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Conflict Analysis: Insight into the conflict involving ISIL (or Islamic State)
David Carr
Nathan Rickard
Dr Ameer Khan
JOAD, DSTO
April 2015
Outline
Conflict Analysis Methodology
What type of Combatant Entity is Islamic State (IS) or Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL)
– 
NOTE: US & Australia use ISIL, Arabs use Da’ish. In this presentation ISIL will be employed
Chronology based on coding of Open Source Structured & Unstructured Data
Strategic Narrative of the Major Powers involved
– 
Impact of strategic narrative on operational/tactical levels of Airpower employed
ISIL as a Combatant
– 
Has Digital Awareness altered ISIL’s Centers of Gravity (CoGs)?
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Conflict Analysis Methodology
Mixed Method Research
Using Open source data only
Quantitative data sources
Structured statistical conflict data
– 
Aircraft sorties, targets attacked
US CENTCOM, UK DoD, ADF DoD, Canadian DoD, French DGA
– 
Statistical conflict data sites
SIPRI, UCDP Dataset, UN Reports, etc
Qualitative data sources
Unstructured data text or narratives
– 
Daily news reports
BBC, Reuters, AP, Times, etc., journalists in situ & eyewitnesses
– 
Daily/Weekly Defence News
Defence Daily, Defence News, JDW, AWS&T, etc
– 
Overseas internet resources
Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, etc
– 
University/Institute recent papers
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, etc
– 
Government New Releases
Regular updates released by major players on progress
Strategic Narrative assessment
Qualitative insight & its impact on the use of Airpower
Case Study Inductive approach
Grounded Theory Construct
ISIL has a Caliphate Structure, Organisation & Resources
Caliphate currently occupies territory in Syria & Iraq and has a defined structure
–  Capital in Raqqa in Syria
–  Political Wing with a Cabinet of Ministers & regional provisional Governors to rule captured areas
–  Military Wing with Commander-in-Chief, Haji Bakr
–  Intelligence Wing
–  Ideological Wing comprising Shura of Religious Scholars & a Media Council
Soft power governance in provinces providing
–  Water, electricity, public services, road repairs & social services
Resources (ISIL is now minting its own currency)
–  Donations
–  Tax required under occupation eg US$800 road tax on trucks
–  Cash from captured areas – eg $500m from Mosul
–  Sale of antiquities
–  Cash from resources – oil wells
–  Extortion – kidnapping for ransom
Source: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/
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What type of Combatant Entity is ISIL
ISIL has outlined Core and Non Core Areas of Interest
–  Core
Syria and Iraq (may include Lebanon, Israel and Jordan)
–  Non Core
Edge of the Muslim world in Africa, Middle East, West and East Asia
Entity is nearest to a Transnational Insurgency as it seeks to control cross border territory
–  Not a terrorist organisation even though they employ terrorist methods
–  Entity has a composition capable of controlling territory and raising revenue
–  Entity disregards the UN, the nation state system & international law
–  Seeks to annul Sykes-Picot 1916 border agreement that set up Syria, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon &
Palestine (near enemies)
ISIL is part of the increase in Trans National Entities
Intra-state
Armed Competition
for control
Counter Insurgency:
OIF & OEF
Public demonstration
low casualty model:
Tunisia, Egypt, Ukraine
Increasing
Armed Force
conventional
structure
Inter-state
Nation-state
Warfare
Hezbollah: attacks on Israel
from Lebanon, sponsored
by Iran/Syria
Decreasing
Boyd: conflict
between complex
adaptive systems
Colbert: limited warfare
Warden: nation state onion ring
Kilcullen: Intrastate competitive
group model
Increasing
Clausewitz: CoG model
Mahan: decisive engagement
Al Queda Franchise:
AQIM, AQI, AQIR, AQIL,etc
Increasing
LeT: terrorism from a
nation state haven
Trans
National
Entities
Islamic State (IS):
Trans insurgency to reestablish Caliphate
covering UN recognised
states that include Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan
and Israel
Terrorism
Criminal
Activity
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Chronology highlights
Chronology to the Creation of Islamic State
2003-6
Al Queda in Iraq (AQI) with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi till 2006 when he is killed by an allied air strike
2010
Significant attrition of AQI leaders with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi taking over AQI
2011/2
AQI seeks former top Iraqi Sunnis, strategy to alter Coalition gains through terror & releasing captives
2012
AQI shifts operations to Syria and establishes itself in Eastern Syria
2013
April merge with Al-Nursa in Syria to create Islamic State in Iraq & Syria (ISIS) or Levant (ISIL)
Breaks with Al-Nursa and Al Queda
Dec offensive in Sunni Anbar Province in Iraq around Ramadi & Falluja & probing the Iraqi Army
2014
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi renames ISIL as Islamic State (IS) & declares a caliphate
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Jun 2014, ISIL Offensive in Northern Iraq
9-10th June Capture of Mosul
–  Four columns comprising technical & armored vehicles with up to 1300 ISIL fighters
–  Support from local Sunni groups & planning/execution aided by ex-Iraqi Army personnel
–  Multi-axis swarming into the centre of Mosul destroying checkpoints with suicide bombers
–  Iraqi 2nd division & 3rd Police Division disintegrated, bank (~$US450m), military & govt assets seized
–  Release of 2400 Sunni prisoners, 1000 civilians killed & 1700 Iraqi prisoners executed (UN est. of 670)
ISIL success at Tikrit, Tal Afar & Al Qaim & battle for resources
–  11th June capture of Tikrit with a major army facility seized
–  15th June capture of Tal Afar
–  22nd June capture of border crossing at Al Qaim
–  Onslaught results in Iraqi 3rd and 4th divisions disintegrating & ethnic cleansing
–  ISIL seeks resource control focusing on the Baiji Oil Refinery (1/3 of Iraqi capacity) and control of Iraqi
water with the capture of Falluja Dam, Mosul Dam & advancing forces towards Haditha Dam
Source: http://www.news.com.au/national/isis-rewrites-the-rules-of-war-as-iraq-concerns-us-allies/story-fncynjr2-1227050293527, JDW 18 June, 2014, p5.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus137_Knights4.pdf, page 7-8.
