1. No category

Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process
Author(s): Rune Ottosen
Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 97-112
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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? Journalof Peace Research,vol. 32, no. 1. 1995,pp. 97-112
Enemy Images and the JournalisticProcess*
RUNE OTTOSEN
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)
This article discusses changes in enemy image in the three Norwegian daily newspapers through a
comparative analysis of the coverage of four international conflicts: the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980,
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, martial law in Poland in 1981 and martial law in Romania in 1989.
Content analysis of a sample of 915 articles shows how Norway's traditional 'enemy', the Soviet Union,
ceases to be an enemy during this ten-year period. The study compares newspaper coverage of the social
unrest in Poland, when the threat of Soviet intervention was manifest, with coverage of the rebellion
against Ceausescu in Romania. The author discusses what has happened since the Soviet Union ceased
to be the 'main threat' to Norwegian security. Has a 'new' enemy linked to Islam emerged? This is
discussed while comparing news coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Iran with that of the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. This sample found several articles revealing prejudice against Muslims in general, but enemy
images were mainly linked with the Ayatollah Khomeini in the first invasion and with Saddam Hussein
in the second. The dominant use of enemy images of these two leaders is in itself an interesting part of
the coverage. The author concludes that enemy images are obstacles to analytical journalism, making it
more difficult for journalists to see the obvious parallels between the two invasions. Enemy images are
projected mainly in editorials and commentary columns and less so in straight news articles. However,
the angling of articles through headlines, illustrations and cartoons may reveal the attitudes of news
desks as to who the 'enemy' is, even when the text itself is written in 'neutral' prose.
1. Enemy Images
Previous research on enemy images has
found that the media have a tendency to
modify such images as attitudes among
the political elites change (McNair, 1988;
Rieber, 1991; Silverstein, 1989). Major
changes on the international scene cause
existing enemy images to fade. When
Gorbachev introduced his 'new thinking',
which culminated in far-reaching reforms in
the Soviet Union and the tumultuous events
in Eastern Europe in 1989, Norwegian
media coverage of the Soviet Union underwent fundamental change. The dominant
media - the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) and the major nationally
distributed newspapers - operating within
an established East-West pattern meant
loyalty towards Norway's NATO allies and
its established security policy and suspicion
against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact (Hellebust, 1990). In this context,
neither the fact that the scepticism and mis* I thank Tore Fougner for his important contribution
as research assistant on this project. Thanks also to Nils
Petter Gleditsch, Stefan Hijelid, Heikki Luostarinen
and an anonymous referee for useful comments.
trust against the Eastern bloc was widely
shared among Norwegians, nor the fact that
many of the events and actions by the Soviet
Union that were castigated in the Norwegian press actually were violations of
international law and human rights, is particularly pertinent. The point here is that the
event, military action or policy decision per
se was not the sole reason for the media
coverage of international conflicts. Let us
consider, for example, the rhetoric in the
Western media concerning two blatant violations of international law - the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the US invasion
of Panama. The invasion of Panama was
(for the most part) treated in a context of
'understanding', whereas the invasion of
Afghanistan was treated in a strongly 'censurious' context (Ottosen, 1993b, 1994).
When Gorbachev came to power, however, this pattern began to change dramatically. Gorbachev became the darling of the
Western media, and Soviet politics was
treated with sympathy and understanding at least up until the repressive measures
taken to quell the movements for selfdetermination in the Baltic republics in
1991.
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98
RuneOttosen
Turning to Islam, then, we should note
that the enemy image of Islam has roots
centuries back and must be analysed in
the context of Christian-Muslim rivalry
(Christensen, 1988). In his book Covering
Islam, Edward Said (1989) argues that the
Islamic Revolution in Iran and the capture
of US hostages in the Embassy in Teheran
represented a watershed in the Western
media's treatment of the Muslim world.
This developed further with the Rushdie
affair, the civil war in Lebanon, Operation
Desert Storm, the turmoil in the Soviet
republics in Central Asia, Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, and the elections in Algeria
(Esposito, 1992; Ottosen, 1992). The point
here is not to identify the coverage of violent
actions, such as attacks by militant Muslims
on Rushdie's publishers, Western tourists in
Egypt, Western-oriented intellectuals in
Algeria, etc., as enemy images in themselves. On the contrary, enemy images of
Muslims do not distinguish between the individual Muslims behind such condemnable
incidents and Muslims in general. On the
contrary, they tend to link all such actions
with Islam and create oversimplified cause
and effect models on the basis of prejudice
(Esposito, 1992; Yassine, 1993). One of the
purposes of my research project has been to
find out whether the roots of this new
'enemy' can be identified in the Norwegian
press coverage of the conflicts mentioned.
Is journalism possible without enemy
images? Foreign news journalism without
enemy images could be analytically oriented
journalism that puts events in a historical
context and bases the use of sources, the
angling, and the whole perspective of the
article on a principal judgment linked to
well-accepted criteria from international
law, human rights, etc. My purpose in this
research project was to test certain hypotheses that might seem fairly obvious, namely
to try to find evidence for a suspicion that
mainstream Norwegian journalism lacks
these analytical elements, and bases its
coverage of international events on a perspective of 'worthy' and 'unworthy' victims
limited to intuitive positions of what serves
Western 'security' in the long run
(Chomsky, 1991).
2. 'Us' and the 'Other'
The creation of a borderline between 'us'
and the 'other' is a sociopsychological mechanism that occurs in all human relations; in
the neighbourhood, community and society,
people will include some but exclude others
on the basis of different criteria (Kelly &
Michela, 1980; Ross, 1977). Eventually
nations start to define other nations as the
'other'. Carl Schmitt was one of the first to
introduce a 'we' vs. the 'other' in the political analyses of a modern society. He
believed that the authority of the state was
linked to a collective understanding of the
border towards the 'other'. If the ruling
class was unable to keep this division alive
its authority could then be challenged
(Harle, 1991, p. 2). Heikki Luostarinen
(1989, p. 124) has identified enemy images
both as a reflection of the actual tension and
conflict between states and as a way of creating unity in a state and legitimizing its
rulers. There is no reason to believe that
human beings feel a natural hostility towards people from other ethnic backgrounds. Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1991, p.
276), having studied multi-ethnic societies in
Mauritius and Trinidad, concludes that
ethnic differences as such are no basis for
hostility between human beings. Anthony
D. Smith (1991, p. 72) shows how language
and symbols help to form the basis of
national identity. Enemy images can also be
analysed in an instrumental way, however.
William Eckhardt (1991, p. 94) has shown
how enemy images can be used in propaganda and war preparation by both sides in
a conflict.
