The Atkin Paper Series
It’s the education, stupid
Eyal Brindt Shavit, ICSR Atkin Fellow
June 2014
About the Atkin Paper Series
Prologue
Thanks to the generosity of the Atkin Foundation, the International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) offers young leaders from Israel
and the Arab world the opportunity to come to London for a period of four months.
The purpose of the fellowship is to provide young leaders from Israel and the Arab
world with an opportunity to develop their ideas on how to further peace and
understanding in the Middle East through research, debate and constructive dialogue
in a neutral political environment. The end result is a policy paper that will provide a
deeper understanding and a new perspective on a specific topic or event.
n the Middle East, timing is everything. This paper was written during the peace
talks of 2013 – 2014, which were declared over (once again) in April 2014. With
the region’s mood changing frequently, veering between hope and despair, public
discussion and dialogue shifts as well.
It is almost impossible – as the peace process seems to be – to write anything
about the Middle East and remain up-to-date. At the same time, nothing really
changes at all. Perhaps more than anywhere else, history and perspective are crucial
to understanding the conflict.
This paper examines conflict narratives in the Israeli and Palestinian education
systems. Though these narratives are well founded on both sides, they evolve,
symbolically, with the region’s mood. Textbooks change constantly, with new yearly
editions, ranging along scales between moderate and conservative, inciting and
hopeful, fact and fiction. In this sense
Therefore, this paper is not only about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its
narratives, rather about any conflict and its narratives – and more important, the way
narratives can play a crucial role in solving conflicts.
This paper offers an opportunity to look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – as
well as other conflicts around the world – from a different perspective, and suggest
an alternative path for dialogue.
Author
Eyal Brindt Shavit is Founder and Chairman of the EduAction Forum. Since 2006,
it had successfully created a public platform for the discussion of strategic education
issues, as well as the role of education in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As an entrepreneur,
Eyal is focused on for-profit educational ventures, with a clear agenda to make a social
change by educational entrepreneurship. Up to 2010, Eyal was the Chief Marketing
Director (CMO) for El Al. Before that, Eyal worked for over 10 years at Haaretz. Eyal is
a LLB graduate from the Herzelia Interdisciplinary Center (IDC).
The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not reflect those
of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation or the Atkin Foundation.
I
Editor
Dr Peter R. Neumann
Director, ICSR
Editor
Dr Ahron Bregman
King’s College London
Editor
Jeni Mitchell
King’s College London
Editorial Assistant
Katie Rothman
ICSR
To order hardcopies or contact the editor,
please write to [email protected]. All papers in
the Atkin Paper Series can be downloaded
free of charge at www.icsr.info
1
Introduction
T
he Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often assumed to have strong religious
foundations, and extremists from both sides use religious-based arguments for
their case. The solution, however, is being sought in the political arena, where
public discussion focuses mostly on the practical side of the conflict, also known
as the ‘core issues’: borders, settlements, recognition of Israel as the state of the
Jewish people, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, etc.
Everyone agrees that at this point in time (2014), the conflict is nourished by
deep distrust and mutual hatred between two peoples, after decades of hate-based
education on each side.
In this paper, I examine the role of education as a tool to help solve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. It is based on the assumption that whatever the political solution
will be (if, indeed, there is one), real peace and co-existence cannot be sustained
by political agreements alone, but require a change in mutual perspectives. In other
words, as long as both sides are nourished by different narratives – and this paper
will show there are many more than two – and basically learn to hate each other,
there will be fuel to keep the conflict going. There is a dominant perception that the solution to the conflict will only be found
by looking forward. This paper will very much undermine this paradigm by suggesting
the creation of a joint narrative of the mutual history of the conflict. The joint narrative
should be objective and neutralised, agreed by both sides, to teach the (mutual)
history of the region from the early 20th century up to the present day.
Some will claim that this approach is even more impossible than reaching an
agreement on current political issues. Nevertheless, I argue that – as difficult as it
may sound – the joint history of both sides, most certainly after the Second World
War and the Holocaust, is the basis for any future co-existence between Israelis
and Palestinians.
