the victors, they provide clues as to the future
direction that Bosnia will take as a state. Analysis of the results of Bosnia’s parliamentary elections since
1998 indicates a recent tendency towards more centrist stances on ethnic nationalist policies among voters
at the central state and in one of the country’s two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(FBiH, or Federation). In contrast, voters in the Republika Srpska (RS) entity have consistently elected
more ethnically nationalist parties since 2002. We can consequently infer from the median voter model that
ethnic nationalism has become less rewarding for political parties in the state and Federation entity, and
more rewarding for political parties in the Republika Srpska.
Literature Review.
The academic literature on Bosnia focuses primarily on the areas of its governance, international
involvement, and methodologies for post-conflict states. Representative of these segments of research is
Schneckener’s analysis of the metrics of conditions and regulations governing power-sharing arrangements
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through the lens of European cases, to include Bosnia.8 While the works in the latter categories are
extremely helpful sources of information concerning the implications for Bosnia’s future writ large, they do
not explicitly address the issue of elections and are therefore excluded from this listing. The remaining
theorists can be divided into two groups. The first addresses the DPA at various anniversaries of its
ratification. The approach varies from Sharp’s emphasis on the development of the Dayton model and its
initial implementation, to Toal, O’Laughlin, and Djipa’s analysis of public opinion regarding proposed
constitutional change as part of a Dayton-to-Brussels strategy.9 McMahon provides a particularly thorough
analysis of Dayton’s progress at the ten-year mark.
Sedo analyzes the origins and development of
Bosnia’s post-war political parties in Bosnia’s first post-war decade.10 A second aspect of the Bosnia
literature concentrates on the specifics of elections.
Caspersen examines ethnic identity and voting
patterns as part of a broader analysis of conflict-regulation strategies in BiH. Sekelj places the dissolution
of Yugoslavia and a resultant sense of frustrated nationalism at the epicenter of party choice and electoral
preference in the former Yugoslav republics, while Pugh and Cobble unpack the significance of nonnationalist voting in BiH municipal elections.11
8
Ulrich Schneckener, "Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict
Regulation," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (2002): 203-228.
9
Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security 22, no. 3 (1997-1998): 101-137; Toal, O'Loughlin,
and Djipa, Ten Years After Dayton, 61-75.
10
McMahon, Rebuilding Bosnia, 569-593; Jakub Sedo, "Party System of Bosnia and Herzegovina After Dayton,"
Central European Political Studies Review (International Institute of Political Science, Massaryk University) VIII, no. 23 (Spring-Summer 2006): http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=277.
11
Nina Caspersen, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? A Comparison of Conflict-Regulation Strategies in
Postwar Bosnia," Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 5 (2004): 569-588; Laslo Sekelj, "Parties and Elections: The
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The most significant feature about the academic literature on the subject of Bosnia is that it stops abruptly
around 2005. In the half decade since Bosnia’s tenth anniversary, the country has undergone several
major elections (one each at the presidential, parliamentary and municipal levels), signed the SAA with the
EU, and flirted with destruction when RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodic threatened RS secession from
Bosnia.12 Given these circumstances, the lack of recent scholarship on the subject of Bosnia is surprising.
Background.
Rarely is a single issue perceived to continuously dominate political discourse and, subsequently, electoral
outcomes, as much as that of ethnic nationalism in Bosnia.13 The internationally brokered DPA ended
military conflict and established the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 under the General
Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).
The GFAP achieved its goal of ending armed interethnic
bloodshed by implementing a consociational form of democracy that legitimized the identities of three
ethnic “constituent peoples,” comprised of self-identified Bosniaks, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs..14 The
constitutional codification of ethnicity solely according to the aforementioned categories simultaneously
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia--Change without Transformation," Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 1 (2000): 57-75;
Michael Pugh and Margaret Cobble, “Non-Nationalist Voting in Bosnian Municipal Elections: Implications for
Democracy and Peacebuilding," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 1 (2001): 27-47.
12
Ivika Lekic, "Visions of Ethnopolis: A Study of Ethnopolitical Streams of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Masters Thesis,
Radboud University Nijmegen, March 1, 2009: 46-47.
13
Sharp, Dayton Report Card, 115; Caspersen, Good Fences, 585; McMahon, Rebuilding Bosnia, 585-586.
14Office
of the High Representative, "The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,"
Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative. December 14, 1995.
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380, accessed November 10, 2010; Anna Morawiec Mansfield, "Ethnic
but Equal: The Quest for a New Democratic Order in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Columbia Law Review 103, no. 8
(2003): 2053.
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excluded other racial and religious groups.15 The GFAP further divided the central state into two roughly
equal-sized legal entities, based on the pre-war demographics of Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks (two of
Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups) and one independent district of Brcko.16
The institutional design of Bosnia agreed upon at the DPA divided the state into two nearly autonomous
regions: the Bosniak-Croat based FBiH, and the largely Bosnian Serb entity of the RS. Each entity
maintains its own foreign policy, constitution, independent taxation, and legislated power sharing among
ethnicities.17 This devolution of powers has resulted in a weak central state with no independent source of
revenue until 2005 except the charity of its subordinate elements.18 Worse, the institutionally prescribed
separateness of the Bosnian entities has reified ethnic sentiment, leading to an astonishing degree of
parochialism and legislative inertia. Thus, although the codified proportional power relationships between
the three constituent peoples were designed specifically with the avoidance of inter-ethnic violence in mind,
it has legitmized apartheid thinking. 19 The entrenchment of ethnic-based political positions among parties
15
Reuters, "European Court: Landmark Ruling on Racial and Religious Exclusion," Human Rights Watch, December
22, 2009. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/12/22/european-court-landmark-ruling-racial-and-religious-exclusion
(accessed January 15, 2010).
16
Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook - Bosnia and Herzegovina," CIA: The World Factbook. November
3, 2010, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html (accessed November 9, 2010).
17Office
of the High Representative, General Framework Agreement for Peace; U.S. Department of State, Background
Notes: Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 3, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm (accessed November 8,
2010).
18
McMahon, Rebuilding Bosnia, 585; Indirect Taxation Authority of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ITA: The Biggest State-Level
Institution in BiH, 2005-2008. http://www.uino.gov.ba/en/O_nama/O_nama.html (accessed November 8, 2010).
19
McMahon, Rebuilding Bosnia 570; Gerard Toal, "‘Without Brussels there can be no Bosnia-Herzegovina?’
Managing BiH's Geopolitical Challenges," in The Tenth Anniversary of the Dayton Accords and Afterwards:
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and voters has been a significant impediment to Bosnia’s progress toward a more stable political situation
in the minds of those agents of the international community charged with deciding whether Bosnia is able to
join the community of nations in the EU.
Bosnia’s Legislative Electoral System.
The state of BiH is governed by a bicameral legislative system. The Parliamentary Assembly is made up of
a 15-person House of Peoples, elected indirectly, and a House of Representatives (HoR), the members of
which are elected directly by the Bosnian voters. The HoR consists of 42 members, of whom 28 are
elected by Federation voters and 14 by RS voters.
Each entity holds its own election to fill its
predetermined share of seats in the central BiH House of Representatives.20 Parliamentary seats are
allocated by a combination of open-list, multi-member constituencies (MMC) and proportional
representation (PR).21
For each parliamentary election since 2002, the Federation HoR (FBiH HoR) has seated 98 deputies
(reduced from 140 in the 1998 and 2000 general elections). The FBiH HoR’s parallel entity in the RS, the
National Assembly (RSNA), consists of 83 deputies. As with the state-level HoR, seat allocation in both
Reflections on Post-Conflict State- and Nation-Building, ed. Nida Gelazis (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, 2005): 33.
20
Office of the High Representative, General Framework Agreement for Peace.
21
OSCE/ODIHR, Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections 1 October 2006 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission Final Report, Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2007: 5-6.
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entities’ parliamentary assemblies is based on an open-list MMC and PR arrangement. 22 Bosnia’s
parliamentary system is configured to elect 100% of its seats at a time at both the central state and entity
levels.23
Political Parties in Bosnia.
Bosnia’s election system has applied the pure Sainte-Lague system of proportional representation seat
allocation with a 3% minimum vote threshold for parliamentary seats at the state level. The 3% limit has
not been applied at entity level, however, which has given rise to numerous political parties,24 most with
nationalist programs. The majority of Bosnia’s ethnic nationalist parties are characterized by an affirmed
desire to preserve geographic and ethnic purity.
The proposed actualization of this goal by Bosnia’s
nationalist parties has generally assumed two forms. Political parties in the first, intra-Bosnian variety
propose either official or de facto independent sovereignty for a particular constituent people, advocating
extreme policies of exclusion. Such organizations include the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Croatian
Party of Rights (HSP), and the Bosniak BiH Patriotic Party (BPS) and Bosnian Party (BOSS). Parties in the
second group view the current state boundaries as artificial and promote their people’s unification with
either Serbia or Croatia. Examples include the Socialist Party of the RS (SPRS), the Croat HDZ 1990 (a
splinter group of dissatisfied Croatian Democratic Community hardliners), the Serb Radical Party of the RS
22
Central Election Committee, Election Statistics, November 9, 2010, http://izbori.ba/default.asp?col=danizbora2010
(accessed November 9, 2010).
23
OSCE/ODIHR, BiH Elections October 2006, 5-6.
24
OSCE/ODIHR, Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections 5 October 2002 Final Report, Warsaw: OSCE Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2003: 4.
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(SRS RS), the Serb Radical Homeland Front (SNS-BP), and the Radical Party of the RS (RSRS).25
In contrast, the platforms of Bosnia’s non-nationalist parties are frequently arrayed around two philosophies.
