1. No category

THE STATE OF TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH, 2009-2010
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI)
Dhaka, Bangladesh
1
Foreword
Bangladesh has witnessed sporadic acts of terrorism. A number of serious attacks were
mounted, particularly in 2004 and 2005. Some of these acts of terrorism took place on 27
February 2004 when suspected Islamist extremists fatally stabbed prominent writer Humayun
Azad in front of the Bangla Academy in Dhaka; on 21 August 2004 a most gruesome grenade
attack took place at the Awami League public meeting which specifically targeted the Awami
League leadership, including Sheikh Hasina, the then Leader of the Opposition and currently
the country’s prime Minister; a grenade attack on the British High Commissioner at the
Hazrat Shahjalal shrine in Sylhet took place on 21 May 2004. What attracted worldwide
attention were the synchronized bombings in 63 out of 64 district towns within an hour on 17
August 2005. Around 500 simple ‘home-made’ bombs blasted off in front of the government
offices, court houses, public parks, universities, airports, shopping centres and on the
roadside. All these horrific incidents testify to the fact that terrorism poses a serious threat to
the stability, security and development of Bangladesh. With this backdrop in mind, the
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) has undertaken a three-year research project (20102012) with the objective of conducting research on the state of terrorism in Bangladesh. The
project will cover the writing of three annual reports and the developing of a national counter
terrorism strategy aimed at creating a more effective counter terrorism regime in the country.
This Report on “The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh, 2009-2010” is the outcome of
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the information and data collected by way of desk
research, perception survey and key informant interviews. The findings here indicate that the
Islamist terrorist groups in Bangladesh have changed the pattern of their activities and
organizational identity in order to ensure their survival and sustainability. The groups were
found to be regrouping by changing their composition and leadership.
Poverty,
unemployment, governance problems, decline in the quality of education and lack of political
consensus were some of the reasons mentioned by a majority of the respondents as
contributing factors for the people, especially the youth, to join either the Islamist militants or
support their activities and their ideology. This Report provides valuable information
regarding terrorist activities in 2009-2010 as well as background information of the terrorist
groups that were responsible for these acts of terrorism or in many cases were apprehended
before they could commit any act of terrorism. We hope this information will contribute to
the preparation of an effective national strategy to combat terrorism in Bangladesh.
The Report was possible due to the relentless efforts and commitment of a team of dedicated
researchers of the Foreign Policy and Security Wing of BEI. Their hard work in designing
and preparing the Report deserves to be commended. We would like to place on record our
profound thanks to the Royal Danish Embassy for its generous financial support for our
project and for making this publication possible. We would also like to extend our sincere
thanks to the many people who provided us with valuable inputs and suggestions for
improving our understanding of the problem of terrorism and in the writing of this Report
and to all those involved in the project.
Farooq Sobhan
President
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI)
2
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
7
1. INTRODUCTION
8
1.1 About the Project
1.2 Objectives of the Project
1.3 Objectives of the Report
1.4 Organization of the Report
2. METHODOLOGY
9-10
2.1 Literature Review, Desk Research and Media Survey
2.2 Baseline Survey
2.3 Perception Survey
2.4 Dialogues and Seminars
2.5 Focused Group Discussion and Interviews
3. TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH
11-43
3.1 Overview of the Menace
3.2 Mapping Terrorism Scenario
3.3 Regional and International Linkages
3.4 Profile of Terrorist Organizations
3.5 Funding of Madrassas
3.6 Conclusion
4. THREAT ASSESSMENT
43-51
4.1 Nature, Types and Extent of Threat
4.2 State-Society Vulnerabilities and Terrorist Capabilities
4.3 Recent Trends in Radicalization, Extremism and Terrorism
4.4 Terrorist Financing
4.5 Terrorist Potential: Tactical Silence or Regrouping?
4.6 The Views of Foreign Governments about Terrorist Threat in Bangladesh
4.7 Status of Threat
5. COUNTER-TERRORISM RESPONSES
51-55
5.1 Hard Power and Soft Power Approaches
5.2 Hard Power Response – Counter-Terrorism Measures
5.2.1 Party Manifesto/Government Declaration, Policy Resolve
5.2.2 Administrative/Institutional Response
5.2.3 Legal/Legislative Measures
5.3 Soft Power Approach
3
5.3.1 National Education Policy
5.3.2 National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention, and other Soft
Power Measures
5.4 International Cooperation/Assistance in Combating Terrorism
5.4.1 Bilateral Relations
5.4.2 Multilateral Relations: International and Regional Organizations
6. CHALLENGES CONFRONTING CT CAMPAIGN
55-62
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
The Growth of Socio-Economic and Political Grievances in Bangladesh
Weak Democratic Institutions and Rule of Law in Bangladesh
Problems in Education System
Lack of Cooperation between People and the Law Enforcement and
Intelligence Agencies
6.5 Lack of Confidence in the Law Enforcement and Intelligence agencies
6.6 The Gap between Policy Responses and Reality
6.7 Lack of Sharing and Integrating Intelligence Information by Different
Agencies
6.8 Lack of Coordination and Organizational Differences
6.9 Inadequate Skilled Human Resources and Corruption
6.10 Lack of Political Consensus and Public Participation in Strengthening the
Counter Terrorism Regime
6.11 Absence of a Counter Terrorism Strategy
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
62-63
4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study explores the present scenario and potentials of Islamist terrorism in
Bangladesh. It assesses the characteristics, patterns and trends in militancy and terrorism,
thereby generating a pool of useful and reliable information for policymakers and other
stakeholders regarding the need for a National Counter Terrorism Policy. The study
indicates that the threat of attacks by Islamist terrorists in Bangladesh still remains a
possibility but would be difficult in the current zero-tolerance environment. In the past
several years (notably from January 2007 till date), Bangladesh has successfully
prevented attacks by Islamist terrorist groups, who have aimed to destabilize the country.
The government of Bangladesh has initiated moves to streamline intelligence agencies
and better coordinate their activities. It has enacted two important pieces of legislation the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2009 and the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2009 - and is
now introducing amendments to both the Acts. Of course, much is yet to be done. The
Prime Minister has mooted the idea of setting up a regional-level Counter Terrorism
Taskforce in South Asia to foster regional cooperation in combating terrorism.
The study indicates that Islamist terrorist groups are regrouping by changing their
composition and leadership. They are also adopting a multi-national identity, and some
religious political parties are suspected of patronizing them. Poverty, governance
problems, decline in the quality of education, and lack of political consensus are still
contributing to the social conditions conducive to the rise in militancy. Due to growing
unemployment, especially among young people seeking to enter the job market, some
youths have become susceptible to radicalization, even those with relatively high levels
of education. Furthermore, terrorist and extremist groups are becoming more adept at
using modern technologies to better present themselves and communicate their ideologies
to a larger audience.
The study suggests that reforms focused on good governance, particularly greater
transparency, accountability and the rule of law, will play a key role in neutralizing
militant ideology calling for the overthrow of secular regimes. Likewise, greater political
cooperation, political will and political consensus will help in better countering militancy
and terrorism. Employment creation, too, will help to ease popular disaffection,
particularly among the country’s disproportionately young population. In addition, a
favourable economic environment that is more appealing to foreign investors will help
the younger generation to integrate more effectively into the broader global economic
system and help narrow the existing economic disparity between the rich and the poor.
As with any counter terrorism campaign, success will depend on a sustained commitment
over a long period by a broad coalition of the government, political parties, public and
civil society organizations and actors.
1.
INTRODUCTION
5
This is first of the three annual reports on the state of terrorism in Bangladesh
conducted under a research project with financial support from the Royal Danish
Embassy, Dhaka
1.1
About the Project
The aim of the project, Towards Developing a Better Counter Terrorism Regime
in Bangladesh, is to try to address the following challenges:
i)
Overcome the existing absence of a comprehensive national counter
terrorism policy by initiating action to work with the government and other
relevant stakeholders in developing a government-owned and consensusbased National Counter Terrorism Policy. This would provide a framework
to enable the government to address the problems of radicalization, militancy
and terrorism in a comprehensive manner;
ii) Lack of detailed action plans on priority areas of counter-terrorism,
preventing strategies from taking practical shape;
iii) Lack of systematic information, monitoring and assessment on terrorism
trends in Bangladesh, which is vital to inform the policy-making processes
and raise awareness of various stakeholders.
1.2
Objective of the Project
The long-term objective of the project is to strengthen the counter terrorism
regime in Bangladesh through advocacy for a government-owned-andimplemented National Counter Terrorism Policy.
1.3
Objectives of the Report
The objectives of the Report are to assess and monitor the characteristics, patterns
and trends in radicalization, militancy and terrorism, thereby generating a pool of
useful and reliable information for policymakers and other stakeholders to
sensitize them about the need for a National Counter Terrorism Policy.
1.4
Organization of the Report
The Report is structured into seven parts that include the Executive Summary,
Introduction, Methodology, Terrorism in Bangladesh, Threat Assessment,
Counter Terrorism Responses, Challenges Confronting a Counter Terrorism
Campaign and the Concluding Remarks.
6
2.
METHODOLOGY
The Report on the State of Terrorism in Bangladesh is a study that has been designed
employing several methods. It integrates five components in assessing the current
scenario of terrorism, particularly Islamist terrorism, in Bangladesh. These are: i)
Literature review, desk research and media survey; ii) Baseline survey; iii) Perception
survey; iv) Dialogues and seminars; and v) Focused Group Discussion and Key
Informant Interviews.
2.1
Literature Review, Desk Research and Media Survey
In preparation for the work on this Report, we reviewed a significant body of academic
research on the trends, structure and behaviour of terrorists and terrorist groups. By
examining how other scholars have approached the issues of terrorism, we were able to
refine our methodology. The study takes note of the fact that there is no universally
acceptable definition of terrorism. It remains a subject of continuing debate in
international circles. However, different countries have endorsed different definitions
according to their socio-legal frameworks and/or based on their practical needs. For the
purpose of this paper, as it will mostly focus on the Islamist form of terrorism in
Bangladesh, an indicative definition could be used – terrorism is an act through using
bombs, dynamite or other explosives, inflammable substances, firearms, or any other
chemicals in a way that may injure or kill people to create panic among the public, and
damage public or private property. Furthermore, threatening anyone with death, taking
any person hostage, physically assaulting anyone or creating panic in the general
masses, detaining or abducting a person by such acts could also be considered as
terrorism.1 Terrorism, as such, needs to be understood as the use of serious violence
against persons or property, or threat to use such violence, to intimidate or coerce a
government, the public or any section of the public, in order to promote political, social,
religious or ideological objectives. These components could be considered to obtain a
holistic view on terrorism that is currently prevailing in Bangladesh.
Much of the information in the report that follows was taken from open sources,
including government and non-government reports, books and academic journal articles,
internet-based documents, court documents and media accounts. To ensure accuracy in
the collection of data, we adopted standards and methods to form criteria for accepting
data from open sources. In order to improve accuracy and reduce bias, we attempted to
corroborate every piece of data collected from one secondary source with data from
another source that was independent of the original source — that is, the second source
did not quote the first source. In this regard, we sought a more heterogeneous data set by
examining foreign documents from non-Bangladesh sources, internet and web-based
materials from open sources.
1
For closer exposition see, The Anti-Terrorism Act 2009, adopted by Bangladesh Parliament on 24 February 2009. The AntiTerrorism Act, 2009 was adopted to prevent, protect as well as to enforce penalties for crimes such as extortion, tender
manipulation, vandalism and mugging etc. To comply with Article 93(2) of the Constitution, the Law and Order Disruption Offence
(Speedy Trial) (Amendment) Act, 2009 was tabled for extending its term by two years to deal promptly with crimes like extortion,
tender manipulation, vandalism and mugging. On 16 June the Law and Order Disruption Offence (Speedy Trial) (Amendment) Act,
2009 was adopted by a voice vote without much discussion in the absence of the opposition members.
7
The study surveyed 12 newspapers from July 2009 to June 2010 – namely, Prothom Alo,
The Daily Star, Ittefaq, Shamakal, New Age, The Independent, Janakhantha, Jugantor,
Sangbad, New Nation, Inqilab, and Naya Diganta. When using media sources, we
checked subsequent reporting by the same publication to find out whether the subject was
described in the same way as before. All the data and examples used by the media have
been verified, and our findings have been validated through the rigorous application of
survey and case study methods.
2.2
Baseline Survey
A baseline survey, including 1214 respondents, was used for mapping public opinion,
attitude and socio-psychological responses of the individuals towards terrorism and
security. The survey was undertaken in various parts of Bangladesh, such as Dhaka,
Barisal, Chittagong, Sylhet, Rangpur, Khulna, and Rajshahi, through a rigorously
selected probability sample of adult group ranging from 18 – 70 years of age. A similar
survey will be again conducted in 2012. The survey indicated an overview of people’s
confidence in the law enforcement agencies, definition of terrorism, views on counter
terrorism activities and sources of insecurity.
2.3
Perception Survey
A perception survey was conducted including 440 respondents. The survey was
undertaken in various parts of Bangladesh. This “Perception survey on terrorism” was
conducted in July 2010 to measure local perceptions in the survey areas. BEI has been
using such surveys for several years to get a snapshot of people’s opinions on a range of
security, trade and investment issues. The perception surveys allow for comparisons
between perceptions and “real” data from various statistical sources on issues such as
perspectives on security and terrorism, threat perceptions, levels of political engagement
and public expectations on the functioning of democratic institutions.
2.4
Dialogues and Seminars
Dialogues and seminars proved to be a crucial component in order to gather informed
opinions and critical perspectives on terrorism in Bangladesh. Outcomes of these events
presented the existing and varying viewpoints of the actors engaged in security sector
reform, security policy makers, security practitioners, bureaucrats, politicians and
parliamentarians, academics, the media, private sector and civil society representatives.
The study, therefore, incorporated outcomes of 30 dialogues and seminars held from
January 2007 to July 2010 in Bangladesh.
2.5
Focused Group Discussion and Interviews
Three focused group discussions (FGDs) and a number of Key Informant Interviews
(KII) were conducted with government officials, security experts, academics, media
personnel, security analysts, and private experts to verify data culled from secondary
sources, obtain information relevant to this report, and to refine the recommendations
made on the basis of the research.
8
3.
TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH
Terrorism in Bangladesh is a relatively new but internationally linked phenomenon,
compared to many other South Asian states. Bangladesh has witnessed a sharp rise in
terrorism from the mid-nineties. During the past several years, a nexus has developed
between terrorist groups and other elements like smuggling syndicates, criminal gangs,
foreign insurgents, outlawed organizations, and remnants of defunct insurgent groups that
mutually nourish a supporting network for each other with conflicting aims.
3.1
Overview of the Menace
Among all the terrorist groups, the Islamist terrorist groups have so far demonstrated
superior capabilities in exerting influence on the populace. The synchronized bombings
in 63 out of the 64 district towns of Bangladesh, including the capital Dhaka, on 17
August 2005 between 10:30 am and 11:30 am, demonstrated the might and strength of
the Islamist terrorists in Bangladesh. The incident was a wake-up call for the then
government in denial and the skeptics in Bangladesh. The bombings killed two innocent
people, wounded hundreds of them and terrorized the whole country. Around 500 simple
‘home-made’ bombs blasted off in front of government offices, court houses, public
parks, universities, airports and shopping centers and on roadside. Although the number
of the dead and injured was relatively small, in comparison with the toll of roadside
bombs in Iraq, the message was very clear-ominously frightening for those who do not
want Bangladesh to turn ‘Islamic’ or unstable for an indefinite period. The fact signifies
the point that Islamist terrorism poses a threat to the stability of Bangladesh. Although
these terrorists represent a distinct minority in the population, their ability to cause
political and economic instability means that we have to take them seriously.2
Apart from the synchronized bombings of August 2005, Bangladesh experienced several
major terrorist incidents. There was a bomb blast in December 2005 in front of the Udichi
Office, the cultural wing of the Communist Party of Bangladesh, at Netrakona leaving six
persons killed and 46 injured, while in November 2005, nine people, including two
lawyers and a police constable, were killed and 78 persons injured in two suicide bomb
attacks by the JMB cadres on the Chittagong and Gazipur court premises. The Gazipur
suicide bomber was killed and the Chittagong suicide bomber, Abul Bashar, was
seriously injured in the incident. On 14 November 2005, a JMB cadre belonging to the
suicide squad of the outfit exploded a bomb killing two senior assistant judges and
wounding three people in the district headquarters of Jhalakathi. Several grenade attacks
were conducted on the then Leader of the Opposition, currently Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina, including the most deadly one on the Bangabandhu Avenue on 21 August 2004
that left 24 people dead and 200 injured. A bomb attack on 21 May of the same year on
the then British High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Mr. Anwar Choudhury, at the Hazrat
Shahjalal shrine in Sylhet left two persons killed and at least 100 others injured. On 27
February 2004, suspected Islamist extremists fatally stabbed prominent writer Humayun
Azad in front of the Bangla Academy in Dhaka. On 12 January 2004, two persons were
2
Hashmi, Taj. 2005. Synchronised Countrywide Bombing in Bangladesh: Prelude to an Islamic revolution? New Age.
http://www.newagebd.com/2005/aug/24/oped.html
9
killed and 37 others were injured in a bomb explosion at the shrine of Hazrat Shahjalal in
Sylhet. On 8 October 1999, seven persons of the Ahamadiya sect were killed and at least
40 others injured in a bomb explosion at the Qadiani Mosque in Khulna. On 7 March
1999, six persons were killed and approximately 100 others injured in two bomb
explosions at a cultural function organized by Udichi in Jessore district.3
However, since 2007 Bangladesh has experienced no significant attacks from the Islamist
extremists. The Caretaker Government during 2007-2008 and the present government
formed by the Awami League-led Grand Alliance in Januray 2009 have been able to
substantially curb Islamist extremist activities. No terrorist attack has so far been
recorded since 2008, although the extremist groups continue to maintain a varying degree
of presence across the country.