When I discuss enemy images in this
article, it is within the framework of what
Johan Galtung has termed 'cultural
violence':
By 'cultural violence' we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art ...
that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or
structural violence (Galtung, 1990, p. 291).'
Cultural violence can internalize the use of
power and violence, but we need not see
this in a purely instrumental manner:
Cultural violence makes direct and structural
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Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process
99
violence look, even feel, right - or at least not The fact that the name Saddam Hussein
wrong. Just as politicalscience is about two prob- ranked number seven on the list of the mostlems - the use of powerand the legitimatingof the
use of power- violencestudiesare abouttwo prob- used words or phrases in US media coverage
lems:the use of violenceandthe legitimatingof that of the Gulf War, and that the name of Hitler
use. The psychological mechanism would be was connected with Saddam in 25% of
internalization.(Galtung,1990,pp. 291-292)
cases, indicates a campaign and not isolated
instances (The Media at War, 1991, p. 42).
The point about 'the enemy as enemy of
This, however, does not mean that I will
empirically test the presence of cultural God' is especially interesting since Saddam
violence, but it is fruitful to clarify that Hussein, in his attempts to rally the Arab
stereotypes can legitimate violent actions world behind him, consciously used Muslim
even in news reporting.
rhetoric. It is also interesting when examinPhilip Knightley (1975) describes how an ing enemy images vis-a-vis Communism,
important element in war-reporting is to since US presidents Ronald Reagan and
'demonize' the enemy and to portray him as George Bush used Christian rhetoric against
'an animal in human disguise'. Enemy Communist and Muslim leaders (0sterud,
images can thus be linked to the journalistic 1991). The angling of 'us' and our allies is
process itself. The portrayal of Saddam part of the picture as well. Do we apply the
Hussein after the invasion of Kuwait offers same yardstick to our own standards as we
rich material in this respect. In headlines, do to our 'enemy'. Do we question the
cartoons and articles all over the world he motives of our own acts as well as those of
was compared to Hitler (also by President our allies in the same way we do with our
Bush in his rhetoric), psychiatrists inter- enemy?
viewed on television presented a 'remote diagnosis' declaring him as paranoid and
mentally ill.2 Now, in this respect, the media 3. Four International Conflicts
did have an easy job. Obviously, Saddam This article discusses changes in the image
Hussein was a totalitarian leader with of the 'enemy' in Norwegian newspapers
regional expansionist goals. Amnesty Inter- through a comparative analysis of the news
national and other human rights organiz- coverage of four international conflicts in
ations have exposed his poor human rights three major Norwegian dailies: Aftenposten
record over and over again, but up until the - the largest circulation daily newspaper in
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the Western world Norway; Verdens Gang (VG) - the largest
chose to look the other way. Just a few circulation tabloid newspaper in Norway;
weeks before the invasion the Bush Admin- and Bergens Tidende (BT) - the largest ciristration refused to conclude that Iraq had culation regional newspaper in Norway. The
engaged in a pattern of human-rights viol- criterion was examination of the most inations (Gerbner, 1992, p. 249). But after the fluential 'mainstream' press, rather than a
invasion, when preparing public opinion for representative sample of the entire Norwar, President Bush was quoting Amnesty wegian press.
International to document human rights
violations in Iraq.
Table I. Aftenposten, Verdens Gang (VG) and Bergens
In Faces of the Enemy, Sam Keen (1986, Tidende(BT): Coverage of Four InternationalConpp. 49-66) shows how enemy images his- flicts(no. of Articles)
torically can be categorized within certain
All
archetypes. Western portrayals of Saddam
Aftenposten VG BT newspapers
Hussein before, during and after the Gulf
99 154
351
98
War fit nicely into several of these cate- Poland
126
Romania
26
41
59
gories: 'the enemy as a criminal', 'the enemy Iraq-Iran
211
49
66
96
as a torturer', 'the enemy as death', 'the Iraq-Kuwait
55
227
64
108
enemy as rapist, desecrator of women and Total
915
237
314 364
children' and 'the enemy as enemy of God'.
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100
Rune Ottosen
The four conflicts analysed are: (i) martial
law in Poland in 1981; (ii) martial law in
Romania in 1989; (iii) the Iraqi invasion of
Iran in 1980; and (iv) the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990.
4. Research Design
The four conflicts are compared in pairwise
fashion. First, I compare the two conflicts
involving the Soviet Union and her former
allies in Eastern Europe: the state of emergency in Poland in 1981 and the revolt in
Romania in December 1989. These two
events are similar in several respects. Both
Poland and Romania were members of the
Warsaw Pact, and both countries' leaders
were in the process of losing control over a
defiant opposition. In both cases there was
speculation into the likelihood of a Soviet
intervention. But there are also important
differences which led to a change in the attitude of the Norwegian media toward intervention. In the case of Poland, the Brezhnev
doctrine was still in force, and Brezhnev
himself was still alive. There is reason to
believe that the state of emergency was
necessary in order to stave off a Soviet
invasion. The Norwegian media stood ready
to condemn such an invasion, should it
occur. In the case of Romania eight years
later, the Brezhnev doctrine had been abandoned, and Gorbachev had proclaimed a
policy of non-intervention vis-a-vis the rampant turmoil in Eastern Europe. This time
the Norwegian media stood ready to accept
a Soviet invasion, had the opposition to the
Ceau?escu regime not been able to do the
job themselves.3
Second, I compare Norwegian newspaper
coverage of the Iraqi attack on Iran in 1980
and the same papers' coverage of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Here, too, there
are obvious parallels. In both cases
Hussein's troops attacked a neighbouring
country in order to annex territory which, as
Iraqi propaganda would have it, 'historically' belonged to Iraq. Again, there are
also clear-cut differences: When he attacked
Iran, Hussein to some extent had the support of anti-Islamic sentiments in the West,
which hoped the war would bring down the
Khomeini regime. When Iraq attacked
Kuwait, Hussein tried to play on Islamic
loyalties against Western condemnation of
the invasion. For a while this tactic
cemented Iraq in the role of 'arch-enemy' in
the new Western enemy image.
Through these comparative studies I hope
to find support for my thesis that it is not
just the events and actions themselves (possible interventions and two actual invasions)
that determine media coverage, but that the
'news slant' and rhetoric applied to the
stories are influenced by the prevailing
enemy image, an enemy image that has
changed significantly over the past decade.
5. Methods and Definition
Several important works on media rhetoric
as a tool of political communication have
appeared in Norway in recent years.
