1. No category

Liberal Equality and Inherited Wealth
Author(s): Michael B. Levy
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Nov., 1983), pp. 545-564
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191449
Accessed: 14-04-2015 04:30 UTC
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LIBERAL EQUALITY AND
INHERITED WEALTH
MICHAEL B. LEVY
Texas A&M University
I am surethereare no menmarkedofGod above another;fornonecomes
intotheworldwitha saddle on hisback,neitheranybootedand spurredto
ridehim.
A LevellerCommonplace,circa 1647
... the day will come whenthe individualwill no morebe permittedto
to hisdescendents
evenbymeansofa willthanhehas
bequeathhisproperty
beenpermitted
(sincetheFrenchRevolution)to bequeathhisofficesand his
status.
Emile Durkheim,1892
... despitetheideologyofthe'open society'and social democraticattacks
upon inheritedwealththroughtheimpositionof estateand deathduties,
ofcontrolover
factorin thedistribution
inheritance
remainsan important
resources,especiallywealth.
RoderickMartin,1977
JNHERITED WEALTH resemblesa livingfossil,curiouslysurvivingtheliberalegalitarianethicofwesternsocieties.FromJohnLocke's
throughfunctionalist
theoriesof
FirstTreatiseattackon patriarchalism
liberalegalitariantheoristshave continuallychallenged
stratification,'
theascriptiveroleoffamilyin politicaland economiclife.It is also true
that inheritedwealthremainsa significant
source of inequalityand
in liberaldemocraticsocieties.2The inheritance
social differentiation
laws ofthesesocietiesare caricaturesofthistension,usuallyamalgams
of symboliclevellingand hereditaryadvantagewithsymboland fact
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 11 No. 4, November1983545-564
? 1983Sage Publications,Inc.
545
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546
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1983
oftencombinedin inverseratio.The exemplaris GreatBritainwhose
estatetaxes are boththemostconfiscatory
and theeasiestto avoid-a
"voluntarytax" accordingto one economist.3
At firstglance thissituationseems to be a simplecase of societal
practicefallingshortofnormativetheory.A closerlook at thebodyof
liberal egalitariantheory,however,reveals a similar,deeplyrooted
ambivalence.Theoristswriting
inthistradition-atonceegalitarianand
individualistic-havenotfailedto act in a mannerconsistent
withtheir
principlesso muchas theirprincipleshavehelpedmakeitimpossiblefor
themto actconsistently.
In fact,thehistoricalresponsesofthesewriters
to thequestionofinherited
wealthsimplymirrortheambivalenceofthe
practiceof liberaldemocraticsocieties.
The followingarticleis an attemptto describeand explain this
paradoxratherthanresolveit.It is mycontention
thatitis impossibleto
fullyresolvethequestionofinheritance
withinthefullmatrixofvalues
associated withthistradition.At the same time,I shall suggestthat
liberal egalitariantheoristscan lessen the conflictswhich inherited
wealthrevealsbyreexamining
thoseofitsfunctionsthatare valuedby
theirtraditionand searching
formoreegalitarian,
yetliberalalternatives
to fulfillthem.This tackplaces muchofthediscussionin a consequentialistmode.I no moreassumean inviolablenaturalrightofthedead to
to thelivingthanI assumean obligationoftheliving
bequeathproperty
descendentto assumethedebtsofa profligate
Nordo I begin
forebear.4
withan idea ofproperty
thatnecessarily
entailsbequest,althoughthere
maybe good reasonsforbequestto exist.Withfewexceptions,liberal
thinkershave consistently
treatedinheritanceand bequestwithinthe
framework
of such assumptions.
To be sure,in recentyearsa libertarian
position,usuallyassociated
withRobertNozick,has gainedsome favor.This positionbeginswith
argumentsof rightand entitlement
similarto those that I have just
dismissed.While a seriousargument,and one thata seriouscriticof
inheritance
mustat sometimeconfront,
itis notone thatI can consider
here.Insteadit is mypurposein thisarticleto examinethepositionof
thosewhorejectideasofentitlement
infavorofegalitarianviewsandyet
stillholdto theneedforinherited
wealth.Furthermore,
itwillnotbe my
purposeto attackliberalinheritance
practicesfromnonliberalpremises,
nor to defendliberalismfromits critics,but simplyto investigate
internaldissonanceand structurallimitswithinthe liberalegalitarian
traditionitself.
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Levy / LIBERALISM AND INHERITANCE
547
THE PROBLEM DEFINED
Inheritance
takesmanyformsofwhichdescendedwealthis onlyone.
Obviouslyindividualsinherit
suchas intelligence,
geneticcharacteristics
beauty,strength,
and athleticprowesswhichinfluence
theirlifechances
in powerfulways. Nongeneticallyacquired assets such as discipline,
skills, professionalinterestsand contacts similarlymay qualify as
inheritance
inthatwe mayobtainthemthroughourfamily.Ifthescope
broadensbeyondthe divisiblebenefitsthatone receivesthroughthe
family,
itmakessenseto includeadditionalformsofcollectiveinheritance
thatindividualsreceivefromassociationsas narrowas a subcultural
groupand as extendedas thenation-state.
The Amishchildin central
PennsylvaniaortheHasidicchildin Brooklynis profoundly
affected
by
his "accident of birth."The average Americanchild speaking an
internationallanguage, livingin the vortexof an integratedworld
system,
takingan adequatedietforgranted,
attending
publiclysupported
schoolsand universities
inherits
a worldstaggeringly
different
fromthat
available to the child of sub-Saharan herdsmen.5To the child who
inheritsthatworld,theseare publicgoods; to thechildexcluded,they
are highlydivisible.Simply,individualsreceivea varietyof legacies
frompastgenerations
whichare unearnedaccidentsofbirthand which
differentiate
themfromothersand profoundly
influence
theiropportunitiesforwealth,power,and personaldevelopment.
All of these legacies create inequalities which concern liberal
egalitariansespeciallyif theytake a view beyondthe bounds of the
nation-state.6Why then the special concern with wealth inherited
throughthefamily?
The answer lies in the nature of liberalismand the attemptsto
accommodateequalitywithinit,as muchas withinherited
wealthitself.
By no means the most consistentof ideological and philosophical
systems,liberalismhas generallyheld two ideals in common: (1) a
commitmentto maximizinglibertyand opportunityfor individual
development
and(2) tolerationfora widevarietyofworld-views
and life
plans.7Generallyliberals,includingegalitarianliberals,have accepted
somevariantofcapitalism,i.e., marketexchangeand privateproperty,
as a necessaryvehiclefor achievingthese ends. Since propertyand
exchangecouldexistwithouttherightto bequeathorinherit,
thereis no
primafaciereasonfortheegalitarianliberalto includeinherited
wealth
as a constitutive
partof liberalism'ssupportivematerialstructure.8
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548
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1983
In fact,liberalnotionsofequalityseemto argueagainstit. Equality
and inequalityin this schemeare necessaryprerequisitesand consequences of individualdevelopment.Thus liberalequalityis of a very
special kind.9If individualsare to developbeyondthelimitsformerly
imposedbyfamily,class or region(i.e., iftheyareto haveequal liberty)
theyrequireexposureto a fullrangeofopportunities
and an equal voice
inthepoliticalinstitutions
whichshapemuchoftheirenvironment.
The
logicofthisenterprise
has ledegalitarianliberalsto espouseequal rights
(political,social, and economic),and equal opportunity.
At the same
time,theyhave rejectedequalityofreward,whichnecessarily
deniesto
individualstheconsequencesoftheiruniquedevelopment,
and whichin
any eventwould requirea level of coerciondestructive
of the liberty
liberalshope to foster.Oftento thedismayof egalitariansfromother
traditions,
liberalegalitariansusuallyhave accepteda notionofearned
or meritocraticinequalityas a legitimateelementin theirtheoryof
the case againstinheritedwealth;it is
justice.This should strengthen
unearned,it preventsfull equality of opportunityand conceivably
equalityof liberty,and it seemsto be in directconflictwiththeliberal
egalitarianethic.
Functionaliststratification
acatheoryis theperfectcontemporary
demicexpressionof meritocratic,
egalitariansentimentand similarly
seemsto reenforce
thisconclusion.Essentially,thefunctionalists
have
contendedthatall societieswithinterdependent
divisionsoflabormust
rewardunequallyin orderto encouragepeople to develop skillsand
apply themin the marketplace.Since the value attachedto a skillor
functionmay vary accordingto supply and demand, and since the
degreeofunequalrewardrequiredto adequatelyallocatelaborwillvary
ina likefashion,RichardSimpsonhas labelledtheoriginalfunctionalist
0 Nominally
a "puredemand-supply"
perspective
modelofstratification.
an explanatorytheoryofstratification,
functionalism
offers
a
indirectly
legitimatingrationale that is traditionallyliberal, egalitarian,and
a logical update of Bentham'sconsequentialistdictum
meritocratic,
"inequalitythathas no specialutilityto justifyit,is injustice."'II
Leavingasidethequestionwhichhasprimarily
concernedsociologists,
i.e.,thesocialoriginsofthosewhoactuallyoccupythemostremunerative
positions,one point becomes obvious. Even if the world and the
functionalist
modelwerecompletely
isomorphicand a naturaleliteheld
themostremunerative
occupations,thefunctionalists'
argumentcould
neitherexplain norjustifythedistributive
shareallocatedto theheir.
The wealththattheinheritor
receivesfromhisorherfamilyis unearned,
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Levy / LIBERALISM AND INHERITANCE
549
unrelatedto personalcontribution,
and irrelevant
to a sociallynecessary
stratification.
In thislight,theheirappearsmorea parasiticrentier
than
a successfuland deservingmarketcompetitoroftraditionalliberaland
contemporary
functionalist
theory.
Nevertheless,
theoristsas different
as Milton Friedmanand John
Rawls haverefusedto see inherited
wealthas a specialdistributive
case.
Both considerit as legitimateas any otherinheritedassets (speed,
beauty,intelligence,
theworkethic,etc.) whichgiveone a competitive
advantage. All are equally neutralfromthe standpointof justice.
Althoughtheyagreeon thispoint,Friedmanand Rawls movetoward
different
ends. Friedmanpositsthe radical oppositionof libertyand
equality, chooses liberty,and hopes to uphold the validityof all
uncoercedexchanges-even those betweenthe dead and the living.12
Rawls prefersmoreequality(seeingit as necessaryforliberty)evenif
achievedthroughextra-market
transfers
whichalterthe outcomeof
individualexchange and competition.'3Yet in acceptinginherited
wealth,bothattempt
to unburdentheirdistributive
theoriesoftraditionallyegalitarianliberalnotionsofmeritordesertwhichhavelegitimated
marketplacedistributive
patternsin thepast.14
The easy dismissalof desert,and the subsequentacceptanceof all
inherited
assetsas identical,is too simpleand misunderstands
theplace
ofdesertinthehistory
ofliberalthought.First,Rawlsand Friedmanare
rightto pointout thatintelligence,
skills,or evendisciplinemaynotbe
fullyearned assets; but theyfail to see thatsuch assets are formsof
"human capital" whichmustbe manifestedin labor beforetheycan
bringa returnto theirownersor a benefitto society.Unlessputto use,
theyhave no value and provideno income.As longas a systemeschews
direct coercion to allocate labor-as a liberal society almost by
definition
mustdo-it can onlyuse moralincentives
orunequalrewards
(prestigeorwealth)to transform
thesepersonaltraitsintosocialfactors
of production.The desertor meritthatis beingrewarded(paid to the
contributor)is in returnfora contribution
to sociallydesiredends as
expressedin themarket.As longas one cannotquestionthelegitimacy
of owningthese assets (theyare part of one's personality),different
rewardsfor theiruse have been consideredboth useful and just.
Furthermore,
the measureof desertis not staticbut directlyreflects
changingexpressionsofsocial utility(or at leastdemand)and thus,like
otherfactorprices,remainssubjectto change.'5This again pointsup
thatone is notrewardedforan inheritedassetperse (e.g., intelligence)
butfortheuse ofa developedasset(e.g., "expertise")in publiclyuseful
or privatelydemandedlabor.
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550
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1983
Second,lumpingtogetherall formsofinheritance
ignoresprogrammaticresponsesthategalitarianliberalshave designedto equalize the
many formsof inheritancewhich are neithermaterialnor genetic.
Public education,school nutritionprograms,earlylearningcenters,
university
scholarships,and subsidizedjob-trainingare all attemptsto
and substitute
approximateequalityofopportunity
publicalternatives
which reduce many of the unequal advantagesgained throughthe
family. Whatevertheir weakness in practice or execution, these
programsoffera policydirectionconsistentwiththeirprinciplesand
further
explainwhymostegalitarianliberalshave not felttheneedto
vieweveryinheritedasset as equallylegitimateor, conversely,
equally
unfair.
fortheefficient
wealthremainsunearned,unnecessary
Onlyinherited
social allocationof labor and less easilyrenderedbenignby programmaticequivalent.Sinceitis byno meansobviousthatinherited
wealthis
intrinsically
legitimate,'6
and moreoversinceit can be separatedfrom
thedecedentat thetimeofdeath,'7thestatusofinheritedwealthmust
remainproblematicforanyoneholdinga liberalworldview.
REVISIONIST DUALISM: THE EXAMPLES
OF MILL AND RA WLS
Despite a natural antipathy,modern liberal egalitarians-C. B.
Macpherson's "revisionists"-have been unwillingto advocate the
abolitionofinherited
wealth.By maintaining
a criticalacceptance,the
egalitarianliberal combines the two opposing positions that have
definedtheouterboundsofthebroaderspectrumofliberalresponsesto
thequestionof inheritance.
One of the great insightsof classical liberal political economy
centeredon the importanceof capital accumulationfor economic
growth.This emphasis,foundin writerssuch as Smithand Bentham,
concentratedon the need to freeownersof capital fromthe fear of
confiscation.When applied to the questionof inheritedwealth,this
meant at most verylightestate taxes which would not discourage
18Thistradition,
savings,accumulation,orlong-term
investment.
which
we can call "accumulationist,"dominatedlate eighteenthand early
nineteenth
centuryliberalthinkingon thesubject,and undergirds
the
neoclassicalwritingsof contemporariessuch as Gordon Tullock and
RichardWagner.'9
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Levy / LIBERALISM AND INHERITANCE
551
Especially in America, however,it was opposed by a radical,
liberalismwhichremainedoutsideof the mainstream.
"confiscatory"
Usingthelanguageofliberalequality(equal opportunity,
equal liberty,
desert),lesserknownpolemicistssuch as OrestesBrownson,Thomas
Skidmore,HarryCall, Harlan Read, and inthelatertwentieth
century,
JamesConant and Hal Varian20arguedforconfiscatory
estatetaxes
even as theyacceptedthe capitalistmarketas necessaryforfreedom.
This literatureusuallyhas had theflavorof a populist"return"to an
originalequalityuntaintedbyseemingly
permanent
class divisions.For
OrestesBrownsonin 1840, confiscationwas "the logical conclusion
fromtheadmittedpremisesoftheAmericanpeople";21forHal Varianin
1975, the basis for a "people's capitalism."22Yet in each case, the
confiscatory
liberalshave failedto confrontthe relationshipbetween
inheritance,
capitalaccumulation,and growth.Capitalismhas been,in
Daniel Bell's words,
a social systemwhichunitedthetwobroadinstitutions
ofproperty
and family,
and
of that
throughthe marriagesystemand inheritanceprovidedforthecontinuity
system.23
Familieshavebeennetworks
foraccumulating
capitalovergenerations.
To confiscatewealthat deathwoulddestroythisprocessand leavemost
future
accumulation
toeitherthestateorthefewjointstockcorporations
Even on a purely
capable of generatingtheirown fundsinternally.24
theoreticallevel,both of thesealternativeswould be unacceptableto
liberalsofall varieties.In eithercase,capitalwouldbecomeconcentrated
in waysthatmightbe detrimental
to liberty.Furthermore,
individual
savings and thus futureeconomic growthmight suffer,affecting
offuture
Brownson's
negatively
thewelfareandopportunity
generations.
is perhapsunderstandsimplecall forconfiscationand redistribution
able givenhismemoriesof a worldofartisansand farmers,
butitis far
less so giventhesubsequentcourseof theindustrialrevolution.While
in theiregalitarianism,
of thistradition
satisfying
laterrepresentatives
have refusedto confrontthe otherside of the liberaldilemma-who
shall accumulatecapital and how will that effectfutureeconomic
theavailabilityofopportunity,
thedistribution
ofpower,
development,
and thusthesurvivalof a liberalpolity.25
Revisionistliberalshave combinedtheconfiscatory
and accumulationistpositionsinto an uneasy synthesis.Two examples are John
Stuart Mill and John Rawls. Mill's desire to eliminateunearned
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552
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1983
inequalities,i.e., "accidentsof birth,"is mostoftenassociatedwithhis
writingson feminism.Yet he was equally hostileto thoseinequalities
whichstemmedfrominherited
wealth26
and theconsequentdistribution
of society'sbenefitsin "inverseratioto labor."127
thelargestportionsto thosewhohaveneverworkedat all,thenextlargestto those
whoseworkis almostnominal,and so on in descendingscale.
to deal withtheproblemof
EssentiallyMill advocatedtwo reforms
inheritancein a capitalistpoliticaleconomy:29
(1) a "limitationof the
sumwhichanypersonmayacquirebygiftor inheritance
to theamount
sufficient
to constitute
a moderateindependence"30
and (2) a progressive
tax upon all inheritanceabove a certainminimum,set at a rate to
producethegreatestrevenuewithoutinducing"evasionsbyintervivos
or concealmentof property,
such as would be inadequateto check.31
Since inheritanceswere not earned by theirrecipients,Mill had no
philosophicalaversionto taxingthemat rateswellabove thatofearned
income.32In practicehowever,theseverityof thetax mightbe farless
than he mighthave preferred,
if highertax rates had the effectof
loweringactual revenue.
HoweverstridentMill's egalitarianrhetoric,it is striking
how these
impulseswere constrainedby othersthat were individualistic.His
proposalsallowedforlargetransfers
ofwealth(althoughtheyencouraged
a largernumberofbeneficiaries
sinceitwas an inheritance
ratherthan
estatetax) and retainedalmostfulldiscretion
overthefundsinthehands
oftheindividualtestator.Furthermore,
he placedutilitarian
constraints
on the severityof the tax in order to increase tax revenuesand
discourageevasion,a positionremarkably
similarto thatofTullock.
Mill's liberal compromisecontains the essence of John Rawls'
treatmentof inheritedwealth,despitethe latter'sconvictionthatA
Theoryof Justiceis an egalitarianwork that pushes beyond the
individualismof liberalismand theaggregatehedonismof utilitarianism.33Even withall theinnovationofthehypothetical
originalposition
and twoprinciplesofjustice,Rawls finallyretainsMill's balancingact
betweenliberty,equality,and economicgrowth.Surprisingly
for an
avowedegalitarian,he legitimatesas wellas limitsthetransfer
oflarge
amountsof inherited
wealth.
The unequal inheritance
of wealthis no moreinherently
unjustthantheunequal
inheritance
ofintelligence
... theessentialthingis thatas faras possibleinequalities
founded on eithershould satisfythe difference
principle.Thus inheritanceis
permissible
providedthattheresulting
inequalitiesare to theadvantageoftheleast
fortunateand compatiblewithliberty
andfairequalityofopportunity34
(emphasis
mine).
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Levy / LIBERALISM AND INHERITANCE
553
We havealreadyseenthatRawlsviewsmostcapabilitiesas inbornor
unintentionally
acquired,in no way deservingof special reward,and
neutralfromthestandpointofjustice.WhileRawls hopesto removeall
oreconomic-as thecause
typesofinheritance-genetic,
psychological,
of unequal advantage,he succeeds only in removingthem as its
Rawls
justification.35
By equatinginheritedwealthwithintelligence,
insuresthat it will not be threatenedby a pure conceptionof equal
opportunity,
equal liberty,or rewardby desert.Inheritedwealth,like
thedifference
manyotherinequalities,becomesjustas longas itsatisfies
principleand doesn'tdestroythefairvalue of liberty(unoperationally
defined,butunequal) orfairequalityofopportunity
(fairinequalityof
opportunity,
While far froma laissez-faire
operationallydefined).36
this is equally far from the egalitarian,
theoryof "entitlements,"
meritocratic
idealofa Brownson.Once thelogicofthispositionis clear,
itis apparentthatRawls legitimates
inherited
wealthwitha systemthat
may requirelittlemore than economicgrowth,"trickledown," and
transfermechanisms.In the process,he diffusesthe most radically
in liberalthought.37
egalitariandirectives
As with many classical liberals, Rawls, also cannot accept the
monopolyofcapitalformation
bythestateorinthosefewcorporations
capable of generatingtheirown capital needs. Even if vague about
measuringthe fair value of liberty,he expresses very traditional
concerns-aboutpublic and privatemonopoliesof power.38Without
exploring alternatives,Rawls returnsto the need for individual
incentivesand asks us to lowerour egalitariansights.
We are morereadyto dwellupon our good fortunenowthatthesedifferences
are
madeto workto ouradvantage,ratherthanto be downcastbyhowmuchbetteroff
we mighthavebeenhad we had an equal chancealongwithothersifonlyall social
barriershad been removed.39
Ironically,Rawls gives inequalitiesperpetuatedby familylife new
permanenceby appeals to mutualclass benefits,
themainstayof most
conservative
hierarchical
politicalphilosophies.40
For bothMill and Rawls, wealthleftat deathbecomesa meansfor
societyto applytheresourcesofindividualfamiliesto collectivegoals,
but neitherwants to press an egalitarianvision beyond what they
perceiveto be the structurallimitsimposed by the need for capital
accumulationin an economywhose actors are inevitablypossessive
individualistsand simultaneously
heads of households.As withtheir
classicalpredecessors,
theyexhibita concernforconsequences;neither
wantedto "killthegoose to getat theegg."41Mill differed
fromearlier
classical theoristsonly in that he believed the need for capital
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554
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1983
accumulationwas far less in maturecapitalisteconomies,allowing
roomforegalitarianreform.42
Rawls similarly
is opento anyegalitarian
reform
whichwouldnotinjurethecapitalaccumulationprocessinways
detrimental
to thelibertyor theabsolutematerialpositionoftheleast
advantaged.Like Mill,Rawlsdiffers
fromboththeradicalconfiscatory
and classical accumulationistpositions.Neithersanctifiesinequality
and inheritedwealth,yeteach remainsremarkably
tolerantof both.
UTOPIAN VALUES AND PRA GMA TIC FUTURES
Rawl's treatmentof inheritancepoints up again the limits of
egalitarianliberalism-itsinabilityto maximizea setofvaluesinwhich
each separatevalue necessarilyconflictswithotherswhentakento its
logical fulfillment.
The egalitarianshares this problem with every
variantof liberalwho is not willingto ignoreat least one value thatis
traditionallypart of the overall liberal worldview.43
Faced withthe
prospectof not beingable to fulfillall values in practice,classicaland
revisionisttheoristsalike have been willingto eliminateone value
altogether,whetherit is equality for the sake of libertyas with
Friedman,or meritfor the sake of the materialwell-beingof least
advantagedas withRawls. In each instance,theoryhas becomemore
consistentand lesscompelling.Thistendency
robsall liberalismofwhat
we mightusefullydescribeas its"utopian"character,44
butin theend it
mayalso weakenitspracticalabilityto guidepolicy.
Perhapsitis odd to speakofliberalismas a utopianbodyofthought.
Withthe exceptionof the earlybourgeoisrationalismof a Turgotor
Paine, liberalism-egalitarianor otherwise-has been an eminently
pragmatictraditionwhichhas guidedtheadjustmentto modernity
as
much as it has offereda set of abstract modernizingprinciples.
Moreover,eversinceMarx associatedutopianthoughtwithunscientific
yearning,it has been unusual fortheoriststo identify
themselvesas
utopians,muchless as liberalutopians.Nevertheless,
itmakessenseto
speak of a utopian side of liberalismand to examineits usefulnessin
a nettlesome
confronting
problemsuch as inherited
wealth.
An appreciationof the utopian side of liberalismbeginswiththe
realizationthat liberalismhas functionedon two different
temporal
levels: firstas a pragmaticguide to the immediate,and second as a
long-rangevisionof a fullyjust society.The combinationof thesetwo
sides of liberalismwas especiallycharacteristicof the thinkingof
neoliberalssuch as Dewey and Hobhouse, who consciouslyset out to
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Levy / LIBERALISM AND INHERITANCE
555
revitalizeliberalidealsfromtheseventeenth
and eighteenth
for
century
twentiethcenturycircumstancesthat were far different.45
From this
perspective,a "utopian" constellationof values prods the liberal to
shapetheworldalongliberallines,whilea pragmaticunderstanding
of
therelationshipbetweenends and meansrequiresthathe or she act in
ways that are presentlypracticable.In effect,the utopian elementin
liberalthoughtrejectstheidea thata valuemustbe droppedas a valueor
as a desirableend, simplybecause one cannot fullyrealize it at that
moment.Whenappliedto thequestionof inheritance,
theshiftin our
perceptionoftimereducestheneedto eschewpartoftheconstellation
of
liberalvalues. For example,froma Rawlsianframework,
bothreward
to meritand equalityof fullopportunity
conflictwithfamilylife-the
formerbecause we are oftenrewardedforthe accidentofgood birth,
andthelatterbecausesuchaccidentswillinevitably
existas longas there
are childrenwithdifferent
parents.Fromthispointofview,therefore,
fullequalityofopportunity
and rewardbased on meritareunrealizable
goals and mustbe dropped.But ifwe shiftour approachto time,the
rejectionof liberalegalitarianvalues becomesunnecessary.
For example,holdingmeritand equalityas valuescertainly
requires
thatliberalegalitariansseekto eliminatetheunequal effects
offamily,
but not the familyitself.Obviously,eliminatingthe familywould
eliminateitseffects,
butitwouldeliminateas wellso muchelse thatall
liberalsholddear.However,as longas thetheorist
seeswaysto continue
to lessen those effectsof familylife which preventall frombetter
realizingtheirnaturaltalents,withouteliminatingthe familyitself,
values such as equalityof opportunity
and meritcontinueto be useful
and legitimate.Althoughit is obviouslytruethat"ought"statements
(i.e., that we ought to do x) imply"can" (that we can do x), this
philosophicalaxiom does not requirethatx be fullyrealizablein an
immediatesense.To have meaningas a proposition,thestatement
that
"we oughtto eliminatetheaccidentof birth"does not have to require
that"we can eliminatetheaccidentof birth"at thatmoment,but only
that we can continueto lessen its effects.To accept the opposite
approach-discarding a value altogetherin the face of temporally
experiencedlimit-removesthepossibilityof thatvalue helpingmove
us in the desireddirection.This stymiesegalitarianliberalthinking
about inherited
wealth.
As utopian,theliberalegalitarianmustarguethatinherited
wealthis
illegitimateunder most conditionsand beyond certainlimits.The
pragmatist
mustinterject
thatfortheforeseeablefutureparentswillseek
to establishtheirchildren'sfuturewellbeing,and therefore
willlook for
waysto pass on wealth,power,and access to leisure.The pragmatist
mightalso emphasizethatto precipitously
severthatlinkcould remove
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556
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1983
in and
theclear-cutperceptionin one generationthatit has an interest
obligationto thosegenerationswhichfollow.The pragmatist
willalso
pointoutthatparentsofchildrenwhoaredisadvantagedorhandicapped
and presentlydependentupon theirparentswill wantto providefor
theirfuturewhen the parents are no longer alive. Since seriously
disadvantagedchildrencan hardlycompeteintheliberalraceoflifeand
mayneverbe able to earnmuchofwhattheywillneedto sustaina decent
livelihood,receivingan inheritance
is probablya farbetterand farmore
dignifiedformof dependencethanmanyothers.
The evidenceon theextentto whichconcernforone's heirsactually
Most would
influencesthepropensity
to consumeor save is unclear.46
in that it
agree that total confiscationof an estate is dysfunctional
destroysany motiveto save wealthunrelatedto one's own wellbeing.
as
The utopianimpulsedemandsa tax on an estatethatis as progressive
possibleup to thepointat whichiteffectsrevenuesand theamountof
little
capital saved. In thispragmaticcompromise,theutopiandiffers
fromRawls exceptthatthereis a refusalto eliminatea principleeven
whileloweringsightsto achievea reasonedpolicy.
The utopian as liberal also asks what consequences of private
inheritance
remaindesirablefroma liberalpointofview,and againhow
thesemightbe accomplishedin a moreegalitarianfashion.Liberalscan
easily argue that inheritedwealth makes a positivecontributionto
nurturing
libertyand diversity,
just as theyhave recognizedthatthe
inequalitygeneratedbyinheritance
can hinderthesesameends.On the
positive side, inheritedwealth has enabled individualsto support
charities,foundations,
thearts,and unpopularpoliticalcauses thatthe
publicas a wholemightchooseto ignoreorevensuppress.Marx'sironic
dependenceon Engel'sfamilywealthhas manyanalogues.In addition,
inheritedwealth can help financeunusual or innovativebusinesses,
churches,universities,
and countlessotheractivitiesthatwe wouldnot
wantto see unfundedor held hostageto bureaucraticor majoritarian
demands.Not least of all, inheritanceis the institution
whichallows
familybusinessesand farmsto devolveto thenextgeneration,
a practice
whichhelpsmaintainthediversity
and decentralized
powerthatliberals
usuallyfavor.Thisis thesameinstitution
whichfacilitates
unearnedand
unequal access to resources,powerand wealth;however,otherof its
outcomesare desirable.
The vehicleto deal withthesetensionsis classicallyliberal:reform.
The goal ofinheritance
reforms
mustbe to takethenaturalpropensity
to provideforone's familyand to use thisimpulseas faras possibleto
achieve more egalitarianends. The liberalreformer
mustattemptto
transform
intosocialinheritances
privateinheritance
whichareavailable
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Levy / LIBERALISM AND INHERITANCE
557
to all individualsin the communityas a new formof birthright.
Like
Mill and Rawls,liberalreform
mustattemptto convertindividualassets
intocollectiveassets.Moreover,it mustaim at a Rawlsiana "chainconnectedness"47
thatlinksthegood fortuneofeach to everyonebutin
waysmoredirectedand specificthanthedifference
principleof Rawls.
The proposals which follow are simplyattemptsat formulating
alternative
methodsofdealingwithinherited
wealth.Theyareguidedby
thefullsetofliberalvalueswhileat thesametimeconsciousofthelimits
of realizingany of themcompletely.They are also attemptsto offer
alternatives
to thepresentdichotomyof wealthdevolvedthroughthe
familyor wealthtaxed forgeneraluse in thewelfarestate.
1. The Social InheritanceFund. A steeplyprogressiveestatetax
should be used to directlyfunda social inheritancesystemsimilarin
spiritto thatofOrestesBrownson.Thereforeprogressive
ratesmustbe
limitedbythedesireto maximizerevenues.On thebirthofeverychild,a
fixed sum of money-financed directlyby estate taxes-should be
bonds.Upon
placedin a specialinterest
bearingaccountorgovernment
wouldbe
reachingtheage of 18,theappreciatedvalue oftheinvestment
made availableto theindividualto financean education,starta family,
orto use as he or shewishes.Paymentcould be deferred
untilmarriage,
birth of a child, purchase of a firsthouse, later job retraining,
investment,
orevenretirement,
withthevalueoftheaccountcontinually
increasingas it accumulates.This proposal achieves the additional
policygoal ofincreasingsavings,whileitclearlyexpandstheindividual
recipient'smeaningfulchoices in ways reflective
of the goal of equal
liberty
and opportunity.
In providing
everyonewitha tangibleasset,this
proposalenhancestheabilityofindividualsto choosea lifeplaninways
thatarecompatiblewithtraditionalliberalvalues.The proposalignores
individualdesertforeach newbeneficiary,
exceptto spreadmoreevenly
to theundeserving
of one generationthefruitsofthepastgeneration's
activities.It also recognizesthatwhileindividualsofa generationhold
wealthunequally,wealthis generatedin a social contextin whicheach
individual'scontribution
cannotbe accuratelymeasured.This system
would create a new social rightfor each memberof the receiving
generation,
and itwouldalso createa corresponding
moralobligationto
helpfinancethenextgeneration.The resultwouldbe a social debt,but
not a social dependency,and thus a systemmost compatiblewith
a liberalpoliticalcommunity.
fostering
2. Regional Banks and TerminalAnnuities.Utilitarianarguments
ofestatetax ratesholdthatat somepoint
againstincreasedprogressivity
theredevelops a greaterincentiveto evade, consume,or simplynot
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558
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1983
work. One possible alternativewould be to allow the option of
convertinga portionof one's taxable estate into terminalannuities
which will pay dividendsto the heir while the principalis held by
regionaldevelopmentbanks.The bank willpay a yearlyincometo the
heir,butupon thelatter'sdeaththeprincipalwouldrevertto thebank.
Regionaldevelopment
bankswouldhavethespecialfunction
ofmaking
loans to businessesthatofferthepromiseof innovationand diversity
and also loans to individualsforadvancededucationor job training.
Thesespecialmissionsfortheregionaldevelopment
banksagainwould
providean exampleof"chain-connectedness,"
linkingthegood fortune
oftheheirto otherswho lack accessto resourcesbuthaveneedand/or
merit.The heir,again,receivesa shareoftheincomestreamthathe or
she does not deserve,but that share also makes fundsavailable to
and individualswhomightnototherwisehavehad access
entrepreneurs
to them.Like theearlierpolicyproposal,thisis a compromisewhich
allows inequalityto pass betweengenerationsand allows forbenefits
withoutdesert,butalso transforms
privateassetsintopublicassetswith
an egalitariandimension.Similarly,this is a liberal proposal which
keepsin mindtheimportanceof maintaininga politicaleconomysupportiveof liberty.
3. The "Expanded" FamilyFirm.Severeestatetaxesmayendanger
thecash flowof familyfirms.Insofaras egalitarianshope to preserve
these firmstheyshould take steps to encouragetheirsuccess. One
importantreformof the estatetax has been to allow a familyfirmto
deferestatetax paymentsovera numberofyearswitha verylow rateof
interestpaid on thedebt.In additionto keepingthisdevice,egalitarian
liberalvalues couldjustifya lowerestatetax rateon family-held
firms
thathave cash flowproblems,but in returnmakefamilystockholders
liable to highercapitalgainstaxes iftheyshouldlatersell theirassets.
Tax ratesshouldalso be used in sucha way,however,as to encourage
broadenedemployeestockownership.Again,thisoptionseeksto create
newpropertyholdersand chain-connects
thegood fortuneoftheheirs
withtheirworkforce.
This proposalreflects
liberalvaluesofdesertand
equalityin thatitrecognizesthecontribution
ofestablishedworkersto
thevalue ofthefirmand throughstockownershipcreatesthepossibility
of greaterworkerparticipationin the managementof the company.
Employeestockownershipplans alreadyreceivesome encouragement
throughthetax systemand are oftenfavoredbyfirmsas usefuldevices
for accumulatingcapital.48Althoughthe transference
of stock upon
deathdoes notaccumulatenewcapital,itwouldobviatepartofthecash
flowproblemthatestatetaxes can create.Once again, thisproposal
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Levy / LIBERALISM AND INHERITANCE
559
butaimsto compromisea varietyof
satisfiesno liberalvaluecompletely,
claimspartially.
4. Tax Free Bequests to Non-ProfitFirms. Schools, charities,
institutions
churches,foundations,
hospitalsand manymorenon-profit
aretraditionalrecipients
oftax-free
bequests.Whilesomemayobjectto
thisas a meansofpreserving
theinfluenceofwealthoverinstitutions
of
are noteasilycontrolledby
theseinstitutions
broad social significance,
thedead, and theircontribution
to a vitalpluralismis great.As longas
the law preventsnon-profitinstitutionsfrom becoming conduits
designedto providetax-freesinecuresforone's heirs,tax-freestatus
shouldbe continued.
5. Tax Exemptionsfor
HandicappedHeirs.Childrenwhoareunable
to provideforthemselvesbecause of severehandicapsare understandthat
ablythecause forgreatconcernforparents.It is in no one'sinterest
parentsnotbe able to providefortheseheirsiftheycan do so. An estate
largeenoughto guaranteea comfortable
independence
shouldbe theirs,
subjectto littletaxation.Anything
beyondthiswouldbe treatedas any
otherestate.Argumentsabout desertare irrelevantin thesecircumstances, since whatevera handicapped individual receiveswill be
or marketvalue. Herewe arein
undeservedifmeasuredbycontribution
areas beyondliberaljustice wherebenificenceand need are the chief
criteriafordetermining
policy.
CONCLUSION
None of theseproposalsfullysatisfiesthefulldemandsof a liberal
egalitariantheory;yeteach is guidedby thetotalityof thatideal and,
takentogether,
theymoveinthedirectionofitsgreaterfulfillment.
This
articlehas attemptedto demonstratethatinheritedwealthnecessarily
violatestheliberalegalitarianethic,and therefore
pointsto thelimitsof
that ideological tradition.Yet it also stressesthat liberalegalitarian
values remainusefulforguidingpolicychoiceseveniftheyare limited
bythedemandsofimmediatepractice.In stressing
theconsciouslinking
of privateinheritanceto public inheritances,
especiallythose which
createnew propertyholders,theseproposalsremaintrueto values of
individualismand pluralismas wellas equality.Desertlegitimates
this
conversionof inheritance,and increased equality (of libertyand
is itsfinalend.
opportunity)
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560
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1983
Inheritanceremains an anomaly for liberal egalitarianpolitical
theorists.It is an anomaly theyshould not ignoreif theyhope to
the broaderliberaltraditionas morethan an outmoded
reinvigorate
class ideology.
NOTES
1. JohnLocke, Two Treatisesof Government,
ed. PeterLaslett(New York:Mentor,
1965); Gordon Schochet,Patriarchalism(Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1973). The classic
worksoffunctionalist
stratification
theorywhichbestexpressan underlying
achievement
ethicare: KingsleyDavis and WilbertMoore, "Some Principlesof Stratification,"
in
AmericanSociological Review,X, (April 1945); KingsleyDavis, "Reply to Tumin,"
AmericanSociological Review,XVIII (August 1953); RichardL. Simpson,"A ModificationoftheFunctionalTheoryof Social Stratification,"
Social Forces,35 (December
1956); Dennis H. Wrong,"The FunctionalTheoryof Stratification:
Some Neglected
Considerations,"AmericanSociological Review,24 (December1959).These articlesare
reprintedin JosephLopreato and Lionel Lewis, Social Stratification:
A Reader (New
York: Harperand Row, 1974).For a good summarydiscussionsee JosephLopreatoand
LawrenceHazelrigg,Class, Conflictand Mobility(San Francisco:Chandler,1972),p.
93-112.
An extensivediscussionof a distinctliberalegalitariantraditionis AmyGutmann's
LiberalEquality(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1980).For a usefuldiscussion
of equality of opportunityand liberal values see Lawrence B. Joseph,"Normative
Assumptionsin Educational Policy Research,"Annals of the AmericanAcademyof
Politicaland Social Science,434 (November1977),pp. 103-106;CharlesFrankel,"The
New Egalitarianism
and theOld," Commentary,
56, 3 (1973).
2. C. D. Harbury,"Inheritanceand theDistributionofPersonalWealthin Britain,"
EconomicJournal,72 (December1962),pp. 845-868;C. H. Harburyand D. M. Hitchens,
"The Inheritanceof Top WealthLeavers:Some FurtherEvidence,"EconomicJournal,
(June 1976); A. B. Atkinson,Unequal Shares (London: Penguin,1972); Paul Menchik,
"The Importanceof Material Inheritance:The Financial Link BetweenGenerations,"
Discussion Paper #474-78,InstituteFor Researchon Poverty,University
of Wisconsin,
Madison);JohnBrittain,
Inheritance
and theInequalityofMaterialWealth(Washington,
D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,
1978);J. R. Kearl and Clayne L. Pope, "Intergenerational
Effectson the Distributionof Income and Wealth:The Utah Experience,1850-1900,"
WorkingPaper No. 754, (Cambridge,Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1981).
3. CedricSandford,"Death Duties,"PoliticalQuarterly
March 1971),p.
(January/
62; see also GeraldJantscher,
Trustsand EstateTaxation(Washington:Brookings,1966),
pp. 4-14; G.S.A. Wheatcroft,
Estateand GiftTaxation:A ComparativeStudy(London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1965),pp. 107-119;JosephPechman,Federal Tax Policy(Washington:Brookings,1971),pp. 190-208.
4. RobertNozick, AnarchyState and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) pp.
150-158,207-208is one oftheveryfewwriterstangentially
relatedto liberalismthatsees
bequestas an inviolablenaturalright.For a convincing
refutation
ofNozick'spositionsee
HillelSteiner,"Justiceand Entitlement,"
Ethics87,2 (January1977),p. 151;and"Slavery,
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Levy / LIBERALISM AND INHERITANCE
561
Socialism
andProperty,"
inProperty:
NomosXXI,ed.,J.RolandPennock
andJohnW.
pp.255-258.
AlanH. Goldman,
Chapman,
"Entitlement
ofDistributive
Theory
Justice,"
TheJournal
ofPhilosophy,
73,21 (December1976)is an excellent
discussion
from
the
perspective
of"desert."
5. KennethBoulding,"Equalityand Conflict,"AnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyof
Politicaland Social Sciences,409 (1973), p. 5-6.
6. CharlesBeitz,"Justice
and International
Relations,"
and Public
Philosophy
Affairs,4, 4 (Summer 1975), pp. 364-389; Robert W. Tucker, "Egalitarianismand
International
60 (September
Politics,"
Commentary
1975),pp.27-40.
7. E.g.,"Basically
liberaldemocracy
thefacilitation
ofindividual
emphasizes
selfdevelopment
and self-expression
as theprimary
The objectof
goalsof government.
government
istokeepopenfortheindividual
a widerangeofoptions
andvalues."Michael
ViableDemocracy(New
Margolis,
York:St.Martin's
Press,Inc.1979),p. 26.See Phillip
Abbott,FuriousFancies:AmericanPoliticalThoughtin thePost-LiberalEra (Westport,
Connecticut:
Greenwood
fora usefuldiscussion
andtypology
Press,1980),p. 14-25,
of
varioustrends
inliberalthought.
8. Hal R. Varian,"Distributive
Justice,
Welfare
Economics,
and theTheoryof
Fairness,"Philosophy
and PublicAffairs,
4, 3 (Spring1975),p. 244: "Thisis the
formalization
oftheconceptof'people'scapitalism'
I discussedearlier.Property-in
particular
productive
property-is
privately
owned.Alloftheincentives
ofcapitalism
are
present,
as are all theliberties,
withone exception-the
liberty
to transfer
wealthto
others."
9. See noteI above,
10. "SomePrinciples
ofStratification,"
p. 243:
Socialinequality
isthusanunconsciously
evolved
devicebywhich
societies
insure
thatthemostimportant
positions
areconscientiously
filled
bythemostqualified
persons.
"Modification
ofFunctional
theory
ofSocialStratification,"
inSocialStratification:
A
Reader,p. 110:"Thesupplyanddemandoftheservices
performedly
theincumbents
of
socialpositions
helptodetermine
theirsocialrewards."
11. JeremyBentham,Escheat withoutBurthen,in Economic Worksof Jeremy
Bentham,
ed.,W. Stark(London:AllenandUnwin,1952),vol.1,pp.328-329.
12. MiltonFriedman
in Whatever
Happenedto Equality,
ed. J.Vaissey,
(London:
B.B.C. 1975).
13. JohnRawls,A Theory
ofJustice
(Cambridge,
Mass.:BelknapPress,1971),pp.
73-75.
14. Fora critical
discussion
ofRawls'position
seeJames
Sterba,
"Justice
andDesert,"
Social Theory
and Practice,
3, 1 (Spring1974).For a neoconservative
critique
ofthe
Friedman/
Hayekpositionsee IrvingKristol,TwoCheers
for Capitalism
(NewYork:
Mentor,1978),pp. 243-249.
15. JamesLowellDietz,"A Noteon HumanCapital,"Journal
ofEconomic
Issues,
IX, 3 (1975), p. 527, fora similardiscussion."Human Capital, however,is by its very
nature,
inseparable
incapitalist
societies,
from
itsowner
andpossessor.
Without
thelabor
powerofthehuman
capitalbeingexpended
andused,there
canbeno(monetary)
return
to
suchinvestments.
Laborpowermustbeexpended
bytheownerandpossessor
ofa human
capitalinvestment
orthatcapitalbecomes
worthless."
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562
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1983
16. For a defenseof all rightsof transfersee RobertNozick, Anarchy,State and
Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 150-158,207-208;foran argumentwhich
as a rightof transfer
excludesinheritance
see "Justiceand Entitlement."
17. The problemof giftsinter-vivosis more complex since it limitsthe absolute
property
rightsoftheliving.However,empiricalevidenceindicatesthatfewarewillingto
alienatethebulk of theirwealthand its attendantpowerwhilestillalive,despitethefar
morefavorabletax rates.LesterThurow,"Popular Mechanics:The Redistribution
of
Wealth,"WorkingPapersfor a New Society,III, 4 (Winter1976),pp. 24-27.
18. Adam Smith,An InquiryInto theNatureand Causes of the Wealthof Nations,
ed.,EdwinCannan(New York:ModernLibrary,1967),Ph V., 11,2 Appendixto Articles1
and 2, p. 814; Adam Smith,Lectureson Police,Justice,Revenueand Arms,ed., Edwin
Cannan,(New York:AugustusM. Kelley,1964),p. 129;pp. 113-127fora discussionofthe
developmentofinheritance
laws;Jeremy
Bentham,CollectedWorksofJeremy
Bentham,
ed. J. Bowring(Edinburgh:WilliamTait, 1843),"CivilCode," Vol. I, p. 112;and Escheat
WithoutBurthen,
p. 329;ThomasCooper,Lectureson theElementsofPoliticalEconomy
(New York: A.M.K. Reprint,1971), p. 67; Max West, InheritanceTax (New York:
Columbia UniversityPress, 1908), p. 191; JosephCropsey,Polityand Economy(The
Hague: MartinusNijhoff,1957),discussestherelationship
and capitalism
betweenliberty
inAdam Smith'sthought.Donald Winch,Adam Smith'sPolitics(Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1979) places this discussionin the contextof a dialogue withcivil
humanistrepublicanism.
19. GordonTullock,"InheritanceJustified,"
JournalofLaw and Economics,XIV, 2
(October 1971); Richard Wagner,Inheritanceand the State, (Washington:American
EnterpriseInstitute,1977).
20. ConfiscatorytractsincludeThomas Spence, The Real Rightsof Men (1775),
reprinted
in Max Beer,Pioneersin Land Reform(London: G. Beltand Sons, Ltd. 1920);
ThomasSkidmore,TheRightsofMan to Property,
(1829); OrestesBrownson,"Laboring
Classes." Boston QuarterlyReview, III, 4 (October 1840); HarryCall, The Coming
Revolution (New York: Lowell Brothers,1896); Harlan Read, The Abolition of
Inheritance(New York: Macmillan, 1919); James B. Conant, "Wanted American
Radicals," AtlanticMonthly(May 1943); Larry Sawers and JimWisman,"Wealth
Taxation fortheU.S.," JournalofEconomicIssues,VII, 3 (1973); "Distributive
Justice,
WelfareEconomics,Fairness."
21. "LaboringClasses,"p. 481; Brownson'sgoal was "to emancipatelaborbyraising
up thelaborerfroma mereworkman,withoutcapital,to be a proprietor,
and a workman
on his ownfarmor in his own shop" (477). His attacksbased on equalityof opportunity
and desertofferrhetorictypicalofthistradition:
But heriditary
property,
unlesstheamountinherited
byeach individualcould be
renderedequal, is unquestionably
a privilege.It givesand alwaysmustgive,to one
portionofthecommunity
an advantageovertherest,to whichtheyareentitledby
no naturalsuperiority
of intellector of virtue.(478)
22. "DistributiveJustice,WelfareEconomics,Fairness."
23. Daniel Bell, "Dilemmas of Managerial Legitimacy,"Proceedingsof the First
National Conferenceon BusinessEthics(Waltham,Massachusetts:CenterforBusiness
Ethics,BentleyCollege),p. 17. For a usefulcase studyin familialaccumulationstrategies
see Peter Dobkin Hall, "Marital Selection and Businessin MassachusettsMerchant
Families1700-1900,"in The Family:Its Structures
and Functions,ed., Rose Laub Coser
(New York: St. Martin'sPress,1974).