This paper aims to lay the foundations for a potential first step of action toward
co-existence and reconciliation through education, by creating a joint history
textbook, with one agreed narrative.
This initiative has a clear goal: to provide a new angle for public discussion
on the conflict and to offer a path for reconciliation through a mutual past, rather
than the concessions of the future. By adopting a joint narrative, people from both
sides can try to see the conflict in as neutral a way as possible and ‘walk in each
other’s shoes’.
Moreover, the paper will show the importance of education in sustaining
peaceful conflict resolutions by examining lessons from Northern Ireland, where
– fifteen years after the Good Friday agreement – both communities are still
segregated, with segregated education systems, and co-existence remains
a challenge.
2
3
As Robert A. Heinlein wrote, ‘A generation which ignores history has no
past — and no future’. Or in the words of George Orwell: ‘He who controls the past
controls the future. He who controls the present controls the past’. In this spirit, I
believe – the conflict can only really be resolved through the creation and educational
implementation of a joint history and civil narrative. This will not be a quick or easy
process, but it all has to start somewhere, and perhaps the first grade of school is as
good a place as any.
What is a Narrative?
T
he Oxford English Dictionary definition of narrative – ‘a spoken or written
account of connected events; a story’ – is insufficient for capturing the true
meaning and implications of the word in the context of the Middle East. Much
more than anything else, narratives are the fuel for most conflicts. As such, they are
one of the only real barriers to solving them – but at the same time, narratives can
also be the solution.
With all due respect to the renowned British dictionary, the answer to the
massive, unpredictable and mostly catastrophic effects of narratives lies within the
definition itself, and its inner contradiction. What begins as a ‘spoken or written
account of connected events’ – i.e., based on facts – ends as ‘a story’, – i.e, a free
and creative interpretation of events.
The oxymoron within this definition works like a nuclear reaction: the neutron
collides with the proton and the result is a massive explosion. History shows that
when a ‘written account of connected events’ collides with the ‘story of the events’,
no-less catastrophic reactions occur.
And yet, narratives are what make societies. Owen Flanagan of Duke Unive
rsity wrote that ‘evidence strongly suggests that humans in all cultures come to cast
their own identity in some sort of narrative form. We are inveterate storytellers’.1
But at the same time, narratives fuel conflicts between societies. Charles L. Brigges
of Berkeley, in his introduction to Disorderly Discourse: Narratives, Conflicts and
Inequality, said:
Gossip narratives play a prominent role in everyday talk among adults in shaping
everyday understandings of social conflict. In recounting wars of ‘independence’,
foundational narratives of modern nation-states impose perceptions of the past,
notions of community, and identities and modes of conduct. In short, narratives
constitute crucial means of generating, sustaining, mediating and representing
conflict at all levels of social organization.2
For that reason and more, narratives should not be hidden under false
arguments or political agendas. Narratives should be ‘outed’, so people and nations
can realise that most long-lasting conflicts are based on stories, not real interests.
1
2
4
Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered, 1993, page 198
Charles L Briggs, ed., Disorderly Discourse: Narratives, Conflicts and Inequality, Oxford Studies in
Anthropological Linguistics, 1996, Page 3
5
Oceans of Narratives
N
arratives are not only the journey between the facts and the story, but also
a reflection of the storyteller – and everyone has a story. When we speak
about narratives, we have to consider that every group has not just one, but
numerous narratives.
The current, modern Israeli-Palestinian narrative has split into numerous subnarratives, depending on heritage, faith, political agenda, etc. For example, the
Israeli-Jewish narrative varies between Orthodox and secular Jews: while the secular
narrative is based on Zionism and post-Holocaust implications, the Orthodox one is
still founded on a religious commandment for the holy land.
There is also a substantial difference in narratives between Jews who
immigrated from Arab countries and Jews with European origins; Jewish people who
live in Israel and the Jewish diaspora; Israelis who live in Tel Aviv and settlers in the
West Bank, etc.