Authors such as Tore Bj0rgo & Daniel
Heradstveit (1987) and Thore Roksvold
(1989) have made valuable contributions to
the analysis of media content. Heradstveit
has also written extensively on media coverage of the Middle East and the conflicts in
the Gulf (1981, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1992a,b).
The rhetorical perspective in this context
focuses on the media's ability to persuade.
Persuasion is achieved with the help of
political rhetoric. In politics, rhetoric is a
tool deliberately wielded in the journalistic
process through words and concepts and can
be used both consciously and unconsciously
to get a given message across to the receiver
(Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991).
I have used content analysis, focusing on
the choice of metaphors,4 metonyms,5 the
relations between connotations6 and denotations,7 which persons involved in the conflict are portrayed through ethos8 (Roksvold, 1989), and the use of the pronouns
'we' and the 'others' (Fairclough, 1989, p.
10). These elements represent the qualitative part of the analyses. It may help to
understand how the enemy images are
created in the text and in what way they
influence the journalistic process. I have
also carried out a quantitative analysis to
indicate how many articles from the sample
reflected these enemy images.
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Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process
For this quantitative part of the research I
needed an analytical tool to enable me to
differentiate between the actual presentation of a hostile act (like the Iraqi invasion
of Iran and Kuwait) and a more diffuse
expectation of aggressive conduct due to
cultural gaps in the perception of earlier historical experiences, or mere prejudices. By
introducing the situational and dispositional
enemy images, I drew upon the work of
Stefan Hojelid (1991, p. 112) in his analysis
of the coverage of the Soviet Union in the
Nordic press. Hojelid's assumption is that
the enemy image is affected by so-called
cognitive factors. But these factors will not
suffice to explain why the enemy image
looks the way it does. We may suppose for
very good reasons that national, political
and ideological circumstances predestine us
to have different views of actors and actions.
In my analyses the situationally determined
enemy image represents the presentation of
a concrete hostile action, while the dispositional enemy image represents expectation
of such an action. By identifying the situational and the dispositional enemy images
we can trace the 'danger zone' for enemy
images in journalism. To avoid enemy
images is a challenge for journalists covering
international conflicts. To differentiate between the two levels of enemy images I have
chosen this definition of dispositional
images:
A dispositional enemy image is a negative stereotype& of a nation, state, religion or/and their
respective regimes and heads of states. The enemy
image can express itself through metaphors or other
effects in the language or visual and graphical
effects that create expectations of aggressive, hostile or inhuman behaviour.
All the articles in the three newspapers
about the four conflicts the weeks before
and after the events described above took
place were registered in a database," using
the following variables:" (i) appearance of
enemy images; (ii) genre; (iii) who is
defined as the enemy?
6. Hypotheses
The hypotheses were the following:
1. In media coverage of the martial law in
101
Poland there will be a clear-cut dispositional
enemy image of the Soviet Union.
2. In media coverage of the martial law in
Romania the dispositional enemy images
have disappeared.
3. In media coverage of the Iraqi invasion
of Iran there will be a clear-cut dispositional
enemy image of the Soviet Union.
4. In media coverage of the Iraqi invasion
of Iran a dispositional enemy image of Islam
will occur. It will be related as much to the
victim of aggression (Iran) as the aggressor
itself (Iraq).
5. In media coverage of the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait the dispositional enemy image of
the Soviet Union will have disappeared.
6. In media coverage of the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait the dispositional enemy image of
Islam will be strengthened and further developed, related mostly to Iraq.
7. Dispositional Enemy Images
Of my total sample of 915 articles I found
enemy images in 217. Dispositional enemy
images are the sole single category in 93
articles. If we dichotomize and collapse 'dispositional' and 'both dispositional and situational' into one category, we find that 144
out of the 217 articles contain dispositional
enemy images. Compared to the 70 articles
with situational enemy images, this is the
biggest category. We can therefore conclude
that there is a dispositional trend among the
enemy images in the sample.
In an analytical perspective these figures
do not tell us very much, however. If we
break the figures down by categories, and go
into the texts we get a better picture. The
sample of editorials had an overrepresentation of enemy images compared to all
other categories. There were enemy images
in 76% of the editorials, as against only 20%
of the news articles.
It would appear that the regional newspaper Bergens Tidende (BT) was the one
paper in my sample that most often used
enemy images in the journalistic process.
The tabloid paper Verdens Gang (VG),
however, had the biggest share of dispositional enemy images. If we break this
down by the categories 'genre' and 'types of
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102
RuneOttosen
Table II. Enemy Images in Editorials
VG
Type of EI
D
B
S
Aftenposten
Type of EI
D
B
S
BT
Type of EI
D
S
B
All
newspapers
B
S
D
All
enemy
images
Poland
Romania
Iraq-Iran
Iraq-Kuwait
2
0
0
1
1
0
0
3
1
2
2
1
1
0
1
0
2
0
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
2
1
0
1
0
3
0
1
1
3
2
2
7
2
3
3
3
8
5
6
11
Total
3
4
6
2
4
3
0
6
2
5
14
11
30
EI = enemy images. S = Number of articles with situational enemy images. D = Number of articles with
dispositional enemy images. B = Number of articles with both situational and dispositional enemy images.
Table III. Enemy Images of Soviet Union in Articles on Martial Law in Poland and Romania
Aftenposten
Type of EI
S
D
B
VG
Type of EI
B
D
S
BT
Type of EI
D
B
S
All
newspapers
D
S
B
All
enemy
images
Poland
Romania
16
O
3
O
4
O
4
O
9
O
4
O
10
O
2
O
5
0
30
0
14
0
13
0
57
0
Total
16
3
4
4
9
4
10
2
5
30
14
13
57
S, D, B, EI - see note to Table II.
conflicts', we get a more mixed picture. BT
emerges as the newspaper with the most dispositional enemy images in editorials. All of
the editorials in BT containing enemy
images belonged to the categories 'dispositional' or 'both'. Given the fact that the
editorials were the sole genre with the
highest level of enemy images, we must conclude that there is no clear pattern between
these newspapers.'12
All the hypotheses about the enemy
images of the Soviet Union (hypotheses 1,
2, 3 and 5) were confirmed. As we shall see,
hypotheses 4 and 6 were only partly confirmed. In what way did the enemy images
influence the journalistic process? I offer
examples for each of the conflicts.