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Levy / LIBERALISM AND INHERITANCE
563
24. Charles K. Rowley and Alan T. Peacock, WelfareEconomics: A Liberal
Reappraisal(New York:JohnB. Wileyand Sons, 1975),p. 157;FritzMachlup,Political
EconomyofMonopoly,(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversity
Press,1952),pp. 238-256;
Roswell Magill, The Impact of Federal Taxes,(New York: Columbia University
Press,
1943),pp. 73-120;Inheritance
and theState,throughout.
25. Sawers and Wismanare the latestexampleof confiscatory
liberalswho do not
discussthisproblem.
26. AlexanderBain,J.S. Mill: A CriticismwithPersonalRecollection,(1882; reprint
ed., New York: AugustusM. Kelley,1969),pp. 88-89.
27. John Stuart Mill, Principlesof Political Economy,Collected Worksof John
ofTorontoPress,1965),vol. 2 and 3,
StuartMill,ed.,J.M. Robson,(Toronto:University
Book II, 1,p. 207; also II, 16,383,and Utilitarianism,
ed., Samuel Gorovitz(New York:
Bobbs-Merrill,
Inc. 1971),ch. 5, p. 49.
28. Principles,II, 1, p. 207; III, 14,p. 383.
29. 1 am ignoringin thisdiscussionMill'sviewson property
and inheritance
once the
stationary
statehad beenreached.It is clear,however,thatthenormallimitsofcapitalism
wouldnot applyunderthesecircumstances.
30. Principles,V. 2, p. 811.
31. Principles,ibid.; Letterto Horace White(1166) CollectedWorks,vol. XVI.
32. Letterto CharlesEliot Norton(1569), CollectedWorks,vol. XVII, p. 1740.
33. A TheoryofJustice,pp. 3-4, 16,211, 262, 106.
34. Ibid., p. 278.
35. For a discussionofthedistinction
between"fortune,"
i.e.,good birth,talent,etc.,
and "luck,"i.e.,unpredictable
ofInequalities:
accident,seeJ.E. Meade, "The Inheritance
Some Sociological, Demographic,Social, and Economic Factors,"Proceedingsof the
BritishAcademy,vol.59, 1973(London,OxfordUniv.Press).Meade contendsthatrecent
egalitarianworkssuchas Christopher
Jencks'Inequality(New York: Basic Books, 1972)
have overplayedtheroleofluchand ignoredfortune.Ignoringfortuneleads themaway
fromthedecisiveroleof inheritance
as a generatorof inequality.
36. A Theoryof Justice,p. 73, 301, 511.
37. The extentto whichRawlscan acceptinherited
inequalityis especiallyclearwhen
he discusses the conditionsunder which primogeniture
would satisfythe difference
principle.He sympathetically
reflectson the argumentsof Burke and Hegel that
"restrictions
on equalityof opportunity"may be necessaryto "insurea landed class
especiallysuitedto politicalrulein virtueofitsindependence
fromthestate,thequestfor
profit,and themanifoldcontingencies
ofcivilsociety."However,he rejectstheseas ends
whichdo notsatisfythedemandforjustice(A TheoryofJustice,p. 300). Primogeniture
would be just, however,if it increasedthe opportunityof those least well-off.Equal
opportunity,
fullyoperationalized,requiresonlyequal opportunity
"forthosesimilarly
endowedand motivated,"notequal opportunity
forall. Thus anyinheritedassetwhich
mightcontributeto economicgrowth,thusexpandingopportunity
appropriateto the
class of thoseless well-off,
wouldsatisfytherequirements
ofjustice(p. 301, 74).
38. For a revealingdiscussionoftheproblemsofmeasurement
in Rawlssee Benjamin
Barber,"Justifying
Justice:Problems of Psychology,Politics, and Measurementin
Rawls," in Reading Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels, (New York: Basic Books, 1975),pp.
300-315;A TheoryofJustice,pp. 272-273,280.
39. Ibid., pp. 511-512.
40. p. 74, esp. fn.12.
41. "Thorntonon Labor and Its Claims," Collected Works,vol. V, p. 657. This
passagediscussestaxes on wages,butthelogic of theargumentremainsthesame.
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564
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1983
42. Mill's beliefin thelong-term
tendencyoftherateofprofitto falland theultimate
rise of the stationarystate alters his final view. However,in those passages Mill is
discussinga post-capitalist
politicaleconomythatis wellintothefuture.
43. ObviouslyI am suggestingthatthe confiscatory
egalitarianignoreseconomic
growthand its effecton libertyas well as happiness;the classical liberalgives up on
equalityof opportunity
altogether;and the revisionistcan give no place to rewardfor
meritor a fulltheoryofequalityofopportunity.
AlthoughI knowofno self-consciously
liberalwriterwho arguesthatmarketsocialismwould resolvethisproblemin waysthat
wouldsatisfythefullrangeofliberaldemands,thisis a plausibleargument.However,far
morethanan antiliberalcommandmodel,marketsocialismwould keep self-interested
individualsat the centerof its marketeconomy.As long as men and womenchose to
accumulatefortheirchildren,anyattemptto preventthiswould be dysfunctional.
Thus
the problemwould remain,althoughits contingentformwould change. Obviously,
whichare
marketsocialismpresentsa wholehostofinteresting
problemsand possibilities
beyondthescope of thisarticle.
between"utopian"
44. Furious Fancies,pp. 23-25,pp. 55-58fora usefuldistinction
ofthe
and "scientific"
notionsofliberalism.Abbottemphasizesthe"hyper-individualism"
liberalutopianto theexclusionof itsegalitariannote.On thiswe differ
greatly.
45. "Liberalismis committedto an end thatis at once enduringand flexible:the
liberationofindividualsso thattherealizationoftheircapabilitiesmaybe thelaw oftheir
life."JohnDewey,Liberalismand Social Action,(New York:CapricornBooks, 1963),p.
57; see also pp. 9-11.
46. "Inheritance
and theState," throughout;"Popular Mechanics," pp. 24-27.
47. A Theoryof Justice,pp. 80-83.
48. WilliamF.Whyteand JosephBlasi,"From Researchto Legislationon Employee
Ownership,"Economicand IndustrialDemocracy, 1 (1980); Louis Kelso, How to Turn
EightyMillion Workersinto Capitalistson BorrowedMoney (New York: Random
House, 1967);RobertSternand PhilipComstock,EmployeeStock OwnershipPlans,23,
Key Issues Bulletins.(Ithaca,New York: New School ofIndustrialand Labor Relations,
similar despite Belloc's
Cornell University).For argumentsthat are interestingly
reputationas a conservative,
see HillaireBelloc, The Restorationof Property(London:
The Distributionist
League, 1958).
Michael B. Levy is an assistantprofessorof Political Science at Texas A &M
He is editorofPoliticalThoughtinAmerica:An Anthology(1982) and
University.
The LiberalFuturein America:Essaysin Renewal,withPhilipAbbott(forthcoming). His essays on liberalpolitical thoughthave appeared in WesternPolitical
workingon a book on
Polity,and theReviewofPolitics.He is currently
Quarterly,
thesubjectof inheritedwealth.
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