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Armenian Massacres: New Records
Undercut Old Blame
Reexamining History
by Edward J. Erickson
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2006, pp. 67-75
The debate about the World War I deportation and massacre of Armenians in
eastern Anatolia has become more contentious with time. Opponents of Turkey's
European Union accession treat the Armenian question as original sin. Yet much
of the historical debate upon which politicians pass judgment is tinged more by
polemic than by fact. Nine decades after hundreds of thousands of Armenians—
and millions of others—died during World War I, it is important to dig down into
the archives to show what the historical record really says.
There is little argument that many Armenians perished during World War I, but
there remains significant historical dispute about whether Armenian civilians
died in the fog of war or were murdered on the orders of the Ottoman
government. More specifically, the debate about whether or not there was a
genocide of Armenians rests upon three pillars: the record of the Turkish courtsmartial of 1919-20 during which the new Turkish government, formed following
the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, tried and hanged some Ottoman officials for
war crimes; documents produced in the Memoirs of Naim Bey, an account
allegedly written by an Ottoman official claiming to have participated in the
deportation of Armenians;[1] and the role of the "Special Organization" (Teşkilatı Mahsusa), somewhat equivalent to the Ottoman special forces.
Recently, two researchers have debated the nature of the World War I Armenian
massacres and, more specifically, the role in the massacres by the Special
Organization and the group's relationship to a Prussian artillery officer known in
the records only by his last name, Stange.[2] The first, Vahakn Dadrian, director
of Genocide Research at the Zoryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian
Research and Documentation, wrote that Stange was the "highest-ranking
German guerilla commander operating in the Turko-Russian border," one of
several "arch-accomplices in the implementation of the massacres," and a Special
Organization commander.[3] Dadrian argued that the Ottoman government
diverted the Special Organization units to deportation duty in rear areas where
they became the principal agent in the Armenian massacres. He bases his claims
against Stange on secondhand German reports of massacres in Stange's area of
operations and uses controversial testimony from the 1919 Istanbul courtsmartial proceedings to support his claim about Special Organization
redeployments. Since that time, many parties have taken Dadrian's assertions at
face value. [4]
Last year, however, Guenter Lewy, a professor emeritus of political science at the
University of Massachusetts, challenged Dadrian's findings on the grounds that
Stange was neither a Special Organization guerilla leader nor did his unit operate
in the area of the massacres.[5]
In history, details matter. Given the importance that contemporary officials place
on the events of nine decades past, clarifying Stange's operations is critical to the
current debate. In this regard, the official 27-volume Turkish military history of
the World War I campaigns, while seldom utilized in Western scholarship, is a
valuable tool.[6] The volumes are not readily accessible to university researchers;
they are only available at a single military bookstore on a restricted Turkish army
compound in Ankara. Far from the politicized debate surrounding the massacres,
these histories shed light on nitty-gritty details such as which officers and units
were deployed where and when. Within the set, the Third Army histories help
flesh out Stange's wartime record. [7] They were published simultaneously to
Dadrian's 1993 article and so should not be dismissed as a Turkish response to
Dadrian's work. They also provide an important source of information which
Dadrian, genocide scholars, and other historians of the period have not yet taken
into account.
Ottoman Irregular Forces in Eastern Anatolia
Analyzing the events of 1915 requires an understanding of the Ottoman military
for, too often, treatments of the period confuse units and muddle Ottoman
military terms.[8] Between 1914-18, there were five groups of Ottoman military
and paramilitary forces engaged on the Caucasian front. The Ottoman regular
army was a uniformed conscript force led by professional officers who were
trained in conventional military tactics and who responded to military discipline
and orders. It fought on all Ottoman fronts during the war.
Assisting them were the jandarma, a paramilitary gendarmerie or rural police
force trained to military standards and led by professional officers. Every
province had at least one mobile jandarma regiment and also numbers of static
jandarma battalions.[9] The Ministry of the Interior controlled the jandarma in
peacetime but, with the Ottoman mobilization on August 3, 1914, command
passed to the Ministry of Defense.
In addition, there was the tribal cavalry (aşiret, formerly the hamidiye). In 1910,
the Ministry of Defense integrated the twenty-nine tribal cavalry regiments into
the regular army. Used as both conventional cavalry and for internal security
duties, members were mostly Kurdish and Circassian, poorly disciplined, and led
by tribal chieftains.[10] However, in the army reorganization of 1913, these
regiments were reclassified as reserve cavalry (ihtiyat süvari) regiments of the
regular Ottoman army.