7.1 Martial Law in Poland
Dispositional expectations of a Soviet
invasion were so strong that both BT and
VG came close to announcing the invasion
that was expected, but never took place. On
26 December 1981, VCGhad a news page
with the title: 'Soviet aeroplanes landed last
night'. There are several elements in this
article to connote that 'the Russians are
coming'. There is a column title: 'Poland's
Hour of Destiny', with the Solidarnosc
symbol. A picture of a warship from the
Russian fleet illustrated the article with the
following text: 'This picture is taken from
the ferry between Poland and Sweden. It
shows Soviet naval ships at the harbour in
Swinemunde. The ship nearest the photographer is a troop transport ship.'
In the leader a Soviet spokesman according to UPI said that the 'Soviet Union would
assist Poland, also militarily if the Military
Council in Moscow asked for help'. This is
the vocabulary of the Brezhnev doctrine
(the Czechs also 'asked' for help in 1968). In
the last two sentences there is information
that weakens the impression that a Soviet
invasion is about to begin, however. There a
spokesman for the US State Department
says that he cannot confirm the message
about Soviet aeroplanes. This contradicts
the telegram referred to further up where
'Western Diplomats' and 'all the Western
news agencies in Warsaw' are cited as
sources that refer to the Soviet aeroplanes
as part of a possible invasion force. The day
before two Polish refugees were quoted as
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Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process
103
having seen a Soviet invasion force under
way (VG, 15 December 1981).
VG in this case put the mainfocus on the
information and sources that predicted a
Soviet invasion(diplomaticsourcesin Warsaw and Polish refugees)- informationcontrary to this was not mentioned until the
very end of the article.The whole page, the
title, the lead, the choice of picture, the
picture text, all point in the directionof an
impendingSoviet invasion.
Most likely, these decisions were taken
under deadline pressure, the editorial staff
drawingtoo hastya conclusionon whatlater
proved to be less reliable sources. Most
likely, the dispositionalexpectation of an
aggressiveact from Moscow was nourished
by the existing enemy images of the Soviet
Jaruzelski's repression, because this very
repressioncould serve to prevent a Soviet
invasion. How then were enemy images of
Ceau?escu,and in what way did they influence the journalisticprocess?
Hitlermetaphorsand metonymsoccurred
in the text, headlines and cartoons. BT
carried the title: 'No assistance to the
Fuhrer' on 22 December 1989. Ceau?escu
was also portrayedas the 'Devil' (VG, 20
December 1989). Nor did it pass unnoticed
that this was the homeland of 'Dracula'.
VG wrote that 'Dracula is dead' when
Ceau?escu was shot (VG, 27 December
1989).
Editorialslinked the events to the 'final
countdown' to communism and revitalization of 'Christianvalues'.
Union. Thus I suggest that enemy images
BT wrote that 'the 'Anti-Christ'is dead
weaken critical thinking among journalists in (27 December). The articlestarts:
respect of choice of sources and in drawing
conclusions too hastily.
7.2 Martial Law in Romania
In this case the hypothesis was confirmed
that the enemy image of the Soviet Union
had disappeared. Instead, a new enemy
image was introduced: the personified
image of Ceau?escuclingingto power. This
new enemy image was of course not unexpected. Ceausescuwas for many 'the ideal
enemy': he was tyrannical in his ruling
methods, unsympatheticin appearanceand
used communist rhetoric to defend his
policy. If we look back on the coverage of
the events in Poland, there was little focus
on the person of Jaruzelski,even thoughhe
had the same 'qualifications'(tyrannical,unsympathetic appearance and communist
rhetoric). Despite this, only 10% had personified enemy images of Jaruzelskiamong
the sample of enemy images in the Polish
case. In the Romaniancase, all 42 articles
classified as containing enemy images
focused on the person Ceau?escu.Among
these, there were five with a supplementary
enemy imageof 'communism'.How can this
development be explained? I find it likely
that the 'dangerfrom the East' duringthe
Polish crisis overshadowed the personal
role of Jaruzelski.In fact the Westernpress
took an 'understanding'attitude towards
PARIS: What a Christmas message: Anti-Christ is
dead - and it happened on Christmas Day,
exclaimed anchorman, Petre Popescu in the free
Romanian television. It may sound foolish, but for
me Ceausescu was Satan himself, the incarnation of
everything evil - and I'm glad that he is dead, says
the famous playwright Eugene lonesco to the newspaper, Le Figaro.
Laterin the articleElena Ceau?escugets her
share: 'Withassistancefrom the machiavellian witch, Elena, he made suppression
and surveillance into the religion of this
country.' A reporter from VG visited a
family in Bucharest: 'This Christmas
Ceau?escuwill no longer play the role of
Jesus Christ.For the firsttime in manyyears
Christians . . . can celebrate Christmas in
the old-fashioned way, with Christmas
trees, hymnsand mass.' Later in the article
the daughter in the family expresses the
wish to reintroduceold execution methods:
'Ceausescugot awaytoo easily, the younger
daughter bursts out: He should not have
been shot, he should have been stoned in
the centreof Bucharest.'Then the journalist
observes: 'The son Adriano is smiling to
himself at the end of the table. On Christmas day he was on the barricadesin the
street of Bucharest,today the Anti-Christis
dead and Christcan be celebratedopenly.'
Aftenposten had two reporters in Romania.In a reportentitled'FromNightmare
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104
Rune Ottosen
to Victory' on 27 December (dateline Timisoara), they wrote:
'Death to Ceausescu. Death to the Anti-Christ'.
The verdict was hanging on walls and posters all
over Romania. Written by a bitter people. Now it's
fulfilled. In Timisoara where the rebellion started,
people went into the streets and embraced each
other. But the joy is mixed with sorrow. On the first
Christmas in freedom the Christmas trees were
decorated with black ribbons. Between 4,000 and
12,000 people out of the total population in this city
of 275,000 have been killed since Sunday 17
December, nobody knows for sure how many.
rights record was not much better during
this period; but at this point the Western
world had more important enemies to fight,
and Romania was given favourable treatment for being the 'weakest link' in the
Warsaw Pact.
Such hypocrisy is one thing, more interesting for my discussion is whether there is a
connection between the demonization of
Ceau?escu and the uncritical use of inflated
death tolls. Could it be that when the demonization goes far enough the critical threshold
gets lower? After all, 'Satan', 'Dracula' and
'Hitler' are capable of almost anything,
aren't they?
Back in Oslo the editorial comment ran like
this: 'Everything is worse in Romania. The
Brezhnev regime in power in Czechoslovakia after 1968 was also brutal, but it was
never bestial. Let us hope Europe has learnt 7.3 The Iraqi Invasion of lran
its last lesson this day before Christmas what The testing of this hypothesis was twofold:
a mad dictator is capable of doing with his partly to see whether an enemy image of
own people.'