Table I
Fatalities-Islamist Terrorism, 2005-20104
Year
Civilians
Terrorists
Total
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
20105
Total
26
6
1
0
0
2
36
9
6
7
0
0
1
23
35
12
8
0
0
3
59
The baseline survey conducted for this report indicates that 62.3 percent people believe
that the magnitude of terrorism has decreased over the past two years. It signifies the
success of the Government of Bangladesh in curbing terrorism so far. In its efforts to
counter terrorism, the government of Bangladesh has so far banned 5 Islamist extremist
groups for their suspected militant connections: 1. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, 2. Jama'atul
Mujahideen Bangladesh, 3. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami-Bangladesh, 4. Jagrata Muslim
Janata Bangladesh and 5. Shahadat-e al-Hikma. While Islamist extremists have not
engaged in any act of overt violence in 2008 and 2009, groups like the Jamaatul
Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) continue to maintain an active presence across the country,
despite their proscription and the arrest of hundreds of their cadres. Additionally,
Bangladesh continues to be a transit and launching point for Pakistan-based terrorist
groups which target India and Southeast Asia. Groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) retain a significant presence within Bangladesh, and
have used its territory to launch terrorist attacks against India. The arrest of three LeT
militants, Mufti Obaidullah, Moulana Mohammad Mansur Ali alias Moulana Habibullah
3
4
5
Compiled from various sources including
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/database/Fatalities-Islamist%20Terrorism%202010.htm
www.thedailystar.com www.prothom-alo.com
Ibid. Data till July 8, 2010
Data till July 2010
10
and Muhaddis Obaidullah, who were active in the country for 14 years in the guise of
madrassa teachers, highlighted the continuing presence of Pakistan-backed terrorist
groups. These three militants were earlier affiliated with the now-dormant Indian militant
group, the Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF); they escaped from India before fleeing
into Bangladesh where they took charge of the LeT’s local chapter.6 Their interrogation
provided important information on cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan and
local political support for the LeT in Bangladesh. During interrogation, they disclosed
that the militants fighting in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir had regularly used
Bangladesh as a transit point to travel to Pakistan and had built safe havens in
Bangladesh to shelter and train militants for terrorist operations in India. Reportedly,
there is ample evidence to show that the student front of the Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh,
Islami Chhattra Shibir, also acts as an extremist group that resorts to violent activities.
Reportedly, it also acts as a funding conduit for the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan.7
3.2
Mapping Terrorism Scenario
Terrorist groups in Bangladesh use violence in the name of religious ideologies.
Religious terrorism in all its manifestations is a horrific and daunting security challenge
confronting Bangladesh. Harakat ul-Jihad-al-Islami - Bangladesh (HUJI-B) (Movement
of Islamic Holy War) and the militant jihadist Jamaatul Mujahdin Bangladesh (JMB) are
engaged in promoting religious terrorism in Bangladesh.8 These religious groups
organize themselves around the rhetoric of a radical, misinterpretation of Islam and seek
to impose religion on the politics of Bangladesh. They also perpetrate repressions of
majoritarian Islamist groups on minority groups.9 In addition to these forms of terrorism,
extremist political views are being used to justify terrorist activities. Such anti-state
terrorism constitutes acts of terror directed specifically against the government and state
institutions and officials. Such acts of terror have so far been carried out by the Sarbahara
party or Purba Bangla Communist Party (extremist leftist parties). While Muslim
extremists have also from time to time attacked government officials and institutions,
their motive for doing so has always been to further their religious and political
objectives, whereas in the case of the Sarbahara party the objective has so far been to
challenge the local authorities and to promote a secular ideology.10
However, it is difficult to understand how people perceive the concept of terrorism in
Bangladesh. If reading newspapers provides a first hand reference in respect of how
security is perceived by the people in Bangladesh, one would observe that Bangladesh is
increasingly becoming vulnerable to terrorism and widespread crimes. However, to
understand the people’s commonsense on terrorism, a survey was undertaken that
attempted to address the following questions:
6
South Asia Terrorism Portal. www.satp.org
South Asia Terrorism Portal. www.satp.org
8
Farooq Sobhan, “Bangladesh: Battling Terrorism”, in South Asia in the Global Community: Towards Greater Collaboration and
Cooperation, ed. Hernaikh Singh, (ISAS: NUS, 2006), 109-119.
9
Islam, a religion of peace, is misinterpreted and misapplied by some Islamist groups for political ends but labeled as “promotion of
faith”.
10
Anti-state terrorism is classified as a different category from both the political or religious terrorism on the basis of ideology that
includes promoting violence against the "state" in order to overthrow all governments ruled by democratic or religious principles.
For closer exposition see, Ahmed, Imtiaz. 2006. Understanding Terrorism in South Asia: Beyond Statist Discourse. Manohar:
Delhi.
7
11
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Are you aware of terrorism that is taking place in Bangladesh?
Is terrorism becoming a threat to national security?
Have you reported any such incidents to the police, council or other authoritative
body?
Do you find any differences between political violence, organized crime and
terrorism?
Is Bangladesh becoming a safer or more dangerous country in terms of terrorism?
What is the single greatest threat to Bangladesh’s security?
What are the root causes of terrorism in Bangladesh?
Perception of terrorism of men and women, living in urban or rural settings, does not
differ very much. First, there is almost no difference in the overall perception of
insecurity by location, gender, and age. The aggregate picture on the questions asked is
complicated on examining people’s experiences of terrorism. On whether people are
aware of terrorism in Bangladesh, nine in ten persons said that terrorism was taking
place. And 81.6 percent indicated that terrorism was a threat to national security.
However, contrary to their perception, 33.4 percent indicated that Bangladesh was still a
safe country, 22.9 percent believed that Bangladesh was gradually becoming an unsafe
country and 19.7 percent believed that the situation was the same as compared to 2005.
Besides, two in ten persons reported that they had experienced some form of terrorist or
criminal acts in the past 5 years. While official statistics on crime and violence remain
disputed and on the whole unusable, a simple question in the survey about whether the
respondents or their family members or someone they knew personally had faced the
physical assault in the last one year brings out the enormity of the challenge of the
freedom from fear; nearly one in ten persons reported this experience.
It appears from the survey that the law enforcement agencies are often non-responsive
and abrasive in their behavior. The police often become part of insecurity rather than its
solution. Only 13.4 percent of the victims reported terrorist or criminal activities to the
police. The overall lack of confidence in the law enforcement agencies in the country
may be gauged by the unusually low proportion of people (15 percent) who said that they
or their family members or acquaintances had reported terrorist incidences to the military
or the police in last one year. A large number of people think that they will approach the
police if the need arises, although most of them do not expect to receive fair and just
treatment. Media reports suggest that people who come in contact with the law
enforcement agencies have experienced indifference and, even worse, harassment.
Between the military and the police, the people’s experience with the police is much
worse.11
Besides, frequent violence in the society in the form of crime, armed political rivalry, and
militant activities, has generated social confusion regarding the definition of terrorism.
Fifty nine percent of the respondents believed that political violence and terrorism were
11
Prothom Alo, Daily Star, Sangbad, Janakantha
12
different. Majority of the respondents identified terrorism as ‘anti-social, antiGovernment activities using arms, rampage, killing, various criminal activities that
threaten people and create social unrest and social insecurity. It is a threat to the
sovereignty of the state’. As many as 34.3 percent of the respondents have identified
terrorism as ‘various anti-social criminal acts perpetrated in the name of Islam’.
The question of the single greatest threat to Bangladesh raises an important observation
that touches the essence of democratic spirit. More than forty (40.2) percent indicated
that ‘political violence’ was the major source of threat to Bangladesh’s security and, thus,
to democracy in Bangladesh. This leads to another question: How far we can expect
democracy to respond to people’s preferences, about their security? In Bangladesh, the
state and society are both inadequate in providing security and often themselves become
sources of insecurity. Inadequate freedom from fear is an enduring challenge to
democracy and, in looking to the future, a key indicator for measuring the success of the
democratic enterprise.12 Moreover, 33.6 percent said that the political patronage for
political ‘goons’ is a significant source of security threat to Bangladesh. According to this
survey, around 25 percent of the respondents identified religious extremists as a source of
major security threat, while 16.8 percent said that proliferation of small arms should be
considered as a major source of insecurity.
Another question that strikes most is the issue of the root causes of terrorism in
Bangladesh. A significant proportion of the respondents (68 percent) identified wrong
interpretation of Islam, 49.5 percent identified illiteracy, 47.2 percent identified poverty,
44.8 percent identified politicization of Islam, 40.9 percent identified international
terrorism and war against Islam, 21.5 percent identified lack of democracy as principal
sources of terrorism in Bangladesh. These are grim figures. These figures on insecurity
signify people’s dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy and non-democratic
attitudes within Bangladesh. It is not clear if lack of security leads to loss of trust in
institutions and democracy or reporting about insecurity is itself part of a general
negative frame of mind. In either situation, this is a matter for concern.
In addition to the survey findings, we have examined media reporting to understand the
pattern of terrorist activities and government initiatives to counter terrorism that have
taken place in Bangladesh during 2009-2010. The following table would provide
functional evidences of terrorist acts and counter-terrorism measures:
Date of
Events/Acts
Terror Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during
July 2009 – June 2010/Other
Legal Measures
Outfit
2009-2010
August 21
The government will formally
submit petitions on August 23
seeking cancellation of the bails
X
12
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies. 2007. State of Democracy in South Asia Study. Oxford: New Delhi
13
Harkat-ulJihad-al
Islami
Date of
Events/Acts
Terror Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during
July 2009 – June 2010/Other
Legal Measures
Outfit
granted to two Harkatul Jihad
(Huji) members in connection
with the August 21 grenade attack
cases.
Bangladesh
(HuJI-B)
July 1, 2009
Mr. Selim, the second in
command of Islam o Muslim- an
offshoot of JMB, learned the
method of producing bullets from
India (Maldah) and trained ten
members of this outfit in a
workshop on the process of
making bullets
.
JMB
July 4,2009
X
Mr. Jahidul Islam alias Suman
alias Bomaro Mizan , chief
operations commander of JMB,
arrested by the members of
Special Branch (SB) on 15 May
2009 from Mirpur, Dhaka. He
confessed in interrogation that
there were 25 members in JMB
who could make different types of
bombs. The most notable thing
was that the militants had been
able to produce these bombs using
local explosive materials. He also
revealed that JMB was planning
to capture the local thanas and
other administrative units in North
Bengal
JMB
July 17, 2009
Mr. Sheikh Obaidullah, a militant
of
ARCF,
revealed
in
interrogation to the members of
Special Branch (SB) that he had
been working as a coordinator for
different militant organizations of
Pakistan and India from 1995. He
admitted that the ARCF, LeT,
Indian Mujahiddin were interrelated and mutually supportive
to each other in Bangladesh and a
top militant of LeT named
Khuram alias Abdullah from
Pakistan was helping the
militants in Bangladesh to
maintain a regional network,
particularly in Pakistan and India
Mr. Sheikh Obidullah, a Chief
organizer
of
Asif
Reza
Commando Force (ARCF), has
been arrested in Bangladesh by
the officials of Special Branch
(SB), Bangladesh Police. ARCF,
an Indian militant group, came to
the limelight following launching
of an attack on the American
Center in 2002 in Kolkata. He
confessed in interrogation that
ARCF had been closely associated
with Lashkar-e-Taiba, the most
fanatic militant outfit in South
Asia, and involved in recruiting
members
for
the
militant
organizations in Bangladesh.
Sheikh Obidullah hailed from the
village of Sizberia of Ulberia
Thana in Hawra District of West
Bengal, India.
Asif Reza
Commando
Force
(ARCF)
14
Date of
Events/Acts
Terror Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during
July 2009 – June 2010/Other
Legal Measures
Outfit
July 22, 2009
Mawlana Mansur Ali, an Indian
national and a militant of ARCF
and the mentor of Obidullah, has
been arrested by the members of
Detective Branch from Uttara of
Dhaka city. It was reported that he
was coordinating a number of
militant outfits in Bangladesh,
particularly LeT, ARCF and
Indian Mujahideen. He used to
maintain connection with the top
militants in Bangladesh
ARCF
July 22, 2009
The Detective Branch of police
arrested three Pakistanis with
suspected links to Lashkar-eTaiba (LeT) in Tongi and
Uttara.The arrestees were Syed
Abdul Qaiyum Azhari alias
Sufian, 22, Mohammad Ashraf
alias Zahid, 24, and Mohammad
Monwar Ali
LeT
October 11,
2009
Four militants of JMB have been
sentenced to five years of
rigorous imprisonment by the
district court of Cox’s Bazar for
stockpiling explosives meant for
launching attacks on Brac and
other NGOs and Churches. Police
arrested them with 53 types of
explosives at a rented house on
December 11, 2005
JMB
Ocober 13,
2009
The district court in Netrokona in
a verdict sentenced three
militants of JMB to thirty nine
years of rigorous imprisonment
each for bombing in the town on
August 17, 2005. This verdict
was given under article 3 of
Explosives Act 1908 and article
15(3) of the Special Powers Act
1974
JMB
October 21,
2009
A divisional court in Cox’s Bazar
sentenced
five
Jama'atul
Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
members to eight years of
rigorous imprisonment each in
August 17 serial bomb blast case
filed with Cox’s Bazar Thana
JMB
October 21,
2009
Mr. Ashraf alais Abdur Razzak,
the chief of Rajshahi Division
JMB
15
Date of
Events/Acts
Terror Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during
July 2009 – June 2010/Other
Legal Measures
Outfit
and coordinator of dawati
activities of JMB, confessed in an
interrogation that JMB had been
collecting money each month
from the well wishers across the
country. He also said that they
expended this money for
purchasing arms and ammunition,
and
conducting
training
programmes.
He
further
acknowledged that all the
militants of JMB must engage in
any profession and should
provide a portion of their income
to the party fund. He also
conceded that JMB maintained a
“bottom up approach” in their
entire process of collecting
money. The militants, collecting
money from district levels, were
responsible for sending their
money to the divisional chief.
Meeting up the divisional
expenses, the rest of the money
went to central fund
November 2,
2009
It was reported that Mr. .Faisal
Mustafa, a British citizen and
chief of the U.K.-based Green
Crescent NGO, was allegedly
involved in setting up an arms
factory inside a madrassa
complex in Bhola. He built this
arms factory with finance from
the U.K. based Green Crescent
NGO
November 6,
2009
The officials of Detective Branch
(DB) of Bangladesh Police
arrested three suspected Lashkare-Taiba (LeT) leaders- Mr.
Shahidul Islam, Mr. Al Amin and
Mufti Harun Izahar- from a
madrassa in Chittagong in
connection with a plot to attack
the US embassy in Dhaka. The
officials said they had caught the
LeT men on information provided
by an Indian born US national and
a Pakistan born US national
arrested in the US recently on
charges of attempting to attack on
the
establishments
including
16
LeT
Date of
Events/Acts
Terror Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during
July 2009 – June 2010/Other
Legal Measures
Outfit
embassies of the US, UK and
India in different countries. FBI
found out connection of Mr.
Abdur Rahman, a Pakistani
militant of LeT, with the two
militants arrested in the USA. It
was reported that these three
militants arrested in Bangladesh
maintained connection through
mobile phone with Mr. Abdur
Rahman,
which
had
been
intercepted by foreign intelligence
agencies. They provided this
information
to
the
law
enforcement
agencies
in
Bangladesh. In interrogation,
Mufti Harun Izahar confessed that
an amount of six lakhs taka came
in the bank account of his brother
Faizullah to execute this heinous
plan.
November 9,
2009
November 15,
2009
Mr. Akbar Ali, a militant of JMB
arrested on 26 October 2009 from
Bagerhat, confessed in a taskforce
interrogation cell that Mr. Mehedi
Hasan, the organizational chief of
JMB in Khulna Division, offered
him financial assistance in
exchange for membership of this
militant organization. He accepted
this proposal due to miserable
conditions of his life.
There was a report that three
Pakistani nationals, the militants
of Let, arrested on 13 November
from Uttara and Tongi, confessed
in interrogation that the militants
of LeT had been sending money
and operating their organizational
activities from Pakistan
November 22,
2009
LeT
Mr. Abdul Majid, a militant of
Hezbul Mujahideen based in Azad
Kashmir, was arrested on
information provided by the
convener of Islamic Democratic
Party (IDP), Mawlana Abdus
Salam. Mr. Abul Kalam Azad, a
Public Prosecutor, stated that Mr.
Majid confessed in interrogation
that he supplied arges grenades to
Mawlana Tajuddin for sending
17
JMB
HuJI-B
Date of
Events/Acts
Terror Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during
July 2009 – June 2010/Other
Legal Measures
Outfit
them to the Huji militants in order
to launch the 21 August attack.
February 2,
2010
Mr. Rashedul Islam, a former
militant of JMB, had been killed
by the militants of the JMB. The
police and the wife of Rashedul
said that the militants had killed
him because of his decision to
disconnect himself from JMB
February 22,
2010
May 24, 2010
Twelve
people
including
policemen had been injured in a
raid on the militants of JMB by
the members of Special Branch
(SB) of Bangladesh Police at
Shahajalalbagh of South Donia in
Dhaka. The militants hurled
fifteen
bombs
and
fired
indiscriminately targeting the
police for escaping the spot.
May 26, 2010
May 28, 2010
Mawlana Saidur Rahman said, in
an interrogation, that Jama'atul
Mujahideen Bangladesh still had
around 400 full-time cadres and
50 thousand well wishers and
supporters across the country He
also said that the military wing of
JMB would be capable of
launching spectacular attacks. He
further informed that he divided
the whole country into 9 divisions
and appointed some hardcore
militants to operate the activities
of JMB.
18
JMB
RAB officials arrested five
militants including a militant of
Jaise-e-Mohammed, Mr. Rezwan
Ahmed from Mirpur road near
Dhaka College. In interrogation,
he confessed his expertise in
making explosives and operating
AK 47, AK 56
Jaise-eMohammad
It was reported that police had
been able to capture Mr. Shibly,
the operational commander of
JMB
JMB
Mawlana Saidur Rahman alias
Jafar, the chief of JMB, and Mr.
Amir Hussain alias Sharif was
arrested from East Donia in
Dhaka. He took the reign of JMB
and tried to reactivate the
organization,
regrouping
the
militants, from disarray after the
demise of Shaykh Abdur Rahman
JMB
JMB
Date of
Events/Acts
June 7, 2010
Terror Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during
July 2009 – June 2010/Other
Legal Measures
Mawlana Saidur Rahman also
confessed in interrogation that
JMB had 3 thousand bombs, 10
suicide belts, 25 trained suicide
bombers and the militants of JMB
also learned how to make rocket
launchers.
Outfit
JMB
October 1,
2010
Mr. Emdadullah alias Mahbub,
Commander of the India-based
militant organisation 'Asif Reza
Commando Force' , nephew of
Mawlana Mansur, was arrested
from Gabtoli in Dhaka. He, in an
interrogation, revealed that he
took one month training in
Baluchistan, Pakistan and was
trained in operating all types of
heavy and light weapons,
including Chinese pistol, AK-47,
SLR,
machinegun,
rocketlauncher and sniper gun
ARCF
January 10,
2010
3 members of JMB’s suicide
squad, Nur Jahan, Marjia and
Mina were arrested at Khartail
village in Tongi last February.
Their husbands are also members
of JMB. According to RAB, those
arrested were trained in arms use
JMB
February 6,
2010
2 members of HuJi were arrested
in Sylhet while distributing
leaflets
HuJI
February
13,2010
Abdul Hannan, trainer of arm
plotters of JMB, was arrested
from Sherpur, Bogra on 10
February. Three jihadi books were
also recovered from the scene
JMB
Febraury 16,
2010
2 JMB “Shura” members were
arrested in a case of attempt to
murder Prof. Humayun Azad of
Dhaka University
JMB
February 23,
2010
7 activists of Hijbut Tahrir were
arrested from Dhaka, Chittagong
and Noakhali. Four of them were
arrested from Noakhali Ekushe
book fair where there was a stall
of publication house owned by
Hijbut Tawhid
Hizbut
Tahrir
March 15,
2010
3 militants of HuJi suspected of
being involved in the bombing of
HuJI
19
Date of
Events/Acts
Terror Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during
July 2009 – June 2010/Other
Legal Measures
Outfit
CPB’s meeting at Paltan were
arrested
by
RAB
from
Mohammadpur on a tip off
April 17, 2010
One of the top leaders of HuJi,
also a black-listed terrorist of
British
Government,
Golam
Mustafa (54), was arrested. He is
also a major accomplice of Abdus
Salam, who is an accused in the
21 Aug Grenade attack case. He is
also the main provider of finances
for HuJi. He is a Bangladeshi born
British citizen. Earlier, on 26 Dec
2007, an arms case chargesheet
was given against him. A lower
court gave him 17 years of jail.
However, he obtained bail from
the Supreme Court
HuJi
April 21, 2010
Chief coordinator of Hijbut
Tahrir, Mohiuddin Ahmed, was
finally arrested after being kept
under house arrest for the past six
months
Hizbut
Tahrir
May 4, 2010
Close associate of JMB’s Bangla
Bhai, A.T. M. Ali Jinnah and his
son Jamal Uddin were arrested
from Naogaon
JMB
May 19, 2010
5 JMB members were arrested
from Kishoreganj by RAB
JMB
May 21, 2010
2 Hijbut Tawhid members were
arrested from Barisal by police
Hijbut
Tawhid
The following terrorist incidents map provides an indication of overall levels and
concentration of terrorist activities in Bangladesh based on this listing. Magenta identifies
attacks by Islamist terrorists, while red identifies all other strikes.
20
3.3
Regional and International Linkages
Forms of terrorism, as discussed earlier, indicate that regional and international linkages
of terrorism have become a major concern for Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s stability is now
threatened by money laundering, international terrorism financing, cross-border
movement of terrorists, proliferation of small arms originating from Pakistan, India and
Myanmar, and illicit drugs. Al Haramain (Bangladesh Branch), Global Relief Foundation
21
(GRF), Jamaat-ul- Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI)
are actively involved in money laundering and have made Dhaka the transit centre for
their money laundering, drug, and human trafficking operations. JMB is not fully
crippled and its financial muscle is unaffected. Monthly funds in-flow is estimated at over
Bangladesh Taka 50 lakh (about 70 Taka = one US dollar) from local and foreign
sources.13 A senior official of the Special Branch, on condition of anonymity, told The
Independent, (a Dhaka daily), "In the course of our investigations, we have come to know
that militants, after fleeing the country, are playing significant roles in regrouping
Islamist militant outfits, following orders from top-ranking detained militants". The
official went on to say: "We also found significant evidence that leaders and activists of
religious extremist groups, patronized by some foreign militants, are desperately trying to
merge with other extremist groups, or create sub-groups under new names." The daily
also quoted him as saying "All this is possible for them, as law enforcers are yet to bring
foreign militants under trial, and can, at most, keep them behind bars for a few months."14
The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), on 24 March 2009, busted a militant training centre
run under the disguise of a madrassa-cum-orphanage in the remote Ram Keshab village
of Borhanuddin Upazila in Bhola. The trail led to the door-step of Green Crescent, a UK
charity, bearing registration no. 1099233.15
The police investigations and confessions of the arrested leaders reveal that JMB collects
funding from domestic sources. It shows that JMB received around Taka 50 to 60 lakhs
in cash during the holy month of Ramadan in 2009. In the Bangla month of Baishakh of
the same year, about Taka 10 lakhs flow into the kitty, mainly from North Bengal, in the
form of Zakat and Ushr (a portion of harvested crop given as donation). The outfit is also
into business enterprises like Taxi cabs, CNG-run three wheelers, vans and rickshaws
(revenue Taka 50,000). These are sources that are traced or acknowledged. What about
hidden sources, which, by general consensus, are one too many.
The survey undertaken for this study identified that Bangladesh's vulnerability to terror
finance comes mostly from foreign remittances sent in the name of charities, and also
from the use of cash couriers, which is unique to the country. Some of the respondents
mentioned that most non-government organisations (NGOs) style themselves as nonprofit organisations (NPO). The sector is home to registered societies, associations, clubs,
companies limited by guarantee and foundation, and the like. Their number is put at
60,000 plus. Almost 19 percent of the respondents indicated that the criminal activities,
i.e. smuggling, trafficking in drugs and humans, ransom and chadabaazi (extortion) are
the principal sources of terror financing, and 18 percent believed that money laundering
was the only source for financing terrorist activities.
3.4
Profile of Terrorist Organizations
The research conducted for this study has identified 11 terrorist outfits operating in
Bangladesh, including 2 ultra-leftist parties: 1. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, 2. Jama'atul Mujahideen
Bangladesh, 3. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami-Bangladesh (Allahr Dal as offshoot), 4. Jagrata
13
http://launderingmoney.blogspot.com/2010/10/bangladesh-stability-threatened-by.html
ibid
15
ibid
14
22
Muslim Janata Bangladesh, 5. Shahadat-e al Hikma, 6. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),7. Islam O
Muslim, 8. Jaish-e Muhammed, 9. Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF), 10. Purba
Banglar Communist Party, and 11. Sarbahara Party.16 While these terrorist groups have
not engaged in major acts of overt violence in 2009 and 2010, the following major groups
continue to maintain an active presence across the country:
Name of the
Organization
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B)
Formation
The Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) was established in 1992, reportedly
with assistance from Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF). On April 30,
1992, some HuJI-B leaders addressed a press conference at the Jatiya Press Club in
capital Dhaka and demanded that Bangladesh be converted into an Islamic State. The
outfit’s activities, however, were noticed in June 1996 after the Awami League (AL)
came to power. The HuJI-B was proscribed by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)led coalition Government on October 17, 2005.17
Leadership
The HuJI-B is led by Shawkat Osman alias Sheikh Farid. Imtiaz Quddus is the general
secretary of the outfit. The outfit's operations commander, Mufti Abdul Hannan, was
arrested in Dhaka on October 1, 2005.18
Objectives and
Ideology
HuJI-B aims to establish Islamic Hukumat (rule/state) in Bangladesh by waging war
and killing progressive intellectuals. It draws inspiration from bin Laden and the
erstwhile Taliban regime of Afghanistan. At one point in time, the group issued a
slogan, Aamra Shobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe Afghanistan (We will all become
Taliban and we will turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan). HuJI-B recruits are
indoctrinated in the mould of radical Islam19
Areas of
activity and
influence
The coastal area stretching from the port city of Chittagong south through Cox's Bazaar
to the Myanmarese border, notorious for piracy, smuggling and arms running, is the
principal area of activity of the HuJI-B. The group reportedly maintains six camps in
the hilly areas of Chittagong, where its cadres are trained in the use of weapons.
Unconfirmed reports also indicate that it maintains six training camps near Cox's
Bazaar. The HuJI-B cadres allegedly also infiltrate frequently into the eastern corridor
of India to maintain contacts with terrorist and subversive outfits of the region. HuJI-B
has been found to be responsible for a number of terrorist attacks mounted in Indian
urban centres in recent years.20
Cadres
Although there is no authoritative information on the actual cadre strength, most reports
mention it to be around 15,000. Several of these recruits were trained in the Kormi and
Kasia areas of Bangladesh. Further, many recruits were reportedly trained at various
training camps in Afghanistan, primarily during the rule of the Taliban. Both local
residents and foreigners are recruited into the HuJI-B. Besides, refugees from Myanmar
are a significant source of cadres for the outfit. They include stateless Rohingyas,
whose families have fled Myanmar over the years allegedly due to religious
persecution.
Cadres
of
the
HuJIB
are
primarily
recruited
from
various Madrassas (seminaries). Madrassas essentially impart religious training and
most of them are financed by Arab charities. Reports also indicate that many HuJI-B
recruits have seen ‘action’ in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, Chechnya and
Afghanistan.21
16
Based on newspaper clippings, field surveys, and key informant interviews
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
18
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011
19
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011
20
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011
21
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011
17
23
Name of the
Organization
Linkages
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B)
The HuJI-B had reportedly been formed drawing inspiration from Osama bin Laden
and continues to maintain active links with the Al Qaeda network and remnants of the
Taliban militia. A large number of volunteers had gone to Afghanistan to fight
alongside the Mujahideen in the war against the former Soviet Union. A large number
of these Mujahideen returned to Bangladesh during the BNP regime of Begum Khaleda
Zia (1991-96) and are now spearheading the fundamentalist movement in the country.
The HuJI-B is also believed to be having links with Pakistan. For instance, the outfit’s
‘operations commander’ and a key suspect in the plot to assassinate the then Prime
Minister, Sheikh Hasina, in July 2000, Mufti Abdul Hannan, after his arrest in October
2005 admitted to have passed out from the Gouhardanga Madrassa in Pakistan. Police
records in Gopalganj district also says that Hannan was trained in the Pakistani city of
Peshawar and then sent to Afghanistan to fight the erstwhile Soviet Army. The HuJIB’s Pakistan link was further established with the recovery of a diary from Hannan’s
brother Matiur Rahman, who was also arrested in connection with the assassination
plot. Entries in the diary revealed that he was in touch with Pakistan’s diplomatic
mission in Bangladesh.
Reports indicate that agents of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s external
intelligence agency, under the guise of HuJI-B cadres impart military training for three
months to youths of both Bangladesh and India from bases in the Kurigram and
Rangpur areas of Bangladesh, near the Coochbihar border. Similar training camps
reportedly also exist in Rangmari, Sundermari, Masaldanga and in other villages, where
training is imparted in the use of sophisticated arms and setting off blasts. After
training, the youths infiltrate into India and spread to various locations in West Bengal
and States in the Northeast region, including Assam. HuJI-B also maintains links with
insurgent groups operating in India’s Northeast, including with the United Liberation
Front of Assam (ULFA). The HuJI-B reportedly managed some of ULFA’s camps
situated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh along the border with the Indian
State of Tripura. The HuJI-B is also linked to another Islamist extremist outfit, the Asif
Reza Commando Force (ARCF) that had claimed responsibility for the January 22,
2002 attack on the American Center in Kolkata, the capital of West Bengal. The arrest
of Aftab Ansari alias Aftab Ahmed alias Farhan Malik, the prime accused in the attack,
led to further information on the linkages between the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM),
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the HuJI based in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Ansari is
reportedly linked to the ISI and to JeM terrorist Omar Sheikh, convicted for the
abduction and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl, in Pakistan. Ansari was
reportedly asked in August 2001 in Islamabad by Omar Sheikh to provide cover and
logistics support for terrorist operations from Bangladesh.
There have also been reports that a 25-member team of Taliban operatives arrived in
Bangladesh in June 2001 to train HuJI-B cadres. In Bangladesh, the HuJI-B is also
alleged to have enjoyed the patronage of some mainstream political parties such as the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami. HuJI-B ‘operations
commander’ Mufti Hannan, subsequent to his arrest on October 1, 2005 was reported to
have confessed that the country’s former home and then commerce minister, Altaf
Hossain Choudhury, had assured him of protection and guaranteed his freedom
following his involvement in the assassination attempt on former Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina in July 2000. The Jamaat-e-Islami, however, denies any links with the HuJI and
dismisses such reports as propaganda.22
Finance
The HuJI-B reportedly receives financial assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and
Afghanistan through Muslim Non-Governmental Organisations in Bangladesh,
22
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011
24
Name of the
Organization
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B)
including the Adarsa Kutir, Al Faruk Islamic Foundation and Hataddin. It is also
suspected to be generously financed by the ISI of Pakistan.23
Activities
The HuJI-B intensified its subversive activities after the Awami League formed the
Government in June 1996. On February 19, 1996, 41 HuJI-B activists were arrested
with firearms from Cox’s Bazaar. The arrested cadres were sentenced to life
imprisonment by a court, but all of them were released on bail by the High Court after
the four-party alliance assumed power in October 2001. Three HuJI-B cadres made a
failed attempt on the life of poet Shamsur Rahman at his residence in Dhaka on January
18, 1999. It was involved in a number of incidents, including the killing of journalist
Shamsur Rahman, on July 16, 2000, in Jessore. Later, police arrested 10 HuJI-B
activists and sealed its office in Khilgaon of Dhaka city. Interrogations revealed that
HuJI-B cadres had planned to kill 28 prominent intellectuals, including National
Professor Kabir Choudhury, writer Taslima Nasreen and the Director General of the
Islamic Foundation, Maulana Abdul Awal. The HuJI-B has been accused of plotting
twice to assassinate the then Prime Minister and AL president, Sheikh Hasina, in July
2000. Security forces on July 20, 2000, during routine security checks, recovered
explosive devices weighing 76-kilograms at and near the places she was scheduled to
visit in her native Gopalganj district, including near the venue of a public meeting she
was slated to address. The key suspect in the plot was Mufti Abdul Hannan. He had
allegedly been instrumental in the manufacture of the explosives at a soap factory––
Sonar Bangla Chemical Industries Limited––near Gopalganj.
Mufti Abdul Hannan, on November 1, 2007, also confessed to have been instrumental
in the grenade attack at the August 21, 2004 AL rally in Dhaka.24
Name of the
Organization
Formation
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)
The Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), an Islamist vigilante outfit that
espouses the ideals of the Taliban, attempts to ensure that the northwestern region of
the country is ‘swept clean’ of the activities of left-wing extremist groups, primarily the
Purba Banglar Communist Party.
A certain section of the Bangladeshi media has indicated that the JMJB is an outgrowth
of the Islamist militant outfit Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh. Indeed, there is
considerable overlap between the leadership of the JMB and the JMJB. Other reports
have indicated that the JMJB is a youth front of the outlawed militant group Harqat-ulJihad.
As per its senior leader Maulana Abdur Rahman, who is also the chief of JMB, the
outfit was formed in 1998. However, when the JMJB first came to limelight on April 1,
2004, it was also known by other names like Mujahidin Alliance Council, Islami Jalsha
and Muslim Raksha Mujahideen Oikya Parishad.25
Leadership
In the early hours of March 30, 2007, JMJB chief Siddiqul Islam alias Azizur Rahman
alias Omar Ali Litu alias Bangla Bhai was hanged in Kashimpur jail, where he was kept
since his arrest on March 6, 2006 from the remote Rampur village under the
Muktagachha sub-district of Mymensingh, 120 kilometres north of Dhaka following
skirmishes with the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). Hanged on the same day were five
other top militants of the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), including its
23
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011
25
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011
24
25
Name of the
Organization
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)
‘supreme commander’ Maulana Abdur Rahman. All these militants, including Siddiqul
Islam, had been pronounced guilty by the Supreme Court of involvement in the killing
of two judges in Jhalakathi in November 2005. On March 4, 2007, President Iajuddin
Ahmed had rejected their mercy petitions paving the way for their execution.
The highest decision-making body of the JMJB is the seven-member Majlish-e-Shura.
Apart from Siddiqul Islam and JMB chief Abdur Rahman, other members of the
council included Ashikur Rahman, Hafez Mahmud, Tarek Moni and Khaled.
Information regarding the Shura, after the March 30, 2007 executions, is not available.
‘Commander’ Bangla Bhai hailed from Bogra district and claimed that, as a college
student, he had joined the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), student wing of the Jamaat-eIslami. Bangla Bhai had also claimed that he quit the ICS in 1995 after the Jamaat
accepted female leadership, which according to him was a sacrilege. On the other hand,
Maulana Abdur Rahman was reported to have worked at the Saudi embassy in Dhaka
between 1985 and 1990. He studied at the Madina Islamic University in Saudi Arabia
and had reportedly traveled to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, among other countries.
His most recent visit to Pakistan was reportedly in the year 2003.26
Objectives and
Ideology
The JMJB follows the ideals of the Taliban militia and propagates a movement based
on Jihad. Its chief has been quoted as stating that "our model includes many leaders and
scholars of Islam. But we will take as much (ideology) from the Taliban as we need."
It has explicitly stated on more than one occasion that it does not subscribe to the
prevailing political system in Bangladesh and that it would "build a society based on
the Islamic model laid out in the Holy Quran and Hadith. The JMJB functions with an
avowed objective of neutralizing the left-wing extremists, especially cadres of the
PBCP. The professed long-term goal of the outfit is to usher in an ‘Islamic revolution’
in Bangladesh through Jihad.27
Organization
The JMJB reportedly has a three-tier organisation. The first tier of the outfit consists of
activists, called Ehsar, who are recruited on a full-time basis and act at the behest of the
higher echelons. The second tier, known as Gayeri Ehsar, has over 100,000 part-time
activists. The third tier involves those who indirectly co-operate with the JMJB.
According to JMJB leaders, the whole country has been divided into nine
organisational divisions. Khulna, Barisal, Sylhet and Chittagong have an organisational
divisional office each, while Dhaka has two divisional offices and Rajshahi three.The
outfit also had committees in each village and, according to media reports, villagers
were being forced to join the committees. If anybody refused, he was branded as a
‘collaborator’ of the PBCP and taken to the JMJB ‘trial centre’.28
Areas of
activity and
influence
The JMJB created strong bases in the districts of Rajshahi, Satkhira, Naogaon,
Bagerhat, Jessore, Chittagong, Joypurhat, Natore, Rangpur, Bogra, and Khulna. It has
allegedly spread its network to most Madrassas (seminaries) and other educational
institutions in these districts.
The outfit also established at least 10 camps at Atrai and Raninagar in Naogaon district,
Bagmara in Rajshahi district, and Naldanga and Singra in Natore district. There have
been reports of JMJB recruits being given training through recorded speeches of Osama
bin Laden and the video footages of warfare training at Al Qaeda's Farooque camp
(now defunct) in Afghanistan. Some JMJB leaders reportedly stated that the outfit is
headquartered in Dhaka. However, media reports indicated all activities of the
organisation revolving around Jamalpur.29
26
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
28
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
29
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
27
26
Name of the
Organization
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)
Cadres
Bangla Bhai on occasions claimed that JMJB commands the strength of 300000
activists across the country. The outfit has about 10,000 full-time activists and spends
up to Taka seven hundred thousand on them a month.30
Weaponry
JMJB cadres during their vigilante operations in 2004 were seen with firearms. They
also reportedly wielded swords, other sharp weapons, hammers and hockey sticks.
Reports have indicated that the JMJB also has access to crude explosives.31
Linkages
Not much is known about the outfit’s external linkages, although Maulana Rahman
claimed in an interview on May 13, 2004, that "My travels abroad are no secret. We
don't have links with any foreign organisation." He also added that "We don't have
direct links with the Taliban either. The Taliban wanted to establish the ideals of Allah.