http://www.news.com.au/national/isis-rewrites-the-rules-of-war-as-iraq-concerns-us-allies/story-fncynjr2-1227050293527, JDW 18 June, 2014, p5
July-Aug 2014, ISIL secures East Syria & Northern Iraq
July
–  3rd, ISIS captured Syria's largest oilfield al-Omar oilfield
–  17th, Syria's Shaer gas field in the Homs Governorate was seized
by the Islamic State
August
–  2nd, ISIS and its al-Nusra Front allies invade Lebanon in and
around the town of Arsal
–  28th Fall of Tabqa Air Base in Ar-Raqqah province (first use of
small UAVs for pre-mission ISR)
Surprise offensive against minorities/Kurds in Northern Iraq
–  Capture of Sinjar sends 50000 Yazadis fleeing
–  Many seek shelter in the mountains, up to 1000 dying
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights noted IS added 6,300
men in July, 80% of them Syrian
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Nth Iraqi offensive triggers US Operation Inherent Resolve
Aug 2014, US response to IS escalates
US Strategy – stop minority persecution, protect infra-structure & US personnel
–  Supporting, advising, assisting, helping Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces blunt the momentum
US F-15E/ F-16 at Qatar, F/A-18 on USS Bush, AV-8B on USS Bataan & MRTT support
–  ISR operations from June: Rivet Joint, Compass Call, U-2, Predator B, Global Hawk, etc
–  Allies contribute early forces: UK Rivet Joint and Australian transport aircraft (C-17 & C130)
US layered Command & Control (C2) with CAOC at Al Udeid co-ord. of air assets
–  Baghdad (JOC) with Ground Liaison teams at Brigade/divisional level of Iraqi Army
–  Irbil (Nth point) with US JTACs receiving Remotely Operated Video (ROVER) feeds from Predator B
Airstrikes
–  8th Aug first airstrike near Irbil, follow on airstrikes near Sinjar
–  Mosul dam recaptured with aid of 90 airstrikes, Haditha dam protected
Humanitarian drops around Sinjar & Amerli
–  Amerli protected from ISIL attacks, RAAF C-130 airdrop fired upon
Source: Dempsey considers US role in ISF ground operations, JDW, 24 Sept 2014, p6. http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20140910/NEWS08/309100057/ US CENTCOM Media
Releases, 8 & 9th August, 2014, DoD News, 8th Aug, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29098791, Google Maps
http://www.news.com.au/national/isis-rebels-shoot-at-raaf-c130-hercules-with-australians-on-board/story-fncynjr2-1227044300309
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11 Sept 2014, US to expand response
US outlines expanded approach to combating ISIL
–  Build broad coalition of partners, degrade ISIL ability to operate, cut off funding then destroy it
–  Support the Iraq Government & arm and train moderate Syrian Opposition groups
–  Target & kill ISIL leadership (Small hard core low visibility group)
–  New expansion to include interdiction, ISIL logistics/supply centres & air strikes in Iraq & Syria
–  Disrupt ISIL C2 & stop ISIL from concentrating for offensive operations
–  Armed ISR aircraft to be deployed to Irbil in Northern Iraq (manned by 125 personnel)
–  Ground Force increased by 475 to a total of 1600 in Iraq
15th Sept meeting with 30 countries including all key Middle Eastern States
–  Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, UAE and Qatar agree to join the air strikes on Syria
–  ISIL gains time to evacuate C2 in Mosul & Raqqa, disperses vehicles & seek alternative houses
Source:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-authorized-to-target-individual-islamic-state-leaders-officials-say/2014/09/11/fcf81e1c-39dd-11e4-9c9f-ebb47272e40e_story.html?
tid=pm_world_pop. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11112171/Isil-fighters-disperse-within-Syrian-and-Iraqi-cities-to-evade-US-air-attacks.html
24 Sept, US & Coalition Air Strikes in Syria
Expansion of Air Operations into Syria against ISIL high value targets
–  Air Strikes by USAF, USN, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, Bahrain & Qatar with US ISR from July
–  The Americans had informed the Syrian representative at the UN of pending strikes on 23rd Sept
–  US provided EW and SEAD support to the Syrian packages (unsure of Syrian IADS reaction)
–  Strikes in early hours of the morning to achieve tactical surprise, no operational surprise
–  US intelligence estimates two thirds of the estimated 31,000-strong IS fighting force in Syria
–  Focus on ISIL Command & Control (C2), infrastructure, logistics & resources
Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11114961/US-military-launches-air-strikes-against-Isil-in-Syria.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/11115890/US-launch-air-strikes-on-Isil-as-Kurds-flee-Syria-in-pictures.html, JDW, 1 Oct 2014, p4-5.
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23 Sept 2014, 3 Phase Coalition Air Strike, 200+ PGM & 47 TLAM
Phase 1 after midnight
–  USN launch 40+ TLAM at the Khorasan Group in Western Syria
–  TLAM in airburst mode destroys ISIL finance building comms gear in Raqqa
Phase 2 at 4am
–  Airstrike area
Raqqa, capital of ISIL
–  USAF
F-22/B-1/F-15E/F-16/Predator
–  Coalition aircraft
4 Saudi F-15, 4 UAE F-16 Bk60 & 4 Jordanian F-16
–  Targets
IS HQ, trg areas, logistics, weapon dumps & checkpoints
–  Utilities
Electricity hit
Phase 3 at 7am
–  USAF
F-16 against Syrian border area
–  USN/USMC
F/A-18s & AV-8B
–  Target focus
Eastern Syria in Deir Ezzor & al Hasakah provinces
–  Key targets
Tabqa Airbase & Brigade 93 military base captured by ISIL last month
Source: http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2024621065_syriaarmsxml.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/11115890/US-launch-air-strikes-on-Isil-as-Kurds-flee-Syria-in-pictures.html
Weapons numbers from CENTCOM Briefing 24 Sept, 2014Rude Awakening for Raqqa as jihadis caught sleeping, C. Philp & D. Haynes, The Times in the Australian p9, 25 Sept 2014, AV-8B EPA
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/11115890/US-launch-air-strikes-on-Isil-as-Kurds-flee-Syria-in-pictures.html
Weapons numbers from CENTCOM Briefing 24 Sept, 2014
Follow up air strikes target ISIL resources
Focus shifts to resource & corridor targets by US, Saudi Arabia & UAE
–  ISIL controlled 11 oilfields in Syria and Iraq, including Omar, Syria’s largest & Ajeel/Himrin fields in Iraq