Islam was introduced, and partly to find out
Later in the article an estimate of how whether there was a shared responsibility by
many deaths this 'mad dictator' had been the parties involved.
The hypothesis was partly confirmed.
responsible for: 'Figures came up to 60,000
according to spokesmen for the new Even though Iraq was the aggressor, Iran
was blamed just as much as Iraq (see Table
regime'.
The same day, Aftenposten in its editorial IV). The enemy image, however, was
referred to 'human slaughter in Romania',
and ironically enough there is a cartoon
beside the editorial with a huge pile of Table IV.
Angling of Total Sample of Articles Covercorpses under the title 'The moment of ing Iraqi Invasion of Iran
truth'. Ironically, the truth was far from
what was reported from the reporters in the Angling
field and from the staff in Oslo. The news- Iraq is attacking
45
33
media in Norway as well as in the rest of the Iran is attacking
10)
Western world operated with roughly the Iraq opposes peaceful solution
9
opposes peaceful solution
same death tolls. Aftenposten did not cor- Iran
6
International support for Iraq
rect their figures until 18 June the next year, International support for Iran
6
when in a short article in connection with a
Total
109
trial against Securitate officers, the official
death figure was pared down to 1038 The total sample of articles covering the Iraqi invasion
of Iran is 211. Of these, I present only the 1()9articles
(Allern, 1992, p. 264).
have the relevant angling for the comparative
It is remarkable how quickly the image of which
perspective discussed in the article.
Ceau?escu in the Western world changed
from 'the favourite member of the Warsaw
Pact' to 'Satan', 'Dracula' and 'Hitler'. For
years Romania enjoyed favourable loan and related to the person, Ayatollah Khomeini,
trading conditions, cultural exchange, etc., rather than Islam. Said (1989, pp. 3-4) anawith the USA and EC as well as other West- lysed how certain persons symbolize the
ern countries. The Norwegian government enemy image of Islam. In 1980 US television
even awarded Ceau?escu the order of St. showed a commercial connected with a
Olav for honourable service to the 'father- shortage of energy and oil. In the film a
land and mankind'. Ceau?escu's human series of still pictures was shown which in
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Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process
105
Table V. Categories of Enemy Images in Coverage of the Iraqi Invasion of Iran
BT
Type of EI
B
S
D
All
newspapers
S
D
B
0
0
5
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
4
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
8
2
4
1
26
2
7
0
1
1
5
2
11
33
Aftenposten
Type of EI
S
D
B
VG
Type of EI
D
B
S
Islam
Arabs
Khomeini
Saddam Hussein
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
2
0
1
O
4
0
0
0
0
0
Total
0
1
3
5
0
All
enemy
images
S, D, B, EI - see note to Table II.
a subtle way linked the Muslim connection
and the fear of an oil shortage. There were
portraits of Khomeini, Gaddafi and Yasser
Arafat. The pictures were shown without
any name being mentioned, but as Said
shows their Muslim background is linked to
the threat to oil supplies.
In several of the articles in my sample
there was an implicit if not open linkage
between Khomeini's 'fanaticism' and Islam.
For example, let us take a commentary
article in Aftenposten on 27 September 1980
under the title 'Showdown in the Gulf':
'The Arab states in the region are watching
Hussein's move forward with satisfaction
and scepticism. Satisfaction is connected
with the prospect of getting rid of
Khomeini, who with his rebellious fanaticism also threatens Saudi Arabia and the
smaller Gulf states.' The Iraqi attack is
toned down with the expression 'move forward'. But Khomeini was a threat through
his 'rebellious fanaticism'. Aftenposten does
not express explicitly that this 'fanaticism' is
related to Islam, but obviously there is an
implicit connection.
My material includes several examples in
which Iraq is blamed for the invasion; justifying circumstances are found often connected with Arabs or Muslims. Here is
another example from the same article in
Aftenposten:
The background to this conflict is complex, and as is
often the case in that part of the world it's not easy
to point out who exactly started the hostilities. But
if we can use an old rule of thumb that the one who
started the war is the one who has greatest progress
in the beginning then the finger should be pointed at
Iraq.
Then Aftenposten launches 'temptation' as a
motive: '. .. the combination of ideological/
religious aggression and a military decline
(in Iran) might have tempted Iraq to teach
its neighbour a lesson.'
No expansionist motives were ascribed to
Saddam Hussein; his motive is simply 'to
teach Khomeini a lesson'. It is Iraq the
state, and not the person, Saddam Hussein,
that is defined as the attacker (after being
tempted).
Several examples of titles, leader,
angling, illustrations and cartoons follow
this trend. There is also a certain element of
wishful thinking in the sense that the desire
to see the fall of Khomeini is so strong that it
is reflected on all levels in the journalistic
process. A couple of headlines can exemplify this: 'Khomeini is totting' (VG, 25 September). 'Khomeini must be removed' (VG,
26 September).
VG on 24 September has a double page
with the title 'Iran is Facing a Breakdown'.
The leader follows up: 'Iran is in danger of
falling apart. Khomeini's aggressive policy
has challenged the neighbouring countries.
Today one can see no gathering authority
except religion.'
The whole article is based on an interview
with Anders C. Sjaastad, a researcher at the
Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs who
later became a Conservative MP and Minister of Defence. In the interview, Sjaastad
mentions several reasons for the likelihood
that Iran would 'fall apart'. These are: ideological and economical contradictions, eth-
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106
RuneOttosen
nical tension and the war itself. He also
launches a theory about a possible Soviet
interventionin the conflict.
The most strikingthing about this article,
however, is a huge drawingwith a map of
the region and portraitsof SaddamHussein
and Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini has
darkdeep eyes while SaddamHusseinlooks
like a Western-orientedbusiness man, a
striking contrast to the cartoons we saw
duringthe Gulf War. There are also many
weaponsdrawnon the map, all of them connoting Iraniaggression.Thereis a huge tank
rolling out of Iran into Iraq. The fighter
planes are headingaway from Iran towards
Baghdad, while the only weapons in the
Iraqimap are two tinyplaneson the ground.
There are two planes directedtowardsIran
in the air, but it looks on the map as if they
come from another country in the Middle
East. The text in the drawingas well as the
visual effects connote Irani aggression,but
also portray Iraq as the losing side: 'The
Iranianforces of Khorramhahrand Abadan
are surrounded and completely isolated'.
This double signal 'Iran as aggressive'and
'Iran is losing' can in many ways symbolize
the whole coverageof this conflict.The contrast between this anglingand what was to
come in the next example of Saddam
Hussein's aggressionten years later is remarkable,as arguedby Mowlana(1992, p.
