Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand's Reforms Author(s): Allen Schick Source: The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 123-131 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3986392 . Accessed: 06/01/2014 00:53 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The World Bank Research Observer. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 202.45.33.1 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:53:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Why Should Most Not Developing Try New Countries Zealand's Reforms Allen Schick Duringthepast decadeNew Zealandhasintroducedfar-reaching reformsin thestructureand operationofgovernmentdepartments and agencies.Thismodelhasattracted interestin developingcountriesbecauseit promisessignificantgains in operationalefficiency.But developingcountries,whichare dominatedby informalmarkets,are risky thatbasicreforms to applyingtheNewZealandmodel.Theauthorsuggests candidatesfor rule-based strengthen government andpavethewayforrobustmarketsshouldbe undertakenfirst. Developingand transitionalcountrieshave an understandabledesireto accelerate publicsectorreformby adoptingthe most advancedinnovationsdevisedby industrialcountries.This interesthas been stimulatedby the New Zealandmodel,which gives public managersbroaddiscretionto operatewithin an accountabilityframework that specifiesthe resultsto be achievedand closely monitorsperformance. Duringthe pastdecade,dozensof countrieshavesentdelegationsto New Zealandto observeits avantgardemanagementpracticesand to interviewgovernmentofficials on how the new systemsandprocedureshaveaffectedthe cost anddeliveryof public services.The WorldBankandotherinternationalorganizationshaveshowcasedNew Zealand'sreformsat variousconferences,and some of the architectsof the reforms have crisscrossedthe globe extolling the virtuesand portabilityof their country's versionof results-oriented publicmanagement. Despite the interestand the salesefforts,only a few developedcountries(suchas Icelandand Singapore)haveadoptedselectedfeaturesof the model;others(suchas Swedenand the United Kingdom)haveembraceda managerialethic without subscribingto the hard-edgedcontractualismthatdifferentiatesNew Zealand'sreforms fromthose triedelsewhere.To this writer'sknowledge,however,not a singledeveloping or transitionalcountryhas installedthe full New Zealandmodel, although quitea few havebeenenchantedby the prospectof leapfroggingto the frontranksin the internationalreformsweepstakes.A few countries(suchas Mongolia)arein the The WorldBankResearchObserver,vol. 13, no. 1 (February1998), pp. 123-31 C) 1998 The InternationalBankfor Reconstructionand Development/ THE WORLD BANK This content downloaded from 202.45.33.1 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:53:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 123 earlystage of adoptingselectedfeaturesof the system,but it is much too earlyto gaugehow fartheywill go in embracingits basictenets.On the whole, industrialand developingcountrieshave not implementedsuch reformsbecausethe reformsare beyondtheirreachor do not fit theircurrentneeds. I drawthisconclusiondespiteNew Zealand'senormouscontributionto the theory and practiceof public management.Not only has the menu of reformpossibilities been greatlyexpanded,but New Zealandhas broughtits publicmanagementmuch morecloselyinto line with institutionaleconomicsandwith contemporarybusiness practices.And the rigorwith which the model has been appliedis impressive.This was not a case in which reformersselecteddiscreteentriesfrom a largemenu of reforms.The change agendawas driven by ideas that have only recentlyentered mainstreameconomics,and the ideaswereappliedwith full fidelityto theirinternal logic. But I do not acceptthe view that New Zealandofferspracticalguidanceon how developingcountriesshouldsurmountdeficienciesin publicmanagement. I believethatthereareimportantpreconditionsfor successfullyimplementingthe newpublicmanagementapproachandthattheseshouldnot be ignoredby countries strivingto correctdecadesof mismanagement.In contrastto those who take the positionthatmanagerialdeficienciesshouldbe the drivingfactorin determiningthe suitabilityof these type reforms,I arguethat they shouldbe deterringfactors.The greaterthe shortcomingsin a country'sestablishedmanagementpractices,the less suitablethe reforms. The New ZealandModel:Governmentby Contract Since 1988, New Zealandhas implementedan enormousnumberof