1. No category

POLITIK
@UNSW
RESPONSE
& RECOVERY
ISSUE 1
MAY 2015
ISSUE 1 • MAY 2015
Editorial Team:
Uzma Sherieff
Max Newman
Megan Fung
Matthew Wilkinson
Andrew Blackie
Amelia Haigh
Veronica Mason
Sharanya Srikanth
Design & Illustration
Lingsi Lu
www.behance.net/Lingsi
Supported by:
UNSW Law
2
Dear reader,
Welcome back to Politik. With this first issue of 2015, we are proud to launch another year of
cross-disciplinary student research and comment, and we remain grateful for the support and
contributions that enable us to do so.
The theme of this issue, ‘Response & Recovery’, follows a trend in global discussion. As we settle in to
2015, the international community has already experienced several critical moments that have pushed us to
re-evaluate our collective capacities and goals. From the string of asylum seeker fatalities sparking debate
in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, to the devastating aftermath of the earthquakes in Nepal, the capacity
of states and non-state actors to collaborate and create effective solutions to global problems is being
tested with urgency. The international community is increasingly pressed to ‘respond’ and ‘recover’ from
moments of instability in a timely and efficient way.
In this issue, our talented student contributors propose an array of solutions as to how we can best respond
to and recover from some of the key challenges facing international security, stability and health in 2015.
The need to respond to non-traditional security threats is well canvassed in this issue by articles
addressing hybrid warfare (p. 15), transnational crime (p. 19) and state fragility (p. 11). The limit to the role
the international community can play in ensuring human security, however, is brought to light over the
question of applying the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine in North Korea (p. 4).
As we stretch our limits, border and resource disputes are growing points of instability. The focal role that
regional cooperation must play in resolving these is highlighted by our authors examining maritime ‘joint
development agreements’ (p. 50) and the contentious preservation of the Dead Sea (p. 26).
Meanwhile, the question of how best to combat the spread of the Ebola virus in West Africa has followed
us into 2015. This issue features an interview with Emilie Fourrey, a Médecins Sans Frontières fieldworker
who recently worked on the medical response to Ebola in Liberia. She shares her thoughts on the
effectiveness of the international response to the epidemic (p. 42).
Finally, it is worth remembering that today’s global dilemmas often require multifaceted solutions. Our
book review analyses the latest work of celebrated Canadian activist and writer Naomi Klein, This Changes
Everything, in which she proposes that our ability to respond to climate change ultimately hinges on our
capacity to reform the prevailing global economic order (p. 53).
This issue hopes to offer an insight into the paths forward for resolving some of today’s critical challenges,
and the hurdles that remain. We hope you enjoy the following articles that showcase a wealth of original
student research and thought at UNSW.
Uzma Sherieff
Editor-in-Chief
Politik
4
So What? Why the Responsibility to Protect Matters for North Korea
Asia-Pacific
Jawoon Kim
7
Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims: The Dangers of an Uneven Transition
Mitchell Buckingham
11
Recovery and Fragile Peace in Nagaland, Northeast India
Matthew Wilkinson
15
Responding to Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine
Europe
Ewen Levick
19
Combatting Transnational Crime and Terrorism: A Global Problem for a United Europe
Lewis Graham
20
Responding to the Occupation of the Palestinian Territories:
Disillusionment Within the Israeli Defence Force
Middle East
& Africa
Amelia Haigh
26
Strategies to Depoliticise the Preservation of the Dead Sea
Vijay Prakash
30
Is There a Future for Tunisian Democracy?
Rose Vassel
34
United States Neo-Isolationism:
The Impacts of Economic Recovery for US Regional Alliances
Americas
Michael Chi
38
A Tsunami of Ageing:
How Will Low- and Middle-Income Countries Respond to the Rising Tide of Dementia?
Global Health
Monica Cations
42
Responding to the Ebola Crisis: Perspectives from the Field
Interview: Emilie Fourrey, Médecins Sans Frontières, Liberia
46
Maternal Health in the Syrian Conflict
Emma Holloway
50
Maritime ‘Joint Development Agreements’:
In a Spirit of Understanding and Cooperation?
Science
& Environment
Morgan Johansen
53
Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything
Book Review
Business
& Economics
So What? Why the Responsibility
to Protect Matters for North Korea
Jawoon Kim
In 2013, the United Nations Human Rights Council established a Commission of Inquiry
on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In early 2014, the
Commission released a 400-page report about the human rights situation in the DPRK. Amongst
many other charges, the report accuses the DPRK of crimes against humanity.1 Consequently, it
reminds the international community of its shared ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). In so doing,
the report makes a conscious effort to adhere to the details of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document, which codified the R2P. It should therefore be seen as an active step by the Human
Rights Council (HRC), particularly the Commission, to operationalise the norm into concrete
policies which states are encouraged to adopt. In this light, this article briefly explains the concept
of the R2P, and examines the significance of the attempt by the Commission to implement the R2P
framework to North Korea.
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
After the intense controversy generated by the 1999 Kosovo War, states faced a ‘real dilemma’
of respecting state sovereignty while implementing armed intervention when necessary.2
Consequently, the R2P was conceptualised by the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS), to reconcile the allegedly incompatible principles of state sovereignty
and protection of human rights. The ICISS acknowledged that the older concept of humanitarian
intervention placed a primary emphasis on the military intervention and it was difficult to
implement due to the historical sensitivities about colonialism. However, it was not until the
World Summit in 2005 that the term was endorsed unanimously.
The R2P was codified in 2005 and since a 2009 Secretary-General report, use of the three-pillar
formulation has become common. 3 The first pillar relates to the primary responsibility of every
state to ‘protect its own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.’4 The second pillar reminds the international community that it bears the responsibility
to ‘assist states in meeting these obligations.5 Finally, the third pillar affirms that peaceful means are
to be pursued in meeting these obligations. If these fail, military intervention is to be considered
on a case-by-case basis, and only if national authorities are deemed to be ‘manifestly failing to
protect their populations… through Chapter VII of the UN Charter.’6
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4
North Korea and R2P
For North Korea, the reference to the R2P in the Commission’s report is particularly significant for
various reasons. Firstly, North Korea, which has traditionally distanced itself from international
dialogues, participated in international dialogues on the R2P through the General Assembly. The
DPRK welcomed the ongoing examination of the concept by the General Assembly and accepted
parts of the R2P, particularly that of the second pillar.7 While it is still unclear as to why, it has been
suggested that this may have been due to North Korea’s reliance on international aid.8 Nonetheless,
this positive engagement with the DPRK, despite its limitations, provides a rare opportunity for
the international community to understand the country’s position on the concept, whilst also
shedding light on how to respond to the DPRK through the framework of the R2P.
Secondly, the report broadened understandings of the R2P. The R2P has been traditionally
understood and evoked in the context of armed conflicts. This is particularly evident in the UN
Security Council (UNSC), the principal actor in the R2P framework. The UNSC has primarily
focused on conflict situations when discussing the R2P, and this has dominated its ongoing agenda.
“
the report establishes
human rights matter
‘in the ordinary
recommendations made by the report, the UNSC
made a historic decision to include ‘[human rights]
situations in the DPRK on its agenda.’10 As such,
the report establishes a precedent that human rights
course of events,’ and
that the R2P should
conflict situations.
have only dealt with situations in armed conflicts,
such as Syria and Libya.9 However, as a result of the
a precedent that
not be limited to
The 26 UNSC resolutions that feature the concept
”
matter ‘in the ordinary course of events,’ and that
the R2P should not be limited to conflict situations.
The reference to the R2P in the report also has
significance for norm operationalisation. While
the report emphasises that ‘appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means’ be
prioritised, it also calls upon the UNSC for
‘decisive… [and] targeted action’, as the past history of engagement with North Korea has so far
proven ineffective.11 In other words, the report indicates that diplomatic means are exhausted,
establishing the necessary grounds for military intervention (Pillar III of the R2P) in the future.
Therefore, despite the unlikelihood of actual military options being pursued in the near future,
the invocation of Pillar III might set a precedent which could be exploited in the longer term. At
minimum, it constitutes diplomatic pressure to induce North Korea to accept Pillar II aid now.
Referring to the R2P is also important because it sheds light on the inherent paradoxes of
implementing any meaningful policies of the R2P in the DPRK. While the report recommends
increased people-to-people contact through NGOs and civil societies in areas such as culture
and sport,12 such recommendations are difficult to actualise without cooperation from top DPRK
officials. It is also difficult to engage with these top officials if the report suggests that they be
prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. 13 Furthermore, the report is trapped in an
institutional paradox. Despite the fact that the report was mandated by the HRC, the only body
with legitimacy to execute any R2P policies is the UNSC, which is often geopolitically motivated.14
For example, China voted against the inclusion of North Korean human rights issues on the
5
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UNSC agenda due to its traditional ties with the DPRK.15 This institutional paradox is additionally
evident in implementing human rights-related sanctions, as is suggested in the report. Due to
geopolitics and the emphasis on traditional understandings of security, there is a real danger for
the UNSC to be willing to lift human rights-related sanctions in return for DPRK cooperation
in nuclear non-proliferation.16 Therefore, while the report attempts to shift the traditional
understanding of security to include human rights, the only legitimate mechanism to authorise
the use of force, the UNSC, seems unlikely to shift its understanding of security. As a result, the
struggle to implement any ‘decisive and targeted action’ remains real.
Conclusion
This article explored the R2P in the context of the DPRK, particularly regarding the recent report
about the country’s human rights situation. The report is important because it reminds us of the
rare substantial interaction that exists with North Korea, while elucidating a possibility for positive
dialogues in the future. It has also provided a human rights dimension to the issues regarding
the DPRK and broadened the implementation of the R2P to countries that are not currently
involved in armed conflicts. The reference to the R2P in the report further bears significance for
operationalising the norm into concrete policies. It allows for the use of force in the future by
establishing legitimacy, but exposes the difficulty in implementing any meaningful R2P policies due
to inexorable paradoxes. Nonetheless, the report represents a crucial step in the effort to achieve
progress on both the entrenchment of the R2P norm and the eventual resolution of the awful
human rights situation in the DPRK.
References
1 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea,’ A/RC/25/CRP.1, UN Human Rights Council, 7 February 2014 (‘Human Rights in the DPRK’).
2 A. J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 35.
3 See UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome,’ A/60/L.I, UN General Assembly, 24 October 2005; UN
Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,’ A/63/677, UN General Assembly, 12 January 2009.
4 Ibid., p. 5.
5Bellamy, op. cit., p. 97.
6 ‘World Summit,’ op. cit., p. 30.
7 A. J. Bellamy, ‘A chronic protection problem: the DPRK and the Responsibility to Protect’, International Affairs, vol. 91, no.2,
March 2015, pp. 229-230.
8 R. Freedman, Failing to Protect: The UN and the Politicization of Human Rights, Hurst, London, 2014, p. 102.
9 Bellamy, ‘DPRK,’ op. cit., p. 226. Some argue that 32 UNSC resolutions are informed by the R2P: see Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, 28 March 2015, ‘UN Security Council Resolutions Referencing R2P’, http://www.globalr2p.org/
resources/335 (accessed on 8 April 2015).
10 UN Security Council, Meeting Records, S/PV.7353, UN Security Council, 22 December 2014.
11 Report of the Commission of Inquiry, para 1208, p. 364.
12 Ibid.,p. 370.
13 Ibid., p. 366.
14 J. Boulden, ‘Double Standards, Distance and Disengagement: Collective Legitimization in the Post-Cold War Security Council’,
Security Dialogue, vol. 37, no. 3, September 2006, pp. 409-423.
15 Bellamy, ‘DPRK’, op. cit., p. 237.
16 The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, ‘Following up on the UN Human Rights Council’s
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Suggestions from a JBI Roundtable’,
The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 27 February 2014, p. 7.
Asia-Pacific
6
Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims:
The Dangers of Uneven Transition
Mitchell Buckingham
Since 2011, Myanmar’s unfolding transition from autocracy to pluralist democracy under President
Thein Sein has been as rapid as it was unexpected. A population that had spent the best part of six
decades in a near-hermetic state, suffering from political oppression, autocratic military governance,
regular armed conflicts and a stagnant, moribund economy was now undergoing significant
reforms and liberalisations in politics and law, society and economics. This was highlighted by
the release of Aung San Suu Kyi after 21 years of near-constant house arrest, the first democratic
elections since 1960 and large-scale trade liberalisation. These transformations attracted
widespread praise from the World Bank and other economic bodies, private-sector investment
sources and Western governments - including a visit from Barack Obama in 2012, the first by a
sitting US president in the country’s history.
Yet juxtaposed against this backdrop of progress stands the plight of the Rohingya Muslims. For
the 800,000 who comprise this ethnic and religious minority, primarily located in and around
the north-eastern state of Rakhine, the results of the relaxation of authoritarian government
control have been adverse. UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee
was compelled to warn in March of a ‘catastrophic’ human rights disaster, as the situation in the
isolated state slid towards ‘extreme nationalism, religious hatred and conflict.’1 Armed conflict has
been a feature of life for the Rohingya for decades,2 and a large-scale civil sectarian war, one that
would engulf large swathes of the country, looms as a possibility. An outcome like this threatens
not only a human rights disaster for the Rohingya, but also puts Myanmar’s ambitious reformation
project into doubt.
Mismanaged transitions: the plight of the Rohingya
Myanmar’s reforms have undoubtedly created a series of positive outcomes. Space has been created
for a variety of civil society groups; this has led to a growing role for the Suu Kyi-led National
League for Democracy, Myanmar’s sole opposition party, for peace-making organisations, and,
perhaps unwittingly, for coalitions of armed non-state groups agitating for constitutional change.3
These civil society groups have had some significant successes, including forcing the release of a
number of political prisoners. Further, the ruling military government has made tentative steps to
improve some aspects of human rights protections. 135 ethnic groups were recognised and afforded
subsequent, albeit minor, protections, and President Thein Sein has announced a ‘zero-tolerance’
approach towards those who incite ethnic violence.4
7
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Image credit: Steve Gumaer
However, the relaxation of authoritarian control and unleashing of pluralist political forces has
been, from a number of accounts, catastrophic for the Rohingya.5 Historically, the Rohingya have
suffered from a pattern of repression and violence. The Rohingya are not included amongst the
government-recognised ethnic groups afforded protections. Instead, they are considered refugees.
Indeed, even the nomenclature is problematic: the Myanmar Government refuses to accept the
name ‘Rohingya’, preferring the term ‘Bengali Muslim’.6 As a consequence, the Rohingya are
effectively a stateless people; they are offered no citizenship rights or the protections that follow.
Successive sets of government policies in 1962 and 1977 forcibly expelled the Rohingya on a large
scale. Since the initiation of reform in 2011, the freedoms afforded to the majority of Myanmar have
not been extended to the Rohingya.
The allowance of greater political freedoms has also empowered and enfranchised a number of
anti-Rohingya organisations. These groups range from those previously convicted as terrorist
organisations, most notably the notorious monk-led Buddhist organisation 969, to non-violent,
religious organisations agitating for the expulsion of all non-Buddhists. Coupled with this, the
release of political prisoners in early 2012 included not just high-profile pro-democracy figures like
Aung San Suu Kyi, but also convicted terrorists; most notably, the influential monk-leader of 969,
U Wirathu, the man once dubbed ‘the Burmese bin Laden,’7 who was responsible for a number of
high-profile anti-Rohingya terrorist attacks.