33):
tray Saddam Hussein as the devil himself.
The media are of course not to blame for
telling the truth about the terrible things
SaddamHusseinwas responsiblefor. However, what was less convincing was that
these things never featuredin the headlines
as long as the regime was regarded as a
Western ally. There was little mention of
the fact that he was armed by the Western
powersnow allied againsthim, that Saddam
Hussein had received help from the Soviet
Union and the KGB to buildup his military
machineand secret police; or that the USA
had used him vigorously in their fight
againstIran after Khomeinicame to power
(Colhun, 1991).
The demonizationof SaddamHusseinbecomes at its most strikingif we take an overall look at the enemy images after the Iraqi
invasionof Kuwait(see Table VI for a full
overview). Comparingthe images of Saddam Husseinin the two invasions,we see a
striking difference. It was not a generally
sympatheticpicturethat was drawnof Saddam duringthe Iraqiinvasionof Iraneither,
but nobody questioned his mental soundness and nobodycalled him 'Hitler'.
After going thoughall the editorials,news
articles and commentariesin my sample, I
have to conclude that there were fewer implicit enemy images of Islam than was the
case with the coverageof the Iraqiinvasion
of Iran. During the invasion of Iran there
were several examples of implicit enemy
images of Islam in the enemy images of
Khomeini.This time the enemy images are
more related to SaddamHussein'spersonal
The Iran-IraqWarended in August1988withSaddam Hussein in disgrace,but two years later the
same Iraqiarmywas publicisedby the greatpowers
and the media as one of the greatestarmiesin the
world, capable of annihilatingall its neighbours. character, his mental health and his lust for
This allegedstrengthjustifiedthe half-million-troop power. All of the three papersin my sample
multinationalpresencein the region.No reporteror
media personnelin the West was willing to inter- have enemy imagesalong those lines. And if
view Iraniansoldiersand generalsas to how they we can talk abut an implicitadditionaldishad been able to keep the Iraqisin check with so positionalenemy image this time, it is more
small a militaryarsenal.No interviewand reporting about 'Arabs' than about Muslims (see
were done with the Iranianpopulationas to how it Table VI).
had resisted the two hundred Iraqi Scud missile
Even the titles of the commentaryarticles
attackson the populationcentresin Tehranandthe
Iranianprovincesduringthe so-called city war in in the three newspapersthe day after the
1987-1988.
invasionset the trendfor whatwas to come:
- 'A Killer with Family Problems' (BT, 3
August) - 'Rulerwith Blood on His Hands'
Since the United Nations had almostunani- (Aftenposten, 3 August) - 'The Bully of
mously condemnedthe invasionof Kuwait, Baghdad' (VG, 3 August). The leader in
the path was clear for the campaignto por- this articlein VG continues:
7.4 The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
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Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process
107
Table VI. Categories of Enemy Images in the Articles on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
Aftenposten
Type of EI
S
D
B
VG
Type of EI
D
B
S
BT
Type of EI
B
S
D
All
newspapers
S
D
B
All
enemy
images
Islam
Arabs
Khomeini
Saddam Hussein
O
0
O
2
O
0
O
11
O
0
O
2
O
0
O
3
O
0
O
14
O
1
O
7
O
0
O
1
O
0
0
5
O
1
0
0
O
0
0
6
O
0
0
30
O
2
0
0
O
2
0
45
Total
2
11
2
3
14
8
1
5
1
6
30
11
47'
S, D, B, EI - see note to Table II.
Totally ruthless, with a greed for power and sly these are the most used adjectives connected with
Saddam Hussein (53), also known as the 'Butcher of
Baghdad'. Only Hitler and Stalin have in modern
times represented a worse mixture of threats, false
promises and military attacks towards their neighbours.
It is less importanthere to discusswhether
this characteristiccan be justified. The importantthingin my comparativeperspective
is to see the differencebetween the Saddam
Hussein we meet in this conflict and the
Saddamwe met ten yearsbefore.
Even if there were similar trends in the
three papers, the tabloid VG went furthest
in demonizingSaddamHussein and in contrasting the 'good' against the 'evil' in the
confrontation between George Bush and
Saddam.To a greaterextent than the other
papers VG personifiesthe whole conflictas
being a 'herovs. villain'melodrama.'3Study
of Norway's major tabloid newspaper,
Dagbladet, shows a similartendency (Berg
& Steien, 1990/91).Thus we can talk about
a tabloid trend that strengthenstendencies
we also findin the other two newspapers.
To take a closer look at the 'villain'in the
drama, let us return to the article already
mentioned,entitled'The Bullyof Baghdad'.
The articlerelatesto the Hitler connotation
introducedin the leader:
could stop Hitler. The articlesummarizesa
number of Saddam Hussein's previous
atrocities- torture, executions, the use of
gas againstthe Kurds,etc. His rationalityis
also questioned: 'Many people are of the
opinionthat he is consciouslyactingcrazyso
that he can more easily frighten his opponents.' It is left to the reader to conclude
whetherhe is crazyor just actingcrazy- but
obviously that you can't make a deal with
this kind of man. A negotiationor a peaceful solution doesn't seem very likely after
this. The only positive thing VG can come
up with is the role Saddamplayed in deterring Khomeini.
On 6 August, Israelis introducedinto the
melodrama by VG's correspondent in
Jerusalem.The title of the article is 'Israel
Demands that "Hitler" be Stopped'. The
article is illustratedwith a photographof a
demonstrationin whicha puppetof Saddam
Hussein is held with Nazi symbols. An
adviserto the IsraeliPrimeMinisterYizhak
Shamir is quoted: 'A Hitler characterlike
Saddam Hussein must be stopped. ... He
may wish to take the rest of the Middle
East.'
Thus VG uses the one partyin the Middle
East with most UN resolutionsagainstit for
expansionismand ill-treatmentof the Palestiniansas proof for the claimthat Saddamis
It's pure fright that made Saudi Arabia sign a nonHitler without mentioningthe fact that the
aggression treaty with Iraq. The treaty is probably
not worth more than the one Hitler signed with Israeli government is involved in the
Stalin. Kuwait is sacrificed in the same way as regionalpower battle.
Poland was sacrificed. But Saddam's main objective
VG also portrays Saddam's regional
could be Saudi Arabia, the same way the Soviet
struggleas part of an Arab tradition.
power
Union was Hitler's main objective.