–  ISIL producing 25-40,000 barrels of oil per day worth up to $US3m
US & coalition air strikes against ISIL oil assets
–  Engaged 4 oil installations and 3 oilfields around Mayadeen in Deir Ezzor in Syria
Other strikes to sever supply & transportation corridors on 24th Sept
–  ISIL vehicles engaged northwest of the border town of Al-Qaim in Syria
–  Attacks near Kobani, a border town with Turkey where Syrian Kurds and IS forces had clashed
US & coalition air strikes continue at reduced level
–  25 Sept, 16 Arab a/c drop 23 & 6 US a/c drop 18 weapons
Source: Coalition hits oil refineries, AFP-AP, published in the Australian, p9, 26th Sept 2014
http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/arab-allies-take-lead-in-syria-airstrikes-f-22s-fade-from-view
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Sept 2014, ISIL response is to go on the offensive , Kobani, Syria
16-28th Sept
–  Early penetration cut water & electricity supply from Kobani
–  325, villages captured & 180,000 Kurds flee to Turkey
–  ISIL attacks, Kurdish YPG defend & US airstrikes from 25th Sept
1st -
15th Oct
–  4th Oct major ISIL penetration into centre of Kobani
–  1-12th Oct 39 air strikes including AI near Raqa & Deir Ezzor
–  14th Oct Kurds remove ISIL flag on the western Tal Shair hill
–  14-15th Oct US launch 21 air strikes
18th Oct till end of year, ISIL slowly pushed back
–  YPG hold Western advance, Turkish crossing & Tall Shair Hill
–  Co-ordination between YPG & US air power includes air drops
–  Turkey announces re-enforcements for YPG
–  ISIL extensive use of suicide bombers to close Turkish Border
Source: Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 5 Oct, 2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29688108,
Google, deSyracuse http://www.smh.com.au/world/kurds-reclaim-hill-from-islamic-state-tear-down-flag-20141015-11663h.html
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123409
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2793880/the-great-kobane-fightback-symbolic-recapture-hill-black-flag-isis-kurdishfighters-swathes-city-step-airstrikes.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/11171939/Inside-Kobane-We-are-winning.-The-town-will-be-acemetery-for-Isil.html
Sept-Dec, 2014, ISIL offensive in NE Iraq & Siege Baiji
Sept/Dec ISIL advantage over Kurdish Peshmerga even with US/UK airstrike support
–  ISIL continue to attack towards the Kirkuk oil fields
–  Peshmerga using earthworks to nullify ISIL firepower advantage (ZSUs)
–  Plenty of manpower but Peshmerga lack mortars & machine guns
–  Kurds using mobile phones as they lack radios
–  Coalition aircraft in the air above but little CAS
–  Intelligence passed on ISIL vehicles not actioned
–  ISIL local commanders replaced with foreigners
Sept-Dec Baiji oil refinery (Iraq’s largest refinery) siege continued by ISIL
Source: Armed with little training and aged guns, Peshmerga troops dig in, Tom Coghlan, The Times, reprinted in Australian, Oct 17, p10.
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Nov 2014, ISIL switch tactics in Anbar Province to threaten Baghdad
ISIL operations continue without Anbar Tribe support near Ramadi, 130km from Baghdad
–  Weeks of assassinations aimed at prominent members of the Anbar tribes
–  ISIL undercutting co-op with Iraqi forces through terror tactics against tribes
–  25 members of Albu Fahd tribe executed
–  Early Nov massacre of 300 members of Albu Nimr tribe in western Anbar
–  17th Nov assault by artillery, car bombs and boats
–  Change of tactics with no reliance on Sunni Tribes
–  Fighting continues to the south and west of Ramadi
Source: Islamic State toughens tactics in Iraq’s Anbar, targeting potential enemies, Susannah George McClatchy Foreign Staff November 24, 2014 http://
www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/11/24/247969_islamic-state-toughens-tactics.html?rh=1#storylink=cpy
http://citizen.co.za/afp_feed_article/is-jihadists-seize-parts-of-key-syrian-town/
2015 , ISIL shifts to the Defence
Jan 2015
YPG liberation of Kobani completed but the town is destroyed
Late Jan
Iraqi forces liberate the entire province of Diyala from ISIL
Jan/Feb
Kurds make advances to the North of Mosul in the Yardaz area
Feb
Iraqi forces finally secure the Baiji Oil Refinery area
Mar
New Political dynamic as Iraqi Army & Iranian backed Shia Militas advance on Tikrit
without co-ordination with Coalition Air Support
Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31723327, 3rd March 2015. A. Lloyd, Uneasy Allies Eager to claim Tikrit Trophy, Australian, 25/3/15, p9
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Mar 2015, Assault on Tikrit with Iraqi Forces & Iranian Militas
27,000 troops drawn from Iraqi Army, Special Ops forces (ISOF), Airforce & Shia Militas
–  General Qasem Soleimani, Iranian Adviser, Revolutionary Guards Quds Force (IRGC)
–  Tikrit operational commander is Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis (close associated of General Soeimani)
1st March assault,initial plan to seal off Tikrit from the north & south along the Tigris River
–  Surround Tikrit before entry with ISIL estimated to have 300+ fighter in urban areas
–  ISIL holds up the advance using IEDs, car bombs, mines, suicide bombers & snipers
–  US selective air strikes begin on 25 March and Shia Militas withdraw some forces
–  Tikrit secured by early April
Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32035340, Islamic State Conflict: US Surveillance flights begin, 24 March.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31723327, 3rd March 2015. A. Lloyd, Uneasy Allies Eager to claim Tikrit Trophy, Australian, 25/3/15, p9
Strategic Narrative of Major Parties
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US Strategic Narrative has altered during the Campaign
Aug 2014, intervention in Iraq at the behest of the Iraqi Govt
–  Stop minority persecution, protect infra-structure & US personnel
–  Support, advise, assist, help Iraqi security & Kurdish forces to blunt the ISIL momentum
–  Iraqi focus was tactical in support Iraqi Army & Peshmerga
–  Mar 2015 US air operations against Tikrit limited to direct support of Iraqi Army units
Sept 2014, shift to a higher level of intervention against ISIL
–  Build broad coalition of partners, degrade ISIL ability to operate, cut off funding then destroy it
–  Support the Iraq Government & arm/train moderate Syrian Opposition groups
–  Target & kill ISIL leadership (small hard core group, difficult to locate)
–  Focus in Syria on ISIL structure, C2, logistics, training areas, military depots and resources
–  Attack Khrosan group in Syria
ISIL Strategic Narrative:
External goal of Islamic State (IS)
IS Goal is to re-establish a Sunni form of Caliphate (29th June, 2014)
–  Unite the true believers in the Muslim World within the resurrected Caliphate
–  Apocalyptic battle prophecy: Muslim army will defeat its enemies at Dabiq, then march on Istanbul
–  Single interpretation of Islam (hand gesture), no tolerance for any form of religious pluralism
–  Ethnic cleansing of Shia, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syriac, Armenians, Yazidis, Druze, Shabaks & Mandeans
–  Strict enforcement of Sharia Law with Religious Police
Black flag
–  The black banner of Islam dates to the 8th century, when the 2nd Dynasty of Islam came to power
–  Top writing
“There is no god but God, Muhammad is the messenger of God”
–  White circle "Muhammad is the Messenger of God"
Source: http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-04/ever-wonder-what-black-and-white-isis-flag-means
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ISIL is Operationally flexible
2012
Switch to Syria to secure a power base
2013
Decision to break with Al Queda to pursue a new agenda
Early probing of Shia dominated Iraqi Army in Anbar Province
2014
Offensive in Nth Iraq increases size, recruitment, funding &
strategic options
Secures most of Eastern Syria with arms/manpower from Iraq
Decision to continue to conduct a more limited offensive in both
Syria & Iraq in the face of Coalition Airpower
2015
No retreat from captured areas unless forced out, blow up
antiquities
Iraqi Government Strategic Narrative
Iraqi Government, Military & Police force are dominated by Shia
2013
Dec Ramadi push by ISIL uncovered the Iraqi Army weakness
2014
ISIL exploited the rift between the Iraqi Govt & Sunni minority
June ISIL offensive creates a major collapse of Iraqi Army & Iranian/Russian assistance
July Haider al-Abadi takes over as PM with calls for a more inclusive government
Formation of Hashid Shaabi (Shia Milita units of uncertain loyalty)
–  Badr Organisation (fought for Iran against Iraq in 1980-88 war)
–  Asaib Ahi al-Haq (attacked coalition forces during US presence up to 2011)
–  Kataib Hezbollah (listed as a US State Dept terrorist organisation since 2009)
2015
March use of Milita groups appears to support ethnic cleansing of Sunni’s in Anbar Area
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Iranian Strategic Narrative reflects a wider regional context
Iranian interest in Iraq based on Shia/Sunni friction & securing holy sites (Karbala)
–  June 2014, Iranian provision of immediate support to the Iraqi government after Mosul fell
–  Hashid Shaabi or Shia Popular Mobilisation Units are controlled by Iran
–  Iranian Adviser in Iraq: General Qasem Soleimani, Revolutionary Guards Quds Force (IRGC)
–  Russian backing with progress arms deliveries including strike aircraft & helicopters
Wider Issue in the Middle East is the Shia/Sunni divide
–  Iranian support
Iraqi Govt, Assad in Syria, Hezbollah, Youthi in Yemen, Shia in Bahrain
–  Sunni Arab Group
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, UAE & Qatar
Implications of US Strategic Narrative on Coalition Operational Airpower
Source: http://images.defence.gov.au/fotoweb/grid.fwx?ArchiveID=5003&Search=S20142974
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Aug/mid Sept 2014
Air Summary
Limited tactical use of air strike to blunt ISIL attacks
–  4100 sorties flown, 1300 tanker, 700 ISR, 300 strike
–  CAOC generating sorties from Qatar for use by forward Baghdad & Irbil HQs
–  Air control corridors with AEW&C & tanker support
Operational Level
–  Early building of an ISR picture in Western Iraq & Eastern Syria
–  Initial Iraqi phase slowed minority persecution/dislocation & the ISIL north east Iraqi offensive
–  Expansion of initial aim when providing armed recce/CAS in support of recapture of Mosul Dam
Tactical Level
–  Limited air strike engagement with only 212 targets attacked
–  Early ISIL asset destruction from AI/CAS/armed recce forced change away from columns
–  Problem of providing a level of CAS to Kurds & Iraqi Special Forces early (forward HQ controllers
only)
Airstrikes are tactically orientated
US destroyed or damaged 212 targets by airstrike from 8th Aug – 10th Sept
–  Two thirds of sorties were from regional air bases
–  One third from the carrier George W. Bush situated in the Persian Gulf
–  ISR sorties began in June, limited overall picture of ISIL & its operations
Vehicles
–  88 (40%)
Technical type – commercial vehicles with a rear flat tray & a weapon mounted
–  2 (>1%)
Tanks
–  15 (7% )
APC or US-made MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) armoured vehicles
–  37 (17%)
Captured US Humvee
Fixed Targets
–  21 (10%)
Heavy weapons: anti-aircraft guns, mortars, machineguns & roadside bombs/IEDs
–  51 (25%)
Fighting positions” (e.g. trenches, foxholes, etc)
Cargo Deliveries for Humanitarian Support
–  25 sorties
7 missions over Sinjar
–  4 sorties
1 mission over Amirli
Source: http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/isis-force-remains-low-tech-dod-data/
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Aug - Oct 2014
Air Strike Summary
Shift to a higher level with the expansion into Syria
–  Expansion into Syria is well documented from 10 Sept
–  Does not achieve operational level surprise, some level of tactical surprise
Operational Level
–  250 sorties in opening raid against Syrian targets including 47 TLAM
–  Initial Syrian Air Strikes were Interdiction and focused on ISIL resources
Tactical Level
–  Tactical air support continues in Iraq in support of Kurds, Iraqi Special Forces & around Baiji
Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29698930, http://citizen.co.za/afp_feed_article/is-jihadists-seize-parts-of-key-syrian-town/ US Central
Command
Oct-Dec 2014
ISIL Offensives
Tactical use of air strike to blunt ISIL attacks
–  ISIL advances into urban areas or holds from defensive bunkers