This enfranchisement of anti-Rohingya forces as a consequence of Myanmar’s reform process has
created a rapidly disintegrating situation in northern Myanmar. Over 100 people were killed in two
waves of violence in June and October of 2012, immediately following the release of the aboveAsia-Pacific
8
mentioned prisoners. 8The relaxation of police and army patrols and controls in the region saw
mob violence become prolonged, with significant consequences. The police and security forces
that remained have been accused of ‘siding’ with Rakhine Buddhists, and themselves participating
in instances of murder, rape and looting.9
A number of outcomes appear possible, or even likely, if the status quo continues. A large-scale
and disastrous armed conflict is a likely possibility. If it resembles the previous clashes of June
and October 2012, there is the realistic possibility of a humanitarian disaster for the Rohingya as
lives are lost, homes, properties and businesses destroyed and thousands of refugees forced to
flee across borders. There are numerous examples in recent history, from Rwanda to the Balkans,
of the catastrophic consequences of uncontrolled violence
towards persecuted minorities. Further, the conflict presents
a huge security risk towards Myanmar itself: already, armed
Islamist groups from Bangladesh and other neighbouring nations
have threatened reprisals.10 The risks of a prolonged, and even
regional, conflict are high. Such an outcome would deal a huge, if
“
there are numerous
examples in recent
history, from Rwanda
not fatal, blow to Myanmar’s reform agenda.
to the Balkans, of
Lessons for transitional reform and justice
the catastrophic
The experience of the Rohingya in Myanmar provides some
consequences of
valuable lessons for the process of reform across other similarly
transitioning nations. At the heart of this is the key assertion that
processes of reform that disadvantage certain societal groups, or
favour some over others, create outcomes that work against the
reform process itself, or indeed jeopardise the entire process. The
uncontrolled violence
towards persecuted
minorities.
creation of a discursive space in civil society is laudable; indeed,
it is one of the foundation stones of democratisation. However,
”
creating the space for political participation for some sectors of society at the expense of others
works only to widen inequality within that society. There are a number of examples from across
the region of minorities or specific sectors of society being ignored during transition periods,
including gendered violence in Timor-Leste and Tamil persecution in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the
inability to involve all previously warring groups in the process of peace and reform significantly
led to the recurrence of civil warfare.11 A similar outcome, as evidenced above, threatens Myanmar.
By failing to hear from all voices in Myanmar’s newfound civil society, the nation has put its entire
transition process at risk.
Another lesson lies in the importance of having effective, properly adjudicated transitional justice
mechanisms. The historic repression of the Rohingya, coupled with numerous human rights
abuses that occurred under the rule of the military government, have created a sense of injustice
and frustration within the population.12 However, under the 2008 constitution, the junta was
effectively absolved of any crimes committed under it. 13 There is little incentive for past wrongs to
be admitted on the part of the junta, and by lacking processes that hold past crimes to account, it
is difficult to find meaningful pathways to future political development between the Rohingya and
9
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the broader population.14 This is an example repeated consistently in transitioning societies across
the world, and in particular, those with histories of human rights abuses. Without effective justice
measures that address long histories of abuse and sectarian violence along religious, ethnic or
ideological partitions, patterns of repression, frustration and ultimately renewed conflict are likely
to continue.
The current plight of the Rohingya demonstrates the dangers of mismanaged and uneven
transitions in transitioning societies and, in particular, for ethnic or religious minorities. This
paper argues that the mismanagement of Myanmar’s transition has led to the current plight of
the Rohingya Muslims. Further, this case provides important lessons for transitional justice and
reform programs more generally: ignoring unequal reform outcomes, especially among minorities,
can not only create major human rights dilemmas, but also threaten the fragile reform agendas of
transitioning nations as a whole.
References
1 P. Parameswaran, ‘Myanmar Sliding Towards Conflict, UN Envoy Warns’ in The Diplomat, 11 March 2015,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/myanmar-sliding-towards-conflict-un-envoy-warns/ (accessed 1 May 2015).
2 A, Tripathi, ‘Profiling Non-State Armed Insurgent Groups of Myanmar’, Himalayan and Central Asian Studies,
vol. 18, no. 2, 2014, p. 135.
3 International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘Navigating Paths To Justice In Myanmar’s Transition,’ International Center for
Transitional Justice, June 2014, p. 2.
4 A. Nicoll, J. Delaney, ‘Reform Fails To Help Myanmar’s Rohingya’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 10, 2013, p. 8-9.
5 Ibid., p. 8
6 N. Kipgen, ‘Conflict In Rakhine State In Myanmar: Rohingya Muslims’ Conundrum’, Journal Of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 33, no.
2, 2013, p. 298-310.
7 Nicoll and Delaney, op. cit., p. 8-9.
8 M. Zarni, A. Cowley, ‘The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya’, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, vol. 23, no. 3. 2014, p.
681-752.
9 Ibid., p. 305
10 Nicoll and Delaney, op. cit., p. 8-9.
11 R. David and I. Holliday, ‘Set The Junta Free: Pre-Transitional Justice In Myanmar’s Democratisation’, Australian Journal Of Political
Science, vol. 41, no. 1, 2006, p. 91-105.
12 Ibid., p. 93.
13 International Center for Transitional Justice, op. cit., p. 1.
14 David and Holliday, op. cit.
Asia-Pacific
10
After the Ceasefire: Recovery and
Fragile Peace in Nagaland, Northeast India
Matthew Wilkinson
Over a decade after ceasefire negotiations began between the Government of India and insurgent
fighters in Nagaland, Northeast India, insurgency in Nagaland continues to dominate local
politics and is an everyday source of insecurity. This article discusses the post-ceasefire situation
in Nagaland today, focusing on questions of where the ceasefires have failed, what that means
for life in Nagaland, and what can be learned from the fragile situation of peace and conflict in
Northeast India.
Nagaland, insurgency and ceasefire
Tibet
The Naga conflict in its contemporary form began in 1947
Arunachal Pradesh
with the independence of India and the annexation of
Naga territories into the Federal Union of India. Before
Bhutan
1947, Naga communities along the border of India, Burma
and China enjoyed a degree of autonomy and isolation
Assam
from outside influences under such legislation as the
Inner Line Permit system.1 Following independence, a
Nagaland
Meghalaya
demand by Naga activists for autonomy on 14 August
1947 was refused, and the state was annexed to India as
Manipur
a territory of Assam. This move was strongly resisted
Bangladesh
Tripura
by communities in Nagaland, who began an insurgent
Mizoram
struggle that continues through various paramilitaries
Myanmar
(Burma)
in Nagaland and in neighbouring Myanmar today. The
largest of these organisations today are the two factions
of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN).
In 1988, the NSCN split along ethnic lines into two
of Nagalim under S. S. Khaplang (NSCN (K)), and the
National Socialist Council of Nagalim under Isak Chishi
Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah (NSCN (IM)).
The demands of the NSCN factions are for the
unification of Naga territories along the lines of a vision
11
Image credit: Lingsi Lu
competing organisations, the National Socialist Council
Asia-Pacific
for ‘Nagalim’, or greater Nagaland, with territory extending beyond the state’s current borders.
Proposed ‘Nagalim’ overlaps borders with Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar.
Nagalim also overlaps territorial claims by other ethnic groups in other states. This has been a
recurrent cause of violence, especially in the period 1992 to 1997 in Manipur, when conflict between
the NSCN (IM) and various ethnic-Kuki groups resulted in hundreds of deaths.2 To designate a
Nagalim would require an infringement on the sovereignty of other Indian states and Myanmar,
and a wilful blindness to the territorial claims of other ethnic groups. Aptly summed up by Ngaihte,
‘the idea that the political geography of the Northeast will be redrawn based on the Nagas’ reading
of history seems unthinkable’.3
Indo-NSCN ceasefires: terms, enforcement and continuing violence
Following an ethnic war between the NSCN (IM) and the Kuki National Army (KNA), from 1992
to 1997, involving hundreds of deaths and claims of ethnic cleansing, the Government of India
sought a negotiated truce with the NSCN factions.4 The terms of both ceasefires were similar,
demanding an end to direct hostilities between the Government of India and the NSCN, retreating
NSCN cadres into designated camps, agreements that the Indian Army will not patrol within
one kilometre of designated camps, and agreements that the NSCN will not stockpile new arms
or continue extortive activities.5 However, the terms of these ceasefires continue to be broken by
NSCN cadres, by the Indian army, and most recently by the NSCN (K),
“
which completely retracted from the 2001 ceasefire on 27 March 2015.
enforcement of the
ceasefire terms has been
Enforcement of the ceasefire terms has been fraught with problems.
Breaches of key terms are commonplace, and taming members of any of
fraught with problems.
the groups has proven impossible. Illegal taxation and extortion rackets
Breaches of key terms
along most major roads.6 Cadres are also regularly arrested trafficking
are commonplace, and
large caches of arms and narcotics into the state.7
Disagreements between insurgent members over the ceasefires has also
taming members of
led to factions and the creation of new insurgent bodies. As recently
any of the groups has
proven impossible.
continue to be run by renegade insurgent cadres in most towns and
”
as April 2015, a new breakaway faction of the NSCN, calling itself the
NSCN Revivalist (NSCN (R)) emerged from the NSCN (K), becoming
the eighth recognised rebel political group in Nagaland by the High
Powered Committee of the Nagaland Government.8
As another means of avoiding ceasefire obligations, insurgent factions have established camps
in neighbouring Myanmar.9 In 2011, a united front of nine outfits formed with a goal of securing
independence for Naga-inhabited territories in Kachin State, Myanmar.9 Many Naga camps in
Myanmar, contrary to the ceasefire agreements, have been used to assist other active insurgencies
in Northeast India, including the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, and United Liberation
Front of Assam.10
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12
Human security: post-ceasefire communities in Nagaland
The post-ceasefire divisions and low-level violence in Nagaland have had the greatest effects
on communities living within the conflict. The continued friction between insurgent groups
divided by the terms of the ceasefires has legitimised a police and military presence that has been
associated with insecurity and human rights abuses.11 My own conversations in Nagaland in 2012
often turned to allegations of torture, forced relocation and raids by the Assam Rifles divisions of
the Indian army attempting to identify and flush out alleged insurgents and conspirators.
Alongside the ceasefires have been development and social welfare programs aimed at encouraging
employment in Nagaland, especially in rural communities. Many of my discussions in 2012 focused
on development and employment schemes. Initiatives such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) were seen as band-aid solutions to social problems.
Locals claimed that the schemes were little more than handouts, and that India prefers hiring cheap
labour locally rather than employing qualified construction workers. Even small-scale employment
schemes were viewed with suspicion and doubt. NSCN outfits play on these suspicions to build
a support base and encourage anti-Indian sentiment.12 Ironically, research by Khongreiwo found
that the proceeds from such employment schemes are often syphoned towards insurgent groups,
including the NSCN (IM), through extortion and illegal taxes.13
There have also been unforeseen outcomes of the Naga ceasefires outside of Nagaland. In
neighbouring Manipur, fifty-thousand ethnic Meitei members protested in the state capitol,
Imphal, on 18 June 2001, following the extension of the NSCN (IM) ceasefire to cover highlands
in the north of Manipur.14 There was a widespread fear that extending the ceasefire into Manipur
territories was a form of encroachment by Naga politicians. In the ensuing riot, 18 protesters were
killed and the Manipur Legislative Assembly was burned down, along with over a dozen other
government buildings. Imphal was placed under curfew for almost a month, until on 24 July 2001 it
was announced that the NSCN (IM) ceasefire would not extend into Manipuri territory.15
Conclusion
Ceasefires have far-reaching and often unforeseen outcomes in conflict settings. Agreements
between governments and insurgent groups often serve as a means to legitimise a group as
representatives of a conflict. They are also an opportunity to negotiate compromised goals, and
are a compromise of sovereignty for all parties involved. These agreements also often divide and
polarise signatories; they can be a source of new conflict and insecurity for the communities that
play host to, and are primarily the victims of, a conflict. The Naga ceasefires are no exception to
these phenomena – they have ultimately been co-opted by insurgents, and have become a source of
continued disagreement and a crafted tool of legitimacy for signatories.
13
Asia-Pacific
References
1 A. Stepan, J. Linz, Y. Yadav, Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies, John Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, 2013, p. 101.
2 S.T. Ngaihte, ‘The Reality of North-East as an Entity’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 48, no. 50, 2013, p. 14.
3 Ibid., p. 26.
4 N. Kipgen, ‘Politics Of Ethnic Conflict In Manipur’, South Asia Research, vol. 33, no. 1, 2013, p. 21-38.
5 Ministry of Home Affairs, ‘Text of Cease-fire ground rules agreed upon between the Government of India and the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)’, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/
india/states/nagaland/documents/papers/Text_ceasefire_May2001.htm (accessed 18 March 2015).
6 S.G. Kashypa, ‘Nagaland police unearth illegal tax network run by NSCN ( IM )’, Indian Express, 18 September 2014,
http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/mumbai/nagaland-police-unearth-illegal-tax-network-run-by-nscnim/
(accessed 18 March 2015).
7 PTI, ‘NSCN ( IM ) cadres held with arms, cash in Nagaland’, 14 October 2014, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-nscnimcadres-held-with-arms-cash-in-nagaland-2026028/ (accessed 18 March 2015).
8 Shillong Times, ‘Another NSCN outfit born in Nagaland’ in The Shillong Times, 08 April 2015, http://www.theshillongtimes.
com/2015/04/08/another-nscn-outfit-born-in-nagaland/ (accessed 1 May 2015).
9 R. Bhattacharyya, ‘What End Of Ceasefire Means For India And Naga Rebel Group NSCN (K)’ in The Huffington Post, 04 April 2015,
http://www.huffingtonpost.in/rajeev-bhattacharyya/what-end-of-ceasefire-mea_b_6991148.html (accessed 4 April 2015).
10 N. Goswami, ‘Peace Again at Stake in Nagaland’ in The Hindu, 11 April 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/commentpeace-again-at-stake-in-nagaland/article7089981.ece (accessed 11 April 2015).
11 K. Muckherjee, ‘India’s Fractured Northeastern Frontier: An Overview’, Asia Pacific Review, vol. 21, no. 2, 2014, p. 161.
12 N. Goswami, ‘Contested Territorial and Border Discourses: Case Studies of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim and the
Dima Halam Daogah’, paper presented at International Conference on Northeast India and its Transnational Neighbourhood,
Guwahati, Asian Borderlands Research Network, 17-18 January 2008.
13 R. Kongreiwo, ‘Understanding the Histories of People’s on the Margins: A Critique of ‘Northeast India’s Durable Disorder’’,
Alternatives, vol. 34, 2009, pp. 437-454. `
14 W. Hussain, ‘Ethno-Nationalism and the Politics of Terror in India’s Northeast,’ South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, vol.
30, February 2015, p. 98.
15 Ibid.
Asia-Pacific
14
Responding to Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine
Ewen Levick
“All warfare is based on deception”.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War1
Tensions between Russia and the West have a long history. In 1945, Winston Churchill saw
Stalin’s Red Army as a threat to European democracy, and ordered contingency plans to be made
for a war between Britain and the Soviet Union. These plans, known as ‘Operation Unthinkable’,
represented a last-ditch attempt to prevent the rise of the Iron Curtain in Europe.2 While
Vladimir Putin’s Russia is not the military power the Soviet Union was in 1945, many see Russia’s
archaic conquests in Georgia and Ukraine as a similarly existential threat to a norms-based
international order. From Putin’s perspective, international norms of behaviour only serve to
mask an archaic reality. He is not alone in this view. Forbes, in their list of people who ‘wield the
kind of power that shapes and bends the world’, has ranked Putin as the world’s most powerful
person two years in a row.3
This article demonstrates how Putin’s Russia exercises power through a military strategy
known as ‘hybrid’ warfare. This type of warfare is deceptive, results from the integration of
politics into military decision-making and fosters political indecision, generating a ‘cold peace’ in
foreign relations. The West must respond in order to regain both military and political initiative
over Russia.
Background: What is hybrid warfare?
Russia’s military is becoming more active as its budget is growing.4 NATO scrambled jets across
Europe more than 100 times in 2014 to escort Russian bombers,5 and Australia sent warships to
intercept a Russian convoy in Australian waters late last year.6 Bomber patrols and naval convoys
are well within standard military behaviour, and are met with a measured, rehearsed response.
