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New Parties' Effects on the Instability of
Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
NAKADA-AMIYA, Mizuho; NARIHIRO, Takashi
明治学院大学国際学研究, 47: 1-33
2015-03-31
http://hdl.handle.net/10723/2340
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http://repository.meijigakuin.ac.jp/
International & Regional Studies, Meiji Gakuin University, No. 47, 1－33, March 2015
【Article】
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments
in East-Central Europe
Mizuho Nakada-Amiya, Takashi Narihiro
Abstract
Previous studies on new political parties have assumed that they change or disrupt the
functioning of the party system and coalition politics by creating high electoral volatility. Five
successful new parties in three elections analyzed in this article failed to validate these
assumptions. The article presents preliminary analysis of the 22 new political parties with a view
to finding the characteristic new party type in East-Central Europe, which is typically
established for electoral success and often joins the governing coalition just after the election.
Canonical discriminant analysis (Knutsen 1989) showed that the five new parties that fell into
this category changed neither party competition structures, nor coalition politics. Contrary to the
general assumption, new parties of this type do not cause instability in the party system or affect
coalition politics directly. However, as indirect outcomes, these parties may cause unclear
ex-post accountability, voter disappointment and instability of coalition government.
Keywords: new parties, canonical discriminant analysis, party system and coalition politics
Repeated emergence of new parties has been one of the areas of focus in the study of
East-Central European party politics. It was explained as the evidence of party system
immaturity and had been expected to decrease in time (Tavits, 2008a). However, in the latest
elections in six East-European countries from 2010 to 2012, 10 new parties won parliamentary
seats. New parties have never faded out, even after more than twenty years of democratic
experience, and they seem to have become an established phenomenon in these countries.
The previous studies have assumed that the presence of the new parties is problematic
for the stability of party systems. Behind this assumption lay the new parties’ image in Western
Europe. Comparative politics research into new parties has been promoted since the 1970s, when
new parties appeared, breaking the "frozen" political party system in Western Europe (Lipset and
Rokkan, 1967). New parties had been studied with a focus on the social cleavage model. It is
commonly perceived that new parties represent new issues or ideologies that might create new
1
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
social cleavage (Hug 2001; Hino 2012). It was assumed that dimensions would be added to the
party competition structure (Kitschelt 1988), and coalition politics would be changed inevitably
because of the new elements.
These are the assumptions that would naturally underlie the existing studies on new
parties in Western Europe. However, there are several studies that suggest a different image of
new parties in East-Central Europe. Tavits (2008b) and Rose (2009) showed that the choices of
elites are essential for the emergence of new parties, suggesting the possible emergence of new
parties that are not based on a new issue or ideology among the electorate. Tavits (2008c)
considered the new parties that were programmatically close to established parties. Sikk (2011)
explicitly analyzed the existence of new parties for which newness itself was the appealing
feature, with ideological character being only a weak motivation.
If the types of new parties in East-Central Europe are different from those in Western
Europe, it is fair to assume that the resulting effect of new parties on party politics and coalition
politics will also be different. Previous studies have criticized the emergence of new parties
without investigating this possibility.
To analyze the new parties’ effect on the party system and coalition politics, we chose
canonical discriminant analysis (CDA) as the method which clearly shows party competition
structure for each election (Knutsen 1989). Sets of variables that differentiate affiliation for the
parties among members of the electorate could be found. Each set of variables indicated party
competition structure. As a result, it became evident that emergence of new parties have hardly
changed the party competition structure. Neither have coalition patterns been ever affected
substantially. The effects of new parties on the party system and coalition politics could be
characteristic in East-Central Europe.
This article presents preliminary analysis of the characteristic types of new parties in
East-Central Europe. Twenty-two new parties were classified according to: (a) the number of
years that elapsed between establishment and electoral success, (b) their participation in
governing coalition, and (c) their electoral endurance. Five new parties in the Czech Republic
and Slovakia showed differences in these aspects, having been established just before their
electoral success and often join the governing coalition after the election. In the second section,
CDA was carried out on these five parties and the relating party systems, producing the above
mentioned results. The last section examines the side effect on coalition politics, including
ex-post accountability of governmental coalition, voters' disappointment, and coalition
popularity.
2
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
1.
Characteristic type of new parties in East-Central Europe
In the preliminary stage of the analysis to find the characteristic types of new parties in
East-Central Europe, we investigated new parties that won seats since 2000 in six East-Central
European Countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia.
These countries have adopted the parliamentary system with elections based on proportional
representation. Hungary, which used the single-seat constituency system combined with the
proportional representative constituency approach, was the only exception. As for Hungary, we
used proportional representative constituency data for our analysis. Previous studies on
East-Central European party systems usually started analysis at the beginning of the
democratization process to examine the institutionalization of party systems. In this study, we
started the analysis as of the year 2000 so that we could explore the trend in recent years. In
addition, the Slovak Democratic movement (HZDS) and Croatian Democratic Union (HZD)
constrained pluralism in the 1990s in each country. By concentrating on the 2000s, it is also
possible to remove this element.
The definition of new parties presents difficult problems (Sikk, 2005). In this article,
new parties are defined as parties that won seats in parliament for the first time. A political party
that just changes its name is not considered to be a new party. But if a new party was launched
by some of the former members of a political party, we recognized it as an "offshoot new party"
on condition that the original party continued to participate in the election. The original party
could be called a "parent party."
By using the Election Database in Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet
Union Countries1, which is published on the website of the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido
University, we listed 22 new parties and checked their size, time of establishment, policy
orientation, prehistory (offshoot new party or not), names, coalition politics, and record of
persistence (success or failure in the next election) (see Table 1).
New parties often started as medium-sized parties. The percentage of votes received
tends to be relatively large, when they win the parliamentary seats for the first time. One reason
is that in most East-Central European elections, the thresholds of 4-5% are provided. But the new
parties often exceeded the threshold easily and won about 10% of votes. As is shown in Table 1,
eight parties out of 22 parties won over 10% of votes.
In addition, 19 parties acquired parliamentary seats during the first election after their
establishment. Most of them were established in the previous year or in the election year. There
are three "exceptions." The Polish "Self-Defense," the Czech Green Party, and the Hungarian
Jobbik were the only parties that had been established but not successful at the point of previous
3
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
Table1:
First
election
which won
seats
New Parties
New parties since 2000
Votes
Votes %
Seats
Seats %
Year of
Foundation
result of the
next election
1,651,099
12.68%
65
14.10%
2001
Win seats
Win seats
(Fail in 2007)
policy
orientation
Offshoot
new
party
Poland
2001 Civic Platform
PORP
2001 Self-Defence
Samoobrona
2001 Law and Justice
League of
2001
Polish Families
PiS
LPR
Ruch Palikota
2011
Palikot's
Movement
1,327,624
10.20%
53
11.50%
1992
1,236,787
9.50%
44
9.60%
2001
1,025,148
7.87%
38
8.30%
2001
1,439,490
10.02%
40
8.70%
2011
Win seats
Win seats
(Fail in 2007)
center-right
populist,
left wing
nationalism
conservative
○
○
conservative
green,
center-left,
personal
initiative
○
Czech
Republic
2006 Green Party
SZ
336,487
6.29%
6
3.00%
1990
2010 TOP 09
TOP 09
VV
(Věci veřejné)
873,833
16.70%
41
20.50%
2009
green,
center-right
center-right
569,127
10.88%
24
12.00%
2009
center-right
SMER
387,100
13.46%
25
16.70%
1999
Win seats
center-left
ANO
230,309
8.01%
15
10.00%
2001
Fail
center-right
SaS
307,287
12.15%
22
14.70%
2009
Win seats
center-right
Win seats
center-right,
ethinic party
○
○
2010 Public Affairs
Slovakia
2002 Direction
Alliance of
2002
New Citizens
Freedom and
2010
Solidarity
2010 Bridge
2012
MOST-HÍD
Ordinary People
and
OĽaNO
Independent
Personalities
Hungary**
2010 Jobbik
Jobbik
Politics Can Be
2010
LMP
Different
Fail
205,538
8.13%
14
9.30%
2009
218,537
8.55%
16
10.70%
2011
center-right
855,436
16.67%
26
17.80%
2003
radical right
383,876
7.48%
5
3.42%
2008
green
NSi
94,661
8.76%
8
8.90%
2000
Win seats
center-right
SMS
46,719
4.33%
4
4.40%
2000
Fail
green,
center-right
Zares
98,526
9.37%
9
10.00%
2007
Fail
center-right
○
○
Slovenia
New Slovenia 2000 Christian
People's Party
Slovenian Youth
2000
Party
Zares - New
2008
Politics
Zoran Janković's
2011 List – Positive
Slovenia
LZJ-PS
314,273
28.51%
28
31.11%
2011
○
○
center-left,
personal
initiative
center-right,
personal
initiative
2011 Virant's List
DL Gregorja
Viranta
92,282
8.37%
8
8.89%
2011
Croatian
2011 Labourists Labour Party
Hrvatski
laburisti Stranka rada
97,701
4.19%
6
4.29%
2010
center-left
2011 Grubišić's List
Ivan Grubišić
29,088
1.25%
2
1.43%
2011***
center-left,
personal
initiative
Croatia
* Parties indicated by gray cells joined the ruling coalition after elections.