The rulingBaathpartyis linkedwithoutany
The naturalanswerto this is of course a logicalreasonto a communistenemy image:
war - war was after all the only thing that 'Saddam claims to have family links to
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108
RuneOttosen
Nebuchadnezzar as well as the Prophet
Mohammed. Only 22 years old he tried to
claw his way to the top as terrorist for the
communist Baath Party.' The other Arab
countries are portrayed as weak, scared and
cowards who would not close ranks behind
Kuwait: 'Beyond dispute the strongest military power in the region - a million men
equipped with weapons and eight years of
experience - Saddam has frightened the
other Arab countries from helping Kuwait.
...
It's pure fright that made Saudi Arabia
sign a non-aggression treaty with Iraq.' The
contrast is enormous between the 'aggressive villain' Saddam, 'the chicken' Arabs
and the other main person in the melodrama: 'the hero' George Bush.
Bush is introduced to the drama on 4
August under the headline 'Bush is Promising Revenge'. At this point Saddam has
claimed that foreigners in Baghdad are not
allowed to leave. A subtitle: 'Americans
Taken as Hostages in the Kuwaiti War'
establishes the dramaturgical context. The
hostages symbolize the cruelty of Saddam
Hussein and their release will eventually be
a measure of Bush's bravery.
A huge picture of George Bush on the
front page with a firm expression and a
fisted hand. In contrast there is a small
picture of Saddam just beside the fist, with
the following text beneath: '"The Butcher
from Baghdad": The feared but impoverished president Saddam Hussein has probably robbed Kuwait's huge gold stock.'
Here, another motive is introduced:
greed. In a Hollywood context the melodrama could be a Western movie. The
impoverished and feared villain has stolen
the gold. But the sheriff George Bush is
about to enter the scene. In the leader the
message is clear and outspoken: Bush is
ready for action: 'The president of the
United States - the world's most powerful
man - came through with a clear message to
"the butcher from Baghdad", Saddam
Hussein - If you as much as touch a hair on
the head of the hostages you must take responsibility for the consequences.'
On 8 August VG has a new front page
with the headline: US Forces to Saudi
Arabia. The headline is inserted in a full
page picture with US soldiers in combat
uniform. The picture connotes 'firm courage' and could be taken out of 'Green Berets' or a similar Hollywood movie. Inset is
the following text: 'US troops are landing in
Saudi Arabia to defend the country against
an attack from Iraq. The situation in the
Gulf is growing more and more explosive.'
The day after, VG has another full-page
spread with a picture of President Bush
seated at his desk. The headline sounds like
Bush's own rhetoric: 'Stop the Dictator'. In
the text beneath we are confronted with
another Hitler connotation: 'President Bush
compares Saddam Hussein's behaviour with
Hitler's tactics in the 1930s and says that he
must be stopped.'
The military potential of both sides in the
conflict is analysed in several articles: Iraq is
presented on 8 August under the headline:
'Desperate Potential'. The leader starts like
this:
Against a unanimous world boycott'4 the world's
most dangerous man - Saddam Hussein - has to
make a choice: He can give in or attack with all the
weapons he has. Nobody doubts that he is mad
enough to use them. Tanks, bombers, rockets and
gas. In addition, 1.3 million'5 well-equipped and
well-trained soldiers.
The articleis illustratedwith a mapof all the
Scud-rocket bases in Iraq. In striking contrast to this connotation of aggression, gas
and death, the day after (9 August) the US
military force is presented with pictures of
various weapons under the heading: 'Here
are the US muscles - warship and battle
planes will tame Iraq'. The article concludes
that the US motives are solely defensive:
'The US will have supremacy in the air, but
President George Bush said clearly yesterday that the US will not attack, just defend
the territory of Saudi Arabia.'
With Iraqi 'desperation' against the
'muscles' of the USA the countdown could
start for what was to become deadline 'Operation Desert Storm' on 15 January 1991.
This melodrama fits into an international
pattern. Similar 'countdowns' between the
'hero' George Bush and the 'villain' Saddam
have been identified in the media coverage
in the USA (Kellner, 1992, pp. 64-65), in
Denmark
(Skovgaard-Petersen,
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1991) and
Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process
in Sweden (Johannesson, 1992). Lakoff
(1991) has analysed how George Bush
played the leading role in a rescue scenario
in the official US version of the conflict: Iraq
is the villain, Kuwait the victim; US the hero
and the crime is kidnapping and rape. This
simplified version of realities and the
purpose of showing that war was necessary
and unavoidable. Kurt Johannesson (1992,
pp. 55-57) has shown how the use of historical parallels covered up other perspectives
of this conflict, including US great power
ambitions in the area. Noam Chomsky
(1992, p. 55) shows how the media made
invisible 'disturbing elements' in this blackand-white picture. One example of such a
disturbing element was the position of the
democratic opposition in Iraq, which was
strongly opposed to Saddam Hussein (and
had been so during the period when the
West used Saddam Hussein as a buffer
against Iran), but it also opposed the strategy of going to war. They feared the consequences the war would have for the civilian
population in Iraq.
In their attacks on Saddam Hussein, the
Western media often ignored the fact that
the Muslim world was deeply divided on the
whole issue of the Gulf War. Instead there
was a tendency to provide a stereotyped
picture of Muslims with racist undertones.
When the media campaign against Iraq and
Saddam Hussein started, it was easy to build
on the prejudice which had always existed
against Muslims in Christian societies and
which was made stronger during the
Khomeini Revolution.
Why then this sudden change in the image
of Saddam Hussein? Torben Retb0ll (1991)
shows how the image of the enemy has
changed according to historical developments, and how the image of the friend can
change accordingly. Basically, you are not
judged by your acts, but according to your
place in the friend/enemy picture. Acts that
the media accept or ignore when 'friends'
are concerned are condemned when the
'enemy' is involved. Retb0ll gives the
following examples: the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait was condemned, but conveniently
forgotten when invasions involving the
Western powers, including the US-backed
109
annexation of East Timor by Indonesia, and
the US invasions of Panama and Grenada.
Saddam Hussein was rightly condemned for
keeping civilians as hostages in Iraq, but
nobody informed the public that the USA
refused to help one of its own citizens, when
Jennifer Casolo (a missionary) was illegally
detained by the government of El Salvador
in 1989. Saddam Hussein was condemned
for invading the French Embassy in Kuwait
and thus violating international law. Hardly
any news media 'remembered' that the US
invasion forces in Panama in 1989 had
entered the private home of the Nicaraguan
Ambassador to Panama and afterwards had
to veto a resolution in the UN Security
Council condemning the act.
8. Conclusion
The Soviet Union ceased to be an enemy in
the ten-year period I have analysed, and in
this sense my hypothesis was confirmed.
When this enemy image was alive (during
martial law in Poland) it seems to have
weakened the source-critical attitude which
eventually led to too hasty conclusions
(about a possible Soviet invasion). Personified enemy images have replaced the role of
the Soviet Union in the conflicts analysed in
my material. The enemy images of Arabs
and Muslims took on a more subtle and indirect role than I had expected. In fact
enemy images of Muslims became more evident after the period analysed here, especially after 15 January 1991, when the
possibilities of terror actions by Iraqi agents
became an issue (Bj0rgo, 1992; Ottosen,
1991, p. 33; Yassine 1993).
In what way does the personified enemy
image influence the journalistic process? In
the cases of Ceau?escu, Khomeini and
Saddam Hussein we can speak of a 'scapegoat effect'. The blame for violation of international law, human rights, etc., is partly
explained through the personal characteristics of the leaders involved. The hypocrisy
of these enemy images is evident in the cases
of Ceau?escu and Saddam Hussein since
both were used by the Western world in a
period when they were useful allies in a bigger strategic game, even when their lack of
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110
RuneOttosen
respectfor humanrightswas evident at that they used, etc. I have analysed only the
time as well. Even more serious is the fact articlesthemselves.It should also be underthat these enemy images seem to have lined that the internationalconflictsstudied
weakenedthe analyticalperspectiveand the here are of the type much more likely to
source-criticalattitude. In the Romanian generate enemy images than other topics.
case the consequence was that the news- To gain a deeper understandingof enemy
papers had exaggeratedthe death figures. images in everydayjournalism,one has to
The fact that Iran and Khomeini were analyse a sample of newspapers over a
blamed for the war just as much as Saddam longer time-span, including periods when
Hussein and Iraq indicates that the enemy the situation is more 'normal'than during
images overshadowedanalyticalapproaches overt conflicts.The extent to whichlinkages
to coverage, such as the historicalconflict- can be found in commercialpressure and
lines in the region and Saddam Hussein's politicalframesof referenceshould also be
regional ambitionsthat were proved again examined.
when he attackedKuwait.Since this analytical perspective was missing in the first NOTES
round, it could not be picked up again ten
1. Galtung (1969) differentiates between direct
years later. Instead we were witness to an
violence, which expresses itself in wars and armed
enormousdemonizationof SaddamHussein
conflicts, and structural violence, which occurs in
that again overshadowedthe international
the global contradictions in the North-South conflict.
aspects of the conflict including the US
15 January 1991.
motive to salvage its own superpoweram- 2. Klassekampen,
3. Aftenposten, 29 December 1989.
bitions and to defend the oil supplies, as 4. I define a metaphor as a quality or a characteristic
declared in the Carter doctrine of the late
attributed to a person by using a name, image,
adjective, etc.
1970s (Ottosen, 1986).
About 80% of the news articles in my 5. I define a metonym as a part of the reality that is
described as representing the whole complex situsample did not include any enemy images,
ation.
which indicates that there is no need to 6. I define a connotation as something that is sugdramatize the effect of enemy images in
gested by a word in addition to its simple meaning.
ordinary day-to-day reporting. When it 7. I define a denotation as the basic meaning of a
word.
comes to news items, my materialindicates
Ethos is analysed here in connection with characthat in general enemy images influencethe 8. terization
of a person we have or have no confiangling more than the text itself. The tabdence in.
loid VG presents a more black-and-white 9. Walter Lippman defines stereotypes as a way of
organizing a presentation on a regular basis
picture of the conflict in the Gulf than
through simplified expressions in a convenient and
the other two newspapers. The overtime-saving manner (Yassine, 1993).
representationof enemy images in the edi- 10. The theoretical and methodological problems are
torials and commentary articles indicates
discussed in more detail in my report (Ottosen,
1993a, pp. 43-50), in which I also describe a rethat enemy images have an impact on the
liability test based on Scott's pi with a methodologilanguage in the process of articulating
cally acceptable result.
meanings.Thus this is a moraland political 11. There
were other variables in the survey as well,
issue as well as a professionalweakness.
such as size of the article, use of sources and
angling, but the whole study will not be presented
Care has to be taken in launching a
in this article.
'replacementtheory' (that a Muslimenemy
In the following cases, ranked in descending order,
image has replacedthe enemy image of the 12. dispositional
enemy images were the biggest catSoviet Union). We haven't actuallyproved
egory of enemy images: (1) VG's coverage of marthat there has to be an enemy image at all
tial law in Poland, (2) VG's coverage of martial law
in Romania, (3) VG's coverage of the Iraqi
times, but my findingsshow that the picture
invasion of Kuwait, (4) Aftenposten's coverage of
is complex and that each crisis has its own
martial law in Romania, (5) Aftenposten's coverage
the
whole
I
not
character. have
analysed
of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, (6) BT's coverage
journalistic process including how the
of martial law in Romania. Situational enemy
images were the biggest category of enemy images
journalists were influenced, what sources
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Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process
in: (1) VG'scoverageof the Iraqinvasionof Iran,
(2) Aftenposten's coverage of martial law in
Poland,(3) BT'scoverageof martiallawin Poland,
(4) BT's coverageof the Iraqiinvasionof Iran. In
Aftenposten'scoverageof the Iraqiinvasionof Iran
'both dispositionaland situational'was the biggest
category of enemy images. In the case of BT's
coverageof the Iraqiinvasionof Kuwaittherewere
equally as many 'situational' as 'dispositional'
enemy images.
13. B0 (1985) has analysedNorwegiantabloidswithin
the perspectiveof Sergej Balukhaty'sanalysesof
the Russiandramasfromthe last century.I use the
expression 'melodrama'in the context of B0's
model.
14. I do not discusshere the well-documentedfactthat
it was the Westerncountriesand the Soviet Union
that had delivered most of these weapons in a
period that Saddam Hussein's expansion should
have been obvious(Ottosen, 1993a)
15. This figuremustbe seen in the lightof the exaggerations about the actual militarystrengthof Iraq
current at the time. The actual size of the Iraqi
forceswas around360,000(Hiro, 1992,p. 397).
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RUNE OTTOSEN, b. 1950, Cand.Polit in Political Science (University of Oslo, 1984), BA in
Journalism (Norwegian College of Journalism, 1973); Journalist in various media (1977-84); Lecturer.
and Research Fellow at the Norwegian College of Journalism (1984-8); Information Director and
Research Fellow at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (1989-91, 1991-2),1
Norwegian Federation of Journalists (1993-5). Currently writing the history of the Norwegian profession of journalism.
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