1. law, govt and politics

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO
J.B.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY AND MICHAEL B.,
Appellees.
No. 2 CA-JV 2014-0090
Filed December 26, 2014
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. JD202233
The Honorable Catherine M. Woods, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Pima County Office of Children’s Counsel, Tucson
By Sarah Richelson
Counsel for Appellant
J.B. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY
Decision of the Court
Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General
By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Law Offices of Belinda B. BreMiller, Tucson
By Belinda B. BreMiller
Counsel for Appellee Michael B.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which
Judge Howard and Judge Vásquez concurred.
K E L L Y, Presiding Judge:
¶1
In this appeal J.B., born October 2001, challenges the
juvenile court’s ruling denying the Arizona Department of Child
Safety’s (DCS)1 motion for termination of her father, Michael B.’s,
parental rights on the grounds that J.B. had been in court-ordered,
out-of-home placement for fifteen months or longer. See A.R.S. § 8533(B)(8)(c).2
1At
the outset of this proceeding, the children were taken into
care by Child Protective Services (CPS), formerly a division of the
Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) and ADES filed
the initial dependency petition. Effective May 29, 2014, the Arizona
legislature repealed the statutory authorization for CPS and for
ADES’s administration of child welfare and placement services
under title 8 and transferred powers, duties, and purposes
previously assigned to those entities to the newly established DCS.
See 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 1, §§ 6, 20, 54.
Accordingly, DCS has been substituted for ADES in this matter. See
Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 27. For simplicity, our references to DCS in this
decision encompass both ADES and the former CPS.
2J.B.’s
mother is not a party to this appeal as her rights were
terminated on her own motion in May 2014.
2
J.B. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY
Decision of the Court
¶2
Before it may terminate a parent’s rights, a juvenile
court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one
statutory ground for severance exists and must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that terminating the parent’s rights is
in the best interests of the child. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), 8-537(B);
Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005).
When reviewing an appeal from an order denying a motion to
terminate a parent’s rights, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s ruling. See Lashonda M. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, ¶ 13, 107 P.3d 923, 928 (App.
2005). Thus, “we will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact
unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings.” Jesus M. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App.
2002). That is, we will not disturb the ruling unless the factual
findings are clearly erroneous. Id.
¶3
J.B. and her half-sister, I.A., were removed from their
mother’s care in August 2012 “due to the mother’s untreated,
unstable mental health and substance abuse.” The mother did not
know where Michael was, and DCS served him with its dependency
petition by publication. J.B. was adjudicated dependent as to
Michael in November 2012. DCS located and contacted Michael by
January 2013. He had been incarcerated before J.B. was taken into
custody, and remained so until November 2013, when he was
released to community supervision. He later violated the terms of
that supervision and was incarcerated again in 2014 with a release
date in June.
¶4
DCS filed a motion to terminate Michael’s parental
rights to J.B. in January 2014. After a contested severance hearing in
May 2014, the juvenile court denied the motion. In a detailed ruling,
the court determined DCS had not provided appropriate
reunification services and had not established that Michael would
not be able to properly parent in the “near future,” as required by
§ 8-533(B)(8)(c).
¶5
On appeal, J.B. argues the juvenile court abused its
discretion in determining DCS had not met its burden to establish
3
J.B. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY
Decision of the Court
the ground for severance and asserts “[t]he overwhelming evidence
presented at trial” supported a contrary conclusion. This argument,
however, amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the
evidence, and that we will not do. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12, 53
P.3d at 207. And, because “reasonable evidence in the record
supports the . . . court’s findings” and because the court thoroughly
and correctly addressed the claims raised, “little would be gained by
our further ‘rehashing the trial court’s correct ruling’ in our
decision.” Id. ¶ 16, quoting State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866
P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993).
¶6
We therefore adopt the juvenile court’s ruling and
affirm its order denying DCS’s motion to terminate Michael’s
parental rights.
4