The first perspective, which promotes multiethnic solutions for Bosnia’s future, is exemplified by the Social
Democratic party of BiH (SDP), the various pensioners’ parties (SPU and FPBiH), and (at its inception) the
Federation of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), led by RS President Milorad Dodik. The second
category of parties supports a distinctly antinational, regionally focused program, as is the case with the
Civil Democratic Party (GDS), the Liberal Democratic Party (LDS), and the Pro-European National
Alliance/Party of Youth (PROENS-SM).26
Despite its abundance of registered parties, however, Bosnia’s post-1996 political landscape has been
largely dominated by three main ethnic political organizations with wartime roots.27 The Serb Democratic
Party (SDS), founded by indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, concerns itself almost exclusively with
the issue of RS sovereignty and views itself as the representative of the destiny of the Serb people.28 The
25
Sekelj, Parties and Elections, 58; Sedo, Party System of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Pugh and Cobble, Non-
Nationalist Voting, 33; Marina Ohanjanyan and Sara Schreuder, Bosnia-Herzegovina. December 7, 2009,
http://europeanforum.net/country/bosnia_herzegovina (accessed November 9, 2010).
26
Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1998, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_98-18_apb.htm
(accessed November 10, 2010); Inter-Parliamentary Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina House of Representatives, 19962008, http://195.65.105.150/parline-e/reports/2039_arc.htm (accessed November 9, 2010); GESIS, European Values
Study 2008 Method Report: Country Report - Bosnia-Herzegovina, Country Report, Tilburg University, Leibnitz:
GESIS-Leibnitz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2010: 16-18; Pugh & Cobble, Non-Nationalist Voting, 33.
27
Caspersen, Good Fences, 575; Carrie Manning, "Elections and Political Change in Post-War Bosnia and
Herzegovina," Democratization 11, no. 2 (April 2004): 82.
28
Alan John Day, Roger East, and Richard Thomas, A Political and Economic Dictionary of Eastern Europe.
Cambridge: Europa, 2003: 506.
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SDS obtained the largest share of the vote count in the RS in every post-Dayton election until 2006.29 The
Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), closely affiliated with the party of the same name in Croatia,
sought initially to join the western portion of the FBiH to Croatia.30 More recently, in a clear violation of the
DPA, the HDZ endeavored to establish popular support via referendum for a third entity within Bosnia to
represent the Croatian constituency.31 Finally, the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which was
also founded by leaders with dubious wartime histories, moved quickly after Bosnia’s 1995 founding to
present itself as the leader of the Bosniak people. 32
Theoretical Model.
This study sought to explain political influence as a function of ethnic nationalism in BiH.
The study
employed the theoretical model of Buena de Mesquita’s Median Voter Theorem to assess the results of the
Bosnian general elections at state and entity level for 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006, and 2010, in terms of the
single issue of ethnic nationalism. The paradigm compares various positions of a policy option along a
spectrum with voter preference on a particular issue to ascertain the median policy. De Mesquita explains
that assessing stakeholders’ assumed gains and losses “…by challenging existing policy, expected utility
29
Central Election Committee, Election Statistics.
30
Srkjan Dizdarevic, "Press Release, ‘The Dirtiest Campaign So Far,’" Coalition of BiH NGO "Izbori 2000" and
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in BiH, November 8, 2000, http://www.bh-hchr.org/Statements/e08-11-00.htm
(accessed November 8, 2010).
31
Lekic, Visions of Ethnopolis, 33.
32
Sedo, Party System of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 11; Ohanjanyan and Schreuder, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fikred
Abdic was indicted for war crimes; Alija Izetbegovic was accused but never indicted.
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decision models estimate whether an existing policy will change and, if so, by how much.”33 Therefore,
political influence served as the dependent variable and degree of ethnic nationalism as the independent
variable, with political parties represented in Bosnia’s respective parliaments as the unit of analysis. The
first step was to identify all the stakeholders, which were defined as “…any group with an interest in the
decision.”34 For the purposes of this paper, the stakeholders consisted of the various official parties
represented in the parliaments of the state of BiH and its nominally subordinate entities for each of Bosnia’s
five most recent general elections. Information on registered parties and parliamentary seats was obtained
from the Central Election Committee in BiH.35
The next step was to identify the position that each party assumed toward nationalist policies and locate it
along a continuum from very low to extreme ethnic nationalist. Parties were assigned one of five values for
the independent variable: very low, low, moderate, high, and extreme. Each party was assigned a value
for its degree of ethnic nationalism based on a composite assessment of two elements. The first was the
extent to which the party advocated policies that favored a particular constituent people (Bosnian Serb,
Bosniak, or Bosnian Croat) to the exclusion or detriment of the others, while the second was the degree to
which the party supported the provisions of the GFAP in its actions and rhetoric. This assessment was a
33
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Forecasting Policy Decisions: An Expected Utility Approach to Post-Khomeini Iran," PS
17, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 226-236: 229.
34
David Hayes, communication with author,"Predicting Political Outcomes: The Median Voter Model," 2009.
35
Central Election Committee, Election Statistics.
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subjective estimate, aggregated from a number of academic,36 government and government-sponsored,37
and NGO, think thank, and journalistic sources.38 Each political party was assigned a value based upon its
degree of ethnic nationalism at the time of a particular election, in order to reflect how a party might have
changed its platform over time. For example, the SDA was categorized with a high degree of ethnic
nationalism in 1998 and 2000 due to the rhetoric and policies of Alija Izetbegovic, its main representative.
Once Izetbegovic resigned in 2001, the party adopted a more centrist position, which resulted in the
movement of its rating to “moderate” in 2002 and “low” in 2006.39
The third step was to determine a party’s relative influence on the decision making process, or level of
political influence, for which this study used the percentage of parliamentary seats earned in Bosnia’s
previous parliamentary elections to determine a cumulative distribution of influence (CDI) for each elected
parliament. According to the model, the group or groups at the center point of the CDI will be the median
party(ies), whose policy preference will likely be validated at the polls.40 The final step of De Mesquita's’
model is to determine each stakeholder’s issue salience, defined as the level of importance of a policy
36
Caspersen, Good Fences, 585-586; Sedo, Party System of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Pugh and Cobble, Non-
Nationalist Voting, 45-46; Lekic, Visions of Ethnopolis, 20-43; Manning, Elections and Political Change, 62-85: GESIS,
European Values Study 2008, 16-18; Day, East, and Thomas, Political and Economic Dictionary,180.
37
Center for Army Lessons Learned; Ohanjanyan and Schreuder, Bosnia-Herzegovina; International Crisis Group,
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina - A Parallel Crisis, Crisis Group Europe Report No. 209,
Sarajevo/Istanbul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010, 1-34.
38
Dizdarevic, Dirtiest Campaign So Far; Nemanja Stefanovic, "What Do Serb Parties in RS Have to Offer?" AIM
Press. July 6, 1996, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199607/60708-007-trae-sar.htm (accessed
November 1, 2010); Sebastian, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
39
Ohanjanyan & Schreuder, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Sebastian, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
40
David Hayes, Predicting Political Outcomes.
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issue to the group.
Although the theoretical question posed by the median voter model is relatively straightforward, the
methodology to obtain the answer is somewhat more complicated because of the byzantine structure of the
post-war Bosnian state. The FBiH and the RS have each, since 1996, been dominated by an ethnic group
(or combinations of groups) that existed in considerably fewer numbers in the other entity. Most of BiH’s
Bosniak and Croat populations (approximately 48.3% and 15.4% of the total population) reside in the FBiH;
while the preponderance of the country’s Serbs (34.0% of the total population) live in the RS.
41
Consequently, it is unlikely that a separate assessment of results from a single entity would provide an
accurate picture of political influence in Bosnia. Furthermore, because the BiH central state is far weaker
than its subordinate elements, it is impossible to gain a complete understanding of political influence in
Bosnia without examining the entities, which are the true loci of power in the state.42 Much of the academic
research on Bosnia buttresses this assertion.
For example, in his analysis of Bosnia’s political party
system ten years after Dayton, Sedo discusses whether one should analyze the state or entity levels, “…as
the most important in describing the party system (in Bosnia).
Although the standard way in normal
countries is (at) national level, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (one) may have doubts about this
41
U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: Bosnia; Pugh and Cobble, Non-Nationalist Voting, 32. Estimates are
based upon Bosnia’s most recent census in 1991, prior to the war and its resultant millions of displaced persons.
42
Schneckener, Making Power-Sharing Work, 209; Robert M. Hayden, “Constitutional Structures in a Nationless
State,” in The Tenth Anniversary of the Dayton Accords and Afterwards: Reflections on Post-Conflict State- and
Nation-Building, ed. Nida Gelazis (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005): 52.
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procedure.”43
Therefore, to capture a true sense of all stakeholders in the Bosnian political system required an analysis of
political parties at both entity and state levels. First, in order to gain an understanding of the longer-term
trend of voter choice on the issue of ethnic nationalism, the study evaluated data from five of Bosnia’s
parliamentary elections since the country was founded following the DPA: 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006, and
2010.44 This data included the three parliaments created during each of the four general elections: the BiH
HoR at state level, and the FBiH HoR and RSNA at entity level. Second, parties represented within each
discrete elected parliament were classified according to ethnicity with possible values of Bosniak, Croat,
Serb, or Multi. This classification was essential in order to determine the relative political power of political
parties and identify the degree of ethnic nationalism within each ethnicity, to determine whether the median
voter model can identify significant differences in political influence among the three constituent peoples.
Election data was derived from the Bosnian Central Election Commission (CEC) and the InterParliamentary Union.45
Methodological Assumptions and Issues.