** As for Hungary, votes, votes rate, seats and seats rate are that of proportional district (district list)
*** Grubišić himself participated in the 2003 election.
4
○
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
elections. They started as social movements outside parliament and won parliamentary seats after
several years of activity. These parties have this feature in common with the "new parties" in
Western Europe. Most of the new parties in East-Central Europe were established with an
immediate focus on achieving electoral success. We may refer to these parties as
election-oriented parties
As for policy orientation, ten new parties involved in the research were center-right,
four center-left, two conservative, two "green," one radical right and one populist left-wing
nationalist. Center-right new parties, which are about half of the 22 new parties, were found in
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia. All of them were election-oriented parties that
received a relatively high percentage of votes. New parties are easy to emerge with center-right
orientations because, in contrast to the center-left position, where relatively coercive Social
Democrats located themselves, most center-right parties in East-Central Europe are
parliamentary parties with low levels of party discipline.
The influence of weak party discipline is also frequently found in offshoot new parties.
Ten parties were offshoot new party; of these, six were center-right, two were center-left, one
conservative and one "green." Politicians working for established parent parties left those parties
and in cooperation with personalities outside political circles, they established new offshoot
parties.
It is difficult to guess ideology or principles from the names of new parties. New
parties named themselves so as to emphasize their newness (Sikk, 2011)2. They wanted to make
the point that they were different from older parties. They tried to show that they were on the
side of ordinary citizens, representing the public voice, as indicated in the names "Civic
Platform," "Public Affairs," and "Ordinary People."
As for coalition politics, nine new parties joined governing coalitions just after the
elections. There is an interesting difference evident among six countries. In the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Slovenia, nine out of thirteen new parties became governing coalition partners. In
Poland, Hungary, and Croatia, all the new parties remained in opposition.
As the last feature, we checked the endurance of new parties. New parties frequently
emerge in East-Central Europe and fade out with the same frequency. Out of twelve parties that
have experienced the next elections, six parties had already lost parliamentary seats, four of them
losing at the very next election. Offshoot parties survived well in party systems. All six offshoot
parties that challenged in the second election won seats. On the contrary, among the Public
Affairs, Alliance of New Citizens and Freedom and Solidarity, which were established by the
people outside parliaments, the first two parties could not be accommodated in the party system.
"Green" parties or radical right parties are typical new parties in Western Europe that settled in
5
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
Table2:
New parties electral success and coalition participation in East-Central Europe since 2000
Result of the next election
Success
Electral success
needs several years
Opposition(9)
Self-Defence(POL), (Jobbik(HUN)),
(Politics Can Be Different(HUN))
Governmental
coalition(1)
The Green Party(CZ)
Opposition(9)
Civic Platform(POL), Jaw and
Justice(POL), League of Polish
Farmers(POL), (Palikot Movement(POL)),
Direction(SLK), (Ordinary People(SLK)),
(Positive Slovenia(SLV)), (Croatian
Labours(HRV)), (Grubis's list(HRV))
Governmental
coalition(10)
(TOP 09(CZ)), Freedom and
Solidarity(SLK), Bridge(SLK), New
Slovenia Cristian Party(SLV), (Virant's
List(SLV)
Electral success just
after establishment
Failure
(Public Affairs(CZ)), Alliance of
New Citizens(SLK), Slovenian
Youth Party(SLV), Zares(SLV)
* Parties written in italics are offshoot new parties.
* Parties in parenthesis won parliamentary seats at the latest election in each country.
* Underlined parties are investigated in the second section.
the party system. In East-Central Europe, "green" parties found difficulty fitting in. No "green"
party has ever succeeded in being elected twice to the parliament.
From the perspective of this article, new parties that joined the governing coalition
after the election attracted our attention. These parties are concentrated in the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Slovenia; most of them are election-oriented new parties (see Table 2). When new
parties join the coalition government, do they affect party competition structure or coalition
politics? To investigate this question, we chose five new parties of this category and four relevant
elections in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to carry out further analysis, which is discussed in
the next section. The reasons for differences in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, on
the one hand, and Poland, Hungary and Croatia, on the other, also captured our attention, but that
discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
2.
New Parties in the party systems
We chose the Green Party, TOP 09, the Public Affairs Party, the Freedom and
Solidarity Party, and the Bridge for further investigation, and we analyzed the relevant elections
held in the years 2002, 2006, 2010 for the Czech Republic and the Slovak election held in 2010.
First, we analyzed the party position on the left-right axis by following three aspects:
(a) party position on the left-right axis according to all respondents, (b) positioning on the
6
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
left-right axis of the political party according to voters who voted for the party, and (c)
self-placement on the left-right axis by the voters who voted for each political party.
Next, we conducted CDA to interpret the characteristics of the party competition
3
structures . CDA is a statistical technique that is used to estimate canonical discriminant
functions (CDFs), which describe separation among groups based on specified linear composites
(discriminant variables) of the outcome variables. In this article, we use as outcome variables
party preferences or party choices in elections, and as candidates for discriminant variables, we
use political issues, political ideologies, and demographic attributes. The CDFs and the
discriminant variables define the issue dimensions of the party systems, each data case is a point
on a scale of these dimensions and has composite canonical scores on the scales, defined as
CDFs. A particular group (possibly supporters of a party) is represented by a swarm of points
concentrated in some position on a particular scale. To summarize the position of a group, we
can compute the group mean (the 'centroid '). We may plot centroids on the scales and interpret
the character of the party systems based on the order of the centroids and the distance between
them. After estimating CDFs, we can calculate discriminant rates (presented in classification
tables) showing how much CDFs discriminate between the data properly. We identify them as an
indicator of differentiation between the groups that support the parties. The higher discriminant
rate belongs to a party that has more distinctive supporters. Discriminant rate, which shows the
extent to which each party's voters are distinct to that party based on the discriminant functions,
is also calculated. Please see Appendix for figures showing the results of the analyses.
In comparison to manifest analysis, or policy position analysis based on expert surveys,
CDA reveals the party competition structure according to voters' preferences. There are several
conflict dimensions that could explain the party competition structure in a party system.
1) The Green Party and the 2006 Czech election
The Green Party was located by voters at the center-right position, overlapping with
the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL) (Appendix, Figure in app-24. Here after “app-24”.).
This position was occupied by the "Coalition" in previous elections, meaning the electoral
coalition between KDU-ČSL and the Free Union (app-17). As seen from the left-right axis, the
Green Party replaced the Free Union (app-24). Self-placement of voters culminated in the middle
of the left-right axis, smoothly extending to the right. Some electors of the Green Party located
themselves exactly right (app-26). The Green Party's distribution of self-placement overlapped
with that of KDU-ČSL.
As for CDA, in the Czech 2006 election, the most useful variable that distinguished
7
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
party attachment was "left-right" (app-27; app-28). In this discriminant function, the Green Party
was situated at the second "most rightist" position. The most rightist party was ODS, and
KDU-ČSL was on the left side. The second discriminant function was the combination of
variables: membership in the catholic denomination, age, and employment status. On the basis of
this discriminant function, only KDU-ČSL was separated from other parties. The Green Party
was located on the opposite side to KDU-ČSL. The discriminant rate for the Green Party was as
high as 60.71% (app-29). The Green Party was distinguished from parties other than KDU-ČSL
by the left-right variable, and was distinguished from the KDU-ČSL by this second discriminant
function.
The discriminant functions of the Czech 2006 election were the same as those in 2002
(app-20; app-27). Even though the Green Party was elected in the 2006 Czech elections,
post-material variable, which is generally assumed to be related with the Green Party, was not
selected in the discriminant function in this election.
2) TOP 09 and the Czech 2010 election
On the left-right axis, TOP 09 was located in a position somewhat to the right,
overlapping with ODS (app-30). The location of ODS was almost the same as it had been in the
2006 election. Self-placement of the party had shifted to the center. The distribution of the
self-placement was concentrated at center point, peaking at the same point with ODS. TOP 09
had more centralists among its supporters than did the ODS.
The CDA shows that in the 2010 election too, group means for each party’s supporters
were spread separately on left-right variables (app-34). The TOP 09's place was distinguished
from the position of the other parties.
However, on the second discriminant function, which consisted of variables including
age, unemployment, education, and membership in the private sector, the parties were located
quite closely and it was difficult to differentiate TOP 09 on the basis of this discriminant function.
On the third discriminant function, variables as religious affiliation and denominational
differences distinguished KDU-ČSL, but other social attribute variables were difficult to identify
as the basis for discriminating the party attachment of the electorates.
The discriminant rate for TOP 09 was as low as 28.46% (app-35). Only the 26.92% of
the electorate, who voted for TOP 09 in reality, were discriminated as supporters of the Civic
Democrats. Discrimination between KDU-ČSL and Public Affairs was also difficult. KDU-ČSL
– TOP 09's parent party – had as high a discriminant rate as 63.51% in the 2006 election, thanks
to the denominational variables. In contrast to its parent party, TOP 09's discriminant rate was
8
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
low and pushed down other parties' discriminant rates as well.
The discriminant functions in the 2010 election did not change considerably (app-27;
app-33). The function including denominational variables changed from the second function to
the third, but the difference in importance between the third and the second is very small (0.098
and 0.090 respectively, app-27).
3) The Public Affairs (VV)
The Public Affairs Party also won the parliamentary seats in the 2010 Czech election.
It was located in the center-right position on the left-right axis, left of ODS and TOP 09 (app-28).
In the 2006 election, KDU-ČSL and the Green Party were allocated this place. These two parties
were judged more centrist in the 2010 election. Distribution of the self-placement of the
supporters showed two peaks, one near the center and the other at center-right. The peak at the
center overlapped with the right peak of the Social Democrats (app-32). Supporters’
self-placement also overlapped with that of the TOP 09 supporters.
The CDA suggests that Public Affairs can be recognized by the left-right variables
(app-34). For the second and third discriminant function it was difficult to distinguish voters'
attachment to Public Affairs. The discriminant rate for Public Affairs was very low at 17.65%.
This was the lowest rate in this election. Many of the persons who voted for Public Affairs were
identified as the supporters of KDU-ČSL, TOP 09, ODS, and the Green Party.
4) The Freedom and Solidarity Party (SaS) and the Slovak 2010 election
The Freedom and Solidarity Party was located on the left-right axis on the right side of
center-right, next to the SDKU-DS (app-56). The Party position of SDKU-DS, the Freedom and
Solidarity Party, and the KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) overlapped. The distribution of
voter self-placement was flat from center to right. It was difficult to find the differences among
KDH, the Bridge Party, and the Hungarian Coalition Party.
In the 2010 Slovakian election, the first discriminant function consisted of linguistic
variables, the second function consisted of left-right variables, and the third one consisted of age,
unemployment, and church attendance variables (app-59). The Freedom and Solidarity Party
distinguished itself at the second left-right function, located next to SDKU-DS and KDH. The
third function suggested that the Freedom and Solidarity attachment was associated with less
church attendance, youth, and employment. The discriminant rate was relatively high, at 56.1%
(app-61). The discriminant rate of the Freedom and Solidarity was much higher than that for
9
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
SDKU-DS (27.94%) and Direction (35.17%).
According to the opinion poll conducted in February 2010 before the election, 31% of
the Freedom and Solidarity supporters voted for SDKU-DS, 21% for the Direction, 11%
abstained in the 2006 election and 21% had acquired voting rights for the first time for the 2010
election (Bútorová a Gyárfášová, 2010). Supporters of the Freedom and Solidarity Party were
more accepting of diverse sexual orientation, the use of “soft” drugs, and abortion (Bútorová,
Gyárfášová a Krivý 2010).
The Freedom and Solidarity Party received 307,287 votes (12.15%) in the 2010
election, but lost half of its votes, receiving 150,266 (5.88%) in the 2012 election4. According to
the opinion poll after the election, about 55,300 former voters for Freedom and Solidarity voted
for the Ordinary People, the newest party, in the 2012 election, and 67,400 members of the
electorate abstained. On the other hand, 26,900 former SDKU-DS voters voted for Freedom and
Solidarity in the 2012 election. It is presumed that some voters moved from older parties to new
parties, and later, to even newer parties.
The discriminant functions in the Slovakian 2010 election changed from those in 2004
(app-60; app-52). The former election was carried out in 2006, but the data for this year was
unavailable. In 2010, the first discriminant function consisted of linguistic variables. The
cleavage between the Hungarian and the Slovakian voters strongly correlated with the voters’
party attachment. In 2004, the Hungarian appreciation variable comprised the second
discriminant function, together with urban residence and denomination (not Catholic). However,
the correlation of this function to the party attachment was rather weak. The self-placement on
the left-right axis was the strongest variable indicating satisfaction with the democratic regime
and EU citizenship. The left-right self-placement was, in 2010 also, the second discriminant
function on which parties located themselves, differentiating them from other parties.
5) The Bridge (Most-Hid) (Slovakia, 2010)
The Bridge also won the parliamentary seats in the 2010 Slovak election. It was the
offshoot party from the Hungarian Coalition Party. According to members of the electorate, this
party was located at center-right on the left-right axis (app-56). But supporters of this party
located it at the right end (app-57). Voters’ self-location was also in the position on the right. The
distribution of voters’ self-placement was similar to that of the supporters of Freedom and
Solidarity (app-58).
CDA revealed that the Bridge and its parent party, the Hungarian Coalition Party could
be recognized by the linguistic (ethnic) variables (app-60). But the second discriminant function
10
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
showed that the Bridge’s supporters were slightly younger and more likely to be employed than
the supporters of the parent party. The discriminant rate for the Bridge Party was relatively high
at 50%, but it was difficult to distinguish between voters for the Bridge Party and those for the
Hungarian Coalition Party. According to the opinion poll, 58% of the Bridge’s voters voted for
the Hungarian Coalition Party in the 2006 election, and 18% of the Bridge’s voters gained voting
rights for the first time (Bútorová a Gyárfášová, 2010).
3.
Case analysis
From this analysis, how can we interpret the new parties’ effect on party competition
structure and coalition politics? This question is addressed in the discussion below.
1) Party competition structure
As far as party competition structure is concerned, the discriminant functions and the
variables included did not change considerably, even though relatively large new parties had
entered the party systems. The left-right self-placement axis correlated strongly with voters' party
attachment in both countries, in every election.
The persistence of the Czech party competition structure deserves attention. The Green
party did not add new conflict dimensions to Czech party politics. This may explain the Green
Party's failure in the subsequent election. It was not based on the post-modern value orientation
of the electorate, as in Western Europe. The Green Party was supported by the electors whose
self-placement was at center-right. Its economic policy orientation was liberal. The Green Party,
as a new party, replaced the Free Union and was replaced by other new parties, such as the
Public Affairs Party and TOP 09. The emergence of TOP 09 and the Public Affairs Party changed
the party landscape. However these parties had only replaced former center-right parties on the
existing conflict dimensions.
In Slovakia, the linguistic – ethnic – variable constituted the strongest discriminant
function in 2010. This emerged as the important difference in comparison to analysis of the 2004
data. The Hungarian minority thought that their situation had deteriorated since the establishment
of the coalition government of the Direction (Smer), the Slovakian National Party (SNS), and the
Movement for the Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in 2006 (Bútorová a Gyárfášová, 2010). Almost
all the voters for the Hungarian Coalition Party were members of the Hungarian minority, and
70% of Bridge Party voters were also Hungarian. The emergence of the Bridge Party could be
related to the prominence of the linguistic variables.
11
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
In addition, in Slovakia, the third discriminant function which consisted of age,
employment, and church attendance worked to distinguish new parties. The function which
consisted of religion and pension variables had existed in the 2004 analysis. The third function
used in 2010 had religious and work status variables in common, but the age variable emerged as
the most important one. The difference between the new party and its parent party was
recognizable by this function. New parties – the Bridge Party and the Freedom and Solidarity
Party – tended to be supported by the younger generation, who were highly paid, employed in
larger numbers, and less earnest about going to church. It is interesting to note that members of
the electorate were not motivated to support the new party on the basis of economic hardship.
As far as these five new parties are concerned, the party competition structure in the
Czech Republic has hardly been influenced. In Slovakia, the linguistic dimension, added to the
cultural and economic dimensions, changed the components of the party competition structure
with the emergence of new parties.