They did their part with courage." Reports indicated that the JMJB is supported by
certain members of the ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP). A former Deputy
Minister was allegedly linked to the outfit. The first rally of the JMJB was reportedly
addressed by Bagmara's BNP Joint Secretary of the time, indicating the degree of
support that the vigilante outfit enjoyed within the then ruling coalition.
According to The New Nation, while the Cabinet Committee on law and order led by
Minister Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan (now deceased) ordered the arrest of Bangla Bhai for
taking what they said law in his own hands, three ministers belonging to Rajshahi
opposed the police action saying the JMJB was on a ‘pro-people mission’ freeing the
northern region from the left-wing extremists. JMJB also enjoyed support among
certain sections of the Police. For instance, the then Deputy Inspector General of Police
in Rajshahi reportedly told The Daily Star on May 5, 2004, that Bangla Bhai and his
operatives were assisting the law enforcers in tracking down the left-wing outlaws.
According to him, "We've asked police stations to support them whenever they go to
catch outlaws." Reportedly, he justified such an action by saying that "You know
Sarbahara [left-wing extremists] men have been quite active in the region for many
years and it is not possible for the undermanned and under-equipped police to hunt
them down. Aziz [Bangla Bhai] is now helping us."
The JMJB chief Maulana Rahman is known to have visited Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. He has allegedly secured help from Saudi charities to build some mosques
and seminaries, from where the group is known to operate. Media reports also indicated
that the JMJB was akin to JMB that fought with the police from a secret training camp
at Khetlal in Jaipurhat district in August 2003. After the gun-battle, a number of its
cadres fled, leaving behind many documents indicating the outfit's subversive plans.
Although police could not then arrest Rahman, they detained his brother Ataur Rahman
Ibne Abdullah and 18 other militants. A few days later, police released the militants and
the higher authorities allegedly transferred several police officials involved in the
Khetlal operation. Rahman was quoted in The Daily Star on May 17, 2004, as saying,
"our workers from Bogra, Jaipurhat, Rajshahi, Rangpur and other adjacent areas
gathered in Khetlal to attend a meeting. But conspirators misled the police saying
militants have gathered there. Police raided the place on wrong information. But they
did not find any firearms."32
Finance
Regarding the sources of income, Bangla Bhai was reported to have said, "People from
all rungs of society are generously paying us funds, no one is pressurised for money. If
someone happily makes a donation, there's no problem." Abdur Rahman also was
reported to have set up a mosque and a seminary with financial assistance from the non-
30
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
32
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
31
27
Name of the
Organization
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)
governmental organisation Rabita-e-Islam and another organisation, Islami Oytijjho
Sangstha.33
Activities
The JMJB activists are reported to have carried out over 100 vigilante operations in
different regions, including murders and attacks on people who they believe have
committed crimes. Apart from these activities, the JMJB cadres have also been accused
of extorting protection money from traders and forcing people to follow a certain
variant of Islam.
Its cadres reportedly compelled local youths to keep beards, wear clothes up to the
ankle, and the women to wear a veil. They were also involved in attempts to
discontinue the playing of music in hotels and restaurants. There had been allegations
that the outfit was enforcing harsh Islamic codes in the northwest region. However,
Bangla Bhai denied these allegations claiming that it was a propaganda exercise. The
activities of the outfit appeared to have stopped completely by mid- 2005.34
Name of the
Organization
Origin
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
The Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) is reported to have been formed in 1998
in Jamalpur district.
While the exact origin is shrouded in mystery, its existence came to notice on May 20,
2002 with the arrest of eight Islamist militants at Parbatipur in Dinajpur district along
with 25 petrol bombs and documents detailing the outfit's activities. Subsequently, on
February 13, 2003, the JMB is reported to have carried out seven bomb explosions in
the Chhoto Gurgola area of Dinajpur town in which three persons were wounded.
Some reports suggest that it is the youth front of the Al Mujahideen, an organisation
allegedly formed in the mid-1990s but whose existence is still ambiguous, whereas
others indicate that the JMB is another name for the vigilante Islamist group-the Jagrata
Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB).
The JMB was proscribed by the Government on February 23, 2005.35
Leadership
Maulana Saidur Rahman is known to be currently heading the JMB after the March 30,
2007 execution of the top six militant leaders of the outfit. On November 16, 2008
security forces came close to arresting Saidur Rahman who used to live in a rented
house in the Mirpur locality of capital Dhaka. Although the raid resulted in the arrest of
a JMB ehsar (full-time worker) identified as Mohammad Hanif alias Kamal, Saidur
Rahman managed to escape.
In the early hours of March 30, 2007, six top militants of the JMB, including its
'supreme commander' Maulana Abdur Rahman and second-in-command, Siddiqul
Islam alias Bangla Bhai were executed in different jails in Bangladesh. The other senior
leaders of the outfit who were hanged were Majlish-e-Shura (the highest decisionmaking body) members Abdul Awal, Khaled Saifullah and Ataur Rahman Sunny and
suicide squad member Iftekhar Hasan Al-Mamun. All of them had been pronounced
guilty by the Supreme Court of involvement in the killing of two judges in Jhalakathi in
November 2005. On March 4, 2007, President Iajuddin Ahmed had rejected the mercy
petitions filed by the convicted militants paving the way for their execution.
Prior to the March 30, 2007 execution, JMB was led by a triumvirate consisting of its
‘supreme commander’ Abdur Rahman, a former activist of the Jamaat-e-Islami,
33
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
35
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011
34
28
Name of the
Organization
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai of the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and
Muhammad Asadullah al-Ghalib, an Arabic language lecturer at the Rajshahi
University and chief of the Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB). Of these,
Maulana Rahman was projected as spiritual leader of the organisation while Bangla
Bhai functioned as the second-in-command and the outfit’s 'operational chief'. On
March 2, 2006, Abdur Rahman, surrendered after a 34-hour siege on his East
Shaplabagh hideout in Sylhet City, 200 kilometres northeast of capital Dhaka. Arrested
along with Rahman were his wife, sons, daughters, grandson, domestic helps and some
associates. Four days later, on March 6, 2006 the JMB number two Siddiqul Islam
hiding in a tin-shed in the remote Rampur village under the Muktagachha sub-district of
Mymensingh, 120 kilometres north of Dhaka, was wounded and captured, after
skirmishes with the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). Asadullah al-Ghalib was arrested
on February 23, 2005.
Operational details of the outfit are overseen by a seven member Majlish-e-Shura.
Apart from Abdur Rahman and Siddiqul Islam, the Shura consisted of Ataur Rahman
Sunny (arrested on December 14, 2005), Abdul Awal (arrested on November 18, 2005),
Rakib Hasan Russel alias Hafez Mohammad (arrested on February 28, 2006), Faruq
Hossain alias Khaled Saifullah, ‘commander’ of the Rangpur-Dinajpur region (arrested
on April 26, 2006) and Salahuddin alias Salehin, ‘commander’ of the SylhetMymensingh region (arrested on April 25, 2006).
Some of the other leaders of the outfit were Maulana Akramuzzaman, Abdur Rouf,
Maulana Shahidul Islam, Maulana Mahadi, Sheikh Maulana Noman, Maulana Manjur
Ahmed, most of whom were reportedly trained in Afghanistan.
The JMB has grown primarily due to the nonchalant attitude of the then Government
and partly because of the official patronage. For instance, the eight JMB cadres arrested
from Parbatipur on May 30, 2002 were subsequently released on bail and investigations
were stalled after the case documents went missing in a "mysterious" fire at the
Parbatipur police station.
The outfit's growth received a boost after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led coalition
Government under Prime Minister Khaleda Zia came to power in 2001. Many members
of the JMB and JMJB have invariably been found to be cadres of the Islami Chhatra
Shibir (ICS), student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a partner in the ruling coalition. Such
unbroken linkages with the Jamaat-e-Islami have helped the outfit immensely not just
in terms of unhindered growth but also in terms of providing relief in the event of
intermittent official action. Following the August 17, 2005 developments, during which
the outfit carried out serial blasts in 63 of the 64 Districts in the country, international
pressure grew on the government forcing it to take action against the outfit.
Prior to that, the JMB, for long, promoted the building of mosques
and Madrassas (seminaries), some of which have developed into effective training
centres for the outfit's radical mobilisation. For example, with assistance from Ghalib,
JMB cadres reportedly used the facilities of some 700 mosques built across Bangladesh
by the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, which is based in Kuwait.
In 2003, decoded diaries of some arrested Islamist militants is reported to have revealed
that the outfit had training camps in 57 districts with bases at the Ahle Hadith mosques
and seminaries. "They have well-equipped training stations in all the 16 northern and
some southern districts, and small stations in other districts where they operate," an
Inspector of Jaypurhat Criminal Investigation Department had told The Daily Star.
Although the outfit was formed in Jamalpur district, its terrorist campaign is based in
the North Bengal region, The Daily Star reported on August 28, 2005. Rahman's
relatives in Dinajpur and Rajshahi districts helped him expand his organisational
activities in these districts.
29
Name of the
Organization
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
According to Growing Fanaticism and Extremism in Bangladesh: Shades of Taliban,
published by the then opposition political party, the Awami League, the JMB is active
in Dinajpur, Jaypurhat, Jamalpur and Bagerhat districts.36
Objectives and
Ideology
The Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Party of the Mujahideen) aims at establishing
the rule of Islam in Bangladesh through an armed struggle. The outfit is opposed to the
establishment of democracy and calls for the conduct of government under Islamic law.
On August 17, 2005, while claiming responsibility for the serial blasts through leaflets,
in Bangla and Arabic, left at the site of the explosions across the country, the JMB said:
"We're the soldiers of Allah. We've taken up arms for the implementation of Allah's law
the way Prophet, Sahabis and heroic Mujahideen have done for centuries… It is time to
implement Islamic law in Bangladesh. There is no future with man-made law”.
The JMB said the blasts were its "third call" to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh. "If
ignored and [if] our people are arrested or persecuted, Jama'atul Mujahideen will take
the counter-action," the leaflets said. They also warned the United States and Britain
against occupation of Muslim lands: "It is also to warn Bush and Blair to vacate
Muslim countries, or to face Muslim upsurge."
Espousing a radical variant of Islam, the outfit is opposed to cultural functions, cinema
halls, shrines and NGOs. One of the objectives of JMB is to free Muslims of the
influence of 'anti-Islam forces' and practices that brought women out of their houses.37
Cadres and
Organization
The outfit is known to maintain about 10,000 fulltime and 100,000 part-time cadres.
Reports also suggest that there are approximately 10 lakh trainees of the outfit.
The cadres belong to a varied spectrum of the society, including teachers of
universities, Madrassas and ordinary people. There are different wings of the outfit,
including those related to finance, public relations, external links and the publicity and
recruitment wing, which is reportedly the largest of them all. While a relatively small
wing looks after armed training, the intelligence wing has cells in different political and
non-governmental organisations.38
Weaponry
An analysis of the seizures from JMB cadres and their hideouts indicate that the outfit
uses or has access to time bombs, detonators, petrol bombs and RDX explosives.
Militants of the JMB are known to receive extensive training in explosive making. The
JMB's involvement in the August 17, 2005 country-wide bombings is also a pointer
towards its explosive making and planting expertise.
The JMB is also reported to be procuring its arms and explosives from militant groups
in Pakistan, Myanmar, Thailand, India and China, which are brought into the country
through land and sea routes.39
Finance
The JMB has reportedly received funds from individual donors in countries like
Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Libya. Several international
NGOs such as the Kuwait-based Revival of Islamic Heritage and Doulatul Kuwait,
UAE-based Al Fuzaira, Khairul Ansar Al Khairia, Bahrain-based Doulatul Bahrain and
Saudi Arabia-based Al Haramaine Islamic Institute have provided, over the years, a
generous amount of funding to the outfit.
The JMB and its leaders are reported to have invested in a large number of shrimp
farms and cold storages in the south-western region of Bangladesh. The outfit is also
alleged to be involved in activities such as money laundering which ensures a steady
flow of finances to its coffers. Funds through the Hundi (illegal money transfer
36
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
38
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
39
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
37
30
Name of the
Organization
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
mechanism) channel are generated through operatives in places such as Dhaka, Jessore
and Chittagong.
JMB cadres and students of Madrassas affiliated to the outfit collect tolls regularly for
running the organisation, according to The Daily Star.
JMB leader Asadullah Ghalib, who is also the Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh chief,
after his arrest on February 23, 2005, admitted to have spent 'crores of taka' for building
mosques and seminaries, giving military-style training to Madrassa students and other
organisational works. Similarly, JMB chief Abdur Rahman's international connections
are spread over few Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia.40
Name of the
Organization
Hizb-ut-Tahrir
Formation
The man who established Hib-ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh was a Jamaat supporter and
reportedly he still has Jamaat connection. After the organization was banned on 22
October 2009, its leaders went into hiding. The organization was founded in 1953
in Jerusalem by Alem Shaiyekh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani. The organization then
expanded to non-Arab and non-Muslim countries including USA and UK. The
organization was established in Bangladesh with the support of its UK branch. A
Professor of Management in Dhaka University returned from the UK and
established Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh in 2001
Current Status
Hizb-ut-Tahrir has been banned in 23 countries. These are: the USA, Russian
Federation, Pakistan, Denmark, Holland, France, Sudan, Qatar, Oman, Jordan,
Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Kirgyzstan, Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, Tunisia and Bangladesh. Other than that, governments of the
following countries are vigilant of their activities: Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia,
and Brunei Darussalam.
The organization has been banned in Bangladesh mainly for the following reasons:
challenging the prevailing system in the country, making provokative statements
about neighbouring countries, commenting that the Middle Eastern countries are
dictator- ruled and making comments on the Bangladesh Army.
Leadership
At present the chief coordinator and spokesman of the Bangladesh branch of this
organization is a teacher of Business Administration of Dhaka University. The
organization has 2000 workers and more than 1 lac supporters. There are 18 cases
against Hizb-ut-Tahrir in different areas of Bangladesh including Dhaka and cases
against more than 100 leaders of this organization. Eight leaders of this
organization are currently in jail.
Two of the 9 members comprising the special central committee of Hizb-ut-Tahrir
are teachers of Dhaka University. The Bangladesh branch of Hizb-ut-Tahrir is
mainly controlled by 4 leaders.41
Objectives and
Ideology
Its aim is to resume the Islamic way of life and to convey the Islamic Call to the
world. This objective means bringing the Muslims back to living an Islamic way of
life in Dar al-Islam (the domain of Islam) and in an Islamic society such that all of
life's affairs in society are administered according to the Shari'ah laws. The Party,
as well, aims at the correct revival of the Islamic Ummah through enlightened
thought. It also strives to bring it back to its previous might and glory. The
40
41
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMB.htm, accessed on 10th Feb 2011.
Sangbad, 25 October 2009
31
Name of the
Organization
Hizb-ut-Tahrir
organization believes in armed Jihad.
Areas of activity
and influence
Hizb ut-Tahrir started to carry the Islamic call within some of the Arab countries. It
then proceeded to expand the delivery of the Islamic call naturally until it began to
function in many Arab countries and in non-Arab Muslim countries as well.42
Hizb ut Tahrir is recruiting followers at Bangladesh’s universities and several of its
student activists have recently been arrested in the country for distributing
inflammatory leaflets. It uses the examples of Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and
Western countries’ policies as the grounds for recruiting – saying that its own
policies will bring Bangladesh into a “Golden Age”, as once Islam experienced.
Derogatory cartoons in the West or adverse Papal utterances would present the
grounds for a Hizb ut Tahrir protest and recruitment drive.43
Activists
Most leaders and supporters of this organization are students and teachers of public
and private universities. The centre of activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir is the Dhaka
University and these are then spread to other universities.
Linkages
Hizb-ut-Tahrir is suspected of involvement with proscribed Jama'atul Mujahideen
Bangladesh (JMB) and other forms of religious extremism and militancy in the
country and elsewhere. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) finds the statements of
Hizb-ut-Tahrir and JMB as similar in nature, even though RAB is yet to trace HT’s
link or involvement in terrorist activity in Bangladesh.44
Finance
Hizb ut Tahrir garners support and funds for its Bangladeshi designs in Bangladesh
and in the UK.45
Activities
Hizb ut-Tahrir gave a press release in its website on 13 January 2011 saying that it
would campaign this month (January 2011) exposing the government's treacherous
policies against the country and crusade against Islam for the past two years. As
part of this campaign, the party published a dossier entitled, ‘Two Years of Sheikh
Hasina Government: Policies to serve US-Britian-India and Crusade against Islam.'
The party planned to organize further activities in major cities of the country from
14 - 30 January 2011, mobilizing public opinion against government policies and
urging the people, ulama, politicians, intellectuals and the people of power to
remove the Hasina government and establish the Khilafah.46
Hizb ut-Tahrir distributed thousands of fliers across the country from 21-24
January (2011), “exposing two years of the Hasina government's treachery against
the country and crusade against Islam”. Members and activists of the party
distributed the fliers in various cities which included Dhaka, Chittagong, Sylhet,
Rajshahi, Khulna, Barisal, Comilla, Brahmanbaria, and Mymensingh. They
interacted with the general people as well as ulama, politicians, intellectuals and
people of power.
Hizb ut-Tahrir warned the Muslims that there was no difference between Sheikh
Hasina's Awami League government and Khaleda Zia's BNP alliance government.
According to this Islamist outfit, both are subservient to and agents of US-BritainIndia; and they are unified upon implementing the kufr democratic system. The
party called upon the people, ulama, politicians, intellectuals and army officers to
42
http://74.50.48.172/info/english.php/contents_en/entry_269, accessed on 8 Feb 2011.
http://bangladeshwatchdog.blogspot.com/2010/04/hizb-ut-tahrir-target-bangladesh.html, accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
44
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/09/hizbuttahrir_bangladesh_islami.php, accessed on 8 Feb 2011.
45
http://bangladeshwatchdog.blogspot.com/2010/04/hizb-ut-tahrir-target-bangladesh.html, accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
46
http://74.50.48.172/info/english.php/contents_en/entry_11271, accessed on 9th Feb 2011.
43
32
Name of the
Organization
Hizb-ut-Tahrir
fulfill their Islamic duty of removing the Hasina government and the entire AwamiBNP ruling regime.47
Hizb-ut-Tahrir has published 24 books to express its views and rules: Islami Jibon
Bidhan, Islami Shashon Babostha, Islamer Orthonoitik Babostha, Islamer Shomaj
Babostha, Dal Gothoner Prokria, Hizb-ut-Tahrirer Chintashomuho, Islami
Rashtro, Islami Baktitto (3 volumes), Hizb-ut-Tahrirer Rajnoitik Dharonashomuho,
Hisb-ut-Tahrirer Rajnoitik Drishtibhongi, Shongbidhaner Bhumika, Khilafat,
Kibhabe Khilafatke Dhongsho Kora Holo, Islami Dandabidhi, Islamer Shakkher
Bidhibidhan, Markshio Communismer Jobab, Chinta, Moner Obosthan, Islami
Chinta, Poshchima Pujibadi Totto’Theory Of Liability’r Jobab, Ushno Ahoban,
Adorsho Orthonoitik Niti, Baitul Maal o Islami Nafsia’r Oti Proyojonio
Bishoeshomuho.
Capabilities
On 31 August 2009, more than 200 members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir attempted a
demonstration in front of the Baitul Mukarram mosque after the Friday Jumma
prayer. The policemen who were present at the venue in disguise tried to disperse
the crowd but the Hizb-ut-Tahrir members attacked them. During this incident,
enormous traffic jam was created and the general public present at the prayer were
terrorized. Thirty members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir were arrested and found 138 sticks,
64 banners consisting of anti-government statements and different festoons.48
Arrests
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Eight members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir were arrested on 27 December 2010 in
Noakhali, and different leaflets, Jihadi books and 1 lac 40 thousand Taka in
cash were recovered. These arrestees used to receive money from different
countries including Libya and Bahrain.49
A member of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, who was arrested in Chittagong, divulged the
name of the coordinator of the organization in Chittagong who is a teacher of
Arabic Studies in International Islami University. Police informed that this
university was under the influence of Jamaat-e-Islami, as many teachers and
workers in this university were thought to be leaders of Jamaat at different
levels.50
There are accusations against Hizb-ut-Tahrir for having a nexus with
Rohingya refugees from Myanmar.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir tries to publicize that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is an agent
of India and the USA and is responsible for the Pilkhana tragedy.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir has also been blamed for publishing provocative posters
against the Bangladesh army and posting offensive accusations against the
government on websites.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir has been accused of being involved in the attack on Barrister
Sheikh Fazle Noor Taposh on 21October 2009.51
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members are reported to be based in Kataban, Elephant Road,
New Market, Uttara, Banani in Dhaka and also in Savar, Narayanganj, Tongi
and Gazipur, from where they are carrying out their activities. In addition,
there is a training centre of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the deep forests of Kumira area
47
http://74.50.48.172/info/english.php/contents_en/entry_11433, accessed on 8th Feb 2011.
Sangbad, 1st September, 2009
49
Sangbad, 28th December, 2009
50
Sangbad, 1st March, 2010
51
Sangbad, 1 March 2010
48
33
Name of the
Organization
Trends
Strategy
Hizb-ut-Tahrir
in Chittagong. A member known as Mohiuddin trains them there. There are
even accusations regarding Jamaat supporting policemen helping them.52
•
Around 20/25 members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir carried out a demonstration-meeting
in Chittagong against the government and hung banners in front of the press
club. Although there was a group of policemen nearby, none was arrested.53
•
A coordinator of banned Islamist outfit Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh was
arrested from his house in Mohammadpur of Dhaka on 21 April 2010.54
•
The Chief coordinator of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh was also arrested on
19 April 2010 and taken on remand. According to him, there are around
18000-20000 workers in Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Among them, around 80-90% are
students. The organization is run on subscriptions from the members and at
least 2 lac Taka is raised every month in this way.55
•
According to a source, members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir displayed videos of
tortured Muslims in Muslim countries including Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran to
young people in Bangladesh to indoctrinate them. They also used a movie
called ‘The Message’ to influence students to join Hizb-ut-Tahrir. They train
members on how to promote Islamic rule in the country.56
•
Police arrested 7 members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir on 2 May 2010 for distributing
leaflets in 4 different areas of Dhaka. These leaflets consisted of provocative
messages against the SAARC summit and the government. Police found a
large number of leaflets from the arrested members.57
•
After the militant outfit Hizb-ut-Tahrir was banned, the members added the
words “Ulai’Ah” to the organization’s name. Ulai’Ah is the name of the
decision making committee of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. This committee is present in
every country in which this organization operates. They also have 10 training
locations in Dhaka. Some of these are located in Kataban, Banani, Khailgaon
Chowdhurypara, Dhanmondi, Mirpur, etc.58
•
On 2 May 2010, 3 members of this organization were also arrested in
Chittagong while distributing leaflets.59
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members are now sending letters against the government and the
opposition BNP to different media offices and people including journalists and
editors. After the arrest of the top leaders, the activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir are being
controlled from Britain through e-mail and phone. About 9-10 Bangladeshis, who
are British citizens, are controlling these activities from Britain.60
The party claims to adhere to the Islamic Shari'ah in all aspects of its work and to
take its methodology from that of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) that he used to
establish the first Islamic State in Madinah. The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)
limited his struggle for the establishment of the Islamic State to the intellectual and
political domains. Hence the party considers violence or armed struggle against the
regime a violation of the Islamic Shari'ah.61
52
Sangbad, 14 March 2010
Sangbad, 16 April 2010
54
Sangbad, 22 April 2010
55
Sangbad, 22 April 2010
56
Sangbad, 23 April 2010
57
Sangbad, 3 May 2010
58
Sangbad, 3 May 2010
59
Sangbad, 3 May 2010
60
Sangbad, 20 May 2010
61
http://74.50.48.172/info/english.php/contents_en/entry_267, accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
53
34
Name of the
Organization
Islam-o- Muslim
Formation
A new Jihadi outfit emerged under the name of Islam-o-Muslim, believed to be a
dissident breakaway faction of JMB. It came to light when the Detective Branch
(DB) of the Bangladesh police apprehended a JMB terrorist in Dhaka’s Fakirerpool
district on June 28, 2009. Another such arrest was made on June 30 from Gazipur
district. The arrestee claimed to be the chief of IoM. He formed IoM following an
internal feud growing within the ranks of the JMB, primarily over financial and
ideological matters.62
Current Status
After a string of arrests, the elite counterterrorism outfit Rapid Action Battalion
(RAB) claimed they had foiled IoM’s attempt to expand its activities by arresting
many of its top leaders in a stepped-up crackdown on the terrorist infrastructure in
Bangladesh.63
Leadership
All the leaders of the new offshoot were close aides to the executed militant
kingpin of JMB, Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai. These leaders faked their
identity and operated their activities under the shelter of their business. Some of
them were former members of the JMB’s Majlis-e-Shura (Council of Advisors) and
alumni of Islami Chhatra Shibir (the student wing of Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh).
Areas of activity
and influence
Primarily, the activists of Islam-o-Muslim targeted the educational and religious
institutions as their main camp.
They have an aim to dominate an area comprised of Gomastapur, Shibganj and
Bholahat upazilas of Chapainawabganj, Bagmara of Rajshahi and Raninagar and
Atrai of Naogaon.
Trends
They opted to wage an armed struggle (Jihad) with small arms rather than their
usual usage of bombs. The newly-formed organization also started training their
members in arms and bullet manufacturing. Although the number of its members
could not be ascertained, it is alleged that its leaders were in charge of recruiting
new members from active as well as inactive members of JMB in Chapai
Nawabganj, Rajshahi and Naogaon districts.
The JMB-minded activists were being recruited in the administration of the
government to get confidential data, information easily.
Strategy
The innocent students of Madrassaa were their target groups indoctrinating into
their ideology. To that end, they circulated leaflets, Jihadi books, etc. among the
students.
The IoM aims to wage jihad with small arms, focusing on weapons and
ammunition manufacturing in their hideouts. IoM cadres vehemently oppose many
of the JMB’s activities, especially bomb blasts. Instead, they have chosen
assassination-style killings with small arms as their main tactic.64
62
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35326, accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35326, accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
64
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35326, accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
63
35
Name of the
Organization
Formation
Objectives
Current Status of
LeT
Laskar-e-Taiba:
For more than a decade, Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba have been
carrying out its activities in Bangladesh, says intelligence officials.
According to the Dhaka Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Mufti Obaidullah was
working to organize terrorist networks with the help of Kashmir-based Lashkar-eTaiba. Mufti Obaidullah had been living in Bangladesh with his family since
1995.65
Mufti Obaidullah said that he had planned to eliminate the Hindus and the enemies
of Muslims by forming a group.66
Going well beyond its Kashmir roots, reports suggest that LeT is establishing its
presence in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
Within a span of six days, Bangladesh authorities arrested four high profile LeT
operatives with smuggled exotic dutiable products and large amounts of explosives
and other bomb making materials. The detainees included Khurram (a.k.a
Mohammad Salem), LeT's chief coordinator (The Daily Star [Dhaka], Oct 05). The
latest arrests revealed that LeT operatives used Bangladesh as a transit point for
counterfeit currency and as a fertile ground for jihadi recruitment.67
“What they [LeT] have been able to do is lay a very solid foundation [in
Bangladesh]. They’re playing for the longer game. They’re building up the
infrastructure, building up the support networks,” says John Harris, a terrorism
expert at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Experts
concur there is no direct evidence of ISI involvement, and disagree over how big a
threat LeT poses in Bangladesh. The group’s size and strength here remain
unclear.68
Linkages
Investigations into number of terror strikes in Bangladesh occurring between May
2004 and December 2005 have revealed, rather unearthed, a lethal nexus between
the two Pakistan based terror groups, Lashkar- e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami,
and a couple of mainstream political parties in Bangladesh. It also revealed how
they teamed up to score a political point by assassinating rival political leaders.
The LeT had sent a cache of ‘Arges’ grenades to HuJI’s Bangladesh franchise
which were used in at least seven major terror attacks, six of them targeting then
opposition Awami League leaders, including AL president and present Prime
Minster Sheikh Hasina and Awami League legislator and former finance minister
Shah AMS Kibria, and British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury. These
deadly Austrian manufactured Arges grenades (allegedly counterfeited by Pakistan
military/ISI) have been used by Pakistan-based terrorists and more recently used in
Mumbai 2008 attacks.69
Activities
•
On 17 July 2009, the trainer of Laskar-e-Taiba in Bangladesh, Mufti Sheikh
Obaidullah alias Maulana Abu Zafar was arrested from the Babu Bazaar bridge
area in Dhaka. He had been providing militant training in different Madrassas
in Bangladesh in the name of teaching. He is an Indian citizen and he had been
trained in guerrilla war and creating and operating weapons in Afghanistan. He
has informed that there are 5 other leaders located in Bangladesh including
Mufti Habibullah and Mufti Shahjahan who are most wanted criminals in India.
65
http://www.bangladeshihindu.com/lashkar-e-taiba-planned-to-eliminate-the-hindus-in-bangladesh/, accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
http://www.bangladeshihindu.com/lashkar-e-taiba-planned-to-eliminate-the-hindus-in-bangladesh/, accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
67
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37056&cHash=b2f2164427, accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
68
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0805/Pakistani-militants-expand-abroad-starting-inBangladesh/%28page%29/2, accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
69
http://asiasecurity.macfound.org/blog/entry/111terror_and_politics_lashkar-e-taiba_huji_and_assassinations_in_banglades/,
accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
66
36
Name of the
Organization
Laskar-e-Taiba:
He informed that although he had contacts with Laskar-e-Taiba, he was not a
member of the organization. The name of his organization is Harkat-ul-Jihadi
Islam. However, it is currently inactive due to his stay in Bangladesh for a long
time. He also claimed to have contacts with the HuJI leader Mufti Hannan.70
•
Mufti Sheikh Obaidullah also informed that Laskar-e-Taiba had provided
money, training and weapons to the banned militant organisation HuJI.
Obaidullah was responsible for the transfer of militants between India,
Bangladesh and Pakistan. He had even sent Jihadi militants from Bangladesh to
Pakistan and Afghanistan several times. He also disclosed that the militants
considered Bangladesh to be a safe ground because it is easy to enter the
country through the borders; the detective and intelligence activities are weak
and it it easy to make passports with some money. When he was asked how a
foreigner could manage to get employment in a madrassa, he replied that no
governmental papers were required in the Quomi Madrassas in this country.71
•
Obaidullah is the head of the militant outfit ‘Asif Reza Commando Force’.72
•
On 20 July 2009, top organizer and trainer of Laskar-e-Taiba, Indian citizen
Maulana Mansur Ali alias Maulana Habibullah was arrested from a Madrassa
in the Dakkhinkhan area in Dhaka. He also used to work with HuJI. Both
Maulana Habibullah and Obaidullah had entered Bangladesh through the
border areas in 1995. According to Habibullah, the Indian law enforcers see
him as the chief organizer of the militant outfit ‘Asif Reza Commando Force’
and a most wanted criminal. He also admitted that he had contacts with HuJI
members, especially with Mufti Hannan, Maulana Abdul Rouf and Maulana
Ali Ahammad. However, he did not come to Bangladesh for destruction, he
said.73
•
On 23 July 2009, a suspected member of Laskar-e-Taiba, Muhaddis Maulana
Obaidullah was arrested from Satkhira. According to Maulana Habibullah’s
statement, Laskar-e-Taiba is not supportive of the Maududi followers
comprising Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. He also admitted that the members of
Pakistan-based militant outfit were working with an aim to wage an armed
struggle. Mansur was quoted as admitting to the Task Force for Interrogation
(TFI) on the first day of his seven-day remand that he was an arms expert.74
•
Although he did not approve of the activities of one of the divisions of Jamaate-Islami Bangladesh, he had regular contacts with the members of that
organization in order to take advice from them. After obtaining the call list of
one of the mobile phones of Maulana Habibullah, it was confirmed that he had
regular contacts with the top leader of one of the divisions of Islami Oikkojot.
It was also found from his call list that he had contacts with several top leaders
of 2-3 Islamist groups. Maulana Habibullah knew about the 21st August
grenade attack, the bomb blast in Ramna Batomul and the grenade attack in the
CPB meeting. He revealed that during the beginning of HuJI activities, the
organization used to receive finance from Laskar-e-Taiba and a temporary
intelligence agency in a neighbouring Muslim country.75
•
The top leaders of the Pakistani militant outfit Laskar-e-Taiba had chosen the
Qoumi Madrassas in Bangladesh as their safe hideouts. They would carry out
70
Sangbad, 18th July, 2009
Sangbad, 20th July, 2009
72
Sangbad, 20th July, 2009
73
Sangbad, 22nd July, 2009
74
The Daily Star, 23 July 2009.
75
Sangbad, 23rd July, 2009
71
37
Name of the
Organization
Laskar-e-Taiba:
militant activities in disguise of Madrassa teachers. Fifteen Quomi madrassas
have already been listed. These militant leaders also had contacts with the top
leaders of several Islamist organizations who have been helping these militants
since the time they had entered Bangladesh. According to information provided
by Maulana Habibullah, after the Soviet war in Afghanistan had ended, 10 top
leaders of Laskar-e-Taiba had decided in Pakistan to enter and work in
Bangladesh. After the synchronized bomb blasts of 17 August, 4 of the 10
Laskar-e-Taiba leaders had fled to India and Pakistan. Two of them have
already been arrested; the others are still in hiding. Information received from
organizations conducting research on militants and detective agencies in
neighbouring countries reveals that most of the militant organizations,
including Laskar-e-Taiba, are warriors returning from Afghanistan. Not only
are these militants experts in operating weapons, they are also trained in
creating weapons if provided with necessary equipment and materials. The
militants of Laskar-e-Taiba have chosen Quomi Madrassas as their safe
hideouts because of several reasons. Firstly, since they become involved in
religious teaching in these Madrassas, they are able to avoid arousing
suspicion. Secondly, it becomes easier to come or remain in contact with the
members of their own organizations as well as the members of other similar
organizations. Finally, a large portion of the funds transferred by foreigners
through NGOs for the establishment of Quomi Madrassas in the country was
allocated among the militant organizations.76
•
The leaders of Laskar-e-Taiba, including Maulana Obaidullah and Maulana
Habibullah, know Osama Bin Laden. In the late 1970s, the Mujahids of India,
Pakistan and Bangladesh were introduced to him. Detective sources have
informed that the militant outfit Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami-Bangladesh is
actually the combination of 5 Pakistan-based militant outfits. Around 13000
Bangladeshi Mujahids returned from Afghanistan after the Afghan-Soviet war.
Previously, when they were located in Pakistan and Afghanistan, they had been
involved with the militant outfits- HuJIB, Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, Hizb-ulMujahidin, Laskar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Activities of different
suspected NGOs are being investigated and the operations of two NGOs have
been stopped- Saudi Arabia-based Al Haramain and Kuwait-based Revival of
Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS).77
•
The warriors in Bangladesh, who had returned from Afghanistan in the
company of the top leaders of militant outfits in India and Pakistan, had been
trying to establish a militant organization similar to Al Qaeda. These returnee
warriors have been trying to instill Islamic Sharia in India. They used the
Quomi Madrassas in Bangladesh, which are directed by the former students of
the Deoband Madrassa of India, to help them hide their identities. Six
Madrassas from Jessore, Habiganj and Madaripur helped the militants.78
•
On 30 September 2009, the Bangladesh chief of Laskar-e-Taiba and Asif Reza
Commando Force, Emdadullah alias Mahbub, was arrested from Gabtoli in
Dhaka. He had been staying in Bangladesh for the previous three years using 9
fake names. He had attended secret meetings with HuJI leaders and they had
planned to attack Bangladesh and India. He had previously been arrested in
India and, after escaping from there, he had come to Bangladesh by crossing
the border illegally. During this time, he even visited Pakistan to receive
training in operating weapons by making a passport with a fake identity. He
76
Sangbad, 24 July 2009
Sangbad, 26 July 2009
78
Sangbad, 1 August 2009
77
38
Name of the
Organization
Laskar-e-Taiba:
had contacts with Indian militants and HuJI members in Bangladesh. Four or
five leaders of Laskar-e-Taiba and Asif Reza Commando Force have been
hiding in Dhaka.79
•
On 3 November 200980, police arrested 3 militants from Sirajul Ulum Al
Islamia Quomi Madrassa in Chittagong. These arrestees are- Mufti Harun
Izhar- son of Mufti Izharul Islam, the Chairman of Islami Oikkojot and 2 other
militants of Laskar-e-Taiba- Saiful Al Amin and Shahidul alias Sujan. These
arrestees have been found to have connections with Laskar-e-Taiba and Al
Qaeda. These militants along with some other militants were planning to attack
some embassies, including the American embassy and the Indian High
Commission and they even participated in reconnaissance. The arrestees
confessed that they had even received Taka 6 lac from Pakistan through a
particular bank. This money was initially sent to them for purchasing materials
required for making explosives. Eight other militants were involved in this
plan.81
•
The subversion of the embassies was planned by Laskar-e-Taiba members in
Pakistan and several meetings were held at Sirajul Ulum Al Islamia Madrassa
in Chittagong. Four to five Indian and Pakistani citizens, who had been hiding
in Bangladesh, were directly involved in this plan.82
•
On 13 November 2009, 3 other members of Laskar-e-Taiba, who were related
to the plan of attacking the American embassy and the Indian High
Commission were arrested from Uttara and Tongi. The arrestees are- Syed
Abdul Kayyum Azhari alias Sufian (22),who was an agent of Laskar-e-Taiba,
Md. Ashraf alias Jahid (24) and Md. Monowar Ali alias Monowar (30).83
•
Pakistani militants have been planning to launch suicide attacks in Bangladesh.
New militants are gathered and sent to Pakistan, especially in the deep forests
of the mountains there, in order to train them. These militants have been taking
shelter in the mountainous areas of the country and they have been gathering
and training poor, Rohingya young men in militancy. Reasons why Laskar-eTaiba members are able to run their activities in Bangladesh include the
geographic location of Bangladesh, the religious views of people in this
country and a weak law enforcement body. Besides, it is easy to make
passports and the militants can keep their identities a secret even while working
as a teacher in a Madrassa.84
•
A connection has been found between the arrested Laskar-e-Taiba militant
Emdadullah alias Mahbub and the CPB grenade attack of 2001.85
•
The arrested militants informed that many Laskar-e-Taiba militants from
Pakistan arrived in Bangladesh with a tourist visa. These militants are
employed in different educational institutions, garments industries, etc. Besides
the HuJI, some leaders of a specific religion based political party in Bangladesh
have been supporting them. Some NGOs in this country have been looking
after the financial side of the group.86
•
On 20 November 2009, the agent of Laskar-e-Taiba in Bangladesh, Motaleb
79
Sangbad, 2 October 2009
Sangbad, 14th November, 2009
81
Sangbad, 7 November 2009
82
Sangbad, 11November 2009
83
Sangbad, 14 November 2009
84
Sangbad, 15 November 2009
85
Sangbad, 15 November 2009
86
Sangbad, 16 November 2009
80
39
Name of the
Organization
Laskar-e-Taiba:
alias Motu, was arrested from Motijheel, Dhaka. He had previously fought in
the Afghan-Soviet war. He has even trained HuJI militants. He was the chief
coordinator of the plan regarding destruction of the American and the Indian
diplomatic missions.87
•
On 7 April 2010, Mubasshir Shahid alias Iyahia, a Laskar-e-Taiba militant, was
arrested from the Chankharpool area of Dhaka. He was a financial supporter of
the militant outfit and he also used to transfer message from one place to
another. He mainly used to work as a coordinator of the organization.88
Name of the
Organization
Jaish-e-Muhammed:
Formation
The Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) is a relatively new terrorist outfit, formed,
controlled and manned by Pakistan. The outfit was launched on January 31, 2000,
by Maulana Masood Azhar in Karachi after he was released from an Indian jail
during the terrorists for hostage swap of December 31, 1999, following the
hijacking of the Indian Airlines Flight IC 814.89
A Pakistani, Rezwan Ahmed, came to Bangladesh under the command of the chief
of the militant outfit Jaish-e-Muhammad, Masood Azhar. Rezwan was staying in
the country for the last three years and operating from there. He was freely moving
between India and Bangladesh.90
Objective
Their objective is to train extremists who are then used for launching terror attacks
in India. This organization is mainly using Bangladesh as a shelter and as a route to
India. The outfit, like other militant outfits in J&K, claims to be using violence to
force a withdrawal of Indian security forces from J&K.
Leadership
Rezwan had been working as a coordinator of Jaish-e-Muhammed in Bangladesh
and also a recruiting agent for conducting operations in India.91
Linkages
Some Islamist leaders participated in several meetings with the top leaders of Jaishe-Muhammed. Two brothers were given the responsibility of directing the activities
of the militant outfit in Bangladesh.92
It is reported that JeM and LeT have joined hands with the HuJI of Bangladesh to
destabilise India taking the strategic advantage of the eastern border. The
Bangladesh-based HuJI, linked to the JeM and LeT, is allegedly recruiting Indian
youths, sending them to Pakistan for training and re-inducting them via Bangladesh
to carry out terrorist attacks. It is understood that the western border of India was
relatively tough for Pakistani militants but the eastern border with Bangladesh had
become more useful for them which they used for sneaking into India and foreign
militants were utilising southern Bengal border for anti-Indian activities.93
Finances
It is reported that JeM gets funds from the Taliban and from Osama bin Laden.94
87
Sangbad, 22 November 2009
Sangbad, 9 April 2010
89
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm,
accessed on 9 Feb 2011.
90
http://idsa.in/idsacomments/AnotherPakistan-basedTerrorGroupExposedinBangladesh_akumar_040310, accessed on 10 Feb 2011.
91
http://gurumia.com/2010/02/28/bangladesh-detains-suspected-5-pakistani-militants/, accessed on 10 Feb 2011.
92
Sangbad, 4 March 2010
93
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm,
accessed on 10 Feb 2011.
94
http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/21spec.htm, accessed on 10 Feb 2011.
88
40
Name of the
Organization
Jaish-e-Muhammed:
Areas of Activity
JeM was set in recruiting locals for the terror outfit and sending them for training in
Pakistan. During interrogation, Rezwan revealed that he had been trained to operate
AK-47, machine guns, sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and explosive
devices.95
Activities
On 28 February 2010, The Rapid Action Battalion arrested a Pakistani national and
four locals for suspected links to Pakistan-based militant group Jaish-e-Muhammed
(JeM).
Of the five, Billal was arrested near the foot-bridge in front of New Market and the
rest including Rezwan were rounded up in Sukanya Tower, an apartment block
adjacent to Gausia Market on Mirpur Road.
Billal had been jailed in India for involvement in hijacking an Indian Airlines plane
in December 1999. After serving out 10 years in Guwahati prison, he recently fled
back home.
This is the first time that law enforcers here have captured suspected members of
JeM.
In a pre-dawn raid on a flat in the Sukanya Tower, the crime busters also
seized three passports, two of them issued in Pakistan, one knife, one CPU,
four national ID cards, five mobile phones and 2,000 Indian rupees. The
passports belong to Rezwan, Billal and another Pakistani named Jawad.96
•
Before being arrested, these militants were making a plan on launching
suicide bomb attacks on different rail stations in Bangladesh and India.
Several meetings of the group have been conducted in the two buildings of
Mohiuddin-Sukonna Tower in Dhaka and his house in Hajiganj in
Chandpur.97
•
Members of this organisation are taking shelter in the border areas of
Chittagong, Khulna and Satkhira.98
4.
THREAT ASSESSMENT
4.1
Nature, Types and Extent of Threat
Following the end of the Afghan-Soviet war, many Bangladeshi Mujahedeen (Afghan
veterans) returned to Bangladesh in the 1990s, indoctrinated with a new political
ideology of Jihad. Some of these groups of Afghan Mujahedeen, like Harakatul Jihad alIslami Bangladesh, Jamatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh
and Ahl-e-Hadith Andolon Bangladesh, vowed to turn Bangladesh into an Islamic state
through Jihad. Following the events of 9/11, these groups felt even more motivated to
take their cause to a higher level.
The majority of Bangladesh’s populace consists of moderate Muslims and Islam plays an
important role in their lives. They lead a secular way of life and support the secular
nature of the Bangladesh state. Such Bangladeshis have no toleration for a theocratic
government or religious violence. However, regular reports of arrests from around the
95
http://idsa.in/idsacomments/AnotherPakistan-basedTerrorGroupExposedinBangladesh_akumar_040310, accessed on 10 Feb 2011.
The Daily Star, 1 Mar 2010.
97
Sangbad, 1 March 2010
98
Sangbad, 3 March 2010
96
41
country of militants, some of whom are members of international terrorist networks or
have links to such groups, demonstrate the clear and existential threat of terrorism in the
country.
Since 1999, Bangladesh has experienced a number of incidents of Islamist terrorism. A
process of Islamist radicalization, militancy and extremism has thus set in, culminating in
intermittent terrorist acts. Of all the terrorist groups, the Islamist terrorist groups have so
far demonstrated superior capabilities in exerting deep influence on the populace.
In its efforts to counter terrorism, the government of Bangladesh, as mentioned before,
has so far banned 5 Islamist extremist groups for their suspected militant connections: 1.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, 2. Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh, 3. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-IslamiBangladesh, 4. Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh and 5. Shahadat-e al Hikma. It is worth
noting that the lukewarm policy towards combating terrorism by the four-party alliance
government during 2001-2006 had encouraged terrorism both in political and religious
forms. Also, funding for religious terrorist activities was not curtailed significantly during
this period.
Islamist terrorism in Bangladesh includes the threat from extremist militant groups such
as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, JMB and HUJI-B. JMB and HUJI-B are fundamentally against all
tenets of the Bangladeshi state and society and seek to overthrow the secular government,
replace the Western-style court system, and establish a Taliban-style state in Bangladesh.
Many of HUJI-B’s most senior leaders are veterans of the Afghan-Soviet war.
Interestingly, it was the Al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, who provided critical
financial backing during the group’s infant stages. In the case of JMB, their ideology and
vision is the same as that of HUJI-B, despite them being a much younger outfit believed
to have been formed around 1998. As mentioned earlier, the JMB proved to be quite a
dangerous group, as was demonstrated by its ability to carry out the 500 coordinated
bomb blasts in 2005.
4.2
State-Society Vulnerabilities and Terrorist Capabilities
State-Society Vulnerabilities
Terrorism in Bangladesh continues to pose a serious threat to the peace and security of
the country by causing economic and political instability and destroying the fundamental
and traditional ethos on which state and society are founded. By targeting people and the
institutions of state which serve civilian needs, terrorism seeks to alter societies, subvert
established order and deny people their basic rights and freedoms. Therefore, society and
the state are especially vulnerable to the threat of terrorism from any of the local terrorist
outfits or those with linkages to Pakistan-based outfits.
Although Bangladesh is a democratic nation with a proper elected government, it is
nonetheless still a fragile state. This type of fragility is due to weak institutions, porous
borders, limited law enforcement capabilities, and in-fighting between the two major
political parties. The state’s vulnerability may be further compounded due to continued
42
endemic corruption, poverty, and a stalemated political process which could further
contribute to the type of instability and widespread frustration that has elsewhere
provided recruits, support, and safe haven to international terrorist groups.
Terrorist Capabilities
From the interrogation of arrested members of various terrorist groups in Bangladesh, it
appears that such groups still have the capability of carrying out deadly attacks.
Recently, law enforcement agencies arrested the leader of JMB, Mawlana Saidur
Rahman, who confessed during interrogation that JMB had around 400 full-time cadres
and 50,000 supporters in the country. He also said that the military wing of JMB would
be capable of launching spectacular attacks.99 He also admitted that JMB had divided the
country into 9 divisions and appointed some hardcore militants to operate the activities of
JMB. These divisions were as follows:
Operational Area
In charge
Dhaka Mahanagar
Mr. Shiblu alias Nazrul (arrested)
Dhaka (South)
Mr. Zahirul Islam alias Zahid ( arrested)
Dhaka (North)
Mr. Sohel Mahfuz ( Not arrested yet)
Khulna
Mr. Mehedi Hasan alias Abir
Chittagong
Mr. Tamim (Not arrested yet)
Rajshahi (two divisions)
Mr. Nazmul alias bhagina Shahid (Not arrested yet)
Barisal
Not reported
Sylhet
Not reported
Saidur Rahman also claimed that JMB had 3,000 bombs, 10 suicide belts, 25 trained
suicide bombers and that JMB members had also learned how to make a rocket
launcher.100
In addition to the arrest of Mawlana Saidur Rahman, Mr. Jahidul Islam alias Suman alias
Bomaro Mizan, chief operations commander of JMB, was arrested in Dhaka in May
2009. He confessed during interrogation that there were 25 members in JMB who could
make different types of bombs. The most notable point was that JMB members had
succeeded in producing these bombs using local materials.
Nexus with Foreign Terrorist Groups
In July 2009, Sheikh Obaidullah, chief organizer of Asif Reza Commando Force
(ARCF), was arrested in Bangladesh by police. ARCF, an Indian militant group, came
into prominence following the attack on the American Center in 2002 in Kolkata. He
99
Prothom Alo, 28 May 2010
Prothom Alo, 7 June 2010
100
43
confessed during interrogation that ARCF had close links with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
that had been involved in recruiting members for militant organizations in Bangladesh.101
Amin Rana, a specialist on terrorism in Pakistan, wrote in his book “Gateway to
Terrorism” that a banned militant outfit in Pakistan named “Sipahe Sahaba” had a branch
in Bangladesh. Mawlana Habibur Rahman was the chief organizer of this group. Rana
said that the militant organizations, active among the Rohingyas near the BangladeshMyanmar border, were directly controlled by a madrassa named Khalid- Bin-Walid from
Karachi, Pakistan.102
Sidney Jones, an expert on terrorism in International Crisis Group (ICG), said that the
militant groups of Bangladesh had a connection with Jemaya Islamiya of Indonesia. He
added that many militant leaders from Indonesia and Malaysia had visited the training
camps of the militants at Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban.103
In November 2009, police arrested three suspected LeT leaders - Shahidul Islam, Al
Amin and Mufti Harun Izahar- from a madrassa in Chittagong in connection with a plot
to attack the US embassy in Dhaka. The officials said they had caught the LeT men on
information provided by an Indian-born US national and a Pakistan-born US national
arrested in the US on charges of planning to attack embassies of the US, UK and India in
different countries. The US law enforcement agency, FBI, found out that there was a
connection between Abdur Rahman, a Pakistani member of LeT, with the two militants
arrested in the US. It was reported that these three militants arrested in Bangladesh
maintained contacts through mobile phone with Abdur Rahman that had been intercepted
by foreign intelligence agencies. They provided this information to the law enforcement
agencies in Bangladesh.104 In interrogation, Mufti Harun Izahar confessed that an amount
of six lakh taka came in the bank account of his brother Faizullah to execute this heinous
plan.105
4.3
Recent Trends in Radicalization, Extremism and Terrorism
The main targets for terrorists are secular institutions, political leaders and members of
the general public. Over the past few years, militant activities through bombings and
grenade attacks have decreased significantly. In recent times, their major activities have
included: regrouping, networking, training, preaching of ideology and abduction for
ransom.106
101
Prothom Alo, 17 July 2009
Prothom Alo, 5 August 2009
103
Ibid
104
Prothom Alo, 6 November 2009
105
Prothom Alo, 8 November 2009
106
Interview with an intelligence agency official, October 2010.
102
44
Recent reports suggest that terrorist groups are attempting to increasingly recruit females
to undertake militant activities. The main recruiting strategy is the jihadi propaganda by
distributing leaflets, handbills, CDs and books on Jihad.107
The dawati (proselytisation) unit of an outfit first selects youths from poor families in
rural areas or by visiting mosques, and they are then exposed to radical ideas and militant
cadres, in preparation for jihad.
For training, regrouping and preaching their jihadi ideology, the terrorist groups choose
remote villages, char and haor areas across the southwestern, northwestern and
northeastern districts of Bangladesh.108
In recent years, there is evidence that the Hizbut Tahrir, a pan-Islamic political
organization with an international presence, in Bangladesh, and Hizbut Tawhid, a local
militant outfit, have been recruiting mainly educated youth of a mostly middle-class
background. This, according to some, is more worrisome and potentially more menacing
than the other terrorist outfits, even though Hizbut Tahrir is officially against any
violence. However, experts in the United States say that it acts as a "conveyor belt" for
young Muslims, using its legal status to indoctrinate them before they leave the group to
join more extreme groups that may engage in violence.109
Reports have revealed that Jamaat-e-Islami is the umbrella organization under which
terrorist outfits like JMB and Hizbut Tahrir operate.110 There are also reports of these
groups forming a nexus with ultra-leftist terrorist groups operating in the southwest of the
country.
4.4
Terrorist Financing
The sources of terrorist funding in Bangladesh have become clearer in recent years.
Locally, terrorist groups are able to obtain money through kidnapping and ransom.
Additionally, terror groups also use Zakat funds, and remittances from Islamic charities
and workers abroad.
Groups such as JMB are reported to have fairly easy access to financing through multiple
sources of funding. These sources include “crop donations, a form of taxation in rural
areas” and local businesses. However, it receives the majority of its funds from Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait. JMB also relies heavily on transferring funds through the
Hawala/Hundi system and is involved in transnational crime, as was confessed to by a
key JMB leader who was involved in a counterfeiting ring run by LeT across South Asia,
as well as arms smuggling across the Indian border.111
107
“7 Hizbut Tawhid men held in Rajshahi”, 27 September 2010.
“Militants' 'ammo factory' busted”, The Daily Star, 25 March 2009.
109
Globe and Mail: Muslim movement offers alternative to Hamas
110
Shariar Kabir, “Jamat-e Islami & Islamic Militancy in Bangladesh”, November 2006.
111
“The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh”, Crisis Group Asia Report No. 187, 1 March 2010.
108
45
NGOs/Charities
In recent years, commentators have discussed the role of various NGOs in Bangladesh as
being susceptible instruments in the flow of terrorist funds. The fact that there are as
many as 100,000 NGOs in the country, with the vast majority of them not officially
registered, is of prime concern to law enforcement officials.112 There is therefore the
underlying problem, where several thousand of these NGOs are based in rural areas and
there is no mechanism for them to be monitored. Thus, in the absence of such a
mechanism, these NGOs may potentially be involved as conduits to the flow of funds
from various overseas charities. This problem was highlighted, in March 2010, when
Green Crescent, a UK-based NGO in Bhola, was found to be storing a good cache of
ammunition, explosive material and booklets on Osama Bin Laden and Jihad.113 The head
of the NGO was Faisal Mustafa, a British citizen, who confessed to owning some of the
arms. Investigators also discovered that Mustafa had had close links with the head of
JMB, Saidur Rahman, and also met Bangla Bhai on a number of occasions.114As a result
of the concern over large donations from Islamic charities in the Middle East, which may
be used for militancy activities, the government, in April 2010, revoked the licences of
2,931 NGOs for breaching government guidelines.115 The fact that the government took
such swift action is demonstrative of the fact it was are very serious about combating
militancy from groups within the country.
Counterfeit Currency
Bangladesh law enforcement authorities have, in recent times, been arresting a number of
people linked to local and regional militant groups who are in the business of producing a
large amount of fake currency, mainly of Indian Rupees and Bangladeshi Takas. Most
recently, Shafique Mahmud Selim, known by his alias of ‘Professor Selim’, was caught
with 50,000 Indian Rupees and 5,00,000 Takas in counterfeit currency. Under
interrogation, Selim confessed to working for both JMB and LeT in fake currency and
arms racketeering for several years. It appeared that Selim was an old hand at this, as he
was arrested and jailed by authorities two years ago.116 Investigation into such
racketeering has revealed the intricate means and method of such counterfeit operations.
For instance, fake Indian currency notes produced in Bangladesh are apparently sent to
Dubai, from where they are sent to Pakistan where local extremist groups disburse the
funds for terrorist activities.117
4.5
Terrorist Potential: Tactical Silence or Regrouping?
Reportedly, there are as many as 30 terrorist outfits in Bangladesh, but, as stated above,
five main groups have been proscribed by the Government. However, these banned
organizations are thought to be regrouping under different names and leadership with
112
Paul Cochrane, "The Funding Methods of Bangladeshi Terrorist Groups," CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, Issue 5
(May 2009), pp. 17-23
113
Julfikar Ali Manik, “Green Crescent Ran Illegally”, The Daily Star, 1 April 2010.
114
“Faisal now admits ownership of arms”, The Daily Star, April 16, 2009.
115
“Bangladesh Bans 3000 NGOs”, www.gurumia.com, April 6, 2010
116
“Arms dealer 'linked to militancy' held”, The Daily Star, April 4, 2010.
117
http://www.rediff.com/money/2008/dec/19mumterror-how-fake-currency-funds-terror.htm
46
new techniques of radicalization and planning for attacks and nexus with other such
outfits.
While Islamist extremists have not engaged in any act of overt violence in 2008 and
2009, groups like the Jamaatul Mujaheedin Bangladesh (JMB) continue to maintain an
active presence across the country, despite their proscription and the arrest of hundreds of
their cadres. Police sources suggested in June 2009 that JMB militants had started
regrouping in the remote villages of four Sub-Districts in Chapainawabganj. According to
the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), at least 5,000 JMB cadres remained active across the
country. The JMB is also reported to be seeking to ideologically mobilize new recruits, or
to entice them with offers of money.118
In an article published in Amader Shomoy, a leading Bangladesh daily newspaper, it was
reported that, in late 2009, leaders of different militant groups had a meeting inside
Dhaka Central Jail where they were being held. The militant leaders apparently discussed
forming a single unified platform to introduce Islamic rule in the country. Hizb-ut-Tahrir,
JMB and Harkat-ul-Jihad were to play a lead role in this operation. However, various law
enforcement agencies launched an operation and arrested several militant group
members.119
4.6
The Views of Foreign Governments about Terrorist Threat in Bangladesh
Since a newly elected government took over in January 2009, the Awami League-led
government pledged to combat terrorism with renewed vigour. The Prime Minister called
for the establishment of a regional task force to fight terrorism.
Bangladesh was visited by several important government officials from the United States,
EU member countries and elsewhere. Dignitaries visiting Bangladesh assured the new
government of all-out support in fighting terrorism. Richard Boucher, then United States
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, commented that the joint antiterror task force for South Asia was a positive idea and the US was waiting to see how
other countries would react and would look forward to supporting it in the event of its
formation. He met with Bangladesh’s Home Minister and discussed issues of
strengthening policing by RAB and the Bangladesh Police to eliminate terrorism. “Since
international terrorists incline to operate internationally, the international community can
get organized and cooperate with each other to prevent extremism” he said. A United
States Justice Department delegation also proposed a joint action plan to Bangladesh’s
Law Minister in strengthening the country’s law enforcement agencies, including RAB
and police, under a joint action plan to control “terrorism and militancy”.
In the State Department’s annual ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2009’, the United States
praised the government in its efforts to deny domestic and transnational terrorists safe
118
Bangladesh Assessment, South Asia Intelligence Review Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 8, No.
20, November 23, 2009. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair8/8_20.htm
119
http://policyresearchgroup.com/bangladesh/b_desh_faces_renewed_threat_from_islamist_militants.html
47
haven and targeting opportunities in Bangladesh. It also appreciated the fact that the
government delivered on its promise in combating terrorism, leading to the arrests of
several high-profile terrorism-related figures in Bangladesh, including some from
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).120
India also commended the Bangladesh government for tackling terrorism effectively, as
Bangladesh had helped India to arrest several senior members of the United Liberation
Front of Assam (ULFA). The Finance Minister of India, on a trip to Dhaka in August
2010, remarked that the government was doing an admirable job in tackling the menace
of terrorism: "We deeply appreciate the efforts of the government of Bangladesh to tackle
this menace and we will continue to be closely engaged”.121 Prime Minister Hasina and
the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, signed 3 agreements on security
cooperation, when Hasina visited New Delhi in January 2010.
4.7
Status of Threat
Since the mid-nineties, when Bangladesh began witnessing a rise in terrorism, there was
barely any threat awareness of the problem of terrorism. Since the coordinated bomb
blasts of August 2005, however, the government, at that time, slowly began sensitizing
the general public to the problem of terrorism. As such, there has been discussion around
on the issue of reform in the role of the intelligence and law enforcement structure in
Bangladesh. In this context, it is believed by many observers that the participation of the
local communities in information generation and intelligence sharing has become an
important aspect in combating terrorism.
Threats from terrorism and organized crimes and subsequent developments in the
national security situation highlight the need for an inclusive intelligence framework that
provides more effective threat warning, helps in developing efficient action plans, and
better supports national security decision-making. These needs however pre-date the
events of August 2005 and, despite significant progress in strengthening national
intelligence capabilities, remain important challenges. Overall, the structure of today’s
intelligence framework, including regulatory, organizational, budget, infrastructure, and
other components, needs to incorporate participation of local communities in Bangladesh.
It is important to note that people may belong to several communities within a locality,
may have varying degrees of commitment and that the significance of a community may
differ during the varying stages of life. Within a community people interact with each
other and their environment (social, physical and policy). This interaction is a significant
determinant of the community’s security environment. Community engagement as a first
step in effective security intervention focuses on developing, empowering and building
capacity of the community to create interactions between the community members and
the law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Given the socio-economic context of
120
121
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140887.htm
“Pranab stresses joint efforts to fight terrorism”, Bdnews24, August 7, 2010.
48
Bangladesh, long-term sustainable engagement would prove to be successful due to
strong social, human and economic capitals that exist in Bangladesh society.
In a survey undertaken by BEI, 98 percent of the respondents indicated that there should
be an effective working relationship between the community and law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. Fifty three percent of the respondents identified general people as
the best source of information and should be invited to exchange views with these
agencies. Thirty six percent identified social leaders, 31 percent identified journalists, 30
percent identified local representatives and 21 percent identified teachers as effective
community actors in this regard. Sixty five percent of the respondents indicated that
‘exchange of views’ on regular basis in a wider platform, i.e. consultation workshop or
seminar, could be the best medium for intelligence sharing between the government
agencies and the community.
5.
COUNTER-TERRORISM RESPONSES
5.1
Hard Power and Soft Power Approaches
Hard power approach in combating terrorism involves the use of the military, lawenforcement and intelligence agencies, while the soft power approach employs tools such
as negotiation, economic development and counter-ideology.
While Bangladesh has employed elements of both types of approaches, its use of hard
power in fighting terrorism appears more prominently. Between January and November
2010, RAB had arrested 81 members of militant groups.122 This high number of arrests
could be attributed to the overall good work being done by the intelligence and law
enforcement agencies.
5.2
Hard Power Response – Counter-Terrorism Measures
The government ministries, departments, law-enforcement and intelligence agencies
involved in combating terrorism are the following:1. PMO
2. Ministry of Home Affairs
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
4. Bangladesh Bank
5. The Police
6. RAB
7. BDR
8. NSI
9. DGFI
10. CID
11. SB
122
http://policyresearchgroup.com/bangladesh/b_desh_faces_renewed_threat_from_islamist_militants.html
49
However, the administrative and operational chain of command among these government
institutions and agencies is not clear, resulting in lack of coordination that is critical in
combating terrorism.
The BNP-led Alliance Government (2001-2006) banned some terrorist organizations,
imprisoned some of their top leaders, put them on trial and sentenced six of them to
death. During the tenure of the Caretaker Government (2007-2008), six militant kingpins,
including the senior leaders of Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Jagrata
Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), were executed.
5.2.1
Party Manifesto/Government Declaration, Policy Resolve
During the Caretaker Government in 2007-2008, the authorities adopted tough measures
to combat terrorism. Prior to the December 2008 national general elections, the Awami
League pledged in their election manifesto that counter-terrorism would be one of its top
priorities, if they were to be elected. Thus far, the Awami League-led Grand Alliance
government, in power since in January 2009, has been able to substantially curb Islamist
extremist activities through strong counter-terrorism measures.
The Hon’ble Prime Minister has advocated for a South Asian Task Force for Countering
Terrorism. She has repeatedly stressed that her government will never allow terrorists to
operate in Bangladesh.
Members of law enforcement agencies (Police and Rapid Action Battalion) have been
launching strong drives against suspected militants, leading to many arrests.
Intelligence agencies have also been working hard to prevent terrorists from establishing
bases for training and conducting any kind of terrorist activities inside or outside the
country.
As a result of such strong measures, terrorists have been unable to easily reorganize
themselves, establish a firm foothold anywhere in the country and are on the run.
5.2.2
Administrative/Institutional Response
In 2009, the government formed an eight-member123 ‘National Committee for
Intelligence Coordination’ (NCIC), with the Prime Minister as its Chairperson, to
coordinate the intelligence activities of the different agencies.
The government also formed a 17-member124 ‘National Committee on Militancy
Resistance and Prevention’ in April 2009, to tackle terrorism and mobilize public
123
The Prime Minister’s Security Adviser is acting as the Chief Coordinator of the Committee. The Cabinet Secretary; Principal
Secretary, Prime Minister’s Office; Director General, Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI); Director General of
National Security Intelligence (NSI); Director General of Special Security Force (SSF) and the Inspector General of Police (IGP),
are members of the committee. In addition, the Director General of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), Additional Inspector General
of Special Branch (SB), and the Additional Inspector General of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), will assist the
Committee.
50
opinion against extremist activities. The Committee consists of relevant ministries and
security agencies, and is headed by the State Minister for Home Affairs.
In another measure to combat terrorism, the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) of the
Bangladesh Police introduced Anti Terrorism and Bomb and Explosive Squads, as a
special unit.
5.2.3
Legal/Legislative Measures
In February 2009, the current government passed into legislation the Anti Terrorism Act
and Money Laundering Prevention Act. The government has also formed a high-powered
National Committee on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter- Terrorism Financing,
which is headed by the Finance Minister.125 However, some local and international
observers believe that the Money Laundering Prevention Act needs to be strengthened.
With the Money Laundering Prevention Act, it was felt there were still not enough
provisions to deal with money laundering offences which could counter the financing of
terrorist operations. Consequently, the government is now planning to strengthen the
Money Laundering Prevention Act by preparing two amendments to it, to be passed in
the next session of the Parliament.126
Bangladesh is a member of the Asia-Pacific Group (APG), a Financial Action Task
Force-style regional body. It hopes to gain admission into the Egmont Group, an informal
international gathering of financial intelligence units. In the interim, the Bangladesh
government has signed MoUs with other FIUs for intelligence gathering and sharing
purposes, and establishing an effective inter-agency working relationship with law
enforcement, regulators and other authorities. However, Bangladesh has, to date, not
ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 127
5.3
Soft Power Approach
Economic development is seen as a means of soft power, as it could be a possible tool in
dealing with the problem of terrorism. The ever increasing gap between the rich and the
poor, unemployment, corruption and lack of economic diversity have, in varying degrees,
rendered people vulnerable to radical ideas and extremism and led some of them to
militancy and terrorism.
5.3.1
National Education Policy
The government announced a new National Education Policy in 2009. The new policy
proposes to modernize the madrassa system, where all students will have English lessons
124
The 17 members are: State Minister, Min of Home; Secretary, PMO, Secretary; Min of Education; Secretary, Min of Social
Welfare; Secretary, Min of Finance; Secretary, Min of Information; Secretary, Min of Religious Affairs; Secretary, Min of Law
Secretary; Min of Local Govt; IGP; DG, RAB; DG, DGFI; DG, NSI; DG, BDR; DG, Ansar & VDP; DG, Islamic Foundation;
Additional IGP, SB
125
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=160135
126
http://www.zeenews.com/news653745.html
127
www.estandardsforum.org/bangladesh/standards/anti-money-laundering-combating-terrorist-financing-standard
51
along with traditional Koran and Arabic classes. The idea behind the reforms forms part
of the government’s strategy to bring Quomi madrassas, some of which are considered by
critics to be a source of Islamist militants, into the mainstream education system and
eliminate the chance of some students becoming radicalized. The madrassa board
estimates that approximately two million students attend Quomi and unregulated
madrassas.
5.3.2 National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention, and other Soft
Power Measures
The functions of this Committee include use of mosques/imams for pre-Khutba sermons,
use of religious scholars and imams in public meetings denouncing terrorism and giving
true Islamic perspective on extremism, militancy and terrorism; public awareness
building; use of Islamic Foundation for publications against terrorist ideology; antiterrorism writings in national text books, and changing the national curricula, among
other measures.
In addition, other soft approaches that may be taken by the government may include the
following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Counter-ideology and de-radicalization techniques may be used in tackling the
terrorism threat, as this is not yet strong in Bangladesh.
Negotiation. So far Bangladesh did not have to negotiate with any Islamist terrorist
organizations.
Civil society involvement. No concrete policy of community engagement.
Role of the media. Visible but not in an integrated manner.
Modernization of Madrassa curricula.
Recent education policy enabling madrassa students to get jobs.
5.4
International Cooperation/Assistance in Combating Terrorism
The United States, The United Kingdom, Australia and some European countries are the
main partners of Bangladesh in combating terrorism. These countries have been
providing various types of support to law enforcement and security agencies, including
training and intelligence-sharing.
5.4.1
Bilateral Relations
In order to effectively counter terrorism, cooperation with India is of critical importance
for Bangladesh. During the visit of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to India in January
2010, Bangladesh and India signed three security cooperation agreements:
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters,
Agreement on the Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking.
Agreement on Combating International Terrorism.
52
5.4.2 Multilateral Relations: International and Regional Organizations
In the multilateral arena, Bangladesh, being a member of SAARC, the UN and other
international agencies, has played an active role as a party to anti- or counter-terrorism
agreements in the region and internationally.
Regionally, Bangladesh, as a member of SAARC, adopted the SAARC Regional
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 1987, as well as the SAARC Additional
Protocol signed in 2003. However, despite SAARC’s several declarations and
commitments in addressing terrorism, these have failed to make any significant progress
at the practical level.
Last December, the seven-member Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral, Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) signed the 'Convention on Cooperation in
Combating International Terrorism, Trans-National Organised Crime and Illicit
Drug Trafficking'. However, official cooperation at the bilateral and regional levels
needs to be increased.
As a result of such strong measures, terrorists have been unable to easily reorganize
themselves, establish a firm foothold anywhere in the country and are on the run.
In another measure to combat terrorism, the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) of the
Bangladesh Police introduced Anti-Terrorism and Bomb and Explosive Squads, as a
special unit.
6. CHALLENGES CONFRONTING CT CAMPAIGN
The nature of risks and vulnerabilities posed by terrorism in Bangladesh is becoming
a much greater threat to national security today. In the last two decades, a number of
militant groups have manifested their presence through violent acts of terrorism in
Bangladesh.128 Religious assassinations, political violence and bombings at public places
of festivities and entertainment and worship have stunned the country. Thus, terrorism
has become an increasing threat to civil life, the economy, and the political and religious
pluralism in Bangladesh. For religious terrorist groups like HUJI-B or JMB, terrorism
has become a way of establishing Islamic order in the society. For extremist political
groups like Sarbahara party or the Purba Banglar Communist Party, terrorism is a
weapon to gain control of the polity. Over the years, a nexus has developed between
these forms of terrorist groups and other elements like smuggling syndicates, criminal
gangs, foreign insurgents, outlawed organizations, remnants of defunct insurgent groups
and politically sponsored cadres that mutually nourish a supporting network for each
other with conflicting aims.129
128
Khan, Shahab Enam. 2010. Understanding the Challenges of Interagency Cooperation in Bangladesh. Keynote paper for the
session on ‘Interagency Challenges in Bangladesh’, at the Workshop on ‘Combating Terrorism in Bangladesh: Developing a
National Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, Organized by Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) and Defense Institutions Reform
Initiative (DIRI), USA, Westin Dhaka 29-31 July 2010, Dhaka, Bangladesh
129
Kabir, Humayun, and Khan, Shahab Enam. 2010. Understanding the Threats from Islamist Terrorism in Bangladesh. Paper
Presented at ORF-BEI India-Bangladesh Dialogue. Held in New Delhi. March 19-20, 2010. www.bei-bd.org
53
The pattern, trends and challenges in terrorism have expanded beyond traditional realms
of security. Today’s threats are ambiguous in nature, making it difficult—if not
impossible—for any single government agency to address them alone. Effective
collaboration therefore among multiple agencies is of critical importance.130 Besides, a
number of initiatives are required to reform parts or, if necessary, the entire structure of
the national security architecture. The government of Bangladesh, at various times, has
either directly or indirectly relied on the use of hard power tactics to combat terrorism.
Although military involvement has been perceived to have had a positive impact in the
short-term, many of the law and order problems re-surfaced almost immediately after the
military operations had ended. The question that needs to be answered in this backdrop is
how to collectively combine domestic energies to deal with the growing problem of
terrorism. One should note that the use of security forces alone will not suffice; it can be
at best an enabling instrument. Another constraint when implementing a counter
terrorism strategy in Bangladesh stems from lack of political consensus regarding the
importance of the growing phenomenon of terrorism. This is a serious impediment
because it points to the heart of the debate in Bangladesh about whose responsibility it is
to counter terrorism, something that shows a reluctance to understand that the problem is
too big to be the sole responsibility of any one agency, be it the police or the military or
any other agency. However, initiatives for the preparation against terrorism must be
decreed by the government as combating terrorism is always, at the end of the day, a
political decision. Active operations are and should be the result of a political decisionmaking process.
The baseline survey conducted for this report identifies that people across the society and
the security practitioners are equally concerned regarding the future proliferation of
terrorism. To curb terrorism, 32.8 percent of the respondents believe, the government
should take extensive public awareness campaigns through various means of
communication; i.e. TV, Radiao, Newspaper, ICT tools, etc. Furthermore, 30.8 percent
stressed on training religious leaders, groups and clergymen on proper Islamic ideology
and philosophy, 18.9 percent stressed on strengthening law enforcement agencies and
justice delivery institutions, 18.2 percent mentioned goodwill of the government, and
17.9 percent mentioned strengthening all streams of education in Bangladesh should be
integral part of counter terrorism measures. Besides, 65.5 percent of the respondents
indicated that terrorism posed threats to national security. While significant number of
respondents stressed on properties and lives, national image, social security, democracy,
social stability, national economy and tolerance and pluralism will severely suffer if the
causes of terrorism are not mitigated.
During interviews, several security experts have indicated that fragile political systems
and nascent democratic institutions have generated ideal conditions for the sponsorship of
terrorism, resulting in institutionalizing this phenomenon. The transnational nature of
terrorism, however, is significantly transforming the challenge of terrorism in
Bangladesh. The convergence of different Islamist groups in pursuit of a global agenda,
130
Khan, Shahab Enam. 2010. Understanding the challenges of Interagency Cooperation in Bangladesh. Keynote paper for the
session on ‘Interagency Challenges in Bangladesh’, at the Workshop on ‘Combating Terrorism in Bangladesh: Developing a
National Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, Organized by Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) and Defense Institutions Reform
Initiative (DIRI), USA, Westin Dhaka 29-31 July 2010, Dhaka, Bangladesh
54
thriving transnational financial and commercial networks, access to latest communication
technology, coupled with weak institutional capacities, socioeconomic marginalization
and widespread corruption, reflect the complexity of the challenges, both regional and
domestic, which confront Bangladesh in its fight against terrorism. However, the surveys
and interviews conducted for this report identified the following major challenges in
combating terrorism:
6.1 The growth of socio-economic and political grievances in Bangladesh
One of the agenda for the Islamist extremists is that Islamic resurgence in Bangladesh
should occur because of long-standing disputes with the secular governments. Most of
the experts and respondents interviewed for this report mentioned that the growth of
Islamist extremism in Bangladesh has less to do with theology but more to do with
disappointment with domestic politics and the economy in the country. The ever
increasing gap between the rich and the poor, unemployment, corruption, lack of
economic diversity, and political corruption have all in varying degrees resulted in the
rise of Islamic extremism in the country. A study identified that ‘people literally become
desperate that they have nowhere to turn but to extremist religious politics. Poverty,
inequality, social discrimination, unemployment and massive corruption in Bangladesh
have become key factors in the growth of terrorism.’131 Psycho-social analysis suggests that
high levels of frustration are likely to prevail among young unskilled and unemployed
people. Frustration causes these people to become involved in petty criminality, join
gangs, engage in hooliganism, extortion and other anti-social activities, not necessarily to the
point of extremism. Terrorist organizations capitalize on these factors, in part by attracting
popular attention. Therefore, the young and unemployed people are a natural target for
recruitment into violent groups and activities, including extremist groups and criminal
gangs. There is evidence (e.g. newspaper accounts of people captured) that young,
unemployed people form the bulk of the rank and file of extremist groups. There is also
evidence of young unemployed people, particularly those who study in Quomi
madrassas, being principal targets for recruitment by the extremist groups. In Bangladesh,
young people may be relatively overlooked by development activities, which are often
focused on women (e.g. micro finance), and many young men have not been direct
beneficiaries of recent employment trends (e.g. in Ready Made Garments). This act of
omission by development actors may cause, or contribute to, the frustration among young
men and hence cause them to resort to violence and extremism. Therefore, Islamist
extremism may continue if political rivalry and serious problems in the governance
system leave young people more disenfranchised.132
6.2 Weak Democratic Institutions and Rule of Law in Bangladesh
What is so evident is that the once secular state is becoming more threatened by a small
group of extremists. Moderate Muslims who embrace tolerance and cohabitation with
ethnic and religious minorities still comprise the majority of the population, but all this is
being overshadowed by a more extremist and violent group that is bent on establishing an
Islamic state. During the BNP government from 2001-2006, the Islamist parties, such as
131
Source not to be identified.
Khan, Shahab Enam. 2007. Political Economy of Terrorism in Bangladesh. The Journal of International Relations. Volume 2. No.
1. Pp 32-59.
132
55
Jammat-i-Islami and Islami Oikko Jot, influenced the national agenda and forced the
government to adopt policies to protect extremist activities in the country, the most
infamous example of that being the case of JMB leader Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai.
The existence of terrorism, whether in the form of Islamist or otherwise, had largely been
denied by the BNP government. This state of denial hampered the growth of political
space to counter terrorism based on political consensus. This has further encouraged the
terrorist organizations to expand with patronage from political and financially corrupt
segments of the country.133 The issue of the absence of an effective judicial system
cannot be ignored. The absence of such a mechanism, supplemented by the ineffective
law enforcement structure, has resulted in the dispensation of justice to people in a quick
and whimsical manner. The Bangladesh Police and other law enforcement agencies have
been repeatedly blamed for corruption and political partiality. There are regular
complaints regarding human rights violations and inaccessibility to the rule of law in
Bangladesh.134 Besides, major shortcomings of state agencies are linked with
politicization and political interference in law enforcement. There is also no debate on the
question of lack of professional competence, coordination among the law enforcement
authorities, trained personnel and arms and vehicles to tackle terrorism in Bangladesh.
Political parties, civil society and the policy makers failed to focus proper attention to the
conditions that enable terrorism to thrive, including poverty, political marginalization,
inequality, lack of proper education and secure employment.135 The failure of civil
society and its political polarization has also become a critical issue.136 Other aspects that
made Bangladesh appealing to the Islamist extremist leadership are the unregulated
network of charities and funding, the almost ineffective NGO Bureau, the spread of
poorly regulated banks, poorly governed investment environment, and institutions that
already had records of extensive money laundering.
6.3 Problems in the education system
Almost 87 percent of the respondents identified that the education system was poor and
did not adequately provide ethical and moral knowledge. Madrassa education has long
been a target of extensive blame and criticism for serving as a breeding ground for
terrorism in Bangladesh. Besides, more extensive and influential among the channels of
Islamist extremism in Bangladesh are the networks of madrassas, particularly the Quomi
madrassas, which attract refugees in the Chittagong region and young Bangladeshis from
the crumbling secular school system. Many of the Quomi madrassas are the ideological
133
It should be noted that Bangladesh remained at the very top of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) produced by the
Transparency International from 2001-2005. Dr Iftekharuzzaman notes that the depth and breadth of corruption in Bangladesh have
been pervasive, with losses estimated to be nearly 3 per cent in terms of the GDP. According to a study by Transparency
International Bangladesh in 2006, per capita loss of household income to bribery in six selected sectors of public service delivery
was estimated to be 7.94 per cent. With the ratio of loss being higher at 9.56 per cent for the low-income groups compared to 2.36
for the high-income category, the poorest have been the worst victims. See http://www.newagebd.com/store/anni07/15.html
134
For closer exposition see, US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published in 2006, 2007 and 2008
135
Roberts, Adam. 2002. The Changing Faces of Terrorism. BBC. 27 August 2002.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/recent/sept_11/changing_faces_05.shtml
136
Since terrorism affects every segment of the society, concrete response from all civil society must be involved in countering it. In
this regard, civil society and religious leaders have a key role to play. The Report of the Secretary-General of the UN on Uniting
Against Terrorism: Recommendations For A Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy suggests that a civil society campaign will need to
work to convince those with genuine grievances that there exist alternative, non-violent strategies, and that these have in most cases
proved more effective. Recent history offers numerous examples of nonviolent opposition movements leading to significant change.
Such success stories deserve to be highlighted more. See, Report of the Secretary-General. UN. 27 April 2006. Uniting Against
Terrorism: Recommendations For A Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Sixtieth Session. General Assembly. United Nations.
56
frontline against democratic aspirations, and serve as the primary socialization vehicle
and recruitment vehicle for extremism. These madrasas teach only Quranic studies and
Arabic—no modern or secular studies. In many cases, the products of madrassas are
radical Muslims who believe that their life mission is to establish a puritan version of
Islam. As Simon Reeve put it, “They leave the schools with only a rudimentary
knowledge of the world, but a fanatical belief in the supremacy of Islam and their
responsibility to fight and ensure its spread.”137 A credible source indicated that 10 to 12
percent of Bangladeshi madrassas, to some degree, had an armed training component.
There is no mechanism in Bangladesh that would identify the madrassas which
“propagate hatred and violence” and “produce semi-literate religious scholars.”138
Besides, no verifiable data exists on the total number of students studying in Quomi
madrassas. The Bangladesh government possesses no accurate studies and figures on
how many Bangladeshis are studying in madrassas in Egypt, Pakistan, or elsewhere and
the amount of donations coming to keep these madrassas functional. A number of studies
have identified that many Quomi madrassas teach rigid Wahhabi interpretations of
Islam.139
Although many of the recruits in the ranks of Islamist extremist groups in Bangladesh
come from madrassas, one of the hallmarks of the current trend in Bangladesh is that
these groups are now able to recruit and radicalize students from mainstream education,
especially those with technical training. Many of the leading operatives in Jamaat-eIslami or HUJI or HT were trained or either was or is working as teachers, in various
public, private and technical universities. Along with the teaching community, a critical
mass of students has emerged from mainstream education indoctrinated to overcome the
myriad of socio-economic and political woes that secularism has brought in its wake. A
number of Islamist political leaders use Islam to manipulate sectarian issues for their own
political purposes. The decline in the quality of secular institutions, especially the
educational and legal systems, has created a vacuum in which non-secular institutions
emerge to fill the void. Increasingly, parents are turning to madrassas to educate their
children as state funding for the educational sector is inadequate. One has to remember
that the Islamists and their supporters will continue to gain power unless the state
provides a successful model of tolerant and modernist Islam. However, one must not
forget that the vast majority of Bangladeshi Muslims do not attend madrassas, and that
they are the products of secular education.
6.4 Lack of cooperation between people and the law enforcement and intelligence
agencies
Participation of local communities in information generation and intelligence sharing and
law enforcement structure has become an important aspect in the Bangladesh context. In
a BEI survey, conducted to understand the people’s perception on community
participation in the law enforcement and intelligence sharing, 98 percent of the
137
Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden, and the Future of Terrorism (Boston: Northeast University
Press, 1999), 226.
138
Khan, Shahab Enam. 2007. Political Economy of Terrorism in Bangladesh. The Journal of International Relations. Volume 2. No.
1. Pp 32-59.
139
Ibid
57
respondents indicated that there should be an effective working relationship between the
community, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Fifty three percent of the
respondents identified general people as the best source of information and should be
invited to exchange views with these agencies. Thirty six percent identified social
leaders, thirty one percent identified journalists, thirty percent identified local
representatives and twenty one percent identified teachers as effective community actors
in this regard. Sixty five percent of the respondents indicated that ‘exchange of views’ on
regular basis in a wider platform, i.e. consultation workshop or seminar, could be the best
medium for intelligence sharing between the government agencies and the community.
6.5 Lack of Confidence in the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies
Almost 83 percent of the respondents claimed that the law enforcement agencies were
involved in violation of human rights. These forces are even more blamed for their nonresponsive and undemocratic behaviour. The Police often become part of insecurity
rather than its solution. But more often than not the people who come in contact with the
military or the police have experienced indifference and even worse, harassment.
Between the military and the police, the people’s experience with the police is much
worse.
6.6 The Gap between Policy Responses and Reality
The gap between high official wisdom on the role of security forces and the ground
realities again illustrates the chasm between expert thinking and people’s perceptions on
the question of security. The survey identified that people do feel insecure, but dominant
in the minds of the people are ordinary failures of the state in providing adequate security
for the routine, quotidian concerns.
6.7 Lack of Sharing and Integrating Intelligence Information by Different
Agencies140
At present, there are no written rules, agreed to by any of the branches of the intelligence
and law enforcement agencies regarding interagency cooperation on CT. There is a lack
of rules or policies on intelligence sharing among the intelligence agencies which
significantly hinders the process of CT. The lack of information sharing between the law
enforcement and the intelligence agencies was highlighted as a failure that might have
made the August 21, 2004 attack on the then Leader of the Opposition Sheikh Hasina, the
August 17, 2005 bomb explosions or the BDR mutiny of February 25-26, 2009 possible.
Since then, the objections against closer cooperation and information sharing is gradually
disappearing.
6.8 Lack of Coordination and Organizational Differences
Organizational differences—including differences in agencies’ structures, planning
processes, and funding sources—can hinder interagency collaboration. Agencies lack
140
1. National Security Intelligence (NSI); 2. Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI); 3. Defence Intelligence Units; 4.
Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Bangladesh Police; 5. Special Security Force (SSF); 6. Intelligence Cell of the National
Board of Revenue; 7. Special Branch, Bangladesh Police; 8. Financial Intelligence Unit of Bangladesh Bank; 9. Intelligence Cell of
Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)
58
adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate this collaboration during planning and
execution of programmes and activities. Achieving meaningful results in CT activitiesrelated interagency efforts requires coordinated efforts among various actors across
government agencies; foreign governments; non-government organizations; and the
private sector. Given the number of agencies involved in Bangladesh national security
efforts, it is important that there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies. Without
such mechanisms, the results can be a patchwork of activities that waste scarce funds and
limit the overall effectiveness of government efforts. Moreover, funding for national
security activities is budgeted for and appropriated by a Cell at the PMO. Therefore, such
mechanisms are not formalized or fully utilized. Without formalizing and
institutionalizing the interagency planning structure, efforts to coordinate interagency
collaboration may not continue when personnel move on to their next assignments.
6.9 Inadequate Skilled Human Resources and Corruption
The government agencies, including the Ministries, do not always have the right people
with the right skills in the right assignments at the right time to meet the security
challenges. As threats to national security have evolved over the past decades, so have the
skills needed to prepare for and respond to those threats. To effectively and efficiently
address the current pattern and trends in terrorism, security and intelligence agencies, as
well as the civil service, need a qualified, well-trained workforce with the skills and
experience that can enable them to integrate the diverse capabilities and resources of the
government. Experts suggest that the security and law enforcement personnel often lack
knowledge of the processes and cultures of the agencies with whom they must
collaborate. Some government agencies lack the personnel capacity to fully participate in
interagency activities and some agencies do not have the necessary capabilities to support
their national security roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, agencies’ personnel
systems often do not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, which could
diminish agency personnel’s interest in serving in interagency efforts. Besides,
widespread corruption, the political use of the police and abuse of power by personnel
involved in law enforcement, have hampered the implementation of CT activities. So far,
except for some initiatives under the UNDP-DFID funded Police Reform Programme, no
initiatives have been taken to develop strategic human capital management systems,
strategic human capital planning and long-term workforce management plans. The
interagency cooperation framework requires necessary components to seek formal
commitments from contributing agencies to provide personnel to meet interagency
personnel requirements.
6.10 Lack of Political Consensus and Public Participation in Strengthening the
Counter Terrorism Regime
Political reservations can also impact on how a country tackles terrorism. The
reservations can be at odds with practical steps that have to be taken.141 For an example,
interagency collaboration and cooperation will require firm political commitment.
141
Chandler, Michael. 2004. Counter Terrorism Policies and Strategies – Keys to Effective Interagency Cooperation and National
Security. Paper written for the ‘Security Sector Track in the framework of the 7th Annual Conference of the PfP Consortium’.
Bucharest 13-15 June 2004.
59
Bangladesh’s threat of terrorism demands political consensus and understanding. To be
realistic, we must face the fact that the importance of political consensus in understanding
the problem is far from realization. The political will to fight terrorism is the fundamental
motivation for all the individual organizations involved. Out of this political will, the
government can formulate necessary laws to enable its counter-terror forces to fight
terrorist activities successfully and sustainably. This is particularly true in dealing with
the interface in Bangladesh where terrorism and crime meet. Political consensus also
includes the will to welcome new ideas to the table. Consensus should also include
popular support and public opinion. Thus, most of the efforts, and a good portion of the
results in successful counter-terrorist activities are in the hands of the targeted population
itself.
6.11 Absence of a Counter Terrorism Strategy
More than ninety seven percent (97.6) of the respondents and all the stakeholders
interviewed have unequivocally agreed that there is a need for concrete, cohesive and
comprehensive counter terrorism strategy. Given the differences among government
agencies, developing a coordination strategy and adequate coordination mechanisms has
become critical to achieving an integrated approach. All government agencies have
different strategies and/or policies, guidance documents, directives, based on ad hoc
requirement, which hinders the potential of formulating a comprehensive CT strategy.
Defence and civilian security and intelligence entities do not have fully or clearly defined
roles and responsibilities because key documents are outdated, are not integrated, or are
not comprehensive. More specifically, conflicting directives assign overlapping law
enforcement responsibilities to the intelligence entities, creating confusion as to which
government office is actually responsible for coordinating with which law enforcement
agencies. Such loopholes within the government are creating gaps. Therefore, a
comprehensive CT policy and strategy would assist in mitigating such loopholes.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study on the state of terrorism in Bangladesh during 2009-2010 has identified the
risks and consequences of terrorist violence. Bangladesh is not immune from terrorist
threats and extremist influences. A national counter terrorism regime has become
justifiable and forms an important, although not exclusive, tool in Bangladesh’s drive for
curbing terrorism. Much of the study dealt with the detail of terror acts and the gaps in
dealing with terrorism. It proposes a series of modest refinements to improve specificity,
clarity and fairness in a way that we believe is consistent with Bangladesh’s antiterrorism drive. It is clear that Bangladesh needs a highly developed legal framework and
stronger institutional capacities to deal with the threat of terrorism. Particular attention
should be given to legality and legitimacy issues and the significance of the rule of law in
combating terrorists. It is also imperative to allot more modern equipments and funding,
in addition to improving human resources engaged in counter terrorism. Given the
political culture of Bangladesh, the level of political consensus would certainly determine
the sustainability question of counter terrorism initiatives taken under any government.
60
On a positive note, the government of Bangladesh has already initiated moves to
streamline intelligence agencies and better coordinate their activities against the backdrop
of their failure in gathering information on the plot for the February 2009 BDR mutiny.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina stated in Parliament that, ‘Effective measures have already
been taken to streamline different intelligence agencies and coordinate their activities’.142
As mentioned earlier, the present government has enacted the Anti Terrorism Law 2009
which was initially approved by the Caretaker Government of 2007-2008 as Anti
Terrorism Ordinance 2008. In addition, the current government has suggested the setting
up of a regional level Counter Terrorism Taskforce. For most part of their rule, the BNPled alliance government had largely denied that there was a problem of terrorism in
Bangladesh, and thus adopted a luke-warm approach towards terrorism. The Caretaker
Government of 2007-2008 took extensive measures to combat terrorism and showed
great firmness in dealing with militancy. Unlike the past government of 2001-2006, the
Caretaker Government focused more on dismantling terrorist structures.143 Key leaders of
the banned JMB organization were executed on being found guilty of terrorist offences.
The present government has further intensified these efforts and has achieved
considerable success in apprehending terrorists in different parts of the country before
they were able to engage in any acts of terrorism. As a result, in marked contrast to other
countries in South Asia, Bangladesh has been commended by the international
community for its work on countering terrorism.
As with any CT campaign, success in countering the challenge of militancy or extremism
will depend on a sustained commitment over the years by a broad coalition of the
government, political parties, and public and civil society actors.
142
New Age. 2009. Govt to streamline intel agencies: PM. June 18, 2009. http://www.newagebd.com/2009/jun/18/front.html accessed
on June 03, 2010
143
Zamir, Muhammad. 2008. A ‘peaceful nation’ and terrorism’. The Daily Star. 14 June 2008.
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=41016 Accessed on 22 July 2010.
61