Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Editors’ welcome
It is with great excitement that this year’s commi ee introduces to you the ﬁrst print
issue of the Queen Mary Undergraduate History Journal for the 2014/15 academic year.
Established in 2011, the History Journal con nues to publish brilliant essays from
undergraduates month a er month, year a er year; a fact that pays testament to the high
standard of work expected by the School of History at Queen Mary, and of which our
undergraduates are capable. As the essay tles in this very issue suggest, the School of History
boasts a wide variety of interes ng modules taught by experts at the cu ng edge of research
in their specialist ﬁelds.
We would like to take this this opportunity to recognise recent milestones in the life
of the History Journal. The History Journal has now adopted a Queen Mary email domain:
[email protected] -please send any future essay submissions or enquires to this
address. Secondly, the History Journal now has a QMPLUS module, which all full- me
History undergraduates have been granted automa c access to. For this achievement, we
would like to thank Dr. Chris Sparks.
The Queen Mary History Journal Blog has now been launched and can be found at:
h ps://queenmaryhistoryjournal.wordpress.com/. We hope that this ini a ve will provide
students with a pla orm to discuss their opinions both formally and informally, with the
added bonus of a comment sec on to generate further discussion. You can also ﬁnd the blog
on Twi er @QMHJBlog and Facebook under ‘Queen Mary History Journal Blog’. Should you
have pieces that you wish to submit or any general enquiries, do not hesitate to email us.
December and January saw an unprecedented amount of work submi ed to the
History Journal, which was given due considera on and edited where appropriate. We would
like to thank all those who submi ed essays for this issue; reading, edi ng, and publishing
your work has been an absolute pleasure. The hard work of the Essay Editors and Design
Team at the History Journal is greatly appreciated and the con nuing success we have
enjoyed pays tribute to this. We wish to congratulate all those who were successful in their
submissions. We also wish to thank the History Department for their unwavering support,
without which the History Journal would not be able to hold its monthly academic events or
publish its biannual issues.
We hope you enjoy reading this year’s Winter Print.
Graciously yours,
Shabbir Bokhari (Editor in Chief) & Catriona Tassell (Commissioning Editor)
1
Like the History Journal on
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Follow the History Journal on
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2
Winter Issue
László Zorya
The idea of ‘na on’ in Romania and the Ukraine
Contents
Compare and contrast the idea of ‘nation’ developed in two
Compare and contrast the idea of ‘na on’ developed in
4
countries in the period before 1848.
Romania and the Ukraine in the period before 1848.
László Zorya
László Zorya
What did the wearing of the veil signify to medieval
15
In a 1973 essay, poli cal philosopher John Plamenatz iden ﬁed a dis nc on
Muslim men and women?
between what he described as "Western" and "Eastern" na onalisms, characterised
Bethany Price
by imita on and illiberalism.1 Plamenatz argues - whilst neglec ng to actually deﬁne
How extensively did the prin ng of maps modify intellectual,
31
Economic, and social life in Europe between 1450 and 1650?
extensively from Western na onalisms, and that this necessitated na onal leaders
Harry Sophocleous
‘Iden ty is a knife’: Must tribal iden
Eastern Europe - that the na onalisms that emerged there were borrowed
forcibly imposing these na onalisms on popula ons. Scep cal of the u lity of such a
generalisa on, this essay will consider the speciﬁc nature of Romanian and Ukrainian
es be repressed in order for
African States to avoid internal violent conﬂict?
48
Sebas an Lowe
na onalisms, as a case study. Plamenatz believed "Eastern" na onalisms assumed
their deﬁning characteris cs at their concep on, and thus the essay will focus on the
emergence and development of na onalism in the Romanian and Ukrainian lands in
Analyse the main diﬀerences between the u litarianism of Jeremy
63
the early nineteenth century.
Bentham and that of John Stuart Mill
There are obvious seman c issues in using the terms “Romanian” and
Sam Allen
“Ukrainian” to refer to members of those na ons before the na ons can be said to
Assess the signiﬁcance of the Iran-Contra Aﬀair.
Harry Sophocleous
77
have deﬁni vely existed. Therefore, for the purposes of this essay, “Romanian” refers
to the people of Transylvania and the Danubian Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia,
3
4
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László Zorya
who were or who would later be considered ethnically Romanian. “Ukrainian” shall
In turn, these Greek na onalists inﬂuenced Romanians who were encouraged to
refer to the people of the Russian Empire, who were or who would later be
ﬁght on behalf of the Greeks.3 Romanians in the Danubian Provinces perceived
considered ethnically Ukrainian.
themselves to have suﬀered equal or greater oppression under the rule of the
The term “Ruthenian” will be used when
men oning their counterparts in the Habsburg Empire.
The idea of ‘na on’ in Romania and the Ukraine
ignominious Phanariot Greeks than the Greeks themselves did under the O oman
The most immediate aspect which ought to be recognised of Romanian and
Turks.4 Thus, when Greek na onal leader Alexander Ypsilan s appealed to Romanian
Ukrainian na onalism is that neither can be seen to have been borne out of a
na onal leader Tudor Vladimirescu for help in the ﬁght against Turks, Vladimirescu
struggle, as was French na onalism in the Revolu on; German na onalism in the
reportedly oﬀered to help Ypsilan s, “go home, so he could have his revolu on
libera on from Napoleon; or Serb and Greek na onalisms in wars against the
there”.5
O omans. Rather, the development of both Romanian and Ukrainian na onalism
Of vital importance to the na onalist movement in the Ukrainian lands were
was the result of a protracted campaign conducted by an educated elite.
the intelligentsia, the rela ve few who possessed an educa on, and whose
In Romania, the ﬁrst step in this development came during the French
ideological convic ons mo vated them to culturally, socially and poli cally “improve”
Enlightenment from Transylvanian Uniate theological students that were educated
the peasantry. Most of the intelligentsia who hailed from this region were of Cossack
in Vienna and Rome. Vienna was an enlightened city with the ideals of the French
descent, and whose noble status (starshyna) had been between 1785 and 1835
philosophes circula ng widely amongst merchants and diplomats who maintained
recognized by the Russian Empire, then rescinded, and eventually granted once
direct connec ons with French counterparts. These ideals reached and inspired the
more, though selec vely so.
Transylvanian Uniate students who would later lead the na onalist movement.2
In order to jus fy, and therefore protect, this nobility, many intellectuals of Cossack
The Enlightenment ideals also reached the cultural radius of Constan nople,
descent began examining past trea es and chronicles to prove the equivalence of
where it profoundly inﬂuenced Greek na onalists to plan the Greek War of
the Cossack starshyna and the Russian nobility (dvoryanstvo).6 In doing so, these
Independence (1821).
Cossacks inadvertently became the ﬁrst Ukrainian historians. Their histories exhibit a
deep patrio sm and nostalgia for the old Cossack Hetmanate. Istoriia Rusov (1800),
5
6
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László Zorya
for example, asserted that the people living under the Hetmanate enjoyed the same
The Cossack Hetmanate and Dacia were considered by the Ukrainian and Romanian
rights and liber es associated with the Enlightenment. However, these early
na onalists to be their na on’s Golden Age. The Golden Age is a vital aspect of
Ukrainian histories generally accepted Ukraine to be an integral component of
na onalism, both in impar ng a sense of legi macy to the na on and in imbuing it
Imperial Russia and did not a empt to jus fy or promote succession.
with pres ge. The Golden Age also oﬀers a contrast with the na on's degraded
The idea of ‘na on’ in Romania and the Ukraine
History also became a key component of Romanian na onalism, for as well as
present and a jus ﬁca on for its eleva on to a utopian des ny. In neither the
absorbing the ideals of the French Enlightenment in Vienna, the Transylvanian Uniate
Ukrainian nor the Romanian case, however, can this des ny be seen to have
students were inspired by the architectural grandeur of Rome, par cularly its Ancient
superiority over other na ons, but rather, equality. Where Ukrainian na onalists
Roman monuments.7 They were also struck by the similarity of their na ve Romanian
were mo vated to a ain an equal standing with the Russian nobility, Transylvanian
language to that of the Italians and came to view themselves as related to the
na onalists sought either a revoca on or altera on of the medieval pact of “Unio
Italians, and therefore of Roman descent, as Italians were considered to be. It was
trium na onum”, which granted na onhood and therefore rela ve poli cal
beneﬁcial that the boundaries of the Roman province of Dacia were considered to
autonomy to Magyars, Saxons and Szekleys, but not to Romanians, thus excluding
have been roughly correspondent to the poli cal boundaries of early nineteenth-
the la er from poli cal life.10 Keen to emphasise the La nity of their na on and thus
century Transylvania.8 Thus it was at this me that the term “Romanian” became
aﬀord it a cultural eminence, Gheorghe Șincai and Samuil Micu collaborated on a
adopted to refer to the people and their language previously referred to as Wallach,
grammar, The Elements of the Daco-Roman or Wallachian Language (1780), to
emphasising their La n origins. Histories were wri en by Uniate priests, such as
codify the Romanian language and accentuate its La n origins. This grammar thus
Petru Maior in History of the Origin of the Roumanians in Dacia (1812), that
marks the start of a concerted campaign by Romanian intellectuals to replace the
portrayed Dacia as a cultural and poli cal idyll and a empted to illustrate a clear line
tradi onal Cyrillic alphabet in which their language appeared in religious texts with
of descent between the Dacians and contemporary Romanians.9 This gave Romanian
the Roman alphabet and a purging of words of non-La n origin from the language.11
na onalism a mission, as Romanians were seen to be defenders of an eastern La n
The Ukrainian language experienced no similar reform in the Russian Empire. It was
culture; as well as a dignity: a superiority over the Magyars, Germans, and Szekleys.
not even being considered a language but rather a dialect of Russian, known as
“Li le Russian”.12 In the Habsburg lands, Ruthenian na onalism was
7
8
handicapped
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
László Zorya
The idea of ‘na on’ in Romania and the Ukraine
by the near total illiteracy of the peasant popula on and the almost complete
that, through its La n links, Romanian was related to Italian and, most
Polonisa on of its social and intellectual elite.13 However, keen to reduce the
importantly, French. Many of these na onalists, such as Ion Heliade Rădulescu and
inﬂuence both of the Polish elite and of the neighbouring Russian Empire, the
Anton Pann, began to publish original literary works and translated classics into their
Habsburgs encouraged the development of the Ruthenian language, dis nct from
language to evidence its cultural worth.
Polish and Russian, inadvertently crea ng a language remarkably similar to
The Ukrainian intelligentsia also became interested in developing a literature in their
Ukrainian.14 It is because of this that Ruthenians began to iden fy with Ukrainian
language, inspired primarily by the German Roman c, Johann Go ried Herder. It
na onalism and, despite exis ng in incredibly diﬀerent poli cal situa ons, the two
was Herder who ﬁrst challenged the view that some na ons were devoid of culture,
groups empathised with one another so that in 1848 the only Ukrainian uprising was
arguing instead that culture was universal. Herder was also convinced of the primacy
a response to the aboli on of Ruthenian serfdom.
of language, wondering, “Has a people anything dearer than the speech of its
Historian Stephen Fisher-Gala argues that there was no real liaison between
fathers? In its speech resides its whole thought domain, its tradi on, history,
Wallachian and Moldavian na onalists, as existed between Ruthenians and
religion, and basis of life, all its heart and soul”.16 This inspired Ukrainians to collate
Ukrainians, let alone between them and Transylvanian na onalists; however, it is
cultural collec ons. Par cularly notable was the collec on of Ukrainian folk songs
clear that these diﬀerent na onalist groups empathised with one another.15 For
compiled by Prince Nikolai Tsertelev and Mykhailo Maksymovych, who argued that
example, Transylvanian Uniate priests were vehemently opposed to a empts to alter
the content and moral quality of the folk songs diﬀeren ated them from those of
their Church doctrine in order to assimilate it with the Roman Catholic Church. Given
other na ons, par cularly Russians.17 However, by 1848 Ukrainian literature was
the Transylvanian na onalists' apparent proclivity towards any other La nising trend,
nowhere near as developed, nor as respected, as Romanian literature, hindered by
this seems bizarre un l one considers that such a change would have resulted in
crass works such as Ivan Kotlyarevsky’s travesty of Virgil’s Aeneid, Eneyida (1798)
greater diﬀeren a on between the Transylvanians and the Orthodox Danubian
which, wri en in a jocular, folksy style, appeared to lend credence to claims that
Romanians. Prior to the nineteenth century, the Romanian and Ukrainian languages
Ukrainian was a language unsuitable for discussing lo ier themes.18
were considered primi ve and therefore capable only of expressing the most basic,
In the 1830s and 1840s the Romanian na onalists became increasingly
domes c thoughts. This view was challenged by Romanian na onalists’ asser ons
poli cal, in contrast to the previous genera on, whose aims had been primarily
9
10
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László Zorya
cultural.19 The development of culture apparently indicated a cultural superiority
considered primarily cultural movements involving the inven on of languages,
over Magyars, Turks, and Slavs and at least equality with Germans and Greeks.
research of histories and development of literary movements. Although elements of
Subjuga on under these peoples could no longer be jus ﬁed. In Wallachia and
both na onalisms were borrowed from foreign sources, par cularly in the case of
Moldavia, the revolu onaries of 1848 were primarily concerned with social
Romanian na onalism, there was no a empt to imitate any foreign na on per se.
revolu on and poli cal independence, and showed li le concern for a uniﬁca on of
Instead, Romanian na onalism borrowed aspects of Italian and French na onalism
the Danubian Provinces with Transylvania. Nor did Transylvanians seek uniﬁca on, or
to emphasise aspects of the na on which were pre-exis ng and perceived to be
even independence, but rather a strengthening of the rights of the Romanian middle
La n whilst Ukrainian na onalists adopted the thoughts of Herder, not to copy
class and intelligentsia, as well as the emancipa on of the peasantry.20 Romanian
German na onalism but to jus fy their cultural output. Since neither Romanian nor
na onalism in 1848, then, manifested itself in demands for equality and
Ukrainian na onalists had states to support them, they could hardly impose their
self-determina on, but not for hegemony.
na onalism on a popula on unless it was willing and neither group agitated for
The idea of ‘na on’ in Romania and the Ukraine
In the Russian Empire, Ukrainian na onalists did not commit to any signiﬁcant
hegemony, only demanding equal standing with other na ons as a natural right of
uprising comparable to those in Transylvania and the Danubian provinces. However,
their na on. Plamenatz’s generalisa on regarding the nature of na onalism in
demands were made to introduce teaching in the Ukrainian language in areas where
Eastern Europe is invalid, a predictable conclusion given his failure to even a empt
Ukrainians were in the majority. Ruthenians, meanwhile, pe
to deﬁne the region.
oned for their clergy
to receive rights equal to that of other na ons of the Habsburg Empire and for the
21
establishment of a Ruthenian Council.
Notes
The emancipa on of the Ruthenian
1.
John Plamenatz, 'Two Types of Na onalism' in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), Na onalism:
Evolu on of an Idea (Canberra: Australian Na onal University Press, 1973) pp. 34- 38.
2.
John Campbell, French Inﬂuence and the Rise of Roumanian Na onalism (New York:
Arno Press, 1971) pp. 7- 8.
3.
Stephen Fischer-Gala , Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Bd. 12, H. 1
(May 1964). p. 49.
4.
R.W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians: From Roman Times to the
Comple on of Unity (London: Archon Books, 1964). p. 196.
5.
Keith Hitchens,The Romanians 1774- 1866 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1996). p. 202.
6.
Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1996). p. 356.
peasantry also provoked a small Ukrainian uprising in the Russian lands in support of
a
similar libera on being granted there. Again, none of these demands can be
considered ones which would elevate the Ukrainians or Ruthenians to a standing
above other na ons.22
In summary, prior to 1848, Romanian and Ukrainian should be considered
11
12
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László Zorya
The idea of ‘na on’ in Romania and the Ukraine
Bibliography
Notes
1.
