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Divergent Descriptions of the JCPOA Framework
The political framework for a final deal on Iran’s nuclear program, which will be called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
was agreed to after many false starts and extended deadlines by the United States, its international partners and Iran on April 2, 2015.
Yet, the various parties to the JCPOA do not appear to be in full agreement about what they have committed to. Both the U.S. Department of State and Iranian Foreign Ministry released their own “fact sheets” describing JCPOA’s parameters while the French government
has shown journalists its own version of the deal.
These dueling descriptions reveal some major differences that suggest that Iran has a substantially different understanding of what it
agreed to—differences that could sink further negotiations toward a comprehensive deal or, if they persist, lead to major difficulties in
implementing that deal.
Pre-JPA
JPA
JCPOA (State
Dept.)
JCPOA (Iran)
JCPOA (France)
696 IR-1
1,044 IR-1 for 15 years
More than 1,000
centrifuges
Unknown
2,710 IR-1
1,044 IR-1 for 15 years
Unspecified
Unknown
3.5% enriched uranium
Non-nuclear medical isotopes for 15 years
“Advanced nuclear
research”
Unknown
9,156 IR-1
5,060 IR-1 for 10 years
More than 5,000 for 10
years
Use of IR-2m and IR-4
centrifuges allowed after
12 years.
15,420 IR-1;
1,008 IR-2m
15,420 IR-1; 1,008
IR-2m
5,060 IR-1 for 10 years
Unspecified
Unknown
3.5% enriched
uranium
3.5% enriched uranium
3.5% enriched uranium
for 15 years
3.5% enriched uranium
for 10 years
Unknown
Enrichment Facilities & Products
Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
696 IR-1
Operating
centrifuges
2,710 IR-1
Total installed
centrifuges
20% enriched
Product
uranium
Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant
9,156 IR-1
Operating
centrifuges
Total installed
centrifuges
Product
Areas of Agreement
Areas of Disagreement
Pre-JPA
JPA
JCPOA (State
Dept.)
JCPOA (Iran)
JCPOA (France)
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unknown
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unknown
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unknown
“Limited” R&D with advanced centrifuges for 10
years.
Unspecified number of
R&D with unspecified
IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8
number of IR-4, IR-5, IRallowed for “completion” of 6, and IR-8 allowed.
R&D for 10 years.
0 kg of UF6; 162.8 kg
processed into U3O8
0 kg for 15 years
Unspecified
Unknown
9,168 kg stockpile as
UF6 despite agreement that new 3.5%
UF6 be converted into
UO2.
300 kg stockpile for 15
years; how excess will
be eliminated remains
unspecified.
“Iran will be able to use
the existing enriched
stockpile for producing a
nuclear fuel center.”
Unknown
Installed
Removed to IAEA
safeguarded facility.
Removed to IAEA
safeguarded facility.
Unknown
Activation and testing
of
reactor not allowed,
but
construction allowed.
Will be modified to “not
produce weapons grade
plutonium;” spent fuel to
be shipped out of Iran; no
additional heavy water
reactors for 15 year.
Will “remain” and be
“enhanced” to increase
efficiency and decrease
plutonium output.
Unknown
Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
328 IR-1
328 IR-1
Operating
centrifuges
328 IR-1
328 IR-1
Total installed
centrifuges
20% enriched uranium 3.5% enriched uraProduct
nium
Centrifuge
Research & Design
•
•
•
•
•
164 IR-2m;
178 IR-4;
1 IR-5;
13 IR-6;
1 IR-6s
•
•
•
•
•
168 IR-2m;
199 IR-4;
1 IR-5;
13 IR-6;
1 IR-8
20% Enriched Uranium
197 kg stockpile as
UF6
3.5% Enriched Uranium
7,207 kg stockpile as
UF6
Non-operating Centrifuges
Installed
Arak Heavy Water Reactor
Under construction
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Pre-JPA
JPA
JCPOA (State
Dept.)
JCPOA (Iran)
JCPOA (France)
Operating
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unknown
Occur with greater
frequency; still limited
to declared facilities.
Iran will implement
Additional Protocol, grant
inspectors access to
“suspicious sites,” allow
real time monitoring of
uranium and centrifuge
facilities for 20 – 25 years,
and provide early
notification of new nuclear
facilities.
“Iran will implement the
Additional Protocol on a
voluntary and temporary
basis…and…the approval
process of the Protocol will
be ratified within a
specified timeframe.”
“Establishment of a guaranteed access mechanism
of IAEA inspectors to any
suspicious site, beyond
AP access measures.”
No progress
Left for separate
“Framework for Cooperation” with IAEA.
Iran will implement an
unspecified “agreed set
of measures” to address
IAEA concerns.
Unspecified
Unknown
Not applicable
Unfreeze some Iranian
funds; suspend sanctions on
petrochemical products and precious
metals; no new sanctions.
Some UNSC sanctions will
be lifted and US and EU
nuclear-related sanctions
will be suspended.
After JCPOA
implementation, “all”
UNSC, EU, and US
sanctions will be revoked.
Reportedly differs from
U.S. document.
Immediate
Upon Iran addressing
“key” concerns.
“At the same time as the
start of Iran’s
nuclear-related
implementation work.”
Reportedly differs from
U.S. document.
Tehran Research Reactor
Operating
International Inspections
Limited in time and
location; usually
occurred every one or
two weeks at known
facilities.
Possible Military Dimension
Sanctions Relief
Sanctions Relief Timing
Not applicable
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