Representative Government in SocialistCuba by PeterRoman A studyofrepresentative insocialistCuba mustbe basedon government criteria thatarisefromandcorrespond toitsparticular socioeconomic system, of socialist and historical takingintoaccountthetheoretical background politicaldevelopment, therelationsof production and thedominant class, Thismeansthatmanyofthe andtheeconomicdevelopment ofthecountry. basic conceptsof representative government undercapitalismmaynotbe orinpractice. applicableeitherintheory Theliterature on theCubangovernment published lacksdetailedanalysis with ofhowthesystemfunctions. Evenwriters whosupposedly sympathize haveconcludedthat,inthebestofcases,Cubanrepresentative therevolution hasseverelimitations government becauseitdoes notfallwithinthehistoricallydefinedlimitsof capitalistdemocracy. Thus it is said thatwithout electoralcampaignsandelectoralpropaganda thepeoplehaveno significant themunicipal politicaloptions;thattheonlylevelthathas directelections, level, is limitedto local issues and therefore insignificant; and that,the majorityof municipaland provincialdelegatesand NationalAssembly deputiesbeingpartymilitants, votinginthesebodiesis dictated bytheparty, whichinanycase dominates thecandidacy theparliamentary system through commissions. My studyof theCubanparliamentary systemexplorestherolesof the and municipal assembly, theprovincial assembly, andtheNationalAssembly theroleoftheCommunist Itsempirical coreconsistsoffourmunicipal party. assemblieson whichI didfieldwork: thoseofPlaya,an urbanmunicipality inCityofHavanaProvince;Bauta,a municipality ontheoutskirts ofthecity ofHavanainHavanaProvince, whereagriculture andtextilemanufacturing are themaineconomicactivities;Cienfuegos, an industrial city200 miles southeastof Havana in CienfuegosProvince;and Palmira,a small,.rural PeterRomanis a professor at HostosCommunity CollegeoftheCityUniversity ofNew York. He is a member oftheeditorial was supported boardofSocialismandDemocracy.Thisresearch in partbygrantsfromtheCityUniversity ofNew YorkPSC-CUNY ResearchAwardProgram andtheCUNY-Caribbean ExchangeProgram of HunterCollegeof theCityUniversity ofNew York. LATINAMERICAN Issue76,Vol.20No.1,Winter PERSPECrIVES, 1993,7-27 i) 1993LatinAmerican Perspectives 7 This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 8 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECrIVES municipality, also in CienfuegosProvince,inwhichsugaris producedand processed.I shallalso discusstheoperation of theprovincial assembliesof theprovincesin whichthesemunicipalities are located-Cityof Havana, - andthat Havana,andCienfuegos oftheNationalAssembly. December1986, Duringmyresearch visitstoCuba (October-November, September1987-June1988, December1988-January 1989, May 1989) I interviewed constituents, municipaldelegates(some of whomwere also ofmuniciprovincial delegatesandNationalAssemblydeputies),members and pal andprovincial executive committees, directors ofeconomicplanning oftheleadership ministers andofficials, andelements budgets,government ofboththeNationalAssemblyandtheCommunist party. Amongmyother I participated inmeetings researchactivities betweendelegatesandconstituents,observedseminarsfordelegates,tookpartin visitsby delegatesto constituents' homes,and attendedsessionsof municipaland provincial ateach ofthepermanent commissions assembliesandmeetings andactivities to Cuba to interview Juan of thethreelevels.In February1992 I returned of theNationalAssembly, Escalona,thenewpresident regarding proposed bodies andtoobservethenewlyformed changesinthesystem neighborhood calledconsejospopulares(people'scouncils). THE ORGANS OF PEOPLE'S POWER in Cuba, knownas the Organosde Poder Representative government Popular(OrgansofPeople'sPower-OPP) has threelevels-the municipal Itis a system theprovincial andtheNationalAssembly. assembly, assembly, andrespondstotheneedsofthepeople. thatidentifies Themunicipal assembly is themostrepresentative, responsive, andactive level,and delegatesto it aretheonlyonesnominated andelecteddirectly. whorepresent ofabout1,000voters electoraldistricts Municipaldelegates, in neighborhood andelected (fewerin ruralareas),arenominated meetings by secretballotin competitive elections(theremustbe fromtwoto eight candidates)fora termof 2?2 years.In lieu of electoralcampaigns,the ofthecandidates Themunicipal arepostedintheneighborhoods. biographies assemblyelectsprovincial assemblydelegatesevery2? yearsandNational Assemblydeputieseveryfiveyears,mainlyfromwithinitself. The Cubanpeoplecloselyidentify andhavepersonalcontactwiththeir municipaldelegates,who are sociallyand economically indistinguishable fromtheelectorate exceptthattheytendto haveachieveda higherlevelof educationand a higherpercentage ofpartymembership versus (60 percent This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT 9 10 percent forthepopulation). Exceptfora fewassemblyleaders,delegates areforthemostpartnotprofessional politicians; theyreceiveno salaryand continue toworkandtobe paidintheirworkplaces (thesameis trueofmost provincial assemblydelegatesandNationalAssemblydeputies).Municipal delegatescontrol,investigate, inspect,pass judgmenton, and overseethe ofthemunicipality economicandsocialactivities within thejurisdiction and andnationalenterprises locatedwithin havesomeinputinrunning provincial themunicipality. Theyapprovelocaleconomicplansandbudgetsbeforethey aresenttotheprovincial board. assemblyandthecentralplanning The roleof thevanguardpartyis essentially politicalin relationto the whole society,includingthegovernment, and consistsof settingnational ofsocialistconsciousness priorities todirectandencouragethedevelopment andbehavior. The partyappointsorapprovestheappointment ofpersonnel in key governmental and societalpositions.Its role is one of guiding, monitoring, and assistingtheOrgansofPeople'sPower(principally on the and municipaland provinciallevels) in carrying out theirrepresentative and approvingthoserecommended forleadership government functions rolesat all levels.At thelevelof theNationalAssemblythepartyin effect choosestheleadership, butit has absolutelyno rolein thenomination of candidatesformunicipal assemblydelegate. on the municipaldelegate Cuban PresidentFidel Castrocommented electionprocessin a speechcelebrating the30thanniversary of theCuban Revolution (1989: 80-81): - andtheinstitutions ourelectoralsystem Regarding oftherevolution areso oftencalledintoquestion-the waydelegatesare nominated in theelectoral whichare thefoundations forall thestate'spower,I believeour districts, electoralsystemis also unique.Thisis so becausetheparty does notnominate candidates tobe delegates, theremustbe morethanonecandidate andnotmore thaneight,andtheyarenominated bythepeoplewithout