–  Switch to air support in Kobani
–  Continued air support against ISIL in Iraq
–  By 1st week Jan
3000 targets had been
engaged
–  Vehicles
58 tanks, 184 Humvees, 26 APCs, 303 technicals, 394 vehicles
–  Artillery/AAA/mortars
79
–  Front line positions, bunkers, etc
1700
Source: US CENTCOM releases Islamic State Target Data, JDW, 14 Jan, 2015
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Oct 2014
ISIL Offensives
Ramp up of support for YPG in Kobani
Jan-Mar 2015
Air Summary
Operational Level
–  Airpower used to foster counter offensives in Kobani, Northern Iraq & against Tikrit
–  Continued building of ISR picture in Western Iraq & Eastern Syria
–  Step up in direct strikes in Syria (e.g. Raqqa) by Arab States against ISIL (particularly Jordan due
to execution of an F-16 pilot by ISIL)
Tactical Level
–  ISIL asset destruction from direct/dynamic AI/CAS/armed recce continue in Iraq
–  ISIL continues to hide or operate within Sunni areas where they were less visible but less effective
–  US CAS/armed recce/supply play an important role in saving Kobani & enabling Kurdish advances
–  Coalition air operations continue to restrict ISIL to mainly defensive operations in Iraq early in 2015
–  Lack of Coalition air power is noticable in the inability of Shia Militas to take Tikrit in March 2015
–  From 25 Mar, direct attacks against targets in Tikrit already hightlighted by Coalition ISR
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Totals
Combined Coalition Air Strike Sorties
–  By 9th March, 2015, coalition had struck 5,314 targets since Aug 8, 2014
–  Coalition has conducted 2,893 airstrikes with 1,631 in Iraq & 1,262 in Syria
–  US has conducted 2,320 airstrikes with 1,151 in Iraq & 1,169 in Syria
Source: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128410, CENTCOM Press Release 15 March 2015
Highlights
US domination in Air Strike Sorties
80% US contribution overall
–  Full spectrum of air power deployed
70% in Iraq
–  Coalition contributions from UK, France, Australia, Canada, Belgium,
Denmark, Holland, etc
92.5% in Syria
–  Coalition contributions from Arab States
Source: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128410, CENTCOM Press Release 15 March 2015
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Highlight:
First Deployment of F-22
First operational deployment of the F-22 on Sept 22nd
–  4 US F-22 fighter jets
–  Deployed by 1st Fighter Wing’s 27th Fighter SQN
–  Increment 3.1 software
–  APG-77 radar upgrade with precision ground mapping
–  Armament of 2 GBU-32 1000lb JDAMs internally
–  Night from the Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE
–  Returned in the early hours of 23rd Sept
–  Fixed target – facility in Raqqa attacked with GBU-32
Source: Raptor Released AWS&T, Sept 29, 2014, p26
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11114961/US-military-launchesair-strikes-against-Isil-in-Syria.html
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/25/exclusive-pictures-of-stealth-jet-raid-onsyria.html http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2024621065_syriaarmsxml.html
Major Campaign Contributors: French Operation Chammel
French contingent based at Dhafra, near Abu Dhabi, UAE
–  9 Rafale in UAE armed with with AASM & 6 M2000D in Jordan
–  Support a/c include 1 E-3F AEW&C, 1 C-135R AAR, 2 Atlantique MPA
–  First strike mission 18th Sept by Rafale against a depot in Zoumar Nth Iraq
Charles De Gaul Carrier Group deployed in Jan 2015
–  Operation Arromanches as a result of Charlie Hebdo attacks,13 Jan, 2015
–  Air Group of 12 Rafale M & 9 Super Etendard
–  1 E-2C AEW&C is embarked
–  Potential use of air & sub (MdCN) launched SCALP
Source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/19/french-planes-carry-out-air-strikes-isis-targets-iraq, Charles De Gaulle sets sail for Gulf,
JDW, 21 Jan, 2015, p5
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Major Campaign Contributors:
UK Operation Shader
Slow build up of ISR, Armed Recce, Strike and Support Assets
–  Aug 2014
Rivet Joint to Al Udeid in Qatar
–  Aug
6 GR-4 with DB110 or Litening pods deployed to RAF Akrotiri in Cypress
–  Aug/Sept
GR-4 conducts 20 Non Traditional ISR (NT-ISR) sorties with Voyager A330 MRTT
–  30 Sept
1st Airstrike with GR-4 armed with Paveway IV and up to 3 Brimstone missiles
–  16th Oct
Switch of 2 MQ-9 Reaper RPAS from Afghanistan
–  23 Mar 2015 2 Sentinel SAR/GMTI radar aircraft for wide area surveillance & track IED planting
–  23 Mar
GR-4s & MQ-9 Reaper RPAS had conducted 194 strikes over Iraq
Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11125538/RAF-planes-fly-first-combat-missions-over-Iraq.html
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2775050/British-jets-make-SEVENTH-sortie-Iraq-without-firing-weapons-Foreign-Secretary-says-RAF-notpanicked-dropping-bombs.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11134159/RAF-UK-stepping-up-air-strikes-against-Islamic-State.html.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-to-train-moderate-syrian-opposition https://www.gov.uk/government/news/latest-iraq-air-strikes
Major Campaign Contributors: Canada Operation Impact
Canada Operation Impact (against Iraq)
–  Deployment of a balanced Air Task Force
–  First strike mission on 2 November
Air Task Force deployed includes
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
6 F/A-18 C
1 Airbus 310 MRTT
2 cp-140 Aurora MPA
1 C-130J
1 C-17
600 personnel
Source: CAF costs outlined for Islamic State Operation, Daniel Wasserbly, JDW, 25 Feb, 2015
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Major Campaign Contributors: Arab Coalition against ISIL in Syria
Saudi Arabia
–  F-15E
Jordan
–  ~6 F-16C (1 pilot captured on 24 Dec after engine failure)
–  1 Airbus 310 MRTT
UAE
–  8 F-16 Block 60 in Jordan at Al-Azraq AFB (deployed Feb)
–  1 Airbus 330 MRTT
Qatar
–  ~6 F-16C
–  C-17
Bahrain
–  F-16 A
NOTE:
The US deployed 2 Tactical Recovery of Aircraft & Personnel (TRAP)
teams. One is at Ahmed Al-Jaber Air Base in Kuwait and another in
Jordan to mount aircrew recovery operations. After a Jordanian pilot
was captured and executed in Syria by ISIL, the team in Kuwait was
moved to Arbil in Nth Iraq. The TRAP teams are supported by USMC
AV-8Bs from MAS 211 (JDW, 21 Jan, 2015, p8).
Major Campaign Contributors:
Australian Operation Okra
Source: http://images.defence.gov.au/fotoweb/grid.fwx?ArchiveID=5003&Search=S20142974
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Early Commitment of Australian Airpower in Supply Drops
C-17
–  Erbil delivery of weapons for Peshmerga fighters on 3rd Sept 2014
–  Defensive deployment of a detachment of RAAF Airfield Defence Guards (ADGs) from Amberley AFB
–  Small contingent of SAS troops
C-130J
–  13th August, with top cover provided by US ISR and fighter aircraft
–  300m level to deliver 15 bundles of water, biscuits and hygiene packs
–  US reports random heavy small arms fire following the C-130 drop at night
Source: http://www.news.com.au/national/isis-rebels-shoot-at-raaf-c130-hercules-with-australians-on-board/story-fncynjr2-1227044300309
ADF Humanitarian Sorties
Weapons Deliveries
24 Sept
C-130J carried AK47 assault rifles (11.5 tonnes)
16 Sept
C-17A carried 7.62mm ammunition (30 tonnes)
7 Sept
C-17A carried 7.62mm ammunition (58 tonnes)
4 Sept
C-17A carried 7.62mm ammunition (57 tonnes)
2 Sept
C-17A carried 82mm mortar rounds (38 tonnes)
Humanitarian Aid
31 Aug
C-130J delivered supplies to Amirli in Northern Iraq
14 Aug
C-130J delivered 9 tonnes of supplies to Yezidi civilians
Mount Sinjar in Northern Iraq
trapped on
Source: http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/Okra/ATG.asp
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Australian Air Task Group (ATG) deployed on 21st Sept
Australian Operation Okra
Increase in Australian contribution
Aircraft contingent sent to Al Mindad, UAE
–  8 F/A-18F strike aircraft
–  1 E-7A AEW&C
–  1 A330 MRTT
–  400 RAAF technical personnel
–  1 Special Forces Group
Source: http://www.airforce.gov.au/News/RAAF-Air-Task-Group-Arrives-in-Middle-East/?RAAF-TN43VR3a/9svIdc+g2ofboRlfXeDzLdP
RAAF Air Task Group (ATG) commences 1 Oct
Initial operations commence 1 Oct in central Iraq
–  1 E-7A AEW&C providing a support mission in central Iraq
–  1 A330 MRTT providing allied aircraft in Iraq with support
(picture refuelling a French Rafale)
Coalition control
–  Allied CAOC control in Qatar
–  Forward operating centres in Baghdad and Erbil
Source:
http://news.defence.gov.au/2014/10/02/australian-air-task-group-commences-operational-missionsover-iraq/ http://news.defence.gov.au/2014/10/06/australia-commences-combat-operations-in-iraq/
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Strike Sorties commence 5th Oct after Cabinet approval,3rd Oct
Control
CAOC, Al Udeid in Qatar
Base
Al Minhad, UAE
Missions
Air Interdiction (AI) & Close Air Support (CAS)
Support
E-7A AEW&C & A330 MRTT
Aircraft
F/A-18F strike aircraft with 3 external tanks
Weapons
2 GBU-12 LGBs & 2 GBU-38 JDAMs
Operations
West and North of Baghdad in Iraq
Sources:
http://news.defence.gov.au/2014/10/02/australian-air-task-group-commences-operational-missions-over-iraq/
http://news.defence.gov.au/2014/10/06/australia-commences-combat-operations-in-iraq/
http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/Okra/atg.asp
Early Sorties flown from 5-8th Oct
No Weapons Release on first 3 sorties
–  5th Oct 2 F/A-18F – strike abort when target moved into urban
area
–  6th Oct 4 F/A-18F supported by USAF & RAAF MRTT
–  7th Oct sortie by 2 F/A-18F supported by MRTT
ISIL change of tactics to reduce exposure to airpower
–  Strict Rules of Engagement – red card system
–  AI/CAS - Dynamic rather than fixed target support
First weapon release on 8th Oct on an ISIL facility
–  2 F/A-18F strike aircraft with 3 external tanks
–  Armed with 2 GBU-12 LGBs & 2 GBU-38 JDAMs
Sources:
http://news.defence.gov.au/2014/10/02/australian-air-task-group-commences-operational-missionsover-iraq/ http://news.defence.gov.au/2014/10/06/australia-commences-combat-operations-in-iraq/
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/islamic-state-fighters-fled-into-civilian-areas-atfirst-sight-of-australian-forces-defence-20141008-10rrml.html,
http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/Okra/atg.asp
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Summary of ATG Air Strike Operations with F/A-18F to date
Targets
ISIL C2, equipment, transport, logistics & trg areas
Target types
Deliberate/dynamic targeting
Weapons
500lb GBU-12 laser and GBU-38 GPS JDAM
Oct
79 sorties with 25 weapons drops
Nov
62 sorties with 49 weapons drops including co-ord
on an ISIL cave complex airstrike of 44 DMPIs
Dec
75 sorties with 61 weapons drops
Jan
70 sorties with 45 weapons drops
Feb
66 sorties with 33 weapons drops
Mar
16 sorties with 5 weapons drops
TOTAL
281 weapons drops to date
Source: http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/Okra/atg.asp
Summary of ADF Effort
Ability to send a balanced force, fully equipped, ready to sortie
Ability to sustain the ATG effort
Own Strict Rules of Engagement, Red Card System
Ability to carry out a range of tasks even during a mission
CAF quote:
“Airpower stops forces like ISIL massing on the battlefield, taking
ground & having the freedom of manoeuvre.
The counter to that is to go into urban areas….There is nothing that
wasn't predicted here”
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Has Digital Awareness altered ISIL’s Centers of Gravity?
