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IReflect – Student Journal of
International Relations
www.ireflect-journal.de
The Divided Union: Why the EU Did not Agree
on a Comprehensive Financial Transaction Tax.
A Comparative Analysis of the German and
British Positions
FELIX RÜDIGER
IReflect – Student Journal of International Relations 2015,
Vol. 2 (1), pp 67-87
Published by
IB an der Spree
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Website: www.ireflect-journal.de
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Website: www.ibanderspree.de
E-Mail: [email protected]
Berlin, March 2015
Rüdiger: The Divided Union
The Divided Union: Why the EU Did
not Agree on a Comprehensive
Financial Transaction Tax.
A Comparative Analysis of the
German and British Positions
Felix Rüdiger
Abstract
This paper investigates two EU member states’ disagreement
over the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) in
the aftermath of the financial crisis. By using Schirm’s societal
approach, it conducts a comparative analysis of the German
and British governmental positions between 2011 and 2013
seeking to explain why Germany approved an FTT while Great
Britain strictly opposed such a tax. Following the societal approach, it argues that the governments’ diverging positions
were strongly influenced by domestic economic interests, societal ideas and regulatory institutions: While more regulation-friendly societal ideas and institutions dominated the
government’s decision in Germany, the UK’s distinct interest
in supporting its financial sector and keeping "light-touch"
regulation in place led to its refusal of an FTT.
Keywords: Financial Transaction Tax, financial market regulation, societal
approach, Comparative Political Economy.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, substantial differences in the
way governments pursued the regulation of global finance became apparent.
This holds especially true for the idea of a European Financial Transaction
Tax (FTT). After having failed in the G20, the topic has, since 2009, been
widely discussed among European Union (EU) member states where it has
sparked heated debate. Disagreement over the European Commission’s proIReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 67-87
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
posal for a European FTT eventually led to the decision of eleven EU member
states to move forward with an FTT under enhanced cooperation, disregarding other members’ refusal to follow their path.
This paper seeks to understand the European Union’s disagreement over
an FTT. After outlining the core components of the Financial Transaction Tax
as proposed by the European Commission, this paper will focus on possible
reasons for disagreement among European governments. For this purpose it
will employ the societal approach (Schirm 2009a, 2009b, 2011, 2013a,
2013b, 2013c, 2014) which holds that diverging governmental positions
arise from differences in important economic sectors’ cost-benefit calculations, fundamental values held by the countries’ societies as well as institutions of their respective regulatory frameworks. It will be used to conduct a
comparative analysis of the German and British positions over an FTT between January 2011 and February 2013 which marks the period that eventually led up to the failure of a comprehensive, EU-wide tax. Germany and Britain were chosen because they can be viewed as representative of the two
diverging European positions – in favour and opposed to an FTT – and therefore allow the comparison between two different sets of ideas, interests and
institutions. This paper draws on various resources in the wide field of domestic politics approaches as well as Comparative Political Economy (CPE).
Many scholars1 have approached the puzzle of diverging governmental positions in global economic governance in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
This paper contributes to this lively discussion and intends to fill in a research gap as divergence over the European FTT has not yet been investigated using the societal approach or any similar CPE research design.
The Proposed European FTT
The recent momentum for the introduction of a transaction tax was triggered
by the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 which, to many observers2, revealed
the instability of financial markets and has cast doubts on the benefits of
financial market liberalisation. As a consequence, the crisis reignited the
debate over the pros and cons of a tax on financial transactions (Schulmeister
et al. 2008: 5). The European Commission adopted a proposal for a Council
Directive on a common system of Financial Transaction Tax on 28 September, 2011. This proposal was instantly met by approval as well as rejection.
The UK government has repeatedly pointed to the numerous negative effects
which it thinks an FTT would have on the EU’s economy – especially in times
Zimmermann (2010), Heyes (2012), Fioretos (2010), Kalinowski (2013), Schrim
(2009) and Hodson (2009) seek to explain diverging governmental positions after the
crisis. Schirm (2009), Schrim (2011), Franke (2012) and van Loon (2013) employ
employ this paper’s societal approach to explain the German and British governments’
differing positions in global economic governance.