anyparticipation by theparty. The partydoesn'tsay we nominate thiscandidateor thatone; itis thepeoplewho do thenominating. Thatdoesn'texistin anyothercountry. . . . If thepeople werecounterrevolutionary, if themajorityof thepeople werecountedrevolutionary, all theyneed do wouldbe to nominatecounterrevolutionaries and themajority of thedelegateswouldbe counterrevolutionaries opposedto therevolution andsocialism. Itwouldbe difficult to understand howtheCubanparliamentary system functions without takingintoaccountthepoliticalconsequencesofgovernofa plannedsocialisteconomy inginthecontext withneither private property norprofound socialclassdivisionsordifferences. Becauseoftheabsenceof thesefactors, debatesanddecisionsinCuba differ parliamentary fromthose incapitalist Intheparliamentary representative systems. bodiesI studied, the This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 10 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECI1VES agreements, reports, evaluations, and laws thatweredebatedandvotedon to wereusuallynotcharacterized by favoring one sectorof thepopulation thedetriment oftheother.Instead,theproceedings wereusuallyapplicable equallyto theconstituent populationas a whole.An attempt was madeto possible resolveconcernsexpressedby delegatespriorto votingwherever andthusavoida sharply dividedvote.I witnessed onlya fewdividedvotes, and theseonlyat themunicipalassemblylevel.In theNationalAssembly, ofthenationalleadership andbecausethey perhapsbecauseoftheprestige havelackeda base ofsupport amongtheelectorate, deputiesseemreluctant toopposewhatis proposedinformalsessionsorto attempt tosettheirown however,I agenda.Duringmeetingsof NationalAssemblycommissions, tovoiceconcernsandopposition. observedmorewillingness In thesocialisttradition oftheParisCommuneof1871andoftheSoviets of 1905 and 1917,mostofthemunicipal including delegatesI interviewed, thosein leadership delegates positionsandthosewhowerealso provincial and nationaldeputies,came fromworkeror peasantbackgrounds. One reasonforthisrelativeclass homogeneity, important of course,was the of almostall thewealthyof Cuba and a majorportionof the emigration A further middleclass.Another reasonwas neighborhood-level nomination. one is thatitis difficult toserveas municipal forhigher-level professionals labor delegatesbecause of theenormousamountof timethisvoluntary requires.Consequently, mostdelegatesarenotonlyworkers or lower-level of professionals butalso personswell-known byandstrongly representative forfinancialgainor theirconstituencies. Giventheabsenceofopportunity privilegesandthesacrifices involved,citizenswithout a desireto servethe andwithout socialistconsciousness becomedelegates. constituencies rarely THE MUNICIPALASSEMBLY Municipaldelegatesaretheaccesspointandmainlinkbetweenthepeople and theirgovernment and, in largepart,shape the electorate'sattitudes towardthegovernment. tasksis to be directly Amongtheirmostimportant comaccountableto theelectorate -to tryto resolveeveryday problems, plaints,andsuggestions (planteamientos) raisedwiththembytheirconstituentseitherpersonallyor at thebiannualneighborhood meetingscalled assemblies(asambleasde rendicionde cuenta).This is a accountability towhichMarx variant ofthe"instructed-delegate model"(mandatimperatij) on theParisCommune the of1871.Atthesemeetings pointedinhiswritings on themunicipal during delegatesreport assembly'sandtheirownactivities and explainhow thecomtheprevioussix months, presentcrimereports, This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT 11 plaintsand suggestions fromthepriormeetinghave beenhandled.Those andsuggestions. Delegateshaveusually attending thenoffer newcomplaints orat beenable toresolvethemajority oftheconcernsraisedbyconstituents butthesevereeconomicshortages leasttoprovideconvincing explanations, the"specialperiod"since1991 havemadethisincreasingly characterizing Thereis intensecompetition withina provdifficult. amongmunicipalities ofconcerns. incetoresolvethehighest percentage monetary Peopleareawareof theamountofworkdelegatesdo without The personalstyleof thedelegates'workwith remuneration or privileges. evenfamiliaridentification is conduciveto a comfortable, thecommunity towardthepoliticalprocess. withthegovernment and a positiveattitude Ninety-five percentof thoseeligiblevote,and 60-80percentattendstreet andtomeetwiththedelegates,all without meetings tonominate candidates Mostpeopleknowwhotheirdelegatesareand coercionorlegalobligation. basis. Citizensmay are personallyacquaintedwiththemon a first-name discussproblems, including personalones,withtheirdelegatesat anytime, in chanceencounters in thestreetor in theirhomesoroffices.My whether led me to concludethatthisfamiliar observations politicalstyleis in large measurea consequenceof theemphasison equalityin Cubansociety,the ofneighborhood life,andtheneighborhood-level openandpubliccharacter by the nomination of candidatesfortheoffice.It has also beeninfluenced inwhichPresident FidelCastrorelatestothepublic. personalmanner heldbythemunicipal assembly)organize Delegates(assistedbyseminars anddirecttheaccountability assembliesandtransmit citizenconcernstothe stateagencies.Theymustsubmitmonthly tothemunicreports appropriate Theymeet thestatusofcitizenconcerns. ipalassemblysecretary concerning twicea month withrepresentatives andentities to ofgovernment enterprises answersontheseissues,andtheyvisitthecitizens receiveanddiscusswritten involvedathometodiscusstheacceptability Whenanswers ofthoseanswers. are deemedunacceptable, the specificconcernsare raisedagain in the Citizenscananddo appealall the municipal assemblyexecutivecommittee. thoughtheyareencouragedto way to theNationalAssemblyifnecessary, seeklocal solutions. forprojectsandproblems thatariseintheir Delegatesarealso responsible electoraldistricts. For example,theymay coordinatevolunteer workon Sundaystofixtheroofon a localstoreorbuilda sidewalkorhelptoorganize local microbrigades by the central (special workbrigadesadministered to repairhomes.Delegatesalso workcloselywiththemass government) in theneighborhood, suchas theComitesde Defensade la organizations - CDRs) andthe Revolucion(Committees fortheDefenseoftheRevolution This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 12 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES Federacionde MujeresCubanas(Federation ofCubanWomen- FMC), the police, the local Communist partynucleus,local social workers,family doctors,andhealthclinicsto helpsolvelocal socialormedicalproblems. In additiontoattending thesessionsofthemunicipal assembly, delegates in participate permanent commissions oftheassemblythatoverseespecific areas,suchas health,education, commerce, etc.,makingon-siteinspections and writingreports.They