management reformsthataddup to an integratedconceptof how governmentshouldwork.That conceptis expressedin the headingto this section.Virtuallyeveryelementof reform has been designedto establishor strengthencontract-likerelationshipsbetweenthe governmentand ministersas purchasersof goods and servicesand departmentsand otherentitiesas suppliers.Hundredsof contractsareformallynegotiatedeachyear; the typicalcontractspecifiesthe resourcesthat one side will provideand the performance the other side will produce.Ministersare alwayson the resource-providing side of the relationship;chief executivescan be on eitherside, dependingon the role they are playing.A chief executiveprovidesresourcesin negotiatingemployment contractswith managersbut promisesresultsin negotiatingpurchaseagreements with ministersand performanceagreementswith the StateServicesCommissioner. This "newcontractualism" replacesthe implicitor relationalcontractsthat characterizetraditionalpublic administration.'Contractsconvertthe budget from an understandingbetweengovernmentandparliamenton the amountsto be raisedand spent into an explicitstatementof whatwill be done with the resourcesto be made 124 The WorldBankResearchObserver,vol. 13, no. 1 (February1998) This content downloaded from 202.45.33.1 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:53:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions available. In a similarvein,performance theold civilservice agreements displace ethicof trustand responsibility with accountability for the resultsexpectedfrom eachchiefexecutive. NewZealand hasgoneto extraordinary to create conditions underwhich lengths formalcontracts arenegotiated andenforced.It hasrestructured manydepartments to decouple policymaking functions fromthedelivery ofservices. (Forexample, the nationaldefenseorganizationwas split into two separateentities:the Ministryof whichprovides Defense, togovernment; policyadvice andtheDefense which Forces, carryout assignedoperations).Under the new system,ministerscan purchaseser- vicesfromgovernment or fromanyalternative departments publicor privatesupplier.Appropriations areon an accrualbasis,so thatthefullcostof thegoodsand isincorporated services inthepurchase price.Infact,topromote competition among suppliers, appropriations includeanamountforthetaxon goodsandservices that would be paid in a privatetransaction.In a similarvein, a capitalchargeis leviedon the net worth(asshownon its balancesheet)of eachdepartment. Thischargereflects the opportunitycost of money and resemblesthe internalrateof returnex- pectedby firmsfromtheiroperatingunits. Contract-like arrangements havebeenextendedto policyadviceas well,so thatministers canopt to obtaininformation andideasfromconsultancies and otherexternalsources.To put alternative supplierson an equalfooting,the governmentaccordsthe chief executivesof departmentsthe same operatingflexibil- itythatis enjoyedbyexecutives in nongovernmental organizations. Chiefexecutives are given a block of resourcesfor each class of outputs they contract to purchase,andtheyhavediscretionto selectthe mixof inputsusedin producing the outputs. These outputs are specified in detail so that the government can havereasonable assurance thatdepartments areproducing theoutputscontracted for.Underthe presentsystem,whenthe budgetis tabledin Parliament, each departmentpublishesa departmental forecastreportthat, amongotherthings, specifiestheoutputsit will producein the nextfinancialyear.Shortlybeforethe startof the year,the outputsarespecifiedin greaterdetailin purchaseagreements signed by the chief executive and the minister purchasingthe services. Multiple purchaseagreementsare written when more than one minister pur- chasesservicesfromthe samedepartment.Afterthe yearis done, eachdepartment publishes an annual report that specifies the outputs actually produced, thereby thegovernment enabling to determine whether thetermsofvarious contractshave been fulfilled. Beforeassessing whetherthe New Zealandmodelis appropriatefordeveloping countries,it is necessaryto considerits effectivenessat home. In my view, organizational performancehas been significantlyenhanced.But this favorableassessment carriescertaincaveats,some of whichwerediscussedin my reportcommissionedby theNewZealand Government (Schick1996). Al/en Schick 125 This content downloaded from 202.45.33.1 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:53:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions * The New Zealandmodel emphasizesmattersthat can be specifiedin contracts, suchas the purchaseof outputs,but givesinadequateattentionto outcomesand the government'sownershipinterestbecausethey do not fit easily into the contractingframework. * Robust contractingdependson voluntary,self-interestedaction. Sometimes, however,self-interestdefeatsthe government'scollectiveinterest.In the early yearsof reform,for example,effortsto establisha seniorexecutiveservicewere underminedby managerswho preferredto contracton an individualbasis. * Contractualismmay weaken traditionalvalues of public service, personal responsibility,and professionalism.It can induce managersto take a checklist approachto accountability-"if it's not specified,it's not my responsibility." do not themselvescreatearms-lengthrelationships * Contract-likearrangements in the publicsector,nordo theyenablethe governmentto toughenits insistence on performance.In mostcases,governmenthaslittlechoicebut to contractwith internalsuppliers,typicallyits own departments.If these fail to perform,the governmentcan sackthe chief executiveand applysome pressure.But it rarely hasthe exitoptionthatis essentialto the effectivenessandenforcementof private contracts. * Chiefexecutives,seniormanagers,andothersattributemostof the improvement in governmentperformanceto the discretiongiven to managersratherthan to formalcontracts.Managersdifferon how muchvalueis addedby contracts,but few think that they have been the main contributorto higher operational efficiency. * Contractingis not costless.Negotiatingand enforcingcontractsentailsenormous transactioncoststhathavenot beensystematically studied,althoughthey takea deepbite out of operatingbudgets,especiallythoseof smalldepartments. These concernspoint to the unfinishedbusinessof publicsectorreformin New Zealand.There is much more to be accomplishedbeforea final assessmentcan be made. At this earlystage, one is justifiedin acknowledgingthat the countryhas vastlyenlargedthe stockpileof publicmanagementideasand practices.In promoting internal marketswithin government, it has devised creativealternativesto privatizationwhile carryingthe pursuitof operationalefficiencywell beyondstandardmarket-typemechanismssuch as usercharges. Yetone shouldnot losesightof the factthatthesearenot realmarketsandthatthey do not operatewith realcontracts.Rather,the contractsarebetweenpublicentitiesthe ownerand the owned.The governmenthasweakredresswhen its own organizations fail to perform,and it may be subjectto as much capturein negotiatingand enforcingits contractsas it was underpre-reformmanagement.My own senseis that whilesomegainmaycomefrommimickingmarkets,anythinglessthanthe realthing deniesgovernmentthe full benefitsof vigorouscompetitionand economicredress. 126 The WorldBankResearchObserver,vol. 13, no. 1 (February1998) This content downloaded from 202.45.33.1 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:53:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The InformalPublic Sector In New Zealand,formalcontractsand internalmarketswere feasiblebecausethe countryhad a robustmarketsectorand establishedmechanismsfor enforcingcontracts-conditions thatareoften absentin developingcountries,which tend to have an informaleconomywith relativelyweakspecificationof propertyrightsand other formalprocessesto regulateeconomicactivity. Informalityis not a new concept;shortlybeforeNew Zealandembarkedon its reforms,de Soto (1989, p. 12) emphasizedinformalityasthe distinctiveconditionof the Peruvianeconomy. Characterizingit "asa grayareawhich has a long frontier with the legalworld and in which individualstakerefugewhen the cost of obeying the law outweighsthe benefits,"de Soto found that the informaleconomysupplied morehousingto Peruviansthan did the government,was the mainsourceof public to startbusinesseswhen theywereblocked andenabledentrepreneurs transportation, by governmentregulations.He alsoconcludedthat the informaleconomywas inefficient, bred corruption,denied home and businessownersaccessto capital,and retardedeconomicdevelopment. De Soto and othershavefocusedon informalityin the marketeconomy.I believe thatinformalityis as pronouncedin the cultureof governmentas it is in the marketplace.In fact,the parallelincidenceof informalityin the publicandprivatesectorsis not happenstance.Norms, practices,and ideasmigratefromone sectorto the other, as does the deadhandof overregulationand the eagernessof governmentofficialsto look the otherway in exchangefor favors.The emergenceof open, robustmarketsis as much a preconditionfor modernizingthe publicsectoras it is for developingthe privateeconomy. It is highly unlikelythat governmentwill operateby the book when rulesand regulationsare routinelybreachedin privatetransactions.If New Zealand-stylecontractsare at one end of the spectrum,then informalityis at the otherend. And if contractsand the ruleof law areunderdevelopedin businessrelations, it is highly improbablethat they can be effectivelyappliedin the conduct of the government'sbusiness.It would be foolhardyto entrustpublic managerswith completefreedomover resourceswhen they have not yet internalizedthe habit of spendingpublic money accordingto prescribedrules.Many developingcountries have formal managementcontrol systemsthat prescribehow governmentshould operate.Thesesystemsareoverseenby powerfulcentralagenciessuch as the finance ministry,the civil serviceboard,and the procurementagency.On papereverything is done accordingto rule.The civil servicesystemis basedon a detailedclassification of positionsand ranks,each with its own job descriptions,skill and experiencerequirements,eligibilityrules,and pay scale.In this formalcontrolprocess,operating units must obtain advanceapprovalfrom the civil serviceagency (and sometimes fromthe financeministryas well) beforethey can fill vacantpositions.Formalrules dictateeverystep in the hiringprocess:announcingthe position, establishingeligi127 Allen Schick This content downloaded from 202.45.33.1 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:53:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions and thewinningcandidate, appointing applications, processing bilityqualifications, bya central payandgradelevels.Eachstepis monitored settingeachemployee's withtherules. compliance agencyto assure thisis notthewaymanycivilservants get however, Whereinformality flourishes, to orhavecontributed theyknowtherightperson theirjobs.Theyarehiredbecause official orcause.Because paylevelsarelow,theymaybeassigned someorganization on whoappear Manymaybeghostworkers to onepositionbutbepaidforanother. andthosewho butnotatwork;somemayholdtwoormorepositions, thepayroll scale theofficialsalary showuponthejobmayputinlessthana day'sworkbecause civilservice pay.Thustherearetwocoexisting is a lot lessthana day'sreasonable To thatthere the other on actual on formal say practices. based rules, systems-one thattherulesalwaysareignored or that is an informal systemis notto conclude thesepathologies it is to mayoccur.Rather, flourishes, although always corruption in the case of the civil to service, contributespublicorder; arguethattheinformality to recruit andretainskilledpersons. thegovernment it enables the hastwobudgets: Thegovernment alsoreignsinthebudgetarena. Informality which andtherealonethatdetermines totheparliament publiconethatispresented spending billsarepaidandhowmuchisactually budgetpromises spent.Theformal fiscalcapacity; theinformal macrobudgetfacilitates thatexceeds thegovernment's someof theexpenditures bytheparliaapproved economic stability bynotmaking theinformal oneafterthespending ment.Theformalbudgetisknownin advance, document to therearetwobudgets, thetemptation isfortheformal occurs.Because Theprocess asthe thusfeedson itself.Inasmuch beunrealistic andunachieveable. thatwillnot willnotbeimplemented, officialbudget whynotcramintoit spending inwhichtheamounts Thisbehavior leadsto cashflowbudgeting, actually bemade? morebycashpayments thanbytheamounts authorized by spentaredetermined inwhichthegovernment several "rebudgets" budgeting, law.Italsobreeds repetitive andresources. timesduringtheyearto aligndisbursements redtape,unreOntheonehand,it cutsthrough Informality is a mixedblessing. on theotherhand,it opensthedoorto andbadpolicies; bureaucracies, sponsive Thepositivesideof corruption andinefficiency. institutionalizes) (andsometimes deof fiscaldiscipline in publicmanagement themaintenance includes informality despiterigidrulesand of publicservices andtheprovision budgets spiteunrealistic evasion ofcivilservice rules controls. Butthecostsarehigh;theyinclude widespread thetimeandresources of andothercontrols, spentin beatingthesystem,distrust andinattention to theoutputsandresultsof routinized corruption, government, Itwould andtheperformance ofgovernment andofficials. agencies publicprograms civilservants indevelandproductive ifsomeofthemostesteemed notbesurprising skillstooutarethosewhousetheirentrepreneurial andmanagerial opingcountries wittheformal controls. Butwhenbureaucrats arevaluedfortheirverveinoperating in thesystemto losesightof the it is easyforthemandotherstrapped informally, 128 The WorldBankResearchObserver,vol. 13, no. 1 (February1998) This content downloaded from 202.45.33.1 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:53:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions publicpurposesthey areservingand the outputsthey aresupposedto produce.It is only a shortstep from disablingthe controlsto bendingthe rulesfor dishonorable purposes. It is a much longer step for them to adopt New Zealand-stylereforms,and a much riskierone. No countryshould move directlyfrom an informalpublicsector to one in which managersare accordedenormousdiscretionto hire and spend as theysee fit. New Zealanddid not makethisleap,andneithershouldothercountries. BeforereformNew Zealandoperatedunderbudgetsthat controlledspendingand correspondedto actualtransactions;it also had a civil servicesystemthat governed how public employeeswere hiredand paid. In otherwords,it had a formalpublic sector.This is an essentialpreconditionfor adoptingelementsof the New Zealand model. The Logic of Development If contract-basedpublicmanagementis beyondreachand informalityis an unsatisfactorystate of affairs,what can developingcountriesdo to improvegovernment operations?In my view, significantprogresscan be madethrougha logicalsequence of steps that diminishthe scope of informalitywhile buildingmanagerialcapacity, confidence,and experience.This concludingsectionoutlinessome of the key steps. First,progressin the publicsectorrequiresparalleladvancesin the marketsector. As long as the economyoperatesaccordingto informalnormsand propertyrights aredefinedmoreby practicethan by contract,the governmentis not likelyto make much headwayin installingrule-basedpublic management.There may be special situations (in colonial regimes,for example)that enable a developingcountryto establisha skilledcivilservicesystem,modernfinancialmanagement,andothertrappings of formalpublic managementeven though the marketsector is laggingbehind. But the much more typical situationis one in which marketdevelopment precedesor coincideswith the developmentof robustpublicinstitutions.Singapore and Chile arecountriesin which economicdevelopmentandmodernizationof public managementhaveproceededin tandem. Formalizingthe marketsectordoes not ensurereciprocalchangesin publicinstitutions,however.Informalityis as much a matterof cultureas of practice;it defines socialroles,relationships,and legitimateand expectedbehavior,and it persistseven when the underlyingconditionsthat gave rise to it vanish.There are quite a few countriesin which the developmentof the public sector has not kept pace with economicchanges. These countriestypicallyhavea competitivesectorthat is open, formal,and lightly regulated,as well as a heavilyregulatedsectorthat dependson informalcontracts,embeddedtraditions,and governmentprotection.The two culturescan operateindependentlyof one anotherfor an extendedperiod,but sooner Allen Schick 129 This content downloaded from 202.45.33.1 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:53:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions orlatertheywillbedrivenbyscandal, financial orcitizenpressure mismanagement, to modernize thepublicsector. Second,modernizingthe publicsectormeansestablishingreliableexternalcontrols, as describedabove.As old-fashionedas externalcontrolsmay seem to be, they are buildingblocksfor a formal,rule-based,honestpublicsector.Operatingin an externallycontrolledenvironmentis an essentialphasein the developmentprocess.It gives managersthe skillsto manageon theirown, buildstrustbetweencentralcontrollers and line managersand confidencebetweencitizensand government,and encourages managersto internalizea publicethicof properbehavior.As thesebasicconditionsof formalmanagementtakeroot, it shouldbe possiblefor centralcontrollersto easethe regulationsby givingline managersbroaderdiscretionin operatingtheirprograms. This process,however,can bearfruitonly if the controlsareexercisedin a fairand realisticmanner.In the caseof civilservicerules,this meansthatpaylevelsriseas the economydevelops,the numberof ghostpositionsdeclines,andpublicemployeesare given opportunitiesto acquirenew skillsand advanceprofessionally.If theseconditions areabsent,learningwill takeplace,but it will be pathological:how to beatthe system,how to