The gönüllü, paramilitary volunteer forces, allowed Turks and Islamic ethnic
groups living outside the Ottoman Empire to join the war effort and fight
together.[11] These were often poorly led and armed but organized into units so
that they could assist the regular army in both combat and non-combat
operations. During World War I, most volunteers serving in the Caucasus were
"Greek Turks," "Caucasian Turks," Laz, or Muslim refugees from the European
provinces such as Macedonia or Epirus lost in 1913.[12] By definition, the
volunteers were not released Ottoman convicts.
The Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa or Special Organization, a multi-purpose special
volunteer force led by professional officers, was equivalent to a modern special
operations force. It sought to foment insurrection in enemy territory, fight
guerillas and insurgents in friendly territory, conduct espionage and
counterespionage, and perform other tasks unsuited to conventional military
forces. While many histories suggest the Special Organization received orders
from the Committee of Union and Progress or the Ministry of the Interior, the
archival record suggests that the Ministry of Defense commanded the Special
Organization during World War I.[13]
Finally, there were numbers of non-military groups operating in Anatolia during
the war. These non-military çeteler (which may be translated as bandit, brigand,
insurgent, or guerilla groups depending on context) were local groups not subject
to centralized command and control. Çeteler was a catchall term that was used by
both the Ottomans to describe insurgents and authentic criminal bands and also
by foreign observers to describe groups of killers, whose origins were often
unknown.
The Stange Detachment
Where then did Major Stange fit in? Shortly before the outbreak of World War I,
the German Kaiser charged General Otto Liman von Sanders to lead a military
mission to the Ottoman Empire to assist in rebuilding the Ottoman army after its
defeat in the Balkan wars. Liman von Sanders assigned Captain Stange, a
Prussian artillery specialist, to command the Erzurum fortress artillery.[14]
Stange was a conventional military officer with no special knowledge of guerilla
operations. His assignment to the Ottoman Third Army in Erzurum reflected his
mainstream skills. He occupied his time working on the defenses until the
outbreak of war offered him the chance to lead troops against the Russians.
According to the original Ottoman war plan, the Third Army was ordered to stand
on the defensive in the Caucasus while the bulk of the Ottoman army
concentrated in Thrace.[15] However, in early September 1914, a revised
campaign plan directed the Third Army to conduct offensive operations in the
event of war. When war broke out between Russia and the Ottoman Empire on
November 2, the Ottomans were actively planning a winter offensive in the
Caucasus. The plan called for the three army corps of the Third Army to encircle
the Russian army at Sarakamiş with a supporting operation on the Black Sea
flank between Batum and Ardahan, in modern day Georgia.[16] There were no
regular Ottoman army combat units on the Turco-Russian frontier from the
Black Sea south for about 100 kilometers for this supporting attack. Nevertheless,
Ottoman border forces pushed across the frontier and, on November 22, closed in
on the Russian town of Artvin.[17] Flushed with success, on December 6, the
general staff ordered the Third Army to push onward toward Ardahan.[18] It was
in this capacity that Stange entered the scene. Ottoman strategists committed
every available Third Army division to the Sarakamiş offensive. The Third Army
headquarters ordered Stange to take command of the Eighth Infantry Regiment,
two artillery batteries, and the Çoruh Border Security Battalion.[19] This newly
organized force was designated the Stange Detachment (Ştanke Bey Müfrezesi)
and ordered to take Artvin while the rest of the army moved toward their main
objective. None of the troops were trained in guerilla or unconventional warfare.
Against light opposition, Stange pushed forward and took the town on December
21.
At the same time, other Ottoman forces were operating in the area. Bahattin
Şakir, a high-ranking member of the governing Committee of Union and
Progress, commanded the Special Organization force, which had infiltrated its
forward units near Batum to foment an uprising among Laz and Turkic peoples
inside the Russian Empire. In addition to this mission, Şakir ordered Ziya Bey, an
artillery major commanding the Special Organization men on the ground in
Russia, to encircle and destroy çeteler that included a number of Armenians.[20]
The Special Organization also attacked regular Russian army units, capturing
four officers and sixty-three Russian soldiers in late November.[21] One Turkish
source also mentions a large force of volunteers operating in the Çoruh River
valley under Yakup Cemil Bey.[22] Another Turkish source asserts that Yakup
Cemil's detachment was a Special Organization force composed of çeteler.[23] In
this bitter internecine fighting, many civilian Turks, Armenians, and other local
ethnic groups were massacred indiscriminately.[24]
With so many different units and organizations operating in the area, there was
bureaucratic wrangling over how to unify the command as the Sarakamiş
campaign approached. In the end, Stange took command of the entire force—
regulars, border security battalions, volunteers, and the Special Organization.
However, the Special Organization and volunteers continued to receive their
orders from Şakir, who wanted to retain control of the operation while Stange
answered to the X Corps commander, in whose sector he operated.[25]
On December 22, the X Corps and Third Army ordered Stange, the Special
Organization, and the volunteers to converge separately on Ardahan. The Special
Organization, now locally commanded by Captain Halit Bey, cooperated and
joined the advance.[26] Despite bad winter weather, these forces began to
encircle the city on December 29. Because Stange controlled neither the Special
Organization nor the volunteers, he sent coordination copies of his own
detachment orders to Halit, who passed these on to the adjacent volunteers.[27]
This was a clumsy arrangement, and there is no indication that the Special
Organization and volunteers reciprocated. The result was an uncoordinated
attack on Ardahan. Stange's detachment suffered heavy casualties[28] while
Special Organization and volunteer losses were light.[29] The Ottomans failed to
hold the city for long. In early January 1915, the Russians retook the city with
bayonet assaults. Over the next month, the Ottomans conducted a fighting retreat
back toward Artvin.
At the end of January 1915, Şakir consolidated some of the Special Organization
units into a Special Organization Regiment (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Alay)
commanded by Halit.[30] This regiment was assigned nine officers and 671
men.[31] Halit also gained control over a group of volunteers known as the Baha
Bey Şakir Force. Subsequently and because of the deteriorating tactical situation,
Şakir ordered the Special Organization Regiment to cooperate with Stange in
defensive operations along the border. Additionally, a smaller Special
Organization detachment commanded by Riza Bey conducted operations around
Murgal, northwest of Artvin. Istanbul also sent Stange about 1,600 replacements.
Fighting was hard, and the Ottomans were pushed back. On February 16, three
Russian infantry and two cavalry regiments, Cossacks, and an Armenian
battalion attacked a rear guard of Halit Bey's Special Organization soldiers.[32]
The Special Organization fought well and covered Stange's regulars as they
retreated.
On March 1, 1915, the Russian army launched a major attack to restore the
frontier, pushing back Stange, the Special Organization, and the volunteers. In
reaction to what appeared to be a disastrous retreat, on March 20, the X Corps
reorganized the Ottoman forces on the northeast frontier, forming the Lazistan
Area Command (Lazistan ve Havalisi Komutanlıgı) [See Table 1].[33] By this
time, Şakir had left Erzurum, and Stange finally received unitary command over
the regular army unit as well as the Special Organization and volunteers. Stange
immediately set about coordinating a defense with a combined force of 4,286
men, six machine guns, and four cannon.[34]
Table 1
Lazistan Area Command - March 28, 1915
Lazistan Detachment
1st Btln, 8th Infantry Regt
3rd Btln, 8th Infantry Regt
Mountain Btry, 8th Field Artillery
Machinegun Company
Engineer Company
Cavalry Platoon
No. of Men
306
581
192
97
140
30
Trabzon Jandarma Regt
Trabzon Jandarma Btln
Rize Jandarma Btln
Giresun Jandarma Btln
Hopa Hudut (Border) Btln
No. of Men
400
450
330
330
1,430 men (in total)
Special Organization Regiment (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Alay)
Zia Bey Btln
Adil Bey Btln
Muhsin Btln
Salih Aga Btln
Ibrahim Bey Btln
Veysel Efendi Detachment
Source: TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, Kuruluş 12 (Organizational
Chart 12)
The Third Army sent Staff Lieutenant Colonel Vasıf to be Stange's chief-of-staff in
the expanded command[35] while Stange collected supplies, engineers, and
cavalry from the Third Army Lines of Communications Command. In addition,
the military mobilized all men in the Trabzon vilayet (province) between the ages
of 17-18 and 45-50 while a Special Organization unit from Istanbul joined the
Lazistan area command's Special Organization regiment.
Stange reorganized his augmented command into field forces and static forces.
The field forces, which held the defensive lines against the Russians, were
composed of the 8th Infantry Regiment, the Trabzon Jandarma Regiment, and
the Special Organization Regiment.[36] The static forces, which were responsible
for rear area security, were composed of the Riza, the Trabzon, and the Samsun
Jandarma regiments. On April 14, 1915, Stange had over 6,000 men assigned to
his command.[37] Table 2 shows Stange's revised command arrangements.
Table 2
Lazistan Area Command - 15 April 1915
FIELD FORCE
Lazistan Detachment
Trabzon Jandarma Regt
Special Organization Regt
Field Force Troops
1st Btln, 8th Infantry Regt
3rd Btln, 8th Infantry Regt
Machinegun Company
Giresun Jandarma Btln Amasya Jandarma Btln
Hopa Border Btln
Machinegun Company
Ziya Bey Btln Adil Bey Btln
Mehmet Ali Btln
Ibrahim Bey Btln
Veysel Bey Btln
Machinegun Company
Two artillery batteries (8th Artillery), Engineer
Company, Cavalry Platoon
STATIC FORCE
Rize Jandarma Regt
Trabzon Jandarma Regt
2 jandarma btlns
3 jandarma btlns
(probably reconstituted from recalled men)
Samsun Jandarma Reg
4 jandarma btlns
Source: TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, Kuruluş 13 (Organizational
Chart 13)
These arrangements solidified the Ottoman defense, which by mid-April was
successfully holding a line about ten kilometers west of the prewar OttomanRussian frontier. They also show a return to a conventional military
organizational architecture, mirroring the organization of regular Ottoman
infantry divisions in 1915, which contained three regiments each with a machine
gun company. A general support element of artillery, engineers, and cavalry
augmented the regiments.[38] The field force was, practically speaking, staffed
and organized as a regular infantry division. This reflects Stange's conventional
background and the tactical necessity to put an effective and standard defense on
the empire's northeast frontier. The tempo of fighting dropped, and the front
remained stationary until early 1916. Throughout this period the Special
Organization Regiment remained on the line and engaged in conventional
defensive operations.[39] In late January 1916, the recently promoted Major
Halit relieved Stange; he returned to Erzurum.
Early 1916 was a period of disaster for the Ottoman strategic position in
northeastern Anatolia and the Caucasus. The Russians seized Erzurum, Rize, and
Trabzon. Regular army infantry divisions reinforced the Lazistan Area Command.
Several Special Organization battalions in the sector were transferred to the
adjacent Çoruh Detachment in May 1916 where they continued to participate in
frontline duties.[40] The remaining Special Organization troops were distributed
into two elements, which were designated as the First and Second Special
Organization regiments and assigned to a newly-formed coastal detachment.[41]
Other Special Organization units were redeployed to the IX Corps sector on the
Erzincan front near the village of Tuzla.[42] These units served directly under a
provisional corps commanded by Staff Lieutenant Colonel Şevket and conducted
offensive operations in conjunction with the Ottoman Thirteenth Infantry
Division.[43] On June 6, 1916, three Special Organization companies were
assigned to the newly formed Haçköy Detachment on the line south of Tuzla. The
detachment also had an infantry battalion, two cavalry squadrons, and
artillery.[44] The Special Organization continued to participate in conventional
operations on the Caucasian front for the remainder of the summer. On July 29,
1916, the First and Second Special Organization regiments were inactivated and a
single regiment reestablished.[45] Major combat operations in the Ottoman
Third Army area began to diminish in the late summer and, by mid-fall 1916, had
almost completely stopped. This was a result of both combat exhaustion and
severe weather.
The published paper trail of the Special Organization formations on the
Caucasian front ends in 1917, and the Special Organization does not appear in the
1918 Ottoman Caucasian orders of battle. It is unclear what happened to the
Special Organization officers and men assigned to the units at that time.
However, the deportation of Armenians was completed in 1916, and it appears
certain that the Special Organization formations in this study remained on the
front during that period.
Conclusions
Many historians find military chronicles dry and difficult to comprehend.
Nevertheless, when it comes to the controversy over the fate of Armenians in
1915, they are crucial. Many contemporary historians accuse the Special
Organization and Major Stange of complicity in genocide. The records, though,
do not lend such accusations credence.