However, Russia is also using ‘hybrid’ warfare to challenge established military doctrine. Hybrid
warfare is a mixture of conventional and unconventional warfare, using tactics ranging from
insurgency to regular combat, as well as information operations.7 The use of hybrid tactics
has a long history in Russian warfighting.8 Russia’s current use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine
15
Europe
is a combination of political and military measures. It is characterised by the deployment of
professional soldiers without identifying insignia, and the description of Russian soldiers in
eastern Ukraine as ‘volunteers’.9 The objective of this combination is to deceive both NATO
military officers on the ground and Western political leaders. One example of how hybrid tactics
deceive an opponent can be found in applying standard ‘rules of engagement’ in the Ukrainian
theatre of operations.
Tactical advantages: Challenging ‘rules of engagement’
Soldiers on operations are subject to rules that govern when they are allowed to use lethal force.
In military jargon, these are called ‘rules of engagement’ (ROE). High-ranking military personnel
decide the ROE for an operation, taking into account the existing threat level and prevailing
political sensitivities. When soldiers encounter a potential threat, officers on the ground consult
the operation’s ROE to decide on an appropriate course of action.
“
it is hard to identify
However, ROE always require the enemy to be properly identified in
the enemy at ground
the enemy at ground level in a hybrid war, because there is no clear
level in a hybrid war,
operational definition of who the enemy is or, indeed, when they are
because there is no clear
and an insurgent depend on whether or not he is wearing insignia,
order for an officer to authorise the use of force. It is hard to identify
or on the area in which he is operating? Who are the real enemy in
operational definition
of who the enemy is or,
indeed, when they are
considered the enemy.
10
considered the enemy. Does the line between a conventional soldier
”
Ukraine – separatist rebels, or professional Russian soldiers?
The integration of political decisions
into military doctrine
Soldiers may be forced to answer the above questions sooner than
expected. NATO personnel have recently been sent to mentor the
Ukrainian army. Canadian soldiers deployed on a similar mentoring mission to Iraq have fought
Islamic State in direct combat.11 What will happen if Russian soldiers, with or without insignia,
fight NATO forces in open battle? This could turn a local conflict into a much larger political or
military conflagration with unforeseeable consequences. Basic ROE do not adequately prepare
soldiers on the ground to make such an enormous geopolitical decision. This potential for tactical
indecision in the heat of the moment is dangerous both to soldiers and to the overall effectiveness
of a military operation.
Herein lies the advantage of using hybrid warfare as a military strategy: it confuses and deceives
the opponent by linking the effectiveness of operational military doctrine, such as ROE, to difficult
political questions. Blurring the operational lines between a soldier and an insurgent also blurs the
political lines between counter-insurgency and a conventional war. In order for NATO to adapt its
ROE to the tactical environment in Ukraine, it must effectively decide whether or not it is fighting
the Russian state on Ukrainian battlefields. Of course, this generates a lot of political debate.
Europe
16
This debate is one reason why Western powers have been slow to send military assistance to
Ukraine.12 However, fostering indecision at all levels of decision-making is the strength of hybrid
warfare, both as a military and political tactic.13 Russia’s use of hybrid warfare is only one part of
an overarching foreign policy strategy known as maskirovka. Maskirovka (Маскировка) is defined
in Russian strategic thinking as a complex of economic, military and political measures designed
to mislead the enemy.14 Just as Russia’s soldiers in Ukraine are neither distinctly conventional nor
unconventional, maskirovka makes no real distinction between war and peace.15 Rather, a ‘cold
peace’ has been created in Russian-Western relations, in which Cold War conflicts and behaviours
are reproduced but not acknowledged.16 Political leaders are still attempting to gauge the state
of relations with Russia and what Putin will do next in order to make an informed decision on
military action. This deba te, or ‘cold peace’, has compromised NATO’s military effectiveness, and
slowed the ability of the West to effectively respond to Putin’s aggression.
Responses: Regaining the initiative
It is clear that the failure to definitively acknowledge a proxy war in Ukraine has led Western
leaders to hope for the best without preparing for the worst. The resulting cold peace means
NATO will struggle to adapt its operational military
doctrine at the same pace as Russia. This is evident in
the tactical example of adapting ROE to a hybrid warfare
environment. The ‘cold peace’ has also slowed the rate
of political decision-making in the West. This is evident
in the slow response to Ukraine’s need for economic and
military aid.
Therefore, Vladimir Putin currently controls both the
political and military tempo. Small wonder he is ranked
first on Forbes’ list.17 This must change in order to
support international norms of state behaviour, uphold
security in Europe, and mitigate the risk of future conflict
in Russia’s near abroad. Much like Churchill, Western
political leaders and NATO generals must contemplate
the ‘unthinkable’; a new form of cold war is in effect.
Acknowledging this is critical in order to increase the
speed at which they can adapt operational doctrine, regain
the political initiative, and effectively respond to Putin’s
Image credit: Michael E.
archaic worldview.
17
Europe
References
1 L. Giles translation, B. Sutton (ed), London, 1910.
2 J. Walker, Operation Unthinkable: The Third World War: British Plans to Attack the Soviet Empire 1945, The History Press, United
Kingdom, 2013, p. 4.
3 C. Howard, ‘Putin vs. Obama: The World’s Most Powerful People 2014’, in Forbes. May 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
carolinehoward/2014/11/05/putin-vs-obama-the-worlds-most-powerful-people-2014/ (accessed 23 March 2015).
4 SIPRI, ‘Milex Data 1988-2013’, Sipri Military Expenditure Database, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_
database (accessed 23 March 2015).
5 BBC News, ‘NATO Reports Rise in Russia Military Flights Over Europe’, in BBC, 29 October 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-29825890 (accessed 23 March 2015).
6 BBC News, ‘Canberra Monitoring Russian Warships Nearing Australia’, in BBC, 13 November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-australia-30032466 (accessed 23 March 2015).
7 L. Freedman, ‘Ukraine and the Art of Limited War’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014, pp. 7-38.
8 A. Jones, Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, Academic Conferences Limited, Reading,
2004, p. 166.
9Freedman, op. cit., p. 11.
10 MOD, Rt. Hn. M Fallon MP, ‘PM Announces Package of Non-Lethal Support to Ukraine’, Ministry of Defence: Announcements,
24 February 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-announces-package-of-non-lethal-support-to-ukraine (accessed 23
March 2015).
11 K. Dutta, ‘Canadian Special Forces fire on ISIS militants in first ground engagement’, in The Independent, 20 January 2015, http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-canadian-special-forces-fire-on-islamic-state-militants-in-firstground-engagement-9989218.html (accessed 23 March 2015).
12 MOD, Rt. Hn. M Fallon MP, op. cit.
13Freedman, op. cit., p. 9.
14 Quoted in T.C. Shea, ‘Post-Soviet Maskirovka, Cold War Nostalgia, and Peacetime Engagement’, Military Review: Fort Leavenworth
Command and General Staff College, May/June 2002, pp. 63-67.
15 T. Ries, quoted in B. Kendall, ‘Hybrid Warfare: The New Conflict between East and West’, in BBC News, 6 November 2014, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29903395 (accessed 26 March 2015).
16 R. Sakwa, ‘Conspiracy Narratives as a Mode of Engagement in International Politics’, The Russian Review, vol. 71, October 2012, pp.
581-609.
17Howard, op. cit.
Europe
18
Combatting Transnational Crime
and Terrorism: A Global Problem
for a United Europe
Lewis Graham
Transnational organised crime (TOC), through its ability to subvert economic, political and social
institutions and harness the forces of globalisation, has been an increasing blight on the world
economy. Given the connection between TOC and terrorist activities, the increase in TOC profits
and a rise in high-profile terrorism attacks has created particular impotence to tackle these security
threats together. As the past year has shown, however, Europe is not immune to the threat of the
TOC-Terror nexus. By recognising the similarities between transnational organised crime and
terrorism activities, Europe can allow itself access to an underutilised approach in combatting both
its external and internal security threats.
TOC and its impact in Europe
TOC is a highly ambiguous umbrella term used to encompass a range of profit-driven criminal
activities, ranging from money laundering and environmental crime to illicit drug and human
trafficking and insurance fraud.1 Organised transnational crime is seen as distinct due to its:
• Tendency towards systemic corruption and violence;
• The receipt of abnormally high rates of return in comparison to other crime; and,
• The use of subversion and infiltration of the legal economy through the re-investment of
illicit profits.2
Unfortunately, the conditions of globalisation have fostered the exponential growth of TOCs.
Improvements in mass communications and freedom of movement have enabled groups to
abandon hierarchical structures, and instead adopt complex networks that are more resilient to
law enforcement and move easily across national borders, thus creating bigger markets.3 Equally,
modern banking systems and technology facilitate the laundering of billions in profit, estimated by
the IMF to be in between 2-5% of global GDP.4 The new ability to garner such large profits, and the
ubiquitous nature of TOC, increases the ability for TOC groups to distort economies and subvert
political and social institutions.
Quashing TOC operations is additionally seen as an important security challenge due to the
emergence of the “crime-terror nexus”. In other words, contemporary TOC and terrorist groups
share similar strategies and can even coexist within the same organisation.5
19
Europe
Key actors: Breaking down the current
situation stakeholder by stakeholder
European Union
As the European Union represents an area where
economic integration and the free movement of people,
capital and goods are at their highest, it has provided an
opportune market for TOC activity. Due to its shadowy
nature, exact figures of TOC are difficult to assess.
However, the continued vitality of the Russian mafia, the
evolution of ISIS, the unrest of the Arab spring and recent
terror attacks on European soil have all contributed to
a general sense of urgency to better deal with the crimeterror nexus.6
European Union strategy has been two-fold. Firstly, there
has been a certain amount of success in the proliferation
and strengthening of institutional and administrative
law enforcement entities, such as Europol.7 However,
Member States continue to call for greater endowments
of resources to local forces and a minimisation of
bureaucracy between domestic authorities and Europol, so
as to combat TOC comprehensively and efficiently.8
Image credit: Eric Chan
Secondly, The EU’s harmonisation of legislation has been hampered by the lack of a
comprehensive definition of TOC that adheres with each Member States’ differing legal traditions.
This has resulted in frameworks and instruments developing extremely slowly and only for specific
TOC crimes. Where no framework exists, Member States are encouraged to make their own
approximations, leaving areas of fragmentation that provide opportunities for TOC and terrorist
groups to thrive. Ideally, the EU will need greater cooperation to iron out areas of fragmentation
and successfully overcome the challenge
of TOC.9
Non-member states
While TOC groups made up of European
nationals are of the most concern to the EU,
a significant proportion of large TOC and
terror groups originate outside its borders.
To combat this, Europol currently cooperates
with many non-Member States, such as
Albania, Serbia and the Russian Federation.
While there is much room for consensus
Europe
“
ideally, the EU will need
greater cooperation
to iron out areas of
fragmentation and
successfully overcome
the challenge of TOC.
”
20
on this issue, a lack of coordination between European and non-European law enforcement
has inhibited success.10 A resolution between the tensions of sovereignty and the needs of
coordination must be found.
Banks and other financial institutions
Anti-money laundering legislation represents half of the global strategy against TOC and
terrorism.11 While not involved directly in policy making, banks and other financial institutions
serve as crucial ‘gatekeepers’ for the crime-terror nexus between their activities and the usability
of their profits.12 While the EU has been particularly successful in creating a universal framework
for anti-money laundering laws, a significant number of EU banks have been found non-compliant
with regulations.13 Such banks have generally found risk of non-compliance as extremely low in
comparison to potential profit. Evidently, a system to ensure compliance beyond reputational
damage and fines must be found.
Potential policy responses
Option One: Transnational Measures
This policy focuses on expanding and enhancing cooperation between anti-crime agencies
internally and externally, so as to harmonise methods of intelligence gathering and analysis.14 This
would entail the homogenisation of criminal codes and improved severity of penalties for TOC. If
successfully implemented, this strategy would remove the potential loopholes that have enabled
TOC and terrorist groups to thrive.
There still remains the potential problem of collaboration with non-member states. This requires
coercion or “incentivisation” to overcome tensions with sovereignty. Attention must also be given
to improving “de-incentivisation” for money laundering in financial institutions.15
Option Two: Improving Individual Capacity
This policy response entails providing resources to individual nations, particularly border and
non-member states, to improve their capacity to enforce and stop TOC activities before they
affect “consumer” countries in the continent’s west. It would aid individual nations in combatting
TOC more comprehensively at a local level, where the majority of activity occurs and where a
lack of resources is most prevalent.16 This approach benefits non-member states as it overcomes
aforementioned sovereignty tensions. However, this strategy is likely to be costly monetarily and
is complicated by the variety of European points of entry, leaving inevitable weak points. Money
laundering issues are not appropriately addressed by this option.
Moving forward with a response strategy
The suggested approach emerging from this article to combat TOC is a focus on transnational
measures. Given the costs of TOC and terrorism in non-member states ($211 billion dollars in
Russia alone over the past decade), incentive-driven talks seem a plausible strategy to promote
further cooperation.17 Furthermore, uniformity in anti-money laundering laws and severity are
21
Europe
crucial, as the interconnectedness of the European Union’s banking system means potential
loopholes emerge if not all nations are on par.18 Some improvement in individual capacity
is advisable to secure Europe’s borders, but it must be pursued within an overall strategy of
multilateral cooperation to be effective.
As such, it can be concluded that transnational problems require transnational solutions. In order
to adequately combat the transnational crime-terror nexus, the European Union should more
closely pursue a harmonisation of its legal codes, and improve coordination between domestic law
enforcement agencies and Europol. It should also take greater action to force compliance from
non-member states and financial institutions, via incentives or severe penalties, and could pursue
specific targets for individual capacity-building at Europe’s borders.
References
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. ‘Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. UNDOC’, http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/treaties/CTOC/(accessed 31 March 2015).
2 Ibid.
3 K. Walter. ‘Internationally Organised Crime: The Escalation of Crime within the Global Economy’, Institute for Security &
Development Policy, 2009, p. 6.
4 W.C. Gilmore, The Evolution of International Measures to Counter Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. Strasbourg,
Council of Europe Pub., 2004, p. 15.
5
I.S. Oliveira, ‘Catch Me If You Can: Or How Policy Networks Help Tackle the Crime Terror Nexus.’ Global Crime, vol 15, no. 3-4,
2014, p. 220.
6 F. Strazzari and A. Russo. ‘US Mainland, EU Archipelago? Convergence and Divergence on Transnational Organized Crime.’
European Security, vol. 23, no. 4, 2014, p. 530
7 Ibid., p. 531.
8 P. Stelfox, ‘Transnational Organised Crime: A Police Perspective’, in A. Edwards and P. Gill (eds.), Transnational Organised Crime:
Perspectives on Global Security, Routledge, London, 2003, p. 114.
9 W. Kego, ‘Internationally Organised Crime: The Escalation of Crime within the Global Economy’, Institute for Security &
Development Policy, 2009.
10 A. Sukharenko, ‘Russian Organized Crime And Its Impact On Foreign Economies.’ Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2013,
no. 114, p. 1-3.
11 W. C. Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of International Measures to Counter Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism,
Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub, 2004, p. 20
12 Ibid., p. 42.
13 European Union: European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper: Compliance with the anti-money laundering
directive by cross-border banking groups at group level’, European Commission, 30 June 2009, SEC(2009) 939, http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/company/docs/financial-crime/compli_cbb_en.pdf (accessed 31 March 2015).
14Kego, op. cit., p. 13.
15Sukharenko, op. cit.,
16Stelfox, op. cit.,
17Sukharenko, op. cit.,
18 K. L. Gardner, ‘Fighting Terrorism the FATF Way’, Global Governance, vol. 1, no. 13, 2007, pp. 325-345.
Europe
22
Responding to the Occupation of the
Palestinian Territories: Disillusionment
Within the Israeli Defence Force
Amelia Haigh
“We’re winning all the battles ...and we’re losing the war.”