Clausewitz Trinity Model
Boyd OODA Loop Conflict between
two Complex Adaptive Systems
Warden Onion Ring Linear Model
Background:
The Recent Decade of Conflict
Conflict Figures over the past Decade (COW Database, 2010, v4 & UCDP Dataset, 2012)
–  By casualty figure only, inter-state warfare is a minor proportion of armed conflict
–  Internal state conflict is the dominant form of armed conflict based on casualty figures (91%)
–  A recent trend is the increase in extra-state or transnational conflicts (ISIL is a major example)
New Combatant Types & Domain Options for Conflict
–  New combatant types are fielding unique force packages capable of new forms of engagement
–  New domain of electronic spectrum enables options from new strategic engagement to cyber attack
–  Even nation states (e.g. China, Russia, Iran) have shifted to new domain options to achieve a level of
coercion or non attributable physical damage reducing the risk of inter-state armed clash (Clark, 2010)
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New Digital Domain: Digital Eversion is turning inside out the Digital Era
Digital Eversion
–  Networked technology shifted from the peripheral to central part of everyday life (Gibson, 2010)
–  Technology and data are changing culture, communications & physical goods/services
–  Causing digital disruption in terms of scale, speed, access & ubiquity (Palmer, 2013)
–  The recent decade is one of universal digital technology rather than Western military developed
–  In the realm of technology that has application to conflict, commercial spending dominates military unique
–  This has the potential to broaden conflict & combatant options at a hither-to unachievable low price point
Components
–  Rapid rise of mobile computing/cellular communications & Internet usage (Arthur, 2013)
–  Finance ( autonomic trading), manufacturing (3D printing), retailing (mobile commerce)
–  Big data collection and fusion spotting any business trends (Arthur, 2014)
–  GPS and GIS, social network software on internet, augmented reality, new media
–  Cross nation state boundaries – crowd support, sourcing, funding, research, digital currency, etc
ISIL Structure Analysis Summary: Digital has an impact
ISIL
Level
Digital
Technology
Adoption Area &
level
Change
Agent
Adaptation
External
Message
Pure form of Sunni
Islam interpretation
Global Digital Media
& Internet
Media Council
Social Media
Use of multiple
media sites to stop
blockage
Post Modern
World Audience
Caliphate transcends
state boundaries
Digital Media
hunter/gathers
Organisation
Composition
Political Wing
Cabinet of ministers
Province local
governors
Digital
Communications
Media council &
supporters
employing the
Internet and Social
Media
Extensive ongoing
media campaign
highlighting military
success,caliphate &
Sunni Muslin duty
Social Media
Very high usage of
Social media
Social Media &
Mosque/cleric
networks
established
throughout the
world
Twitter
Facebook
Flickr, etc
On line
radicalisation of disenfranchised
Muslins in Middle
East, Asia &
Western Worlds
Self Gratification
Justification
State like
Structure over
foreign and local
Sunni groupings
~20,000
foreigners
~15000 Local
Sunni
~10m people
under control
Funding &
Revenue
Recruitment
Military Wing
Haji Bakr (C-in-C)
Intelligence Wing
Ideological Wing
Religious council
Spura Scholars
Media Council
Al Furqan Institute
Dabiq magazine
Donations from abroad
Seized cash
Truck tax $US800
Oil sales
Selling antiquties
Post Modern
World Audience
Dis-enfranchised local
Sunnis in Syria
(Alawtie) & Iraq (Shia)
govts
Individuals
Foreign Muslins
Culture Responsible
Post Modern
World Audience
Digital distribution of
Media Institute
output
Digital Media for
Donations &
antiquity sales
Digital Media
hunter/gathers
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ISIL Digital Approach:
Immediacy to a World Audience
Media Production Arm, The Al Furqan Institute (established in Nov 2006)
–  Media centre targeting English, Russian, German and French languages
–  Use of Twitter to provide immediate coverage of advances and generate fear through atrocities
–  Production of CDs, DVDs, posters, pamphlets, and web-related propaganda products
I'tisaam Media Foundation, formed in Mar 2013 is the main media outlet (through GIMF)
Al Hayat Media Centre
–  Targets a Western audience and produces material in English, German, Russian and French
–  Weekly report
–  Video reporting of battlefield successes within days of the event
Ajnad Media Foundation
–  Releases jihadist audio chants
ISIL Digital Approach:
Immediacy to a World Audience
Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)
–  Developed its own encryption programs for PCs and Android smartphones
–  User guides in English, Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia & Urdu, free download & updated periodically
Use of password protected online discussion forums for recruiting/money raising
–  New use of Twitter to provide detail on how to dodge Western government security monitors
–  Use of Virtual private networks & secure encryption strategies
–  Randomised IP addresses with browsers like TOR that allow users to hide location/identity by
bouncing traffic around a global network relay
Dabiq
–  July 2014, ISIS began publishing a monthly digital magazine called Dabiq in multiple languages
The Dawn of Glad Tidings
–  Custom Arabic language social networking app
Source: US Claim hundreds killed, Phil Stewart, Reuters, Washington Post, reprinted in The Age, 17th Oct, p18, IS recruits told how to dodge capture,
Armando Cordoba, Herald Sun, April 1, 2015, p8
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ISIL Digital Approach:
External message through Social Media
Social Media use to gain influence in the Muslim World, Recruits & Donations
–  Individual level
Individual reporting of new recruits in Iraq & Syria
–  Engagement level
Twitter/Flickr, etc coverage of field exploits to attract recruits
–  Strategic level
Unique message to rally support (donations) & recruitment
throughout the Muslim World
Note: Out of an estimated 32-35000 in ISIL, over 20,000 are now foreigners
ISIL Digital External message:
How Successful
External Recruits now comprise 20,000 of the estimated 32-35000 ISIL actives ~60%
High level of pledged support to ISIL, with adoption of flag, methods & Caliphate cause
–  Al-Shabab
22 Nov killing 28 non Muslim civilians, 5 Mar 2015 147 students
–  Boko Haram
23 Nov execution of 48 non Muslim fishermen at Lake Chad
–  Ansar Beit al-Maqdis jihadists
Opposing Egyptian forces in Sinai
–  Libyan Affiliates
Wilayat Tarabulus (executed 23 Copts) & Wilayat al-Barqah
–  AQIM in Mali
Opposing Government, African and French led forces
–  Extremist Muslim forces
Ongoing turbulence in Pakistan, India, Malaysia and Indonesia
–  Lone Wolf Individuals
Australian Café & French Charlie Hebdo attacks
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ISIL:
Combatant Analysis Summary
Domains
–  Land – dominates with use of Soviet, captured US & off the shelf equipment (trucks, bulldozers, etc)
–  Air - use of hobby drones (Phantom 2 used for organic ISR against Tabqa AFB in Syria in Aug, 2014
–  Spectrum - with digital (including Cyber) & open source usage of comms/space
Initial Offensive Land operations