2) Coalition politics
All five parties took part in governing coalitions after the elections. Did this mean they
took the initiative in the creation of the new governing coalition? The Green Party's emergence
certainly coincided with the change in coalition politics. Till the election of 2002, the Czech
coalition politics had displayed a partially alternating pattern with three poles. Center-right
Parties had formed governing coalitions with either left Social Democrats or right Civic
Democrats. The 2006 election was the turning point for Czech coalition politics. Two blocks of
left and right were formed, including the Green Party in the right block. The formation of the two
blocks was mainly caused by the approximation of the Communists and the Social Democrats,
along with an embittered relationship between the KDU-ČSL and the Social Democrats. The
Green Party chose the center-right coalition as the result of these circumstances and did not
cause the change in coalition politics.
TOP 09 and Public Affairs did not affect the two-block pattern of coalition politics.
Those parties replaced the KDU-ČSL and the Green party in the center-right position and
participated in a coalition with the Civic Democrats. The same trend was seen in the case of the
two new Slovakian parties. In spite of the change in party competition structure, the left and right
governing coalition remained unchanged. Two coalition blocks fully alternate.
The party positions on the left-right axis also suggest these coalition patterns. The
positions of TOP 09 and the Public Affairs Party consolidated the right block (app-30) and so did
the Bridge Party and the Freedom and Solidarity Party (app-56). The position of the two offshoot
12
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
parties was very near to their parent parties.
4.
Conclusion
Our five cases show that new parties do not always change party competition
structures, and coalition patterns remain the same even when the party competition structure
changes. Contrary to general assumptions, parties of this type do not directly cause instability
within the party system and coalition politics. These five new parties are characteristic of new
types of parties in East-Central Europe, especially in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
High electoral volatility caused by the "supply side effect" of new parties has been getting
attention because of the possibility of the party politics turmoil affected by the continuous
emergence of new parties. However, as we have shown in this article, about half of these
constantly emerging new parties do not always cause changes in the party competition structure
and generally, they keep the coalition pattern unchanged.
On the other hand, we suggest that these parties may cause the following three indirect
outcomes: unclear ex-post accountability, voter disappointment, and instability of coalition
governments. Where accountability is concerned, governing parties are appreciated or punished
by voters according to voters' judgment of government’s political achievements up to the
elections. This is the government's ex-post accountability as measured by the voters. When new
parties got support in an election, the ex-post accountability of the governing coalition became
unclear. The uncertainty is more evident in cases in which new parties join the coalition with
former governing parties, as in the case of TOP 09 and the Public Affairs Party. The Ordinary
People Party in the 2012 Slovakian election also fell into this category. TOP 09 and the Ordinary
People Party were formed by the split of coalition parties, which re-entered the coalition after the
election. These new parties hindered clear accountability of the coalition government. Voters
could be disappointed by the new parties’ policy after the election.
In the case of new parties, voters' self-placement was widely distributed on the
left-right axis. As for Public Affairs, the distribution line had two peaks. The Freedom and
Solidarity Party’s supporters were distributed from center-left to center-right. New parties
discriminant rates were generally low, and this affected discriminant rates of the older parties. In
the 2002 and 2006 Czech elections, all the parties except the Social Democrats had discriminant
rates of more than 60%. The discriminant rate decreased in the 2010 election. More than half of
the parties got only one-third of previous rate (app-35). The Communist Party was scarcely
affected, and the Civic Democrats still kept 58% of the discriminant rate, but the Social
Democrats' rate went down to 28%. Voters’ perceptions of the parties’ plans may be widely
13
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
different from the actual direction which new parties take after elections.
New parties' willingness to enter the governmental coalitions with older parties could
be especially disappointing for the voters. New parties attack old parties for corruption or poor
governance during electoral campaigns. Sikk suggested that some types of new parties do not
represent new issues or ideologies but just win elections by projecting the image of "newness"
(Sikk 2011). The voters for the new parties chose them to show their disapproval of the existing
parties or of government politics. But their choice was not reflected in the composition of the
new coalition.
As one of the effects, some of the new parties lost popularity in a short time. The New
Citizens Alliance, the Green Party, and Public Affairs Party entered into coalition governments
with high levels of popularity but they lost popularity at the end of their governments5. On the
other hand, the Freedom and Solidarity Party and TOP 09 showed popularity persistence, even
though the former group lost half of its former voters. The reason why new parties in
East-Central Europe are inclined to have short lives needs more investigation.
When new parties lost popularity, this damaged popular support for the coalition
government. Unpopular new parties often lost integrity and lost their deputies to the opposition.
These occurrences may cause instability for the governing coalitions in these countries.
An important point is that these indirect outcomes are closely connected to the stability
of the party competition structure and coalition politics. This article's conclusion is still tentative,
as the in-depth investigation has been limited to five cases in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Still, it is clear that there exist new types of new parties in East-Central Europe, a reality that
needs special consideration to determine the real significance of their emergence.
Notes
1
2
14
The original version of this article was prepared for the 7th ECPR General Conference 2013 in Bordeaux,
France 4-7 September 2013 (Panel: Party Governments in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenging
Conventional Wisdom). We thank Prof. Dr. Marc Debus for his constructive comments. We are also grateful
for the anonymous referees from the Meiji Gakuin review -International & regional studies for their helpful
comments.
The Election Database in Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union Countries is a comprehensive
database on parliamentary elections, presidential elections, and European elections. It contains the
background information by experts on political parties and elections.
http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/election_europe/index.html.
As Sikk pointed out, Italy and Japan are the two old democracies that have produced numerous new parties
since the 1990s. Japanese new parties are too numerous to count. Most of them are established as new
offshoot parties. The names of the new parties show that founders of new parties tried to emphasize their
newness: New Party Sakigake (SAKIGAKE: Forerunner), New Frontier Party (SHINSHINTO), Japan
Renewal Party (SINSEITO), Sunrise Party of Japan (TACHIAGARE NIPPON: Stand up Japan), People's
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
3
4
5
Life First, Tomorrow Party of Japan (MIRAI no TO: Future Party). The effects of new parties on coalition
governments are real in Japan, where three new parties gained more than a quarter of votes in proportional
representation constituencies in the 2012 parliamentary election. In Italy and East-Central Europe, voters can
locate new parties on the left-right axis. In Japan, voters have difficulty in locating parties on the left-right
axis. On the Japanese party scene, there are no serious leftist parties. We can see the Polish-style right versus
right politics in Japan.
Canonical Discriminant Analysis (CDA) consists of a variety of multivariate statistical techniques to be
conducted for the purpose of estimating canonical discriminant functions (CDFs), which describe separation
among groups based on some linear composites (discriminant variables) of the outcome variables. CDA may
also properly classify cases into the groups and provide the absolute and relative magnitude of different
discriminant variables. For technical details, see Klecka (1980) and Huberty (2010). For examples of the
application to comparative politics, see Knutsen (1989).
As for data, the following were used: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) 1,2,3, European
Election Studies (EES) 2004, 2009, and European Values Survey (EVS), European Values Survey (EVS),
World Values Survey (WVS) 1999/2000.
Kam zmizli v roku 2012 voliči pravice? Zostali doma, 13.VI.2013, SME,
http://www.sme.sk/c/6770254/kam-zmizli-v-roku-2012-volici-pravice-zostali-doma.html
Party preference in Czech Republic: opinion poll by SANEP,
http://www.volebni-preference.cz/volebni-preference/
Party preference in Slovakia, opinion poll by Focus,
http://www.focus-research.sk/?section=show&id=10
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Acknowledgement
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 23530142.