We also have to look at the multiple layers of narration. There is the political
narrative and the academic narrative. There is the educational narrative taught in
schools, and the cultural narrative spoken over the family dinner table.
There is also a difference between the written narrative and the spoken one.
Children can use the same textbooks, but will be taught differently by their teachers.
Narratives are captives of perception.
In the Israeli education system itself, there is not one agreed narrative. There are
actually four different education systems in Israel, which all teach different narratives:
(a) State (mainstream secular); (b) State-Religious (religious Zionist); (c) Orthodox
Jewish; (d) Arab (Israeli-Arab citizens). All teach from different textbooks and
promulgate different narratives.
The Palestinian side is no different. The education system is divided into at least
three: (a) the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank; (b) the Hamas education
system in the Gaza Strip; (c) the international system operated by UNRWA and other
international organisations.
Narrative is a crucial element in defining society. Thus, these splits in narrative
might be a sign of the (lack of) strength of these societies.
Within these multiple narratives, I will focus here on the educational
narratives, as they are relatively established and under the control of the state/
regime. I argue that, in fact, education is the best system for shaping narratives
and thus driving social change – including the creation of co-existence and peace
between two people.
6
7
The Weapon of Education
T
he discussion about the role of education in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
while not dominant, is not new either. The Oslo accords, back in 1993,
referenced education as a tool for co-existence, albeit with no specific call for
actions. Indeed, in the two years that followed the agreement, Israeli and Palestinian
schoolchildren met for joint activities, mostly in neighbouring cities like Hadera (Israel)
and Qalqilya (PA). These ventures did not last long, as the peace process collapsed
shortly after.
Ever since, as peace talks ritually exploded and each side looked for a means of
blaming the other side, textbooks have been pulled off the shelves again – not as a
measure of enlightenment (as textbooks are meant to be) but as a weapon, as proof
of the other’s incitement and resistance to peace.
Textbooks have become inflammatory, mostly used by Israeli right-wing
activists to demonstrate Palestinian incitement against Israel. Numerous papers have
been written on the use of Palestinian textbooks to incite. This is not the purpose of
this paper.
It should be said that some Palestinian textbooks do encourage resistance – in
some cases non-violent resistance – not only to Israeli occupation in the West Bank
and Gaza but to the State of Israel in its 1967 borders. This constitutes incitement in
the eyes of most Israelis and the Western countries that recognise Israel in its 1967
borders. For example:
The Ribat for Allah is one of the actions related to Jihad for Allah, it means:
Being found in areas where there is a struggle between Muslims and their enemies...
the endurance of Palestine’s people on their land … is one of the greatest of the
Ribat and they are worthy of a great reward from Allah. [Islamic Education, Grade 12,
pp. 86-87]3
However, incitement is only one aspect of the textbooks. While most public
discussions feature textbooks as a weapon (and counter-weapon), textbooks are
rarely looked at as a means of solving the conflict.
Here, I will look at the textbooks and their narratives as an example of the real
gap between the Israelis and Palestinians. I will then suggest a bridge between those
narratives as a way of creating an environment for co-existence.
For the sake of this paper, I will only focus on the narrative gaps for the
1948 war and the Palestinian refugees, which are in many ways the core of the
conflict. ‘The 1948 Arab-Israeli war was one of the most important events in the
contemporary Middle East’, writes Saleh Abdel Jawad, in The Arab and Palestinian
Narratives of the 1948 War:
3
8
Itamar Marcus, Director, and Barbara Crook, Associate Director, Palestinian Media Watch,
February 2007
9
Its consequences and impact go beyond the geographical limit of the area and
the historical time in which it occurred. Because of the issues left unresolved by
the 1948 war and its aftermath – on the Palestinian side, the refugee problem in all
its dimensions and the unmaking of a Palestinian state; on the Israeli side, control
over the whole of Mandatory Palestine and hegemony over the region – the 1948
war soon became the ‘mother’ of the many wars that followed. As a corollary to this
unresolved struggle, the historiography of the war also became a battlefield for two
opposing narratives.4
The Israeli Narrative
W
hen it comes to the Middle East, especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
the narrative is narrowed to one, very complicated issue: the right to the
land. Where does a people’s right to live in this land, in self-determination,
come from? The answer to that question unfolds the answers to all the issues
allegedly at the core of the conflict: borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees,
natural resources, etc. If you have the right to the land, then you have it all.
The Jewish-Israeli narrative can be divided into three phases: (a) the religious
phase, which goes back 3000 years, as written in the Bible and spoken in religious
rituals and practices; (b) the Zionist phase, which lasted from the late 19th century
until the end of the Second World War; (c) the modern Israeli-Jewish (switch
intended) phase, post-Holocaust and within the State of Israel.
As a whole, the current Israeli common narrative ranges between religious,
historical and security arguments. It sprawls from the sea to the river, on the whole
land of historic ‘Palestine’.
Israeli historical narratives in school textbooks are much less researched than
their Palestinian counterparts, mainly, I assume, because of their allegedly less violent
and inciting content. Though the Israeli textbooks do not actively encourage fighting
the Palestinians (contrary to what you might find in Palestinian textbooks), the Israeli
narrative is rooted deeply in militant stories of ‘freeing the holy land’.
The Israeli educational narrative of the conflict and the way the conflict is taught
in schools has changed extensively over the years. In general, the textbooks are
much more moderate and open to the other side’s point of view (much more than
Israeli discourse would recognise). However, the basis of the narrative has stayed
the same: the return of the Jewish people to the holy land, and fighting over the land
against the hostile Arabs.
The History of the History Textbooks
One of the only extensive researches made on the Israeli side is Elie Podeh’s The
Arab-Israeli Conflict in Israeli History Textbooks, 1948 – 2000. According to Podeh,
the Israeli narrative of the 1948 war, called by the Israelis ‘the Independence War’ or
‘the War of Liberation’, is based on: (a) military achievements; (b) the battle of the
few against the many. ‘The Israeli War of Independence has a special place in Zionist
mythology’, says Podeh:
4
Saleh Abdel Jawad, The Arab and Palestinian Narratives of the 1948 War, Israel and Palestinian
Narratives of Conflict, History Double Helix, Edited by Robert I. Rotberg, Indiana University Press;
Annotated edition (September 7, 2006), Page 4
10
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that it was the single most important topic in
both the first and second generations of history textbooks on Zionism and Israel.
The war was described exclusively from the Jewish point of view; the fact that
the Palestinians and other Arabs regard it as ‘the catastrophe’ (al-Nakba) or
holocaust (al-Karitha) was not mentioned. The textbooks described the military
11
a State in the Middle East, a section
on ‘The Palestinian Nakba (Disaster)’
describes the flight of at least
700,000 Palestinians and explains:
campaigns in great detail, documenting Israel’s achievements during the war
and their significance; at the same time, the consequences of the war for the
Palestinians and Arab states was only briefly discussed, if at all. A noticeable
change, however, is discerned in the narrative of third-generation textbooks;
these are mainly reflected in the treatment of two major problematic issues: the
question of the few (Jews) against the many (Arabs) and the question of the
Palestinian refugees.5
In Ahron Bregman’s book, Israel’s Wars, he shows that the many were the Jews and
the few were the Arabs, according to David Ben Gurion’s diaries:
Contrary to popular belief, the 1948 war between Israeli forces and the invading
regular Arab armies was not one between ‘the few’ [Israelis] and ‘the many’
[Arabs], or, as it is often put, a clash between David (Israel) and Goliath (the
Arabs). The root of this popular, though utterly erroneous, notion lay in the Israeli
practice of referring to the potential number of Arabs rather than to the actual
number of troops they put into the field.6
On the issue of refugees, some Israeli textbooks represent the narrative upheld by
all Israeli governments, ‘that Israel had no part in creating the problem. According to
this narrative’, writes Podeh, ‘the Arabs of Eretz Israel (land of Israel) had simply fled
the country (for various reasons that are discussed later) despite Israeli attempts to
persuade them to stay’.7
Changes in Israeli Textbooks
Israeli textbooks have come a long way in the past ten years, and now present a
much more balanced picture of the history from 1948 onwards. There are roughly five
different textbooks that are approved for use in Israeli high schools. The schools, or
teachers, can choose which book to teach from.