–  High level support within Sunni Areas (eg, Northern Iraq & Anbar Province)
–  High level usage of former Sunni Iraqi Army operatives even at the highest levels
–  Swarm attacks on multiple axis with co-ordinated vehicle columns
–  Level of indirect fire using mortars, artillery and rockets before direct fire assault
–  Technical vehicle columns with subunit of 15 pers, 4 vehicles & a suicide bomber
–  Combined suicide strikes: suicide car bombs at a number of spots,a large truck suicide device at a key
location & multiple suicide-vest bombings of checkpoints by fighters wearing opponents uniforms
Defensive operations
–  Use of diversion and excavation tactics in the open
–  Use of road side bombs and vehicle carried remotely detonated bombs
–  Funnelling tactics in complex urban with multiple IED types, snipers & suicide bombers
ISIL: Combatant Analysis Summary indicates less Digital Impact
ISIL
Combatant
Operational
Concepts
Domains/operation
Technology Adopted
Pre airpower
Land ops by Mobile
columns
Military equipment Soviet origin
preferred, some captured equipment
Off the shelf: navigation, comms, NVGs,
clothing, IED components, hobby UAVs
for pre ISR
Military equipment More emphasis on
sniper rifles, GPMGs, crew AAA, mortars
Off the shelf high requirement for
multiple types of IEDs including for
suicide bombers
Technicals, light armour
Crew serviced weapons
Post airpower
Dispersed ops
Excavation, bunkers
Force
Packaging
Offensive
Mobile Columns
Defensive
Use of dispersion &
excavation tactics
Engagement
Direct Fire
In open ground extensive bunkers &
switch from artillery to mortars/rockets
Urban: dispersed groups on bikes, non
descript vehicles
Dismounted concentrated GPMG fire
Mounted cannon fire on vehicles
Precision fire snipers, suicide bombers
Area fire car borne IEDs, mines
Indirect Fire
Mortars, rockets, limited artillery
Funnelling
Sniper rifles
Vehicle, road & building placed IEDs
Suicide bombers as PGMs against high
value targets
Change
Agent
Suicide
bombers
Car borne
IEDs
Adaptation
Bulldozers
Major increase
in IED usage
Suicide
bombers as
PGMs
Extensive
usage of
multiple types
of IEDs
& local Sunni
supporters
Limited usage
& effect
Combination
of Snipers,
IEDs & suicide
bombers to
slow attacks
Terror tactics
against
prisoners to
force collapse
Low visibility
within friendly
urban areas
Use of columns
speed coupled
with suicide
bombers
against check
points
More use of
mortars/rockets
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ISIL operations: Exploitation of Social Media to spread terror
Social Media use to spread terror to ALL opponents
–  Individual level
Individual reporting of personnel exploits in the field
–  Engagement level
Twitter immediate coverage of advances to generate fear through atrocities
–  Strategic level
Executions of US, UK & French nationals to alter involvement
Has ISIL Digital Awareness altered their CoG as a Combatant ?
New Centres of Gravity for ISIL have arisen due to eversion change in the recent digital era
–  External Message
Strategic message of Caliphate is attractive to many in the Muslim World
–  Pledged Support
Induce other Muslim organisations to recognise ISIL & its methods
–  Recruitment
Over 20,000 of ~32-35000 ISIL actives are foreigners from the World Audience
–  Training
Ability to gain access to a large range of training on the internet
–  Individual Muslims
Donations, support or potential recruitment
More conventional Military Approach is benefiting from new digital availability
–  Offensive
Mobile columns, suicide bombers for point targets
–  Defensive
Snipers, IEDs, mines, suicide bombers, earthworks
–  Off the Shelf purchasing Increasingly important in communications, clothing, navigation, organic ISR, etc
–  Social Media
Integral to ISIL strategic, operational & tactical levels of combat operations
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Final
Strategic Narrative: US has dictated Coalition Air Application
Iraqi focus is in the provision of tactical air support – long term low level Strategy
–  Designed to delay ISIL gains until the Iraqi Army is in a position to counter attack
–  Support the Kurdish Peshmerga & Iraqi Army in counter attacks against ISIL
–  Employ coalition support
–  Open ended commitment to drive ISIL from Iraqi territory over a long period ~years
US/Coalition lack input/influence on the ground in Iraq
–  Iranian strength is the ability to influence operations on the ground
–  Input into Iraqi Army Planning – mixed messages in Jan by US on Mosul, then Tikrit
Syrian focus is more operations with US domination of this air offensive
–  Initial focus on Khorasan group planning Western terrorist raids
–  Focus on ISIL structure, C2, logistics, training areas, military depots and resources
–  Airpower employed to stop an ISIL victory in Kobani
–  Long term strategy due to lack of understanding of how much pressure is needed on ISIL
to collapse within the boundaries of the failed state of Syria
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Coalition Air Effort tailored to different aims in Iraq & Syria
US contribution comprises 80% overall with 70% in Iraq & 92% in Syria
–  Full spectrum of air power deployed
Iraq focus for Western Coalition airpower is tactical in support of ground forces
–  US, UK, France, Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, etc
Syrian airpower focus is at the operational level
–  Coalition contributions from Arab States
UK, France, Canada and Australia all deployed integrated air groups
–  This is different from recent Coalition air operation reliance on majority US supporting assets
–  Incorporation of National Rules of Engagement
–  Air flexibility in conducting a range of tasks per mission e.g. NT-ISR, armed recce, dynamic strike
Digital Awareness:
A new factor in the 5th Domain of Conflict
New Centres of Gravity for ISIL have arisen due to the recent digital eversion era changes
–  External Message
Strategic message of Caliphate is attractive to many in the Muslim World
–  Pledged Support
Induce other Muslim organisations to recognise ISIL & its methods
–  Recruitment
Over 20,000 of ~32-35000 ISIL actives are foreigners from the World Audience
–  Training
Ability to gain access to a large range of training on the internet
–  Individual Muslims
Donations, support or potential recruitment
Air Force Plan Jericho to exploit Networked Systems early
–  Need to review how future combatants will employ the 5th domain of conflict (spectrum)
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Final Thought :
Alternative Strategic Narrative
Split the estimated 8+m Sunnis from under ISIL forces control estimated at <35000 actives
Syria, friction within ISIL should be exploited
–  External Recruits now comprise 20,000 of the estimated 32-35000 ISIL actives ~60%
–  Initial preference in pay issue with local Sunnis, later use of foreigners as expendable Suicide Bombers
–  Implementation of an extreme form of Sharia Law often by foreigners acting as Religious Police
Iraq
–  There are no incentives from the Iraqi Government to achieve Sunni inclusion
–  Leading to charges of ethnic cleaning by Shia Militas with the retaking of areas in the Sunni Heartland
–  Sunni inclusion was a major factor in the US 2007 Surge success engineered by Gen. David Patraeas
QUESTIONS
34