Abbreviation list for the Appendix
<Political Parties in the Czech Republic>
ČSSD: Česká strana sociálně demokratická (The Czech Social Democratic Party)
KDU-ČSL: Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová (The Christian and democratic
Union)
KSČM: Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)
ODA: Občanská demokratická aliance (The Civic Democratic Alliance)
16
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
ODS: Občanská demokratická strana (The Civic Democratic Party)
SPR-RSČ: Sdružení pro republiku - Republikánská strana Československa (Association for Republic - the
Republican Party of Czechoslovakia)
SZ: Strana zelených (Green Party)
TOP09: TOP 09 (TOP 09)
US: Unie svobody (Union of Freedom)
VV: Věci veřejné (Public Affairs)
SPO: Strana Práv Občanů - Zemanovci (Party of Civic Rights – Zeman's people)
<Political Parties in Slovakia>
ANO: Aliancia nového občana (Alliance of New Citizens)
DS: Demokratická strana (Democratic Party)
DÚ: Demokratická únia Slovenska (Democratic Union of Slovakia)
KDH: Kresťansko-demokratické hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement)
KSS: Komunistická strana Slovenska (Communist Party of Slovaika)
HZDS: Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (Movement for Democratic Slovakia)
HZDS-LU: Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko - Ludová únia (Movement for Democratic Slovakia - People's
Union)
ĽS-HZDS: Ľudová strana - Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (People's Party－Movement for Democratic
Slovakia)
MOST-HÍD: MOST-HÍD (Bridge)
SaS: Sloboda a Solidarita (Freedom and Solidarity)
SDK: Slovenská demokratická koalícia (The Slovak Democratic Coalition)
SDKÚ-DS: Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia - Demokratická strana (Slovak Democratic and Shristian
Union and Democratic Party)
SDĽ: Strana demokratickej ľavice (Party of the Democratic Left)
SOP: Strana občianskeho porozumenia (Party of Civil Understanding)
SMER: SMER (Direction)
SMER-SD: SMER - sociálna demokracia (Direction-Social Democracy)
SMK: Maďarská koalícia/Magyar Koalíció (Hungarian Coalition)
SMK-MKP: Strana maďarskej koalície-Magyar Koalíció Pártja (Party of the the Hungarian Coalition)
SNS: Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party)
17
18
4
8
ODS
3
5
6
7
9
app-4
2
SPR-RSC/KDU-CSL ODA
app-3
1
CSSD
L-R position of circles are mean of all respondents’ response which locate each party
on the left(0)-right(10) scale. Circle sizes are party vote (PR) in the election.
0
KSCM
Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all
respondents,
by voters of the party, and
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the
party
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis
CSES 1 Czech （1996）
CSES 1996 Party Position by all
respondents and Size(% of votes)
10
app-2
app-1
Mizuho NAKADA-Amiya
and
Takashi NARIHIRO
• Countries: Bulgaria, Czech, Romania and Slovakia
• Data: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems(CSES) 1
2, 3, European Election Studies(EES) 2004, 2009 and
European Values Survey(EVS)/World Values
Survey(WVS) 1999/2000
• Single Dimensional Party Competition by Left-Right
placement
• Multi-Dimensional Party Competition Structure
estimated using Canonical Discriminant Analysis
• Statistical Software: Stata 13SE
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of
Coalition Governments in East-Central
Europe
Appendix: Tables and Figures
Data and Software
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
Appendix
．
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
-0.4
-1.6
-3
1
self
2
ODS
3
CSSD
4
5
app-5
KSCM
6
KDU-CSL
7
SPR-RSC
8
9
ODA
-1.4
-0.2
-2.5
-1.2
-2
0
ODS
-1
ODS
ODS
KSCM
KDU-CSL
KSCM
-1
KDU-CSL
-0.5
SPR-RSC
KSCM
-0.6
KDU-CSL
-0.4
SPR-RSC
-0.2
ODA
0
ODA
ODA
0.5
0.2
0.2
app-7
0.4
0.6
0.8
LR・lowly educated・dissatisfied with democracy
CSSD
-0.8
secular・non-Catholic・high income
CSSD
-1.5
0
SPR-RSC
LR・satisfied with democracy
CSSD
1
1
0.4
Group means: party positions on the
scales
00. LEFT
1.2
0.6
1.5
10. RIGHT
1996 Czech LR self-placement by voter in Lower House
Election
-0.4702729
0.0910331
0.057347
-0.4926194
domination1
ethnicity2
democracy
Total
ODA
discontent with
0.7820274 democracy
lowly educated
discontent with democracy
L-R
0.0339965 Czech
-0.1623342 Catholic
-0.1748287 piety
0.0292637 income
0.0627548 retired
-0.0755439 trade unionist
ODS
15.07
112
8.7
4
5.58
15
5.56
15.21
113
15.22
7
14.87
40
13.89
10
0
4
0
9
61.9
6.35
10.98
39
8.06
36.02
4
17
76
CSSD
KSCM
16.15
120
13.04
6
0.37
1
0
0
82.93
68
0
0
21.33
45
KDU-CSL
15.34
114
4.35
2
21.93
59
45.83
33
1.22
1
4.76
3
7.58
16
7
4.27
9
22.88
170
4.35
2
50.19
135
23.61
17
0
0
11.11
SPR-RSC
ODA
Classification table
app-6
15.34
114
54.35
25
7.06
19
11.11
8
4.88
4
15.87
10
22.75
48
Total
100
743
100
46
100
269
100
72
100
82
100
63
100
211
app-8
The diagonal cells （highlighted） denote correctly classified percentage. We suppose
that ideologically or socially well-organized party support produces high disriminant
rate.
SPR-RSC
KDU-CSL
KSCM
non-Catholic
satisfied with
democracy
high income
secular
L-R
-0.1230582
0.0144256
0.3567359 L-R
-0.2507128 ｈighly Educated
Relevant CDFs: 3．The discriminant variables which have strong effects on CDFs are
highlighted and define the characteristics of the scale each CDF represents.
TRUE
CSSD
ODS
-0.9630622
0.1632386
religiosity
0.2239829
0.1260442
income
-0.0297875
-0.014009
0.1563314
0.2336082
0.0316859
employment5
-0.0745465
0.1485676
education
union1
0.9215997
lr
Canonical Discriminant Analysis:
Discriminant Function * 3
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
19
20
0.5654
ODA
CSSD
1
-0.2227
0.3118
-0.0838
0.319
KSCM
-0.3286
0.3467
-0.3299
1
KDU-CSL
1
0.5211
-0.2175
SPR-RSC
1
-0.2046
ODA
1
app-11
app-9
Correlations between the Like-Dislike for political parties scale items (0-10) on CSES data.
Except KDU-CSL vs CSSD, all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.
We can see clear Left and Right blocs.
0.4913
-0.3138
SPR-RSC
-0.4942
KDU-CSL
-0.4031
1
KSCM
ODS
CSSD
ODS
Correlation Table: party like-dislike
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1
3
ALL
CSSD
4
5
KDU-CSL
6
KSCM
ODS
7
US
8
9
10
app-12
Many respondents didn’t answer voting intention because this survey was not
conducted in the election year.
2
1999 Czech LR self-placement by voter
app-10
Self-placement on the LR Axis by
voters of the party, distribution of LR
self-placement by voting intention,
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis
EVS 1999 Czech （1999）
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
0.2082602
-0.1282241
0.044735
0.1695359
-0.2113745
strongleader
union
ecogroup
o46
o49
enviromental activist
lower income
older
Catholic
authoritarian leader support
-2.5
KDU-CSL
KSCM
ODS
US
CSSD
-2
KDU-CSL
-1.5
KSCM
-1
-0.5
ODS
0
US
0.5
1
L-R，bad feeling toward past regime、higher social class
CSSD
Group means of CDA
app-13
materialist
satisfied with democracy
dissatisfied with democracy highly educated
not unionist
past regime bad
past regime bad
high social class
0.2895885 environmental activist
0.1384676 anti EU feeling
0.0145935 low social class
good feeling toward
-0.0150175 immigrant
1.5
-0.0064128 good feeling toward past
bad feeling toward
-0.1401053 autholitarian leader
0.1363286 trade unionist
-0.4279243 dissatisfied with democracy
-0.0847403 L-R
0.2862926 age
-0.1727541 highly educated
0.3221706 pentioner
-0.236862 higher income
0.4010727 Catholic
-0.0362538 low church attendance
-0.5213151 post materialist
Catholic
F4
freqent chuch attendance
0.0884633
-0.0335932
0.0620548
-0.1082927
-0.4677046
-0.0637925
-0.4948969
-0.0964684
0.2680024
-0.0157656
-0.1333069
-0.1540564
0.0367848
0.1604026
0.1367904
0.1655633
-0.0477365
R-L
F3
0.0547288
-0.0893677
0.011111
-0.2348371
-0.2362349
0.0098432
0.2956299
-0.1286716
-0.0635239
-0.0958659
-0.0992908
0.0063205
0.2735218
-0.7450449
-0.0194593
L-R
F2
-0.8
-0.6
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
CSSD
-0.4
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
-0.2
KSCM
app-15
KDU-CSL
0
ODS
0.2
US
0.4
R-L，bad feeling toward past regime, highly educated
0
0.6
1
frequent church attendance,dissatisfied with democracy, non unionist，Catholic，strong leader supporter
-3.5
-3
-0.7676303
pastgov
0.1046128
-0.2324377
democracy
immigcustom1
0.7967508
-0.1384761
0.1614235
-0.1294807
0.1696658
4.07E-06
-0.1337192
0.2045974
F1
lr
age
education
employment4
v320_ppp
denomination1
relservice
v191_4
Canonical Structure
0.1882
app-16
Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all
respondents,
by voters of the party, and
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the
party
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis
CSES 2 Czech （2002）
app-14
LR sclae has stronger correlation with view on economiy and democracy in Czech Republic
than in Romania.
0.3154
-0.0738
-0.3129
democracy best
government /not
income equality significant
/ not significamt
-0..224
-0.1207
-0.0949
-0.2801
Romania(WVS99)
-0.2629
-0.2757
freedom of corporation or
stronger regulation
satisfaction with
democracy
individual responsibility vs
state responsibility
Czech（WVS99）
Meaning of “Left and Right”：Correlation
with Self-Placement in Czech and
Romania
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
21
22
1
2
1
2
0
1
2
self-placement of voters
0
by voters for each party
0
2
CSSD
3
4
app-17
5
6
7
KSU-CSL+US-DEU
8
ODS
9
CSSD
3
CSSD
3
3
CSSD
4
ODS
4
ODS
4
ODS
app-19
5
KSCM
5
KSCM
5
KSCM
7
US_DEU
7
US_DEU
6
7
US-DEU & KDU-CSL
6
KDU_CSL
6
KDU_CSL
8
8
8
9
9
9
CSES2 Czech(2002） lower chamber election:
Party Position by Electorates
1
by all voter
0
KSCM
Czech 2002
Party Position and Size(% of votes)
10
10
10
10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
ALL
2
3
CSSD
4
5
KSCM
app-18
ODS
6
7
8
9
US-DEU & KDU-CSL
0.0928304
0.0470036
-0.1747192
0.9523412
self LR placement
app-20
male
non-Catholic
low attendance
-0.7110576democracy
0.2417682unionist
0.1885668unemployed
0.0060378Catholic
0.1216639education
0.2647864income
high income
Catholic
low attendance
female
low age
10
-0.2100677church attendance
0.2341028female
-0.4822104age
0.1390867
-0.0822834LR
satisfied with
democracy
-0.1626752
-0.0601482
0.1091601
-0.4872
-0.0648254
trade unionist
dissatisfied with
democracy
0.1361173
Catholic
F3
-0.0494184
0.1232346
highly educated
-0.8863054
-0.2789945
-0.1436924
unemployed
0.2201167
high ncome
LR
F2
0.1507123
-0.0153963
female
church attendance
-0.1743246
F1
CSES2 Czech 2002 Canonical Discriminant Analysis
（response variable=party choice）
1
age
0
2002 Czech LR self-placement by voter: All voters and
voters for a paticular party
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
-2
-1.2
-0.4
-2.5
-1.4
-0.5
KSCM
0
1
US-DEU & KDU-CSL
0.5
US-DEU & KDU-CSL
ODS
-0.6
KSCM
-0.4
-0.2
0.2
US-DEU & KDU-CSL
0
0.4
1.5
0.6
2
0.8
2.5
-0.2
-0.1
0
app-21
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
app-23
Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all
respondents,
by voters of the party, and
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the
party
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis
0.6
satisfied with democracy，low age，female，high income，trade unionist
CSSD
-0.8
ODS
CSSD
LR
KSCM
low church attendance，non-Catholic，male
-0.5
-1
ODS
CSES 3 Czech （2006, 2010）
-0.3
-1
-1.5
CSSD
Group means in CDA
Total
US-DEU &
KDU-CSL
KSCM
ODS
CSSD
CSSD
KSCM
app-24
app-22
121
25.58
146
22.09
30.87
12.79
19
0
18.58
11
0
78.57
21
8.93
88
8.64
64.2
10
14
104
ODS
25.16
119
3.49
3
78.76
89
0
0
16.67
27
17
18.39
87
61.63
53
2.65
3
12.5
14
10.49
US-DEU &
KDU-CSL
Total
Classification Table in CDA
100
473
100
86
100
113
100
112
100
162
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
23
24
1.85458
app-25
0.078014
0.028816
voters for each party self-placement
-0.2107271
not employed
0.2631879
-0.8260737
0.1167438
-0.1035503
0.2166666
0.0301794
-0.031685
0.0180419
-0.1178342
0.9373043
income
Catholic
atheist
rural-urban
democracy
self LR
0.0249309
employed
younger
atheist
0
0.005
0.4059775 democracy
-0.1478338 residence
-0.2256465 atheist
0.2420508 Catholic
-0.2058223 income
0.2872265 private sector
-0.2924099 white-collar
-0.0612935 fermer
retired/unemploye
0.2624449 d
-0.0764812 unionist
-0.5378859 gender
-0.4844725 education
-0.1624315 age
function4
older
public sector
not white-collar
0.2364996
0.0724096 self LR
retired,
unemployed
female
dissatisfied with
democracy
lowly educated
0.6366693
-0.0052432
0.132014
-0.2081026
-0.0390604
0.2221099
0.0137617
0.3391676
0.0111531
-0.1151529
0.1019397
0.1783241
0.6106441
function3
app-27
non Catholic
0.1838349
0.4511046
0.0496888
-0.3442555
0.1775884
-0.1093078
secter
LR
-0.0283098
farmer
socioeconomic class
-0.0373384
-0.0382631
0.014435
0.0455274
-0.0408272
-0.0397442
0.1815219
unionist
0
-0.5252472
function2
female
education
0
-0.2734817
CDF1
0.107261
age
Prob>F
Eigenvalue
CSES3 Czech 2006 Canonical Discriminant Analysis（response variable=party
choice）
by voted for each party
by All-Voter
CSES3 Czech(2006） lower chamber election: Party Position by Electorates
F4
F3
F2
F1
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
-2.5
-2.5
-2.5
-2.5
0
1
-2
-2
-2
-2
ALL
ODS
3
4
5
6
KSCM
app-26
CSSD
7
8
KDU-CSL
SZ
9
-1
CSSD
-0.5
SZ
SZ
KSCM
0
KSCM
KDU-CSL
0.5
KDU-CSL
1
-1.5
1.5
10
-1
CSSD
-0.5
SZ
0
KSCM
0.5
KDU-CSL
1
1.5
ODS
-1
CSSD
-0.5
SZ
KSCM
0
KDU-CSL
0.5
1
-1
app-28
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1.5
older・not employed・retired・dissatisfied with democracy
ODS
non-Catholic・atheist・younger・not employed・retired
ODS
LR
CSSD
female・lowly educated・white-collar・private sector
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
ODS
Group means in CDA
2
2006 Czech LR self-placement by voter
2
2
2
2
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
0
ODS
216
65.06
10
3.27
15
17.86
4
2.56
7
9.46
CSSD
8
2.41
129
42.16
6
7.14
22
14.1
7
9.46
SZ
62
18.67
50
16.34
51
60.71
4
2.56
11
14.86
KSCM
1
0.3
77
25.16
3
3.57
118
75.64
2
2.7
45
13.55
40
13.07
9
10.71
8
5.13
47
63.51
KDU-CSL
332
100
306
100
84
100
156
100
74
100
3
ODS
4
TOP09
5
KSCM
VV
6
7
SZ
8
9
by all voters
voters for each party self-placement
KDU=CSL
app-31
Voters who voted KSCM, CSSD, TOP09 or ODS locate themselves more moderate
than the party they voted.
2
by voted for each party
1
CSSD
CSES3 Czech（2010） lower chamber：L-R Party Position by Electorates
app-29
CSSD supporter discriminant rate is the worst, possibly because CSSD is the centrist and
gathering votes from broad voters.
KDU-CSL
KSCM
SZ
CSSD
ODS
Classification Table in CDA
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1
ALL
2
ODS
3
CSSD
4
6
7
KDU-CSL
app-32
KSCM
5
8
SZ
9
VV
10
2010 Czech: LR self-placement by all voter and voted for each
party
app-30
TOP09
11
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
25
26
ODS
Sovereignty
SZ
KDU-CSL
TOP09
SPO
CSSD
KSCM
VV
-0.2113858
0.0292798
-0.0267963
-0.0144007
0.2332709
-0.9674685
income
denomi2
denomi5
ruralurban
democracy
self
0.0400979 retired not employed
atheist
app-33
private sector
highly educated
non-Catholic
0.0638657 self L-R
0.0682215 residence
-0.0485634 dissatisfied with democracy
0.8106785 atheist
-0.8736777 Catholic
-0.0582551 income
0.2327481 private sector
-0.1424049 white-collar
active worker
0.0402957
-0.0628535
-0.1474072
-0.1747377
0.0379912
-0.0381409
0.2615239
0.1930487
-0.6761379
0.0827712 fermer
0.1182933 unionist
-0.0356325
0.0295064 highly educated
0.0011912 female
-0.1191561 age
0.0979489
f3
0.3836803
0.207662
0.7194144
0.0001
0.090471
age
f2
0
0.098099
VV
18
17.65
1
1.11
3
1.49
0
0
18
13.85
0
0
0
0
3
14.29
18
10.84
KSCM
0
0
62
68.89
63
31.34
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
10
1
4.76
0
0
CSSD
4
3.92
13
14.44
57
28.36
6
27.27
2
1.54
0
0
1
5
1
4.76
2
1.2
SPO
TOP09
14
13.73
0
0
1
0.5
0
0
37
28.46
0
0
2
10
1
4.76
19
11.45
app-35
3
2.94
2
2.22
14
6.97
7
31.82
3
2.31
0
0
1
5
4
19.05
2
1.2
20
19.61
4
4.44
24
11.94
3
13.64
20
15.38
18
90
3
15
2
9.52
19
11.45
KDU-CSL
SZ
12
11.76
3
3.33
18
8.96
3
13.64
10
7.69
0
0
8
40
2
9.52
5
3.01
16
15.69
4
4.44
19
9.45
1
4.55
5
3.85
0
0
2
10
5
23.81
5
3.01
Sovereignty
ODS
15
14.71
1
1.11
2
1
2
9.09
35
26.92
2
10
1
5
2
9.52
96
57.83
On the whole the discriminant rates are lower than those of 2006. Especialy the DRs of
new paties (VV and Top09) are. The exceptions are the paties which has ideologically
reliable supporters (KDU-CSL and KSCM).
0.1408904
secter1
-0.1093425
0.0047839
-0.0867188
socioecono~1
farmer1
notemployed
0.0245252
-0.1781088
union1
education
0.2443822
-0.0235932
L-R
f1
0
2.1744
gender1
age
Prob>F
Eigenvalues
CSES3 Czech 2010 CDA（response=party choice）
-2
-2
-2
-1.5
VV
-1.5
VV
-1.5
VV
SPO
SPO
0
0
0.5
TOP09
L-R
0.5
TOP09
1
KDU-CSL
1
KDU-CSL
1.5
SZ
1.5
SZ
2
Sovereignty
2
Sovereignty
-0.5
CSSD
SPO
0
1
KDU-CSL
app-34
not-Catholic, atheist
0.5
TOP09
1.5
SZ
2
Sovereignty
older, active worker, highly educated,private sector
-0.5
CSSD
-0.5
CSSD
app-36
Self-placement on the LR Axis by
voting intensions
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis
EVS 2008 Czech Republic
-1
KSCM
-1
KSCM
-1
KSCM
Group means
2.5
ODS
2.5
ODS
2.5
ODS
3
3
3
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
-1.2
-2
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
lr
2
3
ODS
4
CSSD
5
SZ
6
KSCM
7
KSU-CSL
8
-1
SZ
KSCM
KDU-CSL
ODS
-0.5
CSSD
SZ
0
KSCM
0.5
KDU-CSL
LR, EU identity, younger, highly educated
CSSD
1
1.5
-1
-0.8
-0.6
2
-0.4
0
app-39
-0.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
KDU-CSL
KSCM
SZ
CSSD
ODS
ODS
3
12
3
0
0
12
0
0
1
8.33
1
8.33
22
34.38
5
2.94
58.82
7.81
1
20
CSSD
8
8
2
10.53
2
83.33
10
9.38
6
23.53
app-40
SZ
KSCM
0
0
89.47
17
0
0
21.88
14
2.94
1
4
68
17
0
0
0
0
26.56
17
11.76
KDU-CSL
Classification Table
Group means
ODS
app-38
TRUE
Total
CDA: Discriminant Function*2
app-37
right
low chuch attendance, not environmental activist, Catholic, frequent church
attendance, retired, unemployed
-1.5
9
will not vote
Respondents who didn’t vote locate themselves on the centre of the scale.
left
LR distribution by Voting Intention
34
100
25
100
19
100
12
100
64
100
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
27
28
lr
ageeducation
employment4
v320
denominati~1
relservice
democracy
1
ALL
2
DU
3
HZDS
4
KSS
5
SNS
6
SDL
7
8
SDK
9
線形 (SDL)
10
0
50
100
DS
app-43
KDH
SMK
SOP
200
o49
strongleader
o46
150
pastgov
250
300
350
400
LR
dissatisfied with democracy
authoritarian leader wrong
negative feeling toward EU
negative feeling toward past
regime
-0.0348255
0.4007369
0.4828391
-0.6257996
0.5974065
0.0195719
0.0265901
-0.041512
0.0426386
0.0575292
-0.2443763
-0.4378618
app-44
0.0274796 autholitarian leader
0.7089607 negative feeling toward EU
good feeling toward past
0.4056321 regime
-0.4047461 LR
-0.1805605 younger
-0.1741233 highly educated
-0.0727865 pentioner
-0.1541233 higher income
0.0206657 Catholic
-0.1213171 religiosity
0.0921797 dissatisfied with democracy
右左
good feeling toward past
0.0166929 social class lower
negative feeling toward EU
lower income
religious
authoritarian leader good
lower social class
LR
older
lowly educated
pentioner
0.3467262
-0.4105785
-0.1616294
0.1982967
0.4592477
-0.3596241
-0.4175798
0.3601973
-0.2676835
0.0280919
-0.5276766
0.2424125
EVS 1999/2000 Slovakia CDA
Party LR distribution by voting intention
450
app-42
app-41
Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all
respondents,
by voters of the party,
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the
party,
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis
EVS 1999 Slovakia
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
-1
-1
-1.5
-0.8
-0.5
DS
-0.6
DS
DU
DU
DU
HZDS
-0.4
HZDS
-0.5
HZDS
0
KSS
KSS
KSS
KDH
0
SNS
0
SNS
SNS
app-45
-0.2
KDH
KDH
0.5
SDL
SDL
SDL
SMK
0.2
SMK
0.5
SMK
SOP
0.4
SOP
SOP
1
SDK
SDK
1
SDK
app-47
Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all
respondents,
by voters of the party, and
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the
party
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis
EES 2004 Slovakia （2004）
-1
DS
Group means in CDA
0.6
1.5
0.8
1.5
Total
SDK
SOP
SMK
SDL
SNS
KDH
KSS
HZDS
DU
DS
DS
5
38.46
1
8.33
2
1.8
1
10
7
10.77
3
6.25
3
4.35
12
25
3
5.88
15
15.96
52
9.98
DU
1
7.69
2
16.67
7
6.31
1
10
4
6.15
0
0
3
4.35
5
10.42
3
5.88
9
9.57
35
6.72
HZDS
0
0
1
8.33
20
18.02
0
0
3
4.62
7
14.58
2
2.9
4
8.33
9
17.65
2
2.13
48
9.21
KSS
0
0
0
0
22
19.82
8
80
6
9.23
3
6.25
7
10.14
4
8.33
2
3.92
2
2.13
54
10.36
1
7.69
2
16.67
10
9.01
0
0
28
43.08
2
4.17
1
1.45
4
8.33
1
1.96
10
10.64
59
11.32
SNS
0
0
3
25
20
18.02
0
0
4
6.15
16
33.33
6
8.7
4
8.33
9
17.65
3
3.19
65
12.48
app-48
app-46
KDH
SDL
1
7.69
1
8.33
7
6.31
0
0
1
1.54
7
14.58
34
49.28
0
0
6
11.76
7
7.45
64
12.28
SMK
2
15.38
2
16.67
9
8.11
0
0
5
7.69
2
4.17
4
5.8
8
16.67
4
7.84
3
3.19
39
7.49
SOP
Classification Table
0
0
0
0
10
9.01
0
0
5
7.69
5
10.42
5
7.25
2
4.17
8
15.69
9
9.57
44
8.45
SDK
3
23.08
0
0
4
3.6
0
0
2
3.08
3
6.25
4
5.8
5
10.42
6
11.76
34
36.17
61
11.71
Total
521
94
51
48
69
48
65
10
111
12
13
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
29
30
1
3
LS-HZDS
4
SMER
5
6
SDKU
app-49
KSS
SMK
7
KDH
app-51
positive feeling Hungary
higher social class
not Catholic
0.7151684
-0.0793351
satisfied with democracy
0.3126513
hungarian1
stronger EU identity
0.2402301
d02
-0.338124
0.3766615
-0.1327098
0.253713
0.0930495
0.0867511
-0.026404
urban resident
0.1353201
f2
LR
-0.0172635
religion1
-0.1902779
work5
ruralurb1
-0.4372387
q27
0.3086371
-0.4041505
q24
socialclass
0.8564129
f1
q14
正準構造
9
SNS
10
positive feeling
-0.2241276 toward Hungary
-0.3869936 years educated
0.4833231 Catholic
0.4183169 rural resident
-0.3972554 higher social class
0.6298706 pentioner
Self L-R
0.2616425 placement
weaker EU
0.2544655 identity
dissatisfied with
0.1214541 democracy
8
ANO
low educated
rural resident
lower social class
Catholic
pentioner
f3
EES04 Slovakia CDA Canonical Structure
（response=voting intention）
2
SELF
-0.6
-0.4
-0.3
0.3061
SNS
1
-0.23
1
SDKU
1
1
0.504 0.2405
SMK
KDH
HZD
1
app-50
0.3115 0.1602 -0.0312
-0.25
HZDS-LU
KDH
KSS
SDKU
SMER
ANO
1
SMK
SNS
0.042 0.1279
0.0254 -0.1324 0.3886 0.1385 0.2684
-0.2194 -0.1831
-0.309 -0.1126 0.1994
-0.218
0.324
KSS
SNS
HZDS-LU
KDH
-0.5
KSS
0
SDKU
SMER
0.5
SMK
1
SNS
-0.4
HZD
HZDS-LU
-0.2
0
KDH
0.2
KSS
0.4
SDKU
0.6
SMER
0.8
SMK
-0.2
-0.1
0
app-52
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
urban resident，non-Catholic，positive feeling toward Hungary
ANO
0.5
SNS
1
pentioner，Catholic，lower social class，rural resident，lowly educated
HZD
-1
LR，stronger EU identity，higher social class, satisfied with democracy
ANO
-1.5
-0.04
ANO
-0.8
-2
-0.1018
KDH
ANO
-0.2568
SMER
group means in CDA
-0.1927
KSS
SMK
0.342
SMER
SDKU
1
0.334
LSHZDS
LS-HZDS
Clear distinction between the left and the right bloc.
Correlation of Voting Probability
0.6
1.2
1.5
1
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
Total
SNS
SMK
SMER
SDKU
KSS
KDH
HZDS-LU
HZD
vi
ANO
7
16.67
2
11.76
6
5.71
1
2.13
0
0
14
12.61
11
10.09
2
3.77
4
17.39
43
7.73
HZD
2
4.76
8
47.06
12
11.43
7
14.89
0
0
7
6.31
21
19.27
2
3.77
1
4.35
66
11.87
6
14.29
1
5.88
5
4.76
18
38.3
0
0
21
18.92
6
5.5
8
15.09
1
4.35
78
14.03
KSS
app-53
HZDS-LU KDH
1
2.38
0
0
25
23.81
2
4.26
3
8.11
5
4.5
5
4.59
1
1.89
2
8.7
58
10.43
2
4.76
3
17.65
16
15.24
0
0
25
67.57
3
2.7
11
10.09
7
13.21
1
4.35
69
12.41
7
16.67
2
11.76
0
0
5
10.64
1
2.7
37
33.33
6
5.5
6
11.32
0
0
63
11.33
SDKU
SMER
4
9.52
0
0
7
6.67
1
2.13
3
8.11
3
2.7
10
9.17
0
0
2
8.7
47
8.45
SMK
app-55
Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all
respondents,
by voters of the party, and
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the
party
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis
CSES 3 Slovakia （2010）
ANO
Classification Table
7
16.67
0
0
13
12.38
10
21.28
1
2.7
14
12.61
17
15.6
27
50.94
2
8.7
50
8.99
SNS
6
14.29
1
5.88
21
20
3
6.38
4
10.81
7
6.31
22
20.18
0
0
10
43.48
82
14.75
app-56
app-54
Multi-Dimensional Scaling with voting
probability(2 dimensional）
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
31
32
Smer-SD
1
0
1
2
2
SDKU-DS
SDKU-DS
3
3
3
SaS
SaS
SaS
KDH
4
app-57
4
KDH
4
KDH
5
Most-Hid
5
Most-Hid
5
Most-Hid
6
6
SNS
SNS
SNS
SMK
6
SMK
7
SMK
7
LS-HZDS
8
LS-HZDS
8
LS-HZDS
0.0054566
-0.0610121
democracy
ruralurban
0.1807208
-0.0299198
relservice
self
-0.251127
-0.0728652
income
app-59
-0.9176952
-0.0869237
0.1180136
-0.0713934
0.1651893
-0.0418961
unemployment
-0.002248
-0.1613997
-0.691378
lang4
-0.0093916
0.1298392
0.9625074
lang1
sector1
-0.0282144
-0.0581804
0.0194071
-0.0691021
education
0.1635371
-0.0261337
union1
0.0090754
-0.0146782
gender1
age
7
-0.0274049 LR
-0.7475913 church attendance
dissatisfaction with
-0.2034848 democracy
rural-urban
0.1584441 residence
0.4292166 higher income
-0.2197685 public sector worker
0.0629633 Slovak speaker
unemployed or
-0.442198 retired
-0.009581 Hungarian speaker
-0.0710431 unionist
0.2929435 highly educated
0.2959398 male
-0.6008512
9
9
8
self-placement
by all voters
CSES3 Slovakia 2010 CDA（response=party choice）
0
Smer-SD
1
SDKU-DS
2
by voter for each party
0
Smer-SD
CSES3 Slovakia（2010） lower chamber：有権者による政党位置
0
KDH
KDH
-1.5
KDH
-1
0
LS-HZDS
LS-HZDS
-1
SDKU
3
4
SaS
5
app-58
KDH
6
Most-Hid
-1
-0.5
Most-Hid
Most-Hid
1
Most-Hid
-0.5
2
SaS
SaS
SaS
0
SDKU-DS
0
SDKU-DS
3
SDKU-DS
app-60
Younger，Unemployed or retired-，church attendance-
-1.5
-2
R-L
-2
Smer
7
SNS
4
SNS
0.5
SNS
SNS
8
SMK
0.5
Smer-SD
Smer-SD
5
Smer-SD
Group means in CDA
2
LS-HZDS
self-all
1
1
6
LS-HZDS
9
SMK
SMK
SMK
2010 Slovakia All voters and voters for each party self-placement on L-R scale
Langage（Ethnicity）
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
10
1
1.5
7
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
LS-HZDS Most-Hid SaS
2
0
4
0
6
0
75
0
0
29
0
50
1
0
2.44
0
3
1
1.47
4.41
1
0
10
0
2
51
0.85
21.61
0
6
0
30
3
6
1
12.5
2
3.45
23
56.1
17
25
1
10
22
9.32
0
0
6
12
0
0
2
3.45
10
24.39
19
27.94
0
0
11
4.66
0
0
SNS
3
6
1
12.5
2
3.45
4
9.76
6
8.82
4
40
41
17.37
0
0
Smer-SD SMK
3
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
23
0
39.66
2
0
4.88
0
3
0
4.41
0
3
0
30
0
83
0
0
35.17
0
14
0
70
app-61
Discriminant rates for parties within the coalition government are low.
33
66
0
0
0
0
1
2.44
19
27.94
1
10
26
11.02
0
0
KDH
50
100
8
100
58
100
41
100
68
100
10
100
236
100
20
100
app-63
• The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org). CSES MODULE 1
FULL RELEASE [dataset]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for
Political Studies [producer and distributor]. August 4, 2003.
• The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org). CSES MODULE 2
FULL RELEASE [dataset]. June 27, 2007.
• The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org). CSES MODULE 3
FULL RELEASE [dataset]. March 27, 2013 version.
• EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, [Voter Study and/or
Candidate Study, and/or Media Study, and/or Euromanifesto Study and/or
Contextual Data], [Advance/Final] Release, DD/MM/2010, (www.piredeu.eu).
• An Expert Survey of 208 parties in Europe, used in Robert Rohrschneider and
Stephen Whitefield. 2012. The Strain of Representation. How Parties represent
diverse Voters in Western and Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(http://party-competition.politics.ox.ac.uk/)
SMK
Smer-SD
SNS
SDKU-DS
SaS
Most-Hid
LS-HZDS
KDH
SDKUDS
Classification Table in CDA
app-62
• Klecka, William R. (1980) Discriminant Analysis (Quantitative
Applications in the Social Sciences), Sage Publications.
• Huberty, Carl J. (2010) “Discriminant Analysis,” in Hancock
Gregory R. and Ralph O. Mueller eds. The Reviewer’s Guide to
Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences, Routledge.
• Knutsen, Oddbjørn (1989) “Cleavage Dimensions in Ten West
European Countries: A Comparative Analysis,” CPS, vol.21, 495533.
• Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), European
Election Database
（http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/index.h
tml）
• Dalton, Russell J. , David M. Farell and Ian McAallister(2011)
‘Citizens and their Party Policy Preferences ` in their Political
Parties & Democratic Linkage, Oxford University Press.
References
New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe
33