2 See Kalinowski (2013), Talani (2011), Semmler (2010), Bieling (2013).
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
of crisis. Citing the European Commission’s own original impact assessment
in 2011,3 British Prime Minister David Cameron indicated that a European
Financial Transaction Tax could end up reducing the GDP of the EU by €200
billion, cost nearly 500.000 jobs and force much of the financial industry out
of Europe: “Even to be considering this at a time when we are struggling to
get our economies growing is quite simply madness” (Cameron 2012). The
British government further expressed concerns over the negative impact an
FTT would particularly have on Britain with its large financial industry. David
Cameron has repeatedly insisted that he considered the financial service
industry as one of Britain’s main strengths which it should openly support
(see, for example, Cameron 2013).
The German government, on the other hand, supports an FTT since the
CDU/FDP Coalition had reached consensus on this question in May 2010
(Tagesschau 2013). The financial sector, among others, was considered responsible for the financial crisis as well as the ensuing economic crisis (Bundesregierung 2012a; Merkel 2011). As a result, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble repeatedly demanded that
the industry must make a fair contribution to the costs imposed on states and
taxpayers during and after the crisis (Bundesregierung 2012b; Schäuble
2012c). It was in turn regarded unacceptable that financial gains were privatised while costs were socialised (Schäuble 2012a). An FTT was furthermore
viewed as a proper means to limit high frequency trading and its “exaggerations”, thereby stabilising financial markets (Schäuble 2012b).
Due to these diverging governmental positions, it became clear during the
seven meetings of the Council’s Working Party on Tax Questions as well as
the European Council meeting on 22 June 2012 that unanimous support for
an EU-wide FTT could not be reached. As a consequence, eleven Member
States4 – representing about two thirds of the entire EU27 economy – voiced
their intention to request an authorisation for engaging in enhanced cooperation (European Commission 2013a: 2).
The European Commission (2013b) names three main objectives for a
Financial Transaction Tax in the European Union:
"Harmonizing legislation concerning indirect taxation on financial transactions […], ensuring that financial institutions
make a fair and substantial contribution to covering the costs
of the recent crisis […] and creating appropriate disincentives
for transactions that do not enhance the efficiency of financial
markets thereby complementing regulatory measures to avoid
future crises" (European Commission 2013b: 2).
The proposal includes specific tax rates on securities trading as well as
derivate agreements which the Commission considers "financial-market
See European Commission (2011).
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain.
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
bets" (European Commission 2013a: 8). Securities trading, including shares
and bonds, will be taxed 0.1 percent of the market price, whereas trading
with derivative agreements is taxed by 0.01 percent of the notional amount
underlying the product. Whereas earlier statements suggested an introduction of the tax by January 2014, the cooperating member countries now plan
to have a legal basis for the tax by the end of 2014 and implement it by 2016
(Reuters 2014).
But why did it come this far? Why was the United Kingdom strictly opposed to an FTT while Germany seemed determined to pull through with the
tax even under enhanced cooperation – thereby unfolding a deep division
within the European Union?
The Societal Approach
This paper will employ the societal approach developed by (Schirm 2009a;
2009b; 2011; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2014). It rests on the liberal theory of
International Relations (Moravcsik 1997; Frieden, Rogowski 1996; Katzenstein 1978; 2005), the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall, Soskice
2001; Fioretos 2001) and historical institutionalism (Fioretos 2011; Farrell,
Newman 2010).
Moravcsik (1997) argues that the state is a representative institution
constantly subject to the influence of coalitions of social actors. The relevance
of domestic factors for governments’ foreign economic policies is furthermore emphasised by Frieden (1996) who holds that the preferences of national economic sectors are crucial for governmental policy decisions.
The role of institutional factors in shaping government positions in domestic as well as foreign economic politics is underlined by the Varieties of
Capitalism approach (Hall, Soskice 2001). VoC assumes that there are two
distinctive ideal types of Western economies due to their institutional design
(Hanke et al. 2010). Whereas market coordination mechanisms dominate in
Liberal Market Economies (LME), Coordinated Market Economies (CME)
tend to rely on the institutional governance structures of non-market coordination. LMEs are typically represented by the United States and Great Britain,
while Germany is the main representative of CMEs. The VoC-literature therefore provides useful insights into institutional peculiarities of the German
and British national economies, especially their regulatory frameworks for
financial markets. According to VoC, institutions reflect ideas of the past and
develop over time. They consequentially constrain future actions – illustrating VoC’s linkage to historical institutionalism.