The median voter model is based on several significant assumptions. The first is that candidates (or, in this
case, political parties), exhibit rational choice by aligning their policies and proposals to fit those of the
43
Sedo, Party System of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
44
McMahon, Rebuilding Bosnia, 575. While general elections were conducted in 1996, they took place too soon too
soon for valid opposition to develop and essentially validated pre-existing nationalist power relationships.
45
Central Election Committee, Election Statistics; Inter-Parliamentary Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina HoR.
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median voter. Additionally, “…as each candidate competes for the favor of the median voter, the positions
of both candidates converge toward the policy positions that maximize the median voter's welfare.”46 The
second assumption is that voter preferences can be determined based on a single issue. This is possible
because, as de Mesquita noted, political systems at a given point in time are generally decided on the basis
of one or two voter concerns. Finally, power is assumed to be relative. The implication of relative power is
that the political stance at the median is not necessarily the one at the political center.47
Several methodological weaknesses must also be mentioned.
To begin with, the percentage of
parliamentary seats allocated is not an entirely accurate representation of political influence among voters
in the Federation and the RS as for two reasons.
The first reason is the existence of additional
requirements implemented by the OSCE beginning in 2002 to reserve “…four mandates…for
representatives from each of the three constituent peoples,”48 if organic elections did not achieve that
proportion, in order to ensure equal representation among Bosnia’s ethnicities. This condition was enacted
in one instance in 2006, which resulted in the awarding of a seat to a party in the RSNA and could have
feasibly contributed to the shift in the policy spectrum addressed in the results section below. Additionally,
the enormous influence of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the international community as
represented by the OHR, Peace Implementation Council (PIC), and the EU continued to served as a
46
Roger D. Congleton, "The Median Voter Model," February 22, 2002, http://www.rdc1.net/forthcoming/medianvt.pdf
(accessed February 28, 2010): 4.
47
David Hayes, Predicting Political Outcomes.
48
OSCE/ODIHR, Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections 1 October 2006 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission Final Report, Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2007: 6.
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shadow government that, despite its incrementally reduced role, maintained significant influence over the
electoral system through the 2006 elections.49 This external authority structure had the effect of masking
any complete assessment of political influence. Furthermore, the model assumes the relationship between
the political party and the voter to be unidirectional. The theory is therefore unable to account for the
association in reverse; namely, the effects that party actions and rhetoric have on framing voter
preferences. Finally, because a valid measurement of issue salience was nearly impossible to obtain
within the framework of this project, salience was assumed equal across the parties.
Results: 1998.
The results of the median voter analysis suggest that ethnic nationalism held tremendous political strength
at both the state and entity levels in Bosnia. In 1998, the median position was rated high for the central
state and the FBiH, and extreme for the RS (Table 1). There was considerable distance (at least a 25 point
difference) between the median degree of ethnic nationalism at in the BiH and FBiH HoRs and that of the
RS. The three main pre-war nationalist each parties captured the largest portion of electoral seats at state
level and in the entities where they comprise the largest portion of the electorate. The Serb SDS scored
22.89 in the RS and 9.52 in the BiH HoR; the Croat HDZ earned 14.30 in the BiH and 20.00 in the FBiH;
and the Bosniak KCD coalition earned 40.48 at BiH and 48.57 at FBiH levels. Significantly, those same
parties posted much lower results in the entity in which they were the minority constituent people. The
49
Bruce Belloni, "Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2
(2001): 164; McMahon, Rebuilding Bosnia, 587.
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KCD’s results are illustrative of this point. The party scored nearly 30 points less in the RS than it did in the
Federation. Furthermore, the HDZ earned a mere 1.20 in the RS, while the SDS did not earn enough votes
for a seat in the FBiH HoR.
Table 1, Degree of Ethnic Nationalism among Political Parties in 1998 General Elections
Very Low
Low
Moderate
High
Extreme
BiH
RSRS (2.38)
N=42
SRS (4.76)
SDP (9.52)
SLOGA (9.52)
CDI
19.04
SD (4.76)
23.8
NHI-HKDU ( 2.38)
26.18
DNZ (2.38)
SDS (9.52)
KCD (40.48)
HDZ (14.30)
69.04*
100.00
FBiH
BOSS (0.71)
N=140
BSP (0.71)
BPS (1.43)
HSP (1.43)
CDI
BPEN (1.43)
HSS (0.72)
SDP (13.57)
SD (4.29)
15.00
20.01
NHI-HKDU (2.86)
22.87
DNZ (2.14)
SPRS (1.43)
KCD (48.57)
HDZ (20.00)
73.58*
99.29**
RSNA
HDZ(1.20)
N=83
KKO (1.20)
RSRS (3.61)
SDP (2.41)
CDI
2.41
SK (2.41)
SPRS (12.05)
NHI (1.2)
SNS-BP (14.45)
SRS (13.29)
SNSD (7.22)
KCD (18.07)
SDS (22.89)
10.83
10.83
45.76
100.00*
*Median Party/ies; ** No information available for KC party (0.71), does not affect median.
CDI = Cumulative Distribution of Influence
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There was minimal representation at the positions of “very low” and “low” in the BiH and FBiH parliaments,
with a CDI below 20 points for each. The RS experienced significantly lower representation at the “very low”
and “low” positions, recording a CDI nearly 10 points less than the central government and the Federation.
Additionally, a large number of parties, such as BOSS, BSP, and HSP represented very low degrees of
political influence. These less influential parties tended to be distributed at the outermost ends of the
spectrum, with non-nationalist and multi-nationalist parties such as the SDP garnering a modest 9.52% of
parliamentary seats, and rigidly nationalist parties like the HDZ and KKO (which advocates a return to the
Serbian monarchy) earning 1.2%.
2000
Ethnic nationalism continued to hold considerable sway for each of the three parliamentary elections in
2000, although the data suggest a tendency toward more moderate positions on the issue (Table 2). While
the median position was still rated “high” for the BiH and FBiH HoRs, the RS median decreased from
“extreme” to “high.” There was also somewhat more representation at the less nationalist end of the
spectrum at the central state and Federation levels, with two major multinational parties, the SDP and the
SBiH, each earning large shares of the parliamentary seats in BiH and FBiH. In fact, the SDP secured the
largest individual percentage of political influence of any party in the BiH, and the second largest in the
FBiH.
Table 2, Degree of Ethnic Nationalism among Political Parties in 2000 General Elections
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Very Low
Low
Moderate
High
Extreme
BiH
BPEN (2.38)
N=42
K/SNSD/DSP (2.38)
DNZ (2.38)
SPRS (2.38)
NHI (2.38)
SNS-BP (2.38)
HDZ (11.90)
SDA (19.05)
SDS (14.29)
SDP (21.44)
CDI
21.44
SBiH (11.90)
40.08
FBiH
BPEN (0.71)
N=140
HSS (0.71)
CDI
BPS (2.38)
PDP-RS (4.76)
45.24
100.00
GDS (0.71)
SNSD (0.71)
HSP (0.71)
LDS (0.71)
FPBiH (1.44)
BPSS (1.44)
RBiH (0.71)
NHI (1.44)
SDP (26.43)
SBiH (15.00)
28.56
48.57
HKDU (0.71)
49.28
RSNA
PRS (1.20)
N=83
DNS (3.61)
SDP (4.82)
CDI
69.05*
4.82
DNZ (2.14)
BPS (1.44)
SDA (27.13)
HDZ (17.86)
78.55*
100.00
SBiH (4.82)
DSP (4.82)
SNS-BP (2.41)
SPRS (4.82)
SNSD (13.35)
PDP-RS (13.25)
SDA (7.23)
SDS (37.37)
56.61*
98.8**
24.09
46.29
*Median Party/ies; ** No information available for DSRS party (1.20), does not affect median.
CDI = Cumulative Distribution of Influence
The 2000 election was also marked by the first appearance of several parties with more temperate
positions regarding ethnic nationalism, such as the SNSD, the GDS, and the LDS. The majority of these
first-time parties had very low political influence scores in both state and entity parliaments, with the
exception of the SNSD, which scored 13.35 in the RSNA. Furthermore, two of the three main wartime
ethnic parties lost political influence. The SDA, no longer part of its coalition, dropped nearly 20 points at
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BiH and FBiH levels and 10 points in the RSNA since the 1998 election, and the HDZ lost several points in
all three parliaments.
In contrast, the SDS made enormous gains in the RS, increasing its political
influence by more than 15 points and consolidating its position as the largest representative of Serb
interests in the entity.
In addition, as in 1998, parties with the highest level of political influence in the BiH and FBiH HoR did not
generally fare as well in the RS, and vice versa. For example, the SDA scored approximately 20 points
lower in the RS than it did in BiH and the Federation. The RS demonstrated much higher levels of ethnic
nationalism than its fellow entity or the central state. In fact, cumulative influence was significantly lower at
every degree of ethnic nationalism in the RS than in either the BiH or FBiH HoRs. This is consistent with
data from the 1998 election as well.
2002.
The median position continued to migrate toward less nationalist positions in the 2002 general elections
(Table 3). For all three parliaments, the median position was “moderate.” The CDI at the median was
significantly higher for the FBiH (75.51) than in either the BiH (66.68) or RS (60.23) parliaments. Two of
the three main ethnic parties lost considerable political influence for the third consecutive election. Despite
aligning itself with a more moderate coalition, the HDZ posted a small loss in the FBiH. The SDS also lost
six points in the RS between 2000 and 2002.
The SDA, in contrast, increased its share of political
influence by about five points in BiH and FBiH (its share remained relatively constant in the RS).
Table 3, Degree of Ethnic Nationalism among Political Parties in 2002 General Elections
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Very Low
Low
Moderate
High
Extreme
NHI (2.38)
PDP-RS (4.76)
DNZ (2.38)
BOSS (2.38)
SPU (2.38)
SNSD (7.15)
SPRS (2.38)
RSRS (2.38)
SBiH (14.29)
SDA (23.82)
K/HDZ (11.90)
SDS (11.90)
BiH
EBHDU (2.38)
N=42
SDP (9.52)
CDI
9.52
30.95
FBiH
HSS (1.02)
N=98
LDS (1.02)
66.68*
83.34
EBHDU (2.04)
CDI
100.00
BP (1.02)
GDS (1.02)
NHI (2.04)
HKDU (1.02)
PROENS-SM (1.02)
SPU (2.04)
SNSD (1.02)
DNZ (2.04)
HSP (1.02)
SDP (15.32)
SBiH (15.30)
SDA (32.65)
K/HDZ (16.33)
BOSS (3.06)
17.36
40.82
75.51*
RSNA
DS (1.20)
N=83
NA (1.20
HPB (1.02)
93.88
100.00
SNA (1.20)
CDI
DPS (1.20)
DNS (3.62)
NHI (1.20)
SDA (7.23)
PRS (1.20)
PDP-RS (10.84)
SDP (3.62)
SBiH (4.82)
SNSD (22.90)
SPRS (3.62)
3.62
12.04
60.23*
63.85
RSRS (4.82)
SDS (31.33)
100.00
*Median Party/ies; CDI = Cumulative Distribution of Influence
It must be noted that the SDA moved toward a more moderate position on ethnic nationalism once
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Sulejman Tihic replaced the party’s founder, Izetbegovic, in 2001.50 This tack toward the median and
subsequent increased vote share for the SDA in the 2002 election lend support to the strength of the
median voter model. In another demonstration of the model’s effectiveness, the SNSD, which progressed
toward a more ethnic (Serb) nationalist position on the ethnic nationalism spectrum between 2000 and
2002, increased its share of political influence from 13.35 to 22.90 in the RS.
The main ethnic parties’ most powerful competition came from the multiethnic SDP and SBiH parties.
However, while the SBiH maintained fairly stable levels of political influence across the three parliaments
between 2000 and 2002, the SDP lost nearly 10 points in the BiH and FBiH (largely to the SDA). Ethnic
nationalist parties continued to demonstrate lower levels of political influence in the entity in which their
constituent people comprised the minority. Croat parties only represented 1.20% of the RSNA, while no
Serb parties attained political influence in the Federation.
Moderate parties made a significant showing in the RS for the second time in a general election.
Furthermore, in contrast to the two previous elections, the median position on ethnic nationalism in the RS
was only lower than the BiH and FBiH at values below the median; in this case, at “low” and “very low.”
However, the RS was once again characterized by a much higher percentage at the “extreme” end of the
spectrum than were the BiH or FBiH.
2006.
The 2006 elections were characterized by a reduction in levels of nationalism in BiH and FBiH. However,
50Manning,
Elections and Political Change, 74; Sebastian, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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the median position in the RS actually increased from low to high during this period; a phenomenon which
represents the first shift toward a higher degree of ethnic nationalism in any entity or state election in
Bosnia since 1998 (Table 4). The SNSD accounted for the majority of the individual vote count in the RS,
more than doubling its influence since the previous election and eclipsing the SDA as the champion of Serb
causes for the electorate. The SNSD's consolidation of political influence in the 2006 elections coincided
with party leader Milorad Dodic's assumption of the office of RS Prime Minister.51 Significantly, the SNSD
continued its trajectory toward more nationalist policies during this period, earning it a "high" rating for
ethnic nationalism. As in 2002, the SNSD's shift toward the voters' ideal position on ethnic nationalism and
the party's concomitant rise in power lend considerable validity to the accuracy of the median voter model.
The second greatest gains in 2006 were made by the SBiH, which increased its influence by more than 6
points in BiH and 13 in FBiH. Notably, the SBiH share of political influence in the RS remained constant.
Table 4, Degree of Ethnic Nationalism among Political Parties in 2006 General Elections
Very Low
Low
Moderate
BiH
N=42
CDI
51
Extreme
DNZ (2.38)
BPS (2.28)
NSRzB (2.38)
SBiH (19.05)
DNS (2.38)
HK (4.76)
K/HDZ (7.15)
SDP (11.90)
SDA (21.43)
PDP-RS ( 2.38)
SNSD (16.66)
SDS (7.15)
14.28
FBiH
N=98
High
54.76*
59.52
83.32
100.00
HSP (1.02)
SNSD (1.02)
PB-BOSS (3.06)
NSRzB (3.06)
SBiH (24.49)
DNZ (2.04)
BPS (4.08)
SDP (17.35)
SDA (28.58)
HK (7.14)
K/HDZ (8.16)
Ohanjanyan & Schreuder, Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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CDI
20.41
74.50*
RSNA
84.70
100.00
SPRS (3.61)
N=83
CDI
74.50
SDA (3.61)
DNS (4.82)
SDP (1.20)
SBiH (4.82)
PDP-RS (9.64)
1.20
9.63
27.70
SRS (2.41)
SNSD (49.39)
77.09*
SDS (20.50)
100.00
*Median Party/ies; CDI = Cumulative Distribution of Influence
The SDA, HDZ, and SDS continued to wane in influence in 2006. The SDS lost nearly 11 points, likely due
to the SNSD's substantial expansion. The HDZ lost the most influence between 2002 and 2006, dropping
to barely 8 points in the FBiH. The HDZ's losses corresponded to the loss of influence by Croat parties
across all three parliaments. The SDA representation in the RS dropped nearly by half, to 3.61 points. The
SDA also lost 4.07 points in the Federation and just over 2 points in BiH. Despite its losses, the SDA still
maintained the largest portion of political influence by a single party in at state level and in the Federation.
The SDA's vote share and its shift to a more moderate level of ethnic nationalism served to consolidate the
median position at the "low" value. Finally, the 2006 manifested a trend toward fewer parties represented,
with 32 parties obtaining parliamentary seats (as compared with 47, 42, and 35 in the previous general
elections). Critically, distinctly non-nationalist parties were punished at the polls. The PROENS and GDS
parties, both of which advocate a broader, regionally based program, did not acquire enough votes to be
represented in any parliament. The absence of non-nationalist options, despite a lower rating on the ethnic
nationalism spectrum, suggests that while a trend toward more moderate positions exists, political options
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are still fundamentally ethnic-based.
2010.
The most recent election indicates a continuation of the divergence between the RS and the BiH/FBiH
along the ethnic nationalism spectrum (Table 5). The BiH and FBiH maintained median positions at the low
rating for the 2010 election, while the RS progressed to the extreme position. The median voter model
once more illustrates which policy choices are rewarded in each Bosnian parliament. The median position
of low on the ethnic nationalism spectrum in BiH and FBiH indicates that parties with similar ratings will fare
well. The SDP’s success is indicative of this trend. The RS movement toward a higher level of ethnic
nationalism is largely due to the electoral success of the SNSD, which campaigned on a secessionist
platform.52
The trend toward more moderate positions in the BiH and FBiH is attributable in great part to the Bosniak
vote. More specifically, the median position along the ethnic nationalism spectrum remained low because
of the success of ethnically moderate Bosniak parties and multiethnic parties comprised preponderantly of
Bosniak voters. The SDP represents the most evident example of this tendency. Within the BiH and the
FBiH, the multiethnic party made the most gains, raising its electoral influence by more than 7 points at the
central state and 11 points in the Federation.
Of the wartime ethnic parties, the SDA lost the most electoral influence, relinquishing approximately five
52
Deutsche Welle, "Political Divisions Expected to Persist after Bosnia's Elections," DW-World.de, October 4, 2010,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6071839,00.html?maca=en-rss-en-all-1573-rdf (accessed November 10, 2010).
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points at both BiH and FBiH levels. The HDZ maintained its position in the BiH and actually gained a point
in the FBiH. The SDS maintained its position in the BiH and RS as the second most influential Serb party.
The 2010 elections were also marked by a further consolidation of electoral power, with influence within
ethnic populations contested by two or three parties.
Table 5, Degree of Ethnic Nationalism among Political Parties in 2010 General Elections
Very Low
Low
BiH
DNS (2.38)
N=42
SBiH (4.77)
CDI
CDI
SBBBiH (9.52)
PDP-RS (2.38)
SDP (19.05)
SDA (16.67)
DNZ (2.38)
HDZ (7.15)
54.77*
59.53
66.67
21.43
Extreme
K/HDZ90/HSP (4.76)
SDS (9.52)
SNSD (19.05)
100.00
SBiH (9.18)
A/SDA (1.02)
NSRzB (5.10)
SBBBiH (13.27)
SNSD (1.02)
SDP (28.57)
SDA (23.47)
DNZ (1.02)
HDZ (12.25)
75.59*
80.61
92.86
33.67
RSNA
SDA (2.41)
N=83
SP/PEN (4.82)
DP-DC (3.61)
SDP (3.61)
DNS (7.23)
PDP-RS (8.44)
3.61
18.07
CDI
High
NSRzB (2.38)
FBiH
N=98
Moderate
K/HDZ90/HSP (5.10)
100.00
SRS (1.20)
30.12
SDS (21.69)
NDS (2.41)
32.53
SNSD (44.58)
100.00*
*Median Party/ies; CDI = Cumulative Distribution of Influence
Although the relative share of electoral influence among constituent peoples has remained fairly constant,
the number of parties with significant influence has stabilized. The SDA, SDP, and SBiH compete for the
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Bosniak vote, the HDZ and HDZ 1990 for the Croat constituency, and the SNSD and SDS vie for the Serb
electorate.
