Representative
Government
in SocialistCuba
by
PeterRoman
A studyofrepresentative
insocialistCuba mustbe basedon
government
criteria
thatarisefromandcorrespond
toitsparticular
socioeconomic
system,
of socialist
and historical
takingintoaccountthetheoretical
background
politicaldevelopment,
therelationsof production
and thedominant
class,
Thismeansthatmanyofthe
andtheeconomicdevelopment
ofthecountry.
basic conceptsof representative
government
undercapitalismmaynotbe
orinpractice.
applicableeitherintheory
Theliterature
on theCubangovernment
published
lacksdetailedanalysis
with
ofhowthesystemfunctions.
Evenwriters
whosupposedly
sympathize
haveconcludedthat,inthebestofcases,Cubanrepresentative
therevolution
hasseverelimitations
government
becauseitdoes notfallwithinthehistoricallydefinedlimitsof capitalistdemocracy.
Thus it is said thatwithout
electoralcampaignsandelectoralpropaganda
thepeoplehaveno significant
themunicipal
politicaloptions;thattheonlylevelthathas directelections,
level, is limitedto local issues and therefore
insignificant;
and that,the
majorityof municipaland provincialdelegatesand NationalAssembly
deputiesbeingpartymilitants,
votinginthesebodiesis dictated
bytheparty,
whichinanycase dominates
thecandidacy
theparliamentary
system
through
commissions.
My studyof theCubanparliamentary
systemexplorestherolesof the
and
municipal
assembly,
theprovincial
assembly,
andtheNationalAssembly
theroleoftheCommunist
Itsempirical
coreconsistsoffourmunicipal
party.
assemblieson whichI didfieldwork:
thoseofPlaya,an urbanmunicipality
inCityofHavanaProvince;Bauta,a municipality
ontheoutskirts
ofthecity
ofHavanainHavanaProvince,
whereagriculture
andtextilemanufacturing
are themaineconomicactivities;Cienfuegos,
an industrial
city200 miles
southeastof Havana in CienfuegosProvince;and Palmira,a small,.rural
PeterRomanis a professor
at HostosCommunity
CollegeoftheCityUniversity
ofNew York.
He is a member
oftheeditorial
was supported
boardofSocialismandDemocracy.Thisresearch
in partbygrantsfromtheCityUniversity
ofNew YorkPSC-CUNY ResearchAwardProgram
andtheCUNY-Caribbean
ExchangeProgram
of HunterCollegeof theCityUniversity
ofNew
York.
LATINAMERICAN
Issue76,Vol.20No.1,Winter
PERSPECrIVES,
1993,7-27
i) 1993LatinAmerican
Perspectives
7
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8
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECrIVES
municipality,
also in CienfuegosProvince,inwhichsugaris producedand
processed.I shallalso discusstheoperation
of theprovincial
assembliesof
theprovincesin whichthesemunicipalities
are located-Cityof Havana,
- andthat
Havana,andCienfuegos
oftheNationalAssembly.
December1986,
Duringmyresearch
visitstoCuba (October-November,
September1987-June1988, December1988-January
1989, May 1989) I
interviewed
constituents,
municipaldelegates(some of whomwere also
ofmuniciprovincial
delegatesandNationalAssemblydeputies),members
and
pal andprovincial
executive
committees,
directors
ofeconomicplanning
oftheleadership
ministers
andofficials,
andelements
budgets,government
ofboththeNationalAssemblyandtheCommunist
party.
Amongmyother
I participated
inmeetings
researchactivities
betweendelegatesandconstituents,observedseminarsfordelegates,tookpartin visitsby delegatesto
constituents'
homes,and attendedsessionsof municipaland provincial
ateach
ofthepermanent
commissions
assembliesandmeetings
andactivities
to Cuba to interview
Juan
of thethreelevels.In February1992 I returned
of theNationalAssembly,
Escalona,thenewpresident
regarding
proposed
bodies
andtoobservethenewlyformed
changesinthesystem
neighborhood
calledconsejospopulares(people'scouncils).
THE ORGANS OF PEOPLE'S POWER
in Cuba, knownas the Organosde Poder
Representative
government
Popular(OrgansofPeople'sPower-OPP) has threelevels-the municipal
Itis a system
theprovincial
andtheNationalAssembly.
assembly,
assembly,
andrespondstotheneedsofthepeople.
thatidentifies
Themunicipal
assembly
is themostrepresentative,
responsive,
andactive
level,and delegatesto it aretheonlyonesnominated
andelecteddirectly.
whorepresent
ofabout1,000voters
electoraldistricts
Municipaldelegates,
in neighborhood
andelected
(fewerin ruralareas),arenominated
meetings
by secretballotin competitive
elections(theremustbe fromtwoto eight
candidates)fora termof 2?2 years.In lieu of electoralcampaigns,the
ofthecandidates
Themunicipal
arepostedintheneighborhoods.
biographies
assemblyelectsprovincial
assemblydelegatesevery2? yearsandNational
Assemblydeputieseveryfiveyears,mainlyfromwithinitself.
The Cubanpeoplecloselyidentify
andhavepersonalcontactwiththeir
municipaldelegates,who are sociallyand economically
indistinguishable
fromtheelectorate
exceptthattheytendto haveachieveda higherlevelof
educationand a higherpercentage
ofpartymembership
versus
(60 percent
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Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT
9
10 percent
forthepopulation).
Exceptfora fewassemblyleaders,delegates
areforthemostpartnotprofessional
politicians;
theyreceiveno salaryand
continue
toworkandtobe paidintheirworkplaces
(thesameis trueofmost
provincial
assemblydelegatesandNationalAssemblydeputies).Municipal
delegatescontrol,investigate,
inspect,pass judgmenton, and overseethe
ofthemunicipality
economicandsocialactivities
within
thejurisdiction
and
andnationalenterprises
locatedwithin
havesomeinputinrunning
provincial
themunicipality.
Theyapprovelocaleconomicplansandbudgetsbeforethey
aresenttotheprovincial
board.
assemblyandthecentralplanning
The roleof thevanguardpartyis essentially
politicalin relationto the
whole society,includingthegovernment,
and consistsof settingnational
ofsocialistconsciousness
priorities
todirectandencouragethedevelopment
andbehavior.
The partyappointsorapprovestheappointment
ofpersonnel
in key governmental
and societalpositions.Its role is one of guiding,
monitoring,
and assistingtheOrgansofPeople'sPower(principally
on the
and
municipaland provinciallevels) in carrying
out theirrepresentative
and approvingthoserecommended
forleadership
government
functions
rolesat all levels.At thelevelof theNationalAssemblythepartyin effect
choosestheleadership,
butit has absolutelyno rolein thenomination
of
candidatesformunicipal
assemblydelegate.
on the municipaldelegate
Cuban PresidentFidel Castrocommented
electionprocessin a speechcelebrating
the30thanniversary
of theCuban
Revolution
(1989: 80-81):
- andtheinstitutions
ourelectoralsystem
Regarding
oftherevolution
areso
oftencalledintoquestion-the waydelegatesare nominated
in theelectoral
whichare thefoundations
forall thestate'spower,I believeour
districts,
electoralsystemis also unique.Thisis so becausetheparty
does notnominate
candidates
tobe delegates,
theremustbe morethanonecandidate
andnotmore
thaneight,andtheyarenominated
bythepeoplewithout
anyparticipation
by
theparty.