As its core argument, the societal approach holds that "divergence and/or
convergence of the positions of governments towards the financial crisis,
new regulation and economic stimulus are strongly influenced by domestic
ideas and interests" (Schirm 2009b: 4). Governmental standpoints reflect
preferences originating from domestic societal influences prior to interna70
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tional negotiations (Schirm 2014: 2). Furthermore, it assumes that since
governments in democratic systems want to be re-elected, they are responsive "to the way in which both domestic material interests and value-based
ideas relate to globalization and (global) governance of markets" (Schirm
2009b: 4). The societal approach features three independent variables –
economic interests, societal ideas, and domestic institutions – whereas governmental positions are treated as the dependent variable (Schirm 2014: 2).
Interests are defined as material considerations of specific domestic
sectors which react rapidly according to short-term benefits and costs induced by the global economy and new national, regional and global economic
governance initiatives, such as regulatory reforms (Schirm 2009b; 2013b;
2014).
Ideas are defined as path-dependent and value-based collective expectations about appropriate governmental positions and behaviour, in particular,
on how politics should govern the (financial) market (Schirm 2013c; 2009b).
These societal attitudes are thought to be more path-dependent than interests and can therefore not change as rapidly as the latter (Schirm 2013c: 6).
Institutions are defined here as “formal regulations which structure domestic political and socio-economic coordination” that result in “long-term
complementarities” resulting from these regulations (Schirm 2014: 3). The
government is expected to act consistent with long-term institutional settings
because they are, for one thing, considered the foundation of economic
groups’ competitive advantage (Fioretos 2010: 701) and because of their
path-dependent ideational legitimacy. In the context of this paper, institutions as regulatory frameworks are thus expected to reflect society’s basic
convictions concerning the relationship between state and market and the
main goals of regulating financial markets as well as economic considerations
for a regulatory framework consistent with a national economy’s competitive
advantage (Gottwald 2010: 57).
The societal approach expects diverging governmental positions to be
rooted in differing material interests, societal ideas and institutions. Ideas
and interests may interact by reinforcing or weakening each other (Schirm
2009b: 5). Interests are expected to prevail over ideas if governance issues
imply direct cost-benefit calculations of a specific, well-organised economic
sector. Ideas, on the other hand, dominate a governmental position if an issue
does not directly affect sectorial cost-benefit calculations, affected sectors are
less relevant to a nation’s economy and an issue instead involves fundamental questions on the role of politics in governing the market. Domestic institutions do not constitute a variable competing with the two but rather weaken
the impact of those ideas and interests that oppose institutional settings and,
in turn, strengthen the impact of ideas and interests that reinforce them
(Schirm 2014: 4). Concerning the German and British positions on an FTT,
the following hypotheses apply:
H 1.1: Since Great Britain opposes a Financial Transaction
Tax, it is to be expected that societal ideas, economic interests
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
and/or domestic institutions cut across increased regulation
of the financial sector.
H 1.2: Because the financial sector contributes significantly
to Britain’s GDP, economic interests predominantly influence
Downing Street’s rejection of a Financial Transaction Tax.
H 1.3: Pro-market ideas, typical for Liberal Market Economies, are expected to reinforce the opposition to a Financial
Transaction Tax
H 1.4: Furthermore, it is to be expected that the British system for financial market regulation reinforces economic interests and societal ideas opposed to an FTT and, consequently,
the government’s opposition to an FTT.
The hypotheses on the German case studies in turn reflect the country’s
position in favor of an FTT.
H 2.1: Since Germany favors a Financial Transaction Tax, it is
to be expected that societal ideas, economic interests and/or
domestic institutions support increased regulation of the financial sector.
H 2.2: With a much smaller financial services sector compared to the UK, an FTT does not pose a major threat to the
German economy. Therefore, material interests of sectorial
lobby groups, be they in favor or against an FTT, cannot dictate the German governmental positions.
H 2.3: Germans are generally more regulation-friendly,
which is considered typical for Coordinated Market Economies. Their ideas will prevail over sectorial material interests
and therefore predominantly influence the government’s decision making.
H 2.4: The German Coordinated Market Economy’s regulatory framework for financial markets is expected to reinforce
regulation-friendly interests and ideas and, in turn, the government’s position in favor of an FTT.
Operationalisation
This paper will conduct an empirical analysis of all three independent variables as well as the dependent variable of governmental positions.
Economic interests will be examined through a content analysis5 (Mayring 2010) of recent publications of business associations concerning the
The text is interpreted using categories, which are developed and revised inductively
in the course of the analysis (Mayring 2000: 3). Reliability is ensured by coding the
examined material more than once (intracoder-reliability) and by allowing other
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(non)desirability of a Financial Transaction Tax in the European Union. Three
business associations were selected for each case study: For Germany, the
Federation of German Industries (BDI), Association of German Banks (Bankenverband) and Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(DIHK) have been selected. British economic interests, on the other hand, will
be examined through publications by the Confederation of British Industry
(CBI), the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) and the Council of British
Chambers of Commerce in Europe (COBCOE). For the content analysis, two to
three publications were selected for each association, encompassing the
period between January 2011 and February 2013 which corresponds to the
political process resulting in the member states’ disagreement over an FTT.
The three respective business associations represent similar sectors in each
country and thus allow for a convincing comparison. Furthermore, they are
supposed to represent not only the financial sector but also parts of the countries’ manufacturing industries.
The empirical examination of societal ideas will focus on ideas as attitudes concerning the appropriate regulation of markets, taxation and the
general role of government. As ideas are thought to be more stable than
interests, it is necessary to focus on values that are persistent over time and
whose validity has been observed over a period of many years (Schirm
2013c: 6). This is why ideas will be evidenced using longer-term surveys,
namely the World Values Survey and Pew Research’s Global Attitudes Project. More short-term oriented polls on the specific issue of an FTT will thus
only be analysed in the context of their coherence with longer-term values.
As a third independent variable, the study of country-specific institutions
of regulatory frameworks will be based on an analysis of secondary literature
on the subject. Including regulatory institutions is a substantial enrichment
to this paper’s analysis of ideas and interests and can help to explain why in
some cases one of the two variables might predominantly influence the government.
Economic Interests
As could be expected, the examined British lobby organisations voiced their
distinct opposition to an FTT. They feared that, unless adopted worldwide,
the tax would especially affect the City of London as Europe’s largest financial
centre and European financial markets in general, putting the European
Union at a competitive disadvantage with other trading hubs and thereby
diverting financial activities to other jurisdictions (CBI 2012: 1; COBCOE
2011: 2). Particular attention was paid to the presumed negative impact of an
FTT on the real economy, stressing that a Financial Transaction Tax “would
coders to potentially reexamine the material of the content analysis (intercoderreliability). The content analyses were conducted with the help of MAXQDA.
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actually weaken both financial sector operators and the economies in which
they do business, which would ultimately be detrimental to European tax
revenue, to employment and to the citizens of the EU” (BBA 2011: 5). The
European Commission’s strategy of applying a very low tax rate on a very
broad base of transactions was not expected to precisely target speculative
trading – especially because it is considered impossible to distinguish between “good” and “bad” transaction types (BBA 2011). Rather, as an FTT is
expected to be a disincentive to risk hedging in the form of derivatives, according to BBA (2011), systemic risks could actually increase. Accordingly,
British interest groups openly applauded the British government once the
latter had made clear its refusal of an FTT, calling it “absolutely the right
decision not to adopt the European Financial Transaction Tax in the UK” (CBI
2012: 1).
In the examined period leading up to the European Commission’s proposal for an FTT under enhanced cooperation, the material interests of Germany’s leading business associations did not differ significantly from its
British counterparts.
First of all, BDI, Bankenverband and DIHK shared the concerns over the
negative impact of an FTT on Germany’s real economy as well as on private
actors. The main concern referred to possible migration of financial institutions such as banks and investment funds to jurisdictions in which transactions were not generally taxed. Furthermore, the business associations
voiced concerns that it would become more difficult for German enterprises
to borrow money and appropriately hedge risks (DIHK et al. 2011: 3; Bankenverband 2013: 1; BDI, BDA 2012: 1). As a result, the FTT was expected to
even further decrease growth and employment (DIHK et al. 2011: 4).
Considering that British and German business associations jointly voiced
their opposition to the introduction of an FTT, both questioning its meeting
the EU’s objectives and underlining possible destructive effects for the Union’s economy: Why did the British government oppose an FTT from the start
whereas the German government eventually became one of its foremost
proponents?
Following the societal approach, the answer lies in country specific economic structures. Whether or not a government will conform to sectorial
economic interests depends on the relevance of the most affected sectors to
the entire national economy ("sektorale Betroffenheit" Schirm 2013a: 176).
In the United Kingdom, the financial industry’s role for the country’s whole
economy is exceptional: In 2011, the financial and insurance industry
amounted to a share of 9.6 percent of the United Kingdom’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), the highest of all G7 countries (Office for National Statistics
UK 2013: 4; Monaghan 2014). Moreover, the sector employs about 1.1 million people, representing four percent of the British workforce (PwC, City of
London 2013: 2). Altogether, these factors presumably serve as economic
reasons to keep the financial industry strong and maintain the global importance of the City of London (Gottwald 2010: 92).
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
The extraordinary relevance of Britain’s financial sector to its national
economy is even more apparent when compared to the German economy. In
2013, the financial sector contributed a share of only four percent to the
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), down from more than five percent
in 2004 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014: 60). The sector currently employs
one million people or 2.3 percent of the German workforce (Bundesagentur
für Arbeit 2014: 46). These figures show that compared to the UK, the financial sector in Germany – as a percentage of GDP and overall employment – is
less relevant to the overall economy. As a consequence, the fact that Germany’s main business associations have voiced their opposition to an FTT does
not mean that the societal approach’s assumptions need to be refuted. Rather, because the financial sector does not constitute a major cornerstone of
the German economy as it does in the UK, societal ideas are expected to ‘fill
in’ this explanatory gap. The analysis of economic interests therefore suggests that H 1.2 and H 2.2 can be verified.
Societal Ideas
According to Schirm (2011: 50), the British society is expected to oppose
more regulation due to their “pro market ideas” whereas the German society
is depicted as more “regulation-friendly” which would, in the case of an FTT,
correspond to society’s opposition in Britain and its approval in Germany.
But do these assumptions hold true?
Basic societal ideas are empirically tested with data from the World Values Survey 2006 (WVS)6 which includes both Great Britain and Germany and
therefore allows a comparison.
As both countries are capitalist societies, they share certain core ideas.
For instance, a wide majority of Germans (79.7 percent) and Britons (72.5
percent) tend to agree that competition is rather good than harmful which is
considered an indicator for the support of free market capitalism (World
Values Survey 2006). More recent numbers by Pew Research (Pew Research
2012: 3) underpin this overall support for free markets, yet they observe a
decline in support in Britain (61 percent in 2012, down from 72 percent in
2007) while increased support is indicated in Germany (69 percent in 2012,
up from 65 percent in 2007). Similarly, most German (58.6 percent) and
British (55.6 percent) respondents rather agree that wealth can be acquired
so there’s enough for everyone and not just at the expense of others (World
Values Survey 2006).
Concerning specific characteristics of the market system, moderate, not
fundamental, differences can be observed among the two countries:
The WVS 2006 constitutes the most current wave in which both the UK and Germany
were included.
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
Concerning the question of the proper role of the state, 66.7 percent of
Germans but only 42.5 percent of Britons rather support the statement that
“governments should take more responsibility” whereas a majority of 56.6
percent of British respondents agree that people should take more responsibility, compared to only 31 percent in Germany (World Values Survey 2006).
Yet, it must be noted that more recent figures by Pew Research (Pew Research 2012: 1) suggest a bigger convergence on a similar subject: A majority
of both German (62 percent) and British (55 percent) respondents found that
it was more important that the state guarantees nobody is in need than the
freedom to pursue life’s goals without state interference.
The different values assigned to individual responsibility as opposed to
collective responsibility endorse this tendency of moderate differences:
While 63.6 percent of Germans agree that incomes should be made more
equal and only 31.3 percent maintain that large income divides are required
as incentives, British respondents are virtually split on the subject (49 percent versus 48.8 percent) (World Values Survey 2006).
A third variable, the respondents’ “willingness to pay taxes” is considered
especially relevant for the topic in question: Again, more Germans than Britons display views that rather correspond to CMEs than LMEs (Schirm 2009a:
509). The fact that governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor is considered rather an essential part of democracy by a vast majority of Germans
(71.1 percent) and – to a lesser extent – Britons (59.9 percent) (World Values
Survey 2006).
More recent publications confirm these moderate differences in societal
ideas which tend to support the societal approach’s argument of pro-market
ideas in Britain and more regulation-friendly attitudes in Germany. Yet, ideas
and attitudes expressed in these opinion polls tend to express more shortterm perceptions that greatly depend on the country’s current socioeconomic situation.
While a majority of both Germans and Britons agree that the current
economic system favours the wealthy (72 percent vs. 65 percent), to close
the rich-poor-gap seems far more urgent to Germans, 42 percent of which
view it the government’s top priority compared to 16 percent in the UK
where the lack of employment opportunities dominated peoples’ perceptions
(Pew Research Center 2013: 17).
Asked about the major threats to their state’s economic well-being, the
results are similar: While the lack of jobs tops the list in Britain with 87 percent of respondents regarding it as a major threat compared to 70 percent of
Germans, the power of banks is perceived as a serious threat to 78 percent of
Germans compared to 65 percent in Great Britain (Pew Research Center
2012: 21).
Considering these and the preceding WVS numbers, the hypothesis that
the German and the British society have different attitudes about appropriate
governmental behaviour towards markets can be validated, yet it must be
kept in mind that differences were often small. This can be attributed to the
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fact that both countries, as market economies, share core assumptions and
both agree that the state is to govern markets to a certain extent (Schirm
2011: 50).
Differences in societal opinions on the Financial Transaction Tax are,
however, a lot clearer than these numbers might suggest: For the entire period between 2011 and 2014, Germany continually shows the highest approval
rates for a Financial Transaction Tax, whereas the UK is one of only three
countries in which a majority of the population opposes an FTT.
Figure 1: Approval Rates of Financial Transaction Tax
Source: Eurobarometer Nov 2011-Jun 2014.
This large divergence of public opinion on a Financial Transaction Tax in the
respective countries underlines the need to check the societal approach
against other variables that might better – or jointly – explain the British and
German attitudes towards a European regulatory measure such as the Financial Transaction Tax. This holds especially true for the societies’ overall
stance towards the European Union.
Nevertheless, the findings of this part confirmed the societal approach’s
main expectations about differing ideas and values in both countries. Whereas in Britain societal ideas opposed to increased regulation might have reinforced the opposition of business towards an FTT (H 1.3), the more regulation-friendly attitudes of Germans who maintain the relevance of the role of
the states towards markets and largely support an FTT are expected to have
shaped the government’s approval of such a measure (H 2.3).
Institutions of Financial Market Regulation
The analysis of regulatory institutions complements the notion that the financial sector is not as relevant to the German economy as it is in Britain and
that path-dependent societal ideas and values about the role of the state
towards markets could eventually dominate the German governmental posiIReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 67-87
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tion. In Britain, on the other hand, the regulatory framework is expected to
correspond to regulation-averse interests and ideas already observed.
The UK’s system of financial regulation has long been considered to pursue a ‘light-touch’ regulatory approach. While prior to the 1980s, the City of
London had been under the sway of a self-regulating “old-boys network”
(Zimmermann 2010: 131), the growing importance of the City of London as
an international financial centre and several regulatory scandals raised increased concern over the system’s effectiveness. The creation of the Financial
Services Authority in 1997 by the New Labour government can hence be seen
as an attempt to strengthen the City’s regulation and thereby its competitiveness and assuage investor’s worries about the credibility of their savings
(Westrup 2007: 1105). Even though equipped with major competences, the
FSA was nevertheless perceived as ostensibly market friendly which made it
popular among financial institutions (Gottwald 2010: 94; Zimmermann 2010:
132). The FSA’s seven principles reflected a market-oriented, light-touch
regulatory approach by including, among others, the promotion of financial
innovations, the need for due regard of the internationality of financial markets and services, the preservation of the competitive position of the British
market place and the minimisation of any adverse effects of regulatory
measures (FSA 2001: 4). These principles translated into a policy which was
primarily aimed at keeping the financial industry in London: by reducing the
capital gains tax from 40 to ten percent on assets held for at least ten, later
two years, government boosted incentives for hedge funds and private equity
funds to keep their firms in the City (Augar 2009: 41).
The overall aim to encourage new financial innovations and push the
City’s competitiveness was proclaimed a main goal of any British government’s regulatory approach towards financial markets in the past decades:
While in November 2005 Gordon Brown called for "no inspection without
justification, no form filling without justification and no information requirements without justification, not just a light touch but a limited touch"
(Brown 2005), the UK government’s impetus of ensuring that London remains a pre-eminent financial centre has withstood the financial crisis. In
2013, Prime Minister David Cameron argued that "this government has done
everything business has asked for. Business wanted lower corporate taxes,
and we have cut our corporation tax to 20 percent. Business wanted lower
personal taxes: we’ve addressed that issue" (Cameron 2013: 1).
The FSA remained the main institution of the UK’s regulatory system of
financial markets for this paper’s examined period between January 2011
and February 2013 which led to Britain’s refusal of the European Commission’s FTT proposal and the ensuing failure of an EU-wide FTT. Yet, as a consequence of its presumed regulatory failure resulting in the financial crisis of
2007/2008, the British government has restructured its regulatory system
and passed the Financial Services Act in December 2012. It abolished the FSA
and created a new regulatory structure consisting of the Bank of England’s
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Financial Policy Committee, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the
Financial Conduct Authority.
Whilst taking into account these current reforms, they do not constitute a
paradigm shift in British financial markets’ regulation. Britain’s experience
with market failures has led to what Kalinowski (Kalinowski 2013: 485) calls
“a pragmatic approach to financial regulation that acknowledges the need for
a strong regulatory framework for financial actors and products”. Yet, the
United Kingdom remains opposed to any regulation of financial flows.
In line with this pragmatic approach, the Financial Secretary to the
Treasury, Mark Hoban, defined the new regulatory system’s main principle as
“to protect and enhance confidence in the UK’s financial system” (Hoban
2011: 2). Therefore, the British government is still expected to assess any
regulatory reform in the light of its economy being equipped with one of the
major global financial centres. These observations affirm VoC’s main assumptions about Liberal Market Economies which are characterised by free market flows and a low degree of taxation on market transactions.
The financial system in Germany and its corresponding regulatory system
had, for many decades, been oriented towards the great relevance of the
German manufacturing sector. This manifested itself in a close industrycapital-nexus with a system of the so-called “Hausbanken” (house banks)
which provided affiliated companies with long-term finance and allowed
companies to pursue long-term strategies (Zimmermann 2010: 125). This
system, often dubbed “Deutschland AG” (Deutschland Inc.), was accompanied
by a corporatist regulatory framework involving federal and state governments as well as the leading German banks and stock exchanges. The financial supervision thus concentrated on the manufacturing industry’s needs
(Gottwald 2010: 79).
In 2002, this regulatory system was partly reformed when the coalition
government of Social Democrats and the Greens established the Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). It centralised much of the supervision of financial markets and thereby corresponded to repeated calls of German banks, such as Deutsche Bank, which considered the fragmented regulatory structure an impediment to its strategic development. The system was
furthermore adjusted to financial globalisation and the emergence of new
investors such as hedge funds and private equity in 2004 when the so-called
investment modernisation law was passed (Vitols 2004). As a consequence,
the major German banks started to enter more profitable areas such as investment banking, soon followed by smaller institutes which had previously
focused on lending to SMEs (Zimmermann 2010: 129). Eventually, the financial crisis revealed the surprising extent to which German institutes had been
involved in risky, short-term speculation.
Yet, the regulatory regime was never as favourable to these new investors
as the UK’s authorities. This is partly due to the German system traditionally
being subject to “incremental change” which favours small adjustments over
“systemic innovations” (Gottwald 2010: 77). In 2003-2004, unlike most other
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countries, the German government introduced direct regulation models and
distinct legal instruments for hedge funds (Fioretos 2010: 710). According to
Zimmermann (2010: 132), the ensuing calls for increased and coordinated
global regulation of financial markets by the German government can be
interpreted as a defensive strategy which aims to keep new financial actors
under control, to preserve the state’s autonomy and legitimacy and to limit
adjustments in the German SME sector. Countries with a large financial sector profit from short-term-oriented, volatile financial markets as they can
charge more for an increased number of financial transactions and are able to
offer more complex financial products. This does not hold true for the CME
Germany which is, also due to its export-driven economy, stability-oriented
and therefore interested in restricting short-term financial flows (Helleiner
2010). From a VoC-perspective, Germany is thus oriented towards the availability of long-term finance, regulated labour markets and extensive coordination among firms. This allows companies to pursue long-term strategies
and protects them from hostile takeovers. ‘New investors’ such as hedge
funds and private equity are viewed as threatening this traditional basis of
German industry. As a consequence, the initiatives for a Financial Transaction Tax by Germany (and France) constitute a roll-back from previous adjustments to globalised finance. They correspond to CMEs’ continued regulatory hesitance towards market liberalisation which was confirmed and
gained momentum after the financial crisis (Kalinowski 2013: 489).
In sum, a rather light-touch regulatory system which is supposed to
strengthen the City of London’s competitiveness in globalised financial markets is expected to have boosted the observed economic interests and societal ideas which mainly opposed further regulation through a Financial Transaction Tax in the UK. The German regulatory framework, even though partly
reformed and liberalised for ‘new investors’, is traditionally less favourable
to short-term investment and favours long-term investment opportunities
for its export-oriented, manufacturing sector, especially SMEs. This regulatory framework has further weakened the sectorial economic interests which
were opposed to a Financial Transaction Tax whereas it facilitated the capability of societal ideas to influence the government’s position. As a consequence, H1.4 and H2.4 can be verified using a societal approach.
Conclusion
Why did the British and German government hold contrary positions concerning a Financial Transaction Tax which eventually led to the failure of its
implementation in the entire EU? Departing from this question, the preceding
analysis sought to explain the two countries’ diverging views. It therefore
employed a societal approach whose core assumptions were found to be
consistent with the empirical evidence concerning a European FTT which is
why this paper’s main hypotheses H 1.1 and H 2.1 can be verified:
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Economic interests in Great Britain as well as in Germany as expressed in
publications of leading business associations proved to be opposed to the
idea of a Financial Transaction Tax in the European Union. Whereas in Britain this opposition is expected to have highly influenced the government’s
decision concerning an FTT, German economic interests were not met by the
government due to the financial sector’s comparably small significance to the
overall German economy. Following the societal approach, the relationship
between its three different variables can be conflictual. In the case of an FTT,
the small contribution of financial markets to the German economy has facilitated societal ideas to predominantly influence the German government’s
decision. Whereas British society holds more regulation-averse values which
translates into a predominant refusal of an FTT, German society is more
regulation-friendly and has proven to be largely in favour of the European
Commission’s FTT proposal. Herein lies, according to the societal approach,
the main reason for the German government’s decision to collect such a tax in
the future. Finally, the examination of country-specific regulatory frameworks has helped to understand the government’s decision in a wider institutional context.
This paper has only attempted to show whether correlations between
ideas, interests and/or institutions on the one hand and governmental positions and measures on the other hand, as suggested by the societal approach,
could be empirically demonstrated. But how exactly do ideas and interests
make their way into policy measures and how do institutions confine governmental actions? In order to answer these questions and thereby enhance
a mere correlation with concrete mechanisms, the societal approach needs to
be supplemented by theories of political decision-making and political legitimacy (Zimmermann 2010: 122).
Moreover, the impact of two other variables should further be investigated to control for alternative explanations, namely the differences in general
attitudes towards the European Union and the role of party politics in the
respective countries. Further research could thus help to draw a more distinct picture and replace mere correlations with mechanisms. This seems
particularly promising, as this paper has proven the overall rich explanatory
power of comparative, sub-systemic approaches to disagreement in global
political economy.
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– I reflect –
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, politicians around the
globe pledged to introduce policies that would prevent financial market actors from continuously trading with highly
speculative products that had destabilised the financial sector
as well as the world economy as a whole. Soon, many critics
contended that after the obvious bail-outs of financial institutions, the promised stricter regulation of financial actors had
failed to appear, once again proving that state policies were
solely concerned with the interests of global capital. To me,
the Financial Transaction Tax seemed to deliver a much more
nuanced picture, with a number of European states continuously committed to introducing an FTT. The societal approach
seemed promising in terms of explaining the apparent divergence in governmental positions with the help of variables
other than solely material interests, such as societal ideas. Yet,
as I reflect upon my findings, I wonder if the approach really
fulfils this promise. Concerning the German case, my analysis
suggests that only because of the relative irrelevance of its financial sector, the German government found itself able to deliver to the popular demand for an FTT. Thus, it has to be
acknowledged that material variables still figure very prominently in the societal approach.
Felix Rüdiger
BA (Politik und Wirtschaft), 6th Semester
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
[email protected]
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