outmaneuverthe controllers,how to get paidwithoutreallyworking, and so on. Realismmustalsopervadebudgeting,anotherarenathatoften is infected by pervasiveinformality.The budgetpresentedto the parliamentmust be one that can be implemented,not a politicalwish list that promisesmore than the government intends to spend. Moreover,agenciesmust inculcatethe habitsand ethic of spendingaccordingto the planslaid out in the budget.In otherwords,the budget must be treatedas an implicitcontract.Only then does it makesenseto convertthe budgetinto an explicitcontract. Third, politiciansand officialsmust concentrateon the basic processof public management.They must be able to control inputs beforethey are calledupon to controloutputs;they must be able to accountfor cash beforethey areaskedto account for cost;they mustabideby uniformrulesbeforethey areauthorizedto make theirown rules;they must operatein integrated,centralizeddepartmentsbeforebeing authorizedto go it alone in autonomousagencies. Once the basicshave been mastered,the public sector should be organizedaccordingto the principlesof internalcontrol. Externalcontrol and New Zealandtype managerialdiscretionare not the only options for organizinggovernmental operations.Internalcontrolis a thirdpossibility.In a formalsense,internalcontrol refersto the systemsandproceduresusedby agenciesto assurecompliancewith rules and to safeguardpublicassets.In a behavioralsense,internalcontrolmeansthat the rulesareacceptedas fair,workable,and legitimate.Without this normativeunderpinning, no systemof internalcontrolcan be effective. In practice,internalcontrolgivesmanagersbroaderdiscretion;it shiftsthe focus from ex ante controlto ex post audit, from controlof individualactionsto control within a broadband,fromreviewingspecificactionsto reviewingsystems.It means, 130 The WorldBankResearchObserver,vol. 13, no. 1 (February1998) This content downloaded from 202.45.33.1 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:53:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions for example,that civil servicerulesdictatethe total numberof positionsor the total within broad employmentcategoriesand that operatingdepartmentsmake their own hiringdecisionssubjectto oversightby centralagencies.In the financialsphere it meansthat if funds are available,agenciescan makepurchases,authorizetravel, and takeotherspendingactionswithout obtainingpriorapproval. Singaporeillustratesthe progressionfromexternalto internalcontrolsand thence to New Zealand-typearrangements. On gainingindependenceand for manyyears afterward,Singaporehad a line-itembudgetthat specifiedthe positionsto be filled and the items to be purchased.During the 1980s block budgetswereadoptedthat shifted the governmentfrom externalto internalcontrol, and in the mid-1990s a "budgetingfor results"systemwas adoptedthat implementsseveralelementsof the New Zealandmodel. Singaporeprovidesanotherlesson for countriesseekingto advanceto the first rankof developingcountries.The processof developmentdoes not haveto stretch out over generations.If developmentproceedsin a logical order,progresscan be rapid,especiallyif modernizationof public institutionsadvancesapacewith modernizationof the marketsector.To many developingcountries,New Zealandis at the cuttingedge in publicmanagement,but theywill not get thereby takingshortcuts that turn into deadends. Notes Allen Schickis a consultantin the PublicSectorGroup,PovertyReductionand EconomicManagement, of the World Bank.He wrotethis articlewhile on assignmentto the EconomicDevelopment Institute. 1. The term is takenfrom Davis, Sullivan,and Yeatman(1997). See especiallyMatheson(1997) in that volume. References The word "processed"describesinformallyreproducedworksthat may not be commonlyavailable throughlibrarysystems. Davis, Glyn, BarbaraSullivan, and Anna Yeatman,eds. 1997. The New Contractualism? South Melbourne:MacmillanEducationAustraliaPTY Ltd. de Soto, Hernando. 1989. TheOtherPath: TheInvisibleRevolutionin the ThirdWorld.New York: Harperand Row. Matheson,Alex. 1997. "The Impact of Contractson Public Managementin New Zealand."In Davis, Sullivan,and Yeatman,eds. (1997), pp. 164-79. Schick,Allen. 1996. "The Spiritof Reform:Managingthe New ZealandState Sectorin a Time of Change."Reportpreparedfor the State ServicesCommission,Wellington, New Zealand.Processed. Allen Schick 131 This content downloaded from 202.45.33.1 on Mon, 6 Jan 2014 00:53:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions