1. No category

Center for Excellence
in Disaster Management
& Humanitarian Assistance
(CFE-DMHA)
Pamela K. Milligan
Director
12 March 2014
PACOM Disaster
Response Lessons Trends
1991-2013
Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
www.cfe-dmha.org
table of contents
01
02
03
Aim: to indicate major categories
of PACOM Disaster Management
Lessons Identified and Good
Practices
Trends Table
Supporting Data
Introduction
CFE analyzed representative PACOM
Disaster Management response activities
between 1991 and 2013 for which military
focused Lessons Identified and After
Action Reports are available. The aim is to
illuminate Disaster Management related
trends in 11 categories.
As more data becomes available additional operations will be
added to the Lessons repository.
Doctrine
Organization
Training
Materiel
Leadership
Personnel
Many After Action Reports (AARs) and Observations
and Lessons Identified have been captured. Yet a
large percentage of the issues identified in HADR
activities are re-identified in subsequent operations.
The re-identification may result from the following
persistent challenges:
1. Personnel turnover. People who learn the
lessons and develop HADR expertise transfer to
new duties. New personnel, without the
expertise and benefit of previous learning, are
called upon to execute the next HADR mission.
2. Implementation challenges. The Lessons
Identified are in some cases not fully
implemented to become Lessons Learned.
Changes to each of the DOTMPLPF elements
are required to generate effective change.
Absent this implementation, the learning
process is repeated.
Facilities
Interoperability
section 01
4
Disaster
Management
Trends Table
LNOs
X
Mapping
Linguistic
expertise
Crisis
Communications
X
NGO Interaction
X
Information
sharing
Pol-Mil
Coordination
Use of Existing
SOPs
Hydrographic
Survey
X
X Issue identified
Source: Placeholder example
X
Communications
X
X
X
X
X
Experience
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X, X
X
X
X, X X
X
Significant Deficiency
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X, X
X, X
X
X
X
X
X
X Good practice
X
2013 OPERATION
DAMAYAN, Philippines
2011 Typhoon Megi
2010 Wildfires, Russia
2010 Pakistan Floods
2009 Padang Earthquake
2008 Snowstorms, China
2008 Cyclone Nagris
Burma
2008 Typhoon Fengshen
Philippines
2006
OPERATION AFTERSHOCK:
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
2006 Pakistan Earthquake
2006 Typhoon/Mudslides
Philippines
2004 Tsunami
OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE
1991 Bangladesh Cyclone
SEA ANGEL
2011 Operation
Tomoedashi Japan
X
2011 Thailand Floods
X
X
X
X
X, X
X
X
X
X
X
No specific data
section 02
6
Supporting
Data
This section contains
selected quotes capturing
key insights upon which the
evaluations were based.
Supporting Data
Liaison Officers (LNOs)
U.S. should position LNOs within
OCHA, WFP, and within the Interagency Coordination cluster,
Emergency Telecommunications
cluster, Logistics cluster. OCHA should
position its own LNOs within relevant
military coordination center (JHOC,
CMOC, etc.).
Responding agencies should seek to
recruit LNOs from the local community
whenever possible, especially where
those individuals possess strong
language skills and are trusted
members of their local communities.
(Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster
Management and Humanitarian
Response to Typhoon Haiyan
(Yolanda) pg. 35)
• Liaison officers played an
important role in facilitating
communications and
coordination between military
and humanitarian
organizations and between
both of these sets of actors
and local and national
government actors. Locally
recruited liaisons that worked
with the Canadian forces
served in each barangay to
provide key information to
local communities about the
response effort and relay any
problems with aid delivery
back to responders.
• Liaison officers were pivotal
in the response for both
effective coordination
between military and
humanitarian agencies and
between government
ministries and the
humanitarian organizations.
(Lessons from Civil-Military
Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Response to
Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg.
33)
Operation Damayan
U) IOT provide 24 hour coverage, use
either a DLA LNO rep in Okinawa or
bring a second DLA Rep from
mainland Japan to provide 24 ;hour
coverage so that there are no gaps in
capturing logistical information that
would help DLA support operations
and plans on time/early should we
stand up for such Operations in the
future. Having two heads together
would produce better results in
support of this type or any other
significant disaster relief operations,
and this type could apply to any other
region in the Pacific.
(U) PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE AND
(U)LNOS ARE VITAL TO TIMELY
ARMY PERSONNEL WERE
INFORMATION FLOW IN ANY
EMBARKED IN STOCKHAM AS
COMBINED OPERATION,
LIAISON OFFICERS (LNO) TO
ESPECIALLY ONE AS TIME CRITICAL
ENHANCE COMMUNICATION WITH AS SAR. CARE MUST BE TAKEN IN
PHILIPPINE SAR OPS CONTROL
LNO PLACEMENT ABOARD SHIP TO
STATIONS DURING CTU 710.11.1
MAXIMIZE EFFICIENCY OF
SAR SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOR
INFORMATION FLOW AND PREVENT
THE CAPSIZED PHILIPPINE FERRY DISCLOSURE OF NON-RELEASABLE
MV PRINCESS OF THE STARS. LNO INFORMATION WITHOUT UNDUE
RELAYED LOCATIONS OF BODIES, IMPACT TO WATCH STANDER
DISTRESSED VESSELS, OR AREAS REGULARLY ASSIGNED DUTIES.
OF WRECKAGE FROM STOCKHAM
AFLOAT OPERATIONS CENTER
(AOC) VIA PHONE OR RADIO TO
PHILIPPINE COAST. STOCKHAM AOC
WAS FIRST SANITIZED TO PREVENT
DISCLOSURE OF NON RELEASABLE
INFORMATION.
Back to Table
section 03
8
Communications
Since commercial e-mail systems are the primary means of communication
among civilian organizations, a reliable capability communicate with these
organizations is critical. Cell phones and SMS text messaging are also the
most common and reliable forms of communication in disaster response
settings where the infrastructure is available. There was a shortage of
Indonesian cell phones issued. AAR participants felt this was an oversight
that could have been easily resolved if it had been brought to the attention of
the leadership. (OPERATION AFTERSHOCK:
A Review of the III MEF Disaster Relief Operation in Yogyakarta, Indonesia April-May 2006, pg. 12)
Three features of information sharing and communication underpinned
successful civil-military coordination in Roxas. First, all communications
were open and unclassified. There were no proprietary data sets or secret
information. Second, because the UN, local government, international
NGOs and Canadian military were all physically collocated in one room,
responders could literally walk over to one another and have a
conversation. Cluster meeting attendance in Roxas was facilitated by the
fact that the different agency representatives were already working in the
room where meetings were being 33 held; it was not necessary to travel
across town to attend a cluster meeting. This encouraged the
development of interpersonal bonds across agencies. Finally, the quality
of information made available by the Philippines government was reliable,
timely, and provided a good common baseline set of information from
which to work. All of these features enhanced communications and
information sharing with the Roxas Operations Center. (Lessons from CivilMilitary Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon
Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 32-33)
(U) There was very limited
(U) (For the Future Operations)
communication capability at the Purchase extra communications
deployed location. Deployers
packages such as Blackberry
having communications
devices, Aircards, Iridium Phones,
packages such as Blackberry
and LAPTOPs with pre ;loaded
devices & Aircards were a information that DST/deployers
tremendous add to the success could easily/immediately access
of their operations and activities. to, without having to reach back
Without the blackberries and
to the rear/main operations.
aircards the deployers could have
the section signifier is a small
been incapable Below
of
text field where you can put
communicating discreet
and/or providing
the real time information
referencetoorthe
source material. You can
DLA rear/main operations (PLOC)
have it be a live web link to the source
or the Commander.
or simply give attribution to the source
you’ve cited.
section 03
9
Experience
As noted above, the prior experience of the leadership of Operation
Aftershock was key to successful interagency coordination and partnering.
The military leadership clearly understood the supported/supporting
relationship with the lead federal agency – USAID’s Office of Foreign
Recommendation 1-5: While the experience level of deployed
Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA). Within two hours of arrival, the 3d
personnel in future disasters can not be guaranteed due to staff
MEB DRAT’s Senior Medical Officer met with representatives of USAIDrotation, III MEF should continue efforts to institutionalize effective
OFDA who facilitated meetings with key NGO partners working in the
policies, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that draw on
Bantul region. Initial contact with local heath officials, including the
lessons observed from recent responses and provide increased
provincial Minister of Health, was made at UN-led health cluster meeting
education and training opportunities related to disaster relief for
the following day. Of note was the 3d MEB leadership’s guidance that
individuals and units
Recommendation 1-6: Develop pre-disaster working relationships junior medical department officers also attend the UN cluster meetings in
order to gain invaluable experience in working with the humanitarian relief
or agreements with key partners in the III MEF area of interest,
community. Such mentoring is critical to sharing knowledge and
such as NAMRU and the Armed Forces Research Institute of
Medical Sciences (AFRIMS) in Bangkok, and with USAID/OFDA, the experience, with a view toward developing institutional and individual
capacity. (OPERATION AFTERSHOCK:
Department of State medical attachés at U.S. Embassies, and
A Review of the III MEF Disaster Relief Operation in Yogyakarta, Indonesia
others as appropriate. (OPERATION AFTERSHOCK:
April-May 2006, pg. 7)
A Review of the III MEF Disaster Relief Operation in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia April-May 2006, pg. 7 )
Military commands should
promote HA/DR training and
further enable JTFs by
providing experienced HA/
Military commands should promote
DR personnel knowledgeable
HA/DR training and further enable
of SOPs and CONOPS. (Lessons
JTFs by providing experienced HA/ DR
Operation Sea Angel: A Case Study Paul A. McCarthy, RAND, pg 12
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/
2007/MR374.pdf
from Civil-Military Disaster Management and
Humanitarian
to Typhoon
personnel Response
knowledgeable
of Haiyan
SOPs and
(Yolanda) pg. 36)
CONOPS. (Yolanda 36)
section 03
10
Mapping
(U) The operational requirement for updated maps and charts of the Panay Island region
drove the need to extract electronic NGA charts from the ship's digital holdings and then
print them via the LFP in the Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC). Electronic chart printing
of this nature was, however, designed for briefing graphics vice the types of tactical
maneuver type charts used for ground operations. Charts produced by the LFP did not
have the required resolution to create quality 1:100,000 scale graphics of the entire
island of Panay on one sheet of paper for ease of use by HAST. Collection of detailed
information on landing zones (LZs) in the relief area, detailed existing maps of existing
infrastructure, critical facilities (e.g., hospitals, airfields, etc.), and utility systems, street
level maps and imagery was precluded by the inability of intelligence personnel to access
high quality electronic printing capabilities. Small, 8 x 10 images were available, but not
realistic for planner purposes. Carrier Air Wing FOURTEEN (CVW-14) personnel contacted
Commander, United States Seventh Fleet (C7F) NGA representatives for special products,
crafted using ARCview or other technologically superior software running on NGAdesigned computer systems, to facilitate single-page printing of a high quality, high fidelity
chart of Panay Island via the LFP. NGA C7F was able to generate the product quickly, and
CVW-14 was able to print and distribute to the HAST ashore, 40 hours after the mission
commenced. (Typhoon Fengshen, Phillipines)
(U) (U)Current shipboard Mapping,
Charting, and Geodesy production
capabilities are highly constrained by
the types of Information Technology
(IT) available, especially in the cases
of large format printers and the basic
Personal Computer (PC) workstations
driving them. This constraint, in turn,
limits the topographic support to the
full range of strike group operations,
to include operations conducted
within the FHA context.
section 03
11
Linguistic Expertise
Liaison officers who had native fluency of the language
in affected areas proved to be a key enabler in the
coordination and information sharing of the relief
efforts. ((Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster
Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon
Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 34)
As was the case in the provision of the NEHK, the assistance of USAIDOFDA in providing interpreters and liaising with the IOM for vehicles was
critical to a successful operation. Despite having 24 fulltime translators,
more were required to fulfill the critical task of providing clinical
translation, as well as assisting with administrative functions in support
of the command element. More dedicated clinical translators would
have greatly assisted medical operations. ((OPERATION AFTERSHOCK:
A Review of the III MEF Disaster Relief Operation in Yogyakarta, Indonesia
April-May 2006, pg. 12)
section 03
12
Crisis Communication
- The media should be provided open and regular access to information. Ideally a central
cell should be made for disseminating information and to avoid inconsistencies.
- Media management is very important: this entails feeding them correct information,
facilitating field visits, educating them on the latest developments, participating in
interviews and talk shows. Equally important is monitoring of the public mood and taking
proactive steps.
- The media should retain its independence and objectivity, but at the same time should
be sensitive to the feelings of disaster survivors and should not undermine the national
effort through overtly negative coverage. Criticism of disaster management by the
authorities and others should be constructive. Pakistan Earthquake AAR, pg. 6
The unfair and inaccurate reporting on the Philippine
• Attention to the positive impact of U.S. relief efforts may government response could conceivably be traced to
have sent the wrong message to certain segments of the Anderson Cooper’s controversial reporting during the
local population.
initial days of Haiyan, and its one-sided reporting,
focusing exclusively on town line roads instead of
• Too little media coverage on the positive AFP relief
going to the hinterlands where Filipino efforts were
efforts.
clearly visible.
• the first few days of the relief efforts, international and
local media largely influenced government response.
The media’s overall thin knowledge on disaster
Isolated areas were left to fend for themselves as
management further caused unfair criticisms to the
international relief poured into areas where the cameras affected state. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and
were rolling. (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 25)
Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 24)
section 03
13
NGO Interaction
Operation Sea Angel: A Case Study Paul A. McCarthy, RAND, pg 16
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/
2007/MR374.pdf
An example of good civil-military coordination was the International Medical Corps (IMC) who used
military transport to set up mobile clinics in some of the hardest hit areas. A Canadian air force officer
joined the team and local police accompanied the teams and provided translation services. The IMC
team was able to provide primary care when mayors of the LGUs requested two-day notice before
providing services. The IMC team also bought pharmaceuticals from the local pharmacies providing
evidence that the transition from response to recovery was already underway. (Lessons from CivilMilitary Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 35)
section 03
14
Information Sharing
Access to shared information among all
partners is critical in responding to a complex
disaster.
For U.S. Forces, there were two major
requirements around which information
sharing was needed: the provision of support
to the Government of Japan, and the safety
of the U.S. military personnel and
dependents living in Japan…Amid the
particular uncertainty of radiological
contamination, the challenge as time moved
on was collecting and presenting the right
information in a way that was useful to all
parties, considering that each had different
goals and priorities. Among the measures
that worked effectively was the
establishment of direct lines of information
sharing between U.S. forces and JSDF.
Bilateral information and intelligence
sharing are essential to relief efforts.
Sharing information is essential to
effective bilateral or multilateral
operations. This applies not just to
information needed for situational
awareness, but also for the protection
of personnel.
Operation Tomodachi: Lessons learned in the
U.S. Military’s support to Japan, Liaison, Vol V,
2012, pg 57.
The NGO perspective in Roxas was
that data coming from national
authorities submitted to the UN
cluster were good, reliable, and timely.
Information sharing within the clusters
was good. ACF had six people on the
ground by 11 November, and had a
team of 20 on the ground by 29
November. ACF is involved primarily in
WASH, food distribution and
supplemental feeding. ACF suggested
that it was important that UNDAC was
on the ground and felt that the
national authorities were impressive.
Rapid turnover of cluster leads and a
disparity in levels of previous
experience and ability to manage and
lead meetings were limiting factors.
(Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster
Management and Humanitarian Response to
Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 24)
Operation Tomodachi: Lessons learned in the U.S.
Military’s support to Japan, Liaison, Vol V, 2012, pg 57.
http://www.coedmha.org/publications/liaison/2012/Liaison2012_Web.
pdf
section 03
15
Pol-Mil Coordination
DART team members
emphasized just how
important prior training
exercises were to successful
response to Haiyan. Strong
relationships between the
DART team lead and the
commanding U.S. generals
greatly enhanced a smooth
relationship between civilian
and military actors. (Lessons from
Civil-Military Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan
(Yolanda) pg. 24)
Operation Sea Angel: A Case Study Paul A. McCarthy, RAND, pg 16
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR374.pdf
There were several innovative Command and Control aspects within 3d MEB that are of note in this operation – most
significant was the conversion of 3d MEB’s Command Operations Center (COC) into a Medical Operations Center (MOC).
This clearly identified medical/health services as the main supported command function rather than a supporting
function. The command relationships established were particularly effective for a mission of this scope and contributed
greatly to the mission’s success.
In this command structure, the Brigade Surgeon (Group Surgeon, 3rd MLG) was effectively both the Director of the MOC
and Deputy Commander for Medical Operations (DCMO). As the DCMO, the Surgeon was given Direct Liaison Authority
(DIRLAUTH) with civilian agencies. He was also given the lead for medical planning and execution, as well as tasking
authority – an authority not typically given to a Special Staff Officer. (OPERATION AFTERSHOCK:
A Review of the III MEF Disaster Relief Operation in Yogyakarta, Indonesia April-May 2006, pg. 8)
section 03
16
Use of Existing SOPs
Many deployed U.S. military
personnel were unfamiliar with
longstanding command, control,
and coordination tactics,
techniques, procedures, and
processes established in the
Multinational Forces Standard
Operating Procedure (MNF SOP)
and the RP-U.S. Military
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief
Concept of Operations (2009) and
exercised in USPACOM Theater
Security Cooperation exercises with
Allies and partner nations. (Lessons
Joint Staff and USPACOM should ensure task order and execution
order for HA/DR response operation directs familiarity and
adherence to standing SOP and CONOPS for HA/DR operations.
Review and update the MNF SOP and “GRP-U.S. Military HA/DR
CONOPS” as required to ensure they are consistent with current
approved command and control, communications, and
coordination concepts for international HA/DR operations.
Consider MPAT deployment to assist USPACOM JTFs deploying to
support multinational operations.
Ensure key staff likely to deploy to international HA/ DR
operations are familiar with the MNF SOP and other key
USPACOM CONOPS prior to deployment (Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster
from Civil-Military Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan
(Yolanda) pg. 24)
Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) pg. 41)
https://community.apan.
org/mpat/p/sop.aspx
section 03
17
Hydrographic Survey
(U) In the aftermath of the South Asia tsunami new underwater hazards were created and
navigation aids were destroyed or moved. Soundings and features on charts were of
questionable reliability. Grounding of a relief vessel could risk life, damage vessels, and
create additional environmental damage and burden on host nations and US forces. A rapid
hydrographic survey capability was needed to support the safe flow of relief supplies.
(U) One US Survey Ship (USNS JOHN MCDONNELL) and two elements of Naval
Oceanographic Office Fleet Survey Team deployed to the Relief Operating Area to survey flow
of supplies. MCDONNELL deployed from SASEBO. The Fleet Survey Team was airlifted from
CONUS and embarked USS BENFOLD of the LINCOLN CSG. Rapidly deployable Survey Teams
from the Naval Oceanographic Office proved invaluable. Their mobility allowed a rapid arrival
into the Relief Operating Area. The small footprint and transportable equipment supported
the embed with the Strike Group where they could directly support the needs of the Naval
Force Commander on LINCOLN.
section 03
18