attendmeetings,forexample,to discussthe economicplanning process,toreviewmunicipal inpreparation problems for theaccountability assemblies,andtotrytoresolveconstituents' concerns. The municipalassemblymeetsin ordinary sessiontwicea yearand in specialsessionaboutfourtimesa year,eachsessionlastinga dayorless.The municipalassemblyanalyzes,discusses,supervises, monitors, inspects, and controls thesocial,economic, judicial,andpoliticalaffairs ofthemunicipality.It also selectsadministrators forlocal enterprises and entities(suchas storesandpolyclinics) andparticipates informulating themunicipal planand budget,whichit mustapprove.Anotherimportant role is monitoring the performance ofthemunicipality's provincialandnational-level enterprises. The municipalassemblyhas no legislative powers:theselie solelywiththe NationalAssembly. Delegatesto theseassemblieselectan executivecommittee, provincial assembly delegates, andNationalAssembly fromamongcandidates deputies proposedby the municipalcandidacycommission,presidedover by a ofthemunicipal representative branchoftheCommunist andincluding party representatives of themunicipalbranchesof theUnionde JovenesComunistas(Unionof Communist Youth- UJC),theCentralde Trabajadores de - CTC), theFMC, andtheCDRs. There Cuba (CubanWorkers' Federation mustbe at least 25 percentmorecandidatesthanpositions.Municipal delegatescan anddo addcandidatestothelists.The factthatthecandidacy commission is presidedoverbya partyrepresentative does notnecessarily meanthatthepartydominatesit. I attendeda meetingof thecandidacy inPlayatochoosecandidates commission tofillthreevacanciesforprovincial delegate.The mostinfluential was nottheparty personat themeeting butthemunicipal representative representative fromtheCDR, whohadthe mostinformation, garneredfromthe local (block) CDRs, regarding the was nota criterion delegates.Partymilitancy discussed.Onlyoneofthefour candidatesproposedbythecommission andnoneofthethreeelectedwas a militant. The executivecommittee has approximately 15 members, all municipal andothers delegates.Thepresident, withresponsivice-president, secretary, bilityforspecificareasareprofessional members andreceivea salaryfrom themunicipalassembly(approximately whattheyreceivedon theirregular This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT 13 thecandidacycommisjobs). Aftertheelectionoftheexecutivecommittee, sion recommends membersto filltheseprofessional positions,subjectto ratification bytheassembly. InPlaya,weekspriortotheexecutive committee electionthecandidacycommission hadalreadyselectedandinformed those itplannedto appoint, butsometimes thecandidatesrecommended forprofessionalpositions failtobe electedtotheexecutivecommittee. Thepercentage ofpartymembers amongmembers ofexecutivecommittees,provincial delegates, andNationalAssemblydeputiesis usuallyhigher The thanthepercentageof municipaldelegateswho are partymilitants. recommendation formunicipalassemblypresident, madebythecandidacy commissionand ratified by themunicipalassembly,is approvedby the memprovincial party, andtherecommendations fortheotherprofessional of bersareapprovedbythemunicipal party. The president, beinga member Howthemunicipal partypoliticalbureau,is certainto be a partymilitant. ever,inPlaya,forexample,severalnonparty delegateshavebeenelectedto professional positions. The executivecommittee, meeting everyotherweek,actsforthemunicipalassemblybetweensessions,andall actionstakenandresolutions passed In fact,thereport of oftheactivities by itmustbe ratified bytheassembly. theexecutivecommittee is usuallyone ofthemostintensely debateditems on the agenda.The executivecommittee sets the agendaformunicipal bothsubjectto the assemblysessionsand appointslocal administrators, approvaloftheassembly. The municipalassembly'scommissionsreportfirstto the executive committee andthento theassembly.Commission andleadership members are chosenby theexecutivecommittee, whichalso setstheagendas.The majority ofcommission members aredelegates,buttherearealso volunteer membersfromthecommunity chosenamongcitizenswithexpertisein a field.Thepresident ofeachcommission particular is alwaysa delegate.Each commission is chargedwithinvestigating, inspecting, andwriting commentariesandcritiques on reports presented to themunicipal assemblybystate Itreviewsthecitizenproposalsthatfallwithinits organswithinitspurview. area and visitsthetargets of complaints and thecitizenswho makethem. inPlaya,a delegatefromthecommerce Duringan inspection ofrestaurants and gastronomy commission checkedthekitchen, foodstorageareas,and bathrooms forcleanliness, verified thatthefoodlistedonthemenuwasbeing offered, questionedthecustomersaboutthequalityof thefood and the service,andreviewedtherestaurant's recordswithitsadministrator. During I observed,commission anotherinspection members toureda dentalclinic in Bauta,questionedpatientsand dentists, and metwithadministrators to discusssomeproblems thathadcometothecommission's attention. This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 14 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES Throughout the representative systembut especiallyat themunicipal level,greatimportance is giventocitizencomplaints. Themunicipal assemblyexecutivecommittee, aidedbytheprovincial government, spendsa great deal of effortpreparingfor and evaluatingthe biannualaccountability assemblies.The municipaland provincialgovernments and themunicipal to theseassembliesto appraiseand to suggest partysend representatives improvements to thedelegate,and representatives of stateenterprises and involvedin citizenconcernsattendto respondto citizens' anyenterprises questions.The municipalassemblysecretary writesa monthly to the report executivecommittee theresolution ofconcerns, listedaccording regarding tocategory, arisingfromthepriorassembliesandproducesa biannualreport theaccountability evaluating also evaluate process.Assemblycommissions thisprocess.Thecitizenwhoraisesan issuereceivesvisitsathishomefrom a representative of theenterprise or entityinvolved,(in someinstances)a member of thecorresponding assemblycommission, andhislocal delegate to verifythathe has receivedan answerand is satisfied.The level of resolution ofsuchissuesis 60-95percent. Citizencomplaints(quejas), usuallyof a moreindividualnature,are deliveredinpersonorbyletter totheofficesofthemunicipal The assembly. president readsall theletters andthereports ofthepersonalinterviews. The municipal government, bylaw,mustrespondtocomplaints within60 days; withthisrequirement compliance is checkedbytheprovincial assemblyand also bytheNationalAssembly. A quarterly on complaints report goes tothe executivecommittee ofthemunicipalassemblyandan annualreport tothe municipalandprovincial assemblies. The municipalofficeof planningandbudgetis underthecontrolofthe municipalassemblyandreceivesinputsmainlyfromtheprofessional membersof theexecutivecommittee (it is usuallythevice-president who is in chargeof economicaffairs)and the administrators and unionsof local entities. Thisofficethendrawsup themunicipal economicplanandbudget, whichmustbe approved,together witha reportfromtheassembly'seconomiccommission, bythemunicipal assemblydelegates.Citizenproposals weighheavilyininvestment decisionsfortheeconomicplan.Recommendationsforthelocalplanandbudgetaresenttotheprovincial government and then,as partoftheprovincial planandbudget, tothecentral planning board. Afterthenationaleconomicplan and budgetis approvedby theNational Assembly,the finalfigures,whichincludefundsforinvestments to be decidedon by themunicipality, aresentbackdownto themunicipality for approvaland implementation. The commissionand assemblydebatesI reviewedregarding plans and budgetson all threelevels were minimal. This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT 15 may Relativeabsenceof debateat this(and higher)levelsof government reflectinsufficient knowledgeof economicmatters, a problembeingdealt withthrough videotapesand seminars.At one assemblysessionin Playa, ofthebudgettowritehisreportin a delegatesaskedthemunicipal director moreaccessiblestyle. The notionthatthemunicipalassemblieslack powerbecausethemost important economicactivitiesare not undertheircontrolis erroneous. Although themajorbranches oftheCubaneconomyandeconomicplanning and needs exare undernationaland provincialcontrol,thesuggestions intheformulation aregivenseriousconsideration pressedbymunicipalities can and do vetoproposed of provincialand nationalplans.Municipalities themunicipal locationsforprojectsinvolvedin theseplans.Furthermore, andmuofplanning, directors executivecommittee members, professional the nicipalassemblycommissions monitor performance, plan fulfillment, enterprises and laborsupply, andtheprofitability ofnationalandprovincial andreport tothemunicipal entities locatedintheirmunicipality periodically concern theoperations assembly. Onereasonforthemunicipality's regarding withinits boundariesis thatit sharesin theirprofits.If problemsare identified, themunicipal vice-president informs boththelocaladministrators In Bauta, the only complete and the provincialor nationalauthorities. ofthelargeAriguanabo textile monitoring plant,whichis runbytheMinistry is donebythemunicipality. InPalmira, thesugarrefineries ofLightIndustry, arerunbythecentral butoversight andday-to-day management government, In Playa,a director aremainlyperformed ofthe bythemunicipalassembly. provincialfruit-and-vegetable-distributing entitywas caughtlyingduring questioning bydelegatesina municipal assemblysession,andas a resulthis of was rejectedandthenextdayhe was replaced.LatertheMinister report came to the municipalgovernment's officeto see how the Agriculture distribution systemcouldbe improved. Forsocialservicessuchas health, andtransportation, policyis education, set at the nationallevel, but the municipalassemblyis responsiblefor forunitslocated personnel, performance, problem solving,andconstruction in themunicipality. Duringa campaignin CityofHavanaProvincein 1987 and 1988 in whichmicrobrigades built104 newnursery schools,theconstruction was closelycoordinated and monitored members by professional ofthemunicipal executivecommittees. In 1989, people's councils(consejospopulares)were added to some inaneffort municipalities tomakethegovernment moreaccessibleandmore tothoselivingfarfrom offices. Sincethen responsive themunicipal assembly in toall municipalitiesCityofHavanaProvinceand theyhavebeenextended This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 16 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES are beingintroduced all overthecountry. Theygroupapproximately 15 electoraldistricts andincludethemunicipal of delegatesandrepresentatives themassorganizations andstateenterprises in thearea.The councilpresidentsand sometimes also vice-presidents, electedby thedelegateson the forthecouncils. council,mustbe delegatesandworkfull-time The emphasison theclosenessof thestateand thepeople places the context. people'scouncilinthesocialisttheoretical A historical precedent for itcanbe foundinthedeputygroupsoftheformer SovietUnion.Itsprimary citizencompurposeis torespondtolocal issues-corruption, inefficiency, - quicklyat the local level, withthe minimum plaintsand concerns of considerable bureaucracy. Councilshavebeengranted authority, including therightto handlelocal economiccrimessuchas foodhoardingand the instateenterprises andto intervene underprovinbribing ofstoremanagers cial or nationalcontrol.I spentthedaywitha delegatefromtheSantaFe ofthedistrict's sectioninPlayawhowasthepresident people'scouncil.Santa a feeling councils Fe isphysically setapart, whichaccentuates ofcommunity; lackingthishistoric senseof community havebeenless successful.It was clearthatmostpeopleknewthepresident andthatthecouncilhadbrought A fewdayspriortomyarrival, to thecommunity. a severetropical benefits low hadcausedflooding, somehouseshavingbeenwashedoutto sea, and he was clearlyinchargeofthecleanupeffort. Accordingto NationalAssemblyPresidentJuanEscalona,significant changesare beingproposedforthemunicipalassemblies,withtheroleof thepartyreducedconsiderably. is to be elected The candidacycommission oftheparty; bymunicipal delegatesandnolongertoincludea representative thepartyis no longertohavea say inselecting andthepresident is officers, no longertobe a member oftheparty'smunicipal bureau.Officers aretobe electedby thedelegatesfromamongthemselves. However,therestof the executivecommittee is tobe replacedbyanadministrative unitcomposedof expertsinthefield,whomayormaynotbe delegatesbutwillbe ratified by thedelegates.Theaimhereis toensuremoreexpertise forthoseinchargeof health, education, commerce, etc.,andtomaketheroleofmunicipal delegate moreone of oversightand controlof theseactivities.Furthermore, the municipalassemblycommissions areto be strengthened andmadeanswerable totheassemblyrather thantotheexecutivecommittee. thereis Finally, a commitment to strengthen theroleof themunicipalassembly, especially inrelation to theprovincial assemblyandtoentities andenterprises located inthemunicipality thatarecontrolled bytheprovince ora nationalministry. Themunicipal assembliesarethelevelofgovernment thattakesthemost in discovering initiative and resolvingproblemsand satisfying theneeds expressedbythepeople.Becauseoftheopennomination procedure, voters This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT 17 tendto identify closelywiththeirmunicipaldelegates.Throughdirect, competitive election, delegatesaredirectly responsible totheirelectors.The people'scouncilshavestrengthened assembliesandbrought municipal them closerto thepeople.The majorityof provincialassemblydelegatesand NationalAssemblydeputiesare also municipaldelegates.The municipal ofthechainbywhichnationalpolicyis formulated. delegateis thebeginning THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY Provincial delegatesareelectedbythemunicipal assembliesfromamong of Thepresidents candidates recommended bytheircandidacy commissions. municipalassembliesare ex officioprovincialdelegates.The provincial andsocialand assemblycontrolsanddirectsthestateeconomicenterprises serviceentitiesunderprovincialcontroland helps monitorthoseunder nationalcontrol.It formulates and approvesprovincialeconomicplans theworkof the and budgetsand aids,inspects,monitors, and coordinates province'smunicipalassemblies.It holdstworegularsessionsand several extraordinary sessionsperyear. The provincialassemblyis similarin its organization and operating procedure tothemunicipal assembly. Provincial delegateselectanexecutive fromcandidates committee proposedbya provincial candidacycommission. The executivecommittee carrieson theworkof the assemblybetween be approvedby sessions,and itsactionsandresolutions mustsubsequently thedelegates.Executivecommittee members areusuallynotalso municipal delegates,butmostarenotsalariedbytheprovincial government. Theprovincial assemblyis muchless likelythanthemunicipality totake initiatives and morelikelytoworkwiththemunicipalities oftheprovince, assistance providing whenrequested. Itis thelinkbetweenthemunicipalities andthenationalgovernment. Becauseofthespecialurbancharacteristics of whichis subdivided intoseveralmunicipalities, its CityofHavanaProvince, provincialassemblydirectly controlsentities, suchas transportation, films, and theaqueduct,thatin otherprovincesare undermunicipalcontroland thusis necessarily also morea government of directinitiatives regarding theseservicesand economicplanning.Officersand functionaries of the provincial assemblyperiodically visitmunicipalities to inspectandtointerview delegatesand issue reports on themunicipalgovernments' activities andneeds,including thoseofthedelegatesandtheorgansundermunicipal control.The municipalexecutivecommittee also issuesperiodicreports to theprovincial assemblyexecutivecommittee andthemunicipal assemblyto theprovincial assembly. This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 18 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES Complaintsat the provinciallevel are handledby a functionary who makesa biannualinspection of all themunicipalities in theprovinceand issuesa quarterly report basedon theinformation receivedfromthem.The report contains numbers ofcomplaints bymunicipality andcategory andhow manyhavebeenresolved.Thepersonwhohandlescitizensuggestions issues similarreports. The provincialassemblieshelpto preparemunicipaldelegatesfortheir biannualaccountability assemblies. Theprofessional members oftheprovincial executivecommittee readall thesuggestions receivedfrom the municipalities to theirareas of and the complaintsthatcorrespond responsibility and,ifnecessary, workwiththemunicipalities toresolvethem. InCityofHavanaProvince, giventhelargenumber ofproposals(over30,000 ateachbiannualassembly), theexecutive committee studiesthemaccording to thenumberscompiledin each categoryand concentrates on resolving thosethatcorrespond tothegreatest collectiveneeds. The commissionsof the provincialassembliesworkwithprovincial that andentities andreceivetheproposalsfrom themunicipalities enterprises andto correspond to theirareasofresponsibility to monitor theirresolution visitthecitizensinvolved.Theyalsocoordinate areasofmunicipal concern. Forexample,theeducationcommission ofCityofHavanaProvincevisited nurseryschools (undermunicipalcontrol)to check on enrollment and withthegoal ofmakingfulluseofall theschoolsintheprovince. attendance As is thecase withthemunicipal arenot someofthemembers commissions, delegates. donebydepartDevelopment ofprovincial economicplansandbudgets, evalumentsundertheprovincial assembly, consistsmainlyofassembling, whicharethenadded themunicipal ating,andcombining plansandbudgets, totheinvestments totheprovince. Almost andexpensesrelatedspecifically all thediscretionary levelareatthemunicipal investments belowthenational in formulating level. The provincialassemblyparticipates and adjusting municipal plansandbudgetsandalso providesinputtothecentralplanning withregardto needsintheprovince. department THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NationalAssemblydeputiesare electedby municipalassembliesfrom andapprovedby amongcandidatesselectedbythecandidacycommissions thecentral oftheparty. committee Therearetwoseparatecandidate lists,one madeup ofmunicipaldelegatesandtheotherofmoreorless distinguished thosewithimportant citizens,including government and/or partyposts,and This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT 19 celebrities, forexample,insportsandthearts.Themajority ofdeputies (about 54 percent) electedarefromthemunicipal delegatelist,whichgivessignificantrepresentation inthehighest organofCubanrepresentative government todelegateswhohaveveryclosetiestothepeopleandwhoarealso themost andactivedeputies).Mostdeputiesreceiveno payandregularly outspoken assembliesthatelectedthem,to which attendthesessionsofthemunicipal theymustreport periodically. Municipalassemblieshavethepowerofrecall is thatmostcitizens(espeoverdeputiestheyhaveelected.My observation ciallyinurbanareas),whileawareoftheNationalAssemblydebates(which inthepressandhavebeencarriedliveontelevision), arethoroughly reported do notknowwhotheirNationalAssembly deputiesare,sincecitizensdo not electdeputiesand thusdeputiesmainlyreportand respondto the directly municipal assemblies. selectedby NationalAssembly deputieselect,fromamongthecandidates of theNational a candidacycommission madeup of deputies,theofficers theCouncilof Ministers AssemblyandtheCouncilof Stateandalso ratify and theleadershipof bothcouncils(includingthecombinedpositionof President oftheCouncilofStateandCouncilofMinisters, heldby currently FidelCastro).Incontrast tosimilarelectionsonthemunicipal andprovincial levels,thisone offers no choiceamongcandidates, who arepreselected by thepartyleadership. The NationalAssembly'schargeis to control, inspect,and monitor the nationalgovernment ministries andstateorgans,including thejudiciaryand theattorney general'soffice,andto supervisethelocal Organsof People's Power,primarily ontheprovincial level.TheNationalAssembly doesnotset long-range national policygoals(thisisconsidered tobe theroleoftheparty), norhas itdebatedordiscussedforeign policy. OnlytheNationalAssemblyhas legislativepowers.While individual deputiesmayproposelaws, deputieshave neitherthetime(theyare not professional politicians) northestaff orothernecessary support togivethem sufficient independence forthis.Legislativeinitiatives or proposalshave comemainlyfromministries andnongovernmental entities suchas theCTC ortheFMC. TheCommunist (forlaborlegislation) partyreviewsall legislationpriorto presentation to theNationalAssembly.Ministry officialsthen workwiththecorresponding assemblycommission to drafta finalversion, and thecommission draftsitscommentary. Duringthisprocesssubstantial changesarepossible(as, forexample,happenedduring thediscussionofthe newpenalcode in theconstitutional affairs commission in 1988). Ministry officials thenmeetwithdeputiesfromeachprovince toexplaintheproposals andanswerquestions. This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 20 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECrTVES NationalAssemblysessionslastfortwoto threedaysandareheldtwice a year,extrasessionsbeingconvenedifnecessary(one was calledseveral yearsago). Deputiesdebateandvoteonproposedlaws,reports, andNational Assemblycommissions' commentaries and critiquesmaderegarding these reportsand proposedlegislation. The assemblydiscussesand approvesat each sessionthereports ofa province, ofa government ministry, andofthe prosecutors andjudiciarybranches. It votes,usuallywithout debate,on the nationaleconomicplanandbudgetandthereports oftheCouncilofState(a bodythatrepresents thelegislature betweensessions)and theCouncilof Ministers. The lackofdebateon theeconomicplanandbudgetis duetothe complexity ofthematerial andthefactthatdeputiesaregivenonlysynopses, ofthe usuallyonlyon thedayofthevote.The lackofdebateon thereports Councilof Stateand theCouncilof Ministers in partto can be attributed forexample,the textsof the deputies'almosttotallack of information; decreeslistedforapprovalarenotmadeavailabletothem. ThedutiesofmostdeputiesconsistlargelyofworkonNationalAssembly Hereagaintherelative commissions. ofdeputies whoaremunicimportance ipal delegatesemerges;manyof thedeputieswho are notalso municipal delegateshavehighgovernment positionsandtherefore rarelyhavetimeto inthecommissions. participate Thismeansthatmunicipal delegates/deputies do thebulkoftheworkon thecommissions, andthishasleftopenforthem important commission postssuchas thepresidency of thepowerful constitutionalaffairs commission or thecommission on local Organsof People's Power. Thecommissions undertake andreport theirfindings tothe investigations NationalAssemblyandpreparecommentaries on reports andproposedlaws to be debatedduringtheNationalAssemblysessions.Annualcommission agendasare setby theNationalAssemblypresidency. The commission on global economicactivitiescommentson thenationaleconomicplan and The constibudgetandhas conducted surveyson thequalityofproduction. affairs tutional commission issuescommentaries to on proposedlegislation thatthereis no conflict withtheCubanconstitution verify laws. or existing It has produceda report suggesting newmethods fordealingwithproposed legislation thatwouldstrengthen theroleofthecommissions andofpopular The commissionon local organsof People's Powermakes consultations. on-siteinspectionsto preparecommentaries on the biannualreportsof provincialassembliesto theNationalAssembly. Membersof thiscommismountainous discovered sion,uponvisiting regionsofLas TunasProvince, thatthoselivingin isolatedareas were not receivingmilk,and at their insistence local dairieswereestablished. This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT 21 Debates in theNationalAssemblyare characterized by thepursuitof consensus,andvotesarealmostalwaysunanimous. Whenitis evidentthat thereis strongdisagreement on an issue,itis usuallywithdrawn forfurther study(as happened, forexample,witha debateon measuresto ensurethat divorcedhusbandspaid alimonyand childsupport).It is evidentduring debatethatthereis nofearofexpressing differences andthatthesedifferences lead to compromises. Forexample,manydeputiesfoundcertainaspectsof thenewpenalcodetoolenient(finesforminorthefts) ortooharsh(penalties forteenagegirlswho hidetheirpregnancy fromtheirfamiliesand subsequentlykill theirnewborns).It is also evidentthatthereis pressureon invoting,especiallyduringformalsessions.Dissentis deputiesto conform morecommonincommission meetings (wheremostdeputiesaremunicipal delegates). Escalonaspokeat lengthof changesat thislevelto be presented to the NationalAssembly forapproval.Onemajorproposalwas direct, competitive electionsforprovincial assemblydelegatesandNationalAssemblydeputies. Thenominations wouldbe madebythemunicipal assemblieson thebasisof therecommendations oftheircandidacycommissions, andcandidates would no longerrequiretheapprovalof theparty.Escalonarecognizedthatsome sortofcampaign wouldbe neededforthevoterstogettoknowthecandidates, althoughhe firmly rejectedpoliticalcampaignsbased on attacksand false promises(politiqueria). This approachwouldmakedeputiesmoreclosely identified withthemunicipalities fromwhichtheywereelectedand better knownbythevoters. The NationalAssemblyitselfwouldundergo profound reform. Escalona spokeoftheneedtoendmeaningless formal from practices, manyborrowed theformer SovietUnion,suchas thepressure forunanimous votes.He also spoke of the need to strengthen the role of the NationalAssembly.Its commissions wouldbe restructured, and commission presidents wouldbe professional and no longerlinked(as has sometimes beenthecase) to the ministries thattheircommissionssupposedlyoversee.Furthermore, they wouldapprovelegislation beforeitwas presented totheNationalAssembly. The NationalAssemblywouldplay a greaterrole in economicplanning. Escalonaconsidersthewholesystemofplanning in termsofspecifictimeframes(one-yearplans,five-year plans,etc.) a disastrous inheritance from theearliersocialistcountries thathas madeit impossiblefortheNational Assemblyto considerand debateeconomicmatters. Finally,and perhaps mostimportant, a needis recognized forthedevelopment ofpoliticalstructuresandpractices inpreparation forthetimewhenFidelCastrois nolonger theleaderof theCubanRevolution. His tremendous anddominant prestige This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 22 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECI1VES have resultedin nationalleadershipselectionprocedures -for personality example,noncompetitive electionsfortheCouncilofStateanditsleadership -which forall practicalpurposescannotbe changedwhilehe is stillableto exerciseleadership. THE ORGANS OF PEOPLE'S POWER AND POPULAR RULE The willofthepeopleis expressedthrough municipaldelegatesbecause withtheirconstituents, oftheirclosecontact reinforced bytheneighborhood nomination procedureand the accountability assemblies.The municipal of theprovincial assemblyofficers andthemajority delegatesandnational deputiescomefromtheranksofthesemunicipal delegates.Thismeansthat at all levelsof thesystemtherearepeoplewho arebestable to understand andexpresstheneedsandconcernsofthepeople.Withall theirdrawbacks, theindirect electionsforprovincialand nationalrepresentatives do ensure thatdirectly electedmunicipaldelegates,who areusuallyunknown outside oftheirelectoraldistricts, constitute themajority atthehigherlevels,atthe sametimestrengthening theroleofthemunicipal assemblies. Importance is giventothepeople'svoicethrough theresponsibility ofthe Cubangovernment torespondtothesuggestions andcomplaints ofcitizens A suggestion notonlyon theindividual levelbutcollectively. orcomplaint is an individualact or,at most,thecollectiveact of thosepresentat an buttakentogether accountability assembly, Cubanpoliticsand theyinfluence thatthe officersof the policy.Fromthisit is clear why it is important municipaland provincialassembliesbe familiarwiththesuggestions and ofthembe distributed atall complaints arisingintheirareasandthatreports levelsofgovernment. Information on theneedsandopinionsof thepeopleis also funneled to themunicipalassembliesby themunicipalpartyorganization through the Estadode Opinion,a monthly report compiledattheprovincial andnational levelsbypartymembers on anonymous opinionsoverheard on thestreet, in andelsewhere. markets, Publicopinionpollingis also donebythepartyand bytheCubanInstitute forConsumer ResearchandDemandGuidance.The information fromthesevarioussourcesregarding citizens'problemsand demandsstrongly influences municipalpolicy-making and economicplanning.Theexecutivecommittee professionals lettheplanning officeknowof theneedsexpressedbytheelectorate so thattheycan be takenintoconsideration.I was shownevidenceof supermarkets, agromarkets, bakeries, This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT 23 commercial centers, housing, andbuildingrepairsthathadbeenincludedin local economicplansthrough thisprocess.Proposalsaresentto thelevelto whichtheycorrespond, at each level and statistics on themare distributed andthusalsoinfluence investments attheprovincial andnationallevels.The in CienfuegosProvinceandthenewhospitalplannedfor newmilkfactory Playaareexamplesofdevelopments suggested bycitizens. THE ROLE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY Perhapsleastunderstood is theroleof thevanguardpartyin relationto theOrgansofPeople'sPowerandtothepossibility ofrepresentative governmentin a one-party state.It is said thatthe partyis the antithesisof representative government andthatthemoreitis involvedthelessrepresentativethegovernment necessarilywill be. It is said thatthe higherthe of delegateswho arepartymilitants theless representative and percentage responsiveis theassembly.It is said thatthepartytellstherepresentatives who are militants how to voteandwhatto do and,through thecandidacy commissions andthenomenclature maintains totalcontroloverthe system, leadershipand the compositionof assemblies.Since the partysets the societalgoals,itis said thatithas so muchpoweras to deprive long-range theorgansofPeople'sPowerofanyimportance. I believethatmyresearch providesa challengetotheseclaims. The principalroleof theCommunist partyis meantto be political- to of a socialistsocietyand a stimulate, guide,and promotethedevelopment In socialistdevelopment, consciouspopulacewithsocialistconsciousness. nessto a largeextentreplacesthecapitalist market andtheprofit motivein theadministration of andcoordination ofproduction andinthemanagement labor.Socialistconsciousness, whiledifficult to implant,implement, and spread,is one of the principalelementsthatmakes socialisttransition possible.In Cuba, it is clearlythe partythatis best able to createand encouragesocialistconsciousness;itsmilitants are supposedlyselectedin parton thebasis of theirconsciousness, and it encompassesall levelsof societalandgovernmental structure. One important rolethepartyplaysis helpingthedelegatesandespecially theleadership workwiththeprofescarryouttheirfunctions. Partyofficials sionalmunicipaland provincialexecutivecommittee membersin solving problems,bothlocal and national.In themunicipality of Cienfuegos, for ofthemunicipalpartypromisedat a sessionof example,thefirstsecretary themunicipalassemblytohelppressure theadministrators ofenterprises to This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 24 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES resolvetheremaining citizenconcerns. In Playatheprofessional executive committee memberin chargeof commerceand thepresident of thecommercecommission workedwitha specialpartycommission setup as partof therectification campaignto improveservices.In Bauta thelocal party officialassignedto a specificspheresuchas educationmeetsmonthly with thecorresponding municipal executive andthoseinthemunicipality member whoruntheofficeofeducation. Partyrepresentatives inseminars participate fordelegates.The partyneighborhood nuclei,composedmainlyof housewives and retirees, help local delegatesin taskssuch as preparation for accountability assemblies.Municipalpartyrepresentatives attendthese meetingsand evaluatehow theywereconducted.The partynucleiof the workplacesof themunicipalgovernment criticizeprofessional executive committee members forfallingdownon (mostofwhomarepartymembers) thejob butdo notinstruct themhowtovoteorwhatto do. The party,in fact,does not tell delegatesor deputieswho are party militants howtovoteorwhattodo. As militants, ofcourse,theyarebound to thepartyprogram and agreements, buttheseconsistmainlyof general, long-term strategies andguidelinesand havelittlerelationto theeveryday debates,votes,decisions,andworkofdelegatesanddeputies.WhenI asked municipalandprovincial delegateswhowerepartymembers aboutresolutionspassedat recentlocal partyassemblies,onlythemunicipalassembly as membersof themunicipalpartybureau,had everevenread presidents, them.NationalAssemblydeputies, almostall ofwhomarepartymilitants, weremoreawareof thepublishedresolutions passedat therecentnational buttheseresolutions partycongress, hadlittleapplicability totheirspecific tasksor votesas deputies.The municipalandprovincialdelegatesI interviewed,includingthosewho werealso professional executivecommittee members, NationalAssemblydeputies, andpresidents ofNationalAssembly all toldme thatthepartydoes nottryto tellthemwhatto do commissions, withregardto theirgovernmental roles.The partydoes notact differently towarda delegatewho is nota militant. I observedamongdelegatesno measurabledifferences in attitudeand behaviorbased solelyuponparty militancy. 60 percent Approximately ofthemunicipal delegatesarepartymembers, notthrough partymanipulation butbecausetheyarenominated andelected In neighborhood bytheirconstituents. nominating meetings thatI attended, partymembership was mentioned whenapplicable,alongwiththeother merits ofthenominee, bythepersonmakingthenomination andlistedinthe official ofthecandidate biography butnothighlighted as themostimportant criterion. Thepercentage ofpartymembers mayalso be highbecause,given This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT 25 thegreatamountofvolunteer workinvolvedinbeinga delegate,thosewith the strongest ideologicalcommitment tendto be partymembersand are ofpartymemamongthemostlikelytoacceptnomination. The percentage berselectedto themunicipalexecutivecommittees as provincialdelegates andas NationalAssemblydeputiesis usuallyhigherthanthepercentage of municipal delegates. Althoughthepartyhas no role in choosingcandidatesformunicipal inhaving ifthepartyhadaninterest delegate,ina fewcases inpastelections, someoneserveas a professional memberof themunicipalexecutivecommitteeit could tryto have thatpersonnominated. It would thenstillbe necessary forthatpersontobe electedintheelectoraldistrict andelectedas - an eventuality well by thedelegatesto theexecutivecommittee by no meanscertain. Beginning withtheelectionsofspring1989,thistypeofparty intervention hasceased. Insteadofantagonism thereseemstobe betweenpartyandgovernment, a spiritofworking andreaching together agreement. Especiallyon thelocal onwhathadbeenthepractice level,Jeffrey Hahn's(1988: 259) commentary intheformer SovietUnionholdstrueforCuba:"formostissuesresolvedby local government theneedforpartyauthority simplydoes notarise.Only whentherearejurisdictional disputesbetweengovernmental and nongovernmental agencies,or withinthebureaucracy, wouldthepartycommittee be likelyto getdirectly involved."The municipalassemblyleadersI met, mostof whomwere militants, were,however,firmwithregardto their Whendisagreements do occurthatcannotbe resolvedat the autonomy. municipallevel,eitherthegovernment prevailsor theissueis raisedat the provinciallevel. Speakingat a provincewide seminarforlocal assembly commission members, oftheCommunist JorgeLezcano,thefirstsecretary partyfortheCityofHavana,criticized theworkofthecommissions. Many withhimandmadetheirdisagreement delegatesdisagreed known,andatthe followingsessionof theprovincialassemblyLezcano feltit necessaryto hisremarks. clarify Representatives ofthepartywhoarenotdelegatesmust be granted permission bythedelegatestospeakatan assembly session.Other practices regarding partyparticipation varyamongmunicipalities. In Bauta, thesecondsecretary ofthemunicipal partyis invited, alongwitha representativeofthemunicipalCFC, totheexecutivecommittee meetings. Theroleofthepartyis greatest intheNationalAssembly. Here,inaddition to approving proposedlegislationbeforeit is submitted, it has important influence in settingtheagendasof theNationalAssembly, theCouncilof andapprovesthecandidates State,andthecommissions forNationalAssemblypresident, andsecretary, fortheCouncilofState,andfor vice-president, This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 26 LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES NationalAssemblydeputy. It is at thislevelthattheoverlapbetweenparty and stateleadershipis thegreatestand theseparation betweenpartyand government leastclear. Escalonawas adamantabouttheneedtoreducetheroleofthepartyand emphasizeitspoliticalrole.To thisendtheparty'sbureaucracy hasbeencut in half.Clearly,itscontroloverleadershipselectionhas beenlimited.No longerwillthemunicipal partyunithavea parallelstructure tothemunicipal assembly executive committee, andthiswilldrastically reducethepossibility ofitsinterfering inthelatter. CONCLUSION In seekingto understand representative government in Cuba,one must firsttakeintoaccountitsprincipalobjectives:transmitting voterdemands and overseeingeconomicactivity. Its strengths have been thequalityand dedication ofthemunicipal delegatesandtheircloserelation andidentification withtheirelectorate.Developingits potentialfurther dependson - thelevelclosestto thevoters - and strengthening themunicipal assembly makingtheNationalAssemblya moreeffective andindependent legislative body.It also dependson thematuration ofthepoliticalcultureandcapacity forleadershipof theCubanworkingclass,whoseexperiencein political leadership andcontrol inCubabeganonlywiththe1959revolution andwas institutionalized onlyin 1976. The changesproposedin 1991 by thefourth congressof thepartyand thoseanticipated by Escalonago a longwaytowardimproving theOrgans ofPeople'sPoweratthemunicipalandnationallevelsbybuildingon their fundamental andbyfurther strengths delimiting therolesofthegovernment andtheparty. Thepeople'scouncilsnowbeingorganized enhance nationally the role of the municipaldelegatewhile broadeningand deepeningthe connection betweencitizensandtheirrepresentatives. Themunicipal assemaretobe givenincreasedimportance inordertoserveas an blycommissions effective to thenewlystructured counterpart executivecommittee, whichis tobecomean administrative unitcomposedofexperts. Thelinkagebetween thepartyandthemunicipal assemblyhasbeenconsiderably weakened,and theroleof themunicipaland provincial partyin candidateand leadership selectionforthemunicipalassemblyhas been eliminated. with Similarly, regard totheNationalAssembly, theparty is nolongertoapprovecandidates. Direct,competitive electionsfordeputyanda strengthening ofthecommissionsopenthewayformakingtheNationalAssemblya moreindependent This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Roman/REPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT 27 and effective bodyforlegislation, governmental monitoring andoversight, andeconomicplanning. A socialistparliamentary systemcan be effective and representative without oppositional politicsanda multiparty systemandwithout electoral campaignsof the typeknownin capitalistdemocracies.This ultimately dependson popularsupport fora socialisteconomicandsocial systemand theperception thattherepresentative systemworksto ensureits fairand effective implementation. Italsodependsona vanguard thathasearned party therespectofthepeoplewhosepurposeis to helpfulfill thesegoals. REFERENCES Castro,Fidel 1989"Thirty yearsoftheCubanRevolution," inFidelCastro, InDefenseofSocialism:Four Speecheson the30thAnniversary NewYork:Pathfinder Press. oftheCubanRevolution. Hahn,Jeffrey W. 1988 SovietGrassroots:CitizenParticipationin Local SovietGovernment. Princeton: Princeton University Press. This content downloaded from 128.227.158.41 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 05:08:07 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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