This paper is not focused on textbook research, and thus does not present
a complete picture of Israeli and Palestinian textbooks. Textbooks are constantly
evolving, and are reprinted with new editions every year. However, this paper does
offer a glance at the basis of the narratives that they are telling.
The 1948 war is called, in all Israeli history textbooks, ‘the Independence War’
or ‘the Liberation War’. The war is described as a result of the Arab rejection of the
United Nations (UN) Resolution 181 that called for the partition of Palestine into two
states, and as a defence against Arab attacks.
Some books authorised by the Israeli Ministry of Education would probably
surprise a lot of readers, and without a doubt show a very liberal and progressive
voice that is not seen on the Palestinian side. In the book Israel Nationality: Building
5
6
7
Elie Podeh, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Israeli History Textbooks, 1948-2000, Bergin & Grevey, 2002,
Page 103
Ahron Bregman, Israel’s Wars, Routledge, 2000, Page 23.
Podeh, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 105
12
Israel Nationality: Building a State in the Middle East
The flight of Arab-Israelis during the
independence war was one of the
most important and crucial outcomes
of the war, since it began. The
estimated count over 700,000
people who ran or were deported,
and became refugees in Arab
countries (The Palestinians estimate
higher number).
From the Israeli point of view, this eased the deployment of the Jewish regime
and solved issues like security, lands and housing. The Palestinians, however,
lost their homes and land, and the opportunity to create a Palestinian state,
according to the UN Resolution. Around 150,000 Palestinians were left in Israel
after the war.8
The issue of Palestinian refugees is dealt with extensively in all textbooks. All books
mention that there were numerous reasons for the Palestinian refugees, such as
fear, propaganda, and the Arab policy of avoiding casualties. However, most of them
acknowledge the deportation of Palestinians from the new State of Israel as one
reason among others. For example:
It seems that the flight of the Palestinian refugees is a result of numerous
and simultaneous processes. The Palestinian population was economically and
organisationally weaker. The early departure of their urban elite and upper-class
people hurt morale and many followed them. Many Palestinians did as Middle East
practice suggested: leave conflict zones and come back after the fighting is over.
This presumption led to the fleeing of many Palestinians, under the assumption they
would be able to come back. The Palestinian leadership and Arab countries led the
Palestinians to a war they were not ready for, with the propaganda of destroying
the Jewish settlements and the State of Israel. In the two phases of the war the
Palestinian villages were the base of attacks and their inhabitants participated in
killing and plundering Jewish settlements. As a result, the Jewish armed forces –
then the IDF – saw all Palestinians as an enemy. This was also clear in the orders
of ‘Plan D’, which allowed field commanders to evacuate and destroy hostile Arab
villages. The evacuation of Arabs out of mixed cities (such as Tiberius) led the
Jews to a feeling it was the right chance to change the demographics of the land.
8
Eyal Nave, Neomy Vered and David Shahar, Israel Nationality: Building a State in the Middle East.
Translation by author.
13
Therefore, they encouraged the flight
of the Palestinians with propaganda
and psychological war, and in some
cases, such as in Ramla and Lod,
Palestinians were deported. During
the war and after, the IDF prevented
refugees from returning to
their homes.9
If narratives, like most stories,
are complex, and derive from a
delicate balance of facts, then it is
not surprising that the Israeli narrative
puts its emphasis on the fighting and
the Arab rejection of UN Resolution
181. On the other hand, the
recognition of the ‘Nakba’ narrative
and the fact of deportation offers a
bridge to a joint narrative.
Building a State in the Middle East
The Palestinian Narrative
T
he Palestinian historical narrative is harder to determine. For more than a
thousand years, ‘Palestine’ was used as the geographical name for the
land which now contains both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Formal
documentation for the ‘land of Palestine’ was found as early of the Roman Empire
and then much later during the British Mandate. However, the citizens of the land
were considered, by themselves and by others, as Arabs or Jews (who were
the minority).
Use of the term ‘Palestinians’ to differentiate the Arabs who lived in the land
of Palestine as a separate ethnic group, a people, began only after 1948. During
the British Mandate over Palestine, the word Palestinians was used to describe all
inhabitants of the land: Arabs, Christians and Jews.
In his book Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National
Consciousness, Rashid Khalidi claims that the definition of the Palestinians as a
people was an ongoing process that started after the First World War: ‘While studies
of Palestinian nationalism have concentrated on its evolution in recent decades,
in fact most elements of Palestinian identity – particularly the enduring parochial,
local ones – were well developed before the climactic events of 1948, although they
continued to overlap and change both before and after that date’.10
Nevertheless, regardless of one’s view of Palestinian self-definition as a
separate people from the Arab nations, no one disputes that the current dominant
Palestinian narrative is based mostly on the consequences of the 1948 war: the
Palestinian refugees (including the drivers and consequences of their flight) and the
establishment of the State of Israel as a Jewish state on parts of the land formerly
known as Palestine. As Khalidi indicates:
Instead of causing their absorption into these countries, the trauma of 1948
reinforced preexisting elements of identity, sustaining and strengthening a
Palestinian self-definition that was already present. The shared events of
1948 thus brought the Palestinians closer together in terms of their collective
consciousness, even as they were physically dispersed all over the Middle East
and beyond. The catastrophic experience of 1948, and its impact on different
segments of the Palestinian people, is still a common topic of discussion among
Palestinians of diverse backgrounds and generations, and ultimately a potent
source of shared beliefs and values.11
10
9
Eliezer Domka, Hana Orbach, Zafrir Goldbreg, Building a State in the Middle East, p. 108.
Translation by author.
14
Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997)
11Ibid.
15
Khalidi notes that the Palestinian narrative has changed in recent decades,
especially after the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.
He also identifies Jerusalem as core to Palestinian heritage and differentiation from
the idea of an Arab nation: ‘It is certainly not a coincidence that virtually all narratives
about Palestine – religious and secular, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim, Palestinian
and Israeli – revolve around the city of Jerusalem’.12 The place of Jerusalem in the
competing narratives and as a core issue of the conflict could be the subject of a
3000-year-long research. On the other hand, it is one of many meeting points in the
narratives of both sides, as discussed later on.
When looking at the Palestinian history books, the terminology is unstable.
The use of ‘Jews’ and ‘Zionists’ is variable and mostly determined by good or bad
connotations: Jews are ok, Zionists are not. The differentiation and incoherence in
the use of these two concepts allows the Palestinian narrative to escape allegations
of anti-Semitism.
The 1948 war is referenced in Palestinian textbooks by the word ‘Nakba’ or by
the year ‘1948’. It is described as a war of Arab solidarity against the new state of
Israel, and the alleged violations of ceasefire agreements by the Jewish side are
a focus.
Overall, the Palestinian narrative of 1948 is one of a victim. It hardly discusses at all
the Jewish background and heritage that led to the declaration of the Jewish state
in 1948. However, it does reflect on the idea, albeit as an understatement, that Arab
decisions and actions were one of the causes of the war and its aftermath.
The military hostilities between Palestinians and the Zionist forces escalated
following the end of the British Mandate over Palestine, and the Jews’ declaration
of the establishment of their state on May 15, 1948. Faced with this situation,
the Arab governments decided to send their troops to Palestine to support the
Palestinian people in defending their land, and to prevent the creation of a Jewish
state there.13
The refugees and the aftermath of the war carry significant weight in the Palestinian
narrative. Israel is the sole actor to blame and the cause of the refugees’ flight.
The Zionist forces used different methods to evacuate the Palestinian territories
of their original population. One of these methods was the psychological war on
the radio of the Haganah, which was sending rumours, in addition to the killings
committed against residents of some towns and villages, such as what happened
in Deir Yassin, Tantura, Lod, and others. This led to the dispersion of about a
million Palestinians to areas inside and outside Palestine, including the Gaza Strip
and West Bank, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and to other different areas
of the world.14
12Ibid.
13 Ministry of Education, State of Palestine, The Modern and Contemporary History of Palestine (Part II),
First-grade Secondary (Humanities) (2006, 1st ed.) Translation unknown, p. 33.
14 Ibid., 38.
16
17
The Joint Narrative
T
his paper’s argument relies on three assumptions: first, that narratives are the
basis for most conflicts, and especially with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict; second, that the education system (alongside the media) is the most
influential system for defining and changing narratives; and third, that bridging the
gap between the Israeli and Palestinian narratives is the only real way to solve the
conflict and create an environment of co-existence.
Therefore, the basic document that both sides should draft while approaching
a solution to the conflict is a joint-narrative history book, which would lay the
foundations for accepting each other and living together in real peace.
The 1948 war and its aftermath, being the core narrative of the conflict, is also
a great example of the possibility of bridging the gap between the narratives, starting
with its title: not ‘the War of Independence’ nor the ‘Nakba’ but the ‘1948 War’. This
is a neutralised name which is commonly used to describe the war.
The name, obviously, is not the end of it. The joint narrative should reflect the
point of view of both sides, whether it is the establishment of the Israeli state or
the disaster of the Palestinian inhabitants. The 1948 war was both, and there is
no contradiction in between. Furthermore, by teaching an inclusive narrative that
contains both perspectives of the war, both sides would be recognising each other’s
history and narrative while building a bridge towards a mutual narrative allowing for
co-existence.
Terminology is a crucial element: the use of words in the right context (such as
Jews, Arabs, Palestinians, Zionists) can make a big difference. For example, referring
to all Palestinians pre-1948 as Arabs undermines the legitimacy of Palestinian self
determination. It was the former and first female Israeli prime minister, Golda Meir,
who used to dismiss the Palestinian claims by saying she was also Palestinian, as
she was born in ‘Palestine’ as it was defined during the British Mandate. The same
can be said for the incoherent use of ‘Jews’ and ‘Zionists’ to differentiate the Jewish
religious heritage from the land of Israel/Palestine.
The joint narrative should place all terms in their correct contexts. It should
teach both the causes and the results of the war, and the mutual historical rights to
the land.
The current textbooks on both sides, as reflected above, should bring a lot of
optimism to this task. In general, the 1948 war narratives are not that far apart from
each other, and in my opinion can be bridged quite easily.
The drafting of a mutual history textbook could send a strong and important
message: the narratives are two sides of the same story, and the story has only
one ending.
18
19
Until we can achieve the neutralisation of the narratives into one joint narrative,
both sides can do much more in the field of education, such as teaching both
narratives, for example. This obviously has the advantage of not giving up one’s
own narrative, while accepting the narrative of the other. However, when history
is being taught at a young age, not all students can handle the complications of
accommodating two, sometimes conflicting narratives.
20
A Look at Northern Ireland
T
here is a lot to be said on the similarities between the Northern Ireland and
Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. For example, one common perception is that in
both cases, religion serves as a screen for inter-group conflict – that there
is no real religious conflict between Judaism and Islam, as there is no real religious
conflict between the Catholic and Protestant churches. The conflict, as explained
above, is between the narratives of two groups of people.
For the purposes of this paper, I invoke the comparison with the Northern
Ireland conflict purely with regard to education and how it can be a tool to solve
conflict and create an environment of co-existence. The main difference between the
two conflicts, in this context, is that Northern Ireland is post-agreement, and in the
Middle East there is still time to learn from the mistakes of others. This is what makes
the Northern Ireland example so crucial for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: if we can
see and learn from its mistakes, then when a peace agreement is signed we can
achieve true co-existence and a warm peace.
In 1998, after centuries of conflict, decades of bloody confrontation, and years
of negotiations, a peace agreement was signed in Northern Ireland. Fifteen years
later, the Good Friday Agreement is, in the eyes of many, a big success. The killing
has abated as armed groups have been deactivated and converted into political
groups. However, I would argue that the conflict still exists. This year (2014) has been
a challenging year in Belfast, where riots are again almost routine. Every parade (a
common ritual in Northern Ireland) threatens to light the fire again.
And no wonder. Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland and the heart of the
conflict, is still a segregated city, with two segregated communities separated by
walls and barriers. Gates in the Belfast ‘peace walls’ are still active, and one needs
to decide on which side of the city to stay after 23:00 (when the gates close) or else
cross over in the city centre, which is still tightly policed.
I would argue that this is the case in part due to the fact that fifteen years after
signing the peace agreement, two segregated education systems still exist: one
Catholic, one Protestant, each with its own textbooks and narrative of the conflict.
The Good Friday agreement only mentioned education eight times, and only in a
general context. The peace agreement did not make any changes to the education
system. The only relevant (general) statement says: ‘An essential aspect of the
reconciliation process is the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of
society, including initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education and
mixed housing’. This remains on paper only.
The youngsters who are leading the current Belfast riots were in primary school
when the Good Friday agreement was signed. They are the product of the Northern
Ireland education system, in both its Catholic and Protestant forms. Growing up with
two segregated communities and two different narratives, they are still learning to
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hate each other. In this environment, the renewal of bloodshed is just a question
of time.
What would be happening today if, fifteen years ago, the two education systems
had been united, creating one joint system with one joint narrative for Northern
Ireland? It is still not too late for the Middle East!
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Learn, Teach, Educate
I
n order to solve a conflict, one should know what the conflict is about. The
common perception of the conflict – at least as reflected in the public media
discussion – is that it is about control: of borders, lands, security, holy sites, etc.
Others might look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a religious one, a long battle
between two monotheistic religions. Others would say it is about domination – the
need to dominate other people.
The answer to the question, ‘What is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict about?’ is
obviously complicated and very subjective.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been going on for 66 years now, since the
1948 war. Since the Oslo accords of 1993, there have been numerous attempts at
negotiations and peace talks. All parties involved are despairing.
While the recent negotiations have been carried out away from the public eye
and under unusual discretion, the public discussion on solving the conflict is still fed
by the political propaganda produced by various groups on both sides.
Since the Oslo accords, global and local discussions about solving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict have revolved around signing a peace agreement. In the last few
years, since the second Palestinian Intifada, the co-existence part of the equation
has disappeared for the sake of ‘separation’, within the context of a one- or twostate solution.
It is popularly argued that co-existence can occur only after a (political) peace
agreement is signed. On the Palestinian side, this is still the most dominant position:
‘no normalisation while occupation’. On the Israeli side, mostly on the right side of
the political map, some try to blur the lines between co-existence and status quo.
Some argue that education does not create society, but society does create
education. No matter what comes first, and no matter what political path you follow,
it all starts and ends with education. It is that simple. Teach children the other side’s
point of view, find the bridge between the narratives, and the political solution will be
much easier.
In sum, both sides of the conflict, and the parties involved in the attempt to
resolve it, should realise that when you speak about peace in the Middle East,
education is just as important as borders and holy places, if not more.
While no one is taking education seriously in the context of solving the conflict,
the textbooks on both sides are actually much more progressive than the politicians
– including, most surprisingly, the Israeli textbooks, which deal quite openly with
the Palestinian narrative and perspective, much more than they have been given
credit for. Obviously this is not enough, but it is a small step in the right direction for
enabling co-existence.
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About ICSR
ICSR is a unique partnership of
King’s College London, Georgetown
University, the University of Pennsylvania,
the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
(Israel), and the Regional Centre for
Conflict Prevention Amman (Jordan).
Its aim is to counter the growth of
radicalisation and political violence
by bringing together knowledge and
leadership. For more information, see
www.icsr.info
www.icsr.info