Campbell, French Inﬂuence and the Rise of Roumanian Na onalism. pp. 23- 24.
Secondary literature
2.
Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians p. 272
Hayes, Carlton J.H., Essays on Na onalism, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928).
3.
Ibid. pp 272- 273.
4.
Fischer-Gala , Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas. p. 48.
Hitchens, Keith; The Rumanian Na onal Movement in Transylvania 1780- 1849 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1969).
5.
Campbell, French Inﬂuence and the Rise of Roumanian Na onalism. p. 26.
Hitchens, Keith; The Romanians 1774- 1866 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1996).
6.
Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) p. 358.
Kann, Robert A.; A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526- 1918, (Berkley: University of
California Press, 1974).
7.
Robert A. Kann, The Mul na onal Empire: Na onalism and Na onal Reform in the
Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, (New York: Octagon Books, 1964) p. 326.
8.
Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526- 1918, (Berkley: University of
California Press, 1974) pp. 392- 394.
9.
Stephen Fischer-Gala , Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas p. 50.
10.
G. von Herder, Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität, cited in Carlton J.H.Hayes,
Essays on Na onalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928) p. 13.
11.
Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) p. 356.
12.
Ibid. p. 358.
13.
Keith Hitchins, The Rumanian Na onal Movement in Transylvania 1780- 1849
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969). p. 135.
14.
Stephen Fischer-Gala , Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas p. 52..
15.
Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) p. 326.
16.
Ibid. p. 335.
Subtelny, Orest; Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) .
Kann, Robert A.; The Mul na onal Empire: Na onalism and Na onal Reform in the
Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, (New York: Octagon Books, 1964) .
Magocsi, Paul Robert; A History of Ukraine, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).
Plamenatz, John; 'Two Types of Na onalism' in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), Na onalism:
Evolu on of an Idea (Canberra: Australian Na onal University Press, 1973) .
Seton-Watson, R.W.; A History of the Roumanians: From Roman Times to the Comple on of
Unity (London: Archon Books, 1964).
Bibliography
Secondary literature
Campbell, John; French Inﬂuence and the Rise of Roumanian Na onalism (New York: Arno
Press, 1971).
Fischer-Gala , Stephen; Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Bd. 12, H. 1
(May 1964).
13
14
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
What did the wearing of the veil signify to medieval Muslim
men and omen?
Bethany Price
The signiﬁcance of the veil for Muslim men and women
There is even evidence that Muhammad explained that the man has to please
and sa sfy the woman, not just to think about himself.3 In turn, the context of the
revela on has to be ques oned. It would seem that there are a number of reasons
Bethany Price
At ﬁrst glance it would be easy to state that the veil signiﬁed the separa on of
spheres for medieval Muslim men and women, which to a far extent is true.
However, there is a signiﬁcant and important gap between men’s ideal of the veil
and women’s prac ce of the veil. Therefore, it would be more accurate to argue that
the wearing of the veil held, and s ll holds for people today, a plethora of meanings
for medieval men and women. Indeed, Mernissi accurately summarised that the
concept of the veil is three-dimensional and that these dimensions o en interplay
with each other. The ﬁrst dimension is visual; the root of the verb hajaba means to
hide. The second is spa al: to separate or mark a border. The ﬁnal is ethical and so
which imply the veil was implemented because of unique contextual factors. For
example, Mernissi highlighted that Year 5 of the Heijra – the year the veil was
introduced - was a par cularly catastrophic year for military defeats and that
Muhammad was red of his enemies following his wives in the street.4 In addi on, it
has quite recently been argued that this pivotal veil verse did not ﬁt in with
Muhammad’s normal pa ern for a revela on; there was no wai ng or thinking
period.5 Furthermore, perhaps the most important and inﬂuen al factor at the me
was the pressure from Umar Ibn al-Kha ab, a close associate of Muhammad, who
was a prominent spokesman in favour of women’s seclusion.6 The context of the veil
revela on is therefore crucial, it can convincingly be argued that the Prophet did not
1
the veil demarks the realm of the forbidden. And yet, even this perhaps rigid
structure does not reliably inform us of the o en ﬂuid and personal signiﬁcance of
the veil.
want to implement the veil or the ins tu on which came to be inseparable from it.
Umar Ibn al-Kha ab and his views were shared by many other men in medieval
Islamic socie es. The idea of women not being veiled and them par cipa ng in the
Muhammad’s revela ons in the Qur’an that seemingly mandated his wives, if
public sphere was abhorrent to some but not to Muhammad. There is much
not all Muslim women, should be veiled are clearly central to this ques on.
evidence of his wives inﬂuencing him and taking an ac ve part in poli cs.7 This was
Although, it has to be men oned that there is evidence that Muhammad did not
perhaps too innova ve for most medieval men. This was because in pre-Islamic
intend to establish an ins tu on of isola on for women, rather the opposite.
society, it has been argued, women experienced daily violence and harassment
Mernissi recently reassessed and argued that the dawn of Islam was supposed to go
under the humilia ng prac ce of ta’arrud and o en remained at home.8
hand in hand with egalitarianism and that all should be equal in this new faith.2
15
16
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Bethany Price
It was against this backdrop that the veil was supported, o en under the premise
is the idea that women are passive and that men are dominant.12
that it would protect free women. In the newly formed Islamic socie es there were
a empts to excuse this harassment with men arguing that they thought unveiled
women were slaves and that this explained why Allah had revealed the wives should
pull their jilbab over themselves, to make themselves known and to protect
themselves.9 Moreover, this is supported somewhat in Mamluk socie es where
concubines had to be veiled, in contrast to ordinary slave girls who did not. Ibn
Taymiyah explained this was not because the veil was a personal status symbol for
the concubines. It was rather for their protec on and probably because their
owners wanted to ensure no other man touched them, so the veil also protected
them but for unscrupulous reasons.
10
It would seem then that the hijab was
necessary to mark which women ta’arrud could be commi ed against and to protect
the others.11 However, in truth it would seem that men supported the veil because it
suited their desired patriarchal society. It perhaps must be men oned though that
Muslim writers have largely inﬂuenced these ideas of the apparent brutal reality of
pre-Islamic socie es, and of course it is in their interest to present Islam as a posi ve
improvement for women, or to at least be providing protec on for women. This only
further supports the idea that Muslim men supported the veil mainly because it
limited women to the domes c sphere. Moreover, to truly understand this medieval
male Islamic
a tude towards women, it is necessary to consider the two theories
of women’s sexuality. The prevailing contemporary belief is the explicit theory, which
17
The signiﬁcance of the veil for Muslim men and women
However, driven far into Muslim unconsciousness, and championed by Imam
Ghazali, is the implicit theory which was dominant in the Middle Ages.13 This belief
contains the idea that society struggles to cope with women and their destruc ve
power. Fears of women’s deadly sexuality existed, and perhaps s ll exist, and in turn
the idea that they had the power to seduce all men. Moreover, according to Ghazli
the biggest gi from Allah is the ability to reason. In order to prevent men from
being distracted and to appreciate this gi
it was argued that women must be
veiled.14 An understanding of this concept goes some way to explain the framework
of medieval Muslim men’s thoughts. To gain the most precise idea of the origins of
the veil in Islam it is necessary to scru nise Muhammad’s revela on regarding the
hijab. It was wri en that whenever someone asked for something from
Muhammad’s wives (‘his ladies’) they should have asked ‘from before a screen: that
makes for greater purity in your hearts and for theirs’.15 In understanding this it
seems obvious that the verse might only apply to Muhammad’s wives, however,
Qur’anic instruc ons addressed to the wives were apparently also naturally seen as
valid for Muslim women and so the ins tu on of the veil was established.16 Indeed
Stowasser has argued that the veil was expanded both seman cally and legally
because the hijab was also linked to the mantle verse (33.59) and the modesty verse
(24.31). In turn, the veil was stretched to be a concept and not merely literally
something women wore.
18
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Bethany Price
The signiﬁcance of the veil for Muslim men and women
Overall, the eﬀects of the veil revela on were monumental in so far as it became an
Furthermore, it would seem that similar to Islamic socie es, in Jewish
ideology. The pairing of key Qur’anic terms such as ‘hijab’ and ‘conﬁnement’
communi es in medieval Cairo, clothes were supposed to ensure that females were
intertwined the two to the extent that they were inseparable. The veil meant, and
invisible. At a glance there are some diﬀerences between Jewish and Muslim
o en s ll means, more than concealing; it means seclusion ‘a domes c ﬁxture to
communi es, for example, mantles and outerwear were important for both sexes in
ensure seclusion and also the seclusion itself.’17 The original view of an egalitarian
regard to respect and piety, especially when entering a House of Worship. To be
Islam began to disappear. Instead, the absolute division of private and public spheres
completely covered was to be digniﬁed. However, despite basic items of clothing
was established, or more precisely women’s isola on from the public sphere.18 It is
being iden cal in form, their purpose diﬀered. Crucially, similar to Islamic socie es,
therefore clear that at the
me of the revela on the veil meant the complete
the aim of clothes for women in the public sphere was for the women to be
separa on of spheres because it perfectly suited, and was perhaps needed, to
‘inconspicuous, if not invisible’. This is in contrast to men whose clothing should
uphold the patriarchal society.19
show him to be male.23 The veil, again, is inexplicably intertwined with invisibility and
seclusion.
In addi on to the Qur’anic verses there are many Hadiths that support the
wearing of the veil. It is recorded by Abu Dawud (2:641) that Muhammad clariﬁed
that a young woman should not leave the house unveiled.20 And it is recorded by
Bukhari (6: 321) that Allah does not accept the prayers of a woman who is
unveiled.21 However, similar to there being ﬂaws in the context in which the
revela on was revealed, Mernissi has argued that the Hadiths were open to
corrup on. It has been proven that authors sold themselves to poli cians who
desired to inﬂuence the Hadith so it would beneﬁt them. There is even evidence of
authors being paid to invent informa on regarding poems wri en and recited by
Muhammad.22 In turn, this only reinforces that in the Middle Ages Muslim men
wanted women to be secluded and went to great lengths to ensure this happened.
19
It has clearly been established that Muslim men desired to veil women – in
the ins tu onal sense of the word – but what remains to be ques oned is the reality
of Muslim women wearing the veil and women who followed other religions. Zilﬁ
argued broadly that slavery and the oppression of women was s ll present in the
O oman Empire. Women were s ll bound to the house late in the nineteenth
century with the separate spheres of men and women being very much the norm.24
In the eighteenth century Osman III mandated that all women should cover their
bodies, seemingly because he found them disgus ng, and yet his decrees also
carried religious weight because the only excep ons to dress codes were granted by
Holy Law.25 Despite Osman’s speciﬁc misogyny perhaps being unique his two
20
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Bethany Price
successors reinforced that veils which revealed women’s faces were not to be
conversing and humouring the shop owners’.30 Moreover, he chas sed women for
tolerated. Indeed, Zilﬁ concluded that ‘misogyny and zealous enforcement of female
showing their wrists, implying they are veiled but not fully covered.31 This is clear
propriety were two sides of the same coin’ in the late O oman Empire.26 And yet, by
evidence that in Egyp an Mamluk society in the fourteenth century the reality was
mid-eighteenth century women were taking more risks. Billowing sleeves and tall
that women who wore veils did not adhere to the ideology of the veil and all that it
headdresses began to appear, they were immediately forbidden but, importantly,
entailed; the veil did not translate as an ins tu on of isola on for them, and if it did
were being tried.27 Overall, the fact that Osman and three of his successors felt the
they apparently ignored it.
need to reinforce the wearing of veils implies that women did not share the same
a tude towards veils as the men wri ng the laws. There is clearly an indica on that
men were manda ng that the veil should be worn and to them it was linked to
female modesty and seclusion. The women also seemingly understood the meaning
of the veil and hence began to a empt to change their clothing.
The idea that women did not agree with men’s ideal of the veil is most clearly
evident in Lu i’s examina on of Ibn al-Hajj’s trea se on fourteenth-century Cairene
women.28 On the face of it, Ibn al-Hajj’s work seems to strengthen the idea that
Muslim men wished to control women, and that they viewed the public sphere of
men and the private sphere of women to be separate. Indeed, this exclusion of
women was informed by the implicit sexual theory: females threatened the order of
the male world. Any mixing of these spheres was seen to be promo ng chaos.29
However, by implica on, his work also suggests Cairene women did not desire and
did not abide by the ins tu on of seclusion. Ibn al-Hajj complained that women
The signiﬁcance of the veil for Muslim men and women
It seems there are clear dispari es between men’s ideal of the veil and
women’s reality of it. Kahf has argued the veil obviously predates Islam and that
throughout history, in prac ce, only the privileged could have worn a veil. It was a
status symbol for those who wore one.32 In the Epic of Gilgamesh (ca. 2000 B.C.E) the
young woman who guarded the gate is veiled and Kahf linked this to her having had
some primal power because she can see without being seen and know with being
known.33 The Prophet Muhammad is even noted in Persian miniatures as being
veiled so as to preserve his image from becoming too common.34 In understanding
these examples there is also much evidence of medieval Muslim women using the
veil as a tool of empowerment.
Similar to its use in Gilgamesh, the veil is portrayed to have been used by
medieval Muslim women to cover themselves to their advantage. When wearing a
veil a woman can see all and see everyone else but people cannot see her. Indeed,
they could ‘openly scru nise men’.35
were were talking in the street and mee ng in shops to gossip for ‘several hours,
21
22
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Bethany Price
Furthermore, from the account of a German knight on a pilgrimage in the late
ﬁ eenth-century we can learn that the veil is apparently used by Muslim women to
conceal themselves from their husbands so that they can visit a soldier or knight to
The signiﬁcance of the veil for Muslim men and women
it represented this, or acknowledged the veil and used it to their advantage, which is
echoed in today’s society.
So far it has become apparent that not only is there a gap between the ideal
36
‘take their pleasure with him for three or four hours.’ The veil was also subject to
fashion, regardless of class. In Egypt the qina was a metre long and not very wide.
This is in contrast to Bagdad where the mi’jar was a black veil, made of muslin and
and the reality of veiling, but alongside this, that the veil varies widely in its
signiﬁcance. Ahmed has wri en broadly on the meaning of the veil in today’s
society. She seems to argue, like others, that the veil’s meaning is not sta c or ﬁxed
37
was perfumed with hyacinth. Bedouin women even decorated their headdresses
with jewellery or silver and gold coins.38 By Muslim women personalising their veil
they were perhaps subconsciously ﬁgh ng against the anonymity furthered by the
ins tu on of wearing a veil. Overall, from this it might be concluded that aside from
its proposed use by men in Islam, veiling was used in a posi ve way, for men and
women. It was perhaps only with the dawn of Islam that the wearing the veil became
an ideology and in turn some Muslim women chose to use the veil to their advantage.
and that it s ll changes today.40 In the places where it is mandatory it is s ll
oppressive, but where it is op onal for women it can mean many diﬀerent things,
for example, Ahmed argued it can be a call for minori es to be treated equally; a call
for social jus ce.41 Stowasser supported the idea of a seman c shi in that the hijab
is becoming more literally a way of dress than a way of life.42 She argued that the
reason for this is, in part, because when families have a low-income, women go out
in the public sphere and work.43 Furthermore, Afshar maintained that supporters of
Islam have argued that the veil can be libera ng by allowing women to be humans
Further to this, Muslim women rejec ng the veil and all it represented is
perhaps epitomised by Sukayna, one of the great-granddaughters of the Prophet. She
revolted against the ‘oppressive, despo c Islam’ and dismissed everything that
rather than mere sex objects.44 However, it is undeniable that in some, if not most,
areas the veil is not free from poli cal links.
Charrad’s case study of Tunisia is revealing. He iden ﬁed that Islamists
39
limited her including the veil. She married ﬁve men whilst pledging exclusivity to
none but demanding it from each of them and she took an ac ve part in poli cs and
poetry. This is obviously an extreme example but goes some way to prove that some
enforce the veil in Algeria with the aim for the women to not look cheap and
materialis c, values probably associated with the West. However, in Tunisia the veil
is not enforced – some women wear it by choice.45
Muslim women rejected being secluded and either rejected the veil because
23
24
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Bethany Price
The signiﬁcance of the veil for Muslim men and women
There are two types of veil in Tunisia. The tradi onal safsari, which changes
This is tenta vely shown in the O oman Empire but more explicitly portrayed
according to regions, is very old and ﬁlled with tradi on. The other is the hijab which
through Ibn al-Hajj’s trea se on Cairene women. In Egypt it seems that the veil
arrived in Tunisia in the 1970s and 1980s. It has no regional uniqueness and is very
signiﬁed an ideology of isola on but was apparently somewhat ignored. The
much related to Islamism – note that here Islamism means fundamental Islam.46 It is
diﬀerence between the ideal and the reality of the veil is prominently shown
a similar situa on in Egypt where Stowasser argued that fundamentalists wear the
through the varying examples of its meaning to women; it was a fashion symbol, to
hijab whereas educated women tend to wear the hijab qua.47 The veil is clearly s ll
be used for their empowerment and to their advantage. Finally, in today’s society
associated with iden ty and poli cs but the important idea is that some women are
the ins tu on of the veil has progressed further and is perhaps more obviously
choosing to wear a veil and in turn are deciding what the veil means to them.
being rejected. Instead, women are using it in their own personal way. Indeed, it
may actually signify today, in some instances, what Muhammad apparently ini ally
It seems true then that the veil did not and does not have a sta c or ﬁxed
intended for Islam to give to women.
signiﬁcance. At the me of the revela on it seems to have been introduced under
Notes
the premise that it provided protec on for women. However, in truth, it seems that
1.
F., Mernissi, Women and Islam. An Historical and Theological Enquiry (Oxford, 1991), p.
93.
2.
Ibid, p. 163.
3.
F., Mernissi, Beyond the Veil. Male-Female Dynamics in Muslim Society (Massachuse s,
2011), p. 51.
4.
Mernissi, Women and Islam, p. 86.
5.
Ibid, p. 106.
6.
Ibid.
7.
Ibid, p. 163.
8.
Ibid, p. 180.
9.
Ibid.
10.
R., Yossef, ‘Women and Gender in Mamluk Society – an Overview’, Mamluk Studies
Review 11/2 (2007), (pp. 1-47) p. 12.
11.
Mernissi, Women and Islam, p. 187.
12.
Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p. 42.
the ins tu on of the veil was needed by the patriarchal society and was needed to
combat the fear of women’s sexuality, but also because any other posi on of women
was too innova ve for the Middle Ages. Despite Muhammad’s apparent inten ons,
the veil signiﬁed the separa on of the public and private spheres. And although as
Islam spread, and was moulded as it came into contact with other diverse cultures, it
seems that the veil also represented invisibility in Jewish socie es in the Arab world
and in the O oman Empire. However, throughout diﬀerent cultures and
me
periods there is a signiﬁcant gap between man’s ideal and woman’s reality of the
veil.
25
26
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Bethany Price
Notes
13.
Imam., Ghazali, Reviviﬁca on of Religious Sciences, vol. II, Chapter on Marriage
14.
h p://www.ghazali.org/works/marriage.htm
15.
[Accessed on 21/11/14].
16.
The signiﬁcance of the veil for Muslim men and women
Notes
35.
M., Zilﬁ, Women and Slavery in the Late O oman Empire: The Design of
Diﬀerence (Cambridge, 2010), p. 84.
36.
H., Lu i, ‘Manners and customs of Fourteenth-Century Cairene Women: Female
Anarchy versus Male Shar‘i Order in Muslim Prescrip ve Trea se’, in N. Keddie and B.
Baron (eds.), Women in Middle Eastern History (New Haven, 1992).
Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p. 42.
37.
Ibid, p. 100.
17.
Qur’an Chapter 33, Verse 53
38.
Ibid, p. 103.
18.
h p://quran.com/33
39.
Ibid, p. 104.
40.
19.
[Accessed on 21/11/14].
M., Kahf, ‘From Her Royal Body the Robe was Removed: the Blessings of the Veil and
the Trauma of Forced Unveilings in the Middle East’, in J. Heath (eds.) The Veil: Women
Writers on Its History, Lore, and Poli cs (London, 2008), p. 30.
20.
F., Stowasser, Women in the Qur’an, Tradi ons, and Interpreta on (Oxford, 1994), p.
92.
41.
Ibid, p. 30.
42.
Ibid.
43.
S., Guthrie, Arab Women in the Middle Ages. Private Lives and Public Roles (London,
2001), p. 124.
44.
A German knight on the women of Cairo, from The Pilgrimage of Arnold von Harﬀ
(1496-1499 AD) (London, 1946), p. 123-4.
45.
Ibid, p. 122.
21.
Ibid, p. 91.
22.
Mernissi, Women and Islam, p. 187.
23.
Ibid, p. 185.
24.
A., Dawud, (2:641)
25.
h p://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/abudawud/032sat.php#032.4092
46.
Ibid, p. 124.
26.
[Accessed on 21/11/14].
47.
Mernissi, Women and Islam, p. 192.
27.
Bukhari (6:321)
48.
L., Ahmed, A Quiet Revolu on; the Veil’s Resurgence, from the Middle East to America
(London, 2011), p. 212.
28.
h p://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/bukhari/006sbt.php#001.006.321
49.
Ibid, p. 211.
29.
[Accessed on 21/11/14].
50.
Stowasser, Women in the Qur’an, p. 129.
30.
Mernissi, Women and Islam, p. 45.
51.
Ibid, p. 129.
31.
S., D., Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: the Jewish Communi es of the Arab World as
Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, vol. 4 (Berkeley, 1999), p. 155.
52.
H., ‘Afshar, Western Inven on on Arab Womanhood: the Oriental Woman’, in H.
Afshar (eds.) Women in the Middle East. Percep ons, Reali es and Struggles for Liberaon (Basingstoke, 1993), p. 12.
32.
M., Zilﬁ, Women and Slavery in the Late O oman Empire: The Design of
Diﬀerence (Cambridge, 2010), p. 73.
53.
33.
Ibid, p. 73.
M. M., Charrad, ‘Cultural Diversity within Islam: Veils and Laws in Tunisia’, in H.
Bodman and N. Tohidi (eds.), Women in Muslim Socie es. Diversity within Unity
(London, 1998), p. 65.
34.
Ibid, p. 74.
54.
Ibid, p. 65.
27
28
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Bethany Price
Notes
55.
The signiﬁcance of the veil for Muslim men and women
Bibliography
Primary literature
Stowasser, Women in the Qur’an, p. 130.
Bibliography
Bukhari (6:321)
h p://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/bukhari/006-sbt.php#001.006.321
Secondary literature
[Accessed on 21/11/14]
Afshar, H., ‘Western Inven on on Arab Womanhood: the Oriental Woman’, in H. Afshar (eds.)
Women in the Middle East. Percep ons, Reali es and Struggles for Libera on (Basingstoke,
1993).
Ahmed, L., A Quiet Revolu on; the Veil’s Resurgence, from the Middle East to America
(London, 2011).
Dawud, Abu, (2:641)
h p://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/abudawud/032-sat.php#032.4092
[Accessed on 21/11/14]
Charrad, M. M., ‘Cultural Diveristy within Islam: Veils and Laws in Tunisia’, in H. Bodman and
N. Tohidi (eds.), Women in Muslim Socie es. Diversity within Unity (London, 1998).
German knight on the women of Cairo, from The Pilgrimage of Arnold von Harﬀ (1496-1499
AD), (London, 1946)
Goitein, S. D, A Mediterranean Society: the Jewish Communi es of the Arab World as
Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, vol. 4 (Berkeley, 1999).
Ghazali, Imam, Reviviﬁca on of Religious Sciences, vol. II, Chapter on Marriage
Guthrie, S., Arab Women in the Middle Ages. Private Lives and Public Roles (London, 2001).
Heath, J (ed.), The veil: women writers on its history, lore, and poli cs (London, 2008).
Kahf, M. ‘From Her Royal Body the Robe was Removed: the Blessings of the Veil and the
Trauma of Forced Unveilings in the Middle East’, in J. Heath (eds.) The Veil: Women Writers on
Its History, Lore, and Poli cs (London, 2008).
Lu i, H., ‘Manners and customs of Fourteenth-Century Cairene Women: Female Anarchy
versus Male Shar‘i Order in Muslim Prescrip ve Trea se’, in N. Keddie and B. Baron (eds.),
Women in Middle Eastern History (New Haven, 1992).
h p://www.ghazali.org/works/marriage.htm
[Accessed on 21/11/14]
Qur’an Chapter 33, Verse 53
h p://quran.com/33
[Accessed on 21/11/14]
Mernissi, F., Beyond the Veil. Male-Female Dynamics in Muslim Society (Massachuse s, 2011).
Mernissi, F., Women and Islam. An Historical and Theological Enquiry (Oxford, 1991).
Stowasser, F., Women in the Qur’an, Tradi ons, and Interpreta on (Oxford, 1994).
Yossef, R., ‘Women and Gender in Mamluk Society – an Overview’, Mamluk Studies Review
11/2 (2007), pp. 1-47.
Zilﬁ, M., Women and Slavery in the
Diﬀerence, (Cambridge, 2010).
29
Late O oman Empire: The Design of
30
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Harry Sophocleous
The prin ng of maps in Europe between 1450 and 1650
woodcut print that showcased the New World, branding the con nent for the ﬁrst
How extensively did the printing of maps modify
me in history as ‘America’ (Figure 1). The cartographer oﬀered an explana on:
‘Since another, fourth part [of the world] has been discovered by Americus
intellectual, economic and social life in Europe between
1450 and 1650?
Harry Sophocleous
Vespu us…I do not see why anyone should object to it being called a er Americus
the discover, a man of natural wisdom, Land of Americus or America’.4 And America
it became; such is the power of maps. Waldseemüller was just one among many
who was able to beneﬁt from the prin ng press in driving the cartographical ﬁeld
‘We should note the force, eﬀect, and consequences of
inven ons which are nowhere more conspicuous than in those
three which were unknown to the ancients, namely, prin ng,
gunpowder, and the compass. For these three have changed
forward to an extent that is recognizable to all in the modern-age.
However, in recent years, the impact of the prin ng press has increasingly
the appearance and state of the whole world’.
become the subject of vitriolic debate. In par cular, Elizabeth Eisenstein’s asser on
Francis Bacon, Novum Organum (1620).1
that the technology was an ‘agent of change’ has been ques oned by Adrian Johns’
‘Journey all over the universe in a map, without the expense
The Nature of the Book.5 It is the tle of the la er’s study that exposes gaping holes
and fa gue of travelling, without suﬀering the inconveniences
of heat, cold, hunger, and thirst’.
Migues de Cervantes, Don Quixote (1605-1615).2
in the historiographical ﬁeld. Much has been said about the impact of the inven on
of prin ng on literacy and ways of library, but less has been wri en about the
Mar n Waldseemüller (c.1470-c.1521), a renowned German scholar,
equally momentous impact of print upon the circula on and communica on of
humanist, cleric, and most of all, cartographer, moved to Basle in the early 1500’s
visual informa on. By overlooking the importance of cartography, our
where he came into contact with the well-known printer Johannes Amerbach. It is
understanding of this important technological innova on on European life is
through Amerbach that Waldseemüller was able to learn how to translate his
subsequently limited. As a result, this essay will argue that the impact of the
humanist educa on in cosmography and mapmaking into the kind of printed maps
movable type prin ng press on the cartographical industry possessed shockwaves
that were surfacing during the early sixteenth century.3 In 1507, within the conﬁnes
that altered European life forever. The contribu on printed maps has had on all
of the small town in North-East France, St. Dié, Waldseemüller would produce a
aspects of European life are neatly intertwined. The intellectual interest for
31
32
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Harry Sophocleous
geographical representa on created a market that thrived for innova on, which, in
back four hundred years prior to the German’s existence. Furthermore, the
turn, led to a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on social norms and views of the wider world.
innova ve idea to develop the technology into metal movable print arrived a
Before this essay proceeds, it is fundamental to establish some context of
cartography. In each ﬁeld, one individual is thought to be the master: Virgin for
poetry; Quin lian for teaching; and Aristotle for physics. For geography, the
acknowledged authorita ve ﬁgure is Claudius Ptolemy (AD 97 – 150). The
Alexandrian’s masterful work, Geographike Hyphegesis (‘Guide to Cartography’)
contained the principles acceding to which the world maps might be drawn and
boasted a vast catalogue of la tude and longitude co-ordinates for approximately
eight thousand places in the known world.6 As soon as the manuscripts of Ptolemy
and other geographers were rediscovered and arrived upon the fer le land of
Europe, they proliferated, assumed an authority, and circulated within intellectual
spheres. By 1409, the La n transla on of Ptolemy’s text had been ﬁnished by
The prin ng of maps in Europe between 1450 and 1650
genera on before Gutenberg, in Korea (the earliest metal type printed document is
a Buddhist manuscript that dates at 1377).8 Nevertheless, upon its arrival in the
1450’s, the technology spread like wildﬁre and by the end of the ﬁ eenth century,
prin ng presses were established in all major ci es. Moveable type prin ng press
expanded the capaci es of produc on to rates thought to be unimaginable
beforehand. During the sixth and seventh centuries, produc on of books sat at
roughly 120 per annum. In 1790 alone, twenty million books were bound.9 Similar
pa ers were reﬂected in mapmaking. From 1476, 56,000 maps were said to be in
circula on in Western Europe; geography began to become a commonality in
everyday life. This growth con nued to ﬂourish in the sixteenth century, of which by
the end the number of maps in existence is said to be in the millions.10
Jacobus Angeli.7 Despite every major European city having the classical ﬁgure’s
However, it would be fallible to assume that the advent of the prin ng press
knowledge at their disposal, map circula on on the con nent was in its embryonic
ini ated a pan-European advancement in geographic knowledge among the
stages. Between 1400 and 1476, maps were s ll in their manuscript form and
everyday person. In fact, the obsession with Classical An quity was exacerbated
es mates stand at just a few thousand maps exis ng in Western Europe during this
through the technology. As early as 1477, the ﬁrst printed edi on of Geography
me.
appeared in Bologna, of which a thousand were printed – a sizeable scale
However, Europe ﬁnally caught up with Asia and introduced the prin ng
press into its opera ons. Contrary to popular opinion, Johannes Gutenberg did not
develop moveable type print. Its inven on originates in China (c. 1040) and dates
33
considering the freshness of the technology (Figure 2). Seven diﬀerent printed
edi ons appeared by 1490 and over half of the maps printed before 1500 were
Ptolemaic.11 Saying this, the prin ng press, as Eisenstein argued, created a ‘process
34
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Harry Sophocleous
of feedback’ and ‘laid the basis for… modern science’.12 The technology had
most cases, printed maps were more expensive than its manuscript form due to the
enabled these classical texts to run loose on the wider European popula on. The
requirement to employ individuals to color each map in rich colors. Saying this,
diﬀusion of Ptolemaic maps and the mul plicity of edi ons bore witness to the
geography in the sixteenth century was a thriving market. It did not take long for
rapidity of the process of veriﬁca on, correc on, and reﬁnement. Indeed, as the
printers, engravers, and cartographers to arrive at the realiza on that maps
sixteenth century progressed, Ptolemaic edi ons were being consulted and
possessed cultural, intellectual, but most importantly, ﬁnancial value. Indeed,
interpreted to incorporate new contemporary discoveries. The 1508 Rome edi on,
Johannes Grüninger, one of the most inﬂuen al printers in Strasbourg encapsulated
for example, included the most Southern part of Africa, showing the sea route to
such commercial possibili es. In 1507, Grüninger printed one thousand copies of
India that was inaugurated by Vasca Da Gama.13 Furthermore, the 1513 Strasburg
Waldseemüller’s famous twelve-sheet wall map (men oned above) equa ng to a
edi on juxtaposes twenty-seven maps by Ptolemy with twenty-ﬁve modern maps,
print run of twelve thousand separate sheets. By 1525, Grüninger had printed no
ﬁve of which are of Africa and Asia.14 Vying with one another in terms of accuracy,
fewer than 3,500 wall maps composed of over 98,000 sheets.16 An endeavor of this
detail, and novelty, each passing edi on grew recognizably more modern. The
scale reﬂects the conﬁdence in a healthy market for beau fully illustrated and
Ptolemaic outlook on the world began to be increasingly viewed as the ves ge of a
expensive maps. However, this growing market brought about more than just
past civiliza on. Such a feeling is symbolized in Mercator’s 1577 produc on that
prosperity to the cartographic industry. The establishment of such a widening
consisted of original Ptolemaic maps, free of any correc ons or moderniza ons –
community of readers ignited a shi in the nature of which these maps could be
almost a novelty work.15 In essence, print culture’s uniformity and absence of
produced. This imagined community, that was beginning to base their geographical
varia on in its produc on fed and promoted a growing interest in geography
knowledge on the printed maps, allowed for geographers to distance themselves
among the wider intellectual circles. The European mind – broadened by Ptolemy –
from patrons. Indeed, as the market began to gear itself towards the increasingly
began to stretch beyond familiar shores and seas. Reawakened Europe was heading
anonymous public, mapmakers were now encouraged to travel to the major
inexorably towards an en cing future.
commercial ci es of Europe in search for possible exchanges between colleagues in
The prin ng of maps in Europe between 1450 and 1650
the form of informa on and knowledge.17 As a result, Europeans were now able to
With the exponen al rise in the volume of maps, one would expect that the
beneﬁt from a growing diversiﬁca on of geographical representa on rather than a
price would fall, as is the case with books, however, this is not the case. Instead, in
35
36
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
biased outlook of the world according to a wealthy commissioner.
However, the increase in circula on of maps did not come without
problems. They were a vital asset to every man whose business was foreign
commerce yet a nuisance to handle. Aegidius Hoo man, a canny merchant from
Antwerp, was one of many who grumbled about the logis cal inconvenience of
printed maps. It is within these condi ons that allowed for one of the greatest
ﬁgures in cartographical history to ﬂourish: Abraham Ortelius, a Flemish
cartographer and geographer. Ortelius began to develop a scheme to write the
Harry Sophocleous
The prin ng of maps in Europe between 1450 and 1650
was not Theatrum’s only signiﬁcance. In the closing words of the atlas, Ortelius
wrote: ‘in these Tables themselves, a certain Shoppe, as it were, furnished with all
hide of instruments necessarily required in such like business’.19 The juxtaposi on of
the atlas to a shop neutralizes its presence as an indispensible part of the social and
poli cal life of the elites that was free from any poli cal par ality. The prin ng press
created the intellectual and commercial possibility for Ortelius to realize that their
output would be more commercially successful and intellectually respected if it
distracted itself from the poli cally or aristocra c bias.
rapidly growing body of regional and global knowledge into one volume: an atlas.
Furthermore, it is with the opening of this mass market that allowed this
On May 20th, 1570, the ﬁrst modern geographical atlas was issued, bearing the
period to be dis nguished as a winning combina on of geographical accuracy with
name: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (‘Theatre of the World’). The atlas consisted of 35
rich ornamenta on. To think, as Jerry Bro on does, that geography transformed
leaves of text, 53 maps, and a catalogue of geographers and cartographers who
‘itself from a mysterious art into a scien ﬁcally exact ﬁeld of poli cal and
contributed. It was a universal, commercial, and intellectual success. The ini al print
commercial administra on’ would be a naïve asser on.20 Due to mainstream
sold so well that a second edi on was printed soon a er. By the end of 1570,
geographical knowledge tangled up in close-knit connec ons between European
another four edi ons had been printed; the following year, a Dutch edi on had
city-states, mapmakers began to alter their cartographical ornamental to a ract
appeared. Year by year the Theatrum grew in size, and, by 1612, there were no
wider appeal. Geographic maps, atlases, and tle pages were now looking from a
fewer than 42 edi ons in circula on, translated into every major European
collec ve European perspec ve to demarcate countries, regions, and even
language.18
con nents. As a result, depic ons of geographical imagery that is coupled with
Ortelius achieved his aim to condense the diversity of both classical and
contemporary forms of geographical knowledge into a single volume, from which
its owners could extract the informa on they required in an instant. However, this
37
allegorical allusions and historical connec ons broke new ground in providing a
more impressive introduc on to a printed work than the preceding printer’s simple
colophon.21
38
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Harry Sophocleous
The prin ng of maps in Europe between 1450 and 1650
A form of this intellectually created geographical sphere began in Ortelius’s
on the con nent began to have an inﬂuence on the way they viewed the world. The
tle page for his 1570 atlas, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, in which a personiﬁca on of
promo on of Chris anity and European supremacy would manage to drown out any
the four known con nents contained allegorical connota ons (Figure 3). Upon a ﬁrst
feelings of inferiority for foreign races when looking at the known world as a whole.
glance at the image, it is apparent to any spectator that Europe is the most
Any drawbacks that the alterna ve races may have had was not viewed to be their
commanding of the four. Indeed, she is depicted as the empress of the world, si ng
individual faults, but simply because they were not European. Indeed, it is possible
at an elevated level, gripping a specter in her right hand, and with her le , holding a
that William Strachey had this reinforced concep on of European supremacy in mind
rudder in the shape of a Chris an cross, controlling the course in which the world
when he arrived in the New World in the early seventeenth century. He wrote a
takes. On the other hand, Africa is scan ly clad, with just enough to cover her loins.
poem to describe his experience of an Indian dance, thus crea ng an insight into a
Rays of the sun wrap around her head to form a nature casque and a spiky halo.
European’s ﬁrst impressions when they encountered new beings from obscure
Furthermore, she is holding a sprig of balsam, of which its unique provenance is
corners of the globe:
Egypt – this may well be an act of homage.22 This innova ve crea on inﬂuenced
‘Wild as there are, accept them, so were we
many decora ve and allegorical fron spieces for numerous atlases and world maps
over the next 150 years. Indeed, the tle page for Hondius-Mercator’s atlas of 1623
exuded similar characteris cs (Figure 4). One again, Europe was depicted as the
crown for the world, clutching a specter while simultaneously holding a ﬂoral
cornucopia – a reminder that her ruling authority produces peace and plenty. With
Africa, once again, an emphasis was placed on the sun, with the black female
a emp ng to shield herself with an umbrella, whilst wielding an umbrella and
mounted on a large crocodile – a reference to the primi ve nature of the African
To make them civil, will our honour be
And if good words, be the eﬀects of Myndes
Which like good Angels be, let our Designs.’24
It’s clear that the atlases contributed to a growing feeling of European
supremacy when it came to dealing with other races during the ‘Age of Discovery’.
Indeed, maps did not create this feeling of European supremacy, but it was
instrumental in strengthening the regulari es of foreign lands and restric ng any
xenophobic feeling that may have been festering beforehand. For example, the
23
civiliza on.
element of the sun appearing in both depic ons of Africa is a reference to the
The success of these European atlases among the wider intellectual spheres
39
misadventures of Phaeton, the son of the ancient Greek god of sun.
40
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Harry Sophocleous
This associa on with the classical world is a clear acceptance of some form of human
civiliza on in Africa, albeit if they think it is of a low standard.25
The prin ng of maps in Europe between 1450 and 1650
Saying this, the prin ng press allowed for map ownership among the upper
echelons of European society to surge. This made possible the assimila on of a
Saying this, there is a reason why this essay has adopted the term
wholly new type of spa al awareness and a vastly more ambi ous sense of space.
‘mainstream’ when discussing geographic knowledge in Renaissance Europe. The
Ortelius inexorably redeﬁned the social status of early modern geography as a
eﬀects of print culture did not translate into any noteworthy breakthrough in the
discipline that revolves around the demands of the market. While this did not
geographic representa on of the world. There was a paradoxical gap between
completely erase the poli cal element to maps, it undoubtedly forced a shi that
manuscript maps – kept secret by merchants, monarchs and aristocrats for their
saw the emergence of a more recognizable modern discipline.28 Without the
accuracy and their subsequent commercial and poli cal value – and printed maps, of
advent of the prin ng press, geography would have not have entered the mindset of
which the informa on remained twenty or thirty years behind and had been built
the mass public and the average European would have con nued to live in a world
upon the founda on of inaccurate classical an qui es.26 Indeed, portolan charts that
of darkness, oblivious to the scale of the lands of which he resides. With the
originated in the Mediterranean Sea in the twel h century oﬀered a remarkable
intellectual spheres now excited by the no on of geography, European expansion
accurate survey of various coastlines. These charts would have been func onal
was now able to implement a new dimension to its adventures. The mo va on to
instruments in the art of travel rather than an intellectual extravagance that could be
map new journeys and to establish close rela onships between European ci es was
sold for its ornamental value. As seen with the Portuguese world map of 1502,
all in a empt to sa sfy a new pulsa ng market.
Notes
mariners would extract important detail from the map concerning various ports
1.
F. Thackeray (ed), Events that Formed Modern World (London: ABC-CLIO, 2012), p. 188.
2.
R. Stefoﬀ, The Bri sh Library Companion to Maps and Mapmaking (London: Bri sh
Library, 1995), p. 6.
3.
J. Bro on, A History of the World in Twelve Maps (London: Penguin, 2013), p. 157.
spread of prin ng only had a marginal eﬀect in regards to the intellectual limits of
4.
J. Wilford, The Mapmakers: The Story of the Great Pioneers in Cartography (London:
Pimlico, 2002), pp. 84-5.
European’s and their knowledge of the world. Print culture were only able to
5.
E. Eisenstein, The Prin ng Press as an Agent of Change (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980).A. Johns, The Nature of the Book (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1998). For an overview of historiography, read: A. Gra on, ‘How Revolu onary
was the Print Revolu on?’, The American Historical Journal, vol. 107 (2002), pp. 84-6.
6.
D. Buisseret, The Map Maker’s Quest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 1216.
along the coastlines, as well as the local powers that rule and would allow them to
undertake diploma c and commercial missions (Figure 5).27 In other words, the
contribute to developments that had come long before the eﬄorescence of printed
maps in the sixteenth century.
41
42
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Harry Sophocleous
Notes
The prin ng of maps in Europe between 1450 and 1650
Bibliography
7.
C. Jacob, The Sovereign Map: Theore cal Approaches in Cartography throughout
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 54.
Secondary literature
8.
Manchester University, ‘Moveable Type Print’, h p://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/
ﬁrs mpressions/From-Manuscript-to-Print/Technology-of-the-Book/Movable-metaltype/ [Accessed 8th December 2014].
Barber, P., The Map Book (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005).
9.
E. Buringh, ‘Char ng the “Rise of the West”: Manuscripts and Printed Books in Europe,
a Long-Term Perspec ve from the Sixth through Eighteenth Centuries’, The Journal of
Economic History, Vol. 69 (2009), pp. 409-445 (p.439).
Binding, P., Imagined Corners: Exploring the World’s First Atlas (London: Headline Book
Publishing, 2003).
Bro on, J., A History of the World in Twelve Maps (London: Penguin, 2013).
10.
D. Woodward, The History of Cartography, vol.3, pt.1 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2007), p. 11.
Bro on, J., Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World (London: Reak on, 1997).
11.
R. Unger, Ships on Maps: Pictures of Power in Renaissance Europe (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010), pp. 62-70.
Brown, L., The Story of Maps (London: Cresset Press, 1951).
12.
Eisenstein, The Prin ng Press, pp. 479,704.
13.
R. Tooley, Maps and Map-Makers (London: B. T. Batsford, 1970), pp. 6-7.
14.
Jacob, The Sovereign Map, pp. 61-2.
15.
Ibid.
16.
H. Johnson, Carta Marina: World Geography in Strassburg (Minnesota: 1963), p. 124.
Eisenstein, E., The Prin ng Press as an Agent of Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1980).
17.
J. Bro on, Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World (London: Reak on,
1997), pp. 169-77.
Gra on, A., ‘How Revolu onary was the Print Revolu on?’, The American Historical Journal,
vol. 107 (2002).
18.
L. Brown, The Story of Maps (London: Cresset Press, 1951), pp. 160-4.
19.
Bro on, Trading Territories, pp. 169-77.
20.
Ibid.
21.
R. Shirley, ‘The Title Pages to the Theatrum and Parergon’ in M. van den Broecke, P.
van der Krogt, and P. Meurer, Abraham Ortelius and the First Atlas (Utrecht: HES
Publishers, 1998), pp. 161-4.
Buisseret, D., The Map Maker’s Quest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Buringh, E., ‘Char ng the “Rise of the West”: Manuscripts and Printed Books in Europe, a Long
-Term Perspec ve from the Sixth through Eighteenth Centuries’, The Journal of Economic
History, Vol. 69 (2009).
Jacob, C., The Sovereign Map: Theore cal Approaches in Cartography throughout History
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
Johns, A., The Nature of the Book (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
Johnson, H., Carta Marina: World Geography in Strassburg (Minnesota: 1963).
22.
P. Binding, Imagined Corners: Exploring the World’s First Atlas (London: Headline Book
Publishing, 2003), pp. 209-214.
23.
P. Barber, The Map Book (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005), pp. 154-5.
24.
W. Strachey, The First Booke of the Historie of Travaile into Virginia Britannica (161012).
25.
Binding, Imagined Corners, pp. 209-14.
26.
Jacob, The Sovereign Map, pp. 54-66.
27.
Buisseret, The Mapmakers’ Quest, p. 71.
Thackeray, F. (ed), Events that Formed Modern World (London: ABC-CLIO, 2012).
28.
Bro on, Trading Territories, pp. 176-7.
Tooley, R., Maps and Map-Makers (London: B. T. Batsford, 1970).
43
Shirley, R., ‘The Title Pages to the Theatrum and Parergon’ in M. van den Broecke, P. van der
Krogt, and P. Meurer, Abraham Ortelius and the First Atlas (Utrecht: HES Publishers, 1998).
Stefoﬀ, R., The Bri sh Library Companion to Maps and Mapmaking (London: Bri sh Library,
1995).
Strachey, W., The First Booke of the Historie of Travaile into Virginia Britannica (London:
Bri sh Library, 1610-12).
44
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Bibliography
Harry Sophocleous
The prin ng of maps in Europe between 1450 and 1650
Figure collection
Secondary literature
Unger, R., Ships on Maps: Pictures of Power in Renaissance Europe (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010).
Wilford, J., The Mapmakers: The Story of the Great Pioneers in Cartography (London: Pimlico,
2002).
Woodward, D., The History of Cartography, vol.3, pt.1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007).
Primary literature
Manchester University, ‘Moveable Type Print’, h p://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/
ﬁrs mpressions/From-Manuscript-to-Print/Technology-of-the-Book/Movable-metal-type/
[Accessed 8th December 2014].
Figure 2: Bri sh Library, London, Claudius Ptolemy,
'Geographia', 1477.
Figure collection
Figure 1: Library of Congress,
Washington D.C., Mar n Waldseemüller,
‘Universalis Cosmographia’, 1507.
Figure 3: Boston Public Library, Abraham
Ortelius, 'Theatrum Orbis Terrarum', 1570:
Title Page.
45
46
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Sebas an Lowe
Tribal iden
es in African States
Figure collection
‘Identity is a knife’: Must tribal identities be repressed in
order for African States to avoid internal violent conflict?
Sebas an Lowe
Iden ty in Africa is an issue that, from the outside, is usually portrayed as
primordial and intractable. This gives rise to the impression that there is nothing to
be done, except perhaps suppress such tribal iden
ﬂuid history of tribal iden
es en rely. But by analysing the
es it becomes clear that the issue moves beyond mere
tribalism. O en Tribal conﬂicts in Africa emerge out of a crisis of ci zenship and
Figure 4: Private Collec on,
Hondius-Mercator, 'Africa', 1623.
representa on that challenges the post-colonial state system. The tribes themselves
emerge from the frozen, primordial culture in which they are cast and take their
true, ﬂuid and dynamic forms. While there are myriad examples of tribal conﬂict
across the Con nent this analysis will focus on the issue within the Great Lakes
region of Central Africa; speciﬁcally Rwanda, Burundi, and the eastern regions of the
Democra c Republic of Congo (DRC).
To realis cally comprehend how Tribalism is understood by communi es in
Africa today a be er understanding of their complex history is needed. O en tribal
Figure 5: Bibloteca Estense Universitaria
Moderna: Anonymous Portuguese World Map,
1502.
conﬂicts are seen as eternal by outsiders; while others dismiss such grievances as an
en rely colonial inven on. The truth is far more nuanced than this, and the tribes of
the great lakes provide strong evidence of this. The most signiﬁcant ethnic cleavage
in the region is the infamous dis nc on between Hutu and Tutsi.
47
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Sebas an Lowe
These (along with the Twa) form the three largest ethnic groups in both Rwanda and
conﬂict back into the primordial past. What this shows is that tribal iden
Burundi. Some have dismissed them as a colonial inven on but there is clear
pre-colonial era were rela vely peaceful, a context which can not be disregarded in
evidence that these two groups existed in the region for centuries. However in the
favour of the total suppression of tribes.
Tribal iden
es in African States
es in the
historic Kingdoms of Burundi and Rwanda the dis nc on was far more ﬂuid than
But establishing tribal iden ty as being neither ﬁxed and primordial nor a
today. It is o en described as akin to a class division, with the Hutu majority o en
colonial inven on is not to discount the transforma ve eﬀect colonialism had on
subservient to the ruling Tutsi elite: and it was possible for a Hutu to "become" a
Iden ty in Africa. The policy of "Indirect Rule" saw the colonial regimes' legi macy
Tutsi. There is li le evidence of ethnic conﬂict between the two groups, conﬂict was
secured through gaining the loyalty of tribal "chiefs". Regimes argued the policy
more inter-elite; and while the Tutsi elite were no ceably taller than the Hutu
protected indigenous culture but Ronald Aminzade contends that o en oﬃcials
peasant class there was li le biological diﬀerence. In fact, in Southern Rwanda the
devoted substan al energy to ﬁnding chiefs even when they knew that no such
Tutsi farmers were indis nguishable from their Hutu neighbours. 1 2
ﬁgure existed.4 Where Rwanda and Burundi saw ethnicity created out of a typical
The more dynamic tribal region of what was to become the eastern DRC was
more complex than the centralised kingdoms to the east, but iden ty was s ll clearly
a ﬂuid concept. The groups that inhabited this region had li le ﬁxed iden ty as
tribes, but iden ty was s ll present. The Congolese historical tradi on was centred
around three strata of the house, village and the district. While these communi es,
to varying degrees, shared a common language and culture they were organised
primarily for defence and thus there was no poli cal centralisa on or permanent
process of indirect rule Bogumil Jewsiewicki sees iden ty in the Congo come from a
push towards regionalism. By drawing "reality out of ﬁc on" the crea on of a
state-wide na onal space depended ini ally on developing regional es. Regionalism
saw the crea on of "ethnici es" out of hitherto similar cultural spheres, for example
the crea on of a "Luba" iden ty out of an area that shared similar dialects. Moreover
regionalism saw the crea on of a feared internal enemy (a "Stranger"), be it the Luba
in Kasai or the Kinyarwandese in the Kivus. A comparison can be made to the Jewish
"internal enemy" that has historically existed in Europe.5 In the eastern country the
authority.3
Kinyarwandan popula on in North Kivu was swelled by the forced migra on of up to
What these pre-colonial iden
es show is that tribal iden ty has not always
300,000 Rwandese throughout the colonial period.6 This process formalized and
been the divisive, rigid structure that one ﬁnds today, and to say that the rivalries
ﬁxed iden
between the tribes of the great lakes region are intractable is to project the present
49
authority to tribal chiefs and tying people to the land of their tribe.
50
es that had previously been largely ﬂuid, serving to both centralize
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Sebas an Lowe
This type of colonial rule was not unique, but the Belgian regime were ardent
with the arrangement of power prior to colonial rule, where power was organised
enforcers of it. The a ermath of the ﬁrst World War saw the crea on of mandates
primarily around defence and permanent authority over villages, or even individual
which the League of Na ons deﬁned as "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves
houses, was uncommon.11 Crawford Young says it is not coincidence that
under the strenuous condi ons of the modern world." But in principle this was an
colonialism in Africa "coincided with the historical zenith of virulent racism" and that
extension of the Belgian empire which had ruled Congo for the previous three
the postcolonial states s ll feel the eﬀects of this.12 But while the colonial regimes
decades. Ironically the mandate periods were o en jus ﬁed as a defense against the
were clearly racially prejudiced this cannot be seen to con nue unchanged, to argue
"Tribal divisions" that were a consequence of indirect rule.7 The former German
this is to again cast iden ty as sta c and primordial. Rather Mamdani's case that
regime had made extensive use of the Hutu-Tutsi divide. By co-op ng the Tutsi to
what the colonial regime did was create a "bifurcated state" where ci zenship was
rule over the Hutu the German Empire had managed to rule Ruanda-Urundi with a
granted to "civilised" men and en re groups were excluded because of their
minute number of personnel. The Tutsis themselves took advantage of their
ethnicity, has far more relevance for the post-colonial states today.13 From this
privileged posi on and there are cases of them even collec ng taxes in areas outside
bifurca on one can see how the exclusion of groups during the colonial regime
of German control.8 The incoming Belgian regime took these divide and rule tac cs
began a crisis of ci zenship, of who was within the state and who was outside it; and
es through id cards, introduced in 1933-34.9 The
iden ty's ﬂuidity, rather than primordial racism, makes such a crisis highly
further by ﬁxing the iden
arguments used by the Belgian Empire extensively employed the fashionable
Tribal iden
es in African States
combus ble.
rhetoric of race science. O en this resulted in the crea on of origin myths; the most
infamous of these was the "Hami c hypothesis" which contented that the Tutsi were
not na ve to the region, nor even a Bantu tribe, but were a superior and more
civilized tribe who had descended from the Nile region to the north.10 What such
myths did was exclude the Hutu from most aspects of public life on racial grounds,
while simultaneously fostering resentment towards the "invading" Tutsi elite.
Jan Vansina has shown that the power granted to chiefs was en rely at odds
In describing Sierra Leone's civil war Paul Richards saw violence as discourse
and war as text: "a violent a empt to... 'cut in on the conversa on' of others from
whose company the belligerents feel excluded."14 This concept crystallises the logic
of tribal violence not as a primal hatred but ins tu onalised exclusion. Rene
Lemarchand ﬁnds this idea as central to explaining the Hutu-Tutsi animosity in the
post colonial period; and the fact that the 1972 Burundian genocide of Hutu by Tutsi
has been largely forgo en is telling. Between April-November, 1972, 100-200,000
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Sebas an Lowe
Hutus were exterminated by the Burundian-Tutsi regime, and Lemarchand sees this
incorporated into the state.18 Morten Bøås expands this idea to a con nental issue
context as crucial to subsequent Hutu-Tutsi rela ons. It signiﬁcantly contextualises
which he deﬁnes as "autochthony". He sees the European no on of ci zenship
the seizure of power by Hutus in Rwanda in 1973 under Juvenal Habyarimana.15 Liisa
within a civil society as unravelling across post-colonial Africa, as diﬀerent groups
Malkki also sees the subsequent refusal to incorporate Hutus into the Burundian
claim "autochthonous", inalienable rights to the land. The groups iden ﬁed as out-
state as fundamental to the radicalisa on of the Hutu refugees in Tanzania and the
siders are more than just Mamdani's "strangers" but are in essence denied
forma on of the PALIPEHUTU movement. That this movement would destabilise
ci zenship. Bøås sees the Eastern DRC to be a prime example of this language of
Burundi to such a degree in 1993 is a direct consequence of the ability of the Hutu
autochthony for while the Congolese 1964 Cons tu on grants that there is "only one
ethnicity to give a "mythico-history" to what in other contexts would be a poli cal
Congolese na onality" the fact individuals had to prove ancestry da ng back to 1908
iden ty.16 Both Lemarchand and Malkki concur that the ethnically driven poli cal
meant that ci zenship was ed to the land.19 For Stephen Jackson this dialogue
exclusion has a dis nct toxicity, and it becomes clear that the living memory of ethnic
between the "Strangers" and the "sons of the soil" is not present in the longue durée
violence explains the violent reac on of Hutus upon hearing that the ﬁrst Hutu
but a consequence of the colonial ﬁxing of iden ty and the crea on of homelands
president of Burundi, Ndadaye, had been assassinated. The Hutu refugees who ﬂed
(the same process of regionalism outlined by Jewsiewicki).20
Tribal iden
es in African States
into Rwanda at this point needed li le encouragement to join the Hutu mili a.17
Throughout the post-independence period the ques on of which groups
Lemarchand is prescient when arguing that the forma on of a collec ve
belonged to the land was central: from 1972 the inﬂuen al Congolese Tutsi poli cian
memory and mythology marks ethnic violence as dis nct and more likely to escalate
Barthélemy Bisengimana changed the law on ci zenship to those living in Congo
but this iden ﬁes a symptom rather than a cause. The dis nct dynamics of the
prior to 1950; but this was changed again when leaders of the "autochthonous"
Hutu-Tutsi myth exemplify the fundamental issue that deﬁned the post-colonial
Babembe tribe from south Kivu pushed the date back to the Berlin Conference of
regimes.
1885.21 As shall be shown below this conﬂict is s ll not resolved, but by connec ng
Returning to the origin myth and the Hame c hypothesis, Mamdani sees the
the language of autochthony with Mamdani's crisis of ci zenship one sees it as less a
ethnic violence as fundamentally a "Crisis of ci zenship", by which the ethnic
conﬂict over historical tribal diﬀerences and more a recent ques on over what
"Stranger" status of the Tutsi is projected onto the more fundamental issue of who is
cons tutes the post-colonial state.
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Sebas an Lowe
By viewing the tribal iden
es not as ﬁxed and historic but recent and ﬂuid, and by
like Kangura pushed many in the Hutu community towards violence.27 The
viewing the post-independence conﬂict as more over ci zenship and autochthony
assassina on of President Habyarimana began the orchestrated execu on of at least
than primordial hatred, the most dis nct period of violence in the region through
half the Rwandan Tutsi popula on over the course of 100 days.28 But what must be
the 1990s is no longer seen as incomprehensible, tribal chaos but as a crisis of
stressed is that the Hutu genocidaires were not mo vated by pure hatred but by the
statehood grounded in a dis nct logic. The region's ﬁrst violent outbreak in the
dual crises of immanent military defeat by the RPF29 and the memory of violence
1990s was not in Rwanda but in Burundi. Under pressure from interna onal donors
against Hutus in 1972.30 In this sense the genocidaires chose to "embrace death itself
the Tutsi minority government of Pierre Buyoya held the ﬁrst democra c elec ons.
as an alterna ve to life without power".31
Tribal iden
es in African States
But the Buyoya government was shocked by the elec on of a moderate Hutu,
Melchior Ndadye.22 More than a tribal rivalry, the Tutsi government feared that
The violence against the Tutsi only ended once the RPF had seized power and
pushed the Hutu genocidaires, along with 2 million Hutu refugees, into neighbouring
Ndadye's elec on would see their removal from civil society, as the Hutu's held an
Zaire (Congo).32 But the RPF's victory did li le to fundamentally alter ethnic
85% majority and their diaspora movement had increased the autochthonous
rhetoric within the Hutu community since 1972.23 24 The violent coup launched by
dynamics in the region. Infused with their own mythology and ideology the RPF
ensured that they were central to the forma on of the state, and moreover, as
the Tutsi military, and Buyoya's assassina on in October 1993, are seen by
Reyntjens has discussed at length, excluded the remaining Hutu from full poli cal
Lemarchand as another example of trying to "cut in on the conversa on" of the
par cipa on.33 This ideology helps one understand why the "counter-genocide" of
25
Hutu Frodbeu party.
the Hutu by the RPF was not only unreported but deemed acceptable34, for the RPF's
In 1994 the Hutu government of Rwanda also feared they were about to be
constella on of morality ﬁrmly entrenched the Tutsi as the permanent vic ms just as
excluded from the conversa on. Interna onal pressure to pluralise and the Tutsi
the exiled Burundian Hutu in Tanzania had cast themselves decades earlier.35 This
invasion of the Rwandan Patrio c Front (RPF) from neighbouring Uganda had led the
also contextualises why the violence was so rapidly exported across the border to
Habyarimana regime to fear expulsion from the process of government.26 Key to the
the Eastern DRC; not only did the RPF leader Paul Kagame sponsor the rebel
"Hutu Power" ideology was the claim the Tutsi were an alien race come to
movement that toppled Congo's entrenched dictator Mobutu, but then launched a
reconquer the land, and poli cal broadcasts over the radio RTKM and in newspapers
seven year proxy war that saw Rwanda gain eﬀec ve control over large swathes of
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Sebas an Lowe
Congolese territory. It has been claimed that this occupa on was largely for control
the poli cal par cipa on of other minori es. When wri ng of the Batwa community
of resources but what cannot be ignored is Kagame's desire for the Hutu Refugees
Danielle Beswick has described how they have no representa on in the state; and
(now the rebel FDLR movement) to permanently remain genocidaires outside the
the Rwandan Ministry of Jus ce threatened to stop all NGO projects within the
country, rather than to return as a poli cal majority and, once again, a empt to
Batwa community if they con nued to be referred to as a dis nct ethnic minority.39
remove the Tutsi from civil society.36
In this way the suppression of iden ty in no way incorporates the ethnic groups into
By analysing the cycles of blame and violence that occurred through the
postcolonial period one is drawn to the social science concept of "retribu ve
Tribal iden
es in African States
the state; and the collec ve memory that ethnic conﬂict creates ensures that a
return to violence remains a dis nct possibility.
genocide" developed by Vahakn Dadrian and Helen Fein. Across all three countries
But calls to abandon repression are o en accompanied with pressure on
discussed it was the stra ﬁed state machinery that saw one group suppress another,
governments to liberalise and pluralise; which can also result in internal conﬂict. It
which feeds the mythology of the suppressed and makes them more opposed to
was precisely the pressure on the Habyarimana and Buyoya governments to
a empts at inclusion.37 In this sense ethnic exclusion, with its propensity for
liberalise and pluralise that frightened the extremist elite to s r up ethnic hatred and
collec ve memory and a single "truth", is more pernicious than any other
commit to a genocide. Democra sa on is likely to create ethnic conﬂict in countries
stra ﬁca on; but as the case studies above show it is the fundamental issue of
with "a popula on with poor civic and underdeveloped representa ve and
ci zenship and a fear of being removed from civil society that drives ethnic divisions
journalis c ins tu ons; and elites who are threatened with democra c change". This
to such violent conﬂicts.
is especially so in countries who s ll bear the legacies of colonial ethnic divisions.40
It becomes clear that suppression does not in any way baddress the
fundamental issues. In Rwanda ethnic iden ﬁca on has been suppressed, and there
Instead a long period of developing ins tu ons must ﬁrst lay the groundwork for
democra sa on that does not produce ethnic violence.
is a strict bar on any form of ethnic poli cs. But this has had the adverse aﬀect of
When describing iden ty as a knife Helen Hintjens makes the dis nc on that
excluding Hutu from the poli cal process as they themselves have to iden fy with
iden ty is not a knife, but rather becomes one.41 This may be a fundamental point
the RPF's oﬃcial truth; any a empt to do otherwise is punishable as "Genocide
when arguing against the mere suppression of tribal iden
ideology.”38 Moreover denying any form of iden ty poli cs has extremely hindered
knife when the ﬂuid nature of it became ﬁxed; when the colonial state became a
57
es. Iden ty became a
bifurcated one; when the post-colonial state sees the ques on of ci zenship
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Sebas an Lowe
transform into an issue of autochthony; and when the collec ve memory and
Tribal iden
es in African States
Notes
mythology iden ﬁes one group as perennial vic ms, and the other as the sole
16.
Malkki, L.H. Purity in Exile: Violence, Memory and Na onal Cosmology among Hutu
Refugees in Tanzania, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995), pp. 36-25.
perpetrators of violence. In this context merely suppressing iden ty does not
17.
Lemarchand, R. "Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?",
African Studies Review, 41:1 (April, 1998), p. 6.
18.
Mamdani, (2001), pp. 234-236.
19.
Bøås, M. "Autochthony and Ci zenship: 'Civil Society' as Vernacular Architecture"
Journal of Interven on and Statebuilding, 6:1 (April, 2012), p. 98.
20.
Jackson, S "Sons of Which Soil? The Language and Poli cs of Autochthony in Eastern
D.R. Congo", African Studies Review, 49:2 (September, 2006), p. 98.
21.
Bøås, (2012), p. 98.
22.
Snyder, J. (2000) From Vo ng to Violence: Democra sa on and Na onalist Conﬂict,
(W.W. Norton & Co., New York, US), p. 300.
23.
Ibid.
24.
Malkki, (1995), p. 250.
25.
Lemarchand, (1998), p.11.
26.
Klinghoﬀer, A.J. The Interna onal Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda, (Macmillan,
London, 1998), p. 17.
address the fundamental issue of crea ng a pluralis c state; something that is
urgently needed to defuse the "simmering volcano before it blows up yet again, this
me engulﬁng the wider region."42
Notes
1.
Dunn, K.C. Imagining the Congo: the Interna onal Rela ons of Iden ty, (Palgrave
Macmillan, New York, 2003), pp. 148-152.
2.
Mamdani, M. When Vic ms Become Killers: Colonialism, Na vism and the Genocide in
Rwanda (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001), pp. 41-74.
3.
Vansina, J. Paths in the Rainforest: Towards a History of Poli cal Tradi on in Equatorial
Africa, (University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1990), pp. 70-80.
4.
Aminzade, R. Race, Na on, and Ci zenship in Post-Colonial Africa, (Cambridge
University Press, New York, 2013), p. 39.
27.
Mamdani, (2001), p. 190.
5.
Jewsiewicki "The Forma on of the Poli cal Culture of Ethnicity in the Belgian Congo:
1920-1959" in Vail, L. (ed). The Crea on of Tribalism in Southern Africa, (University of
California Press, Berkely, 1991), pp. 327-330.
28.
Klinghoﬀer, (1998), p. 3.
29.
Mamdani, (2001), p. 215.
6.
Huggins, C "Land, Power and Iden ty: The Roots of Violence in Eastern DRC",
Interna onal Alert, (November, 2010), p. 16.
30.
Lemarchand, (1998), p. 7.
31.
Mamdani, (2001), p. 215.
7.
Aminzade, (2013), pp. 37-39.
32.
8.
Louis, R,W.M. Ruanda-Urundi: 1884-1919, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963), p. 158.
Prunier, G Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a
Con nental Catastrophe, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009), pp. 4-5.
9.
Dunn, (2003), p. 148.
33.
Find in Reyntjens.
10.
Louis, (1963), pp. 107-08.
34.
Lemarchand, (1998), p. 8.
11.
Vansina, (1990), pp. 70-80.
35.
Malkki, (1995), p. 250.
12.
Young, C. The African Colonial State in Compara ve Perspec ve, (Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1994), p. 280.
36.
Autesserre, S. The Trouble With the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of
Interna onal Peacebuilding, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010), p. 61.
13.
Mamdani, M. Ci zen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialism, (Fountain, Kampala, 1996), pp. 16-18.
37.
Klinghoﬀer, (1998), p.115.
38.
Mamdani, (2001), p. 270.
14.
Richards, P. Figh ng for the Rainforest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone
(Villiers, London, 1996), p. xxiv.
39.
Beswick, D. "Democracy, Iden ty and the Poli cs of Exclusion in Post-Genocide
Rwanda: The Case of the Batwa", Democra za on, 18:02 (April, 2011), p. 502.
15.
Lemarchand, R. "Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?",
African Studies Review, 41:1 (April, 1998), pp. 5-7.
40.
Snyder, (2000), pp. 296-306.
59
60
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Sebas an Lowe
Notes
41.
Hintjens, H. "When Iden ty Becomes a Knife: Reﬂec ng on the Genocide in Rwanda"
Ethnici es, 1:1 (April, 2001), p. 26.
42.
Mamdani, (2001), p. 215.
Bibliography
Tribal iden
es in African States
Bibliography
Secondary literature
Richards, P. Figh ng for the Rainforest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone, (Villiers,
London, 1996).
Snyder, J. (2000) From Vo ng to Violence: Democra sa on and Na onalist Conﬂict, (W.W.
Norton & Co., New York, US).
Vansina, J. Paths in the Rainforest: Towards a History of Poli cal Tradi on in Equatorial Africa,
(University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1990).
Secondary literature
Aminzade, R. Race, Na on, and Ci zenship in Post-Colonial Africa. [Online]. (Cambridge
University Press, New York, 2013). Available from: Cambridge Books Online h p://
dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107360259 [Accessed 17 December 2014].
Young, C. The African Colonial State in Compara ve Perspec ve, (Yale University Press, New
Haven, 1994).
Autesserre, S. The Trouble With the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of Interna onal
Peacebuilding, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010).
Beswick, D. "Democracy, Iden ty and the Poli cs of Exclusion in Post-Genocide Rwanda: The
Case of the Batwa" Democra za on, 18:02 (April, 2011).
Bøås, M. "Autochthony and Ci zenship: 'Civil Society' as Vernacular Architecture" Journal of
Interven on and Statebuilding, 6:1 (April, 2012).
Dunn, K.C. Imagining the Congo: the Interna onal Rela ons of Iden ty, (Palgrave Macmillan,
New York, 2003).
Huggins, C "Land, Power and Iden ty: The Roots of Violence in Eastern DRC", Interna onal
Alert, (November, 2010).
Hintjens, H. "When Iden ty Becomes a Knife: Reﬂec ng on the Genocide in Rwanda",
Ethnici es, 1:1 (April, 2001).
Jackson, S "Sons of Which Soil? The Language and Poli cs of Autochthony in Eastern D.R.
Congo", African Studies Review, 49:2 (September, 2006).
Jewsiewicki "The Forma on of the Poli cal Culture of Ethnicity in the Belgian Congo: 19201959" in Vail, L. (ed). The Crea on of Tribalism in Southern Africa, (University of California
Press, Berkely, 1991).
Klinghoﬀer, A.J. The Interna onal Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda, (Macmillan, London,
1998).
Lemarchand, R. "Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?", African
Studies Review, 41:1 (April, 1998).
Louis, R,W.M. Ruanda-Urundi: 1884-1919, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963).
Malkki, L.H. Purity in Exile: Violence, Memory and Na onal Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in
Tanzania, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995).
Mamdani, M. Ci zen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism,
(Fountain, Kampala, 1996).
Mamdani, M. When Vic ms Become Killers: Colonialism, Na vism and the Genocide in
Rwanda, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001).
61
62
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Sam Allen
Comparison of the u litarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
In analysing these diﬀerences several key tenants of Mill and Bentham’s
Analyse the main differences between the utilitarianism of
thought shall be examined in detail. First, Bentham’s ‘quan ta ve hedonism’ will be
compared to Mill’s ‘qualita ve’ concep on of happiness. This will lead onto a
Jeremy Bentham and that of John Stuart Mill
considera on of how Bentham’s views of human mo va on and self-interest
Sam Allen
contrasted with Mill and his theory of life and how these diﬀerences informed their
The moral theory of u litarianism is built upon the premise that the maximising
of human happiness or ‘u lity’ is the moral index for which ac ons should be
evaluated and judged. Hence, the consequen alist theory places u lity at the
founda on of morality, and seeks to reject a priori formula ons of intrinsic value in
ac ons.1 Having weathered severe cri cism since its emergence in the eighteenth
century, the modern u litarian school now stands as one of the most important
ethical frameworks in moral and poli cal philosophy. This essay will examine the
main diﬀerences between the ideas of two of its greatest contributors; Jeremy
Bentham (1748-1832) and his protégé John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). I will analyse
varying poli cal views on the nature and role of government within a u litarian
context. Indeed, the role of the legislator in Bentham’s cons tu onal model will be
compared to Mill’s concep on of individuals as moral agents of u lity. Acutely
conscious of his tutor’s cri cs, Mill’s work undoubtedly departs from Bentham’s
ideas in signiﬁcant ways. Yet, rather than looking to discredit Bentham’s ideas, it will
be maintained that Mill seeks to provide a defence of Bentham’s u litarianism that
works to make the “greatest happiness” principle a more encompassing and
nuanced theory. In this sense, it will be suggested that a reading of Mill’s ideas can
inform a re-interpreta on of Bentham’s u litarian thought.
Bentham’s u litarianism through the prism of Mill’s signiﬁcant reﬁnements, and will
Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill both seek to prove that the moral value of
seek to prove that their diﬀering theories stem from their contras ng concep ons of
ac ons are con ngent upon the human happiness they bring about. Indeed, both
human psychology and sociability. Indeed, Bentham’s more simple and reduc ve
place happiness as the founda on of morality because the seeking of happiness
u litarianism will be linked to his ego s cal percep on of human nature while Mill’s
drives human ac on. However, one of the fundamental diﬀerences between
richer and more nuanced ideas will be connected to his concep on of humans as
Bentham and Mill’s u litarian moral theories are their concep ons of what human
social
happiness cons tutes. Bentham proposes a quan ta ve hedonis c interpreta on
‘progressive
beings’
and
his
principle
concern
with
individual
while Mill argues that quality of pleasure determines happiness. These diﬀerences
self-development.
63
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Sam Allen
are important as they determine the ways in which the two thinkers oﬀer
individual conduct. Thus, Bentham oﬀers a ‘quan ta ve’ form of hedonism in which
contras ng systems for ‘calcula ng’ the value of ac ons and more generally serve to
happiness, when reduced to its cons tuents, is determined by the dura on and
underpin their moral u litarian theories.
intensity of pleasure. This forms his end point for evalua ng the u lity of ac ons.5
Comparison of the u litarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
Taking an empirical and reduc ve approach, Bentham maintains that happiness
Although raised under strict tutelage of his father James Mill and Bentham
is con ngent upon pleasurable sensa ons and the absence of pain. In the ﬁrst
himself, J. S. Mill had grown disillusioned with this reduc ve Benthamite hedonism.6
chapter of his Introduc on to the Principles of Morals and Legisla on (1780),
Although he had revised much of his hos lity towards Bentham by the me he wrote
Bentham states that nature has ‘placed mankind under the governance of two
U litarianism in 1861, the work s ll departs signiﬁcantly from Bentham’s
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure’ and that these alone should inform ‘the
psychological concep on of happiness. Indeed, Mill oﬀers a more sophis cated
standard of right and wrong.’2 Because humans are mo vated by the seeking of
account in which the quality of pleasure as opposed to the quan ty is given
pleasure and the avoidance of pain this concep on of happiness is, by deﬁni on
paramount status. While he agrees that happiness cons tutes ‘pleasure and the
hedonis c, and should be valued as the basis of morality.
absence of pain,’7 Mill argues that the es ma on of pleasure should not be
Moreover, because happiness can be reduced to pleasurable psychological
states, Bentham maintains that the quan ty of pleasure determines the value of
ac ons. This no on informs his ‘feliciﬁc calculus,’ a system which seeks to calculate
the value of ac ons according to the pain or pleasure they bring about. Indeed,
pleasure is described in units and valued according to intensity, dura on, certainty,
propinquity, fecundity, purity and extent (the number of individuals the act aﬀects).3
Taking into account ‘the number of persons whose interests appear to be
concerned’ and summing up these pains and pleasures determines the ‘good
tendency’ or ‘bad tendency’ of the act.4 It is proposed that this system can be used
to calculate the value of any act, be it a piece of governmental legisla on or
65
calculated on “quan ty alone” because some kinds of pleasure ‘are more desirable
and more valuable than others.’8 Mill delineates a hierarchy of pleasures in which
those that ‘employ the higher facul es,’9 namely one’s intellectual facul es as
opposed to more ‘base’ and simple pleasures, are valued higher than ‘sensual
indulges’. Mill seems determined to deﬂect the cri cism levelled at Bentham’s
u litarian theory concerning the dehumanizing eﬀect of quan ta ve hedonism; a
doctrine ‘worthy of swine.’ Indeed, Mill seeks to describe a happiness that is
par cular to humans as progressive beings; ‘a beast’s pleasures do not sa sfy a
human being’s concep on of happiness.’10 He famously states that it is be er to ‘be
a human being dissa sﬁed than a pig sa sﬁed; be er to be Socrates dissa sﬁed than
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Sam Allen
a fool sa sﬁed.’11
pleasure and pain. In his 1833 essay Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy,14 Mill cites
Thus for Mill, a balance of lower pleasures such as food and sex, as well as
higher pleasures in the form of intellectual or social pursuits, help bring about a state
of happiness. Unlike Bentham, Mill does not believe that this state can be measured
in the form of pleasurable mental sensa ons.12 Instead, complex mental experiences
determine happiness. Furthermore, Mill gives great emphasis to self-development or
the cul va on of the mind. Hence, happiness is conceived as an on-going process in
which past experiences are built upon. Wendy Donner sums Mill’s ‘theory of life’
succinctly: ‘Out of the building blocks of pleasures are built human happiness and
sa sfac on…on this base is erected the ediﬁce of human beings of ﬁrm and
dis nc ve character that allows humans to pursue meaningful lives.’13 These
contras ng theories of happiness ul mately stem from diﬀerences between Mill and
Bentham’s concep ons of human nature. These diﬀerent concep ons warrant
examina on because they shape each thinker’s applica ons of the ‘greatest
happiness principle’ to poli cal ideas of liberty and government.
Comparison of the u litarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
Bentham’s unpublished The Book of Fallacies: ‘[i]n every human breast…
self-regarding interest is predominant over social interest; each person’s own
individual interest over the interests of all other persons taken together.’15 Hence,
Bentham not only sees humans as inherently ego s cal and self-serving, but also
incapable of fully comprehending the interests of others. Indeed, he takes a cynical
stance on the nature of social rela ons and the existence of social society itself. In
The Principles of Morals and Legisla on he argues: ‘the community is a ﬁc
ous
body’ simply composed of individuals whose personal interests amount to ‘the
interest of the community.’16 He further stresses that it is vein to consider the
interest of the community ‘without understanding what is the interest of the
individual.’17
Predicated on this account of human nature is Bentham’s u litarian role of
the legislator. Because the individual is unable to appreciate the interests of the
community, and thus can’t promote the greatest happiness principle, Bentham
Jeremy Bentham can be seen to subscribe more fully to the doctrine of
a ributes this role to the state by regula ng individuals’ behavior. This is achieved
psychological egoism than his pupil Mill, in that he saw human mo va on governed
primarily through the mechanisms of punishment and reward. In The Principles of
by the desire to serve one’s own personal interests. As men oned above, Bentham
Morals and Legisla on he states that ‘the business of government is to promote the
placed human nature in subjuga on to ‘two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure’
happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding’18 and this is also echoed in his
and thus conceived all human behavior as being determined by the seeking of
later work The Leading Principles of a Cons tu onal Code: ‘Whatever is done by
pleasure and the avoidance of pain. ‘Interests’ are thus treated within the context of
government is done – partly by means of the ma er of punishment, or the fear of it,
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
partly by means of the ma er of reward, or the hope of it.’19 Thus, Bentham sees the
legislator as fashioning the behavior of the ego s cal individual to promote the
greatest good of the greatest number through punishment and reward which he
directly relates to pleasure and pain. As Frederick Rosen states, Bentham inherited
this idea from the French eighteenth–century philosopher Claude Adrien Helve us.
An adherent of psychological egoism, Helve us saw the importance of pleasure and
pain as tools of legisla on in shaping individual’s behavior to serve the interests of
Sam Allen
Comparison of the u litarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
‘There remained, as a mo ve by which mankind are inﬂuenced,
and by which they may be guided to their good, only personal
interest. Accordingly Bentham’s idea of the world is that of a
collec on of persons pursuing each his separate interest or
pleasure, and the preven on of whom from jostling one another
is unavoidable, may be a empted by hopes and fears derived
from three sources – the law, religion, and public opinion.’24
Although Mill later revised these hos li es towards his mentor, U litarianism
nevertheless oﬀers a divergent concep on of human nature in which human’s
sociability and ‘moral feelings’ are incorporated into the theory of u litarianism.
20
society. Hence Bentham draws on the eighteenth-century poli cal discourse of the
power of the legislator in rela on to the self-interested individual to inform his
u litarian concep on of law and governance.
Indeed, when addressing ‘the ul mate sanc on of the principle of u lity’ in the third
chapter of U litarianism, Mill introduces the concept of the ‘moral character’ which
can be cul vated by educa on.25 This moral character pertains to ‘a feeling of unity
It is this ego s cal concep on of human nature that Mill sets out to
with our fellow creatures’ and cons tutes an ‘internal’ sanc on that forms ‘the con-
reformulate in U litarianism. Indeed, Mill seeks to realign human nature with the
scien ous feelings of mankind.’26 Mill thus seeks to prove that humans are capable
u litarian principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest good hence removing
of taking into account others interests. He stresses that we all hold a
the mechanical purpose of legisla on in fashioning individuals’ behavior. In his 1838
proclivity ‘to be in unity with our fellow creatures’27 and as this grows we begin to
essay Bentham, Mill airs his cri cisms of Bentham’s psychological egoism. Indeed he
recognize ‘the good of others.’28 Although this sociability needs to be cul vated by
states that ‘Bentham’s knowledge of human nature is bounded’21 and that he knew
educa on, it is by no means ar ﬁcial and essen ally forms the basis of Mill’s moral
‘li le of human feelings.’22 Most signiﬁcantly, Mill a acks Bentham’s theory of life in
theory. Indeed, Mill asserts that the founda on of the u litarian principle is the
which humans are only mo vated by ‘either self-love, love or hatred of others.’23 He
‘social feelings of mankind’ because this internal moral feeling is more binding than
elaborates:
any external sanc on.
This becomes par cularly evident if we consider the poli cal implica ons of
69
Mill’s concep on of human nature and how this shapes his u litarian thought.
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
By emphasizing the power of the internal sanc on of moral and social consciousness
Mill essen ally inverts Bentham’s u litarian legisla ve system. Bentham asserts that
external sanc ons are needed to exert individuals to act in the interests of the
community and thus contribute to the general happiness. However, Mill turns this
Sam Allen
Comparison of the u litarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
‘A complete web of corrobora ve associa on is woven round it by
the powerful agency of external sanc ons…Every step in poli cal
development renders it more so, by removing the sources of
opposi on of interest and leveling those inequali es of legal
privilege between individuals or classes, owing to which there are
large por ons of mankind whose happiness is s ll prac cable to
disregard.’31
on its head and suggests that self-developed individuals can act as individual moral
This is further stressed in Mill’s more poli cally orientated works On Liberty
agents promo ng this end without the need of interference of government. Indeed
(1859) and Considera ons of Representa ve Government (1861). In On Liberty, Mill
he states: ‘Not only does all strengthening of social es, and all healthy growth of
does not propose liberty as an intrinsically valuable state in itself but argues that it
society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in prac cally consul ng
serves the purpose of u lity.32 Indeed, Mill asserts that liberty is integral to the
the welfare of others, it also leads him to iden fy his feelings more and more with
development of individuality and diversity of modes of life in order to promote the
their good.’ Thus, Mill seeks to solve one of the theore cal problems Bentham strug-
happiness of individuals and society:
gled to overcome by proving that the principle of u lity is compa ble with the interests and mo va ons that deﬁne human nature. Indeed, Mill’s no on of moral and
social sen ment counters those who ques on why they are bound to promote the
general happiness in areas where legisla on and public opinion do not interfere.
Within this system, individual moral and intellectual self-development are
given central importance.29 However, this is not to imply that the legislator does not
play a role in Mill’s poli cal u litarian thought. Mill suggests that the role of the
legislator is in maintaining condi ons conducive to human self-development and
individualism. This is principally achieved by protec ng the rights and liber es of
individuals to pursue their own self-development:30
‘Diﬀerent persons also require diﬀerent condi ons for their
spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the same
moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical,
atmosphere and climate…Such are the diﬀerences among human
beings in their sources of
pleasure, their suscep bili es of pain,
and the opera on on them of diﬀerent physical and moral
agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their
modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor
grow up to the mental, moral and aesthe c stature their nature is
capable.’33
In Considera ons of Representa ve Government Mill proposes that
representa ve forms of government serve two purposes that are related to his
u litarian theory. First fully democra c governments with universal suﬀrage are best
suited to iden fying the common good through public delibera on and hence
promote the interests of the whole community. Secondly, Mill asserts that poli cal
par cipa on also helps further intellectually and morally cul vate individuals who in
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Sam Allen
turn help promote the principle of u lity:
u litarian theory. While much of his ideas are inversed by Mill and informed by
‘The self-beneﬁ ng quali es are all on the side of the ac ve and
energe c character: and the habits and conduct which promote
the advantage of each individual member of the community, must
be at least a part of those which conduce most in the end to the
advancement of the community as a whole.’34
Comparison of the u litarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
contras ng interpreta ons of human psychology, the founda ons of Bentham’s
u litarianism remain the same in Mill’s u lity. Thus, his contribu ons can inform a
re-reading of Bentham’s u litarian works.
Notes
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill’s diﬀering u litarian theories emanate
1.
Wendy Donner, “Mill’s U litarianism” in The Cambridge Companion to Mill, edited by
John Skorupski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 256.
2.
Jeremy Bentham, “An introduc on to the principles of morals and legisla on,” in
Selected Wri ngs on U litarianism (Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 2000), p. 87.
3.
Jeremy Bentham, “An introduc on to the principles of morals and legisla on,” pp. 115118.
4.
Ibid., p. 117.
concerned with the reforming of the penal code and eighteenth-century
5.
Ross Harrison, Bentham (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 170.
cons tu onal discourses, Bentham thus predicates his poli cal u litarian ideas on
6.
Wendy Donner, “Mill’s U litarianism”, p. 274.
7.
John Stuart Mill, U litarianism (Second Edi on), edited by George Sher (Indianapolis:
Hacke Publishing Company, 2001), p. 7.
8.
John Stuart Mill, U litarianism, p. 8.
9.
Ibid., p. 9.
from their contras ng concep ons of human nature. For Bentham, humans are
subjected to the psychological states of pleasure and pain. Inherently egois cal
beings, we are governed by the need to serve our own interests and this directly
corresponds to the a ainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Primarily
this reduc ve psychological egoism and postulates that it is the role of the legislator
to fashion individuals’ behaviour in line with the principle of u lity. Mill, on the other
hand, seeks to prove that the greatest happiness principle corresponds with human
nature. If Bentham’s theory is mechanical, Mill’s is organic. Educa on and
10. Ibid., p. 8.
11. Ibid., p. 9.
12. Wendy Donner, “Mill’s U litarianism”, p. 256.
self-development play a key role in cul va ng diverse individual moral agents who
13. Ibid., p. 259.
promote the principle of u lity rather than violate it. Indeed, Mill’s theory is bound
14. John Stuart Mill, “Remarks on Bentham’s philosophy”, in Collected Works of John Stuart
Mill: Volume X, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1969), p. 14.
to the no on of progress and in this sense is typically nineteenth-century orientated
while Bentham oﬀers a more basic, reduc ve and sta c framework. Despite these
signiﬁcant diﬀerences, Mill’s reﬁnements of Bentham’s theory are just that;
15. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies (London: Hunt, 1824), pp. 392-393.
16. Ibid., p. 88.
17. Ibid., p. 89.
18. Ibid., p. 154.
reﬁnements seeking to illuminate, develop and ul mately defend Bentham’s
73
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Sam Allen
Bibliography
Notes
19.
Jeremy Bentham, “Leading Principles of a Cons tu onal Code,” in Selected Wri ngs on
U litarianism (Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 2000), p. 471.
20.
Frederick Rosen, Classical U litarianism, p. 93
21.
John Stuart Mill, “Bentham,” in Mill on Bentham and Coleridge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978), p. 62.
22.
John Stuart Mill, “Bentham,” p. 63.
23.
Ibid., p. 66.
24.
Ibid., p. 70.
25.
John Stuart Mill, U litarianism, p. 27.
26.
Ibid., p. 29.
27.
Ibid., p. 32.
28.
John Stuart Mill, U litarianism, p. 32
29.
Wendy Donner, “Mill’s U litarianism”, p. 272.
30.
Ibid., p. 278.
31.
John Stuart Mill, U litarianism, p. 33.
32.
Ross Harrison, “John Stuart Mill, mid-Victorian” in Gareth Stedman Jones & Gregory
Claeys, eds., The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Poli cal Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 307.
33.
34.
Comparison of the u litarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
Secondary Literature
Donner, Wendy, “Mill’s U litarianism” in The Cambridge Companion to Mill, edited by John
Skorupski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 255-292.
Mill, John Stuart, “On Liberty” in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks,
2008), pp. 201-467.
Mill, John Stuart, “Remarks on Bentham’s philosophy”, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill:
Volume X, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).
Mill, John Stuart, U litarianism (Second Edi on), edited by George Sher (Indianapolis: Hacke
Publishing Company, 2001).
Primary Works
Bentham, Jeremy, “An introduc on to the principles of morals and legisla on,” in Selected
Wri ngs on U litarianism (Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 2000), pp. 75-309.
Bentham, Jeremy, “Leading Principles of a Cons tu onal Code,” in Selected Wri ngs on
U litarianism (Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 2000), pp. 463-475.
John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty” in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford
Paperbacks, 2008), p. 75.
Bentham, Jeremy, The Book of Fallacies (London: Hunt, 1824).
Mill, John Stuart, “Bentham,” in Mill on Bentham and Coleridge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978).
Mill, John Stuart, “Considera ons on Representa ve Government” in On Liberty and Other
Essays (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 2008).
Mill, John Stuart, “Considera ons on Representa ve Government” in On Liberty and
Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 2008), p. 249.
Bibliography
Secondary Literature
Harrison, Ross, Bentham (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).
Harrison, Ross, “John Stuart Mill, mid-Victorian” in eds. Gareth Stedman Jones & Gregory
Claeys, The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Poli cal Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), pp. 295-318.
Rosen, Frederick, Classical U litarianism from Hume to Mill (London: Routledge, 2003).
75
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Harry Sophocleous
The signiﬁcance of the Iran-Contra Aﬀair
ignited a poli cal scandal and Reagan was under pressure to address the
Assess the significance of the Iran-contra affair.
Harry Sophocleous
issue. On November 13th the President announced that the total deliveries could
easily ﬁt into a single cargo plane, a fabrica on considering, by this point, at least
2000 missiles had already been delivered. Furthermore, Reagan declared that there
‘[The President] shall care that the laws be faithfully
exercised.’
(Ar cle 2, Sec on 3 of the United States of America
Cons tu on).1
was no third country involved. Twelve days later, the chickens had come home to
roost, and on November 25, Reagan and his A orney General Edwin Meese had
admi ed to the redirec on of funds, and NSC director Admiral John Poindexter had
On August 12, 1987, the for eth president of the United States, Ronald
resigned whilst Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North had been relieved of his
Reagan, addressed the na on from the Oval Oﬃce. He sat behind his desk,
du es.3
sheepishly staring into the eyes of every American watching, and acknowledged that
he had lost sight of the Founding Fathers’ vision when he declared: ‘I was stubborn
in my pursuit of a policy that went astray”.2
When Deputy A orney General Lawrence Walsh was asked how he thinks
Iran-contra will be remembered in history, his answer was clear: “I think it’ll be
remembered as a non-sordid disregard of cons tu onal restraints. I think the
This policy was the Iran-contra aﬀair. In essence, America contravened the
president was wrong, he was deﬁant, he was deliberate, but he wasn’t dirty”.4 His
trade embargo on Iran by selling arms and direc ng the funds to rebels in Nicaragua
predic on was right. Memory of the scandal appears to have fractured into two
despite numerous Boland Amendments prohibi ng such aid. A series of events that
conven onal strands: the ﬁrst draws upon the inves ga onal conclusions that focus
necessitated this admi ance had begun to snowball when a cargo plane ferrying
on the individual shortcomings of Reagan and his aides; the second views the scandal
American aid was shot down over Nicaragua on October 5, 1986. The only survivor
as a failure in the American system of poli cs. Undoubtedly, both arguments possess
from the plane crash was captured with secret documents leading back to the
great validity when discussing the implica ons of the Iran-contra aﬀair, which this
Na onal Security Council (NSC). Suspicions were beginning to arise when a Lebanese
essay will analyze and expand upon. However, the issue possesses greater
magazine Al Shiraa published a story that NSC director Robert McFarlane had visited
complexi es. In order to understand the true signiﬁcance of the Iran-contra scandal,
Teheran on a secret mission. Ali Akbar Hashemi, the speaker of the Iranian
one must leave the shores of the United States and look at the aﬀair through the
parliament, then conﬁrmed this the following day. These bombshell disclosures
77
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Harry Sophocleous
The signiﬁcance of the Iran-Contra Aﬀair
prism of interna onal rela ons. Here, one is able to see its subsequent
scandalous episode, The Tower Commission oﬀered its moderate sugges ons to
impact on the nature of Western nego a on with terrorist forces, as well as the
achieve future preven on, one of which recommended that ‘Congress consider
exposure of the United States as an imperialist force that was willing to undermine
replacing the exis ng intelligence commi ees”.8 Such conclusions powerfully shaped
the system of democracy to extend its inﬂuence in the Middle East. However, the
public percep on of the crisis as an innocuous failure of management. The
Iran-contra aﬀair has been le unresolved and relegated to the mere footnote of
recommenda ons were not headline grabbing or likely to a ract any interest from
Reagan’s presidency - this essay will a empt to highlight its relevance.
the United States media, thus ensuring that the scandal became a distant memory.
When the scandal came to light on November 25, 1985, the world’s media
exploded and the aﬀair stole the front pages of every major newspaper across the
One magazine noted that ‘a er a day of obligatory headlines, news of the report
vanished as abruptly as an April snowfall’.9
globe. The New York Times printed a par cularly interes ng headline the following
The limited poli cal ramiﬁca ons were reinforced when all of Walsh’s eleven
day that read: ‘The Iran Aﬀair: A Presidency Damaged’.5 However, why was Reagan’s
convic ons were pardoned in June 1992.10 Instead, the only tangible poli cal
presidency merely ‘damaged’ and not under threat? It is this knee-jerk reac on
consequences that illustrated any signiﬁcance was the ini al impulse for Poindexter
from the media that is sustained throughout history as a result of the limited
to resign and North to be relieved of his du es. Reagan’s admi ance that ‘you take
poli cal implica ons of the Iran-contra aﬀair.
your knocks, you learn your lessons, and then you move on’ suggests that this was
Unlike the Watergate scandal, which forced Richard Nixon’s resigna on in
1974, the Iran-contra aﬀair did li le to weaken the Reagan administra on. Despite
the President’s approval ra ng ini ally dropping from 67% to 46%, levels quickly
returned to above 50% only a year and a half later.6 American historian Phillip
Jenkins oﬀers the explana on for this poli cal stability by arguing that ‘the public
does not become angry enough to support a president’s removal while the
merely deemed an unpopular policy solvable by an administra ve reshuﬄe.11 The
public were mere spectators to a succession of sensa onalist headlines and televised
hearings that would ul mately degenerate into an elaborate public rela ons exercise
in damage control.12
The underplaying of the scandal’s signiﬁcance through the sta c nature of
poli cal personnel, despite events, has led poli cal scien sts, such as Adam
7
economy is booming’. However, this fails to recognize the inﬂuence of the various
inves ga onal commi ees in shaping public opinion. A er months of studying the
79
Wildavsky, to approve of the
Iran-contra
aﬀair ‘fading
into
insigniﬁcance’.13 However, deeming the aﬀair as an aberra onal lapse by an
80
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Harry Sophocleous
ina en ve president to control his aides, leaves analysis of the scandal limited in
were framed in the eighteenth century. As a result, there have been calls to learn
depth, and fails to address the systema c irregulari es that were manifest during the
from the episode. Historian Arthur Schlesinger has deemed the American
aﬀair.
cons tu on outdated and calls for a move towards a parliamentary system.17 Given
The scandal was not the secret delivery of arms, or even the lying and
hypocrisy that accompanied it. Instead, the real scandal lay in the subversion of law,
congressional authority, and the will of the public in order to produce immoral and
counterproduc ve policies. Furthermore, the Iran-contra aﬀair was no aberra on.
Instead, it was the product of a long process of presiden al aggrandizement,
congressional ﬁckleness, and judicial connivance.14 Woodrow Wilson recognized ‘the
ini a ve in foreign aﬀairs, in which the President posses without any restric on
The signiﬁcance of the Iran-Contra Aﬀair
the decentralized nature of American poli cs such reforms are unrealis c. Instead,
presidents should be forced to acknowledge the risks associated with exercising the
power and preroga ve of government by the enforcement of stricter due diligence
when it comes to foreign policy. Indeed, the Iran-contra aﬀair ar culated the
disadvantages of arbitrary power and should have triggered a process that saw
Congress grow in inﬂuence on interna onal ma ers.
Alas, this was not the case. Vital lessons were not learnt, and history was le
whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolutely’.15 Moreover, in the 1936
to repeat itself. Echoes of the Iran-contra aﬀair can be found in the
case, U.S. v. Cur ss-Wright Export Corpora on, Jus ce George Sutherland held that
Bush-administra on and the decision in early 2007 to reconﬁgure policy in the
‘the president [operates] as the sole organ of the federal government in the ﬁeld of
Middle East. In order to prac ce outside of the Congressional appropria ons
interna onal rela ons’ and that ‘within the interna onal ﬁeld [Congress] must o en
process, covert opera ons were implemented. In the a empt to keep the Lebanese
accord to the president a degree of discre on and freedom from statuary
Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora, in power against a persistent opposi on led by
restric on which would not be admissible were domes c aﬀairs alone involved’.16
Hezbollah, clandes ne support was given to the Siniora government. Por ons of this
The Iran-contra aﬀair exposed the weakness of Congress vis-à-vis the presiden al
aid found its way into the hands of emerging Sunni radical groups with ideological
execu ve branch in the sphere of foreign policy. This hegemonic environment
es to Al Qaeda.18 Iran-contra was the moment in history when America decided
encouraged the president’s agents to pursue a policy that risked execu ve
that no authorita ve ﬁgure would ask serious ques ons of the hegemonic
overshoot. By circumven ng, and repeatedly lying to Congress, the scandal
presiden al system. The cons tu on has morphed into a manipula ve puppet
threatened to undermine the cons tu onal ideals of interna onal rela ons that
show, which has le a na on in a constant brace posi on fearing inevitable
81
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
presiden al overreach in foreign policy.
Harry Sophocleous
The signiﬁcance of the Iran-Contra Aﬀair
Margaret Thatcher is one leader who may have asked such ques ons. Like
The Iran-contra aﬀair undermined Reagan and his administra on on one of
the strongest, and most supported principles that they proudly proclaimed;
non-nego a on with terrorists. On November 11, 1986, eight days following the
leak by the Lebanese government, The New York Times raised ques ons over the
revela on of the arms-for-hostages deal and the implica ons for ‘America’s
credibility abroad’.19 Such inquiries were right to be made. On April 15, 1986,
Reagan had promised that there would be no ‘appeasement of evil… no sanctuary
for terror. Terrorism undeterred will deﬂect the winds of freedom’.20 The
Iran-contra aﬀair however, exposed such asser ons as empty rhetoric. Indeed,
former Iranian President, Abolhassan Banisadr, told a Lebanese newspaper that
Americans ‘are capable of making 180-degress turns in their policy’.21
Reagan, the Bri sh Prime Minister had been insistent that one must never nego ate
with terrorists. However, when repeatedly ques oned on the aﬀair, she held a
consistently conserva ve approach. At one point she stated: ‘One simply has to
recognize that you can’t carry on the business of government unless some things are
conﬁden al… We are dealing with leaders who understand the big issues and who
are not going to be sidetracked from the big issues’.23 This muted response was not
merely an a empt to maintain the special rela onship between Britain and the
United States.24 Thatcher was hesitant in condemning America’s ac ons because she
was planning clandes ne opera ons in Ireland. No ac on had been taken when it
was contemplated that the Bri sh withdraw from Northern Ireland in 1981.25
However, in 1990, three years following the sales-of-arms deal was made public,
Thatcher authorized her Secretary of State Peter Brooke to hold secret talks with IRA
The aﬀair did not just act as a signal to its adversaries that hostage taking was
leadership.26 This shi from hesita on to authoriza on can be in part a ributed to
a useful instrument in extrac ng poli cal and ﬁnancial concessions from the West,
the Iran-contra aﬀair in that it established a precedent for Western powers to
but also undermined any credibility of U.S. cri cism of other states’ devia on from
nego ate with terrorists and such nego a ons remain in prac ce today. On April 20,
the principles of non-nego a on and no concessions to terrorists.22 It is this la er
2014, four French journalists were mysteriously released a er ten months in Syria,
point that would illustrate best the impact that Iran-contra had on the interna onal
sparking ransom rumors. Al-Qaeda had received £75 million from ransoms since
stage. Following the outbreak of the scandal, Western powers must have asked
2008.27
themselves, ‘If America can do it, then why can’t we?’ A er all, America was the
leading power in the Western world.
Furthermore, the Iran-contra aﬀair exposed America to be an imperialist
power seeking to extend its inﬂuence across the globe. This was vociferously
83
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Harry Sophocleous
ar culated in the Middle East. Indeed, the media characterized the United States as
As a result, this triggered interna onal implica ons that are s ll being felt in current
an interna onal bully: ‘The bourgeois democracy is nothing but a cover behind which
global poli cs. Indeed, when the two planes ﬂew into New York’s World Trade Centre
the imperialist class hides to carry out arbitrary opera ons and brutality both in
on September 11, 2001, Saddam Hussein approved by asser ng that the a ack
domes c and foreign policy’.28 A Turkish report asserted that ‘all [Reagan’s] reali es
happened on a na on that ‘exports evil, in terms of corrup on and criminality, not
are based on the globalist doctrines of the greatest imperial states’ ruling circles who
only to any place to which its armies travel but also to any place where its movies
consider all other countries and peoples pawns in their hegemonis c policies’.29
go’.32 It cannot be doubted that the actor-turned-president, Reagan, had a domino to
Middle Eastern na ons felt America’s ambi ons were to gain control of the
play in the deteriora on towards a war on terror that the world ﬁnds itself
Organiza on of the Petroleum Expor ng Countries (OPEC), establish a Westernized
engulfed in today.
regime, and manipulate the terrorist groups.30 Iran-contra illustrated to the Islamic
The signiﬁcance of the Iran-Contra Aﬀair
Notes
regions of the Middle East that the United States was unable to accept their
1.
The Cons tu on of the United States, h p://www.franklincountypa.gov/da/
Documents/US%20Cons tu on.pdf [Accessed 1st December 2014].
civiliza on as unique and cooperate by maintaining the mul -civiliza onal character
2.
R. Reagan, ‘Address to the Na on on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy and
Administra on Goals’, August 12, 1987, h p://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/
speeches/1987/081287d.htm , [Accessed 1st December 2014].
3.
J. Mitchell, Execu ve Privilege: Two Centuries of White House Scandals (New York:
Hippocrene Books, 1992), pp. 358-91.
4.
B. Woodward, Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate (London: Simon
& Schuster, 1999), p. 179.
5.
‘The Iran Aﬀair: A Presidency Damaged’, The New York Times, November 26 1985.
6.
J. Pa erson, The Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 207-13.
7.
P. Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Six es and the Marking of the
Eigh es America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 234-5.
8.
Tower, J., Snowcro , B., and Muskie, E., ‘The Iran-Contra Aﬀair’, in P. Hays, Brenda
Vallance, and A. van Tassel, America Defense Policy, vol.7 (Bal more: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1997), p.203.
9.
R. Williams, Poli cal Scandals in the USA (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 50.
10.
Pa erson, Restless Giant, p.213.
11.
R. Reagan, ‘Address to the Na on on Iran-Contra’, March 4 1987, h p://
millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3414, [Accessed 2nd December 2014].
of global poli cs. Hence the aﬀair undoubtedly contributed to the an -Americanism
that was beginning to fester on the con nent.
In his famous review of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon stated that:
‘History… is li le more than the register of crimes, follies, and misfortunes of
31
mankind’. This deﬁni on oﬀers some explana on as why the Iran-contra aﬀair fails
to get men oned in any discussion regarding the Reagan presidency or American
poli cal history. With an emphasis being placed on the lack of physical results from
the scandal by the journalis c dominance in the historiography, it is no surprise that
the general conclusion deems the aﬀair insigniﬁcant. However, the Iran-contra aﬀair
exposed gaping cons tu onal and congressional holes that were unaddressed.
85
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Harry Sophocleous
Notes
12.
J. Marshall, P. Sco , and J. Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connec on (Boston: South End
Press, 1987), p. 230.
13.
A. Wildavsky, The Beleaguered Presidency (New Brunswick: Transac on Publishers,
1991), p. 238.
14.
T. Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Aﬀair (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), p.
582.
15.
J. Lindsay, Congress and the Poli cs of U.S. Foreign Policy (Bal more: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1994), pp. 141-4.
The signiﬁcance of the Iran-Contra Aﬀair
Notes
32.
P. Clawson and B. Rubin, ‘An -Americanism: in the Middle East’, in P. Hollander,
Understanding An -Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004), pp. 124-5.
Bibliography
Secondary literature
Bovard, J., Terrorism and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Jus ce, and Peace to Rid the World of
Evil (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
16.
Ibid.
17.
A. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Miﬄin Company, 1989), pp.
461-3.
Chavira, D., ‘Evidence and Analysis: The Iran-Contra Aﬀair as Seen Through American, Middle
Eastern, and Soviet News Sources’, University of Pennsylvania CUREJ (January 2014).
18.
S. Hersh, ‘The Redirec on: Is the Administra on’s new policy beneﬁ ng our enemies
on the war on terrorism?’, The New Yorker, March 5 2007, h p://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/03/05/the-redirec on , [Accessed 27th
November 2014].
Clawson, P. and Rubin, B., ‘An -Americanism: in the Middle East’, in P. Hollander,
Understanding An -Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad (Chicago: Ivan
R. Dee, 2004).
19.
‘U.S. Policy on Terror’, The New York Times, November 11, 1986.
Draper, T., A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Aﬀair (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991).
20.
J. Bovard, Terrorism and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Jus ce, and Peace to Rid the
World of Evil (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 26.
21.
D. Chavira, ‘Evidence and Analysis: The Iran-Contra Aﬀair as Seen Through American,
Middle Eastern, and Soviet News Sources’, University of Pennsylvania CUREJ (January
2014).
22.
M. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Poli cs of the Western Hostage Crisis (New
York: St Mar ns Press, 1997), p. 203.
Freedman, R., The Middle East from the Iran-Contra Aﬀair to the In fada (New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1991).
Gibbon, E., The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London: Joseph Ogle
Robinson, 1830).
Jenkins, P., Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Six es and the Marking of the Eigh es
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
23.
G. Smith, Reagan and Thatcher (London: Bodley Head, 1990), pp. 204-13.
24.
Ibid.
25.
O. Bowco , ‘Thatcher cabinet “wobbled” over IRA hunger strikers’, The Guardian,
December 30 2011.
26.
N. Wa , ‘Thatcher gave approval to talks with IRA’, The Guardian, October 16 1999.
Lindsay, J., Congress and the Poli cs of U.S. Foreign Policy (Bal more: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1994).
27.
J. Lichﬁeld, ‘Ransom rumours a er French Syrian hostages go free’, The Independent,
April 20 2014. And, D. Blair, ‘Should government spay a ransom for hostages?’, The
Telegraph, August 21 2014.
Lynch M., and Bogen, D., The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text, and Memory at the
Iran-Contra Hearings (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996).
28.
Chivara, ‘Evidence and Analysis’.
29.
Ibid.
30.
Ibid.
31.
E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London: Joseph
Ogle Robinson, 1830), p. 31.
Islam, I., ‘An -Americanism in the Muslim World’, in B. O’Connor and M. Griﬃths, The Rise of
An -Americanism (London: Routledge, 2006).
Marshall, J., Sco , P., and Hunter, J., The Iran-Contra Connec on (Boston: South End Press,
1987).
87
Mitchell, J., Execu ve Privilege: Two Centuries of White House Scandals (New York:
Hippocrence Books, 1992).
Pa erson, J., The Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005).
88
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Winter Issue
Bibliography
Secondary literature
Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Committee 2014/15
Ranstorp, M., Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Poli cs of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St
Mar ns Press, 1997).
Schlesinger, A., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Miﬄin Company, 1989).
Editor in Chief
Smith, G., Reagan and Thatcher (London: Bodley Head, 1990).
Tower, J., Snowcro , B., and Muskie, E., ‘The Iran-Contra Aﬀair’, in P. Hays, Brenda Vallance,
and A. van Tassel, America Defense Policy, vol.7 (Bal more: The John Hopkins University
Press, 1997).
Wildavsky, A., The Beleaguered Presidency (New Brunswick: Transac on Publishers, 1991).
Shabbir Bokhari
Commissioning Editor
Sub Editor
Catriona Tassell
Becky Adkins
Williams, R., Poli cal Scandals in the USA (London: Routledge, 1998).
Head of Design
Woodward, B., Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate (London: Simon &
Schuster, 1999).
H. Zinn, A People’s History of the United States: From 1492 to the Present (New York:
Longman, 1996).
Primary literature
Blair, D., ‘Should government spay a ransom for hostages?’, The Telegraph, August 21 2014.
Bowco , O., ‘Thatcher cabinet “wobbled” over IRA hunger strikers’, The Guardian, December
30 2011.
The Cons tu on of the United States
Sandip Kana
Design Editors
Social Team
Phoebe Cousins
Jacob Kishere
Nirah Knight
Lauren Macaskill
Charlie Roden
Jonathan Sayegh
Essay Editors
h p://www.franklincountypa.gov/da/Documents/US%20Cons tu on.pdf [Accessed 1st
December 2014].
Sam Allen, Mamataj Begum, Lisa Bull, Pearce Branigan, David Clements ,
Hersh ,S., ‘The Redirec on: Is the Administra on’s new policy beneﬁ ng our enemies on the
war on terrorism?’, The New Yorker, March 5 2007
Rhiannon Doran, Kieran Jones, Carl Lentz, Sebas an Lowe, Anna Macaninch,
h p://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/03/05/the-redirec on [Accessed 27th November
2014].
Lauren Macaskill, Vivan Nabukenya, Amy Sinclair,
‘The Iran Aﬀair: A Presidency Damaged’, The New York Times, November 26 1985.
Jake Stephen Vo, and Poppy Waring
89
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Queen Mary History Undergraduate Journal
Contributors
Sam Allen
Sebas an Lowe
Bethany Price
Harry Sophocleous
László Zorya
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Copyright of images used on the cover and back with permission from,
Queen Mary University of London Archives.
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