Analysis.
The data from the median voter model suggest several important trends related to ethnic nationalism in
Bosnia. First, post-Dayton politics in Bosnia can be generally divided into two phases. The first phase,
comprised of the period between 1998-2002, is characterized by a general lessening of ethnic nationalism
over time at all levels. In the second phase, from 2002 to the present, the moderating trend continued for
BiH and FBiH. In contrast, the RS has become more ethnically nationalist, as demonstrated by the results
of the 2006 and 2010 elections. Furthermore, progress toward lower levels of nationalism generally took
place first in BiH and the FBiH, with the RS following suit later. From 1998 to 2000, for example, BiH and
FBiH had a lower level of nationalism than the RS, reflected by a lower median position. While all three
parliaments reflected median positions of "moderate" in the 2000 elections, the RS's CDI was still 22 points
lower than the BiH and FBiH at that level. The trend continued to a degree in 2002, when the CDI at the
median position in the RS was lower than the FBiH (although not in the BiH), and in 2006, when the median
position actually increased. All indications are that the RS has consistently struck a more independent
course than its fellow entity.
Additionally, the results reveal a strong relationship between the central state and the Federation along the
spectrum of ethnic nationalism. This relationship exists in a much weaker form between the central state
and the Republika Srpska. The BiH/FBiH link is borne out by each parliament's respective median voter
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positions, as well as the parallels between levels of political influence for individual parties. The same
types of parties fare well in BiH as in the FBiH. This phenomenon applies particularly to Croat or Bosniak
parties. Non-Serb ethnic parties that fare well in BiH and FBiH do not generally fare as well in the RS, as
exemplified by the HDZ's minimal showing in all five of the general elections in the RS.
A third tendency suggested by the model is the increasing fragmentation of the vote. In 1998, the main
three ethnic parties were located at either the median position or higher along the spectrum of ethnic
nationalism, because they possessed the largest respective individual percentages of political influence for
each constituent people. By 2006, however, the main ethnic parties could not maintain their singlehanded
dominance of the median. Again, the RS diverges from BiH and FBiH in this arena. While the SDA and
HDZ ultimately shared the median position with more moderate, multinational parties such as the SBiH in
BiH and the Federation, the SDS relinquished its majority hold of Serb voters to the increasingly Serb
nationalist SNSD, which was located at the median in the RS. Additionally, while the median position
migrated toward lower levels of nationalism over time in all three parliaments, there was still substantial
representation of positions at the more extreme end of the ethnic nationalist spectrum. The continuing
levels of influence among these more radical parties points toward a persistence of nationalism in all three
levels.
Fourth, ethnic parties consistently fared poorly among voting populations dominated by a different
constituent people. This feature holds true particularly for Croat parties in the RS and Serb parties in the
Federation. Croat parties only manifested measurable political influence in the RS in 1998 with 2.4 points,
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and then again in 2002 with 1.2 points. Similarly, Serb party influence in the Federation never topped 2
points in a given election, and Serb parties were not represented in that parliament at all in 2000.
Opportunities for Future Research.
This study’s main finding, that degrees of ethnic nationalism are lower in the Federation than in the RS,
lends support to Pugh and Cobble’s research on the results of the 1997 Bosnian municipal elections. They
determined that “…the highest levels of non-nationalism are found in areas where Bosniaks are
concentrated in mixed, relatively heavily populated municipalities.”53 A study of more recent municipal
electoral data would enable scholars to identify whether the relationship persists between the various levels
of Bosnian government, as well as to identify any changes in local nationalist voting over the past 13 years.
Future study is also warranted following the transition of the UN OHR to the EUHR, to determine whether
the demonstrated progress toward decreased nationalism is a permanent feature of Bosnian affairs, or
merely a tool of political expedience to accelerate the departure of the international community.
Most importantly, however, the results of this study indicate a need to examine potential structural change
in the state’s power-sharing arrangements, to address what effect any changes in the Bosnian structure will
have on actor freedom and behavior, as well as identity. The most likely venue for change is through
constitutional reform. What form such alterations might, or should take, is a vital question worthy of future
study.
53
Pugh and Cobble, Non-Nationalist Voting, 34.
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Conclusion.
It is likely that the tendency toward more moderate tones will continue among BiH and Federation voters,
despite rhetoric among Croatian parties and politicians regarding establishing a third entity. More than any
other concern raised by the median voter analysis of Bosnian parliamentary elections, the increasing
political influence wielded by the non-nationalist parties of SBiH and SDP indicates a growing pragmatism
among Federation voters about the reality of the Bosnian state’s legitimacy. It is also not unreasonable to
surmise that the decrease in political influence of more rabidly ethnic nationalist parties could also be
attributed to the recognition among two of Bosnia’s constituent peoples that the international bodies
charged with the supervision of Bosnian governance will not yield their considerable powers until the
political situation has stabilized. Independence, even if only from the yoke of the protectorate relationship,
requires a softening of nationalist sentiment.
Unfortunately, uncertainty still remains regarding the
willingness of RS voters to become a truly viable part of a functioning Bosnian state. Such questions attain
more urgency as UN and EU deadlines for compliance on questions of state loom closer.
It is imperative to note that structural issues are a crucial component of any analysis of ethnicity and
political influence in Bosnia. The GFAP applied a consociational model of democracy to halt hostilities. To
that end, the agreement functioned reasonably well. However, the country’s institutionalized power-sharing
is deterministic and works counter to long-term stability for this particular state. Bosnia is a case that
demonstrates the influential power of a structure vis-à-vis individual agents. The country’s codified power
relationships remove individual actor incentive to cross ethnic lines.
The absence of inter-ethnic
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cooperation may be attributable to the fear of losing power and a desire to maintain influence in a situation
that is neither ideal nor bad enough to change. This assertion may go some way toward explaining why,
for example, the political rhetoric of Croat parties has become more strident in recent elections.
One must concede that ethnic nationalist rhetoric, once intended to topple the Dayton system, has been
modified in acknowledgment of the surprising durability of Bosnia’s recent statehood. Nevertheless, while
ethnic nationalism has diminished over the past 12 years of Bosnia’s electoral history at state and entity
level, the phenomenon is not going away. Indeed, segregationist behavior is codified in the constitutional
structures of the state. The days of the international community’s rule in Bosnia are finite in number. It
remains for Bosnians of all three ethnicities to decide how prepared they will be for the challenges of
statehood when they become a truly independent nation.
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Center for Scholars, 2005.
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43. Toal, Gerard, John O'Loughlin, and Dino Djipa. "Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: Constitutional
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Brandon Harkins. “China's Access to Essential Resources and Commodities: Can there
be such a thing as ‘Peace Rise?’”
Brandon Harkins, M.A. Candidate
Yonsei University
Graduate School of International Studies
[email protected]
Project Paper: “China's Access to Essential Resources and Commodities: Can there be such a thing as
‘Peace Rise?’”
In recent years there has been much literature and discourse on how the growth of China is severely
affecting the supplies and costs of the world’s energy resources and the resulting security implications. To
name a few, Fareed Zakaria’s ideas on “The Rise of the Rest” highlight the impacts growing nations such
as China and India have on resources, these points are further emphasized in the book “Rising Powers,
Shrinking Planet” by Michael T. Klare, and Hong Kong newspapers of the early 2000’s called attention to
China’s need to secure shipping routes in order to protect energy supplies.
As a likely result of these
analyses and resulting dialogues, the leadership of China and those of the world’s top economic powers
have instituted measures to mitigate the economic and security threats of future constraints on energy
supplies. These measures include investment in biofuel technologies, wind farm development throughout
China, alternative fueled vehicles, enhanced public transportation system development in China, recycling
take-back programs, and so on. However, the measures taken to address concerns with regard to Primary
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Essential Resources, termed as oil and natural gas in this article, are only a temporary patch and the threat
these resources pose to security needs to be further evaluated. On the other hand, Secondary Essential
Resources, another term coined in this research that refers to copper and iron ore, have been left out of the
spotlight and as a result of this lack of attention; the potential for conflict with regard to these resources will
continue to grow in the coming decades if they remain unchecked.
The current demands China’s growth is putting on resource supplies is grandiose and if one examines
predictions of future growth, the constraints to be put on the world’s Primary and Secondary Essential
Resource supplies is mind boggling. It would be pure negligence if we did not make an effort to analyze
China’s stance on procuring these resources and how that procurement can affect other countries that rely
on the same resources.
Therefore the question must be asked, can it be expected that China will not
pursue “peaceful development” because it’s demands on Primary and Secondary Essential Resources are
too great compared to supplies? Furthermore, will it take aggressive measures to ensure it has access to
essential resources, thereby leading to conflicts with competing nations? This paper will attempt to answer
these questions by evaluating the following five criteria:
(1) The resources necessary for (China’s) economic development and sustainability
(2) Cases of Chinese conflicts with regard to resources/commodities
(3) Historical and psychological factors that will pressure the CCP to aggressively seek
resources
(4) Perceptions of future threats from China based on trends from the cases evaluated above
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and military development
(5) Mitigating the resource conundrum
From analyzing these 5 points we intend to show that the Chinese leadership will go to great lengths in
order to secure access to Primary and Secondary Essential Resources. Despite claims from the Chinese
leadership that they intend to “develop peacefully”, it can be expected the contrary will ensue.
The
examination of the aforementioned 5 points will point out resource supplies and consumption predictions,
China’s ever growing demand on the world’s resources, the Chinese leadership’s desire to maintain
stability amongst its population so that it can retain power, the aggressive acts the Chinese leadership has
taken as it has continued to gain strength, its increasing “blue-water” naval acquisitions, and how it can be
expected that “peaceful development” is not in the cards of China’s future.
It should also be noted further, that in the analysis of the Chinese threat perception, Primary Essential
Resources receive priority over Secondary Essential Resources because they are most likely to cause
more immediate conflict, whereas the latter could be expected to cause similar reactions, further in time, as
their supplies become further constrained. It is also recognized that there are critical resources other than
the ones discussed in this paper and that they too hold value in assessing China posture on resource
acquisition. However, the argument of this paper is only meant to analyze a narrow spectrum of essential
resources that are thought of as being critical to economic development and pose the most immediate
threat of conflict. Therefore, the ultimate goal from the data and arguments posed in this research is to give
policy makers a better insight into the problem so that strategies and policies can be implemented in order
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to combat this rising threat.
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Amber Hicks. “Women on the Frontline: Democratic Republic of Congo North & South Kivu
Region.”
Amber Hicks, Master’s degree student
Troy University
Ph: 010-5571-7980
Abstract: “Women on the Frontline: Democratic Republic of Congo North & South Kivu Region.”
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has suffered from a lack of a stable government, corruption and
civil war since independence from Belgium in 1960. These conflicts culminated during The Second Congo
War, also referred to as Africa’s World War. Despite the war being officially declared over in 2003, peace
in the DRC remains elusive.
This paper presents the comprehensive case study of this international conflict focusing on the areas in the
North and South Kivu region. It further applies feminist critique by considering the impact of this current
conflict on women. By applying the concept of gender sensitivity, this paper builds upon critical theory,
constructivism, post-modernism, and post-colonialism.
The feminist goal of making unequal gender
structures visible is used in an effort to shed new light on the DRC and bring further attention to the reasons
women are disadvantaged relative to men.
Keywords
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), Armed
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Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
(FDLR), Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(MONUC), United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUSCO), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Military Operation against Ugandan (ADF-NALU)
Women on the Frontline: DRC: North & South Kivu Region
The Second Congo War, otherwise referred to as Africa’s World War, was officially declared over in 2003,
but “a true peace has been elusive and the conflict has continued on a smaller scale in the eastern part of
the country,” (http://www.spiritus-temporis.com). The eastern area of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) is called Kivu. Both the North and South Kivu provinces are positioned between the rest of the DRC
and Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania. “International conflict in the provinces of North and South
Kivu- eastern Congo is notorious for shocking levels of sexual violence and widespread looting of the
region’s natural resources,” (Hara, 2010).
This is where the international conflict of my descriptive,
predictive and prescriptive analysis occurs.
In an effort to understand the current situation in the Kivu regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) one must first lay a descriptive groundwork summary of the chaotic current state of affairs. Please
refer to the abstract of this essay under “keywords” for full names of each group which I fully define and
provide current affair updates in my previous works. To simplify the conflict players as best as possible,
today there are Rewandan Hutu and new recruites of FDLR as one group active in the DRC. Then there is
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the DRC (CNDP & FARDC combined foces) along with the Rwandan Tutsi lead RPF who joined together
in June 2010 to oppose the FDLR forces. The Mai-Mai is another force active in protecting local DRC
territory against other armed groups. The United Nations (MONUC newly transitioned to MONUSCO) is
also a key player in this conflict. In addion to these players, the Uganda miltary front is present as well as
their two rebel groups LRA and ADF-NALU who all have contributed to the chaotic state of affairs in the
DRC.
The nine African nations who played a part in the African World War are reported as still being involved,
either by picking a side or playing as a supporter of both sides for personal economic gain. The positions
of these outside countries are not always obvious in the conflict, nor is it always clear whether or not they
are actually contributing to both sides at the same time (similar to Argentina in WWII selling resources to
both the German and the Allied forces for their personal economic development). Each of these forces,
many of them literally patrolled by child soldiers, contribute directly to the disordered state of affairs in the
Kivu regions. The military actions taken by each group are similar. They kills, loots, pillages and rapes for
power. The victims are as diverse as the fighting groups. It is becoming increasingly clear that the victims
are disproportionately more women and children. “The FDLR, which has been terrorizing the Eastern
Congo for over a decade, is just one of the many rebel groups that continue to employ systematic rape as a
tactic and means to oppress the people there,” (www.voanews.com). Even though the African World War
was declared over in 2003, the violent “silent war” fighting continues even today.
“Sexual Violence in the DRC has been widespread and systematic over the last 15 years, with more than a
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dozen armed groups using rape to terrorize, punish, and control civilians,” (www.mg.co.za).
World
attention to these atrocities is reported today to be the worst in the world. As newspapers highlight the
DRC war, predictive analysis of the situation is needed to evaluate the broad scope of war crimes occurring.
“Typically, when rape happens in the midst of war, no individual soldier-rapists are identified by the victims,
by their senior command or by the media (if there). The women who suffer rape in wartime usually remain
faceless as well…. they are put on the list of war damage along with gutted houses and mangled rail
lines… It becomes just an indistinguishable part of a poisonous wartime stew called ‘loot pillage and rape’”
(Enloe, p. 108). By grouping all tragedies of war into one, it takes away from the grave psychological long
term impacts rape and sexual violence have on an individual.
By bringing these crimes into the
international spotlight, healing is more likely to occur on the individual level. More importantly, attention to
the problem could help deter future violators.
Using rape and sexual violence is not a new concept in militarization. “The opportunistic rape and pillage of
previous centuries has been replaced in modern conflict by rape used as an orchestraed combat
tool,“ (www.news.bbc.co.uk). Reports of these offences are now being categorized and reported in the
international community. Gita Sahgal of Amnesty International explains that rape in war is used as “spoils
of war,” not for sexual satisfaction. The motivation for such acts brought to attention are defined as a clear
strategy of war.
German researcher Hanne-Margret Birchenbach (translated by Andreas Speak) said
“Under the diguise of ‘no to killing-yes to killing for the purpose of defence,’ conscientious objectors and
those willing to perform military service do not only fight about military violence, but also- without knowing-
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about ideals of masculinity,” (www.wri-irg.org).
Cynthia Enloe’s work looks beyond the DRC and issues surrounding women and militarization. In her
article Beyond 'Rambo': Women and the Varieties of Militarized Masculinity, she states, "As we have
accumulated more and more evidence from more and more societies, we have become increasingly
confident in this assertion that to omit gender from any explanation how militarization occurs, is not only to
risk a flawed political analysis; it is to risk, too, a perpetually unsuccessful campaign to roll back that
militarization”.
Her theories examine women and their connection to militarization which have been
expanded upon by writers such as Colleen Burke. Burke states that “Militarism emerges out of patriarchal
ideas,” (www.wilpfinternational .org). She continues by expounding upon radical feminist theory which
points to the fact that patriarchy becomes a block in goals of creating an equal and just society for both
men and women, since it is the very power structure which provides justification for institutionalized
discrimination and violence against women. The reality is that the military must support patriarchy to exist.
Halil Savda, a Turkish conscentious objector who has been repeatedly imprisoned for not serving in the
military says, “Questioning the military’s value system and its practices which are identified with military
service, one is also obligated to question the hegemonic understanding of masculinity. In Turkey, military
service is a laboratory in which masculinity is reproduced. The patriarchal system is solidified through
military service. I objected to military service, because I am also against this laboratory manufactured
masculinity. The struggle against militarism defined in heterosexist terms through sexist structures finds its
fundamental expression in anti-militarism,” (www.wri-irg.org).
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The DRC is an extreme example of hegemonic masculinity gone out of control. “Hegemonic masculinity
was understood as the pattern of practice (i.e. things done, not just a set of role expectations or an identity)
that allowed men’s dominance over women to continue,” (Connel & Masserschmidt, p. 832). Basically, it is
the normative ideas believed by both men and women, subconsciously as well as obvertly, surrounding the
power of masculinity in societies. It is the behavior that points out that power lies in masculinity and thus it
is better than femininity. Granted, it takes on various manifestations depending on the particular region of
the world so we can say that “since gender characteristics are generally unequal - meaning that people of
both sexes ascribe more positive value to the masculine ones - gender is also a structure of meaning that
signifies power relationships. If gender characteristics denote inequality, gender becomes a mechanism for
the unequal distribution of social benefits and costs. Therefore, gender is crucial for analyzing global
politics and economics, particularly with respect to issues of inequality, insecurity, and social justice.
Feminists believe we need to make unequal gender structures visible in order to move beyond them,”
(Tickner, p.265).
To fully examine through postcolonial feminist perspective and critial theory analyis of the current situation
in the DRC today, one must listen to the stories of the victums in the DRC. “Eliza, 12, stands in the Panzi
hospital where she is being treated for Fistula repair, in South Kivu, in Eastern Congo. Eliza was taken
from her home by two soldiers and brought into the forest, where she was kicked to the ground and raped.
She explains '...they introduced something into my body, and urine started pouring out. Before urine didn't
come out that way.
It was something hard, something close to his body....I didn't know what was
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happening...'
Eliza
was
11
years
old
when
she
was
raped,”
reported
Lynsey
Addario
(www.lynseyaddario.com). Eliza is only one of the 400 women per month who were estimated to be
sexually assaulted in the autumn of 2007 in eastern Congo. “It is more dangerous to be a woman than a
soldier in the DRC right now,” reported by the NGO HOPEinternational (www.careinternatinoal.org.uk).
U.S. Secertary of State, Hillary Clinton was the first in her position to tour and listen to these women in the
eastern Kivu DRC region. She prescriptively reported in August of 2009 that these horrific attacks against
women are, “yet another example of how sexual violence undermines effort to achieve and maintain
stability in areas torn by conflict but striving for peace” (www.afrik-news.com). Due to attention brought to
this issue from Clinton’s visit, $17 million was given by the United States to help survivors of rape and to
help prevent sexual violence in the eastern DRC. “The funding is being used to provide medical care,
counseling, economic assistance and legal support to 10,000 women in areas including North and South
Kivu. Part of the money is also being spent to train health care workers in the complex surgical procedures
needed by survivors of rape, such as fistula repair,” (www.afrik-news.com). The UN has reported at least
200,000 cases of sexual violence against women and girls since 1996. These numbers are not conclusive
because many women never make it to treatment centers so they are not accounted for in these statistics.
“Military operations, attacks and abuse by armed groups and forces against the civilian population continue
to pose major problems,” reported by the International Committee of the Red Cross mission in DRC
(www.irinnews.org).
The first International Criminal Tribunal trial and conviction of an individual for genocide and international
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crimes of sexual violence was held in 1998. This pioneering case Prosecutor v. Akayesu ruling “defined
‘rape’- listed as a crime against humanity in the ICTR Statue- ‘as a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances with are coercive’ and ‘sexual violence’- a crime it derived
from other provisions of the Statue- as ‘any act of sexual nature which is committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive’”, (Armann, p.197). The trial found Rwandan Hutu leader Akayesu guilty
and set a precedent under humanitarian law which is protected under Article 3 of 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Protocol Additional II. Under the precedent of this case, countless others have been tried
and convicted of crimes against humanity including rape.
Even with international law’s dedication to condem such atrocities of crimes against humanity, on October
14th, 2010, Margot Wallstrom, the Security Council Secretary General’s Special Representative on sexual
violence, “expressed concern over recent reports on the involvement of soldiers of the Armed Forces of the
Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) in rapes and looting [and] called on member states to enact laws
requiring companies to disclose whether their products contain minerals originating form the DRC,”
(www.securitycouncilreport.org). The combination in this report, regarding violence and minerals, points to
the fact that much of the fighting, pillaging, looting, raping and other forms of sexual violence are used as
techniques to gain domination over natural resources. The natural resources are sold to finance these
various army fronts. Ironically, as mentioned before, these minerals are sold directly back to various
countries who are UN member representatives in MONUC/ MONUSCO front. The other very interesting
part of this report was that the recent rapes and looting were atrocities comitted by the FARDC the
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Congolese army who are allies of the United Nations new MONUSCO peace supporting force. “We are
able to conclude that the issue concerning human rights and its gender dimensions cannot be clearly
analysed without referring to the overall process of socio-political development” (Rodriguez & NatukundaTogboa, p. 90). Violence against women is directly tied to politics and it is also directly connected with
economics.
“In Africa, some leaders believe that political and economic stability and the state sovereignty and security
must come first, before individual rights can be guaranteed... Priority is given to economic and political
progress rather than to the respect of Human Rigths,” (Rodriguez & Natukunda- Togboa, p. 90). They
realize a long standing war zone does not promote economic investors who choose to first work on building
a political front for their countries’ collective good before bringing attention to the individual human right
gender based atrocities being committed. Clearly, one can point to the direct problems of eliminating the
connection of weak economics and political power with the atrocities being commited to women and
children in the DRC. It is vital to integrate the feminist perspective as a means of creating economic
security and political power in the DRC. A shift in interconnected consciousness between the various
International Relation Theories is needed to progress towards peace in the DRC. Awareness is the first
step, acknowledgment and acceptance of the decriptive state of affairs by listening to the people being
impacted by this chaotic nation state is the next. These steps are essential for the DRC to take prescriptive
action. Building peace is a process which takes extensive work. As Robert Fulghum says “Peace is not
something you wish for; it's something you make, something you do, something you are, something you
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give away,” (http://www.heartquotes.net/Peace.html).
Biblography
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2. Armann, Diane Marie. (2010). Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Case ICTR-96-4-T. The
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2010
from
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=85222.
13. Kaufman, Stephen. (2010). AFRIK-NEWS. Hillary Clinton Condems mass rapes in DRC. Retrieved
November 3rd, 2010 from http://www.afrik- news.com/article18156.html.
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14. Rodriguez, Dina & Natukunda-Togboa, Edith. Gender and Peace Building in Africa. University for
Peace, San Jose Costa Rica: 2005.
15. Security Council Report. (2010). NOVEMBER 2010 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO.
Retrieved
from
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.6355207/k.7ED2/November_2010brDe
mocratic_Republic_of_the_Congo.htm.
16. Spiritus Temoris. (2005). The Second Congo War. Retrieved July 7, 2010 from http://www.spiritustemporis.com/second-congo-war/.
17. Tickner, Ann J. “Gender in World Politics”. The Globalization of World politics, 4th ed. Oxford
University Press: 2008.
18. VOATV2Africa. (2010). VOA TV2Africa: UN Report on Congo War Crimes. Retrieved October 29th,
2010 from http://www.voanews.com/english/programs/tv/65652317.html.
19. War Resisters International. (2010). Militarization and Masculenities. Retrieved Nov.3rd, 2010 from
http://www.wri-irg.org/node/9725.
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Vladimir Kim. “The Border Conflict Over the Island Zhenbao/Damansky in 1969 Between
the PRC and the USSR.”
Vladimir Kim, M.A. Candidate
Yonsei University
[email protected]
Abstract: “The Border Conflict Over the Island Zhenbao/Damansky in 1969 Between the PRC and the
USSR.”
This paper is dedicated to the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969 focusing on Damansky (now Zhenbao)
island as a main disputed territory. While the format of the paper does not imply in-depth analysis and
completeness of the research, it rather aims mostly on the causes of the conflict and its resolution with an
emphasis on international law framework. The overall structure of the paper is the following: introduction,
main part (Sino-soviet split, border alignment and legal issues, dispute area, negotiations prior to the
conflict and both sides’ argumentation, outbreak of hostilities, skirmish outcome, foreign policy shift and
resolution breakthrough), author’s conclusion, selected bibliography. The necessary citations were made
exactly and precisely in a format of citations (in parenthesis with reference to the author and page), in
contrast to footnotes since the latter aimed at elucidation and thus do not strictly appropriate for use in the
paper.
Let the author first express the issue’s topicality and related causes why the current issue has been taken
for a research. Happened more than 40 years ago, the Sino-Soviet border clash over the island Damansky
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(Zhenbao) often remains within the field of IR a minor and insignificant occurrence and on another hand it
has been a subject of numerous interpretations, speculations and conspiracy theories amid some scholars
especially affected by official ideology by one of the belligerents. This confusion and complication of the
issue constitutes its attractiveness in a sense of research and study and provides a fairly wide and rich
perspective for a scholar to present his views and assertions. For the majority of non-specialists PRCUSSR relations back that time frequently appear with no contradictions, problems and crossing national
interests. Official propaganda of the two communist states emphasized bright and memorable but barely
significant diplomatic gestures, widely backed by solemn swear of “eternal friendship.” To prove the
opposite i.e. that it is hard to find in the history of PRC-USSR relations genuinely tranquil period based on
the example of frontier military dispute over Damansky island also motivated the author to choose this topic
as a research one.
In spite the fact that the conflict happened some 40 years ago, regrettably enough author while conducting
preliminary preparations mostly aimed on searching and compilation of data has got a fairly discontented
impression about the availability and diversity of sources. In most cases the author found a few very limited
academic sources worth citing and using. This particular source problem also contributed its part to the
overall necessity of further studying the conflict and subsequently to authors’ motivation and decision to
conduct the research under the certain topic. While looking for necessary data and sources the priority was
given to the diversity and variety of them, since the issue has to be considered from as many points of view
as possible in order to provide the unequivocal, unambiguous, and tend-to-be objective description of the
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events happened.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
I.
On English language:
1) Allen S. Whiting, China's Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2
(Autumn, 2001), pp. 103-131
2) G. P. D., The Territorial Imperative, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jan. 21, 1978), p.
98
3) Lyle J. Goldstein, Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969, Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 1 (Spring, 2003), pp. 53-80
4) Lyle J. Goldstein, Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters, The China
Quarterly, No. 168 (Dec., 2001), pp. 985-997
5) Neville Maxwell, A Note on the Amur/Ussuri Sector of the Sino-Soviet Boundaries, Modern China,
Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan., 1975), pp. 116-126
6) Neville Maxwell, Sino-Soviet Boundary Agreement: Prelude to Sino-Indian Settlement?, Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 39 (Sep. 26, 1987), pp. 1643-1647
7) Neville Maxwell, The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao, The China Quarterly, No.
56 (Oct. - Dec., 1973), pp. 730-739
8) Peter S. H. Tang, Sino-Soviet Territorial Disputes: Past and Present, Russian Review, Vol. 28, No.
4 (Oct., 1969), pp. 403-415
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9) Shao-Chuan Leng, Legal Aspects of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 6 (Jun.,
1972), pp. 493-509
10) Thomas W. Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March
1969 Clashes, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Dec., 1972), pp. 1175-1202
11) Yan Mei, The Maturing of Soviet-Chinese Relations, Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, Vol. 481, Soviet Foreign Policy in an Uncertain World (Sep., 1985), pp. 70-80
12) Yang Kuisong, The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American
Rapprochement, Cold War History, Vol. 1, No.1 (August 2000), pp.21-52
13) Zhou Enlai, Letter, Zhou Enlai to Alexei Kosygin, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic
Papers of Zhou Enlai], The Central Press of Historical Documents (1990), pp. 462-464
II.
On Russian language:
1) Andrei Musalov, Damanskii and Zhalanashkol’: sovetsko-kitaiskii vooruzhennyi konflikt 1969 goda
(Damansky and Zhalanashkol’: Soviet-Chinese military conflict of 1969), Eksprint: Fond voennogo
iskusstva (Moscow: Eksprint, 2005)
2) Dmitri Ryabushkin, Mify Damanskogo (The myths of Damansky), (Moscow: AST, 2004);
3) Vitalii Bubenin, Krovavyi sneg Damanskogo: sobytiia 1966–1969 gg., (Bloody snow on Damansky:
events of 1966-1969), (Moscow: Granitsa; Kuchkovo Pole, 2004)
III.
Web
1) http://www.damanski-zhenbao.ru/materials.htm
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.
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Richard Shannon. “Globalization, International Trade, Transport and Tourism in Busan,
South Korea: the Roles of Culture.”
Richard W. Shannon, Assistant Professor
Pusan National University, Graduate School of International Studies
[email protected]
Please do not quote or copy without permission.
Abstract: “Globalization, International Trade, Transport and Tourism in Busan, South Korea: the Roles of
Culture.”
Busan (Pusan), Korea’s second largest city (population 3.6 million) and fifth busiest port in the world, is
experiencing rapidly increasing trade, global connections, events, and resulting infrastructural projects.
What should Busan do to better handle the social, political, and economic complexities brought by these
changes?
To answer this question, this paper explores the relationship of globalization and culture, as treated by
cultural anthropology. It also considers how the tools of applied anthropology and social science can be
mobilized to help Busan and the Southeast Korea region deal with these challenges.
After introducing anthropological treatments of culture, globalization and global problems, I discuss how
anthropology is used in international business/trade, tourism, and transport/logistics, especially the third
area. To show how applied social science can help transportation and logistics projects in Busan and Korea,
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I present lessons from case studies in Denver, Colorado Springs, and Chuuk (Truk, South Pacific).
Applied anthropology presents a wealth of helpful methods and insights to help Busan and Korea improve
planning, public participation, political, social and environmental issues in transport and logistics projects,
and to help prevent ethical and budgetary lapses. Finally, I offer suggestions for initial training programs to
help expedite these goals.
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Jisun Yi. “Human Security and Humanitarian Aid: A Case Study of North Korea.”
Jisun Yi
Ewha Womans University
Graduate School of International Studies
Abstract: “Human Security and Humanitarian Aid: A Case Study of North Korea.”
Looking at the previous patterns of ODA of both the US, the most generous donor to the North, and South
Korea, this paper primarily identifies the dominant purposes of ODA of two countries to North Korea. A
critical proposition of this analysis is how peculiarities of politics and human rights abuse cases of a
recipient country, North Korea, can affect major donor countries’ ODA policies and future directions. Next
focus is firstly, why those bilateral official foreign aid flows that have directly or indirectly helped generate
progresses on human rights practices in North Korea and human betterment of the North Koreans attention
needs more an academic attention; secondly, what kind of roles that Korea ODA and USAID have
performed in the backdrop where a huge influx of humanitarian aid from multilateral international aid
organizations and NGOs for North Korea prevails.
Research questions (focus on the bilateral aid from the US)
1) Why humanitarian aid to North Korea should be continued?
2) Despite constraints, the orientation of foreign aid to North Korea should be transformed from
humanitarian aid to development aid to promote the stable betterment of human security?
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Pan Xiaolin. “Transformation of the Subject of Crime against Humanity: Obstacles
and Activators.”
Pan, Xiaolin, PhD candidate
Yonsei University, GSIS
Paper: “Transformation of the Subject of Crime against Humanity: Obstacles and Activators.”
Since “Crime against humanity” appeared in history literally in 1915, although the identification and scope
of it changed gradually, it has been accepted broadly, and then settled down as one specific crime in a
series of international treaties, protocols and other documents, that crime against humanity refers to the
offense to both certain victims and the communities they belonged to, moreover, to the all human beings.
Therefore, any subject violated to this provision, could become the crime subject of crime against Humanity,
and then be the research target of this dissertation.
Actually, the subject evolution of crime against humanity in international judicial practice could be reflected
on both substantive dimension and procedural dimension, in the restricted explanation of the primitive
treaties, only war criminals had been identified as subject of crime against humanity and then received
international judgment. After that, high level government officials joined in, till the historic trials against
Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte and Slobodan Milosevic, the crime subject has been broadened to
the former head of state. This seems not the end, when Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir was sued of in ICC,
the present head-of-state might be deprived of immunity. With this radical transformation, we might as well
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make a prediction of the future trend: any individual could be identified as crime subject, besides, nonnatural person, such as institution, group, and even state, might get evolved in, too.
This remarkable transformation of the crime subject has been witnessed during only six decades. Taking a
microscopic look at this process, it is not hard to conclude a series of factors activating this evolution.
First, the inherent characteristic of humanity shows that the criminal actually offends against the whole
community by offending specific victims, thus anyone committees this crime is henceforth an enemy of all
humans; Second, it was this crime nature leads that the only effective way to punish this crime is the
establishment of an international criminal court and the execution of its judgment by an internationally
organized power; Third, the disastrous loss in the World Wars and district conflicts also call for the
transformation; Fourth, the expansion of extraterritorial jurisdictions, especially the universal jurisdiction, on
crime against humanity consistently influences the whole international community’s conception and view of
value on this international crimes, and consequently, spurs the range of crime subject expanding broader
gradually; Fifth, the communication and connection among the international community makes the sharing
of common value, mainly reflected as respect and protection of humanity, come true; Last, the efforts of
some pioneer states, such as Belgium, Spain, France, Canada and etc, and NGOs also contributed to this
trend.
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Although the evolution of the subject of crime against humanity is on the desirable way of the idealistic
scholars and activists with some occasional regression, this process is not one smooth sailing; some
obstacles could also be witnessed.
First, being influenced by Realism theory, U.S. took a series of opposite actions to resist the jurisdiction of
the ICC; these actions consist of both internal and external strategies. In American Service-Member
Protection Act (ASPA) (August 2002) and Nethercutt Amendment, the U.S. claimed to suspend the foreign
military aids and economic aids to states that did not sign the Article 98 Agreement, which is one of the
chief forms of Bilateral Non-surrender Agreements (BNSA), aiming to prohibit signatories from referring
investigations of any members of the American military stationed in ICC State Parties. Furthermore, in
order to get the immunity from prosecution by the ICC to UN peacekeeping personnel from the U.S.,
through threatening to veto the renewal of all UN peacekeeping missions, the U.S. successfully pushed the
UN SC passed Resolution 1422 unanimously on July 12 2002, and successive Resolution 1487 on June 12
2003, in which the ICC…shall for a twelve-month period not commence or proceed with investigation or
prosecution for any such case. However, the hostile attitude has been changed gradually.
Second, China’s conservative attitude could also influence the transformation, and it could be explained by
the theory of Constructivism, which maintain that the normative structure shapes the identity and interests
of actors, knowledge shapes how actors interpret and construct their social reality.
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As far as China is concerned, the essential normative structures have originated from horrible historical
experience of being invaded and depressed in the First Opium War (1839-42) and the successive Second
Opium War from 1856-1860. The first image of “international justice” was be identified and then locked as
“international invasion and intervene” through provisions of Treaty of Nanking1, which first officially related
to the issue of foreign judicial jurisdiction in China. This shameful historical experience has taken effect in
the current policy orientation: avoiding the external intervenes extremely. But this caution sometimes could
exceed the proper limits.
Besides, there are some traditional culture and heritage also influence the identities and behaviors of
Chinese Politian. There is no better example than the old sayings, Keep the Skeleton in the Closet Forever
(家丑不可外扬), and Notify Good News and Withhold the Bad News (报喜不报忧). In China, “Mian Zi”,
which means prestige and reputation, is very significant not only to the individuals, but also to the institutes.
To avoid being judged by external force, Chinese prefer to hide all the disrepute and resolve all the
problems internally and artificially. It is almost endurable for being charged by a foreign court, not mention
an international criminal court. Actually, this external feint could never undermine the internal chaos.
Contrarily, it led to the escalation of the crisis and un-trustful government images.
1
According to Article VIII and Article IX, the Qing government undertook to release all the British prisoners of War and
to give a general amnesty to all Chinese subjects who had cooperated with the British during the war.
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Third, certain procedural difficulties could also impede the transforming process, for example, no matter
jurisdiction is claimed in terms of universal jurisdiction or treaty jurisdiction, the application is quite difficult
since the cooperation of related states could be the precondition. And it is obvious that state would
compromise easily. Meanwhile, the execution of prosecution and compensation could also be problems.
Fourth, some accidental factors also might erode the subject transformation, if there appears one politician,
at high position with strong power, the whole situation could be more frustrated. The obscure attitude of the
U.S. towards to Japan resulted in the predominate status, on every aspect and in every period, of General
MacArthur in the IMTFE.
To sum up, although occasional retroversion arose inevitably, the whole spirally proceeding scope of crime
subject of crime against humanity shall be estimated as ascensive due to its progressiveness and
significance in both essential and functional angles. Taking optimistic perspective, it could be expected
audaciously that the subject of crime against humanity will transfer from former head of state to current
head of state steadily, not occasionally, and even to the sovereign state and other international
participators, like organizations and institutes. However, this expectation will be only Utopia unless its
sequent abundant problems could be resolved. Exploiting the activators of this transformation could be
helpful to make them keep functioning, and studying the obstacles could make some solution to avoid them.
Obviously, within this process, dominant states and states which have great power could take national and
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international responsibilities, rather than negative attitudes.
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Thanks to all, participants, presenters, chairs, discussants, audience, exhibitors, and the organizing
assistants.
MM
END OF DOCUMENT
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