The partydoesn'tsay we nominate
thiscandidateor thatone; itis
thepeoplewho do thenominating.
Thatdoesn'texistin anyothercountry.
. . . If thepeople werecounterrevolutionary,
if themajorityof thepeople
werecountedrevolutionary,
all theyneed do wouldbe to nominatecounterrevolutionaries
and themajority
of thedelegateswouldbe counterrevolutionaries
opposedto therevolution
andsocialism.
Itwouldbe difficult
to understand
howtheCubanparliamentary
system
functions
without
takingintoaccountthepoliticalconsequencesofgovernofa plannedsocialisteconomy
inginthecontext
withneither
private
property
norprofound
socialclassdivisionsordifferences.
Becauseoftheabsenceof
thesefactors,
debatesanddecisionsinCuba differ
parliamentary
fromthose
incapitalist
Intheparliamentary
representative
systems.
bodiesI studied,
the
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10
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECI1VES
agreements,
reports,
evaluations,
and laws thatweredebatedandvotedon
to
wereusuallynotcharacterized
by favoring
one sectorof thepopulation
thedetriment
oftheother.Instead,theproceedings
wereusuallyapplicable
equallyto theconstituent
populationas a whole.An attempt
was madeto
possible
resolveconcernsexpressedby delegatespriorto votingwherever
andthusavoida sharply
dividedvote.I witnessed
onlya fewdividedvotes,
and theseonlyat themunicipalassemblylevel.In theNationalAssembly,
ofthenationalleadership
andbecausethey
perhapsbecauseoftheprestige
havelackeda base ofsupport
amongtheelectorate,
deputiesseemreluctant
toopposewhatis proposedinformalsessionsorto attempt
tosettheirown
however,I
agenda.Duringmeetingsof NationalAssemblycommissions,
tovoiceconcernsandopposition.
observedmorewillingness
In thesocialisttradition
oftheParisCommuneof1871andoftheSoviets
of 1905 and 1917,mostofthemunicipal
including
delegatesI interviewed,
thosein leadership
delegates
positionsandthosewhowerealso provincial
and nationaldeputies,came fromworkeror peasantbackgrounds.
One
reasonforthisrelativeclass homogeneity,
important
of course,was the
of almostall thewealthyof Cuba and a majorportionof the
emigration
A further
middleclass.Another
reasonwas neighborhood-level
nomination.
one is thatitis difficult
toserveas municipal
forhigher-level
professionals
labor
delegatesbecause of theenormousamountof timethisvoluntary
requires.Consequently,
mostdelegatesarenotonlyworkers
or lower-level
of
professionals
butalso personswell-known
byandstrongly
representative
forfinancialgainor
theirconstituencies.
Giventheabsenceofopportunity
privilegesandthesacrifices
involved,citizenswithout
a desireto servethe
andwithout
socialistconsciousness
becomedelegates.
constituencies
rarely
THE MUNICIPALASSEMBLY
Municipaldelegatesaretheaccesspointandmainlinkbetweenthepeople
and theirgovernment
and, in largepart,shape the electorate'sattitudes
towardthegovernment.
tasksis to be directly
Amongtheirmostimportant
comaccountableto theelectorate
-to tryto resolveeveryday
problems,
plaints,andsuggestions
(planteamientos)
raisedwiththembytheirconstituentseitherpersonallyor at thebiannualneighborhood
meetingscalled
assemblies(asambleasde rendicionde cuenta).This is a
accountability
towhichMarx
variant
ofthe"instructed-delegate
model"(mandatimperatij)
on theParisCommune
the
of1871.Atthesemeetings
pointedinhiswritings
on themunicipal
during
delegatesreport
assembly'sandtheirownactivities
and explainhow thecomtheprevioussix months,
presentcrimereports,
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Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT
11
plaintsand suggestions
fromthepriormeetinghave beenhandled.Those
andsuggestions.
Delegateshaveusually
attending
thenoffer
newcomplaints
orat
beenable toresolvethemajority
oftheconcernsraisedbyconstituents
butthesevereeconomicshortages
leasttoprovideconvincing
explanations,
the"specialperiod"since1991 havemadethisincreasingly
characterizing
Thereis intensecompetition
withina provdifficult.
amongmunicipalities
ofconcerns.
incetoresolvethehighest
percentage
monetary
Peopleareawareof theamountofworkdelegatesdo without
The personalstyleof thedelegates'workwith
remuneration
or privileges.
evenfamiliaridentification
is conduciveto a comfortable,
thecommunity
towardthepoliticalprocess.
withthegovernment
and a positiveattitude
Ninety-five
percentof thoseeligiblevote,and 60-80percentattendstreet
andtomeetwiththedelegates,all without
meetings
tonominate
candidates
Mostpeopleknowwhotheirdelegatesareand
coercionorlegalobligation.
basis. Citizensmay
are personallyacquaintedwiththemon a first-name
discussproblems,
including
personalones,withtheirdelegatesat anytime,
in chanceencounters
in thestreetor in theirhomesoroffices.My
whether
led me to concludethatthisfamiliar
observations
politicalstyleis in large
measurea consequenceof theemphasison equalityin Cubansociety,the
ofneighborhood
life,andtheneighborhood-level
openandpubliccharacter
by the
nomination
of candidatesfortheoffice.It has also beeninfluenced
inwhichPresident
FidelCastrorelatestothepublic.
personalmanner
heldbythemunicipal
assembly)organize
Delegates(assistedbyseminars
anddirecttheaccountability
assembliesandtransmit
citizenconcernstothe
stateagencies.Theymustsubmitmonthly
tothemunicreports
appropriate
Theymeet
thestatusofcitizenconcerns.
ipalassemblysecretary
concerning
twicea month
withrepresentatives
andentities
to
ofgovernment
enterprises
answersontheseissues,andtheyvisitthecitizens
receiveanddiscusswritten
involvedathometodiscusstheacceptability
Whenanswers
ofthoseanswers.
are deemedunacceptable,
the specificconcernsare raisedagain in the
Citizenscananddo appealall the
municipal
assemblyexecutivecommittee.
thoughtheyareencouragedto
way to theNationalAssemblyifnecessary,
seeklocal solutions.
forprojectsandproblems
thatariseintheir
Delegatesarealso responsible
electoraldistricts.
For example,theymay coordinatevolunteer
workon
Sundaystofixtheroofon a localstoreorbuilda sidewalkorhelptoorganize
local microbrigades
by the central
(special workbrigadesadministered
to repairhomes.Delegatesalso workcloselywiththemass
government)
in theneighborhood,
suchas theComitesde Defensade la
organizations
- CDRs) andthe
Revolucion(Committees
fortheDefenseoftheRevolution
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12
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Federacionde MujeresCubanas(Federation
ofCubanWomen- FMC), the
police, the local Communist
partynucleus,local social workers,family
doctors,andhealthclinicsto helpsolvelocal socialormedicalproblems.
In additiontoattending
thesessionsofthemunicipal
assembly,
delegates
in
participate permanent
commissions
oftheassemblythatoverseespecific
areas,suchas health,education,
commerce,
etc.,makingon-siteinspections
and writingreports.They attendmeetings,forexample,to discussthe
economicplanning
process,toreviewmunicipal
inpreparation
problems
for
theaccountability
assemblies,andtotrytoresolveconstituents'
concerns.
The municipalassemblymeetsin ordinary
sessiontwicea yearand in
specialsessionaboutfourtimesa year,eachsessionlastinga dayorless.The
municipalassemblyanalyzes,discusses,supervises,
monitors,
inspects,
and
controls
thesocial,economic,
judicial,andpoliticalaffairs
ofthemunicipality.It also selectsadministrators
forlocal enterprises
and entities(suchas
storesandpolyclinics)
andparticipates
informulating
themunicipal
planand
budget,whichit mustapprove.Anotherimportant
role is monitoring
the
performance
ofthemunicipality's
provincialandnational-level
enterprises.
The municipalassemblyhas no legislative
powers:theselie solelywiththe
NationalAssembly.
Delegatesto theseassemblieselectan executivecommittee,
provincial
assembly
delegates,
andNationalAssembly
fromamongcandidates
deputies
proposedby the municipalcandidacycommission,presidedover by a
ofthemunicipal
representative
branchoftheCommunist
andincluding
party
representatives
of themunicipalbranchesof theUnionde JovenesComunistas(Unionof Communist
Youth- UJC),theCentralde Trabajadores
de
- CTC), theFMC, andtheCDRs. There
Cuba (CubanWorkers'
Federation
mustbe at least 25 percentmorecandidatesthanpositions.Municipal
delegatescan anddo addcandidatestothelists.The factthatthecandidacy
commission
is presidedoverbya partyrepresentative
does notnecessarily
meanthatthepartydominatesit. I attendeda meetingof thecandidacy
inPlayatochoosecandidates
commission
tofillthreevacanciesforprovincial delegate.The mostinfluential
was nottheparty
personat themeeting
butthemunicipal
representative
representative
fromtheCDR, whohadthe
mostinformation,
garneredfromthe local (block) CDRs, regarding
the
was nota criterion
delegates.Partymilitancy
discussed.Onlyoneofthefour
candidatesproposedbythecommission
andnoneofthethreeelectedwas a
militant.
The executivecommittee
has approximately
15 members,
all municipal
andothers
delegates.Thepresident,
withresponsivice-president,
secretary,
bilityforspecificareasareprofessional
members
andreceivea salaryfrom
themunicipalassembly(approximately
whattheyreceivedon theirregular
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Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT
13
thecandidacycommisjobs). Aftertheelectionoftheexecutivecommittee,
sion recommends
membersto filltheseprofessional
positions,subjectto
ratification
bytheassembly.
InPlaya,weekspriortotheexecutive
committee
electionthecandidacycommission
hadalreadyselectedandinformed
those
itplannedto appoint,
butsometimes
thecandidatesrecommended
forprofessionalpositions
failtobe electedtotheexecutivecommittee.
Thepercentage
ofpartymembers
amongmembers
ofexecutivecommittees,provincial
delegates,
andNationalAssemblydeputiesis usuallyhigher
The
thanthepercentageof municipaldelegateswho are partymilitants.
recommendation
formunicipalassemblypresident,
madebythecandidacy
commissionand ratified
by themunicipalassembly,is approvedby the
memprovincial
party,
andtherecommendations
fortheotherprofessional
of
bersareapprovedbythemunicipal
party.
The president,
beinga member
Howthemunicipal
partypoliticalbureau,is certainto be a partymilitant.
ever,inPlaya,forexample,severalnonparty
delegateshavebeenelectedto
professional
positions.
The executivecommittee,
meeting
everyotherweek,actsforthemunicipalassemblybetweensessions,andall actionstakenandresolutions
passed
In fact,thereport
of
oftheactivities
by itmustbe ratified
bytheassembly.
theexecutivecommittee
is usuallyone ofthemostintensely
debateditems
on the agenda.The executivecommittee
sets the agendaformunicipal
bothsubjectto the
assemblysessionsand appointslocal administrators,
approvaloftheassembly.
The municipalassembly'scommissionsreportfirstto the executive
committee
andthento theassembly.Commission
andleadership
members
are chosenby theexecutivecommittee,
whichalso setstheagendas.The
majority
ofcommission
members
aredelegates,buttherearealso volunteer
membersfromthecommunity
chosenamongcitizenswithexpertisein a
field.Thepresident
ofeachcommission
particular
is alwaysa delegate.Each
commission
is chargedwithinvestigating,
inspecting,
andwriting
commentariesandcritiques
on reports
presented
to themunicipal
assemblybystate
Itreviewsthecitizenproposalsthatfallwithinits
organswithinitspurview.
area and visitsthetargets
of complaints
and thecitizenswho makethem.
inPlaya,a delegatefromthecommerce
Duringan inspection
ofrestaurants
and gastronomy
commission
checkedthekitchen,
foodstorageareas,and
bathrooms
forcleanliness,
verified
thatthefoodlistedonthemenuwasbeing
offered,
questionedthecustomersaboutthequalityof thefood and the
service,andreviewedtherestaurant's
recordswithitsadministrator.
During
I observed,commission
anotherinspection
members
toureda dentalclinic
in Bauta,questionedpatientsand dentists,
and metwithadministrators
to
discusssomeproblems
thathadcometothecommission's
attention.
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14
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Throughout
the representative
systembut especiallyat themunicipal
level,greatimportance
is giventocitizencomplaints.
Themunicipal
assemblyexecutivecommittee,
aidedbytheprovincial
government,
spendsa great
deal of effortpreparingfor and evaluatingthe biannualaccountability
assemblies.The municipaland provincialgovernments
and themunicipal
to theseassembliesto appraiseand to suggest
partysend representatives
improvements
to thedelegate,and representatives
of stateenterprises
and
involvedin citizenconcernsattendto respondto citizens'
anyenterprises
questions.The municipalassemblysecretary
writesa monthly
to the
report
executivecommittee
theresolution
ofconcerns,
listedaccording
regarding
tocategory,
arisingfromthepriorassembliesandproducesa biannualreport
theaccountability
evaluating
also evaluate
process.Assemblycommissions
thisprocess.Thecitizenwhoraisesan issuereceivesvisitsathishomefrom
a representative
of theenterprise
or entityinvolved,(in someinstances)a
member
of thecorresponding
assemblycommission,
andhislocal delegate
to verifythathe has receivedan answerand is satisfied.The level of
resolution
ofsuchissuesis 60-95percent.
Citizencomplaints(quejas), usuallyof a moreindividualnature,are
deliveredinpersonorbyletter
totheofficesofthemunicipal
The
assembly.
president
readsall theletters
andthereports
ofthepersonalinterviews.
The
municipal
government,
bylaw,mustrespondtocomplaints
within60 days;
withthisrequirement
compliance
is checkedbytheprovincial
assemblyand
also bytheNationalAssembly.
A quarterly
on complaints
report
goes tothe
executivecommittee
ofthemunicipalassemblyandan annualreport
tothe
municipalandprovincial
assemblies.
The municipalofficeof planningandbudgetis underthecontrolofthe
municipalassemblyandreceivesinputsmainlyfromtheprofessional
membersof theexecutivecommittee
(it is usuallythevice-president
who is in
chargeof economicaffairs)and the administrators
and unionsof local
entities.
Thisofficethendrawsup themunicipal
economicplanandbudget,
whichmustbe approved,together
witha reportfromtheassembly'seconomiccommission,
bythemunicipal
assemblydelegates.Citizenproposals
weighheavilyininvestment
decisionsfortheeconomicplan.Recommendationsforthelocalplanandbudgetaresenttotheprovincial
government
and
then,as partoftheprovincial
planandbudget,
tothecentral
planning
board.
Afterthenationaleconomicplan and budgetis approvedby theNational
Assembly,the finalfigures,whichincludefundsforinvestments
to be
decidedon by themunicipality,
aresentbackdownto themunicipality
for
approvaland implementation.
The commissionand assemblydebatesI
reviewedregarding
plans and budgetson all threelevels were minimal.
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Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT
15
may
Relativeabsenceof debateat this(and higher)levelsof government
reflectinsufficient
knowledgeof economicmatters,
a problembeingdealt
withthrough
videotapesand seminars.At one assemblysessionin Playa,
ofthebudgettowritehisreportin a
delegatesaskedthemunicipal
director
moreaccessiblestyle.
The notionthatthemunicipalassemblieslack powerbecausethemost
important
economicactivitiesare not undertheircontrolis erroneous.
Although
themajorbranches
oftheCubaneconomyandeconomicplanning
and needs exare undernationaland provincialcontrol,thesuggestions
intheformulation
aregivenseriousconsideration
pressedbymunicipalities
can and do vetoproposed
of provincialand nationalplans.Municipalities
themunicipal
locationsforprojectsinvolvedin theseplans.Furthermore,
andmuofplanning,
directors
executivecommittee
members,
professional
the
nicipalassemblycommissions
monitor
performance,
plan fulfillment,
enterprises
and
laborsupply,
andtheprofitability
ofnationalandprovincial
andreport
tothemunicipal
entities
locatedintheirmunicipality
periodically
concern
theoperations
assembly.
Onereasonforthemunicipality's
regarding
withinits boundariesis thatit sharesin theirprofits.If problemsare
identified,
themunicipal
vice-president
informs
boththelocaladministrators
In Bauta, the only complete
and the provincialor nationalauthorities.
ofthelargeAriguanabo
textile
monitoring
plant,whichis runbytheMinistry
is donebythemunicipality.
InPalmira,
thesugarrefineries
ofLightIndustry,
arerunbythecentral
butoversight
andday-to-day
management
government,
In Playa,a director
aremainlyperformed
ofthe
bythemunicipalassembly.
provincialfruit-and-vegetable-distributing
entitywas caughtlyingduring
questioning
bydelegatesina municipal
assemblysession,andas a resulthis
of
was rejectedandthenextdayhe was replaced.LatertheMinister
report
came to the municipalgovernment's
officeto see how the
Agriculture
distribution
systemcouldbe improved.
Forsocialservicessuchas health,
andtransportation,
policyis
education,
set at the nationallevel, but the municipalassemblyis responsiblefor
forunitslocated
personnel,
performance,
problem
solving,andconstruction
in themunicipality.
Duringa campaignin CityofHavanaProvincein 1987
and 1988 in whichmicrobrigades
built104 newnursery
schools,theconstruction
was closelycoordinated
and monitored
members
by professional
ofthemunicipal
executivecommittees.
In 1989, people's councils(consejospopulares)were added to some
inaneffort
municipalities
tomakethegovernment
moreaccessibleandmore
tothoselivingfarfrom
offices.
Sincethen
responsive
themunicipal
assembly
in
toall municipalitiesCityofHavanaProvinceand
theyhavebeenextended
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16
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
are beingintroduced
all overthecountry.
Theygroupapproximately
15
electoraldistricts
andincludethemunicipal
of
delegatesandrepresentatives
themassorganizations
andstateenterprises
in thearea.The councilpresidentsand sometimes
also vice-presidents,
electedby thedelegateson the
forthecouncils.
council,mustbe delegatesandworkfull-time
The emphasison theclosenessof thestateand thepeople places the
context.
people'scouncilinthesocialisttheoretical
A historical
precedent
for
itcanbe foundinthedeputygroupsoftheformer
SovietUnion.Itsprimary
citizencompurposeis torespondtolocal issues-corruption, inefficiency,
- quicklyat the local level, withthe minimum
plaintsand concerns
of
considerable
bureaucracy.
Councilshavebeengranted
authority,
including
therightto handlelocal economiccrimessuchas foodhoardingand the
instateenterprises
andto intervene
underprovinbribing
ofstoremanagers
cial or nationalcontrol.I spentthedaywitha delegatefromtheSantaFe
ofthedistrict's
sectioninPlayawhowasthepresident
people'scouncil.Santa
a feeling
councils
Fe isphysically
setapart,
whichaccentuates
ofcommunity;
lackingthishistoric
senseof community
havebeenless successful.It was
clearthatmostpeopleknewthepresident
andthatthecouncilhadbrought
A fewdayspriortomyarrival,
to thecommunity.
a severetropical
benefits
low hadcausedflooding,
somehouseshavingbeenwashedoutto sea, and
he was clearlyinchargeofthecleanupeffort.
Accordingto NationalAssemblyPresidentJuanEscalona,significant
changesare beingproposedforthemunicipalassemblies,withtheroleof
thepartyreducedconsiderably.
is to be elected
The candidacycommission
oftheparty;
bymunicipal
delegatesandnolongertoincludea representative
thepartyis no longertohavea say inselecting
andthepresident
is
officers,
no longertobe a member
oftheparty'smunicipal
bureau.Officers
aretobe
electedby thedelegatesfromamongthemselves.
However,therestof the
executivecommittee
is tobe replacedbyanadministrative
unitcomposedof
expertsinthefield,whomayormaynotbe delegatesbutwillbe ratified
by
thedelegates.Theaimhereis toensuremoreexpertise
forthoseinchargeof
health,
education,
commerce,
etc.,andtomaketheroleofmunicipal
delegate
moreone of oversightand controlof theseactivities.Furthermore,
the
municipalassemblycommissions
areto be strengthened
andmadeanswerable totheassemblyrather
thantotheexecutivecommittee.
thereis
Finally,
a commitment
to strengthen
theroleof themunicipalassembly,
especially
inrelation
to theprovincial
assemblyandtoentities
andenterprises
located
inthemunicipality
thatarecontrolled
bytheprovince
ora nationalministry.
Themunicipal
assembliesarethelevelofgovernment
thattakesthemost
in discovering
initiative
and resolvingproblemsand satisfying
theneeds
expressedbythepeople.Becauseoftheopennomination
procedure,
voters
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Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT
17
tendto identify
closelywiththeirmunicipaldelegates.Throughdirect,
competitive
election,
delegatesaredirectly
responsible
totheirelectors.The
people'scouncilshavestrengthened
assembliesandbrought
municipal
them
closerto thepeople.The majorityof provincialassemblydelegatesand
NationalAssemblydeputiesare also municipaldelegates.The municipal
ofthechainbywhichnationalpolicyis formulated.
delegateis thebeginning
THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY
Provincial
delegatesareelectedbythemunicipal
assembliesfromamong
of
Thepresidents
candidates
recommended
bytheircandidacy
commissions.
municipalassembliesare ex officioprovincialdelegates.The provincial
andsocialand
assemblycontrolsanddirectsthestateeconomicenterprises
serviceentitiesunderprovincialcontroland helps monitorthoseunder
nationalcontrol.It formulates
and approvesprovincialeconomicplans
theworkof the
and budgetsand aids,inspects,monitors,
and coordinates
province'smunicipalassemblies.It holdstworegularsessionsand several
extraordinary
sessionsperyear.
The provincialassemblyis similarin its organization
and operating
procedure
tothemunicipal
assembly.
Provincial
delegateselectanexecutive
fromcandidates
committee
proposedbya provincial
candidacycommission.
The executivecommittee
carrieson theworkof the assemblybetween
be approvedby
sessions,and itsactionsandresolutions
mustsubsequently
thedelegates.Executivecommittee
members
areusuallynotalso municipal
delegates,butmostarenotsalariedbytheprovincial
government.
Theprovincial
assemblyis muchless likelythanthemunicipality
totake
initiatives
and morelikelytoworkwiththemunicipalities
oftheprovince,
assistance
providing
whenrequested.
Itis thelinkbetweenthemunicipalities
andthenationalgovernment.
Becauseofthespecialurbancharacteristics
of
whichis subdivided
intoseveralmunicipalities,
its
CityofHavanaProvince,
provincialassemblydirectly
controlsentities,
suchas transportation,
films,
and theaqueduct,thatin otherprovincesare undermunicipalcontroland
thusis necessarily
also morea government
of directinitiatives
regarding
theseservicesand economicplanning.Officersand functionaries
of the
provincial
assemblyperiodically
visitmunicipalities
to inspectandtointerview delegatesand issue reports
on themunicipalgovernments'
activities
andneeds,including
thoseofthedelegatesandtheorgansundermunicipal
control.The municipalexecutivecommittee
also issuesperiodicreports
to
theprovincial
assemblyexecutivecommittee
andthemunicipal
assemblyto
theprovincial
assembly.
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18
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Complaintsat the provinciallevel are handledby a functionary
who
makesa biannualinspection
of all themunicipalities
in theprovinceand
issuesa quarterly
report
basedon theinformation
receivedfromthem.The
report
contains
numbers
ofcomplaints
bymunicipality
andcategory
andhow
manyhavebeenresolved.Thepersonwhohandlescitizensuggestions
issues
similarreports.
The provincialassemblieshelpto preparemunicipaldelegatesfortheir
biannualaccountability
assemblies.
Theprofessional
members
oftheprovincial
executivecommittee
readall thesuggestions
receivedfrom
the municipalities
to theirareas of
and the complaintsthatcorrespond
responsibility
and,ifnecessary,
workwiththemunicipalities
toresolvethem.
InCityofHavanaProvince,
giventhelargenumber
ofproposals(over30,000
ateachbiannualassembly),
theexecutive
committee
studiesthemaccording
to thenumberscompiledin each categoryand concentrates
on resolving
thosethatcorrespond
tothegreatest
collectiveneeds.
The commissionsof the provincialassembliesworkwithprovincial
that
andentities
andreceivetheproposalsfrom
themunicipalities
enterprises
andto
correspond
to theirareasofresponsibility
to monitor
theirresolution
visitthecitizensinvolved.Theyalsocoordinate
areasofmunicipal
concern.
Forexample,theeducationcommission
ofCityofHavanaProvincevisited
nurseryschools (undermunicipalcontrol)to check on enrollment
and
withthegoal ofmakingfulluseofall theschoolsintheprovince.
attendance
As is thecase withthemunicipal
arenot
someofthemembers
commissions,
delegates.
donebydepartDevelopment
ofprovincial
economicplansandbudgets,
evalumentsundertheprovincial
assembly,
consistsmainlyofassembling,
whicharethenadded
themunicipal
ating,andcombining
plansandbudgets,
totheinvestments
totheprovince.
Almost
andexpensesrelatedspecifically
all thediscretionary
levelareatthemunicipal
investments
belowthenational
in formulating
level. The provincialassemblyparticipates
and adjusting
municipal
plansandbudgetsandalso providesinputtothecentralplanning
withregardto needsintheprovince.
department
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
NationalAssemblydeputiesare electedby municipalassembliesfrom
andapprovedby
amongcandidatesselectedbythecandidacycommissions
thecentral
oftheparty.
committee
Therearetwoseparatecandidate
lists,one
madeup ofmunicipaldelegatesandtheotherofmoreorless distinguished
thosewithimportant
citizens,including
government
and/or
partyposts,and
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Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT
19
celebrities,
forexample,insportsandthearts.Themajority
ofdeputies
(about
54 percent)
electedarefromthemunicipal
delegatelist,whichgivessignificantrepresentation
inthehighest
organofCubanrepresentative
government
todelegateswhohaveveryclosetiestothepeopleandwhoarealso themost
andactivedeputies).Mostdeputiesreceiveno payandregularly
outspoken
assembliesthatelectedthem,to which
attendthesessionsofthemunicipal
theymustreport
periodically.
Municipalassemblieshavethepowerofrecall
is thatmostcitizens(espeoverdeputiestheyhaveelected.My observation
ciallyinurbanareas),whileawareoftheNationalAssemblydebates(which
inthepressandhavebeencarriedliveontelevision),
arethoroughly
reported
do notknowwhotheirNationalAssembly
deputiesare,sincecitizensdo not
electdeputiesand thusdeputiesmainlyreportand respondto the
directly
municipal
assemblies.
selectedby
NationalAssembly
deputieselect,fromamongthecandidates
of theNational
a candidacycommission
madeup of deputies,theofficers
theCouncilof Ministers
AssemblyandtheCouncilof Stateandalso ratify
and theleadershipof bothcouncils(includingthecombinedpositionof
President
oftheCouncilofStateandCouncilofMinisters,
heldby
currently
FidelCastro).Incontrast
tosimilarelectionsonthemunicipal
andprovincial
levels,thisone offers
no choiceamongcandidates,
who arepreselected
by
thepartyleadership.
The NationalAssembly'schargeis to control,
inspect,and monitor
the
nationalgovernment
ministries
andstateorgans,including
thejudiciaryand
theattorney
general'soffice,andto supervisethelocal Organsof People's
Power,primarily
ontheprovincial
level.TheNationalAssembly
doesnotset
long-range
national
policygoals(thisisconsidered
tobe theroleoftheparty),
norhas itdebatedordiscussedforeign
policy.
OnlytheNationalAssemblyhas legislativepowers.While individual
deputiesmayproposelaws, deputieshave neitherthetime(theyare not
professional
politicians)
northestaff
orothernecessary
support
togivethem
sufficient
independence
forthis.Legislativeinitiatives
or proposalshave
comemainlyfromministries
andnongovernmental
entities
suchas theCTC
ortheFMC. TheCommunist
(forlaborlegislation)
partyreviewsall legislationpriorto presentation
to theNationalAssembly.Ministry
officialsthen
workwiththecorresponding
assemblycommission
to drafta finalversion,
and thecommission
draftsitscommentary.
Duringthisprocesssubstantial
changesarepossible(as, forexample,happenedduring
thediscussionofthe
newpenalcode in theconstitutional
affairs
commission
in 1988). Ministry
officials
thenmeetwithdeputiesfromeachprovince
toexplaintheproposals
andanswerquestions.
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20
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECrTVES
NationalAssemblysessionslastfortwoto threedaysandareheldtwice
a year,extrasessionsbeingconvenedifnecessary(one was calledseveral
yearsago). Deputiesdebateandvoteonproposedlaws,reports,
andNational
Assemblycommissions'
commentaries
and critiquesmaderegarding
these
reportsand proposedlegislation.
The assemblydiscussesand approvesat
each sessionthereports
ofa province,
ofa government
ministry,
andofthe
prosecutors
andjudiciarybranches.
It votes,usuallywithout
debate,on the
nationaleconomicplanandbudgetandthereports
oftheCouncilofState(a
bodythatrepresents
thelegislature
betweensessions)and theCouncilof
Ministers.
The lackofdebateon theeconomicplanandbudgetis duetothe
complexity
ofthematerial
andthefactthatdeputiesaregivenonlysynopses,
ofthe
usuallyonlyon thedayofthevote.The lackofdebateon thereports
Councilof Stateand theCouncilof Ministers
in partto
can be attributed
forexample,the textsof the
deputies'almosttotallack of information;
decreeslistedforapprovalarenotmadeavailabletothem.
ThedutiesofmostdeputiesconsistlargelyofworkonNationalAssembly
Hereagaintherelative
commissions.
ofdeputies
whoaremunicimportance
ipal delegatesemerges;manyof thedeputieswho are notalso municipal
delegateshavehighgovernment
positionsandtherefore
rarelyhavetimeto
inthecommissions.
participate
Thismeansthatmunicipal
delegates/deputies
do thebulkoftheworkon thecommissions,
andthishasleftopenforthem
important
commission
postssuchas thepresidency
of thepowerful
constitutionalaffairs
commission
or thecommission
on local Organsof People's
Power.
Thecommissions
undertake
andreport
theirfindings
tothe
investigations
NationalAssemblyandpreparecommentaries
on reports
andproposedlaws
to be debatedduringtheNationalAssemblysessions.Annualcommission
agendasare setby theNationalAssemblypresidency.
The commission
on
global economicactivitiescommentson thenationaleconomicplan and
The constibudgetandhas conducted
surveyson thequalityofproduction.
affairs
tutional
commission
issuescommentaries
to
on proposedlegislation
thatthereis no conflict
withtheCubanconstitution
verify
laws.
or existing
It has produceda report
suggesting
newmethods
fordealingwithproposed
legislation
thatwouldstrengthen
theroleofthecommissions
andofpopular
The commissionon local organsof People's Powermakes
consultations.
on-siteinspectionsto preparecommentaries
on the biannualreportsof
provincialassembliesto theNationalAssembly.
Membersof thiscommismountainous
discovered
sion,uponvisiting
regionsofLas TunasProvince,
thatthoselivingin isolatedareas were not receivingmilk,and at their
insistence
local dairieswereestablished.
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Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT
21
Debates in theNationalAssemblyare characterized
by thepursuitof
consensus,andvotesarealmostalwaysunanimous.
Whenitis evidentthat
thereis strongdisagreement
on an issue,itis usuallywithdrawn
forfurther
study(as happened,
forexample,witha debateon measuresto ensurethat
divorcedhusbandspaid alimonyand childsupport).It is evidentduring
debatethatthereis nofearofexpressing
differences
andthatthesedifferences
lead to compromises.
Forexample,manydeputiesfoundcertainaspectsof
thenewpenalcodetoolenient(finesforminorthefts)
ortooharsh(penalties
forteenagegirlswho hidetheirpregnancy
fromtheirfamiliesand subsequentlykill theirnewborns).It is also evidentthatthereis pressureon
invoting,especiallyduringformalsessions.Dissentis
deputiesto conform
morecommonincommission
meetings
(wheremostdeputiesaremunicipal
delegates).
Escalonaspokeat lengthof changesat thislevelto be presented
to the
NationalAssembly
forapproval.Onemajorproposalwas direct,
competitive
electionsforprovincial
assemblydelegatesandNationalAssemblydeputies.
Thenominations
wouldbe madebythemunicipal
assemblieson thebasisof
therecommendations
oftheircandidacycommissions,
andcandidates
would
no longerrequiretheapprovalof theparty.Escalonarecognizedthatsome
sortofcampaign
wouldbe neededforthevoterstogettoknowthecandidates,
althoughhe firmly
rejectedpoliticalcampaignsbased on attacksand false
promises(politiqueria). This approachwouldmakedeputiesmoreclosely
identified
withthemunicipalities
fromwhichtheywereelectedand better
knownbythevoters.
The NationalAssemblyitselfwouldundergo
profound
reform.
Escalona
spokeoftheneedtoendmeaningless
formal
from
practices,
manyborrowed
theformer
SovietUnion,suchas thepressure
forunanimous
votes.He also
spoke of the need to strengthen
the role of the NationalAssembly.Its
commissions
wouldbe restructured,
and commission
presidents
wouldbe
professional
and no longerlinked(as has sometimes
beenthecase) to the
ministries
thattheircommissionssupposedlyoversee.Furthermore,
they
wouldapprovelegislation
beforeitwas presented
totheNationalAssembly.
The NationalAssemblywouldplay a greaterrole in economicplanning.
Escalonaconsidersthewholesystemofplanning
in termsofspecifictimeframes(one-yearplans,five-year
plans,etc.) a disastrous
inheritance
from
theearliersocialistcountries
thathas madeit impossiblefortheNational
Assemblyto considerand debateeconomicmatters.
Finally,and perhaps
mostimportant,
a needis recognized
forthedevelopment
ofpoliticalstructuresandpractices
inpreparation
forthetimewhenFidelCastrois nolonger
theleaderof theCubanRevolution.
His tremendous
anddominant
prestige
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22
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECI1VES
have resultedin nationalleadershipselectionprocedures
-for
personality
example,noncompetitive
electionsfortheCouncilofStateanditsleadership
-which forall practicalpurposescannotbe changedwhilehe is stillableto
exerciseleadership.
THE ORGANS OF PEOPLE'S
POWER AND POPULAR RULE
The willofthepeopleis expressedthrough
municipaldelegatesbecause
withtheirconstituents,
oftheirclosecontact
reinforced
bytheneighborhood
nomination
procedureand the accountability
assemblies.The municipal
of theprovincial
assemblyofficers
andthemajority
delegatesandnational
deputiescomefromtheranksofthesemunicipal
delegates.Thismeansthat
at all levelsof thesystemtherearepeoplewho arebestable to understand
andexpresstheneedsandconcernsofthepeople.Withall theirdrawbacks,
theindirect
electionsforprovincialand nationalrepresentatives
do ensure
thatdirectly
electedmunicipaldelegates,who areusuallyunknown
outside
oftheirelectoraldistricts,
constitute
themajority
atthehigherlevels,atthe
sametimestrengthening
theroleofthemunicipal
assemblies.
Importance
is giventothepeople'svoicethrough
theresponsibility
ofthe
Cubangovernment
torespondtothesuggestions
andcomplaints
ofcitizens
A suggestion
notonlyon theindividual
levelbutcollectively.
orcomplaint
is an individualact or,at most,thecollectiveact of thosepresentat an
buttakentogether
accountability
assembly,
Cubanpoliticsand
theyinfluence
thatthe officersof the
policy.Fromthisit is clear why it is important
municipaland provincialassembliesbe familiarwiththesuggestions
and
ofthembe distributed
atall
complaints
arisingintheirareasandthatreports
levelsofgovernment.
Information
on theneedsandopinionsof thepeopleis also funneled
to
themunicipalassembliesby themunicipalpartyorganization
through
the
Estadode Opinion,a monthly
report
compiledattheprovincial
andnational
levelsbypartymembers
on anonymous
opinionsoverheard
on thestreet,
in
andelsewhere.
markets,
Publicopinionpollingis also donebythepartyand
bytheCubanInstitute
forConsumer
ResearchandDemandGuidance.The
information
fromthesevarioussourcesregarding
citizens'problemsand
demandsstrongly
influences
municipalpolicy-making
and economicplanning.Theexecutivecommittee
professionals
lettheplanning
officeknowof
theneedsexpressedbytheelectorate
so thattheycan be takenintoconsideration.I was shownevidenceof supermarkets,
agromarkets,
bakeries,
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Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT
23
commercial
centers,
housing,
andbuildingrepairsthathadbeenincludedin
local economicplansthrough
thisprocess.Proposalsaresentto thelevelto
whichtheycorrespond,
at each level
and statistics
on themare distributed
andthusalsoinfluence
investments
attheprovincial
andnationallevels.The
in CienfuegosProvinceandthenewhospitalplannedfor
newmilkfactory
Playaareexamplesofdevelopments
suggested
bycitizens.
THE ROLE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY
Perhapsleastunderstood
is theroleof thevanguardpartyin relationto
theOrgansofPeople'sPowerandtothepossibility
ofrepresentative
governmentin a one-party
state.It is said thatthe partyis the antithesisof
representative
government
andthatthemoreitis involvedthelessrepresentativethegovernment
necessarilywill be. It is said thatthe higherthe
of delegateswho arepartymilitants
theless representative
and
percentage
responsiveis theassembly.It is said thatthepartytellstherepresentatives
who are militants
how to voteandwhatto do and,through
thecandidacy
commissions
andthenomenclature
maintains
totalcontroloverthe
system,
leadershipand the compositionof assemblies.Since the partysets the
societalgoals,itis said thatithas so muchpoweras to deprive
long-range
theorgansofPeople'sPowerofanyimportance.
I believethatmyresearch
providesa challengetotheseclaims.
The principalroleof theCommunist
partyis meantto be political- to
of a socialistsocietyand a
stimulate,
guide,and promotethedevelopment
In socialistdevelopment,
consciouspopulacewithsocialistconsciousness.
nessto a largeextentreplacesthecapitalist
market
andtheprofit
motivein
theadministration
of
andcoordination
ofproduction
andinthemanagement
labor.Socialistconsciousness,
whiledifficult
to implant,implement,
and
spread,is one of the principalelementsthatmakes socialisttransition
possible.In Cuba, it is clearlythe partythatis best able to createand
encouragesocialistconsciousness;itsmilitants
are supposedlyselectedin
parton thebasis of theirconsciousness,
and it encompassesall levelsof
societalandgovernmental
structure.
One important
rolethepartyplaysis helpingthedelegatesandespecially
theleadership
workwiththeprofescarryouttheirfunctions.
Partyofficials
sionalmunicipaland provincialexecutivecommittee
membersin solving
problems,bothlocal and national.In themunicipality
of Cienfuegos,
for
ofthemunicipalpartypromisedat a sessionof
example,thefirstsecretary
themunicipalassemblytohelppressure
theadministrators
ofenterprises
to
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24
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
resolvetheremaining
citizenconcerns.
In Playatheprofessional
executive
committee
memberin chargeof commerceand thepresident
of thecommercecommission
workedwitha specialpartycommission
setup as partof
therectification
campaignto improveservices.In Bauta thelocal party
officialassignedto a specificspheresuchas educationmeetsmonthly
with
thecorresponding
municipal
executive
andthoseinthemunicipality
member
whoruntheofficeofeducation.
Partyrepresentatives
inseminars
participate
fordelegates.The partyneighborhood
nuclei,composedmainlyof housewives and retirees,
help local delegatesin taskssuch as preparation
for
accountability
assemblies.Municipalpartyrepresentatives
attendthese
meetingsand evaluatehow theywereconducted.The partynucleiof the
workplacesof themunicipalgovernment
criticizeprofessional
executive
committee
members
forfallingdownon
(mostofwhomarepartymembers)
thejob butdo notinstruct
themhowtovoteorwhatto do.
The party,in fact,does not tell delegatesor deputieswho are party
militants
howtovoteorwhattodo. As militants,
ofcourse,theyarebound
to thepartyprogram
and agreements,
buttheseconsistmainlyof general,
long-term
strategies
andguidelinesand havelittlerelationto theeveryday
debates,votes,decisions,andworkofdelegatesanddeputies.WhenI asked
municipalandprovincial
delegateswhowerepartymembers
aboutresolutionspassedat recentlocal partyassemblies,onlythemunicipalassembly
as membersof themunicipalpartybureau,had everevenread
presidents,
them.NationalAssemblydeputies,
almostall ofwhomarepartymilitants,
weremoreawareof thepublishedresolutions
passedat therecentnational
buttheseresolutions
partycongress,
hadlittleapplicability
totheirspecific
tasksor votesas deputies.The municipalandprovincialdelegatesI interviewed,includingthosewho werealso professional
executivecommittee
members,
NationalAssemblydeputies,
andpresidents
ofNationalAssembly
all toldme thatthepartydoes nottryto tellthemwhatto do
commissions,
withregardto theirgovernmental
roles.The partydoes notact differently
towarda delegatewho is nota militant.
I observedamongdelegatesno
measurabledifferences
in attitudeand behaviorbased solelyuponparty
militancy.
60 percent
Approximately
ofthemunicipal
delegatesarepartymembers,
notthrough
partymanipulation
butbecausetheyarenominated
andelected
In neighborhood
bytheirconstituents.
nominating
meetings
thatI attended,
partymembership
was mentioned
whenapplicable,alongwiththeother
merits
ofthenominee,
bythepersonmakingthenomination
andlistedinthe
official
ofthecandidate
biography
butnothighlighted
as themostimportant
criterion.
Thepercentage
ofpartymembers
mayalso be highbecause,given
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Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT
25
thegreatamountofvolunteer
workinvolvedinbeinga delegate,thosewith
the strongest
ideologicalcommitment
tendto be partymembersand are
ofpartymemamongthemostlikelytoacceptnomination.
The percentage
berselectedto themunicipalexecutivecommittees
as provincialdelegates
andas NationalAssemblydeputiesis usuallyhigherthanthepercentage
of
municipal
delegates.
Althoughthepartyhas no role in choosingcandidatesformunicipal
inhaving
ifthepartyhadaninterest
delegate,ina fewcases inpastelections,
someoneserveas a professional
memberof themunicipalexecutivecommitteeit could tryto have thatpersonnominated.
It would thenstillbe
necessary
forthatpersontobe electedintheelectoraldistrict
andelectedas
- an eventuality
well by thedelegatesto theexecutivecommittee
by no
meanscertain.
Beginning
withtheelectionsofspring1989,thistypeofparty
intervention
hasceased.
Insteadofantagonism
thereseemstobe
betweenpartyandgovernment,
a spiritofworking
andreaching
together
agreement.
Especiallyon thelocal
onwhathadbeenthepractice
level,Jeffrey
Hahn's(1988: 259) commentary
intheformer
SovietUnionholdstrueforCuba:"formostissuesresolvedby
local government
theneedforpartyauthority
simplydoes notarise.Only
whentherearejurisdictional
disputesbetweengovernmental
and nongovernmental
agencies,or withinthebureaucracy,
wouldthepartycommittee
be likelyto getdirectly
involved."The municipalassemblyleadersI met,
mostof whomwere militants,
were,however,firmwithregardto their
Whendisagreements
do occurthatcannotbe resolvedat the
autonomy.
municipallevel,eitherthegovernment
prevailsor theissueis raisedat the
provinciallevel. Speakingat a provincewide
seminarforlocal assembly
commission
members,
oftheCommunist
JorgeLezcano,thefirstsecretary
partyfortheCityofHavana,criticized
theworkofthecommissions.
Many
withhimandmadetheirdisagreement
delegatesdisagreed
known,andatthe
followingsessionof theprovincialassemblyLezcano feltit necessaryto
hisremarks.
clarify
Representatives
ofthepartywhoarenotdelegatesmust
be granted
permission
bythedelegatestospeakatan assembly
session.Other
practices
regarding
partyparticipation
varyamongmunicipalities.
In Bauta,
thesecondsecretary
ofthemunicipal
partyis invited,
alongwitha representativeofthemunicipalCFC, totheexecutivecommittee
meetings.
Theroleofthepartyis greatest
intheNationalAssembly.
Here,inaddition
to approving
proposedlegislationbeforeit is submitted,
it has important
influence
in settingtheagendasof theNationalAssembly,
theCouncilof
andapprovesthecandidates
State,andthecommissions
forNationalAssemblypresident,
andsecretary,
fortheCouncilofState,andfor
vice-president,
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26
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
NationalAssemblydeputy.
It is at thislevelthattheoverlapbetweenparty
and stateleadershipis thegreatestand theseparation
betweenpartyand
government
leastclear.
Escalonawas adamantabouttheneedtoreducetheroleofthepartyand
emphasizeitspoliticalrole.To thisendtheparty'sbureaucracy
hasbeencut
in half.Clearly,itscontroloverleadershipselectionhas beenlimited.No
longerwillthemunicipal
partyunithavea parallelstructure
tothemunicipal
assembly
executive
committee,
andthiswilldrastically
reducethepossibility
ofitsinterfering
inthelatter.
CONCLUSION
In seekingto understand
representative
government
in Cuba,one must
firsttakeintoaccountitsprincipalobjectives:transmitting
voterdemands
and overseeingeconomicactivity.
Its strengths
have been thequalityand
dedication
ofthemunicipal
delegatesandtheircloserelation
andidentification withtheirelectorate.Developingits potentialfurther
dependson
- thelevelclosestto thevoters
- and
strengthening
themunicipal
assembly
makingtheNationalAssemblya moreeffective
andindependent
legislative
body.It also dependson thematuration
ofthepoliticalcultureandcapacity
forleadershipof theCubanworkingclass,whoseexperiencein political
leadership
andcontrol
inCubabeganonlywiththe1959revolution
andwas
institutionalized
onlyin 1976.
The changesproposedin 1991 by thefourth
congressof thepartyand
thoseanticipated
by Escalonago a longwaytowardimproving
theOrgans
ofPeople'sPoweratthemunicipalandnationallevelsbybuildingon their
fundamental
andbyfurther
strengths
delimiting
therolesofthegovernment
andtheparty.
Thepeople'scouncilsnowbeingorganized
enhance
nationally
the role of the municipaldelegatewhile broadeningand deepeningthe
connection
betweencitizensandtheirrepresentatives.
Themunicipal
assemaretobe givenincreasedimportance
inordertoserveas an
blycommissions
effective
to thenewlystructured
counterpart
executivecommittee,
whichis
tobecomean administrative
unitcomposedofexperts.
Thelinkagebetween
thepartyandthemunicipal
assemblyhasbeenconsiderably
weakened,and
theroleof themunicipaland provincial
partyin candidateand leadership
selectionforthemunicipalassemblyhas been eliminated.
with
Similarly,
regard
totheNationalAssembly,
theparty
is nolongertoapprovecandidates.
Direct,competitive
electionsfordeputyanda strengthening
ofthecommissionsopenthewayformakingtheNationalAssemblya moreindependent
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Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT
27
and effective
bodyforlegislation,
governmental
monitoring
andoversight,
andeconomicplanning.
A socialistparliamentary
systemcan be effective
and representative
without
oppositional
politicsanda multiparty
systemandwithout
electoral
campaignsof the typeknownin capitalistdemocracies.This ultimately
dependson popularsupport
fora socialisteconomicandsocial systemand
theperception
thattherepresentative
systemworksto ensureits fairand
effective
implementation.
Italsodependsona vanguard
thathasearned
party
therespectofthepeoplewhosepurposeis to helpfulfill
thesegoals.
REFERENCES
Castro,Fidel
1989"Thirty
yearsoftheCubanRevolution,"
inFidelCastro,
InDefenseofSocialism:Four
Speecheson the30thAnniversary
NewYork:Pathfinder
Press.
oftheCubanRevolution.
Hahn,Jeffrey
W.
1988 SovietGrassroots:CitizenParticipationin Local SovietGovernment.
Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions