1. No category

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 10 of 2003
--1.Md. Maqsood Alam
2.Budheswar Pal
…
…
Petitioners
…
…
Opposite Party
Versus
The State of Jharkhand
--CORAM
: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY
--For the Petitioners
: Mr. R. P. Gupta, Advocate
For the Opposite Party : Mr. Shekhar Sinha, A.P.P.
--3/05.01.2015
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned
counsel for the State.
In this application, the petitioners have
challenged the entire criminal proceeding including the order dated
13.03.2002 whereby and whereunder cognizance has been taken
under Section 414/34 of I.P.C. in connection with Mahespur P. S. Case
No. 12 of 1991 corresponding to G. R. No. 58 of 1991.
2.
The prosecution story as would appear from the F.I.R. instituted
on 23.02.1991 is that on the same date itself, the informant and the
other police officials on receiving confidential information that a large
quantity of iron pipes stocked near Bisheswar Paharaia's house, went
there and found that a number of pipes measuring 20 feet in length and
4 inches in width were kept hidden. The whereabouts of the owner of
the pipes could not be ascertained and it was concluded that the pipes
appeared to be belonging to some government department and the
same appeared to be stolen property. On the basis of the fard beyan
of the informant, an F.I.R. was instituted being Mahespur P. S. Case
No. 12 of 1991. After submission of the charge-sheet under Section
414/34 of the I.P.C. cognizance was taken by the learned Judicial
Magistrate 1st class, Pakur on 13.03.2002.
3.
The learned counsel for the petitioners has confined his
argument only to the point as to whether in view of the delay in taking
cognizance, the entire proceedings are barred under Section 468 of
the Cr.P.C. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted
that although the date of occurrence is 23.02.1991 and the F.I.R. was
instituted on the same date i.e., on 23.02.1991, but the cognizance
-2was taken on 13.03.2002 and therefore, in view of the provisions of
Section 468 of Code of Criminal Procedure as also in view of the fact
that the maximum punishment under Section 414 of the Indian Penal
Code is 3 years and as such the cognizance having been taken
beyond the period of 3 years, the same is hopelessly barred by
limitation and on the said ground, the entire proceedings are liable to
be quashed.
4.
The learned counsel for the State, on the other hand has
submitted that, although the occurrence is said to have taken place on
23.02.1991, but the F.I.R. was registered on the same day i.e., on
23.02.1991 and therefore, it cannot be construed that there has been
an inordinate delay so as to attract Section 468 of Code of Criminal
Procedure.
5.
After hearing the parties and after going through the records, I
find that the occurrence is said to have taken place on 23.02.1991 and
immediately thereupon the F.I.R. was registered on 23.02.1991.
Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages as follows:
“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the
period of limitation.—(1) Except as otherwise provided
elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an
offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the
expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be—
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine
only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but
not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of
limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together,
shall be determined with reference to the offence which is
punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case
may be, the most severe punishment.”
6.
The cognizance was taken vide order dated 13.03.2002 for the
offence under Section 414/34 of the Indian Penal Code which provides
for a maximum punishment of imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
7.
Therefore, in such circumstances and also in view of the
arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners it is to be seen as to
whether the present case is hopelessly barred under Section 468 of
Code of Criminal Procedure or not.
-38.
In the case of “Mrs. Sarah Mathew Vs. the Institute of Cardio
Vascular Diseases by its Director Dr. K. M. Cherian & Ors.” reported in
(2014) 2 SCC 62, the question which fell for consideration before Their
Lordship was (a)
Whether for the purposes of putting the period of limitation
under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the relevant date
is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of
prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a
Magistrate takes a cognizance of the offence?
9.
While answering the aforesaid question, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the above judgment held as follows:
“51. In view of the above, we hold that for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation under
Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or
the date of institution of prosecution and not the date
on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.”
10.
Considering the aforesaid judgment and also considering the
fact that the F.I.R. was instituted on the same date on which the
offence was committed and that there has been no delay in launching
the prosecution, I therefore, find and hold that the petitioners cannot
avail any benefit on the ground that cognizance was taken after 3
years from the date the alleged offence is said to have been
committed.
11.
In view of the circumstances enumerated above, there being no
merit in this application, the same is accordingly dismissed.
(R. Mukhopadhyay, J)
R. Shekhar Cp 3