Ami Ayalon, former Head of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), 1995-2000.1
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long been characterised by violence between the State of Israel
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), comprised of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
The most recent clashes occurred in July and August 2014, in which 2,200 people were killed,
primarily Palestinian civilians.2 Criticisms have been launched by the international community
through various human rights organisations,3 UN bodies,4 and other states5 regarding Israel’s
excessive use of force in the OPT. In Gaza, these criticisms have focused on the civilian casualties
resulting from Israeli bombing operations, most recently affecting UN premises and personnel
in Gaza, as well as the ongoing blockade of the strip, which prevents humanitarian supplies from
entering.6 In the West Bank, criticism has focused largely on the human rights abuses perpetuated
by Israeli soldiers through their hostile occupation; this includes the unnecessary killing of
Palestinians posing little immediate threat,7 dogs attacks on civilians8 and the facilitation of the
continued spread of Jewish settlements contrary to international law.9
While this says nothing of the atrocities also committed by Palestinians and Hamas militants, the
aforementioned operations are carried out by the Israel Defence Force (IDF), an army of conscripts.
Under such conscription policy, it is mandatory for all Israeli Jews aged 18 years and above to serve
up to three years unless otherwise exempted for religious, psychological or other specific reasons.
As a result, tensions arise between the personal views of Israeli conscripts and the practices they
are required to carry out in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Local resistance and disillusionment
with the treatment of Palestinians in these regions are evident. It is not only international opinion
that has condemned Israel’s policies in the OPT but Israeli citizens themselves; primarily a minority
of current and former IDF soldiers who are disillusioned with the continuing excessive use of force
in these regions.
23
Middle East & Africa
Non-governmental organisations as a voice for resistance
Since the collapse of the Oslo Accords and the onset of the Second Intifada around 2000, there
have been an array of local Israeli non-governmental organisations (NGOs) emerging that are vocal
in articulating their disillusionment with IDF operations in the OPT. According to Patir, such
timing is not coincidental:
‘...in understanding the effect of the last 20 years on Israelis, especially the young,
one should focus on two realities; the rollercoaster in and out of hope [for peace]
and the ever-escalating reality on the ground.’10
The inability of Israeli occupation policy to produce a superior reality has led to resistance from
civil society and former IDF personnel through the advent of NGOs with both explicit and
implicit anti-occupation stances. Breaking the Silence (2004) is a platform for ex-IDF soldiers to
testify to the brutality of their conduct in the OPT,11 whilst Combatants for Peace (2005) protests
the occupation by bringing together former Israeli soldiers and violent Palestinian resistors.12
Furthermore, Ta’ayush (2000) opposes the occupation13 and, like many local NGOs, would involve
Israeli citizens who have previously completed their national service. Among others, these
organisations represent the small but growing local disillusionment with the occupation policy,
particularly after the lack of progress towards a lasting solution following the failure of the Oslo
Accords and the Second Intifada.
Breaking with the ranks of the military
Dissent from within the ranks of the IDF is evident through the refusal of conscripts to serve, often
specifically in the OPT. Since the late 1990s there have been growing numbers of conscientious
objectors, also known as refuseniks, who are refusing to serve in the IDF for a variety of reasons.14
Studies have found that the rate of recruitment of the IDF has declined more recently, with
increasing numbers of Israelis preferring to serve jail time rather than engage in military service.15
Many of these refuseniks have made public declarations and open letters of refusal. Examples
from 2014 include the 34 military intelligence reservists who refused to serve in the OPT, citing
aggression that no longer constitutes self defence,16 and over 50 young Israelis refusing service due
to their rejection of the occupation and militarisation of Israeli society.17
There are numerous accounts of such public acts of dissent. However, accurate numbers of
refuseniks are elusive and underrepresent the extent of disillusionment within Israeli civil society.
Such figures do not account for the retrospective disillusionment from ex-IDF personnel regarding
their service, nor those who emigrate prior to service, fake mental illness to be acquitted from
the IDF18 or purposely fail entrance tests in order to avoid social condemnation for dissenting
publicly.19 The attraction of ‘quieter’ resistance comes in the face of criminal punishment and
defamatory accusations from Israeli leadership for speaking out against the occupation.20
Discouragement to dissent persists and resistance to the occupation of the Palestinian Territories
remains the view of a minority. Quantifiably, 62% of Jews in Israel consider that soldiers have no
right to refuse service in the West Bank due to personal opposition to the occupation.21 Thus it is
within these limits that disillusionment with the occupation of the Palestinian Territories exists
within the IDF, albeit developing with the growing numbers of conscientious objectors and antioccupation NGOs.
Middle East & Africa
24
Conclusion
Israeli conduct in the OPT is an increasingly decisive factor for many soldiers when refusing to
serve, and has emerged as a focal point of criticism for many local NGOs. Whilst the policy effects
of such grassroots action cannot be overstated and dissent remains sparse, the occupation of the
Palestinian Territories should be considered a watershed issue for public opinion. Accordingly, the
developing disillusionment should be recognised as a direct response to IDF conduct in the OPT
and a manifestation of the declining legitimacy of occupation policy within the IDF.
References
1 The Gatekeepers, dir. Dror Moreh, USA, IMDB, 2012 [DVD].
2 Associated Press, ‘Gaza peace deal agreed to end 50 days of fighting’, in The National, 27 August 2014, http://www.thenational.ae/
world/middle-east/gaza-peace-deal-agreed-to-end-50-days-of-fighting (accessed 12 April 2015).
3 Amnesty International, ‘‘Trigger-happy’ Israeli army and police use reckless force in the West Bank’, 27 February 2014,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/02/trigger-happy-israeli-army-and-police-use-reckless-force-west-bank/
(accessed 12 April 2015).
4 UN News Centre, ‘Israel must curb ‘continuous stream’ of protest fatalities in Occupied Palestinian Territory – UN’, 12 December
2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49594#.VSs5MnuJjX4 (accessed 12 April 2015).
5 Agence-France Presse, ‘Egypt condemns Israel’s ‘excessive force’ in Gaza’, in The Times of Israel, 28 July 2014,
http://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-condemns-israels-excessive-force-in-gaza/ (accessed 12 April 2015).
6 Human Rights Watch, ‘Gaza: Donors, UN Should Press Israel on Blockade’, 12 October 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/12/
gaza-donors-un-should-press-israel-blockade (accessed 12 April 2015).
7 Amnesty International, op. cit.
8 B’Tselem, ‘Beating and Abuse: Military still using dogs to attack Palestinian civilians’, 29 December 2014,
http://www.btselem.org/beating_and_abuse/20141229_military_continues_to_use_attack_dogs_against_civilians (accessed 12 April 2015).
9 UN News Centre, ‘Planned Israeli settlements in West Bank violate international law, says UN envoy’, 7 June 2012, http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42168#.VStALnuJjX4 (accessed 12 April 2015); The Associated Press, ‘West Bank settlement
expansion surged under Netanyahu’, in Haaretz, 15 December 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.631924
(accessed 12 April 2015).
10 Y. Patir, ‘Who is Afraid of Peace?’, The Palestine-Israel Journal, vol. 18, no. 4, 2013, p. 47.
11 Breaking the Silence, ‘Organization’, 2015, http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/about/organization (accessed 12 April 2015).
12 Combatants for Peace, ‘About’, 2015, http://cfpeace.org/?page_id=2 (accessed 12 April 2015).
13 Ta’ayush, ‘About Ta’ayush’, 2014, http://www.taayush.org/?page_id=61 (accessed 12 April 2015).
14 A. Thomas, Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Lonely Planet Publications, 2010, p. 51.
15 Al Ghad, ‘Increasing numbers of Palestinian Druze refuse to serve in Israeli army’, in Middle East Monitor, 25 January 2014,
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/9429-increasing-numbers-of-palestinian-druze-refuse-to-serve-in-israeliarmy (accessed 12 April 2015).
16 ‘Israeli intelligence veterans’ letter to Netanyahu and military chiefs - in full’, in The Guardian, 12 September 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/12/israeli-intelligence-veterans-letter-netanyahu-military-chiefs (accessed 12 April 2015).
17 New Profile, ‘Press Release: 50 Young Israelis Send a Letter to Netanyahu: “We Refuse to Serve in the Occupation Army”’, 9 March
2014, http://www.newprofile.org/english/node/419 (accessed 12 April 2015).
18 S. Khalel and M. Vickery, ‘The refuseniks: Israeli teenagers refuse to accept draft’, in Middle East Eye, 10 July 2014,
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/refuseniks-1560753191 (accessed 12 April 2015).
19 F. Ghani, ‘Breaking Ranks: The Israeli Defense Forces’ Refuseniks’, in The Yale Globalist, 30 April 2007, http://tyglobalist.org/in-themagazine/theme/breaking-ranks-the-israeli-defense-forces-refuseniks/ (accessed 12 April 2015).
20 P. Beaumont, ‘Israeli refuseniks will be treated as criminals, says defence minister’, in The Guardian, 15 September 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/15/israeli-refuseniks-are-criminals-defence-minister (accessed 12 April 2015).
21 T. Hermann, E. Heller, N. Atmor and Y. Lebel, ‘The Israeli Democracy Index 2013: Main Findings’, The Israel Democracy Institute, 2013, p. 5.
25
Middle East & Africa
Strategies to Depoliticise
the Preservation of the Dead Sea
Vijay Prakash
The Jordan River has sustained successive settlements for over 8,000 years, only to be reduced to
sewage in a single generation.1 The construction of the 1964 Israeli National Water Carrier and the
1966 Jordanian King Abdullah Canal, which both remove water from the Jordan River as it flows
south to the Dead Sea, have had devastating effects.2 The consequent imbalance of incoming and
outgoing water to the Dead Sea has caused water levels to decline as fast as one metre per year.3 As
such, preservation of the Dead Sea stands as one of the most pressing environmental issues in the
region. Currently, the three riparian states of Israel, Palestine and Jordan, have agreed to construct
the Bahrain Canal. This project will pump water from the Red Sea back up to the Dead Sea in
the north, rather than restoring flows to the Jordan River, in order to preserve Dead Sea water
levels. However, there are a number of factors that threaten to fragment the solidarity of the joint
venture, including external actors such as Egypt becoming involved in
“
the debate.4 This article will propose that the restoration of the Jordan
the restoration of
the Jordan River is a
viable alternative to
the construction of the
Bahrain Canal, avoiding
River is a viable alternative to the construction of the Bahrain Canal,
avoiding further politicisation of water resources.
The primary stakeholders are the governments of Israel, Jordan and the
Palestinian Authority. In Israel, public sector stakeholders encompass
a number of executive agencies, such as the Ministry of Energy and
Water Resources and the Israeli Water Authority, as well as local
communities such as the Valley of Springs Regional Council.5 In the
further politicisation of
Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Palestinian Water Authority
water resources.
Ministries of Water and Irrigation, Agriculture, and Environment
”
is the relevant government agency.6 In Jordan, the governmental
have intersecting interests in preservation efforts.7 The Friends of the
Earth Middle East Association (FoEME) is an interested private entity
functioning across all three countries.8
Option A: Construction of the Bahrain Canal
The first phase of the Bahrain Canal project has already begun. The plan involves transferring
water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea. Prior to conveyance, the seawater is desalinated at a plant
Middle East & Africa
26
in the Gulf of Aqaba.9 According to a 2013 ‘memorandum of understanding’ between the Israeli
government, the Jordanian government and the Palestinian Authority, the first phase alone costs
$2.5 billion, and pumps 850 million cubic meters per year into the Dead Sea.10
However, if this option is pursued, the parties will be forced to tackle environmental and political
obstacles. The first involves the increased potential for seismic activity in the region. The
Chairman of the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority, Ahmed Ali Fadel, made this point in 2005, citing
the fragility of the Earth’s crust at the Gulf of Aqaba where the proposed canal begins.11 Further
concerns have been raised regarding the vulnerability of coral reefs in the Gulf.12 These issues run
the risk of unnecessarily antagonising Egypt and efforts towards multilateralism.
Political stagnation has already surfaced with the absence of the Palestinian Authority from the
most recent phase of signing for the project between Israel and Jordan.13 Broader diplomatic
relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority are evidently in tethers. While cooperation
is possible, current Palestinian concerns with the process are largely immobilising. Hassan
Khreisheh, the deputy head of the Palestinian Legislative Council, has expressed the belief that
Palestinians have been excluded from negotiations after fulfilling their role as a “bargaining chip”
for international legitimacy and securing initial funding.14 Journalist Ahmed Melhem highlights
Palestinian accusations that the project aims to provide cooling for Israeli nuclear reactors and
create a water barrier between the West Bank and Israel.15 Palestinian involvement is crucial for
the international support and credibility of the project.16
However, political immobility, such as that which is
already occurring, could mean the death of the Dead Sea,
and water insecurity for all riparian states.
Option B: Restoration of the
Lower Jordan River
The alternative option involves desalinating water to
reduce the overdraft of groundwater aquifers in Lake
Tiberias and the Yarmouk River, which is the Jordan
River’s largest tributary.17 This desalinated water would
then be redirected back into the Jordan River and
consequently the Dead Sea.18 While such efforts were
not inspired at the 2014 International Conference on the
Rehabilitation of the Lower Jordan River, it did commit
Israel to the construction of four desalination plants
along the Jordan River that supply 25% of the nation’s
The non-governmental organisation Friends of Earth
Middle East (FoEME) suggest that an additional 400600 million cubic metres of water would be needed
annually to environmentally re-stabilise the Lower Jordan
River.20 Although an onerous task, the FoEME contend
that rehabilitation could be justified also on economic
27
Image credit: M. Disdero
freshwater.19
Middle East & Africa
grounds due to potential profitability.21 The report on the restoration of the Lower Jordan River
acknowledges that the study is preliminary, though research on the Bahrain Canal suffers from
similar gaps in empirical knowledge.22
From a political perspective, the restoration of the Jordan River is a more attractive option, as it
would circumvent environmental concerns emanating from Egyptian authorities. Furthermore, it
would address Palestinian concerns that the Bahrain Canal serves only to further Israeli interests.
Restoring the water flow to the Jordan River could ensure water security for the region, whilst
preventing seismic interruptions and upsetting the ecosystem of the Dead Sea. The water security
of other stakeholders would be contingent on the adoption of effective joint water management
structures.23 This could allow for fairer participation for the Palestinian Authority and Jordan in
the process.
Conclusion
Securing the Bahrain Canal arrangement has brought some hope for the future of the Dead Sea
and deserves commendation. However, in light of numerous environmental consequences and
political stresses that will continue to arise as a result of the project, it is critical that the parties
reconsider the construction of the Canal. Unfettered compliance is vital for progress; this is
unlikely given recent disputes between states. Water politics threatens to halt progress towards
necessary goals in the environmental and political sphere of the region. Therefore, it would be
beneficial for the riparian states to reorientate their focus from the Bahrain Canal project towards
the restoration of the Jordan River, in order to depoliticise the preservation of the Dead Sea.
Middle East & Africa
28
References
1 B. Richter, ‘Can Desalination Help Save a Holy River?’, in National Geographic, 2 November 2014,
http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2014/11/02/can-desalination-help-save-a-holy-river/ (accessed 26 March 2015).
2 Royal HaskoningDHV, ‘Integrated Transboundary Regional NGO Master Plan for the Lower Jordan River Basin’, Friends of the
Earth Middle East, February 2014, http://foeme.org/uploads/FoEME_Baseline_Report_vs5_L.pdf, p.298 (accessed 27 March 2015).
3 S. Griffiths, ‘Slow Death of the Dead Sea: Levels of salt water are dropping by one metre every year’, in Daily Mail, 6 January 2015,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2897538/Slow-death-Dead-Sea-Levels-salt-water-dropping-one-metre-year.html
(accessed 25 March 2015).
4 Planet Ark, ‘Dead Sea-Red Sea Canal could Cause Quakes –Official’, Planet Ark, 27 July 2005, http://www.planetark.com/
dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/31801/newsDate/27-Jul-2005/story.htm (accessed 27 March 2015).
5 Royal HaskoningDHV, op. cit., p. 254.
6 Ibid., p. 255.
7 Ibid., p. 252.
8 Ibid., pp. 252-5.
9 Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Project Concept For RSDS/ Initial Phase - Red Sea Desalination Project at Aqaba, 2015,
http://www.jva.gov.jo/sites/en-us/RSDS/SiteAssets/rsds%20phase1.aspx?PageView=Shared (accessed 25 March 2015).
10 Ibid.
11 Planet Ark, op. cit.
12 Ibid.
13 A. Melhem, ‘Canal project from Dead Sea to Red Sea makes waves’, Al-monitor, 16 March 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2015/03/israel-jordan-palestine-absence-bahrain-canal-project.html (accessed 27 March 2015).
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 B. Richter, op. cit.; T. Allan, H. Malkawi, and Y. Tsur, ‘Red Sea – Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program: Study of Alternatives
at the Regional Level’, World Bank Group, December 2010, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTREDSEADEADSEA/
Resources/RDSOutlineReport_FinalDec.pdf (accessed 27 March 2015).
18 Ibid.
19 B. Richter, op. cit.
20 S. Gafny, S. Talozi and B. Al Shiekh, ‘Toward a Living Jordan River: An Environmental Flows Report on the Rehabilitation of the
Lower Jordan River’, Friends of the Earth Middle East, http://foeme.org/uploads/publications_publ117_1.pdf, p.14 (accessed 27
March 2015).
21 S. Bamya, N. Becker, E.J. Saaf, ‘Toward a Living Jordan River: A Regional Economic Benefits Study on the Rehabilitation of the
Lower Jordan River – Executive Summary’, Friends of the Earth Middle East, February 2015, p.12,
http://foeme.org/uploads/Economic_Benefits_Study_Executive_Summary_English.pdf (accessed 28 March 2015).
22 Ibid., p. 10; Friends of the Earth Middle East, ‘Projects – Red-Dead Conduit’, 2015, http://web.archive.org/web/20070405233944/http://
foeme.org/projects.php?ind=51, 2015 (accessed 25 March 2015).
23 Royal HaskoningDHV, op. cit., p. 299.
29
Middle East & Africa
Is There a Future for Tunisian Democracy?
Rose Vassel
In the five years since the beginning of the Arab Spring, many of the states whose citizens took to
the streets to protest repressive regimes have abandoned their pursuit of democracy and retreated
to authoritarianism and civil war.1 Tunisia, the catalyst of the revolution, seems to be the exception.
Tunisia’s revolution concluded with the Tunisian President of 23 years, Ben Ali, fleeing the
country on 14 January 2011. The spontaneous and largely unorganised Tunisian revolution has
been the most fruitful of all the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, ushering in a new
constitution and a democratically elected government.2 This article will explore the key factors that
differentiated Tunisia from the other states involved in the Arab awakening and that shaped its
comparatively successful response, including the presence of a politically engaged civil society. The
successes that have enabled democratic change in Tunisia are increasingly jeopardised by balancing
with security concerns, however. This poses the question: can Tunisian democracy last?
Young, educated and clinging to democratic ideals
Tunisia’s transition from dictatorship to democracy was in large part due to the highly educated
nature of the Tunisian population. Tunisia is renowned as having the best education system
in the Arab world.3 The education system is also increasingly accessible; Ben Ali’s predecessor,
Habib Bourguiba, improved access to public education for both men and women alike.4 In 2015,
approximately 80% of Tunisians were literate.5 Tunisia’s schools typically educate their students
to consider their individual actions in context, which has contributed to the invigoration of civil
society.6 Such education and literacy rates were critical in a revolution that largely originated in
progressive social media.7
Despite being well educated, however, the Tunisian population pre-revolution remained largely
employed in low-skilled industries. Under Ben Ali’s regime, Tunisia’s outputs were focused on
labour-intensive textiles, agriculture and mechanicals production.8 As a result, the educated
suffered, with over 30% of Tunisians with higher education degrees unemployed.9 When
Mohammad Bouazizi set himself alight in response to his treatment at the hands of corrupt
municipal officials,10 his protest resounded with a population enraged by the unfairness of a regime
that had manifestly failed its mandate. After the fall of Ben Ali, a strong sense of Tunisian identity
developed and morphed into a resilient civil society which Libya and Egypt were unable to achieve.
Middle East & Africa
30
Pre-existing laws and institutions
Despite having never experienced democracy prior to 2011, Tunisia has previously enshrined
rights and freedoms that have made way for the development of an empowered political society.
For instance, in 1857 a Bill of Rights was instituted to codify equality and security of property,
irrespective of religion.11 Laws pressing for the equality of women had been established long before
the revolution.12 The institution of the new, progressive constitution in 2014 was possible in the
context of a legal system that already possessed a structure for civil and political rights, despite
these rights being often blatantly disregarded by past regimes.13 As such, the focus when drafting
the constitution was on restraining executive power and legitimising political processes.14 The
outcome was the establishment of a dual executive of President and Prime Minister with clearly
delineated powers.15
Tunisian institutions also remained largely
intact after the revolution. Although Ben Ali
was notorious for his cronyism and for allowing
his family to appropriate state funds, low-level
corruption had not undermined the legitimacy
of institutions in the same way that it had in
Libya.16 As a result, reform has been focused on
expelling Ben Ali’s ruling party and opening
up the country to the creation of new political
organisations and associations.
Perhaps most importantly, the Tunisian military
remained largely uninvolved in the revolution,
allowing diverse political views to develop in a
society unhindered by military pressure. Unlike
in several other Arab regimes, the Tunisian army
did not interfere in domestic affairs throughout
the rule of Ben Ali, who used only the police
force to maintain domestic security.17 While it
has been reported that the military has resisted
Image credit: Amine Ghrabi
change during the governmental transition,18 it does not have enough power to dominate the state’s
population. This is in stark contrast to the situation in Egypt, where the military has retained a
central political position from before the revolution,19 deposing the democratically elected Muslim
Brotherhood and taking power in 2013.
Engaging political actors
Steps were taken in the immediate aftermath of the revolution to engage political actors in a
dialogue about Tunisia’s future. A high commission for political reform was created. Designed to
be inclusive, it rapidly expanded to include 150 members, three from each political party.20 Prior to
the revolution, Islamist and secularist groups had met to discuss future prospects and conditions
of democracy,21 setting a precedent for inclusive dialogue with diverse groups of Tunisian society.
Such engagement of political actors both before and after the revolution meant that parties were
31
Middle East & Africa
involved in the process of democratisation, despite having divergent expectations.22 Tunisia’s first
free and democratic parliamentary and presidential elections, held in late 2014 with a 59% turnout,23
are a testament to the success of this approach towards democracy for Tunisia.
Future prospects
Tunisia faced two political assassinations in 2013 and the dissolution of two transitional
governments to achieve its first free elections.24 Despite these struggles, Tunisia is the last remaining
testament that the ideals of the Arab Spring have been upheld. However, these ideals are potentially
jeopardised by the state precariously balancing security and order with
“
democracy cannot
flourish without security
and order, but nor will it
flourish in the absence of
civil and political rights
and freedoms.
”
rights and freedoms.
Militant religious violence, terrorism and the exodus of people leaving
to fight in Syria and Libya has inspired among in some citizens a
nostalgia for the security demanded by Ben Ali’s repressive regime.25
In this context, the attack on the Bardo Museum on 18 March 2015, that
left 17 foreigners and two Tunisians dead, has brought the freedom
versus security debate into the limelight.26 Democracy cannot flourish
without security and order, but nor will it flourish in the absence of
civil and political rights and freedoms.
Many of the calls for social and economic rights that spurred the
revolution remain unanswered. Under Ben Ali’s regime, a hierarchy separated the disadvantaged
non-coastal and southern regions from the coastal areas of the north that attracted tourism and
foreign investment.27 The distinction went largely unaddressed by Ennahda, the Islamist party that
led the transitional government up until the 2014 elections. This has been coupled with an increase
in the prosecutions of journalists since 2012, culminating in the January 2015 arrest of Yassine Ayari.
Ayari, a prominent blogger, criticised the Minister of Defence in comments said to be defamatory
of the armed forces, earning him a one-year jail sentence.28
Conclusions
Tunisia’s successful transition to democracy since the 2011 revolution is a testament to its engaged
civil and political society. However, Tunisia’s democracy will now largely depend on the newly
inaugurated President Essebsi. It remains to be seen whether the attacks on the Bardo museum
and threats of militant religious violence will prompt the government to adopt a heavy-handed
approach to domestic security, quashing civil and political rights as in some other Arab regimes.
In order to be perceived as legitimate and maintain the support of the Tunisian people, the
government should address the socio-economic disparities that partially incited the revolution.
Civilian discontent, in combination with fear of violence, is the perfect recipe for a retreat to
authoritarianism. While Tunisian civil and political engagement ensured the success of the
2011 revolution, it remains to be seen whether Tunisia can overcome the challenges to its newly
democratic status, or if it will follow Egypt and Libya in falling victim to the conflicts that plague
the region.
Middle East & Africa
32
References
1 Including Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. See generally T. Masoud, ‘Has the Door Closed on Arab diplomacy?’, Journal of
Democracy, vol. 26, no. 1, 2015, pp. 74-87.
2 L. Anderson, ‘Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90,
no. 3, 2011, p. 4.
3 Ibid., p. 3.
4 H. Sanborn and C.L. Thyne, ‘Learning Democracy: Education and the Fall of Authoritarian Regimes’, British Journal of Political
Science, vol. 44, no. 4, 2014, p. 790.
5Masoud, op. cit., p. 80.
6Sanborn, op. cit., pp. 790-791.
7 N. Miladi, ‘Tunisia: a media led revolution?’, Al Jazeera, 17 January 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2011/01/2011116142317498666.html (accessed 10 April 2015).
8 P. Trape, M. Chauvin and H. Salah, ‘Tunisia 2014’, in African Economic Outlook, 2014, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/
fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Tunisie_EN.pdf (accessed 10 April 2015).
9Sanborn, op. cit., p. 791.
10 Al Jazeera, ‘Tunisian protester dies of burns’, 5 January 2011, in Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
africa/2011/01/201115101926215588.html (accessed 2 April 2015),
11 F. Blibech, A. Driss, and P. Longo, ‘Citizenship in post-awakening Tunisia: power shifts and conflicting perspectives’, Democracy and
citizenship in North Africa after the Arab Awakening: challenges for EU & US foreign policy, Centre for Mediterranean and International
Studies, February 2014, p. 1.
12 G.N. Sfeir, ‘The Tunisian Code of Personal Status (Majallat Al-Ahw Al Al-Shakhsiy Ah)’, Middle East Journal, vol. 11, no. 3, 1957,
pp. 309-318.
13Blibech, op. cit. p. 1.
14 A. Billingsley, ‘Writing constitutions in the wake of the Arab Spring: the challenge of consolidating democracy’, in Foreign Affairs,
30 Nov 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136699/anthony-billingsley/writing-constitutions-in-the-wake-of-the-arabspring (accessed 2 April 2015).
15 D. Pickard, ‘Prospects for Implementing Democracy in Tunisia’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 19, no. 2, 2014, p. 261.
16 Anderson, op. cit., p. 3.
17 A. Stepan and JJ. Linz, ‘Democratisation Theory and the “Arab Spring”’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 24, no. 2, 2013, p. 29.
18Blibech, op. cit., p. 9.
19Billingsley, op. cit.
20Pickard, op. cit., p. 260.
21Stepan, op. cit., p. 23.
22Pickard, op. cit., p. 260.
23 M. Casey-Baker, ‘Essebssi claims victory in Tunisia’s presidential elections’, in Foreign Policy, 22 December 2014,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/22/essebsi-claims-victory-in-tunisias-presidential-election/ (accessed 10 April 2015).
24Blibech, op. cit., p. 2.
25 S.S. Cordall, ‘A cloud descends on Tunisia’, in Foreign Policy, 21 March 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/21/a-cloud-descendson-tunisia/ (accessed 3 April 2015).
26 Ibid.
27Blibech, op. cit., p. 2.
28 A. Ghribi, ‘Another blow to freedom of speech in Tunisia’, in Foreign Policy, 23 January 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/23/
another-blow-to-freedom-of-speech-in-tunisia-ayari/ (accessed7 April 2015).
33
Middle East & Africa
United States Neo-Isolationism:
The Implications of Economic Recovery
for US Regional Alliances
Michael Chi
On 13 April 2015, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute made its annual press
release detailing worldwide military expenditure, and noted that spending had fallen for the third
year in a row.1 United States military spending in particular fell by 6.5%, with close allies France, the
United Kingdom, Germany, and other NATO partners demonstrating similar decreases.2 While
so-called ‘low-intensity conflicts’ seem to be on the rise, the past three years of military spending
figures are a rare piece of good news, and may suggest that the international community has been
better able to respond to traditional security threats.
However, increasing commentary from within the US, particularly in the aftermath of the global
economic crisis, has begun to critically question how the US engages with its regional allies. While
‘2014 was a black year for European security’3 due to the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
and the crisis in Ukraine, increasing attention has been called for in the US towards the issue of
unequal burden sharing between the US and its allies.
This article seeks to examine how structural trends in US regional alliances have resulted in
a disproportionate amount of US carriage of the ‘allied burden’. It will further consider what
repercussions this has had for the US willingness to continue to engage in allied frameworks.
The structure of US security alliances
Jens Stoltenberg was appointed the new Secretary-General of NATO in October 2014. The
Secretary-General’s first annual report, published in January 2015, outlined several key issues that
the 28 countries of the collective defence alliance will face. Stoltenberg focuses particularly on the
results of the September 2014 NATO Summit in Wales and the ‘Readiness Action Plan’ - a ‘pledge
to stop the cuts in defence spending, to aim to spend 2% of Gross Domestic Product on defence
within a decade, and to spend that money more efficiently’.4
Americas
34
This ‘pledge’ has become a sticking point between the NATO allied nations. NATO seeks to
ensure collective self-defence, originating from Article 5 of the Treaty, whereby ‘the Parties
agree that an armed attack against one or more [allied nations] in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all’.5 As a result, researchers have noted that NATO’s
collective defence is a ‘public good’.6 That is, the benefits of defence spending are ‘non-excludable’
(publicly and freely available once ‘purchased’) and ‘non-rivalrous in consumption’ (one state’s
consumption does not deny the good to another state) amongst alliance members.7
NATO provides a public good, as its collective defence guarantee acts to ensure regional security
by deterring potential aggressors. This form of defence is non-excludable and non-rivalrous
‘among allies insofar as [their] ability to deter an attack is independent of the number of allies (or
citizens) on whose behalf the retaliatory threat is made, so long as the promised action is automatic
and credible’.8
Unfortunately, because the public goods that
“
the largest ally will bear
a disproportionate share
NATO provides are so freely accessible, there
are two key consequences that follow. First, the
largest ally will bear a disproportionate share
of the defence burden of the alliance, because
of the defence burden
second, it is easier for smaller allies to under-
of the alliance because
supply their contribution to the public good
it is easier for smaller
without a noticeable effect on the alliance’s
ability to defend its borders, compared to
larger sharers of the burden.9 Importantly, this
allies to under-supply
deterrence is accessible to most US allies, with
their contribution to the
the US having signed a further 26 mutual-
public good
‘strategic ambiguity’ to do most of the legwork
”
defence treaty obligations,10 and relying on
in deterring aggressors with the possibility of
US intervention.
The burden-sharing problem
The burden-sharing dilemma has proven to be a persuasive issue and, in the recent string of budget
proposals from US allies, has become an increasingly central part of US foreign relations. President
Obama stated prior to the Wales Summit that ‘“every NATO member has to do its fair share” by
committing “a proportional amount” of resources to the common security’.11 At that time, out of 28
NATO members, only the UK, US, Estonia and Greece were meeting the 2% or more GDP target,
resulting in the United States accounting for a staggering 75% of NATO military spending in 2013.12
Implications on the US hegemonic structure
Increasing commentary from US media, NGOs, think-tanks and ‘grey literature’ has focused
on the problem of allied ‘free-riders’.13 ‘The security free-riding narrative proposes that ‘many
Americans believe the United States carri es a disproportionate burden for the alliance and that
35
Americas
it should not continue to do so when many of the European allies are not willing to invest in
their own defence’.14 This has resulted in disenchantment in the US electorate, with a 2015 poll
indicating that only 58% of responders still believe NATO is essential.15 Increasingly, books such as
America in Retreat (2014) suggest there is a growing return to
U.S. isolationism.16
“
While no other US alliance has required pledges or commitments to 2%
if the perceived costs
of GDP spending targets, US concerns over the contributions of other
of a hegemonic system,
regional partners in Asia,17 the willingness of steadfast allies to jump
on board with the Shanghai-based ‘Asian Infrastructure Investment
such as that which the
Bank’,18 coupled with a perception of European backsliding in NATO
US maintains, become
disenchantment with its regional allies across the board. Furthermore,
greater than its benefits,
this equilibrium becomes
a disequilibrium in the
international system
”
since the end of the Cold War, have resulted in considerable American
the US is limited in what pressure it can apply to these alliances
without losing the credibility of its security guarantees.
Hegemonic stability theorist Robert Gilpin would argue that this comes
with the territory; the U.S. is simply experiencing the demands placed
on it during a time of economic uncertainty. However, he would also
caution US allies against allowing such structural deficits and voter
disenchantment to continue. If the perceived costs of a hegemonic
system, such as that which the US maintains, become greater than
its benefits, this equilibrium becomes a disequilibrium in the international system, and if ‘the
disequilibrium is not resolved, then the system will be changed’. 19
Conclusion
The current three year-long reduction in global military expenditure, while stemming in part from
budgetary responses to enable economic recovery, has occurred alongside the development of a
disequilibrium in U.S. alliances. The US has begun to view the costs of its burden-sharing role in
key alliances such as NATO as greater than the benefits it receives. The increasingly isolationist
sentiment that has resulted comes at the cost of the credibility and strength of future relationships
the United States engages in, and calls into question the stable continuance of the hegemonic
status quo the US has maintained to date.
Americas
36
References
1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, ‘13 Apr. 2015: US military spending falls, increases in eastern Europe,
Middle East, Africa and Asia says SIPRI’, 13 April 2015, http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/milex-april-2015 (accessed 24
April 2015).
2 Ibid.
3 Jens Stoltenberg, NATO, ‘The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2014’, 30 January 2015.
4 Ibid.
5 North Atlantic Treaty, art. 5, 4 April 1949, 63 Stat. 2241. 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
6 J.A.C, Conybeare, ‘The Portfolio Benefits of Free Riding in Military Alliances’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 3,
September 1994, p. 406.
7 T. Plumper and E. Neumayer, ‘Free-Riding in Alliances: Testing an Old Theory With a New Method’, Conflict and Peace Science,
forthcoming, 2015, p. 6, http://www.lse.ac.uk/geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/neumayer/pdf/Free-riding-inAlliances.pdf (accessed 25 April 2015).
8 T. Sandler and K. Hatley, ‘Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action’, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 39, no. 3,
September 2001, p. 872.
9 Plumer and Neumayer, op. cit., p. 6.
10 S. Rasmussen, ‘Ready to Cut Military Spending’, in Reason Magazine, October 2012, http://reason.com/archives/2012/09/17/ready-tocut-military-spending (accessed 25 April 2015).
11 J. Joyner, ‘Europe’s Free Ride on the American-Defense Gravy Train’, The National Interest, 13 July 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/
feature/europes-free-ride-the-american-defense-gravy-train-10864 (accessed 25 April 2015).
12 N. Benashel and J. Stokes, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, ‘The U.S. Defense Budget and the Future of Alliance
Burden-Sharing’, Transatlantic Security Task Force Series, November 2013, p. 2.
13 D. Larson, ‘Free-Riding Allies and the Myth of U.S. Indispensability’, The American Conservative, 28 May 2014, http://www.
theamericanconservative.com/larison/free-riding-allies-and-the-myth-of-us-indispensability/ (accessed 25 April 2015); S.M. Walt,
‘What Obama Should Say at West Point, But Won’t’, in Foreign Policy, 27 May 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/27/
what-obama-should-say-at-west-point-but-wont (accessed 25 April 2015); G. Rachman. ‘US Allies Must Come to the Party Over
Security’, in Business Day Live, 4 September 2014, http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/09/04/us-allies-must-come-tothe-party-over-security (accessed 25 April 2015).
14 Benashel and Stokes, op. cit., p. 1.
15 K. Donfried, ‘Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2014’, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, September 2014, p. 45.
16 B. Stephens, America in Retreat: The New Isolationism and the Coming Global Disorder, Sentinel, New York City, 2014.
17 J. Logan, ‘Asia’s Free-Riders’, in Foreign Policy, 9 November 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/09/asias-free-riders/ (accessed 25
April 2015).
18 S. Tiezzi, ‘China’s AIIB: The Final Tally’, in The Diplomat, 17 April 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-aiib-the-final-tally/
(accessed 25 April 2015).
19 R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, p. 186.
37
Americas
A Tsunami of Ageing: How Will Low- and
Middle-Income Countries Respond to the
Rising Tide of Dementia?
Monica Cations
Dr Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organisation (WHO), opened the
first Ministerial Conference on Global Action against Dementia in March 2015 by describing the
projected increase in dementia prevalence as an ‘oncoming tidal wave’.1 Dr Chan refers to the
prediction that the number of dementia cases worldwide, currently at 47.5 million, is expected to
double every 20 years for the foreseeable future.2 She succinctly summarised the most worrying
feature of this increase by remarking that ‘about 60% of this disease burden falls on low- and
middle-income countries, which have the least capacity to cope’.3
Dementia is a collective term to describe conditions, most commonly Alzheimer’s disease, that
cause progressive deficits to memory, cognition, language and functioning. For the person
diagnosed and their family, dementia can be associated with profound loss, grief and burden.
Moreover, the financial costs are staggering; from productivity loss to community and residential
care, these are projected to top US$1.2 trillion by 2030.4
An unequal burden
There are a number of reasons why the expected increase in dementia cases will disproportionately
affect low- to middle-income countries (LMICs). The majority of the worldwide population, and
two-thirds of people living with dementia, reside in LMICs.5 As socioeconomic development
proceeds, these regions move through the ‘health transition’, in which disease burden moves from
communicable to non-communicable causes. Accordingly, LMICs are experiencing demographic
ageing and an associated rise in dementia incidence at a sharper rate (246%) than high-income
countries (131%).6 The health transition is particularly relevant in the case of dementia, to which
some communicable disease is etiologically related. For example, it is estimated that up to half of
those living with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) will develop an associated cognitive
impairment,7 with the most severe cases occurring when antiretroviral treatment is unavailable
or is delayed. Currently, less than 40% of people with HIV in LMICs receive timely treatment,8
potentially adding many millions to current dementia projections.
Global Health
38
Adding a third layer of insult is that residents of LMICs experience, and will continue to
experience, disproportionate exposure to known environmental and lifestyle risk factors for
dementia. This includes poorer access to education and higher rates of prenatal insult and dietary
deficiencies. A growth in exposure to cardiovascular risk factors is also predicted with increasing
urbanisation.9 Finally, lack of awareness and barriers to diagnosis mean that the current prevalence
of dementia in LMICs is probably underestimated.10 As detection and diagnosis improve, so too
will the number of people eligible for social and financial aid.
Taking cover
Appropriate dementia diagnosis, treatment and care require sophisticated social and financial
infrastructure that even the most developed regions have not yet mastered. To implement such
infrastructure with their already limited resources, LMICs will need to take a multidimensional
approach with particular focus on the below:
Research
The first step in responding to a problem is to understand its scope and impact. In this race, LMICs
have always been far behind; the vast majority of dementia research has long been conducted
in high-income countries.11 In 1998, the 10/66 Dementia Research Group was established to
rectify this problem, largely funded by bodies in high-income nations or by the WHO. The 10/66
Dementia Research Group has since significantly improved knowledge of dementia prevalence,
diagnosis, risk profiles and impact in LMICs, but gaps are still noticeable. Much remains unknown
about how specific cultures are impacted by and might respond to a rise in cases. Group leaders
“
argue that responsibility for funding this research
must be shared amongst higher and lower income
it has been established
nations, recognising the collective benefit that
that people with
would result.12
dementia and
Social protections in old age
their families are
A crucial element of the dementia response in
more likely to
It has been established that people with dementia
LMICs will be to address intersections with poverty.
and their families are more likely to experience
experience financial
financial disadvantage.13 Most LMICs do not
disadvantage.
provide disability benefits to people with dementia,
”
and pension coverage is not comprehensive.14
Multi-generational co-residence is a norm in many
LMICs, and dependents are often expected to shoulder the financial burden of care. Despite
reducing state costs in the short term, this model ultimately adds to them; caregivers are forced
to leave the workforce prematurely, and development stalls as increasingly educated residents are
forced back into the home.
Sustainable poverty reduction schemes are required that consider the implications of dementia on
the whole family unit. The implementation of social pensions for the elderly has been suggested
to help to break the cycle of chronic, intergenerational poverty.15 In LMICs, pensions can make up
39
Global Health
more than a third of the household income, improving
living conditions for the whole family.16 Moreover,
older people are known to invest the money they have
into the education and health of their dependents,
which ultimately advances a country’s socioeconomic
development.17 Most importantly, pensions ease
dependency as paid/formal care becomes
more affordable.
Workforce capacity building
While freedom from poverty also facilitates better access
to health care, a long focus on managing acute medical
conditions has left health providers in LMICs with limited
understanding of the appropriate management of chronic
disease.18 Changes to medical and nursing curricula and
a broader role for specialists are required to appropriately
meet increasing demand.
Awareness
Finally, the need for and value of dementia awareness is high; some LMIC cultures remain
unfamiliar with the concept of neurocognitive disease, and many perceive dementia as a normal
and anticipated part of ageing.19 This creates critical barriers to diagnosis and receipt of care, and
alleviates pressure on policy makers to provide adequate care services.
Knowledge of the early signs of dementia can lead to earlier diagnosis, allow for future
planning, and facilitate access to peer support, known to protect against psychological
distress.20 Understanding the modifiable risk factors for dementia can encourage preventative
health behaviours in early and mid-life, ultimately reducing late-life incidence of disease
(and associated costs). Community awareness can also affect policy change. For example, the
Australian government recognised dementia as a national health priority in 2012 after many
years of lobbying from consumer and advocacy groups. Since then, funding for dementia has
increased significantly, including an AUS$200 million boost to research announced in the 2014
budget.21
Conclusion
Efforts to steel LMICs for the oncoming tidal wave are moving forward. Leaders from 80
countries, 80 philanthropic foundations, 45 non-governmental organisations and four United
Nations agencies signed the call for dementia action drafted by the WHO in March 2015. They
committed to increasing public awareness, risk reduction campaigns, workforce capacity
building and improvements to care, particularly in LMICs.22 It is increasingly apparent that only
a coordinated approach between low, middle and high-income regions will allow LMICs to
implement the infrastructure they need, but whether in-kind commitment transpires to effective
action remains to be seen.
Global Health
40
References
1 M. Chan, ‘Opening remarks at the First WHO Ministerial Conference on Global Action against Dementia’, Geneva, Switzerland,
17 March 2015, para. 3, http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/dementia-conference/en/ (accessed 4 April 2015).
2 World Health Organization, ‘Dementia: A global health priority’, World Health Organisation, 2009,
http://www.who.int/mental_health/neurology/dementia/en/ (accessed 2 February 2014).
3Chan, op. cit., para. 5.
4 World Health Organization, op. cit.
5 C.P. Ferri et al., ‘Global Prevalence of Dementia: a Delphi Consensus Study’, The Lancet, vol. 366(9503), 2005, pp. 2112-2117.
6 M. Prince et al., ‘The Global Prevalence of Dementia: A Systematic Review and Metaanalysis’, Alzheimer’s & Dementia, vol. 9(1), 2013,
pp. 63-75.
7 R.A. Cohen, T.R Seider and B. Navia, ‘HIV Effects on Age-associated Neurocognitive Dysfunction: Premature Cognitive Aging or
Neurodegenerative Disease?’, Alzheimer’s Research & Therapy, vol. 7(37), 2015, pp. 37-47.
8 World Health Organisation, ‘Global update on the health sector response to HIV’, World Health Organisation, July 2014,
http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/progressreports/update2014/en/ (accessed 7 April 2015).
9 S. Norton et al., ‘Potential for Primary Prevention of Alzheimer’s Disease: an Analysis of Population-based Data’, Lancet Neurology,
vol. 13(8), 2014, pp. 788-794.
10Prince, op cit.
11 M. Prince et al., ‘Ageing and Dementia in Low and Middle Income Countries - Using Research to Engage with Public and Policy
Makers’, International Review of Psychiatry, vol. 20(4), 2008, pp. 332–343.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 L.E. Garcez-Leme, M. Deckers-Leme and D.V. Espino, ‘Geriatrics in Brazil: a Big Country with Big Opportunities’, Journal of the
American Geriatrics Society, vol. 53(11), 2005, pp. 2018–2022.
17 Prince, 2008, op. cit.
18 R. Beaglehole, ‘Improving the Prevention and Management of Chronic Disease in Low-income and Middle-income Countries: a
Priority for Primary Health Care’, The Lancet, vol. 372(9642), 2008, pp.940–949.
19 Prince, 2008, op. cit.
20 R. Schulz and L.M. Martire, ‘Family Caregiving of Persons with Dementia: Prevalence, Health Effects, and Support Strategies’,
The American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, vol. 12(3), 2004, pp. 240–249.
21 National Health and Medical Research Council, ‘NHMRC unveils plan for $200m dementia boost’, National Health and Medical
Research Council, 8 August 2014, https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/media/releases/2014/nhmrc-unveils-plan-200m-dementia-boost
(accessed 6 April 2015).
22 World Health Organisation, ‘Governments commit to advancements in dementia research and care’, World Health Organisation,
17 March 2015, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2015/action-on-dementia/en/ (accessed 2 April 2015).
41
Global Health
Responding to the Ebola Crisis:
Perspectives from the Field
Interview: Emilie Fourrey, Médecins Sans Frontières, Liberia
Over the past year, thousands of health care
to its Ebola management centres and treated 5,170
workers have been deployed to West Africa to
patients confirmed with Ebola, of whom 2,956 died.
respond to the deadliest outbreak of the Ebola
Fourteen MSF staff also lost their lives to Ebola
virus in history. The situation has been described
across West Africa.
as the perfect storm – an epidemic that has swept
across borders into countries that lack sufficiently
strong health institutions to treat it. Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF), also known as Doctors Without
Borders, was one of the earliest organisations to put
out a warning call in 2013 about the virus’ potential
to spread from Guinea to the region. Since then,
it has played a focal part in the international
medical aid response to the crisis. We spoke to
Emilie Fourrey, a Médecins Sans Frontières France
fieldworker recently working in Monrovia, Liberia,
about the response to the Ebola crisis.
Q1. Liberia has been the country worst affected
by the Ebola virus outbreak. What is the current
atmosphere like on the ground in Liberia? Are
people scared, frustrated or optimistic about
the crisis?
With 10,212 cases of Ebola and 4,573 deaths, Liberia
has been badly hit by the current outbreak. The
peak of the outbreak in Liberia occurred between
August and October 2014, when MSF opened what
became the world’s largest Ebola management
centre, ELWA 3, in Monrovia, with a total capacity
of 400 beds. In Liberia, MSF admitted 9,470 people
Global Health
I went to Liberia twice over the course of the
epidemic. The first time was in October 2014, at a
time when the number of cases was extremely high.
People were very scared, as it seemed that there
was little hope that we would be able to control the
outbreak in the near future. When I returned in
February 2015, the mood had clearly improved a lot,
as the number of cases had dropped significantly
(the last case of Ebola was reported on 28 March
2015 in Liberia).
The curfew that had been imposed nationwide
since the middle of 2014 was lifted at the end of
February, schools reopened, and people generally
started getting back to a relatively ‘normal’ life.
However, I think the fear of a new outbreak will
remain present for months amongst the population,
and the consequences of the epidemic, which are
yet to be fully measured, will affect the country well
beyond the last case of the disease.
This month was a very significant step for Liberia,
as the country was finally declared ‘Ebola-free’ on
9 May by the World Health Organisation (WHO),
after 42 days without a case being reported.
42
Q2. What have your typical activities as an MSF
fieldworker in Liberia been?
I worked as the Medical Coordinator for the French
section of MSF in Liberia. My position involved
the coordination of the various medical activities
implemented by MSF in the country as a response
to the Ebola outbreak. MSF France did not operate
any Ebola Treatment Units for infected patients.
Our programs were oriented towards community
outreach activities, and support for ‘non-Ebola’
health facilities.
partners working in the country, as well as the
Ministry of Health of Liberia. MSF worked closely
with other agencies, and was a key part of the Ebola
response coordination mechanisms that were put
in place in the country. However, in my opinion,
coordination of partners has been one of the
main issues during this crisis. There were a lot of
organisations involved, and it felt sometimes that
a lack of communication and information-sharing
was slowing down the humanitarian response.
appropriately refer eventual cases. Finally, we
Q4. In late 2014, a controversial armed
lockdown was imposed on the Ebola-affected
West Point township in Monrovia by the
Liberian government. Did you find that
quarantine made it more or less difficult for
healthcare workers to control the spread of
the virus?
opened a paediatric hospital in Monrovia to respond
The question of quarantine was a highly
At the community level, we worked to increase
awareness of Ebola by promoting messages on
the disease and its prevention. We strengthened
infection control in health centres across Monrovia
in order to increase their capacity to detect and
to the lack of paediatric beds available, as the health
system was greatly affected by the outbreak. As
the medical coordinator, I was also responsible
for response collaboration and for monitoring the
health of our staff, both international and
controversial issue during the outbreak. While
there is no medical evidence to justify quarantining
contacts in the context of an Ebola outbreak, this
measure was somehow implemented in an attempt
definitely a challenge.
Q3. How has your role as a
fieldworker changed over the
course of the crisis? What kind of
interaction or collaboration have
you had with local and international
response efforts?
My role was not ‘clinical’ in this
assignment. What changed mostly,
Image credit and copyright: Morgana Wingard
national, which in such a context was
from my perspective, was the focus
of our operational priorities as the
number of Ebola cases decreased. From
the beginning of 2015, the focus shifted
significantly towards ‘early recovery’
and restoring basic health services in
Liberia, which have not functioned
since the middle of 2014.
My role involved strong coordination
with other sections of MSF and other
43
All healthcare workers must wear full Personal Protective Gear (PPEs). Before they cross over into the
hot zone, or patient area at ELWA3. A mirror next to the entrance reminds them to check their PPEs for
any holes or openings. This could mean the difference between life and death. ELWA3 is the Ebola Case
Management Center run by MSF in Monrovia.
Global Health
to try to control the spread of the virus. MSF did
not support the use of quarantine, and we strongly
advocated against it.
People who have been in contact with Ebola-
Leone. What do you think explains this
pattern, and what kind of measures do MSF
fieldworkers take to prevent the spread of the
disease back to Liberia?
infected patients need to be closely followed up
As mentioned, Liberia reached 42 days without a
during a 21-day period to observe whether they
new confirmed case in May. However, the outbreak
develop symptoms of the infection or not. However,
is still ongoing in neighbouring Guinea and Sierra
until they show these symptoms, they are not
Leone, so we cannot say that Ebola is over just yet.
contagious, even if they have been contaminated.
Vigilance against re-emergence is key and close
The misconceptions regarding quarantine, and
surveillance is crucial. MSF remains in Liberia and
the stigma that this brought, definitely had a
still has the capacity to respond to health needs
negative impact in my opinion. People denied
and crises.
Ebola contact to avoid being quarantined, which
is understandable if you consider that they would
then have limited access to financial income, food
and other services, aside from the psychological and
social impacts of quarantine for their families.
emergence of Ebola; there must be strengthened
epidemiological surveillance and the rapid response
alert system must be maintained if a new Ebola
case occurs. In particular, the potential impact of
the rainy season on the spread of the epidemic
is unknown. There must be continued contact
tracing, community awareness and regional
cooperation. Given the high mobility of the
population across the three most affected countries,
surveillance must be ensured across borders and
coordinated on a regional level.
Image credit and copyright: Malin Lager/MSF
Q5. The porous nature of West African borders
has played a significant role in facilitating the
spread of Ebola into neighbouring countries.
At the moment, cases of Ebola have been
declining in Liberia, but are still climbing in
neighbouring countries Guinea and Sierra
Liberia must remain vigilant against a re-
Practical collaboration between
surveillance teams based in each
country needs to be implemented
as soon as possible to avoid
importing new cases into areas
considered ‘Ebola-free’.
Q6. When you began work in
Liberia, were you confronted
with initial widespread denial of
Ebola by the general population?
Did you encounter any mistrust
towards yourself as a foreign
healthcare worker from the
communities you worked in?
Yes, we definitely did, although
A survivor of the deadly Ebola virus puts her hand print on a survivors’ wall erected by MSF at its ELWA-3
Ebola Management Center in Monrovia.
Global Health
Liberia was perhaps not so much
affected by this issue than Guinea,
44
where there were actually some violent reactions of
need. During the outbreak, non-Ebola needs were
the population directed towards health workers.
neglected, resulting in children going unvaccinated
While I never felt any hostility personally, there
was clearly some mistrust about the work of NGOs
in general and MSF, as we were on the frontline.
Denial is very much a normal human reaction
and becoming prone to diseases such as measles,
and pregnant women being forced to risk the health
of themselves and their babies by giving birth at
home. These need to be addressed as priorities.
when you are confronted with grief and loss.
MSF is helping to look after health needs in
However, I think the way communication about
Liberia, post-Ebola, by running a paediatric patient
the response was handled with communities, at
clinic in Monrovia. It is also working with the
least initially, was not optimal. There was much to
Liberian Ministry of Health to carry out a measles
do very quickly once we realised the scale of the
vaccination campaign, currently underway across
crisis, and as much as we tried to ensure strong
three districts in the capital.
community outreach activities, it was difficult for
the general population to fully understand what
we were doing and why, especially as our activities
were confronting to some of the communities’
cultural beliefs.
Q7. The Ebola crisis exposed the weaknesses of
West African healthcare systems in response to
emergencies. Is MSF involved at all in trying to
improve the resilience of these systems?
Q8. What do you think are the most important
lessons we can take away from the challenges
of responding to the Ebola outbreak? Do you
feel the response has been effective enough
in hindsight?
The international community failed to qualify the
Ebola outbreak as a major humanitarian crisis in
a timely way, which had negative consequences
on the response and contributed to the loss of
With a national health workforce that has been
lives. The main lesson learnt for Liberia and the
decimated by the outbreak – nearly 200 Liberian
international community is simply that we were all
health care workers died from Ebola – Liberia will
too late and too slow to start the response.
need significant support from the international
community to rebuild a functioning health system
with adequate human and material resources.
Liberians must feel confident they can go to
hospital once again and have their healthcare
needs looked after. The international community
must support Liberia – and Guinea and Sierra
Leone – in rebuilding a strong and affordable
national health system with adequate human and
material resources.
Now that the peak of the Ebola crisis looks to
be over in Liberia, non-Ebola health needs must
be addressed as an urgent priority to ensure that
people do not continue to die of treatable diseases
such as malaria and diarrhoea. Many hospitals
have shut, health workers have died or fled, and
few people have access to the level of care they
45
Governments of affected countries and the WHO
should have recognised much earlier that this
outbreak required a more hands-on response. It
would be a mistake to attribute full responsibility
for the dysfunctional response to just one agency
– rather, there was a general lack of recognition
and willingness to assume responsibility for a
robust response. For months, unequipped national
health authorities and volunteers from a private
aid organisation bore the brunt of care – there is
something profoundly wrong about that.
The humanitarian and international community
also took a long time to fully organise a strong
coordination of efforts to improve the efficiency of
our interventions. This clearly delayed and weighed
down the response.
Global Health
Maternal Health in the Syrian Conflict
Emma Holloway
“There is no peace without development, there is no
development without peace.”
Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, 20131
Conflict has long been recognised as a hindrance to human development in all its forms. This
article will explore the damage caused by the ongoing civil war in Syria to essential health services,
with a particular focus on maternal health,2 and the international response to an increasingly
critical health care situation.
The maternal health and development nexus
Maternal health is a central indicator and goal of international development, as indicated by its
inclusion in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG).3 MDG Goal Number
5 aimed to reduce the global maternal mortality rate by three-quarters between 1990 and 2014,
and to ensure universal access for all women to reproductive health services by 2015.4 Some
global improvements have been made in that period: the maternal mortality ratio dropped by
approximately 45% between 1990 and 2013, the proportion of deliveries attended in developing
regions by professional health workers rose by 12% between 1990 and 2012 and the amount of
women receiving antenatal care increased by nearly 20%. However, there is still a long way to go.5
The maternal mortality ratio continues to be much lower in Less-Developed Countries (LDCs),
and only half of women in LDCs receive the level of health care they require.6
Although the health care and development situation in many parts of the world signals progress,
the protracted and violent conflict in Syria has resulted in the destruction of vital health
infrastructure and continues to worsen, hindering access to even basic maternal health services for
women in the region.7
Declining maternal health in Syria
Before the war, health indicators in Syria had significantly improved in a number of key areas,
including life expectancy, infant mortality and maternal mortality.8 Maternal health care standards
Global Health
46
were considered relatively high for a developing country, with the maternal mortality ratio
dropping from 482 to 52 deaths per 100,000 live births from 1970 to 2009.9 Furthermore, 96% of
women had medical assistance during childbirth.10
However, since the Syrian uprising in March 2011 and the resulting civil war, the health system in
Syria has critically deteriorated. The progress made in maternal health over the past four decades
has reversed as the availability and quality of care worsens.11 Health infrastructure has been
largely destroyed. By 2014, 60% of hospitals and 38% of health care facilities were devastated, and
personnel have resorted to creating makeshift hospitals (for example in living rooms).12 Large
numbers of healthcare staff have been killed or imprisoned, with many more fleeing the escalating
conflict.13 By 2014, nearly 50% of Syria’s doctors had left the country, leaving inexperienced
and underqualified staff to perform complex operations.14 Ambulances, medical supplies and
equipment needed for maternal care and delivery have became increasingly scarce.15 Women
continue to experience reduced access to even the
limited available health services, as roadblocks became
more common and transport options more restricted.16
A recent survey indicates that less than one quarter of
women have frequent access to reproductive health
services, with some women having none at all.17
This lack of access to and quality of maternal health
services has taken a devastating toll on women and
children alike. Giving birth in a limited or unattended
setting in the midst of a civil war is both psychologically
distressing and extremely risky. Women are exposed to
higher risks of infections and complications, and babies
are at risk of premature birth, infection and disease and
generally lower health scores.18
“
Women continue to
experience reduced
access to even the
limited available health
services, as roadblocks
became more common
and transport options
more restricted.
International Response
”
The maternal health care situation in Syria is well and truly critical. As Save the Children
commented in a recent report, ‘Syria’s humanitarian crisis has become a devastating health crisis’.19
There has been some response by members of the international community to this situation, both
inside Syria itself and within refugee camps in neighbouring countries, where large numbers of
Syrians have fled to escape the ongoing conflict.
Inside Syria, only a small number of programs have been set up to manage the deteriorating
health care situation. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has partnered with a
number of hospitals and clinics to provide reproductive health services, including safe delivery
kits.20 Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors Without Borders, established two maternal
health care projects in Northern Syria at the beginning of 2015.21 However, the precarious security
situation and restricted entry to the country prevents access on the most part. It appears that until
the violent conflict settles or ends, both domestic and international assistance for maternal health
within Syria will continue to be highly limited.22
47
Global Health
Impact on maternal health for refugees
As a consequence of the civil war, over three million Syrian refugees have entered neighbouring
countries, including Lebanon (over one million), Turkey (over 800,000) and Jordan (over 600,000).23
In some of these camps, over 75% of Syrian refugees are women and children.24 Whilst some camps
have decent shelter and healthcare facilities, others have limited access to even basic sanitation,
exposing pregnant women and newborns to serious risks.25
The necessity of international assistance in response to the critical need of healthcare for expectant
mothers within these camps has become increasingly apparent.26 It is beyond the scope of this
article to go into great detail regarding the assistance provided in all camps, as quality and access
varies greatly, but some general observations can be made.
A number of Syrian refugees are able to use health care services provided by countries hosting
refugee camps, although this access differs across countries and camps.27 In Jordan, all Syrian
women registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are allowed access
to free public health services.28 In Lebanon, where natal care is highly expensive, the UNHCR
provides funding for 75% of delivery costs to Syrian refugees, regardless of formal registration
status.29 This has been reduced from 100% due to funding shortages, reducing access in turn for
refugees who have limited financial resources.30
The UNFPA has also undertaken a number of projects in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, including
distribution of birthing kits and contraception, training sessions for medical staff and health
awareness campaigns.31 MSF additionally operates in a number of refugee camps.32 Although the
initial priority was trauma victims, as the situation deteriorated, activities have been extended
to priority health activities, including maternal health care.33 In addition, MSF has established
numerous maternal healthcare clinics at refugee camps that aim to provide four antenatal visits
per pregnancy, free referral if there are complications, some post-natal care and reproductive
health education.34
Despite this international assistance, a number of serious challenges remain for Syrian women in
refugee camps. In addition to the ongoing issues of maternal health access, serious challenges for
the future are posed by: the tightening of control on the number of Syrian refugees allowed to enter
camps; rising social tensions and instability due to other crises in the Middle East; serious shortages
of staff and resources; and, lack of capacity-building and education on women-specific issues.35
Prospects for recovery
Whilst the international community appears to recognise the importance of providing
reproductive health services for women in the midst of a violent and devastating conflict, a number
of serious barriers to safe, universal maternal health care remain both inside Syria and the refugee
camps in neighbouring countries.36 The blocking of humanitarian access by the Syrian government
and continuing violence and instability prevent women from accessing these vital services inside
Syria. Increased resources, skilled staff and capacity-building measures are desperately required to
expand access to maternal and reproductive health care in refugee camps.
Global Health
48
References
1 Remarks at Deputy Secretary-General’s Press Conference on Rights up Front Action Plan, New York, 19 December 2013,
http://www.un.org/sg/dsg/dsgoffthecuff.asp?nid=270 (accessed 11 April 2015).
2 ‘Maternal health’ refers to the health of women during pregnancy, childbirth and the postnatal period. It may also encompass
preconception and family planning.
3 United Nations, ‘Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health’, Millennium Development Goals, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
maternal.shtml (accessed 11 April 2015).
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 M. Kherallah, T. Alahfez, Z. Sahloul, K. Dia Eddin and G. Jamil, ‘Health Care in Syria Before and During the Crisis’,
Avicenna Journal of Medicine, vol. 2, no. 3, 2012, pp. 51-53.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Save the Children, ‘A Devastating Toll: the impact of three years of war on the health of Syria’s children’, Save the Children,
London, 2014, p. 5.
11 H. Naili, ‘Syria War Shatters Maternal Care, Mothers’ Health’, in Womens E-News, 2014, http://womensenews.org/story/war/140311/
syria-war-shatters-maternal-care-mothers-health (accessed 12 April 2015).
12 Save the Children, op. cit., p. 2.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 5.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 6.
19 Ibid., p. 4.
20 United Nations Population Fund, ‘Regional Situation Report for Syria Crisis,’ United Nations, 2014, http://www.unfpa.org/sites/
default/files/resource-pdf/UNFPA%20Regional%20SitRep%201%20-%2030%20September%202014%20%20_%2025%20.pdf (accessed
12 April 2015).
21 Doctors Without Borders, ‘Syria’, Doctors Without Borders, 2015, http://www.msf.org.uk/node/17126 (accessed 12 April 2015).
22 Ibid.
23 S. Kittleston, ‘Geographical Divide in Maternal Health for Syrian Refugees,’ in Inter Press Service, 19 September 2014,
http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/09/geographical-divide-in-maternal-health-for-syrian-refugees/ (accessed 11 April 2015).
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 W. Doedens et. al, ‘Reproductive Health Services for Syrian Refugees in Zaatri Refugee Camp and Irbid City, Jordan’, Interagency
Working Group on Reproductive Health in Humanitarian Crises, March 2013, p. 4, https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/
download.php?id=4108 (accessed 11 April 2015)
28 Ibid.
29Kittleston, op cit.
30 Ibid.
31 United Nations Population Fund, op cit., pp. 2-5.
32 Doctors Without Borders, op cit.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 United Nations Population Fund, op cit., p. 8.
36 Ibid.
49
Global Health
Maritime ‘Joint Development Agreements’:
In a Spirit of Understanding and Cooperation?
Morgan Johansen
“Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang
suspended the modern issues of war and peace.”
Lord Curzon of Kedleston1
Natural resources are rarely distributed neatly within geopolitical boundaries. Rivers, forests,
fishing stock, hydrocarbon deposits and more may straddle international land and sea borders or
even exist in as yet undelimited territory. Tensions can arise between neighbouring states over
sovereign rights to these resources’ exploitation, leading them to contest existing boundaries
or make claims to new ones. This article looks at the evolving state practice of maritime joint
development agreements (JDAs) as a response to these ownership disputes. The Australia-TimorLeste JDA will be used as a critical case study.
Maritime Boundaries
Throughout the mid-to-late twentieth century there was an upsurge in drawing boundary lines in
the sea, something that Eckert described as ‘[t]he enclosure of the oceans’.2 Coastal states sought
to extend jurisdiction beyond their territorial waters to encompass the continental shelf. The 1958
Geneva Conventions responded to this growing tendency by seeking to codify the international
law on claims to maritime borders and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) – which entered into force in 1994 – advanced this process.3 In particular, UNCLOS
entitled signatories to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles (nm) from
baselines in which states have sovereign rights over resources and all related activities.4
The result has been a proliferation of new potential maritime boundaries; states could lay claim
to a 200 nm EEZ and states within 400 nm of one another suddenly became maritime neighbours.
At present less than half of the potential maritime boundaries in the world have been delimited.5
The remainder are either subject to competing claims or left dormant. States may make claims
to extended maritime boundaries for strategic, historical or cultural reasons; however, Valencia
asserts that ‘[t]he expectation of enlarged resource bases stimulated the extended maritime
jurisdiction movement’ and indeed, the pursuit of boundary claims has been strongly linked to the
existence of real or suspected hydrocarbon reserves, as well as other resource bases like fisheries.6
Science & Environment
50
The problem is that states are often unable to agree on boundaries and, therefore, on ownership of
the resources found within them. Even in cases where a boundary is settled, resources may straddle
the boundary line, making exploration and/or exploitation difficult. The existence of broad areas of
competing claims to maritime space is problematic, not only in the implications for the ownership
and control of resources, but for the instability it places on the international system. The Spratly
Islands dispute in the South China Sea is a commonly cited example of this instability.7 However,
in recent years a response to the dilemma of competing and overlapping maritime claims has
emerged in the form of maritime joint development.
Joint Development
JDAs have become an increasingly popular means to resolve deadlocked jurisdictional disputes
over maritime resources.8 They can be roughly divided into two types: those formed in addition to
a maritime boundary line and those formed in the absence of one. Fundamentally, JDAs provide
that the state parties will jointly manage the disputed zone, sharing in the costs of exploitation
and any profits generated. Even though a number of JDAs were formed prior to UNCLOS, the
Convention provides a clear legal basis for joint development and as such, state practice increased
following its entry into force.9 Where competing claims exist, Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS
require that ‘the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to
enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature…’10
The increasing prevalence of JDAs has many merits. In cases where states are unable to agree on
an international boundary, JDAs allow the temporary
sidestepping of these intractable sovereignty disputes in
order for cooperative development of resources to take
place, for the mutual benefit of both states. In addition
to their economic practicality, JDAs can even have the
by-product of defusing tension between the agreeing
states for a certain period of time while arguments are
set aside in favour of cooperation.11 There exist upwards
of twenty concluded JDAs in state practice and multiple
discussions on the potential for joint development
mechanisms to calm maritime ‘flash points’ in areas like
the South and East China Seas.12 As a growing response
to the uncertainty generated by disputes over maritime
boundaries, the concept of joint development seems
incontrovertible.
Concluding Concerns
Despite its positives, joint development is not a
watertight solution, as the Australia-Timor-Leste case
demonstrates. Without delving into Australia and TimorLeste’s complicated history, it is enough to say that the
negotiations leading up to the conclusion and ratification
of the Timor Sea Treaty and associated JDA were bitterly
51
Fig 1. The Australia-Timor-Leste JPDA (Image from The Economist, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21579074-timorese-leaders-push-better-dealtheir-offshore-gas-fields-bugs-pipeline)
Science & Environment
contested by both parties.13 However, instead of dissolving tensions over the unresolved maritime
border, the joint development zone has remained a point of contention between the two countries
from signature in May 2002 until today. This is despite providing considerable revenue in a 90-10
split to Timor-Leste and Australia. The joint development area extends from the median line
between the two countries towards Timor-Leste, an area Timorese believe should be entirely theirs
if a boundary line were to be drawn.
Authors have pointed to Australia’s behaviour in the negotiations as the prime reason for
ongoing tensions, calling it ‘oil grabbing’ and a ‘second betrayal’.14 Others have alluded to power
asymmetries and noted that Timor-Leste received a generous deal with all things considered.15
However, the root of the problem, Schofield argues, is that the construction of joint areas is based
on unilateral claims, a process that ‘to an extent, validates such claims, giving them…a degree of
endorsement and legitimacy’.16 In other words, because Australia unilaterally claimed an area of
ocean as its own and Timor-Leste disputed it, that claim formed the physical boundary of the joint
development area.
JDAs are intended as a temporary solution until official boundaries can be agreed upon but they
have immediate practical and economic impact. As a structural arrangement, JDAs perhaps
encourage states to make excessive claims to territory,17 and leave the challenging states with
no option but to participate or remain in deadlock. While JDAs have emerged as a creative and
rational response to the problem of disputed maritime borders, it is worth questioning the methods
by which they are constructed and their potential to be used in ways that are not ‘in a spirit of
understanding and cooperation’.
References
1 Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Frontiers: The Romanes Lecture, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1907, cited in J.R.V. Prescott and G.D.
Triggs, International Frontiers and Boundaries: Law, Politics and Geography, Martinus Nijhoff, London, 2008, p. 5.
2 R. D. Eckert, The Enclosure of the Oceans, Hoover Press, Stanford, 1979, cited in ibid., p. 13.
3 C.H. Schofield, ‘Blurring the lines: maritime joint development and the cooperative management of ocean resources’, Issues in Legal
Scholarship, vol. 8, no. 1, 2009, p. 1.
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 16 November 1994).
5 Schofield, 2009, op. cit., p. 3.
6 M.J. Valencia, ‘Taming Troubled Waters: Joint Development of Oil and Mineral Resources in Overlapping Claim Areas’, San Diego
Law Review, vol. 23, no. 3, 1986, p. 661.
7 M.J. Valencia, ‘Asia, the Law of the Sea, and International Relations’, International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 2, 1997, p. 268.
8 C.H. Schofield, ‘Defining areas for joint development in disputed waters’, in Recent Developments in the South China Sea and Prospects
for Joint Development, S. Wu and N. Hong (eds.), Routledge, Abingdon, 2014, p. 80; Valencia, 1997, op. cit., p. 279.
9 Schofield, 2009, op. cit., p. 24.
10 UNCLOS, op. cit., Arts 74(3) and 83(3).
11 M. Miyoshi, ‘The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to Maritime Boundary Delimitation’, International
Boundaries Research Unit: Maritime Briefing, vol. 2, no. 5, 1999, p. 6.
12 See, for example, Wu and Hong, op. cit.
13 D. Mercer, ‘Dividing Up the Spoils: Australia, East Timor and the Timor Sea’, Space and Polity, vol. 8, no. 3, December 2004, p. 290.
14 P. Cleary, Shakedown: Australia’s grab for Timor oil, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2007; T. Anderson, ‘Aid, Trade and Oil: Australia’s
Second Betrayal of East Timor’, Journal of Australian Political Economy, vol. 52, December 2003.
15 T. Clifton, ‘Fields of Dreams: The battle for the Timor Sea, home of oil, gas, hot air and hope’, The Monthly, July 2005, p. 8.
16 Schofield, 2014, op. cit., p. 80.
17 Ibid, p. 97.
Science & Environment
52
Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything
Book Review
Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything:
Capitalism vs. the Climate, 2014,
Alfred A. Knopf Canada, Toronto, 566pp.
On a sweltering day in 1988, Dr James Hansen took
to the floor in Washington D.C. to testify before
a congressional hearing examining energy and
natural resources policy. He immediately declared
that ‘the earth is warmer in 1988 than at any time
in the history of instrumental measurements’.
After decades of quiet speculation within the
scientific community, it was with broad confidence
that Hansen, then Director of NASA’s Goddard
climate change movement has consolidated since
1988, the often ineffective application of the Kyoto
Protocol and stalled international negotiations have
left a void that is yet to be filled by a global, binding
agreement on post-2020 emissions reductions.
Instead, each year has brought world leaders to the
same political impasses, and climate scepticism
continues to frustrate attempts at progress. At this
point, one wonders why, in the face of all that we
know about climate change, we have not been able
to respond. What is wrong with us?
Institute for Space Studies, confirmed that the
This is the very question that Canadian writer and
planet was excessively warming and definitively
activist Naomi Klein addresses in her seminal book,
launched the term ‘global warming’ into the
This Changes Everything. The answer is certainly
public sphere. He concluded that the cause, the
a drastic change from the standard analytical lens.
greenhouse effect, was already increasing the
Klein puts to us an idea that has not seen enough
probability of extreme weather events, such as
debate – at the heart of our failure to respond
the summer heat wave North America was in the
adequately to climate change is our unrelenting
midst of. The message was not lost on the room of
obsession with capitalism. Indeed, she writes that
perspiring senators.
‘our economic system and our planetary system are
Fast-forwarding some decades, 2015 has begun
much like every other since Hansen’s gamechanging address. New figures and dire predictions
of impending climate disasters emerge on a rolling
basis and, disturbingly, further entrench themselves
53
as part of the norm. Although the international
now at war’. It is a war of attrition, in which either
our limited resources or our pursuit of ‘unfettered
expansion’ must give way. What is wrong with
us, she argues, is that taking the exploitative path
is proving easier than accepting our consumerist
Business & Economics
reality and subjecting ourselves to drastic change.
This is certainly not the first time that a rethinking
has been called for of the ‘growth-based, profitseeking logic of capitalism’. In the wake of
the Global Financial Crisis, the flaws in the
international financial system were glaringly
exposed, and the institutions that had until
then been promulgated and shielded by the
Washington Consensus were for a time lambasted
the anti-poverty and social justice movements to
create a holistic social restructuring such that we
begin to live sustainably from the base. Indeed,
facing the difficult question of how we can possibly
achieve change, it is a constructive solution. Instead
of consuming green, we should first consume less,
such as by reforming transport and housing services
that currently force low-income populations to
consume too much.
for the self-advancing interests they had come to
The proposal is a ‘Great Transition’. In the face of
espouse. However, it has not been enough. Klein
arguments that this approach will instead cause
argues that the cultural, economic and political
another ‘Great Depression’, Klein endorses our
upheaval we need remains elusive, but is within
ability to finance a major, sustainability-based
our reach. In a galvanising move, she proposes that
transition where equity is central to fundraising
climate change is the ‘shock’ that can push us to
and cost-bearing. In this vein, she puts forward her
emergency action, much as we have responded to
support for the ‘polluter pays’ principle, defending
economic meltdowns and terrorist attacks in the
the need for fairness in any taxation scheme
past. The emergency action we need is a shift away
designed to mitigate the effects of climate change.
from our unsustainable ‘constant drive for endless
People, she argues, will make sacrifices in the face
economic growth’. The first step, she claims, is to
of climate change; they will not, however, make
stop denying it.
lopsided sacrifices. Fair taxation that is unshackled
Throughout the first two parts of her book, Klein
canvasses many arguments to this point that will
be familiar to readers. She debases the economic
orthodoxy that prevails by exposing its shortsightedness, and discusses the damaging impact
that neoliberal supporters of unchecked free market
capitalism are having on the social consensus
against climate change in North America and
by the ‘corporate liberation project that has shaped
our political culture for three and a half decades’
is important, but only half of the equation. Klein
recognises that even if the money were to be raised
to finance such a momentous transition, political
leadership at present would not know what to do
with it. In this sense, the ‘lost art’ of long-term
public planning must be revived.
beyond. The dramatic sub-title, ‘Capitalism vs.
The changes that Klein proposes refer both
the Climate’, belies, however, the intricacies of the
to local economic structuring and the global
arguments Klein makes.
economic agenda at large. At one point, she
She puts forward that responding to climate change
can be the means by which we respond to a host
of other social problems that remain unaddressed,
including poverty and wealth inequality. ‘When
climate change deniers claim that global warming is
a plot to redistribute wealth, it’s not [only] because
they are paranoid. It’s also because they are paying
attention,’ she writes. It is a novel idea, in which
the climate change movement would combine with
Business & Economics
looks at the interesting and little discussed way
in which climate movements have been derailed
by the international free trade framework. Citing
the example of a thwarted Italian solar panel
manufacturer in Ontario, Canada, she tells the tale
of how legislation to promote local manufacturing
of renewable energy equipment in Ontario
was forcibly overturned when Japan and the
European Union took Ontario to the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), claiming that its buy-local
54
provisions discriminated against imports, and were
thus illegal. Much can be said as to the economic
rationale and the justice of this case. However,
Klein frames the situation as a defence of exportled development, which has enabled countries
to move dirty production overseas and escape
from counting production emissions within their
own cumulative national emissions. To feasibly
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, she claims that
we must rethink our free trade frameworks so as
to ‘relocalise’ our economies. It is a big claim that
may fall on unwilling ears; international consensus
on free trade has been difficultly reached, and it is
perhaps unlikely that effective changes to this new
framework will take place so soon after its advent.
Klein’s book attempts to address a heavy challenge
and, in doing so, raises a number of other
seemingly insurmountable challenges. Changing
culture is, after all, a painfully slow process, as
civil rights movements have found throughout
history. The idea that we can generate upheaval
of an entrenched global economic system is
easy to shy away from. However, Klein puts her
case admirably. She puts forward a convincing
rationale that is well supported by both optimistic
and realistic case examples, which comprise most
of the third part of her book. It is an optimism that
is difficult to ignore. By showcasing instances of
where human civilisation successfully responded
to crises in the past, and the innovative moves
towards renewability and sustainability that are
already taking place, This Changes Everything
reinforces that politics, economics and social
culture are ultimately under our control. Each can
be rethought and, ultimately, climate change may
be the impetus we need to ‘change everything’.
55
Business & Economics
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ISSUE 1 • May 2015
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