The official military histories of the modern Turkish Republic portray the
operations of organized Ottoman Special Organization units on the Caucasian
front from December 1914 through the end of 1916 as largely conventional. There
is little evidence of a cover-up, especially as these histories are technical, not
intended for the public, and predate the scholarly controversy over allegations of
Special Organization complicity in Armenian genocide. Importantly, the official
histories fully cite archival sources and often reproduce reports and orders.
Early Special Organization operations near Batum were unconventional and
involved guerilla warfare operations. However, the Sarikamiş offensive provided
the engine that drove the Special Organization into the arms of regular army
commanders like Stange. Subsequent and perennial manpower shortages kept
the Special Organization engaged in conventional military operations. From the
record of unit assignments and locations on the front, it appears that the Special
Organization units associated with Stange were not redeployed from the
Caucasian front to deport and massacre Armenians.
Nor does it seem possible that Stange was involved in the deaths of Armenians.
The modern Turkish histories show that he commanded regular army forces
engaged in conventional offensive and defensive operations until late March 1915.
Although he technically commanded all Ottoman forces near Ardahan in 1914, he
exercised no real control over the Special Organization or volunteers. After
Stange gained command of the Lazistan Area Command, he held direct command
over Special Organization forces, which he employed on the defensive line in a
conventional manner. In effect, from December 11, 1914 through March 20, 1915,
Stange can be characterized as a detachment commander who cooperated with
the Special Organization in conventional operations. After March 20, 1915,
Stange was an area commander who commanded Special Organization forces for
conventional defensive operations. The record demonstrates that Stange was
neither a Special Organization commander, nor was he a guerilla leader. Indeed,
Stange was unhappy with the discipline and training of both the Special
Organization and irregular forces, reflecting his lack of authority over them.[46]
The Turkish histories do reveal an intriguing alternative possibility concerning
who might have been redeployed to deport Armenians. The reserve cavalry
regiments (the former aşiret or tribal cavalry) were grouped into four reserve
cavalry divisions that were mobilized into the Reserve Cavalry Corps in August
1914. The tactical performance of this corps was abysmal, and its levels of
discipline and combat effectiveness low.[47] Consequently, the Ottoman General
Staff inactivated the Reserve Cavalry Corps on November 21, 1914,[48] and only
seven of the twenty-nine reserve cavalry regiments remained with the colors in
the Third Army.[49] The remaining regiments were dissolved, and "10,000
reserve cavalrymen dispersed throughout the region and returned to their
villages."[50] Most of these men were tribal Kurds or Circassians and,
unemployed following demobilization, many may have been attracted to the work
of deporting the Armenians in the spring of 1915. Clearly, many Armenians died
during World War I. But accusations of genocide demand authentic proof of an
official policy of ethnic extermination. Vahakn Dadrian has made high-profile
claims that Major Stange and the Special Organization were the instruments of
ethnic cleansing and genocide. Documents not utilized by Dadrian, though,
discount such an allegation.
Edward J. Erickson, Ph.D. is a retired U.S. Army officer at International
Research Associates.
[1] Aram Andonian, comp., The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official
Documents Relating to the Deportations and Massacres of Armenians
(Newtown Square, Pa.: Armenian Historical Society, 1965, reprint of London,
1920 ed).
[2] See Guenter Lewy, "Revisiting the Armenian Genocide," Middle East
Quarterly, Fall 2005, pp. 3-12; Vahakn Dadrian, "Correspondence," Middle East
Quarterly, Winter 2006, pp. 77-8.
[3] Vahakn Dadrian, "The Role of the Special Organization in the Armenian
Genocide during the First World War," Minorities in Wartime: National and
Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia in Two World Wars,
Panikos Panayi, ed. (Oxford: Berg, 1993), p. 58-63.
[4] For example, see: Taner Akçam, Armenien und der Völkermord: Die
Istanbuler Prozesse und die türkische Nationalbewegung (Hamburg:
Hamburger Edition, 1996), p. 65.
[5] Lewy, "Revisiting the Armenian Genocide"; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian
Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, A Disputed Genocide (Salt Lake City: The
University of Utah Press, 2005), pp. 82-8.
[6] See Edward J. Erickson, "The Turkish Official Military Histories of the First
World War: A Bibliographic Essay," Middle Eastern Studies, 39 (2003): 183-91.
No library outside Turkey holds the complete series. In addition to the 27-volume
coverage of World War I, there are also fourteen volumes on the Balkan wars
(1911-13) and eighteen volumes on the war of independence (1919-23).
[7] These two books are T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlıgı, Birinci Dünya Harbinde,
Türk Harbi, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, Cilt I ve Cilt II (Ankara:
Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993). Hereafter referred to as TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi
3ncü Ordu Harekatı and TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı II.
[8] For example, "scum" cited in Dadrian, "The Role of the Special Organization
in the Armenian Genocide during the First World War," p. 58, or "ex-convict
killer bands" in Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris, The Armenian Genocide and
America's Response (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003) p. 182-3.
[9] TCGB, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, IIIncü Cilt, 6ncı Kısım, 1908-1920
(Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1971) pp. 133-5.
[10] Ibid., pp 129-32.
[11] Ibid., pp. 239-40.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt (ATASE), BDH Koleksıyonu Kataloğu-4
(Ankara: undated). First World War Catalogue, no. 4, of the military archives
lists files of the Special Organization detachments, proving that these
detachments were under Ministry of Defense command.
[14] Ismet Görgülü, On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922, Balkan-Birinci Dünya
ve Istiklal Harbi (Ankara: Türk Tarıh Kurum Basımevi, 1993), p. 105; Deutsche
Offiziere in der Türkei (Bonn: Militar, 1957), p. 10.
[15] TCGB, Birinci Dünya Harbinde, Türk Harbi, Inci Cilt, Osmanlı
Imparatorluğunun Siyasi ve Askeri Hazırlıkları ve Harbe Girişi (Ankara:
Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1970), pp. 212-38.
[16] Fahri Belen, Birinci Cihan Harbinde Türk Harbi, 1914 Yılı Hareketleri
(Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1964), p. 96.
[17] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, Kroki 36 (Map 36).
[18] "Ottoman General Staff Orders, ATASE Archive 2950, Record H-6, File 1267," reproduced in ibid., pp. 339-40.
[19] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, p. 349.
[20] Ibid., p. 344.
[21] Ibid., p. 293.
[22] Ibid., Kroki 37 (Map 37).
[23] Görgülü, On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922, pp. 109, 111.
[24] Muammer Demirel, Birinci Cihan Harbinde Türk Harbinde Erzurum ve
Çevresinde Ermeni Hareketleri (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1996), pp. 41-5;
Dadrian, "The Role of the Special Organization in the Armenian Genocide during
the First World War," p. 62.
[25] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, p. 602.
[26] Ibid., p. 605.
[27] "Detachment Orders, ATASE Archive 5257, Record H-1, File 1-10," cited in
ibid., p. 603.
[28] "Detachment Orders, ATASE Archive 5257, Record H-1, File 1-12,"
reproduced in TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, p. 603.
[29] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, p. 603.
[30] Ibid., p. 608.
[31] "Strength Report, ATASE Archive 5257, Record H-3, File 1-4," reproduced in
ibid., p. 603.
[32] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, p. 607.
[33] Ibid., p. 614.
[34] "Reports, ATASE Archive 2950, Record H-3, File 1-49," cited in ibid., p. 614.
[35] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, p. 615.
[36] "Detachment Orders, ATASE Archive 2950, Record H-4, File 1-8," cited in
ibid., p. 615.
[37] "Strength Report, ATASE Archive 5257, Record H-4, File 194," reproduced
in TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, p. 616.
[38] TCGB, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, pp. 199-203, 266-72, for information
on the architecture of Ottoman army infantry divisions. The Lazistan Detachment
was a regimental equivalent.
[39] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı II, p. 86.
[40] "Orders, ATASE Archive 3974, Record H-2, File 1-59 and 73," cited in ibid.,
p. 181.
[41] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı II, p. 251.
[42] Ibid., p. 233.
[43] Ibid., p. 240, Kuruluş 11 (Organizational Chart 11).
[44] Ibid., p. 247.
[45] "Strength Report, ATASE Archive 2950, Record H-58, File 1-329 & 333,"
cited in ibid., pp. 369-70.
[46] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, p. 618.
[47] Belen, 1914 Yılı Hareketleri, p. 116-24.
[48] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, p. 311.
[49] Ibid., Kuruluş 1 (Chart 1).
[50] Ibid., p. 322.