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Project title:
Nordic-Baltic Security Dynamics after the Ukraine Crisis
Project seminar
Master Thesis
Prepared by (Name(s) and study number):
Kind of project:
Module:
Tina Sundree Lauge Gill
Master Thesis
GS-K4
Oliver Heinisch Schou
Master Thesis
GS-K4
Name of Supervisor:
Annemarie Peen Rodt
Submission date:
30-03-2015
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236,823
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the next page):
192,000 – 240,000
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Abstract
This master thesis takes departure in the observation that the Russian involvement in the Ukraine
crisis since 2014 has altered the European security environment with implications for the security
dynamics of the Nordic-Baltic states. The thesis examines how the perception of Russia in relation
to the Ukraine crisis has affected the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics. In order to analyse this, the
thesis employs an analytical framework based on the Regional Security Complex Theory by Barry
Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003) and considers the Nordic-Baltic states as a subcomplex.
Based on the threat perceptions and practices of the Nordic-Baltic states the analysis first examines
the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine crisis. Next, it investigates to what extent
Russia constitutes a common security issue in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex after the Ukraine
crisis. Finally, the extent to which the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex is a security community after the
Ukraine crisis is assessed. The thesis concludes that the perception of Russia as a threat in the
Nordic-Baltic subcomplex in relation to the Ukraine crisis has affected the Nordic-Baltic security
dynamics by increasing the relative security interdependence and the extent to which the NordicBaltic subcomplex constitutes a security community.
Keywords
Nordic, Baltic, security, security dynamics, Russia, Ukraine crisis, regional security complex,
subcomplex, security community
List of Contents
List of abbreviations .......................................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter 1 - Problem Area .................................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 The Ukraine Crisis and a New European Security Environment ............................................................ 4
1.2 Nordic-Baltic Security Relations after 1991 - a Brief Account ............................................................... 5
1.3 Security Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Subcomplex ............................................................................. 7
1.4 Research Questions & Purpose of Thesis ................................................................................................ 8
Chapter 2 - Theory............................................................................................................................................. 9
2.1 Regional Security Complex Theory ...................................................................................................... 10
2.2 Analytical Framework for Investigation................................................................................................ 13
2.3 Definitions of Core Concepts ................................................................................................................ 15
2.3.1 Security Dynamics.......................................................................................................................... 15
2.3.2 Social Construction......................................................................................................................... 15
2.3.3 Security Community ....................................................................................................................... 16
2.3.4 Security Issues ................................................................................................................................ 18
2.3.5 Box of Theoretical Concepts .......................................................................................................... 20
2.4 Structure of Analysis and Employment of Concepts ............................................................................. 21
Chapter 3 - Methods ........................................................................................................................................ 23
3.1 Research Structure ................................................................................................................................. 23
3.2 Timeframe ............................................................................................................................................. 24
3.3 Theoretical Considerations .................................................................................................................... 25
3.4 Collection and Analysis of Empirical Data ........................................................................................... 27
3.5 Limitations............................................................................................................................................. 28
Chapter 4 - Nordic-Baltic Security Dynamics prior to the Ukraine Crisis ...................................................... 31
4.1 The International Security Environment ............................................................................................... 31
4.2 The Role of Traditional Security Issues ................................................................................................ 34
4.3 Perceptions of Russia before the Ukraine Crisis ................................................................................... 35
4.4 Internal Security & Minority Issues ...................................................................................................... 37
4.5 Information- and Cyber Security: Examples of Non-Military Security Issues...................................... 40
4.6 Institutional Arrangements .................................................................................................................... 42
1
4.7 Official Positions to Nordic-Baltic Defence Cooperation ..................................................................... 44
4.8 Sub-Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 47
Chapter 5 - Russia as a Common Security Issue in the Nordic-Baltic Subcomplex after the Ukraine Crisis . 49
5.1 Perceptions of Russia after the Ukraine Crisis – the Baltic States ........................................................ 50
5.2 Two Dimensions of the Russian Security Issue .................................................................................... 56
5.3 Nordic-Baltic Responses to the Russian Security Issue ........................................................................ 57
5.4 Institutional Security Practices after the Ukraine crisis ......................................................................... 61
5.5 Bilateral Responses in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex after the Ukraine crisis ..................................... 64
5.6 Sub-Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 66
Chapter 6 - The Nordic-Baltic Subcomplex as a Security Community ........................................................... 68
6.1 Mutual Desecuritisation......................................................................................................................... 69
6.2 Conception of Shared Threats ............................................................................................................... 71
6.3 Shared Response to Threats................................................................................................................... 75
6.4 A Nordic-Baltic Security Community in the Making? .......................................................................... 77
6.5 Prevailing Elements of Indifference in the Nordic-Baltic Security Dynamics ...................................... 79
Chapter 7 - Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 81
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................... 83
2
List of abbreviations
CSDP
Common Security and Defence Policy
COE
Centre of Excellence
COPA
Cooperation Areas
DIIS
Danish Institute for International Studies
EU
European Union
FOI
Swedish Defence Research Agency
IISS
International Institute for Strategic Studies
KaPo
The Estonian Internal Security Service
MoU
Memorandum of Understanding
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBG
Nordic Battle Group
NORDEFCO
Nordic Defence Cooperation
PfP
Partnership for Peace
RSC
Regional Security Complex
RSCT
Regional Security Complex Theory
3
Chapter 1 - Problem Area
1.1 The Ukraine Crisis and a New European Security Environment
February 28, 2014 marked a turning point in European history. On that day, pro-Russia gunmen
seized local government buildings in the Crimean capital Simferopol in response to the Ukrainian
revolution that was taking place in Kiev. The Russian parliament subsequently approved a request
from President Vladimir Putin to use military force in Ukraine in order ‘to protect Russian citizens’
living in the country (Washington Post 2014c). Russian forces spread in Crimea in the following
days and Crimea was subsequently absorbed into Russia. The Russian intervention in Ukraine was
widely condemned by NATO, the EU and many others, and the absorption of Crimea was deemed a
Russian annexation in violation of international law (BBC 2014b).
As a consequence of the Ukraine crisis, the European security environment has changed
dramatically. Russia's intervention in Ukraine demonstrated that the stable European security order
was no longer secure (Rasmussen et al. 2014, p.8). With Russia's demonstrated willingness to use
military force to secure what it considers its national interests, the question of territorial defence is
brought back into focus. The Ukraine crisis has raised concerns in the three Baltic states of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania because the arguments used by Russia to justify its involvement in the Ukraine
crisis also apply to the Baltic states. As geographical neighbours of Russia with historical ties to the
Soviet Union and sizeable Russian minorities, the Baltic states are potential targets of Russian
projection of influence through the so-called 'soft power' and non-military, coercive means of
destabilisation (Grigas 2012; FOI 2014). However, Russia's boosting of military capabilities and
activities towards its northern and western border, increased maritime and airspace activity in and
near the territorial waters and sovereign airspace of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden means
that Russia's projection also affects these four Nordic states 1 (European Leadership Network 2014;
Danish Defence Intelligence Service 2014). Russia's confrontational behaviour in the Baltic Sea
region predates the Ukraine crisis, but with Russia's rearrangement of Ukraine's political borders
this behaviour is now cast in a different light. With the historically close and cooperative relations
between the Nordic and Baltic states, a perceived Russian threat may thus provide the impetus for
bringing the Nordic and Baltic states into further alignment.
1
Note that the term ‘Nordic states’ in this project report refers to Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Iceland is not
included in this relation – see Section 3.5 for further explanation of this.
4
1.2 Nordic-Baltic Security Relations after 1991 - a Brief Account
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a new geopolitical reality. A range of former
Soviet states suddenly had to navigate in a Europe that was transforming rapidly. When the Warsaw
Pact was disbanded the same year, the Baltic states stood as nonaligned. As the three states
struggled to regain their independence and cut ties with the Soviet Union, the Nordic states quickly
offered a wide range of political and military assistance (Dahl 2014, p.71). Denmark was the first
country to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Baltic states soon after their independence. On
October 1, 1991 Denmark opened embassies in the three Baltic capitals of Tallinn, Riga and
Vilnius, and in 1994 Denmark signed individual defence agreements with each of the Baltic states
(Danish Ministry of Finance 1997). Denmark thus increased stability in the Baltic Sea region by
strengthening democracy and human rights based on the principle that all states, even so-called
small states, shall be able to freely decide their own future without interference from great powers
(Jakobsen 2014). During the 1990s, the four Nordic states also supported the Baltic states in
developing their own framework for trilateral military and defence cooperation. This Baltic
framework included projects for joint military units, education institutions and defence
infrastructure,2 and it served as a way for the Baltic states to cooperative militarily – both at home
and abroad (Männik 2013; Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002). These initiatives were also
an advantage for the Nordic states as it provided them with an arena for close defence cooperation
with the Baltics (Järvenpää 2014a, p.138). Moreover, the Nordic states all supported Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania in their pursuit for NATO and EU membership until 2004 when the three Baltic states
were accepted into both organisations. Compared to Norway, Denmark was the most proactive state
in the campaign for Baltic NATO-membership, while Sweden and Finland supported the idea as
well despite their policies of non-alignment. (Dahl 2014, pp.75–76).
The 1990s saw enhanced institutional intertwinement of the Nordic states in terms of practical
security and defence cooperation. During the Cold War, the Nordic states managed to cooperate
informally on military matters in spite of their institutional differences (Jakobsen 2006, pp.10–45).
The two officially non-aligned states Finland and Sweden joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace
(PfP) programme in 1994 which paved the way for enhancing Nordic defence cooperation. In the
years thereafter the Nordic states established institutional frameworks to facilitate joint
2
The Baltic military cooperation projects included BALTBAT (Baltic Battalion), BALTRON (Baltic Navy Squadron),
BALTNET (Baltic Air Surveillance Network) and BALTDEFCOL (Baltic Defence College).
5
deployments, acquisitions, research and development3 (Saxi 2011, p.16). In 2009, former
Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg published a report with 13 proposals for
enhancing Nordic security and defence policy upon request by the Nordic foreign ministers
(Stoltenberg 2009). Inspired by the findings of the Stoltenberg report, the Nordic defence ministers
agreed to merge the existing defence and security structures into a new overarching structure for
Nordic Defence Cooperation called NORDEFCO later the same year (Järvenpää 2014a, pp.138–
140; Archer 2014, p.105). However, only some of the Stoltenberg proposals were accepted as part
of this structure. The last proposal of the Stoltenberg report called for a ‘mutual declaration of
solidarity’, meaning that the Nordic states should clarify how they would respond if one of them
should be victim of an armed attack, was rejected by most of the Nordic states (Gotkowska & Osica
2012, p.23). The main driver behind NORDEFCO was economic: concerted planning and action
would provide more ‘bang for the buck’ in a time where the Nordic states had to deal with shrinking
defence budgets and rising costs (Saxi 2011, p.4). Pooling and sharing of resources was seen as the
optimal step for enhancing Nordic defence cooperation. In continuation hereof, Latvia and Denmark
published the NB84 Wise Men report in 2010 with recommendations for how to intensify NordicBaltic defence and security cooperation. The report placed the idea of greater regional cooperation
and integration on the agenda – for instance by proposing that enhanced Nordic-Baltic cooperation
could happen within the newly established NORDEFCO framework (Danish and Latvian Ministries
of Foreign Affairs 2010, p.11). Hereby it presented the central notion that Nordic defence
cooperation should be expanded beyond the Nordic region to include the Baltic states (Ibid.).
Since then, the Nordic and Baltic states have cooperated within areas of defence and security in
various ways. For instance, the Baltic states have been invited to participate in NORDEFCO
projects since 2012 - but only to a limited extent (Winnerstig 2012, p.70). Institutionalised NordicBaltic defence cooperation has mostly been limited to operations abroad (both civilian and
militarily) and within the areas of ‘soft security’, for instance on issues such as cyber and energy
security (Gotkowska & Osica 2012, pp.47–48). Moreover, the Nordic states have not fully engaged
in a defence association that provide them with a common security guarantee, due to their different
institutional memberships and their different views on defence and security policy issues
(Winnerstig 2012). However, the Russian intervention in Ukraine and the changed European
3
The Nordic NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support), NORDAC (Nordic
Armaments Cooperation) and NORDSUP (Nordic Supportive Defence Structure).
4
NB8 refers to the eight Nordic and Baltic states.
6
security environment gives rise to considering that the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics have
changed. This assumption is based on the widespread interpretation of Russia’s behaviour in
relation to the Ukraine crisis as reflecting an aggressive and revanchist agenda. Central to this
perception is the fear that Russia’s willingness to rewrite the European map is not geographically
limited to Eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, numerous incidents are interpreted as Russian
projection towards its neighbours in the Baltic Sea region (European Leadership Network 2014).
Whereas the security concerns and institutional alignments have hitherto set the seven Nordic-Baltic
states apart, a perceived Russian threat may potentially generate the necessary gravitational pull to
bring the Nordic-Baltic states into unison.
1.3 Security Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Subcomplex
Given their geographical proximity to Russia and their all but immaterial ability to defend
themselves against a possible military attack, it is reasonable to assume that the assertive posture
and military power projection of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis is a cause of great concern
in the Nordic-Baltic region (Wivel et al. 2014). This is based in the observation that the Ukraine
crisis has dramatically and unequivocally altered the European security environment in which the
Nordic-Baltic states are deeply integrated. It can thus be presumed that the Russian behaviour in the
Ukraine crisis has had a direct impact on the perceived security of the seven Nordic-Baltic states but
also on the relationships between them by extension. This calls for an investigation of how the
security dynamics of the Nordic-Baltic region has been affected by the new European security
environment in relation to the Ukraine crisis. To this end, this master thesis employs an analytical
framework based on the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) by Barry Buzan and Ole
Wæver (2003). Subscribing to the notion of RSCT that security and threats are matters of
perception, whether Russia indeed threatens the Nordic-Baltic states is irrelevant in this thesis.
Rather the focus is on how Russia is perceived by the Nordic-Baltic states in relation to the Ukraine
crisis, and how this affects the security dynamics between the seven states. RSCT holds that the
world can be divided into regional security complexes (RSCs) defined by security concerns that
connect actors within a complex more to each other than to states outside it. Considered here as
denoting the threat perceptions and security practices revolving around specific security issues,
regional security dynamics connect states to each other through interconnected security concerns.
Taking into account the wider European security context in which the Nordic-Baltic states are
embedded, the RSCT framework is employed to enable an investigation of the security dynamics
between the Nordic-Baltic states by analysing them as a subcomplex within the European RSC.
7
Thus, the objective of this thesis is to answer the following problem formulation:
How has the perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis affected the Nordic-Baltic
security dynamics?
1.4 Research Questions & Purpose of Thesis
In order to answer the problem formulation, three research questions will be answered:
1. What characterises the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine crisis?
2. To what extent does Russia constitute a common security issue in the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex after the Ukraine crisis?
3. To what extent is the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex a security community after the Ukraine
crisis?
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the security dynamics between the Nordic-Baltic states in
light of the Ukraine crisis. It thus contributes to the body of literature within international security
studies by providing timely and important knowledge about the post-Ukraine security order. In
particular, this thesis adds to the existing research into European security with new insights into the
security dynamics of the Nordic-Baltic region. By constructing an independent analytical
framework based on Buzan and Wæver's Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (2003), the
thesis also presents a contribution to that theory. Hence, the thesis is relevant for the development of
RSCT, and the findings of the thesis can be utilised in investigations of the wider European regional
security dynamics.
8
Chapter 2 - Theory
This chapter presents the theoretical foundation of the thesis and lays out the analytical framework
which is developed specifically to enable an investigation of the problem formulation. The
framework draws inspiration from the notions and concepts of Regional Security Complex Theory
(RSCT) by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003). However, the analytical objective of the present
investigation has a number of implications for the way in which RSCT is operationalised and
employed in this research project. This thesis therefore entails the development of an analytical
framework specifically to enable the investigation of the problem formulation. This endeavour is
important, as it also makes up a theoretical contribution of the thesis. It involves a number of
choices concerning the selection and operationalisation of theoretical notions and concepts to
construct the analytical framework for the investigation. These choices will be presented in this
chapter, as will the operationalisation of the central theoretical notions and concepts which in
combination make up the analytical framework.
First, Buzan and Wæver's RSCT will be briefly introduced to provide an overview of the theory.
Rather than including an exhaustive account of the comprehensive theory, the section presents the
selected elements and notions which are deemed the most important to understanding the theory and
which consequently form the theoretical basis for the analysis. This includes the theoretical
understanding of security and the focus on the regional level of international security, as well as the
concepts of securitisation and regional security complex. Next, the chapter turns to presenting the
analytical framework for this thesis. Undertaking this task requires revising the theory and its core
concepts in adherence to the empirical developments and analytical purpose on which the
investigation is based, in order to be able to employ the analytical framework to the empirical
context at hand. In particular, defining the selected concepts from RSCT makes up an important
task because, as can be observed from the first section, they are defined rather loosely by Buzan and
Wæver (see Section 3.3). The section starts by clarifying the purpose of this investigation and how
it diverges from that of Buzan and Wæver in their application of RSCT in their work of Regions
and Powers (2003). Subsequently the implications of the analytical approach of this thesis for how
RSCT is operationalised and employed in answering the problem formulation are presented. This in
turn involves highlighting certain concepts and notions which are selected and subsequently
operationalised to form part of the analytical framework. Considerations regarding the omission of
other elements of RSCT as a consequence of the present analytical focus will also be included. The
9
chapter concludes with an overview of the analysis illustrating how the analytical framework and its
concepts are employed during the analysis.
2.1 Regional Security Complex Theory
Since Barry Buzan’s original sketch of the concept in “People, States and Fear” (first edition from
1983), several versions of theories of security complexes have been developed, elaborated, updated
and applied to various empirical cases by a range of authors (e.g. FOI, 2012; Mölder, 2011;
Winnerstig, 2012). Co-authored by Buzan, however, the theory found its most recent and elaborate
expression as the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) in “Regions and Powers” (2003).5
The notion of security complexes was presented in response to what Barry Buzan apparently
observed as a gap in the literature for studying international security (Buzan 2007, pp.157–158). In
between the security analyses conducted at the level of individual states on the one hand and
systemic, i.e. global level on the other, he proposed an important intermediate level of analysis,
namely the inter-state or regional level. This level contains an important set of ‘relatively
autonomous’ security dynamics and is “(…) where the extremes of national and global security
interplay” (Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.43). RSCT is based in a relational understanding of security
which reflects the view that international security is about “(…) how human collectivities relate to
each other via threats and vulnerabilities” (Buzan et al. 1998, pp.10–11). Along with a strong
notion of geographical proximity which means that “(…) threats operate more potently over short
distances”, the security concerns of states tend to make them mutually dependent on their
neighbours (Buzan 2007, pp.40, 161; Buzan et al. 1998, p.43).
In turn, the security and security concerns of actors (commonly but not necessarily states) are
matters of perception. In its emphasis that threats and security issues are constructed entities the
theory is influenced by constructivist thinking (Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.71). In the context of
international relations, security is about survival and a security issue constitutes an issue that is
“(…) presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object” (Buzan et al. 1998,
p.21)6. RSCT focuses on the context and conditions under which a certain issue is framed as a
security issue or a threat (Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.71). This is important to study because,
5
In addition to the concept of a security complex (Buzan 1983) RSCT also draws on the theory of securitisation (Buzan
et al. 1998). These three books will therefore be included when relevant in this chapter.
6
The term of referent object will be clarified below.
10
“(…) by saying “security,” a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a
right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development” (Buzan et al. 1998,
p.21).
This process is referred to as securitisation. It is immensely important for the formation of security
dynamics, including those among states, because security dynamics originate in and revolve around
the security issues which are the outcome of the political process of securitisation (Buzan & Wæver
2003, p.71). Desecuritisation denotes the reverse process by which a security issue is downgraded
and ceases to be considered an existential threat to a valued referent object (Ibid., p.489). Through
the patterns of security interaction, i.e., the security dynamics that revolve around certain security
issues, states are thus connected in regional clusters of interconnected security concerns which are
termed regional security complexes (RSCs) (Ibid., p.73). An RSC is defined as follows:
"a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked
that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another."
(Ibid., p.44)
A crucial consequence of this definition relates to what constitutes a region within the perspective
of RSCT. The authors stress the importance of defining regions strictly in functional terms of
security. Regardless of whether they qualify as regions in other conceptualisations, RSCs constitute
regions as seen through the lens of security (Ibid., pp.43–44). It is the relative security
connectedness within a group of actors that defines an RSC (Ibid., pp.43–44, 48–49). Moreover
RSCs can be told apart by the relative degree of security connectedness, also referred to as security
interdependence, among a group of actors and security indifference between that group and actors
outside of it (Ibid., p.48). RSCs are thus socially constructed regions in that they are defined by the
security practices of the actors within the RSC and the intensity of the security connectedness which
these security practices give rise to (Ibid.).
It is important to note that RSCs are not merely analytical units but are ‘in some sense real’ (Buzan
2007, p.161). As such these subsystems within the international structure of security are to be
studied in their own right because, although the regional level is not necessarily always dominant,
the authors hold that;
“Both the security of the separate units [such as states] and the process of global power
intervention can be grasped only through understanding the regional security dynamics” (Buzan &
Wæver 2003, p.43)
11
RSCs are made up of four essential components, namely; boundary, anarchic structure, polarity, and
social construction. Put briefly, the boundary component denotes the geographic confines of the
RSC formed by patterns of relative security interdependence and indifference (Ibid., pp.49, 53). The
second component of anarchic structure refers to the notion that an RSC constitutes a relatively
autonomous substructure with self-contained security dynamics and is composed of at least two
autonomous units (Ibid., p.53). Polarity refers to the power relations between the units in the RSC
in the form of an e.g. uni-, bi-, or multipolar distribution of power within the RSC (Ibid., p.49).
Social construction reflects the constructivist influence in the theory as it denotes the historical
patterns of amity and enmity between the units in the RSC (Ibid.). In combination polarity and
social construction largely define the RSC and inherently reflect the combination of realist and
constructivist elements inherent to the theory (Ibid., p.53; Buzan et al. 1998, p.201). It is especially
the social construction which defines the security dynamics of the RSC as it concerns the character
of security practices in the region. Based on this variable the RSC can be characterised along a
spectre from conflict formation through security regime to security community (Buzan & Wæver
2003, pp.53–54):
Figure 1
These RSC types in turn point to the way in which security matters are dealt with in the region –
from the first which reflects a high level of fear and rivalry and where use of violence is expected in
political relations; over security regime where the fear and expectations of violence are partly
controlled by certain rules of conduct which the actors involved have agreed upon and expect to by
upheld; towards security community in which there is no fear or expectation of the use of force in
the settlement of disputes (Ibid., pp.489, 491, 492). These RSC types and the social construction of
an RSC will be elaborated and defined in greater detail below.
Through these components RSCT enables in-depth analyses of the security practices among states
because the regional security dynamics internal to an RSC are considered durable features of the
international system. One purpose of the theory is thereby to make it possible to map out the world-
12
wide set of security relations in mutually exclusive RSCs which, in combination with analyses
based in the other levels spanning from the national, through inter-state or regional to the interregional and the global level, make up the full picture of the ‘security constellation’ (Ibid., pp.44,
51). Hence, in an apparent attempt to fill the regional gap of international security Buzan and
Wæver undertook the endeavour to map out the contemporary world into RSCs in “Regions and
Powers” in 2003. Yet, while the wider security patterns are durable they are notably not held to be
permanent features of the international structure. Another purpose of RSCT is therefore to grasp the
developments in these relations and to this end RSC assessments, such as those conducted in
"Regions and Powers", can also be used as benchmarks against which to trace and analyse
continuity and the potential for change (Ibid., p.53). In that light, updating and revising RSC
analyses remains a continuously relevant undertaking. This also forms part of the contribution of
this thesis.
The next section will identify the major differences between the analytical focus and empirical
context of the present research project and that of Buzan and Wæver in 2003. This has
consequences for the approach to the empirical object of research but also has implications for how
RSCT is operationalised and used to structure the analysis, involving that certain concepts and
elements of the theory are highlighted while others are omitted from the analytical framework
employed here. The objective of the next section is to elucidate these choices.
2.2 Analytical Framework for Investigation
The present investigation differs markedly from that of Buzan and Wæver in 2003 in its analytical
focus and the empirical object of investigation. First of all, given the analytical focus on the security
dynamics between the seven Nordic-Baltic states which was presented in Chapter 1, this thesis
defines the Nordic-Baltic states as forming a subcomplex within the European RSC. The concept of
a subcomplex is here defined in adherence to RSCT in which a subcomplex is essentially the same
as an RSC with distinctive patterns of security interdependence; the major difference being that a
subcomplex is firmly embedded within an RSC (Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.51). Importantly, this
means that the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex is defined by the same components as those of an RSC, as
sketched out in the previous section (these will be elaborated and operationalised below). The
conception of the Nordic and Baltic states as part of the same security complex, i.e. the European
RSC, makes up the empirical and conceptual basis for this investigation but also part of the
contribution to RSCT of this thesis. As such it has a number of implications. It means, first, that the
13
units under investigation are states and, second, that the investigation will focus solely on the
Nordic states of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, and the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia
and Lithuania (see Section 3.5).
Considering these seven states together differs from the analytical findings of Buzan and Wæver in
2003. In Regions and Powers the Nordic states were considered part of – or rather, a subcomplex in
– the European RSC, whereas the Baltic states formed part of the Post-Soviet RSC (Buzan &
Wæver 2003, p.xxvi). In the view of the authors of this thesis, this is no longer valid, and needs to
be revised in light of the accession of the three Baltic states to both the European Union and NATO
in 2004. While the analysis takes departure in the already established European RSC from Buzan
and Wæver’s study in 2003 (see Buzan & Wæver 2003, pp. 352–376), owing to the aforementioned
empirical development, the thesis by contrast considers the three Baltic states part of the European
RSC. Not only does this theoretical revision make it possible to consider the Baltic states part of a
subcomplex with the Nordic states - it also makes it a highly relevant object for analysis,
considering that this constitutes a relatively new subregion within the European RSC. 7 The purpose
of this investigation is therefore to examine the security dynamics in this subregion, and considering
the Nordic-Baltic group of states as a subcomplex is the means which enables such investigation
with the use of the analytical concepts of RSCT.
Adhering to RSCT’s definition of a subcomplex, the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex will be investigated
as if it were an RSC, meaning that the security dynamics and major security issues in the
subcomplex are considered in the same way, or through the same lenses, as those applied to
analysing RSCs. As such, it is assumed that the security dynamics of the subregion can be
investigated in their own right or, put differently, that it is valid to consider the security dynamics of
the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex to be “(…) self-contained in the sense that they would exist even if
actors beyond the region did not impinge on it” (Buzan 2007, p.158). As a result it is considered
valid and relevant to study the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics in their own right and that, even
though the wider regional security dynamics of the European RSC will not be in focus in the
analysis, this study contributes with relevant and timely knowledge about the development of the
European RSC. As stated previously, owing to the definition of a subcomplex, the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex is to be analysed as an RSC, meaning that the same components are involved in
defining it. However, the analytical focus of this investigation has implications for the concepts
7
See for instance Winnerstig 2012 and FOI 2012.
14
which are selected to be included in the analysis. Therefore, rather than involving the four RSC
components, this investigation focuses on the component of the social construction and omits the
remaining three. The two components of boundary and anarchic structure are not in focus as they
largely relate to defining or establishing an RSC. They are deemed irrelevant here seeing as the
geographical object of investigation is already defined, i.e. as a subcomplex composed by the seven
Nordic-Baltic states. Instead, the purpose of this investigation is to examine the internal security
dynamics of the subcomplex which leads to a focus on the internal character of the RSC of which
the components of social construction and polarity are more indicative. The component of polarity
does not form part of this investigation, however. Its omission is a consequence of the specific
definition of security dynamics in the present analytical framework and the analytical focus which
entails examining to what extent the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics have developed towards a
security community. The next section will define the concepts that will be employed in the analysis,
including the important concepts of security dynamics and security community. In this relation the
importance of the component of social construction and omission of polarity will be elucidated. The
section concludes by providing a brief overview of the core concepts and their definitions.
2.3 Definitions of Core Concepts
2.3.1 Security Dynamics
RSCT does not provide a clear definition of security dynamics and it is therefore considered an
important task to clarify the understanding of it within the present analytical framework. Buzan,
Wæver and de Wilde (1998) state that,
“The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are normally generated by the units
within it – by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other” (Buzan et al. 1998,
p.201)
This gives rise to an understanding that security dynamics involves both the perceptions and
practices of units (i.e. states in this thesis) within an RSC. Combined with the aforementioned
understanding in RSCT that security dynamics originate in and revolve around certain security
issues, this forms the basis for defining security dynamics as the security perceptions and –practices
of a set of states that revolve around certain security issues.
2.3.2 Social Construction
The social construction is an important component in this regard as it is the patterns of amity and
enmity that give rise to the security interconnectedness which defines a group of states as an RSC.
In other words;
15
“RSCs are defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal,
geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence” (Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.45).
As such the relations of amity and enmity mark the character of the security dynamics of an RSC
ranging from negative to positive security interdependence. In this light, security dynamics in an
RSC can be characterised on a spectrum ranging from ranging from amity (friend) at one end
towards enmity (enemy) at the other (Buzan & Wæver 2003, pp.50, 57). Analysing variations in
amity and enmity further enables a categorisation of the type of an RSC on a spectre from conflict
formation, through security regime to security community. Buzan and Wæver explain the relation
between amity and enmity patterns and RSC types by stating that in terms of amity and enmity,
RSCs “may be conflict formations, security regimes, or security communities, in which the region is
defined by a pattern of rivalries, balances, alliances, and/or concerts and friendships” (Buzan &
Wæver 2003, p.55). Consequently, analysing the patterns of amity and enmity in the subcomplex
plays an important role in this investigation as it enables the objective of investigating the degree to
which the subcomplex can be characterised as a security community.
2.3.3 Security Community
A security community denotes an RSC “in which disputes among all the members are resolved to
such an extent that none fears, or prepares for, either political assault or military attack by any of
the others” (Buzan 2007, p.180). In addition to amity and enmity patterns, a security community
thus also involves processes of desecuritisation, which is here defined as perceptions and practices
that reflect that actors cease to regard and treat each other as enemies and instead behave as friends
(Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.57). Importantly, this does not imply that securitisation processes do not
exist in a security community but rather that the security concerns are consciously aggregated
(Ibid.). Thus;
“The most relevant form of security community contains active and regional securitisation, only it
is not actors-to-actor (one state fearing the other and therefore counterthreatening it), but a
collective securitisation of the overall development of the region” (Ibid.).
As such it is expected that active and regional securitisation is present in a security community but
that it takes the form of collective securitisation. A security community can thus involve shared
threats, which is here understood as threats that are perceived by more than one actor. However, it is
here deemed necessary to elaborate and clarify the understanding of what defines a security
community. To this end the present analytical framework draws inspiration from Mike Winnerstig’s
reformulation of the concept. In his study of what he terms the Baltic Sea security complex (2012)
he restates Buzan’s definition of a security community but notably adds that;
16
“By extension, this should – or at least could – also entail a conception of shared threats and
shared responses to these threats, military or otherwise.” (Winnerstig 2012, p.65)
Based on the view that these definitions are compatible and that the latter has the advantage of
providing a more tangible addition to concept, the two definitions are combined in this
investigation. Thus, in this thesis a security community is defined by mutual desecuritisation and a
shared conception of threats and a shared response to these threats. A security community can
thereby be considered the ultimate expression of positive security interdependence.
The concept of security community constitutes an important element of the present analytical
framework because it helps answering the problem formulation. As will be recalled, the overall
objective of investigating how the perception of Russia has affected the Nordic-Baltic security
dynamics includes an expectation that the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics may indicate enhanced
security interdependence. Combined with the initial observation of the good relations between the
Nordic-Baltic states, this gives rise to a hypothesis that through enhanced security interdependence
the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex may develop into a security community. While it is deemed beyond
the scope of this thesis to determine whether the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics qualify as such,
the security community will instead be treated here as a relative notion representing a high intensity
of positive security interdependence on the spectrum ranging from security indifference to
interdependence. It can be illustrated as follows:
Figure 2
As regards the omission of polarity from the analytical framework, this is a consequence of the
analytical focus on the character of Nordic-Baltic security dynamics that make it possible to identify
to what extent the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics constitute a security community. As shown in
the above, it is through variations of amity and enmity patterns that the security dynamics can be
characterised by positive to negative security interdependence which indicates to what extent the
Nordic-Baltic subcomplex constitutes a security community. As such, answering the problem
formulation relates closely to the social construction and does not involve the component of
polarity. It is important to note, however, that the omission of polarity does not signify that an
17
investigation of the power distribution is deemed irrelevant. Rather it is a result of the analytical
objective and an assumption that the perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis has not
altered the existing power relations in the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics. Thus, the identification
of Russia as a great power as was established by Buzan and Wæver in 2003 is not refuted in this
thesis, on the contrary it forms part of the initial premise for assuming that the perception of Russia
in relation to the Ukraine crisis has affected the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics, since Russia as a
great power can affect security dynamics in its neighbour regions.
2.3.4 Security Issues
As shown in the section introducing RSCT, security issues are matters of perception. The process of
securitisation is important for the analysis of a security issue. In RSCT it denotes the process by
which a certain development or situation is formulated by a securitising actor as a threat to a
specific referent object (Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.71). This process makes up the securitising move,
by which the alleged threatening development is thus moved beyond the normal realm of politics to
mobilise extreme countermeasures. Whether the attempted securitisation results in constituting a
security issue depends on whether the security issue is accepted as such by the audience and the
securitisation and extreme countermeasures consequently legitimised (Buzan et al. 1998, p.25).
However, while securitisation thus involves the formulation of something as a threat, securitisation
is not always made explicit and it is consequently not to be expected that a security issue is
necessarily presented in a statement. This relates to the understanding that securitisation in some
cases is institutionalised (Buzan et al. 1998, pp.27–28). It means that not only statements but also
security practices can indicate that a certain issue has been successfully securitised and thus
constitutes a security issue. This corresponds with the definition of security dynamics in this
analytical framework which notably involves both perception and practices (see 2.3.5 – Box of
Theoretical Concepts). Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde explain the institutionalisation of security as
follows:
“Securitization can be either ad hoc or institutionalized. If a given type of threat is persistent or
recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized.
This situation is most visible in the military sector, where states have long endured threats of armed
coercion or invasion and in response have built up standing bureaucracies, procedures, and
military establishments to deal with those threats. Although such a procedure may seem to reduce
security to a species of normal politics, it does not do so. The need for drama in establishing
securitization falls away, because it is implicitly assumed that when we talk of this issue we are by
definition in the area of urgency. (…) urgency has been established by the previous use of the
security move. There is no further need to spell out that this issue has to take precedence, that it is a
18
security issue – by saying “defense” (…), one has also implicitly said “security” and “priority”.”
(Buzan et al. 1998, pp.27–28)
The understanding that security issues can be identified through security practices in addition to
formulated threat perceptions is crucial to the present analytical framework.
Due to the aim of examining inter-state security dynamics, a detailed study of the processes behind
a given security issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. Consequently, only specific elements of the
elaborate theory of securitisation are included in the analytical framework, and they are furthermore
operationalised to correspond with the analytical purpose. As for the securitising actors, the
investigation is therefore limited to including publications and statements by the Nordic-Baltic
governments, and state- and government officials which are assumed to represent their respective
state. The question of whether an issue is successfully securitised is not included in the first
analytical chapter, because the security issues that are identified from the security and defence
policies of the seven states are here considered to reflect that a successful process of securitisation
has taken place. A similar logic can be extended to the second analytical chapter which examines
statements from state- and government representatives and practices that reflect the perception of
Russia as a common security issue. The chapter also draws on the aspect of securitising moves, but
only to a limited extent, as it helps explain the statements. The notion of referent object plays a
more prominent role through the analysis, as it adds to the analysis of the identified Nordic-Baltic
security issues in the first analytical chapter and the perception of Russia as a threat in the second
analytical chapter by focusing on what the threat in question is held to be threatening.
In addition to this, the first and second analytical chapters categorise security issues as either
traditional or untraditional. This simplistic dyad is developed because it serves to distinguish
between different security issues with different referent objects. Thus, traditional security issues are
understood as threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity that typically involve the use of
military force. Untraditional security issues are here understood as the opposite, i.e. typically
involving non-military means which are nonetheless threatening but do not necessarily involve the
referent object of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. This rather general understanding
draws inspiration from a report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) on Russia’s nonmilitary warfare aimed at destabilising the Baltic states, because it contributes with relevant
elaborations for the specific analytical context (FOI 2014, p.4). Though these categories are
simplistic and not clearly defined here, they are employed in the analysis as they serve to elucidate
the perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis.
19
Having specified the way in which the selected concepts of RSCT are understood and used in the
analytical framework of this report, the next section will present how the analytical framework and
its concepts will be employed in the analysis. First, however, the definitions of the key concepts
which constitute the analytical framework, are summed up as follows:
2.3.5 Box of Theoretical Concepts
Security Dynamics are defined as the security perceptions and –practices of a set of units that
revolve around certain security issues. Security dynamics can vary in terms of amity and enmity and
the interconnectedness of security dynamics can range from positive to negative security
interdependence.
A Security Issue is an issue that is presented as a threat to a referent object. It is thus a perceived
threat which is identifiable through statements formulating it as such but also through practices
which reflect the perception of an issue as a threat. A security issue is the outcome of a successful
securitisation which denotes the process through which an issue is posited as an existential threat to
a referent object.
Referent Object is the object which is held to be threatened by a security issue.
Social Construction is defined as patterns of amity and enmity in security dynamics. Through
variations of amity and enmity security dynamics can be marked on a spectrum ranging from
positive to negative security interdependence. Amity denotes relationships in which the actors
perceive of each other as friends.
Desecuritisation is defined as perceptions and practices of actors which reflect that they cease to
regard and treat each other as enemies and instead behave as friends. It entails that issues or
situations that emerge in the inter-state relations are neither formulated nor responded to as security
issues.
A Security Community is defined by mutual desecuritisation, a conception of shared threats and a
shared response to these threats. It can contain processes of securitisation but these are aggregated
to form collective securitisations. A security community can thereby be considered the ultimate
expression of positive security interdependence.
20
2.4 Structure of Analysis and Employment of Concepts
Having defined the concepts that are selected to facilitate the investigation of the problem
formulation, this section provides an overview of the analysis and the way in which the concepts are
employed to answer the three respective research questions which in combination serve to answer
the problem formulation.
The first analytical chapter (Chapter 4) will answer the research question;
1. What characterises the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine crisis?
The objective of the first analytical chapter is to investigate the inter-state security dynamics in the
subcomplex before the Ukraine crisis and see how they can be characterised in terms of amity and
enmity, and securitisation and desecuritisation. In adherence to the definition of security dynamics,
this is an examination of the threat perceptions, security practices and central security issues of the
Nordic-Baltic states. It is based on the official security and defence policies of the seven NordicBaltic states which are considered to represent the official threat perceptions of the respective states
and which also enable the identification of the central security issues. All the official security and
defence policies are published before the Ukraine crisis unfolded and they consequently comprise
security issues prior to the crisis. The analysis of security practices is based on the institutional
arrangements and selected bilateral defence- and security collaboration. Combined this data allows
for an investigation of the social construction of the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics, i.e. the
patterns of amity and enmity, and processes of securitisation and desecuritisation. To this end the
investigation looks for statements and practices reflecting the relations between the Nordic-Baltic
states are perceived to be good, and mired with peace, stability and cooperation as indications of
amity, meanwhile statements and practices reflecting the opposite perceptions conversely will point
toward enmity. Securitisation and desecuritisation in the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics will be
identified similarly through statements and practices. For instance, security- and defence related
cooperation will be considered to signify desecuritisation.
The second analytical chapter (Chapter 5) will answer the research question;
2. To what extent does Russia constitute a common security issue in the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex after the Ukraine crisis?
21
As transpires from the research question, the central concept here is that of a security issue. In
adherence to the definition of a security issue, identifying Russia as a security issue is not only
through explicit formulations but can also be indicated by practices. Therefore the analysis is based
on official statements and practices that relate to Russia and the Ukraine crisis and thereby reflect
how Russia is perceived after the Ukraine crisis. In order to qualify as a common security issue,
Russia first needs to be established as a perceived threat by the seven states, before considering the
extent to which this perception is shared. The chapter also looks for practices in the form of military
activities and institutional responses which indicate that the Nordic-Baltic states take a shared
response to the perceived Russian threat, as this is also indicative of the extent to which Russia
makes up a common security issue.
The third analytical chapter (Chapter 6) will answer the third research question:
3. To what extent is the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex a security community after the Ukraine
crisis?
As indicated in the question, the concept of a security community forms the centre of this analysis.
In accordance with the definition of a security community, the chapter thus examines the extent to
which the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics contain mutual desecuritisation, a conception of
common threats and a shared response to these threats. In the endeavour to identify these three
components of a security community the analysis compiles the findings from the former two
analytical chapters. Based in the findings regarding the three security community components the
relative degree of security interdependence and indifference is assessed. This relates to answering
the research question because, as will be recalled from its definition, a security community marks
the ultimate expression of positive security interdependence. However, as stated previously, the
security community will instead be treated as a relative notion representing a high intensity of
positive security interdependence. Therefore, based in the three security community components,
indications of increased positive security interdependence will be interpreted as signifying that the
extent to which the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex constitutes a security community has increased. The
assessment of relative security interdependence and indifference will ultimately help answer the
problem formulation on how Russia has affected the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics after the
Ukraine crisis.
22
Chapter 3 - Methods
This chapter will account for the methodological considerations of the thesis. First, it will outline
the research structure which clarifies how each of the chapters serves to enable the objective of
answering the problem formulation. Next, the timeframe of the thesis is presented. Afterwards, this
chapter will bring up some theoretical considerations, including points of critique for the theoretical
concepts used in the thesis. Finally, this chapter will also look into the collection and analysis of the
empirical data used, and subsequently account for the limitations of the thesis.
3.1 Research Structure
This thesis is divided into seven chapters:
Chapter 1 problematises the area of research and presents the problem formulation and the purpose
of research
Chapter 2 introduces Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)
and presented the theoretical framework for the analysis. The main theoretical concepts presented in
the chapter serve as tools for the analysis to help answer the three research questions and ultimately
the problem formulation.
Chapter 3 presents the methodological choices and reflections regarding the analysis, and includes
the analytical timeframe and limitations.
The analysis is divided into three chapters and each of these chapters is structured around answering
a designated research question. While the first two parts contain a sub-conclusion, the final part
leads up to the overall conclusion of the problem formulation.
Chapter 4 is the first part of the analysis and will answer the first research question:
1. What characterises the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine crisis?
The first analysis examines indications of the social construction and securitisation/desecuritisation
in the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics and is based on the latest official security and defence
policies published by the governments of the seven Nordic-Baltic states prior to the Ukraine crisis8.
This analysis forms an important step in answering the problem formulation in that an investigation
8
Note that changes in government have occurred in some of the states, since the latest official state and defence policies
were published.
23
of the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine crisis is needed in order to subsequently
be able to identify change that has occurred after the Ukraine crisis.
Chapter 5 is the second part of the analysis and answers the second research question:
2. To what extent does Russia constitute a common security issue in the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex after the Ukraine crisis?
This second analytical chapter investigates to what extent the formulations and practices of the
Nordic-Baltic states after the Ukraine crisis indicate the perception of Russia as a common security
issue. This analysis relates to the problem formulation by investigating how the Nordic-Baltic states
perceive of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis, which enables the subsequent investigation of
how this perception has affected the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics.
Chapter 6 is the third and final part of the analysis and answers the third research question:
3. To what extent is the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex a security community after the Ukraine
crisis?
This chapter examines how the relative interdependence and indifference in the Nordic-Baltic
security dynamics has been affected by the perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis. To
this end the chapter analyses the three components of a security community by compiling the
findings from the two previous analyses. This enables answering to what extent the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex is a security community after the Ukraine crisis. The third analytical step relates to the
problem formulation by combining the previous findings to investigate the effect of the perception
of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis on the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics. It thereby
answers the problem formulation based on the findings of the two previous analyses.
Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the thesis. This chapter sums up the central findings from the
analysis in order to finally answer the problem formulation. The chapter will thus answer how the
perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis has affected the Nordic-Baltic security
dynamics.
3.2 Timeframe
Seeing as the purpose of this investigation is to establish the impact of the perception of Russia in
relation to the Ukraine crisis, a timeframe needs to be established. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly
24
when the Ukraine crisis started, which is consequently a challenge for the frame of the thesis and
the structure of the analysis. It can be argued that the wave of demonstrations and civil unrest at the
Maidan Square in Kiev was the decisive moment. Others might argue that the crisis unfolded even
earlier when the EU first offered Ukraine an Association Agreement and consequently antagonised
Russia9. The internal problems in Ukraine can possibly be traced all the way back to the Orange
revolution in 2004. Nevertheless, this thesis takes the Russian intervention in Crimea on February
28, 2014 as the point of departure, since this was the first time Russia officially took part in the
conflict militarily and can consequently be expected to have had an impact on the perception of
Russia.
In order to identify the changes that occurred with the development of the crisis the first analytical
chapter analyses the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine crisis. It therefore focuses
on the Nordic-Baltic security and defence policies that are the most recent of their kind prior to the
annexation of Crimea. As a result of this criterion, the security policies investigated in the first
analytical chapter are not published at the same time. But combining the documents in an analysis is
deemed valid because they have in common that they are the most recent policies published before
February 28 2014, meanwhile they are published well in advance of the Russian annexation of
Crimea. As such the documents enable an investigation of the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics
before the Ukraine crisis. Conversely, the second part of the analysis, which investigates the extent
to which Russia makes up a common security issue, is limited to focusing on events and
developments that have occurred since the Russian annexation of Crimea, with a timeframe
spanning from March 2014 to March 2015.10 Evidently, the impact of the Ukraine crisis is not
limited to this timeframe considering that the conflict March 2015. Clearly this makes up an
inherent limitation of the findings of this thesis.
3.3 Theoretical Considerations
The thesis develops an independent analytical framework based on Buzan and Wæver’s Regional
Security Complex Theory (RSCT). The analytical framework operationalises RSCT with a
constructivist approach by using concepts of the theory that allow for an investigation of threat
perceptions and their effect on the security dynamics of the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. The threat in
itself is not relevant in this view – it is the perception of what constitutes a threat that is important
9
See e.g. Rasmussen et al. 2014, p.8.
The most recent source included is from March 3, 2015.
10
25
(Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.71). The problem formulation does not deal with the 'actual' Russian
threat (or Russia’s willingness or ability to use power against the Nordic and Baltic states), but
merely with how the Nordic-Baltic states perceive Russia as a threat to their security, and how this
in turn affects the security dynamics between them. In this relation, the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex is
also seen as socially constructed in the sense that it is contingent on the security practices of the
seven Nordic-Baltic states. Inspired by Alexander Wendt, Buzan & Wæver state that: “’security’ is
what actors make of it, and it is for the analyst to map these practices” (Ibid., p.48) which is
exactly what this thesis intends to do. The realist elements of the theory, such as power polarity, are
not part of the theoretical framework of this thesis because they are not relevant for answering the
problem formulation.
Another important point to mention is that Buzan and Wæver use a long range of concepts in RSCT
that are not clearly defined which forms a point of critique of the theory. The term ‘security
dynamics’ is not clearly defined by Buzan and Wæver although they use it extensively in their work
for instance. Additionally, the meaning of what constitutes a ‘security community’ and what it
entails is contested (Agius 2013, p.96; Acharya 2001). Karl Deutsch, who first introduced the term
in 1957, stated that a security community is characterised by a ‘we-feeling’ where common interests
and a peaceful environment for solving conflicts are essential components (Agius 2013, p.96).
Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett later developed the concept along constructivist lines by also
placing an emphasis on shared values and identities (Ibid.). Buzan and Wæver’s definition of a
security community (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 491) is somewhat similar to that of Deutsch, but it still
leaves room for interpretation for the reader. Buzan and Wæver’s own definition is rather broad and
does not go into detail with the level of interdependence needed for a security community to exist.
This is why the analytical framework of this thesis draws inspiration from Winnerstig’s definition,
which entails a conception of shared threats and shared responses as determinants (see Section
2.3.3). However, even with this definition, it is difficult to clearly identify a security community.
This inherently poses a problem for the findings of this analysis, however, as explained in Chapter
2, this thesis treats the concept of security community as a relative notion to ameliorate this
problem.
Finally, as a consequence of the analytical framework being constructed specifically for the purpose
of this thesis, validity is prioritised over reliability.
26
3.4 Collection and Analysis of Empirical Data
As previously stated, the empirical data used in this thesis primarily consists of official documents
and statements from the governments of the seven Nordic and Baltic states. The official documents
are retrieved from the relevant ministries, while the personal statements mostly stem from
newspaper articles. Furthermore, the thesis also uses reports and peer reviewed journals from
relevant academic scholars and institutions in the analysis. Since the theoretical framework of this
thesis puts great emphasis on discourse, the data gathered will primarily be qualitative, e.g. in the
form of statements and quotes.
The first part of the analysis characterises the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine
crisis, based on an analysis of the official security and defence policies of the seven states. During
the research process it has been necessary to first examine the official security and defence policies
of the seven states one by one, in order to say something more general about them afterwards. It is
inherently difficult to make conclusions without going into detail with each policy that has been
published by the Nordic-Baltic states, respectively. Additionally, it is also difficult to focus equally
on the seven Nordic and Baltic states in the analysis. Some of the states will naturally be
emphasised more than others in the different subsections depending on the focus of their policies
(this is especially evident in the first and second part of the analysis). Furthermore, the formats of
the official security and defence policies are diverse. Only some of the Nordic and Baltic states
have traditions for publishing security and defence policies where threats and security strategies are
clearly defined,11 which limits the foundation for comparing the states. This is a hindrance for the
first part of the analysis since it examines Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine
crisis based on the official policies published by the various states in question. In order to
accommodate this problem, the first part of the analysis also employs speeches by government
representatives, e.g. by Jonas Gahr Støre and Nick Hækkerup, as representations of the state
policies.
The second part of the analysis, which examines Russia as a common security issue in the NordicBaltic subcomplex after the Ukraine crisis, is largely based on statements from government
representatives who address Russia’s behaviour in relation to Ukraine after the crisis has unfolded.
11
For instance, Denmark does not have a tradition for making clear-cut security and defence policy strategies. It is not
part of the Danish tradition to do so, according to Johannes Kidmose, Military Analyst at Centre for Military Studies,
University of Copenhagen. Kidmose made this statement during a seminar on security policy in the Baltic Sea region at
the Royal Danish Naval Academy on March 5, 2015.
27
These statements mainly stem from news sources where the various politicians are directly quoted.
The second part of the analysis also uses the 2014 annual report from NORDEFCO in order to
examine how the Nordic and Baltic states address Russia’s behaviour through this defence
structure. Moreover, the second part of the analysis also uses reports from academic institutions,
e.g. from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and the European Leadership Network, to
examine the security practices of the Nordic and Baltic states. By using these reports, the second
part of the analysis also relies on quantitative data – for instance when looking at recent military
activity in the subcomplex after the Ukraine crisis unfolded.12
The findings of this thesis is based on a vast amount of data – especially since the various official
security and defence policies cover a long range of topics that are not directly relevant to answering
the problem formulation. The main challenge is therefore to extract the most relevant parts of the
policies to help answer the research questions in the best possible way. A problem in this process is
that the researcher might, knowingly or unknowingly, extract data that supports his or her
arguments and leads to the conclusions that he or she wanted to reach beforehand. In that way, the
researcher might have a certain bias when conducting research, which can influence the final results
and findings of the thesis.
3.5 Limitations
The most obvious limitation of this thesis relates to the geographic area of investigation, which is
limited to the four Nordic states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) and the three Baltic
states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). First and foremost, this excludes Iceland from the
investigation despite the fact that Iceland is in some cases considered as a Nordic state on par with
the other four states (Winnerstig 2012; FOI 2012). However, this thesis has chosen not to include
Iceland as part of the subcomplex due to the fact that Iceland is located relatively far away from the
other states geographically, and since Iceland has no armed forces (IISS 2014). Other scholars who
focus on the Baltic Sea area more broadly (e.g. FOI 2012; Mölder 2011; Winnerstig 2012) also
include Poland and Germany in their regional analyses. This thesis omits Poland and Germany from
the subcomplex – not because they are deemed necessarily irrelevant, but primarily because of the
limited time and resources available for this research. This thesis considers the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex to be firmly embedded within the European RSC. But the basis for the investigation of
12
Note that the third part of analysis is not addressed in this section, since this part of the analysis is based on the
findings from the two previous parts.
28
the Nordic-Baltic states’ security dynamics is the assumption that, according to RSCT,
subcomplexes are defined in the same way as RSCs, although they form substructures of RSCs, and
by extension it is considered valid to study the security dynamics within the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex in their own right. This investigation, in turn, makes up a sub-regional ‘piece of puzzle’
of the European RSC. The authors of this thesis acknowledge that other states in the wider
European region might affect the security dynamics at play in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex, but it
is for others to explore those processes as they are outside the scope of this research.
Russia is excluded from being part of the subcomplex, which may appear strange in light of the fact
that it is precisely Russia’s impact on the subcomplex that forms the basis of the analysis. The
omission of Russia is primarily theoretically founded and relates to the assumption of Russia as a
‘great power’. Within the understanding of RSCT the actions and behaviour of a great power are
can impinge on the security of its neighbours regions (Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.35). As a
consequence of this classification, it is both reasonable and relevant to consider the impact of the
perception of Russia on the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics without including Russia in the
subcomplex.
Another limitation is that there may be a difference between official threat perceptions as presented
by government representatives of a given state and the actual threat perceptions of that state (as
perceived by the public for instance). Naturally, it is a limitation to regard states as monolithic
entities in which a single politician or government spokesman can be considered representative of
the entire state and its population. In some cases, it is difficult to know whether a government
representative actually speaks on behalf of the state or just expresses his/her personal views. The
boundaries between actual securitisation and politicisation thus becomes blurred, which is a highly
criticisable aspect of the securitisation theory in general (Emmers 2013, pp.136–137). However, this
choice is a result of the level of generalisation at which the analysis operates, namely the inter-state
level of security dynamics. Moreover, the official security and defence policies used in the analysis
are fairly diplomatic in their rhetoric, and are not outspoken when it comes to articulating specific
threats, e.g. in relation to Russia. This of course makes sense since it would have damaging
consequences for the diplomatic relationship with other states if such states were mentioned directly
by name in the official policies. In comparison, statements from individual politicians are often
more forthright rhetorically since politicians do not necessarily have to reflect the exact same views
as those presented in the official policy documents.
29
As previously stated, this thesis also uses statements from newspaper articles in the analysis. These
mostly stem from Western-based media sources that might be biased. Some will possibly depict
Russia’s actions more negatively than others, which in turn can affect the research findings.
However, the authors of this thesis strongly dissociate themselves from passing judgment or
expressing bias with regards to Russia’s role in the Ukraine crisis, first and foremost because this is
not in focus here. What is important in this research is the way in which the Nordic and Baltic states
themselves perceive Russia as a threat to their security – not how the authors interpret Russia’s
actions.
30
Chapter 4 - Nordic-Baltic Security Dynamics prior to the Ukraine Crisis
The aim of the first part of the analysis is to investigate the character of the Nordic-Baltic security
dynamics before the Ukraine crisis. As stated in the analytical framework for this thesis, security
dynamics is understood as a combination of security perceptions and practices of a set of units – in
this case the Nordic and Baltic states – that revolve around certain security issues. For that reason,
this chapter will investigate the perceptions (e.g. in the form of official articulations) and practices
(e.g. in the form of institutional arrangements) of the Nordic-Baltic states. By looking at perceptions
and practices, this chapter will also look for processes of amity and desecuritisation in the
subcomplex. The analysis sets out by exploring the central security issues in the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex as they are presented by the official security and defence policies of the seven Nordic
and Baltic states. First, this chapter will therefore briefly examine the international security
environment as it is perceived by the Nordic and Baltic states according to their official policies. 13
Then, it will thematically investigate the various perceived threats according to the policy
documents. These include the role of traditional military threats to national security and the
perception of Russia before the Ukraine crisis, but also the role of ‘non-military threats’ such as
minority issues, and issues of information- and cyber security. Finally, this chapter will look into
the institutional arrangements of the Nordic and Baltic states in order to explore practices indicating
the social construction of the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics.
Thus, the aim of the following chapter is to answer the first research question:
1. What characterises the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine crisis?
4.1 The International Security Environment
Considered at large, the various official security and defence policy documents of the Nordic and
Baltic states have in common an overall representation of national security understood as being
heavily influenced by international security. The official security and defence policies of the seven
Nordic and Baltic states all widely refer to the developments of ‘the international security
13
The aim of this chapter is not to conduct an exhaustive examination of all the individual security and defence policies
from the seven Nordic-Baltic states. Nor will this chapter give a detailed historical account of the security dynamics
between the states. Rather, the objective is to provide an overview of the security issues in the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex as they are articulated in the policy documents and present these thematically with a focus on similarities
and differences among the threat perceptions of the individual states.
31
environment’14 as being important to their own national security (Parliament of the Republic of
Lithuania 2012; Estonian Ministry of Defence 2011, p.6; Prime Minister’s Office Finland 2013,
p.9). As stated in Chapter 2, Buzan and Wæver emphasise that security is relational (see Section
2.1). With their notion in mind, the Nordic-Baltic focus on the international security environment is
natural and to be expected because the perceived security of a given state logically relates to and is
shaped by its position in the international security environment. Nonetheless, in terms of the present
endeavour to examine the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex and its pertaining security issues, it is relevant
and important to consider how security and national security is perceived – and the evident
characterisation across the range of states in focus here is that the national security of the individual
states is presented as being inextricably tied to international security. What is here summed up as
the international security environment15 is widely described as complex (Hækkerup 2013; Estonian
Ministry of Defence 2011, p.6; Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania 2012; Støre 2012; Ministry
of Defence of Republic of Latvia 2012, p.4). The security challenges or threats that form part of it
are described in a similar vein, with words such as ‘complex’, ‘complicated’ and ‘uncertain’ and
they are presented as unforeseeable (Danish Government 2012, p.1; Swedish Government 2009,
p.9; Prime Minister’s Office Finland 2013, p.14; Støre 2012). Although the wording is not exactly
the same in different the policy documents, this understanding of security is dominant in the Nordic
and Baltic policy documents. This understanding of security is also linked to features of
globalisation which, among others, result in the perception that local or regional challenges far
away from the geographical locations of the Nordic and Baltic states may suddenly become global
issues, as stated by former Danish Defence Minister Nick Hækkerup (2013).
As a consequence of this perspective, the Nordic and Baltic states all focus on a ‘broad’
understanding of security to form the basis for the respective approaches to ensuring national
security. This broad understanding of security is difficult to define since it reflects the complex
nature of the international security environment – threats are no longer predictable and they can
emerge in various forms and within different settings. As an example, both Norway and Finland
focus on what they call ‘comprehensive security’ to explain the complex nature of the international
security environment. Jonas Gahr Støre explained the concept in a speech on Norwegian security
policy:
14
The Finnish Security and Defence Policy (2013) formulates the international security environment as the ‘global
security environment’.
15
See previous footnote.
32
“Today, we must take as our starting point the concept of comprehensive security that encompasses
territorial, economic, social, political and environmental security. The comprehensive security
concept reflects the complexity of the present security policy picture” (Støre 2012).
Støre’s statement reflects the broad Nordic-Baltic understanding of security – the international
security environment is complex and it deals with security issues of various kinds. This broad
understanding of security has several implications. First and foremost, the Nordic and Baltic states
acknowledge that their national security is shaped by international security, as mentioned
previously. This is for instance reflected in that each of the states represents threats that affect the
security of their allies and neighbours as consequential for their respective national security (this
will be elaborated in Section 4.2). Yet, the broad understanding of security also entails the inclusion
of threats that are non-conventional or untraditional in the sense that they cannot be summed up as
so-called traditional military threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Buzan 2007,
pp.107–108). As such, the threats and challenges listed across the official security policies and
statements refer to threats which are trans-boundary in nature and involve non-state actors in
addition to state actors, such as radical movements and international terrorism (Foreign Affairs
Committee of Finland 2013; Parliament of the Republic of Latvia 2011; Parliament of Estonia
2010, p.6; Prime Minister’s Office Finland 2013, p.23).16
Cyber attacks constitute another issue mentioned across the range of investigated security and
defence policy documents (Støre 2012; Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania 2012, para.10.5;
Danish Government 2012, p.2; Prime Minister’s Office Finland 2013, p.97; Parliament of Estonia
2010, p.6). It embodies the abovementioned features of trans-boundary threats, potentially operating
from far beyond the geographical region of the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex, and does not necessarily
involve state actors. Furthermore, another set of issues included in the broad security understanding
have to do with the international economy: all the Nordic and Baltic states share the perception that
developments in the international economy, and possible economic crises, have crucial implications
for security (Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania 2012, para.6.5; Parliament of Estonia 2010,
p.19; Parliament of the Republic of Latvia 2011, sec.3.4; Støre 2012; Hækkerup 2013; Swedish
Government 2009, p.28; Foreign Affairs Committee of Finland 2013, p.7). This logic is identifiable
in the National Security and Defence Policy of Finland, for instance:
16
Other threats are of a different, ‘non-military’ nature, in the words of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden 2011), such as global pandemics, infectious diseases, or natural disasters and
other consequences of climate change, but also organised crime and smuggling of drugs, weapons or people (Støre
2012; Foreign Affairs Committee of Finland 2013, p.12).
33
“The economy constitutes an increasingly important factor in security policy. Interaction between
the economy and politics is nothing new but this interdependence becomes highlighted in the
current environment of threats and warfare” (Foreign Affairs Committee of Finland 2013, p.7).
Moreover, the Nordic and Baltic states also focus on issues of energy in their security and defence
policies (Foreign Affairs Committee of Finland 2013, pp.8–9; Parliament of the Republic of Latvia
2011, sec.3.4; Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania 2012, para.16.6; Swedish Government 2009,
p.28; Parliament of Estonia 2010, pp.18–19; Støre 2012). For instance, Finland emphasises that
“Energy security is a growing global challenge” (Foreign Affairs Committee of Finland 2013, p.8),
while Jonas Gahr Støre quotes Tony Blair for saying that “energy security is just as important as
defence policy” (Støre 2012). In addition, Sweden underlines that: “The importance of natural
resources and energy occurrences affects the security policy, and to some extent the military
developments in Europe”17 (Swedish Government 2009, p.28).
In sum, the Nordic and Baltic states all focus on a long range of security issues within the
international security environment - many of which can be characterised as untraditional compared
to the traditional military threats to national sovereignty for instance.
4.2 The Role of Traditional Security Issues
One explanation for the strong focus on international security and the elaboration of threats to the
international security environment among the Nordic-Baltic states is the perception that traditional
military threats to national security are deemed unlikely. While the Nordic and Baltic states note
that a military attack can never completely be ruled out, they do not perceive themselves to be
threatened in this traditional sense (Swedish Government 2009, p.28; Prime Minister’s Office
Finland 2013, p.14; Støre 2012; Parliament of Estonia 2010, p.8; Parliament of the Republic of
Lithuania 2012, para.9; Parliament of the Republic of Latvia 2011, sec.3.1). As an example,
Sweden’s official defence and security policy states that:
“A single military armed attack directly against Sweden remains unlikely for the foreseeable future
(…) [but] in the longer term, the threat of a military attack can never be ruled out”18 (Swedish
Government 2009, p.9).
Similarly, Estonia’s National Defence Strategy notes that:
17
Own translation from Swedish to English. The official Swedish security and defence policy called ‘Ett användbart
forsvar’ (2009) has not been translated to English according to the Swedish Ministry of Defence.
18
Own translation from Swedish to English.
34
“A direct military attack against Estonia is unlikely; however, such a threat cannot be ruled out
altogether” (Estonian Ministry of Defence 2011, p.7).
This perception is widely shared among the Nordic and Baltic states. In other words, the traditional
military threat is not perceived to be imminent according to the official Nordic-Baltic security and
defence policies. The emphasis on international security can be understood as a consequence of this
perception, in the sense that the absence of immediate military threats has enabled the Nordic and
Baltic states to consider threats originating further beyond their borders. At the same time, based in
the significance apparently attributed to international security issues including those originating far
beyond the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex, the logic seems to be that in order to ensure national security
threats have to be dealt with when and where they arise.
4.3 Perceptions of Russia before the Ukraine Crisis
Despite the fact that the Nordic and Baltic states do not perceive to be threatened by military
attacks, some of them address Russia in relation to their considerations about threats to national
security in the official policies. Even though Latvia underscores that there are no direct military
threats to its security in the official policy, it still mentions the military conflict in Georgia and the
training of armed forces in Russia in its section on ‘prevention of military threats’ for instance
(Parliament of the Republic of Latvia 2011, sec.3.1). Still, Latvia declaredly perceives the security
situation in the Baltic Sea region to be safe and stable, and it also focuses on having a relationship
with Russia based on mutual trust and cooperation (Ibid.).
Sweden also addresses the role of Russia in its official security and defence policy. In fact, Sweden
has dedicated an entire section of its official policy to its views on Russia. Sweden’s policy
describes the political development in Russia as characterised by authoritarian tendencies, elements
of corruption and rising nationalism (Swedish Government 2009, p.23). It further states that
independent media has a limited role in Russia and that the democratic system is weak (Ibid.). Like
Latvia, Sweden’s policy also addresses the Georgia conflict from 2008, but in a more critical
manner: “The Georgia conflict has shown that the Russian threshold to use military force in its
vicinity has lowered (Swedish Government 2009, p.24). In continuation hereof, Sweden notes that
then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev referred to the protection of Russian citizens as a
justification for the military intervention in Georgia (Ibid., p.24). While Sweden acknowledges that
Russia is willing and able to conduct military operations in neighbouring areas (e.g. in the
Caucasus), Sweden does not express a perception of Russia as a traditional military threat to
35
Sweden’s geographical vicinity (Ibid., p.28). However, Sweden observes that: “The existence of
nuclear weapons in our region and Russia’s suspension of disarmament agreements affect our
security”19 (Ibid.: 28). Interestingly, Sweden therefore perceives Russia to have an impact on
Swedish security before the Ukraine crisis, although this impact is not officially articulated as
negative for Sweden’s security. In this relation, Finland’s Security and Defence Policy states that:
“Russia’s internal stability, its economic development and its military modernisation programmes
are factors which fundamentally impact Finland’s security environment” (Prime Minister’s Office
Finland 2013, p.74).
Like Sweden, Finland thus acknowledges that Russia has an impact on Finland’s security, even
though this impact is not articulated as being directly negative for Finland’s security. Finland’s
policy especially focuses on Russia’s build-up of military capabilities in Finland’s vicinity – for
instance in St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad and on the Kola Peninsula situated close to Finland’s border.
Moreover, Finland notes that Russia has a strategic interest in the Arctic region and that Russia
views NATO enlargement as both a political and military problem, which weakens Russia’s foreign
policy objectives (Ibid.: 74-75). According to Finland’s policy, positive developments in NATORussia relations are therefore vital for stability in the region (Ibid.: 75).
Estonia also addresses Russia in its National Defence Strategy by stating that Estonia’s security is
influenced by the internal and foreign policies of Russia (Estonian Ministry of Defence 2011, p.7).
More specifically, Estonia underlines that:
“The Russian Federation has demonstrated an increased interest in re-establishing its spheres of
influence and strengthening its influence over Europe’s security environment” (Ibid.: 7).
Estonia’s National Security Strategy proceeds by stating that Russia has increased its military forces
close to the Estonian border. Furthermore, Estonia’s National Security Concept notes that “Russia
is (…) prepared to use military force to achieve its goals” (Parliament of Estonia 2010, p.7). Still,
Estonia does not articulate this directly as being negative for Estonia’s security, and Estonia does
consequently not perceive Russia to be a an issue for its security.
Unlike Sweden, Finland and Estonia, Denmark does not include Russia’s military activity in its
official security policy. In the Danish Defence Agreement, Russia is only mentioned in relation to
areas of cooperation. More specifically, Denmark focuses on having a good cooperative relationship
19
Own translation from Swedish to English.
36
with Russia in relation to the Arctic region and NATO’s missile defence capability (Danish
Government 2012, pp.16, 43). Still, Russia is only mentioned sporadically in the official Danish
policy, and unlike some of the other states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex, Denmark does not
focus on Russia in relation to Danish security. Similarly, Lithuania’s National Security Strategy
emphasises that Lithuania seeks to promote cooperation with Russia within areas of economy and
transportation, among others (Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania 2012, para.15.3.7). In relation
to Russia, Norway only mentions that Russia has a strategic military focus on the High North, 20 but
the Norwegian policy does not go into details about what this means for Norway’s security or the
region itself (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2013, p.10).
In sum, it is clear that there are different perceptions of Russia in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex
before the Ukraine crisis. While none of the seven states perceive Russia to be a military threat to
their security, some of the states perceive Russia differently than others, according to the official
security and defence policies. Sweden is the most outspoken of the seven states with its rather
negative articulations about Russia’s political environment and its role in the Georgian conflict.
Finland, Estonia and Latvia also mention Russia’s military activities in the policies, although Latvia
is not as critical as the two others. Like Norway, Denmark and Lithuania, Latvia mostly focuses on
cooperation when mentioning Russia. However, it is worth noting that Russia only makes up a
rather limited element in the security and defence policies of the seven Nordic-Baltic states, and
Russia is not formulated as constituting a threat to their respective security.
4.4 Internal Security & Minority Issues
While the Nordic and Baltic states share the official stance that the risk of military attacks again
them is considered unlikely, it is with regard to the perception of internal threats to national security
that the Nordic and Baltic states can be told apart. Like its Nordic neighbours, the Baltic states do
not perceive a direct military attack against their territory to be likely, according to their official
security and defence policies. Still, the Baltic security and defence policies do perceive influence
and coercion, for instance by external pressure, to be a threat to their national security. This is
illustrated by the inclusion of a chapter in Estonia’s National Security Concept on the resilience and
cohesion of its society, as well as an internal security policy in both the Estonian and Lithuanian
20
The term ’High North’ is used by the Norwegian authorities as the English synonym for the Norwegian term
nordområdene. For a detailed description of the term see Skagestad (2010).
37
National Security Concepts (Parliament of Estonia 2010, p.15; Parliament of the Republic of
Lithuania 2012, para.16).
In relation to internal security, Estonia’s National Security Concept refers to the strength of civil
society as a “precondition for reinforcing security” (Parliament of Estonia 2010, p.9), and Lithuania
declaredly considers civil society a vital interest of national security (Parliament of the Republic of
Lithuania 2012, para.16.10). Latvia, for its part, prioritises a social integration policy as part of the
foundation of civil society so as to prevent the development of processes which can lead to
‘splitting society’ (Parliament of the Republic of Latvia 2011, sec.3.3). Among other things, this
policy aims to strengthen the belonging to the state, its values and state language both as a means of
communication between different societal groups but also to develop and maintain the ethnical
identities of minorities (Ibid.).
Yet, the Baltic states go even further in their strategies to reinforce internal security, thus indicating
its perceived prominence in their respective national security policies. Estonia’s National Security
Concept even contains a so-called ‘psychological defence’ to enforce Estonia’s security by
developing and protecting common values associated with social cohesion. The psychological
defence thus aims to “avert anti-Estonian subversive activity” (Parliament of Estonia 2010, p.20).
Similarly, Lithuania’s National Security Strategy includes the ‘cultivation of civic awareness and
patriotism’ and the ‘preservation and fostering of cultural and national identity’ (Parliament of the
Republic of Lithuania 2012, para.16.10–16.11). Meanwhile, Latvia focuses in particular on
strengthening “civic consciousness and values, such as belonging to Europe” among school
children and youth (Parliament of the Republic of Latvia 2011, sec.3.3). In this light, the relatively
higher degree of awareness and attention dedicated to threats to internal security sets the Baltic
states apart from the Nordic states in this investigation.
As for minorities, none of the four Nordic states has a sizeable amount of Russian residents. 21 In
fact, minorities is not a pronounced security issue for the Nordic states according to their official
security and defence policies.22 As for the Baltic states, however, the threat perception relating to
minority issues is quite different. Russian minorities make up a substantial part of the total
21
Finland has the largest ethnic Russian minority out of the four Nordic states. However, it only amounts to 1.2% of the
total Finnish population (Statistics Finland 2015).
22
Still, the Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee does for example mention the importance of supporting the integration
of second-generation immigrants into Finnish society, this is mentioned in relation to persons returning to Finland after
having engaged in violent activity in conflict in Syria (Foreign Affairs Committee of Finland 2013, p.12).
38
population in both Latvia and Estonia, and the Russian language and culture is thus prevalent in
both states. In Latvia, the Russian minority makes up close to 40 per cent of the total population of
approximately 2 million people, making Latvia the country with largest minority of ethnic Russians
in the EU. About 300,000 people of the ethnic Russian minority have non-citizenship status, which
means that they are not allowed to vote at elections among other things (IHS Jane’s 2015b). A large
amount of this Russian minority community resides in the Latgale region located in the eastern part
of Latvia, where the city of Daugavpils have around 100,000 residents of Russian ethnicity
(Latvijas Statistika 2011). The Latvian government sees language barriers and the cultural
differences between minorities and ethnic Latvians as a potential threat to Latvia’s internal security.
In the National Security Concept from 2011, the Latvian government notes that:
“It is expected that, in future, competition between languages will increase in Latvia (…) This
development of situation may enhance further splitting of society by language principle. Separated
information space reduce equally effective applying to entire society by the state, thus, specific part
of the society fails to acquire feeling of belonging to Latvia” (Parliament of the Republic of Latvia
2011, sec.3.3).
The National Security Concept proceeds by stating that different attitudes to historical issues affect
cultural and political identity, which in turn may lead to mutual disagreements between different
parts of Latvia’s population. According to the Security Concept, the Latgale region is in particular
characterised by socioeconomic inequality and political isolation with potentially negative future
consequences. These issues combined with language differences and a failed sense of belonging
among some Latvian residents “may cause potential threats to national security interests of Latvia”
(Ibid.). The Latvian Security Concept is thus explicit in stating that the minorities in Latvia may
pose a threat to the Latvia’s internal security. No specific ethnic groups are mentioned in the
concept, but since Latgale is brought up as an example, and since half of the population in Latgale
is of Russian ethnicity, it is here considered reasonable to assess the Russian minority as forming
part of the internal security issue in Latvia.
In Estonia, the ethnic Russian population makes up close to 30 per cent of the total population of
1.32 million people (IHS Jane’s 2015a). The ethnic Russian minority in Estonia has not led to
significant inter-ethnic conflicts so far, apart from one incident in 2007 when a three-day riot
erupted and led to controversies between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians, disputing the
symbolic value of a Soviet monument that was relocated in Tallinn (IHS Jane’s 2015a). In relation
to social unrest more generally, the National Security Concept of Estonia from 2010 states that:
39
“Estonia as a democratic, open society may also be affected by the spread of extremist, hostile or
hate-based ideologies. This may weaken social cohesion, reduced tolerance and cause social
tension (…) Uneven regional development and poorly adapting social groups may (…) affect
internal stability” (Parliament of Estonia 2010, p.8).
The government thus acknowledges that ideological differences, poorly adapted social groups and
uneven regional development may pose a potential threat to Estonia’s security. Nevertheless, this
internal threat is not specified in terms of minorities. Still, this focus on weak social cohesion as a
general internal security issue can be linked to what the Estonian government referred to as
‘psychological defence’. Without going into details about specific groups of society, Estonia
demonstrates awareness that internal instability may pose a problem for its security. However, when
looking at the Estonian Security Concept it is not apparent that minorities pose a security issue for
Estonia. The issue of Russian minorities as an internal security issue is simply not pronounced in
Estonia’s official policy.
Compared to its two Baltic neighbours, the amount of ethnic Russians living in Lithuania is
relatively low. The number of ethnic Russians living in Lithuania amounts to a little less than 6 per
cent of the total population of 2.9 million people, while a little more than that are Russian speakers
(Grigas 2014). Lithuania does not mention minorities in its National Security Strategy, and in terms
of internal security the focus is related more to the aforementioned concept of ‘civic awareness’
among the population.
4.5 Information- and Cyber Security: Examples of Non-Military Security Issues
While the issue of minorities is not explicitly mentioned in the Lithuania’s National Security
Strategy, it nonetheless refers to ‘external risks, dangers and threats’ that must be addressed in order
to ensure Lithuania’s national security. These threats include:
“Actions of state and non-state entities in the international and national information space aimed at
spreading biased and misleading information, shaping a negative public opinion in respect of
interests of national security of the Republic of Lithuania” (Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania
2012, para.10.4).
The Lithuanian security strategy calls this type of threat ‘information attacks’. According to the
statement, such attacks could come from state and non-state actors. The issue of information
security can be seen in connection with that of cyber security. It can be argued that the Baltic states
place particular emphasis on them seeing as a NATO Centre of Excellence (COE) dedicated to both
these issues is located in Estonia and Latvia - NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence COE is located
in Estonia and the NATO’s Strategic Communications COE is located in Latvia. Their location
40
suggests the perceived importance of the respective issues. For instance, the-Estonian based COE
was established to address the need for enhanced cyber security in light of a major cyber attack
which hit Estonia in 2007 (NATO 2014b). In relation to information- and cyber security more
generally, Estonia’s National Security Concept states that:
“Insufficient protection of information and communication system or inadequate response
capabilities increases the effect of threats stemming from malfunction or attack. In addition,
cyberspace may be used for inciting tension and conflicts within the society” (Parliament of Estonia
2010, p.8).
Like Lithuania, Estonia perceives information- and cyber threats as important to its internal
security. In order to accommodate such threats, Estonia’s policy also emphasises that international
cooperation is needed (Ibid.: p. 18). Latvia also focuses on these threats in its policy section on
‘prevention of information technology threats’ and consequently calls for cooperation with the two
other Baltic states, for instance through the abovementioned NATO structures (Parliament of the
Republic of Latvia 2011, sec.3.7). In addition, Lithuania’s policy also stresses the importance of
Baltic cooperation within NATO’s structures for addressing information- and cyber threats
(Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania 2012, para.15.1.2). The Latvian and Lithuanian statements
can thus be seen as a sign of amity and desecuritisation from an inter-state Baltic perspective.
The four Nordic states also focus on information- and cyber security in the respective security and
defence policies, although not in an extensive manner. Still, Finland, Norway and Sweden have all
published specific strategies to address these issues, which indicate that the Nordic states also
perceive information- and cyber security issues to be important (Norwegian Ministry of
Government Administration Reform and Church Affairs 2012; Finnish Ministry of Defence 2013;
Swedish Civil Contigency Agency 2011).23
More generally, the issues of information- and cyber security have in common that they are socalled untraditional in the sense that the threats involved are non-military. Interestingly, they can be
understood in two overall perspectives. Considered from one angle, they can be considered in
relation to internal security issues since their objective is to protect, prevent, and manage
disruptions of the normal functioning of society. Alternatively they can be considered areas at
which foreign state or non-state actors can direct non-military attacks. In this conception, attacks in
these areas can form part of a larger strategy to destabilise and undermine a state. As such, threats to
23
Note that Denmark has published a ‘Cyber and Information Security Strategy’ after the Ukraine crisis (Danish Centre
for Cyber Security 2015).
41
information- and cyber security are thus ultimately a threat to national security. While the NordicBaltic states do not perceive these type of threats to be imminent, they are still of vital interest
according to their official security and defence policies.
4.6 Institutional Arrangements
The institutional arrangements of the seven states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex are quite diverse
and complex. Especially the Nordic states have different positions and approaches in terms of
institutional defence memberships. Finland and Sweden are not members of NATO but are known
to cooperate with NATO in some instances.24 Conversely, both states are fully integrated in the
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) pillar of the European Union (EU). As for, Denmark
and Norway both are members of NATO. Though Denmark is a member of the EU it has ‘opted
out’ of defence cooperation aspect of the CSDP, whereas Norway has ‘opted in’ on a case-by-case
basis, despite the fact that it is not an EU-member. For instance, Norway is part of the Nordic Battle
Group (NBG) under the EU together with Sweden, Finland and the three Baltic countries - but
Denmark is not. In addition to this, the Nordic countries have created their own institutional defence
set-up called the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), which includes Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Sweden and Iceland as members. The Baltic states have been members of both EU and
NATO since 2004, but they are not officially members of NORDEFCO. Furthermore, the states in
the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex also have bilateral defence arrangements which extend beyond the
already mentioned institutions.25
All of the states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex emphasise the importance of international
institutions in their respective official defence strategies and policies. However, there are
differences in terms of the importance attached to the different institutions by the seven states. The
five NATO-members (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway) emphasise NATO in their
official defence and security policies, while Sweden and Finland are more focused on their
relationship with the EU. The reference to Nordic-Baltic collaboration is not equally emphasised in
all of the official defence and security policies. Still, there is a declared interest in the collaboration
between the states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. The establishment of NORDEFCO is a great
24
For instance, Finland and Sweden cooperated with Norway in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan. In 2006, Finland and Sweden were in the city Mazar-e-Sharif in the northern part of
Afghanistan as part of the PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) (Järvenpää 2014a, p.140).
25
The aim of the this section is not to give a detailed and historical account of the institutional memberships of the
states within the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex, but rather to explore how the seven states practice security in relation to the
various structures, in order to examine how they collectively seek to counter their common threats. It thereby adheres to
the analytical objective of this chapter by examining the extent and focus of regional cooperation in the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex prior to the Ukraine crisis.
42
example of this. When NORDEFCO was established in 2009, the former defence ministers of the
Nordic states agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which states that:
“The aim of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is to strengthen Participants’ national
defence, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions” (NORDEFCO 2009,
sec.1.1).
Pauli Järvenpää elaborates on the abovementioned aim of NORDEFCO quite well:
“The general idea behind the concept is that since the Nordic armed forces are structured on
basically similar fundamentals in terms of their tasks, objectives and concepts, so broad
cooperation is both possible and desirable. The cooperation is based on the conviction that there is
much to be gained through shared experiences, cost sharing, joint solutions and joint actions”
(Järvenpää 2014a, p.141).
NORDEFCO has five specific cooperation areas (COPAs).26 The aim of the COPAs is to prioritise
among the most important tasks and to merge and terminate the number of activities and working
groups, to make the cooperation more efficient (NORDEFCO 2015). Ultimately, the COPAs should
focus on high-priority activities and also save resources. One of the main ideas of NORDEFCO is
thus to create a platform, which enables the Nordic states to make cost-effective solutions based on
defence and security cooperation in areas of mutual interest. This idea of cost-effective cooperation
is very much in line with the NATO-concept of ‘Smart Defence’ – the idea that multinational
solutions, such as harmonising requirements, pooling and of sharing capabilities, common priorities
and better coordination, can provide more effective defence capacities for the same or less money
(NATO 2015).27 This flexible format makes it possible for the members to pick and choose between
policies and areas of cooperation, and cooperation among the states involved can thus easily happen
on a bi- or trilateral basis (Järvenpää 2014a, pp.141–142). Cooperation under NORDEFCO auspices
is not only limited to the Nordic states. The NORDEFCO MoU opens up for cooperation with third
parties (NORDEFCO 2009, sec.7). The Baltic states have at times been invited to participate in
NORDEFCO areas in relation to this. In 2011, the Baltic states were invited by the Swedish
chairmanship to join areas of cooperation concerning gender and veteran issues, and in 2012 the
Baltic states were invited to participate in a meeting of the NORDEFCO military coordination
committee for the first time (Winnerstig 2012, p.70). Both these examples show NORDEFCO’s
interest in collaborating with the Baltic states to ensure their security. In theoretical terms, it also
26
More specifically, the five COPAs are: capabilities; human resources and education; training and exercise; operations
and; armaments.
27
Note that the EU also has a ‘Pooling & Sharing’ initiative based on the same logic. However, this thesis will not go
into detail with this initiative.
43
shows that relations in NORDEFCO – and the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex more generally – are
strongly characterised by amity.
4.7 Official Positions to Nordic-Baltic Defence Cooperation
Unlike the other states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex, Finland mentions NORDEFCO in its
Security and Defence Policy. Finland states that NORDEFCO has spurred progress in cooperation
between the four Nordic countries and that NORDEFCO can possibly serve to even intensify
defence cooperation in the future as the international security environment changes (Prime
Minister’s Office Finland 2013, p.28). The official Finnish policy states that:
“The intensifying Nordic foreign, security and defence policy cooperation supports the
strengthening of the role of the Nordic countries in the international arena, promotes stability in
Northern Europe as well as in the Baltic Sea area and northern regions, and provides a practical
approach to handling wide-ranging security questions (…) Nordic defence cooperation improves
cost-effectiveness and interoperability (…) NORDEFCO provides the framework for the
intensification of defence cooperation (Prime Minister’s Office Finland 2013, p.72).
The statement reflects that Finland identifies security issues that are perceived to be common to the
Baltic Sea- and Nordic region which, by extension, also includes the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex.
Interestingly, Finland points to the advantages of taking a shared response to these shared security
issues through increased Nordic foreign, security and defence policy. In this relation NORDEFCO
is presented as a practical tool which can be used to handle common security issues in the
subcomplex while allowing the involved states to use their resources more efficiently as defence
cooperation increases. The quotation is remarkable in the present analytical context, as it
demonstrates the Finnish understanding of the advantages of intensifying cooperation via
NORDEFCO to counter common security challenges. In turn it draws on the significant
identification of security issues that are perceived to be common to the Baltic Sea- and Nordic
region. In combination the statement thus shows a Finnish stance that shared responses should be
used to counter common threats. Without mentioning NORDEFCO directly, Sweden presents a
similar view, according to their official defence and security policy:
“The [Swedish] Government believes that Nordic cooperation in the defence area should be
deepened (…) A close Nordic cooperation should lead to a more efficient use of resources as well
as providing increased power. Closer cooperation between the Nordic countries will also
strengthen the countries’ ability to contribute to security and stability”28 (Swedish Government
2009, p.32).
28
Own translation from Swedish to English.
44
This Swedish statement is in line with NORDEFCO’s aforementioned aim about enhancing Nordic
defence cooperation through common synergies and solutions. The Swedish policy further notes
that closer cooperation in the North has a positive impact on the security development in the Nordic
proximity. As was the case of Finland in the above, Sweden is apparently positive towards
increased cooperation. Apparently, this also includes the Baltic states:
“The development of borderland cooperation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are also of great
importance for the development of the region and the integration between the Nordic and the Baltic
countries has deepened further. The Baltic Sea region is characterised by stability, dialogue and
cooperation”29 (Swedish Government 2009, p.28).
The last sentence points to amity being considered a dominating aspect of the security dynamics in
the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex, according to Sweden. Considered jointly, the Swedish and Finnish
statements indicate that the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics contain widespread desecuritisation.
Rather than references to security issues which set the Nordic-Baltic states apart, the statements
emphasise the Swedish and Finnish perception of clear advantages of further security cooperation
which relates to the identification of common security issues. Moreover, the emphasis on the
advantages of closer cooperation and that the Baltic Sea region is characterised by stability,
dialogue, cooperation and integration point to strong amity in Nordic-Baltic security dynamics.
Both Estonia and Lithuania also emphasise the importance of Nordic-Baltic cooperation in their
respective security and defence policies. Estonia states that:
“Estonia’s objective is the stable development of the Baltic Sea area. Estonia seeks the continuous
deepening of the co-operation between the Nordic and Baltic States, allowing the advancement of
both political dialogue and security in the wider Baltic Sea area” (Parliament of Estonia 2010,
p.12).
Hereby Estonia expresses a similar view to that of Finland and Sweden, namely, that deepened
cooperation in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex will allow for increased security among the states
involved. According to Estonia, security practices in the subcomplex should be based on the
interdependent regional relationship that already exists – a relationship that is characterised by
amity. Also, it is interesting to note that Estonia stresses the role of the EU in relation to the
development of the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. It is thereby implied that Nordic-Baltic cooperation
is not separate from existing institutional defence arrangements. This understanding is also
29
See previous footnote.
45
identifiable in the Swedish policy which states that “Nordic defence cooperation cannot become an
independent security policy alternative” (Swedish Government 2009, p.28).
Like Estonia, Lithuania also highlights an interest in developing defence cooperation with its
neighbours in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex:
“The Republic of Lithuania will also seek a more active co-operation between the Baltic States and
Nordic countries in the field of security and defence, including joint military projects whose
implementation would enhance interoperability of the armed Forces and allow development of
capabilities at lower costs” (Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania 2012, para.15.3.3).
The statement shows that Lithuania focuses on a Nordic-Baltic relationship based on amity.
Moreover, it illustrates a parallel between Lithuania’s ambition of enhancing interoperability and
developing capabilities at a lower cost in the subcomplex and NORDEFCO’s raison d’être – that is
“to produce national military capabilities in a more cost-efficient way by means of multinational
cooperation” (Järvenpää 2014a, p.142). Like its two Baltic neighbours, Latvia similarly emphasises
the importance of Nordic-Baltic collaboration based on amity:
“Military cooperation with the allies in the Baltic Sea region plays an important role (…) It is
within the interests of Latvia to promote the Baltic and Nordic cooperation, promoting their unity in
terms of security and defence policy, as well as deepening the cooperation of the armed forces”
(Ministry of Defence of Republic of Latvia 2012, p.14).
Hereafter, the Latvian State Defence Concept states that the EU and NATO should be the main
actors in resolving the security issues in the Baltic Sea area (Ibid.). The Latvian perception thereby
accords with the Swedish and Estonian in that cooperative security practices in the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex is considered important in order to counter common threats, but regional security
practices in the subcomplex should be aligned with and not separate from the existing EU or NATO
arrangements.
Denmark’s focus on Nordic and Baltic relations is relatively limited according to the Danish
Defence Agreement. Denmark mostly focuses on the relationship with NATO, including the Smart
Defence initiatives, in relation to the development of capabilities and interoperability in a
multinational context (Danish Government 2012, p.7). From a practical perspective, however,
Denmark has been active in cooperating with the Baltic states on defence related matters. Denmark
has, for instance, been part of the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission since the Baltic states first
46
joined the Alliance in March 2004. Norway has also been part of the mission twice since 2005. 30
The Danish and Norwegian contributions in the mission follow the logic of Smart Defence because
as it saves the Baltic NATO-allies the considerable expense of having to invest in an air
surveillance system at NATO standards (Pradhan-Blach 2014, p.2). In addition, Denmark and
Norway’s numerous participations in the mission also demonstrate the willingness of both states to
actively engage in securing the territorial sovereignty of their fellow Baltic Alliance members.
Indicatively, the Danish Defence Agreement uses the Baltic Air Policing mission as an example of
how an efficient and coordinated division of labour in a multinational context can be useful from a
Smart Defence-perspective (Danish Government 2012, p.18). Considered in relation to the other
five states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex, the Norwegian and Danish participation in the Baltic
Air Policing mission implies an understanding of the advantages of taking a shared response to
defend their NATO allies. Moreover, Denmark and Norway’s participation is a in the mission is a
clear indication of desecuritisation.
4.8 Sub-Conclusion
Based on official threat perceptions and security practices, this chapter investigated the security
dynamics of the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex prior to the Ukraine crisis. The first part of the chapter
demonstrated several important intersections in the official threat perceptions of the seven states.
Considered at large, the Nordic-Baltic states share the same understanding of what characterises the
international security environment, namely that it is complex. As a consequence, all seven states
take a declaredly broad and comprehensive approach to security. Furthermore, the seven states do
not perceived to be threatened by a military attack, although they all note that such an attack cannot
be ruled out altogether.
Russia is also mentioned in the various official security and defence policies. While none of the
seven states perceive Russia to be a threat to their security, some of the states perceive Russia
differently than others. Sweden is the most outspoken of the seven states with its rather negative
articulations about Russia, but the states mostly focus on cooperation with Russia in their official
policies. In terms of internal security, the Baltic states perceive influence and coercion to be a threat
to their national security – the three states focus on internal security issues which centre on civic
30
The overall purpose of the Baltic Air Policing mission is to monitor and enforce sovereignty in the Baltic airspace
with NATO member states patrolling on a four-month rotational basis, since the Baltic states do not have fighter jets of
their own. Denmark was among the first states to offer assistance in the mission when it was launched in 2004, and
Denmark has participated in the mission five times with F-16 fighter jets since then (Danish Ministry of Defence 2014).
Norway has also participated in the mission twice in 2005 and 2007 with their F-16’s (Lithuanian Armed Forces
2014a).
47
consciousness and national identity. In this relation, the Baltic states all perceive poorly adapted
social groups which feel a failed sense of belonging as a threat to their national security. However,
only Latvia implies that the ethnic Russian minorities are part of this security issue.
Furthermore, the Nordic-Baltic states all stress the importance of deepening defence cooperation in
the subcomplex in order to counter common security issues. Especially resource-saving initiatives,
such as NORDEFCO, are perceived as important in terms of defence cooperation. Considered in
combination with a declared absence of direct military threats to the national security of the seven
states, respectively, the shared emphasis on the stability and good relations between the NordicBaltic states indicate that the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics are characterised by mutual
desecuritisation and mutual amity. The latter in particular is underscored by the explicit mutual
interest of all seven states to intensify and deepen security and defence related cooperation.
Divergences can also be identified in the threat perceptions and security practices of the seven
states, however. This is seen in particular in relation to internal security issues that hold a different
significance in the threat perceptions of the three Baltic states than in those of the Nordic states. The
Nordic-Baltic states also diverge from each other in terms of institutional memberships and in
regards to the unequal emphasis placed on the role of Nordic-Baltic collaboration by the different
states. One common perspective across the states of the subcomplex is that none of the states wants
Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation to develop independently of existing institutional arrangements
and that cooperation within the EU and NATO is prioritised over specific Nordic-Baltic defence
cooperation. Considered in this perspective, questions thus remain as to the extent of security
connectedness in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. While amity and desecuritisation also constitute
important components of the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine crisis, they are
clearly also limited by the differences in threat perceptions and security practices of the seven
states. Against this background, the next analytical chapter will therefore examine whether or to
which extent Russia in light of the Ukraine crisis has presented as a security issue that, first of all,
figures in the threat perception of all seven states and which, secondly, forms a common security
issue, meaning one that is perceived to be of common concern to all of the Nordic-Baltic states. In
turn this involves whether the Nordic-Baltic states seek to counter the Russian security issue with a
common response.
48
Chapter 5 - Russia as a Common Security Issue in the Nordic-Baltic
Subcomplex after the Ukraine Crisis
This chapter explores how Russia is perceived by the Nordic-Baltic states after the Ukraine crisis
with the aim of answering to what extent Russia constitutes a common security issue in the NordicBaltic subcomplex. In order to qualify as a common security issue, Russia first needs to be
established as a perceived threat by the seven states, before considering the extent to which this
perception is shared. As will be recalled from the definition of a security issue, it denotes an issue
that is presented as a threat to a referent object. Consequently a security issue is a perceived threat
and it is identifiable through formulations but also practices which reflect such perception. In
correspondence with this understanding, establishing Russia as a security issue requires that
practices and formulations of the Nordic-Baltic states reflecting such perception can be produced.
To this end, the chapter comprises a selection of incidents which have taken place in the NordicBaltic subcomplex since Russia's annexation of Crimea in February 2014. They are selected
because they involve Russia and the response of the Nordic-Baltic states to these incidents in the
form of statements and practices thus reflect their perception of Russia. This provides the empirical
basis for investigating whether Russia constitutes a security issue for the seven Nordic-Baltic states
and amounts to an assessment of the extent to which Russia forms a common security issue in the
Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. This analytical chapter makes up an important step towards answering
the problem formulation because it concerns investigating the Nordic-Baltic perceptions of Russia
after the Ukraine crisis. It thereby adds to the findings of the previous analytical chapter which
characterised the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics before the Ukraine crisis. Combined, these two
chapters provide the basis for subsequently investigating the impact of the perception of Russia on
the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics after the Ukraine crisis which is undertaken in the third
analytical chapter.
This investigation sets out in the Baltic states. Through statements by official state- and government
representatives and practices of the three Baltic states in relation to the Ukraine crisis two different
perceptions of the Russian threat become apparent. The next section explores the two dimensions of
the Russian security issue and the implied referent object, including assessing whether the threat is
presented as a common security issue. Subsequently, the analysis focuses on the Nordic-Baltic
responses to the Russian security issue. This involves examining to what extent the Nordic states
share the Baltic states' perception of Russia as a security issue. The two final sections investigate
49
the Nordic-Baltic institutional and bilateral security practices, respectively. Through pertaining
statements the extent to which they form responses to a perceived Russian threat is analysed.
Thereby the chapter answers the following research question:
2. To what extent does Russia constitute a common security issue in the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex after the Ukraine crisis?
5.1 Perceptions of Russia after the Ukraine Crisis – the Baltic States
An exhaustive account of official responses by the various Nordic and Baltic states to Russia's
behaviour is beyond the scope of this investigation. Instead, the analysis focuses on statements and
practices indicating the perception of Russia as a threat since the Ukraine crisis. As will be recalled
from the timeframe of this investigation (see Section 3.2), in this master thesis the Ukraine crisis is
marked by the annexation of Crimea. Mike Winnerstig observes that the Baltic states have been
directly targeted by a number of incidents in the autumn of 2014 in which Russia has acted “(…) in
a way that is well short of a military attack but still reeks of provocation” (FOI 2014, p.14). This
makes for a range of incidents that make it possible to investigate how the crisis in Ukraine has
affected the perceived security in the Baltic states. It is important to recall that the incidents
themselves, including what in fact has occurred, are not in focus here. Rather, the objective is to
analyse the impact of Russia's behaviour in relation to the Ukraine crisis on the perceived security
of the Nordic-Baltic states. This will be traced through practices and formulated official responses
to selected incidents that involve Russia.
Since the annexation of Crimea, Russia has criticised the Baltic states for the treatment of their
Russian-speaking minorities (BBC 2014a; Christian Science Monitor 2014; Reuters 2014a).
Statements of the Baltic states testifying to their concern over their ethnic minorities should not be
surprising seeing as it was established in the previous chapter that such issue formed part of the
official threat perceptions of the Baltic states prior to the Ukraine crisis. Similarly, the notion that
Russia has the right to protect Russian-speaking minorities outside its borders precedes the Ukraine
crisis.31 Nonetheless, the existing concerns of the Baltic states were exacerbated by the Ukraine
crisis because precisely this logic formed part of the defence of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine
(Reuters 2014a). The implied parallel between the crisis in Ukraine and Latvia and Estonia was
made apparent with Russian statements indicating that the logic did not apply merely to Ukraine.
31
In fact this notion is represented in several Russian policies and strategies, e.g. the Russian Compatriots Abroad
Policy. For example, see FOI, 2014, pp. 30–48 and NATO Stratcom COE, 2014
50
For instance, stating how “language should not be used to segregate and isolate groups” a Russian
diplomat has notably remarked that “Russia was “concerned by steps taken in this regard in
Estonia as well as in Ukraine”” (Ibid.). A similar statement was made by a Russian diplomat in
Latvia's capital Riga warning of the unfortunate consequences of discrimination against the Russian
minority in Latvia (Washington Post 2014a).
In Latvia the Ukraine crisis exacerbated the previously described existing divisions in society
between the large minority of primarily ethnic Russian non-citizens and ethnic Latvians over the
crucial question of where to place the blame for the crisis in Ukraine (BBC 2014a). Although the
threat of political destabilisation due to Russian influence already formed part of the official Latvian
threat perception prior to the crisis in Ukraine, as was established in the previous chapter, the
salience of the issue was thus reinforced by the crisis because it made for yet another point of
discord for the already divided ethnic communities. Illustratively, the disputed events in Ukraine
had a significant impact on the already divided Latvian politics. This was illustrated in the Latvian
parliamentary elections on October 4 2014 with the issue of Russia forming the centre of the
election campaigns (The Guardian 2014b). With the elevated threat of Russian influence and the
disputed events in Ukraine, the chairman of the Latvian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee
Ojar Kalnins described this as “(…) the first election where security and foreign policy have been
the main issue” (Ibid.).
The Latvian government considers the Russian media sources, which largely inform the Russianspeakers in Latvia, as one channel through which Russia can assert and increase its influence to
create resentment and political instability (BBC 2014a). In the words of Latvian Foreign Minister
Edgars Rinkevics:
"There's massive propaganda, even an information warfare - not only here, and not only using
Russian-speaking media, but also using other channels" (BBC 2014a).
The quotation demonstrates that the exertion of Russian influence through information campaigns is
considered both worrisome and extensive. This is made apparent by Rinkevics’ framing of what he
calls ‘an information warfare’, which further underscores the seriousness with which the threat of
political destabilisation due to Russian influence is perceived.
In terms of the understanding of the Russian security issue, the above does not indicate that the
crisis in Ukraine has given rise to a qualitatively ‘new’ threat perception of Russia. Rather the
Ukraine crisis prompted an increased articulation of the potentially damaging impact of what is
51
perceived as Russian attempts at gaining influence in other states, as was allegedly illustrated in
Ukraine. The following statement by Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkevics provides further
insight into the character of the perceived threat and the pertaining referent object: “We can see
attempts by Russia to affect many countries’ policies. Soft power, soft influence” (Washington Post
2014a). The statement implies that the Russian threat has a non-military dimension and involves
non-military means of influence. This can be interpreted from Rinkevics' formulation that the power
and influence which Russia attempts to exert is 'soft'32. Moreover, Russia’s perceived objective is to
gain influence over policies in other countries. Consequently, the Russian threat can be
characterised as one of political destabilisation. In terms of referent object, Rinkevics presents
Russia and its endeavours as a threat not only to Latvia but to many countries. This finding is
further substantiated by the following statement by Latvian Defence Minister Raimonds Vejonis.
Here, Russia’s attempts at coercing Russian-speaking minorities are notably held to be directed at
the post-soviet territories rather than, for instance, that of Latvia alone:
“Russia and Putin still have a geopolitical interest in the post-Soviet territories (…) Russia is
trying to use the Russian-speaking minority as a tool to aggressively promote its objectives” (Ibid.).
In combination with the former statement by the Latvian Foreign Minister, in which the propaganda
and other means employed to exert Russian influence are presented as a type of warfare, it can be
established that the Russian threat of political destabilisation constitutes a significant security issue
in the perception of the Latvian government – one which is perceived to threaten national security.
This is demonstrated by the Latvian government’s temporary ban of particular Russian state-run
television channels in 2014, which was allegedly ascribed to their coverage of events in Ukraine
and Latvia as “detrimental to national security” (Washington Post 2014a; Baltic Times 2014b).
Similar restrictive measures had been taken in Lithuania prior to those described in Latvia, which
indicates that the security issue also figures in the threat perception of Lithuania (Daily Mail Online
2014). Importantly, however, the security issue arguably also constitutes a common security issue
for the three Baltic states. This finding is corroborated by the fact that all three Baltic states are
engaged in a joint state-funded venture to launch a Russian-language television network which
involves all three Baltic states. The initiative is intended to provide an alternative to what is
perceived as biased Russian state television (Washington Post 2014a). This example points to an
inherent understanding among the three Baltic states that the Russian threat of political
32
see FOI 2014 for further elaborations on the notion of soft power
52
destabilisation simultaneously is one that they have in common and one that is met with a shared
response.
Lithuania, for its part, has also strongly rejected Russia’s incursions into Ukraine. In this regard
Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite’s strong and explicit denouncements of Russia’s
involvement in the Ukraine crisis are exemplified in an interview from September 2014 in which
she called Russia a 'terrorist state' (Washington Post 2014b). The interview is relevant to include for
the present purpose for a number of additional reasons. Not only does the interview demonstrate her
clear perception of Russia as a threat to Lithuania’s national security, but also strongly indicates that
the referent object under threat from Russia is all of Russia’s neighbour countries. She repeatedly
underscores the urgency of countering the threat of Russia and Putin by emphasising that Crimea
and eastern Ukraine "is not the last territory where Putin is going to demonstrate his powers"
(Ibid.). Further expansion onto the territories of Russia's neighbours is the inevitable consequence if
Putin is not stopped now: "If we [Europe] allow him [Putin] to go, he will go anywhere" – the latter
illustrating her conviction that Putin is not merely a threat to Russia's neighbours but to Europe at
large (Ibid.). She asserts that the threat which Russia poses is not taken seriously except by the
Baltic states and Poland which border with Russia. Apparently on behalf of this group of states,
Grybauskaite therefore states that:
"This is our one tool to fight Russia: to be vocal and courageous and to shame leaders of the West
for not taking the responsibility for protecting freedom, sovereignty and democracy in Europe"
(Ibid.)
The quotation also contains further revelations as to what Grybauskaite considers to be at stake, that
is, the referent object of the threat of Russia's behaviour, namely; the freedom, sovereignty and
democracy in Europe. Whereas the findings thus far have indicated that the Russian threat is one of
soft power and non-military means of influence, as Winnerstig formulates it (see FOI 2014), the
objective of which is political destabilisation, Grybauskaite goes beyond that in her presentation.
She thus identifies the threat as one of 'real war' threatening the territorial integrity of its
neighbours. This can be seen from her repeated emphasis that Russia is “ready and willing to go to
war” and warning Europe and the world not to be surprised when “new territories are taken”
(Ibid). She thus perceives Russia as a military security issue which threatens the territorial integrity
of its neighbour states. Thus, "all neighbouring countries to Russia are under threat now", but the
threat is ultimately directed at Europe – Europe's freedom, sovereignty and democracy, as can be
seen from the above quotation (Ibid.). Consequently Grybauskaite calls for a stronger response than
53
the widespread references to NATO's Article 5 because this is 'only talk' that cannot stop Putin or
defeat the threat of real war (Ibid.).
Grybauskaite’s strong condemnation of Russia and Putin is a response to Russia's behaviour in
Ukraine. That is strongly indicated in the above-mentioned interview which deliberately securitises
Russia as a threat, but is also reflected in that she amended her previous rejection of higher military
spending after Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 (Reuters 2014b). Her perception of
Russia as a security issue is representative of Lithuania's stance. This is illustrated by two notable
developments that indicate the Lithuanian perception of Russia as a security issue. Thus, Lithuania
is considering to reintroduce military conscription, which was abolished in 2008 (BBC 2015).
Furthermore, Lithuania’s Defence Ministry has published a manual entitled “How to act in extreme
situations or instances of war” (International Business Times 2015). It is to be distributed among
the Lithuanian population, and the Lithuanian Defence Minister Juozas Olekas has reportedly stated
that its sole purpose is to instruct the population on what to do in the case of an invasion (Ibid.).
This measure makes up a response to the perceived Russian aggression in Ukraine, as is indicated
by Olekas in this statement:
"When Russia started its aggression in Ukraine, here in Lithuania our citizens understood that our
neighbour is not friendly, (...) The examples of Georgia and Ukraine, which both lost a part of their
territory, show us that we cannot rule out a similar kind of situation here, and that we should be
ready." (Ibid.)
The statement reflects that Russia is perceived as a security issue after the Ukraine crisis. With his
reference to the examples of Russian aggression against the territories of Ukraine and Georgia,
Olekas implies that the referent object of the Russian security issue is Lithuania's territory.
The Estonian President Toomas Ilves' perception of the impact of the Ukraine crisis was made
explicit in a speech which he held in February 2015. Ilves described the impact of the Ukraine crisis
on Estonia by stating that it has made security- and defence issues more acute, which consequently
led him to expect these issues to feature in the forthcoming elections (Ilves 2015). Ilves also
underscored the need for deterrence and prioritising the allocation of resources for 'real' defence
forces:
"Real defence forces alone, which is to say manned, trained, armed and supplied, have the ability to
deter and protect. Units that only exist on paper and for whose establishment there are no
resources are incapable of defending or deterring anyone or anything." (Ibid.)
54
Though he does not explicitly name Russia as constituting a threat his emphasis on this need is
made with reference to the annexation of Crimea and military attacks on Ukraine. His statement is
therefore interpreted as indicating that Russia is perceived as a threat by President Ilves.
However, the Estonian President's formulation of the Russian security issue is significantly more
indirect than that of Lithuania's President Grybauskaite. This relatively indirect approach of
President Ilves to the Russian security issue is also reflected in the Estonian response to especially
one incident in which Russia’s behaviour towards Estonia can be considered antagonistic. On
September 5, 2014 Eston Kohver, a counter-intelligence officer in the Estonian Internal Security
Service KaPo33 was abducted by Russian agents on the border between Estonia and Russia (The
Guardian 2014c; Baltic Times 2014a; FOI 2014, p.14). Notably, he was detained just days after US
President Barack Obama gave a speech in Estonia ensuring NATO's protection against foreign
aggression (New York Times 2014). The KaPo official Kohver was subsequently brought to
Moscow, accused of espionage and is to remain in Russian custody until April 2015 (Baltic Times
2014a)34. Interestingly, in contrast to Lithuania's President Grybauskaite, Estonia's declared
response was one of desecuritisation towards Russia. In the wake of the incident Marko Mihkelson,
chairman of the Estonian parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, stated as follows:
"It seems the Russians are trying to paint this event into a bigger story. I don't want to speculate on
their aims, but remember they have done these kinds of acts that affect the sovereignty of other
countries (…) But we have been dealing with difficult issues with Russia for years. I don't see the
need now for a bigger action. But we'll strengthen the border and keep our eyes open" (The
Guardian 2014c).
The alleged abduction from Estonian territory and subsequent detention of Eston Kohver in Russia
was later denounced as 'violations of international law' by Estonian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman
Mariann Sudakov (Baltic Times 2014a). However, the overall response of Estonia's official
representatives has been to seek to de-escalate the situation on the grounds that it was apparently
not considered in the interests of Estonia to escalate it (The Guardian 2014c). Estonia's president
Toomas Hendrik Ilves' statements in the wake of the abduction reflect this perception. He explicitly
said he had “no idea why Kohver had been taken" and that Estonia was in the process of talking to
the Russians with a view to getting him released (The Guardian 2014a). Yet the most striking
illustration was the President's strong refusal of the incident being the first of a series of Russian
33
Kaitsepolitseiamet in Estonian, generally referred to as KaPo.
On some accounts, the incident was downplayed in the hope of recovering him through negotiations with Moscow
but this was demonstratively dismissed by Russia when the detainee was brought to Moscow and accused of espionage
(Baltic Times 2014a).
34
55
acts similar to those in Ukraine. In response to such speculation, Ilves' bluntly responded that:
"That's all crap (...) We are a Nato ally, a member of the EU" (Ibid.). Ilves’ thereby strongly
rebuffed the scenario that a crisis like that in Ukraine should erupt in Estonia and emphasised his
confidence that NATO would defend Estonia in the event of a military attack (Ibid.).
5.2 Two Dimensions of the Russian Security Issue
Based on the above, two different perceptions of Russia can be identified in response to Russia's
involvement in Ukraine but also in response to Russia's actions towards the Baltic states after the
Ukraine crisis: In one perspective Russia is perceived as a threat of that can be described as 'soft
power and non-military means of influence' (FOI 2014, p.4). This conception involves an
expectation that Russia will act provocatively in a range of ways towards the three Baltic states
short of triggering an Article 5 response of collective defence by NATO. This conception is
presented by the Latvian Foreign and Defence Ministers. As seen from their statements above, the
Russian security issue entails gaining political influence in other states, information warfare
involving propaganda via Russian-language media, and using Russian-speaking minorities (see
Section 5.1). In the alternative perception, the Russian security issue also has a military dimension
and could potentially entail a military attack, as indicated by Lithuania's President and Defence
Minister. In both perspectives, Russia thus makes up a security issue, but the difference between
these two perceptions lies in what sort of threat Russia is perceived to pose and what is
consequently held to be the referent object: in the former conception political stability is of 'other
countries' is at stake, but the second conception holds that the threat is directed at the territories of
Russia's neighbours (Washington Post 2014b; Berzins 2014, pp.4–5). In both conceptions, the
Russian security issue is thus presented as targeting more than one state. This means the nonmilitary Russian security issue is presented as a common security issue by Latvia, and that the
military dimension of Russia is portrayed as a common security issue by Lithuania. The
securitisation and alarm expressed by Lithuanian President Grybauskaite over the perceived
military threat of Russia is not shared by Estonia's President Ilves in terms of his formulated
perception. This is illustrated in that Grybauskaite calls for further countermeasures towards the
Russian military security issue from the EU and NATO whereas Ilves, by contrast, dismisses both
conceptions of the Russian security issue with reference to his clear confidence in NATO's
guarantee of collective defence. At the same time however, Ilves has also underscored the need for
prioritising deterrence with 'real defence forces', which implies preparing to respond to a traditional
military threat.
56
Considering the practices of the three Baltic states, the initiatives undertaken in cooperation
between the Baltic states indicate that they take a shared response to the Russian security issue,
specifically its non-military dimension. Such cooperation includes measures to counter alleged
Russian information warfare by initiating an alternative Russian-language media platform, as stated
previously. Prioritising energy supply diversification makes up another strategy that can be
understood as a shared response to the perceived non-military threat of Russia. The energy
collaboration between Estonia's state-owned energy company Eesti Energi and the Lithuanian gas
company Litgas was initiated prior to the crisis in Ukraine. But the recently signed contract was
presented by the Estonian company as important in light of the ‘tense political situation’ (Baltic
Times 2015). Along with the Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski, the three Baltic states’
presidents also met in Tallinn to review the energy, information and cyber security issues (Baltic
Times 2014d). The meeting points to the shared perception of threats faced by the three Baltic states
which can be considered strongly related the security issue of Russian non-military influence.
In sum, the three Baltic states perceive of Russia as a security issue. In terms of formulations,
Russia is presented as a non-military security issue by Latvia, and is portrayed as having a military
dimension by Lithuania. Considering the practices of the Baltic states they cooperate to counter the
non-military Russian security issue which inherently implies an understanding that the Russian nonmilitary threat is one which the Baltic states have in common. Thereby the Russian non-military
threat constitutes a common security issue for the three Baltic states.
5.3 Nordic-Baltic Responses to the Russian Security Issue
As was the case of the Baltic states investigated above, the Nordic states’ conception of and
response to the Russian threat is not only identifiable in relation to the Ukraine crisis, but also in
response to several incidents of Russian behaviour directed at the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex,
including the Nordic states. Numerous examples could be presented as indications in the wake of
the Ukraine crisis of what Claus Mathiesen, lecturer at the Royal Danish Defence College, has
characterised as ‘Russia’s confrontational behaviour’35. They comprise a significant increase of
occasions in which Russian military aircrafts have entered into Nordic as well as Baltic airspace
without having obtained permission or notified of such plans. The aircrafts often flew without
transmitting their positions. Increased military activity can also be identified in the maritime sphere
with several reports of Russian surveillance and intelligence operations in the Baltic Sea. Latvia, for
35
Claus Mathiesen made this statement during a seminar on security policy in the Baltic Sea region at the Royal Danish
Navy Academy on March 5, 2015.
57
instance, reports repeated sightings of Russian military vessels near its territorial waters (Baltic
Times 2014c). One example of maritime activity is the alleged detection of a Russian submarine in
the Stockholm archipelago in Swedish territorial waters. The subsequent Swedish search for the
vessel was futile, although the Swedish defence confirmed that “foreign underwater activity” had
taken place (European Leadership Network 2014, p.3).
Increased military activity has also been observed in Russia’s westernmost regions bordering
Finland and in the Kaliningrad exclave near the Baltic states in the form of frequent military
exercises. As so-called ‘snap military drills’ their aim is to test the Russian joined commands’
combat readiness, and it thereby follows that their planning is not made official prior to their
initiation (Järvenpää 2014b, p.7). According to Pauli Järvenpää, such activity has been observed
over the past several years and is generally not considered a cause for alarm in Finland (Ibid., p.5).
By contrast, Lithuania and Estonia draw parallels between the Russian military exercises and the
onset of the Ukraine crisis. A spokesperson for the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence observed that
“Russia may also use such snap military drills as a cover for redeployment of their military units
to, for example, Russian-Ukrainian border” (Newsweek 2015). In a similar vein, an official of the
Estonian Ministry of Defence said:“Let’s remember that the aggression against Crimea also
started out of another snap exercise so we ought to stay vigilant” (Ibid.). Unlike Finland the two
Baltic states thus articulate Russia's military activity as forming a threat which indicates the two
states' perception that Russia constitutes a security issue. However, the increased Russian military
activity has given rise to debates about the need to increase the national defence budgets in Norway,
Finland and Sweden, respectively (Defense News 2014). These developments indicate that the
Russian military activity has also led to the perception of Russia as constituting a security issue for
these three Nordic states. The Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg referred specifically to the
need to prioritise the North in explaining why Norway chose not to deploy to Iraq to fight Islamic
State in October 2014: “My impression is that all our NATO friends believe our key role now is
actually to ensure good surveillance in the north” (Reuters 2014b).
Norway is boosting its existing strategic focus on the High North36 in response to Russian similar
boosts of its air, naval and ground forces in its northern territories. Norway’s strategic priority of the
High North has been on the increase since 2010 (Defense News 2015b). Yet, former Norwegian
Defence Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg points to the need for prioritising military readiness and
defence capability in the High North as being the catalyst for the reinforcement of Norway's High
36
The term ’High North’ is used by the Norwegian authorities as the English synonym for the Norwegian term
nordområdene. For a detailed description of the term see Skagestad 2010.
58
North defences (Ibid.). The enhanced Norwegian focus on territorial defence can thus be seen as a
response to Russia boosting its capabilities in the northern territories and implies a Norwegian
perception of Russia as a threat.
Similarly, Finland is showing signs of having altered its stance towards Russia. Finland thus
brought bilateral talks with Russia about developing defence-industrial cooperation to a halt in
February 2014 when Russia reportedly sent military equipment into Ukraine (Defense News
2015a). This act indicates more than Finnish support for the EU’s sanctions against Russia because
Defence Minister Carl Haglund strongly distanced himself from Russia by declaring his deep
mistrust in Russia: "Russia says one thing but does another. I do not trust Russia at all, and I could
never be in favor of purchasing Russian military jets" (Ibid.). With reference to Russia’s military
projection in the Nordic-Baltic area through repeated incursions into the sovereign airspace of other
states, Haglund also said that Russia was seriously violating European air safety. Finland’s
dissociation from Russia is further underscored by the controversial decision to take part in joint air
exercises with the US and Sweden (Ibid.). The decision was strongly supported by the Finnish
Prime Minister Alexander Stubb and Defence Minister Carl Haglund who are among the proNATO voices in Finland. It may be premature to interpret this as a sign that Finland is revising its
historical position as alliance free, seeing as President Sauli Niinistö and Foreign Minister Erkki
Tuomioja remain focused on sustaining relations with Russia – or are at least wary towards
potentially alienating Russia. For the present purpose it can nonetheless be established that Finland
has dissociated itself significantly from Russia because of its role in the Ukraine crisis.
In contrast to the Norwegian and Finnish responses to the Russian security issue, Denmark’s
Foreign Minister Martin Lidegaard emphasises that the Russian threat should not be exaggerated by
stating that: "I cannot imagine that Russia would dare to disturb the Baltic countries or Poland or
any NATO member" (Reuters 2014b). His conception of the Russian security issue is more in line
with the previously described notion that Russia constitutes a threat of soft-power and non-military
means of destabilisation. This is indicated by Lidegaard’s statement:
"You have massive propaganda, provocations, stimulation of groups inside other countries, which
is not warfare but which is something very hostile and close to warfare" (Ibid.).
Though he stops short of describing the Russian activities as warfare, with his observation that
Russia is waging what he calls a "hybrid warfare" Lidegaard does however share the Baltic states’
perception of Russia as a threat of destabilisation for 'other countries' (Ibid.). The statement does not
illustrate a perception that Denmark is included in this referent object. Though the Danish Defence
59
Intelligence Service (DDIS) has observed an increase in Russian air activity in the Baltic Sea region
during the last years, two noteworthy incidents of Russian military activity towards Denmark have
occurred since the Ukraine crisis. In the summer of 2014 the DDIS observed an extensive Russian
air exercise in the Baltic Sea which “(...) likely also involved simulated missile attacks by tactical
aircraft against Danish territory” (Danish Defence Intelligence Service 2014, p.15). The other
incident occurred on March 3 2014 and involved a close encounter between a SAS airplane with
132 passengers on board and a Russian reconnaissance aircraft that did not transmit its position
(European Leadership Network 2014, p.2). The European Leadership Network described it as a
high risk incident which means it entailed a high probability of causing casualties or a direct
military confrontation (European Leadership Network). Russian air activity since the Ukraine crisis
has also been directed at Sweden. In September 2014, for example, Sweden reported sightings of
Russian fighter jets and bombers on two different occasions – this time near Öland and Skåne
(Svenska Dagbladet 2014).
The states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex have also increased their military activity in the region,
for instance in the form of joint exercises since the Ukraine crisis erupted. One example of this was
the so-called ‘Saber Strike’ exercise held in June 2014 – an exercise regularly held in the three
Baltic states – in which Denmark participated for the first time. In 2014, the exercise had a record
number of around 4.500 participants from 10 NATO and partner nations, including Norway and
Finland, making it twice as large as the 2013 exercise (Lithuanian Armed Forces 2014b; JyllandsPosten 2014, pp.14–15). The exercise was the fourth of its kind with the aim of enhancing
multilateral military cooperation and training interoperability through simulated war-like scenarios
(Jyllands-Posten 2014, pp.14–15). No official reference to Russia was made in connection with the
exercise, yet the participation of six out of the seven states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex37,
demonstrates the dedication of these states to respond jointly to common threats after the crisis in
Ukraine.
The NATO Baltic Air Policing mission (see Chapter 4) is another example of this. In April 2014,
NATO agreed to increase its presence with additional jets to the mission by request from the Baltic
states as a reaction to the situation in Ukraine (NATO 2014a; Pradhan-Blach 2014, p.3). In the
following month, Denmark sent four F-16 fighters to the Baltic states, including two on standby in
Denmark, in a joined coalition together with three fellow NATO members as part of the enhanced
security measure (Rasmussen et al. 2014).
37
Sweden did not participate in the exercise.
60
Both Sweden and Finland took part in an airspace exercise in Estonia in October 2014, together
with four states that were already deployed in the region as part of the NATO Baltic Air Policing
mission (Mission of Sweden to NATO 2014; Airheadsfly.com 2014). In a simulated scenario, the
Swedish and Finnish fighter jets intercepted airplanes with which radio contact had been lost, and
then transferred responsibility to the NATO states. The participation of Sweden and Finland in the
exercise shows an interest of both states in collaborating with NATO members, despite that neither
of them are members of the Alliance themselves. The exercise in Estonia was not formulated as a
direct response to the Russian threat in the region. However, the fact that all states in the NordicBaltic subcomplex now have participated directly in or alongside the NATO Baltic Air Policing
mission shows that the states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex seek to make shared responses to
common threats by participating in joint exercises.
The remaining sections of this chapter will further investigate institutional responses to the Russian
security issue within the realm of NORDEFCO and other multi- and bilateral cooperation between
the Nordic-Baltic states. Having explored the most general institutional security practices in the
subcomplex in the first part of the analysis, the final sections of this chapter will thus explore
indications of shared Nordic-Baltic response to the perceived Russian threat.
5.4 Institutional Security Practices after the Ukraine crisis
The Ukraine crisis has prompted discussions among the states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex on
how to jointly counter the Russian threat from an institutional point of view. NORDEFCO has been
forthright in its criticism of Russia’s actions. The Norwegian Minister of Defence, Ine Eriksen
Søreide, addressed the new security situation in NORDEFCO’s 2014 Annual Report concluding the
Norwegian chairmanship:
“Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in Eastern Ukraine have changed the
European security landscape, with implications also in our own region, and we have discussed how
we can adapt our defence policies to this new situation. The Nordic nations are reconsidering their
security policies and their relationship with Russia” (NORDEFCO 2015, p.3).
In this statement Søreide acknowledges that Russia’s intervention in Crimea and Ukraine has
changed the security environment in Europe, which in turn has affected the security dynamics in the
Nordic region. She also emphasises that Russia’s actions have prompted the Nordic states to
reassess their security policies, and that the Nordic states in the subcomplex have discussed the
possibilities for jointly adapting their defence policies to the changed security environment. In
continuation hereof, Ine Eriksen Søreide emphasises that a range of factors among the Nordic states
61
make enhanced NORDEFCO cooperation valuable. These factors include geographical proximity,
shared political values, security concerns in the region, mutual international interests and structural
similarities among other things (Ibid.). At a meeting hosted by the Nordic Council in the parliament
in Oslo on October 13, 2014, Søreide also addressed Russia’s actions:
“The conflict in Ukraine has led to a fundamental and lasting change in the framework conditions
for European security policy. Trust in Russia has broken down and can’t be fully rebuilt. Russia has
not only shown a willingness to use military force but has also significantly enhanced its ability to
deploy it" (Nordic Council 2014).
The statement underscores that Russia’s behaviour has changed the European security environment,
which by extension includes the regional security dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. In
relation to NORDEFCO, Søreide further noted that the differences between the Nordic states in
terms of their security-policy affiliations should not be seen as a barrier to closer regional
cooperation (Ibid.). The fact that Sweden and Finland are not NATO members is thus no hindrance
for cooperation among the Nordic states, according to Søreide.
Yet the Ukraine crisis has not only affected the security dynamics between the Nordic states
according to NORDEFCO’s 2014 Annual Report. The report stresses that Russia’s assertive
behaviour in relation to the crisis has affected the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex as a whole:
“Russia’s increased military presence and activities, especially in the Baltic Sea region fosters the
need for exchange of information regarding emergency planning and preparedness. This also
underlines the importance of developing the Nordic Baltic defence cooperation and security
dialogue” (NORDEFCO 2015, p.11).
Here NORDEFCO presents the Russian security issue as a threat for both the Nordic and the Baltic
states, and thus articulates Russia as a common security issue. The statement indicates the
perception that the states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex should form a shared response to the
Russian threat by further developing their security and defence cooperation. The Russian security
issue has, in other words, increased the need for integration between the Nordic and Baltic states
according to NORDEFCO. Furthermore, NORDEFCO also observes that there has been practical
progress in cooperation with the Baltic states in 2014. The annual report states that all activities
within NORDEFCO’s cooperation areas (COPAs) are now in principle open for Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, which means that there is room for enhanced cooperation within areas of security
communication, cyber defence, training and exercises and capacity-building for instance (Ibid.). A
concrete example of such cooperation began in 2014 when the Nordic defence ministers agreed to
establish a joint capability at the aforementioned Nordic Council meeting in Oslo, which focuses on
62
defence sector capacity-building. The aim of the capability is to function as a plug-and-play
component to NATO, EU and UN engagements around the world. The Baltic states have joined the
initiative and are prepared to contribute when the capability is finally established during 2015 (Ibid.,
p.10). Though the development of this capability is not formulated as being a response to the
Ukraine crisis, it nonetheless reflects that the perceived need for enhancing Nordic-Baltic
cooperation, which was expressed by Søreide above, is shared across the Nordic and Baltic states.
Other voices have advocated for the creation of a Nordic defence and security commission as a way
to commonly respond to the Russian threat. Thorvald Stoltenberg, author of the Stoltenberg
report38, made such proposal in October 2014, stating that the security situation called for closer
Nordic cooperation, and that a commission could provide concrete proposals and plans for the states
to follow (Defense News 2015c, p.6). Bertel Haarder, First Vice President of the Nordic Council’s
Presidium, stated that the establishment of such a commission would serve to strengthen defence
cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic states. In addition, he noted that Russia’s aggression in
the region had increased the need for real defence cooperation between the Nordic states, and that a
united Nordic-Baltic response would send a clear signal to Russia (Ibid.). These articulations
indicate that the Russian security issue has affected the way in which the Nordic states perceive
their own security and defence policies by giving rise to a perceived need for enhancing defence
cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic states.
Sweden has also advocated for strengthening Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation. During the
Swedish NORDEFCO chairmanship in 2015, the declared policy aim is to:
“Strengthen the Nordic voice on security and defence issues through increased dialogue and
coordination. Increase exchange of information regarding incidents and violations of air space and
territorial waters. Enhance cooperation with the Baltic States within areas of common interest.
Initiate an exchange of best practices and lessons learned related to national contingency
planning” (NORDEFCO 2015, p.40).
The statement shows that Swedish chairmanship intends to use NORDEFCO as an institutional tool
to further enhance cooperation between the Nordic and the Baltic states “within areas of common
interest”, which supports the perception that the Nordic and Baltic states have common interests as
regards security issues and that the Russian security issue is among these. The above sections
demonstrate that NORDEFCO sees Russia’s increased military presence in the region as a threat to
Nordic-Baltic security, and with the Swedish aim of strengthening cooperation in the subcomplex, it
38
See Chapter 1
63
is clear that the Nordic and Baltic states aim to use NORDEFCO as a way to commonly respond to
the Russian threat. Sweden has even asked NORDEFCO to examine the possibility of establishing a
Nordic-Baltic Battle Group, inspired by the already existing Nordic Battle Group (NBG) – a
standby unit that is ready to deploy its forces within a short notice on behalf of the EU (Defense
News 2015c, p.6). On top of this, Sweden has proposed to increase air and sea surveillance and
cross-border training in the region (NORDEFCO 2015, p.40). These proposals further corroborate
the finding that the Nordic states are moving towards forming a shared Nordic-Baltic response to
their common threat of Russia.
The Nordic-Baltic security dynamics also involve a shared response to the Russian security issue
beyond the institutional settings of NORDEFCO. In January 2015, representatives of the Nordic
Council, the Baltic Assembly, and the Nordic and Baltic members of the European Parliament met
to enhance cooperation to face ‘the information war that Russia is waging’, as Christina Gestrin of
the Nordic Council reportedly said (Nordic Council 2015). She stated that "The Baltic countries,
which are subject to this propaganda on a daily basis, are particularly concerned about Russia's
next steps" (Ibid.). Gestrin thereby shares the perception of the Baltic states that Russia constitutes a
security issue. Considered in conjunction with the two perceptions of the Russian security issue
investigated in Section 5.2, this makes up a Nordic-Baltic shared response to the perceived Russian
non-military security issue.
This section has established that the perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis has
increased the importance of NORDEFCO for the states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. The seven
states' shared conception of the Russian security issue has thus spurred closer institutional
cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic states. NORDEFCO’s primary objective thereby seems
to have evolved from being primarily focused on resource-saving initiatives based on the notion of
Smart Defence, to becoming more practical in terms of concerted planning and action. The idea of
establishing a joint Nordic-Baltic Battle Group is a prime example of this development. Whether
such a unit will see the day of light remains unknown at the time of writing this thesis, but the fact
that it is being considered in NORDEFCO shows that the institutional security practices in the
subcomplex have changed after the Ukraine crisis.
5.5 Bilateral Responses in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex after the Ukraine crisis
A range of bilateral defence agreements has also been made after the Ukraine crisis unfolded. For
instance, Denmark signed bilateral defence agreements with each of the three Baltic states on
64
February 5, 2015. All the agreements focus on cooperation in terms of training and exercises.
Considered individually, the agreement with Estonia focuses on cyber defence, the agreement with
Latvia focuses on strategic communication, while the agreement with Lithuania focuses on green
defence in relation to military planning39 (Ritzau 2015). When the Danish Defence Minister Nicolai
Wammen presented the agreements at a NATO meeting in Bruxelles, he stated that: “This is a clear
indication that we support the Baltic states in a difficult time when they are worried” (Ibid.).
Wammen thereby implies that the bilateral agreements are an acknowledgment of the Baltic states'
concerns and that Denmark through these agreements supports the Baltic states in responding to
their perceived threats. Consequently it indicates that the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics after the
Ukraine crisis involve a shared response to threats.
Sweden and Finland published a report on deepened defence cooperation between the two in
February 2015. The report was developed in accordance with an action plan, signed by the Defence
Ministers of Sweden and Finland in May the previous year. The report recommends increased
bilateral defence cooperation in both a short and a long term perspective in a range of areas such as
mutual use of base infrastructure, secure communications at strategic and political level, common
procurements, enhanced exercises and increased operability within all three services (Navy, Air
Force and Army) (Finnish Defence Forces & Swedish Armed Forces 2015). The ambition is to
realise these new initiatives bilaterally as well as multilaterally within existing institutional
frameworks, such as NORDEFCO, the EU, NATO or the UN – and thus not undermine or overlap
with existing agreements (Ibid.). Without mentioning Russia directly, the report emphasises that
“bilateral cooperation as a whole is well worth doing and gives a significant signal to the
surrounding region” (Ibid.: 2).
At the time of writing there are also bilateral talks between Denmark and Sweden on how to
enhance defence cooperation in areas of shared intelligence and access to bases. A forthcoming
report by the Danish and Swedish Defence Commands, expected to be released by the end of March
2015, recommends that both states gain free access to their respective sovereign airspace and
territorial waters without having to seek diplomatic approval first (Kristeligt Dagblad 2015, p.3).
Defence Minister Nicolai Wammen emphasised that the latest development in Eastern Europe had
influenced the process of enhancing the bilateral defence relationship between Denmark and
39
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are already affiliated to the Danish Division.
65
Sweden (Ibid.). Additionally Dennis Gyllensporre, Chief of Defence Staff of the Swedish Armed
Forces, described the objective of the bilateral talks as follows:
“We do this in order to strengthen our national defence. Basically, this proposal is about
strengthening the security in the Nordic region”40 (Svenska Dagbladet 2015). He also stated:
“What is happening in our neighbourhood actualises and stresses the importance of going further
to develop our bilateral cooperation with Denmark”41 (BT 2015). The statements show that the
Ukraine crisis has increased the perceived importance of forming a shared Nordic response to
enhance security and that this is in response to developments "in their neighbourhood" which is
here considered a reference to Russia. Like the aforementioned example from Finland and Sweden,
the Danish-Swedish initiative demonstrates that responses are being formed at a bilateral level in
the subcomplex to counter common threats – in this case the Russian threat.
5.6 Sub-Conclusion
The aim of this analytical chapter was to examine the extent to which Russia makes up a common
security issue for the states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. The first section showed that the three
Baltic states perceive Russia as a threat to their respective security. Especially Russia’s ability to
use ‘soft power’, e.g. in the form of information campaigns to affect Russian-speaking minorities, is
perceived as a common security issue by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. This is evident from
investigating how various government representatives formulate Russia as a threat. Two competing
perceptions of the Russian security issue are formulated by Latvia and Lithuania, respectively. The
former centres on Russia’s non-military means of influence that threaten political stability, while
the latter holds that the Russian security issue also has a military dimension. While Estonia is less
direct in its formulations of the perception of the Russian security issue, the practices of the three
Baltic states in the form of shared response to the Russian security issue indicate that the Russian
non-military security issue is perceived to be common by the three Baltic states.
The Nordic states share the Baltic perception of Russia as a threat to their security. Russia’s
increased military activity in the wake of the Ukraine crisis has given rise to increased concern in
all four Nordic states. This is reflected in the responses of the Nordic states which comprise
Norway's boost of its Northern defences, and Finland halting bilateral defence cooperation talks
with Russia. Moreover, both Sweden and Finland have participated in an air exercise in Estonia,
40
41
Own translation from Swedish.
Own translation from Danish.
66
which marks an unprecedented level of cooperation with NATO member states of the two nonaligned states. Denmark articulates the Russian threat as a non-military security issue and has
responded to the request of the Baltic states to partake in guarding their respective airspace. The
states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex have enhanced their defence cooperation – for instance by
expanding on-going exercises and missions in the region. Furthermore, NORDEFCO articulates the
perception that Russia constitutes a common security issue for the Nordic-Baltic states. According
to NORDEFCO, Russia’s military presence in the region should be met with enhanced security and
defence cooperation among the Nordic and Baltic states. The seven states have enhanced NordicBaltic defence cooperation by expanding exercises and missions in the subcomplex, and the NordicBaltic states thereby respond jointly to the Russian security issue. Sweden's request for examining
the possibility of establishing a Nordic-Baltic Battle Group represents a notion of an unprecedented
level of cooperation in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex that may institutionalise a shared NordicBaltic response to threats. Beyond the realm of NORDEFCO, the Russian non-military security
issue has given rise to a shared Nordic-Baltic response involving the Nordic Council and the Baltic
Assembly. Finally, bilateral cooperation to enhance security in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex was
also identified.
In sum, whereas the practices and formulations of the Nordic-Baltic states demonstrate that they
perceive of Russia as a threat, it is not formulated as a common security issue by each of the seven
states. However, the practices of the Nordic-Baltic states in the form of enhanced defence
cooperation indicate that the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics involve a shared response to threats
after the Ukraine crisis. Thus, even though the Russian security issue is not formulated as a
common security issue by each of the seven states, the practices of the Nordic-Baltic states
demonstrate a shared perception of the Russian threat. Thereby Russia to a large extent constitutes a
common security issue after the Ukraine crisis.
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Chapter 6 - The Nordic-Baltic Subcomplex as a Security Community
In this chapter, the findings of the previous two analytical chapters will be compiled to answer the
problem formulation. This chapter thus examines how the perception of Russia in light of the
Ukraine crisis has affected the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics. In adherence to RSCT, it is when a
particular security issue is aggregated with others to form an integrated pattern of security concerns
that it becomes possible to assess the degree of relative security interdependence and indifference
between the states in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex (Buzan & Wæver 2003, pp.48, 49, 73). This is
considered crucial in this thesis because it is precisely the relative security interdependence and
indifference, or the degree of security connectedness that defines a regional security complex (RSC)
(Ibid., pp.49, 73). Since a subcomplex is defined in the same way as an RSC (Ibid., p.51), the
relative security interdependence and indifference is consequently of high importance in this
analysis.
While the relative intensity of security interdependence in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex was
debatable prior to the Ukraine crisis, the emergence of Russia as a common security issue may have
pushed the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics further along the spectrum towards increased security
interdependence. Considering the widespread amity and desecuritisation in the Nordic-Baltic
security dynamics (see Chapter 4), the intensification of security interdependence in the
subcomplex may transform the subcomplex into a security community. As stated in Chapter 2 a
security community involves three components: mutual desecuritisation, conception of shared
threats, and shared response to these threats. While it is beyond the scope of this investigation to
determine whether the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics qualify as such, the security community
will instead be treated here as a relative notion representing a high intensity of positive security
interdependence on the spectrum ranging from security indifference to interdependence:
In sum the security issue of Russia post-Ukraine may thus have enhanced the degree of security
interdependence in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex to the extent that it has evolved into a security
community. This hypothesis forms the centre of investigation of this chapter. It will be investigated
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by examining to which degree it can be established that the relative security interdependence has
been enhanced vis-à-vis indifference. To this end the chapter analyses the three components that
define a security community with a view to assessing to what extent they can be established in the
Nordic-Baltic security dynamics as a consequence of the perception of Russia after the Ukraine
crisis. Thus, the first three sections are dedicated to investigating the three security community
components in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex, namely mutual desecuritisation, conception of shared
threats, and shared response to these threats. Each of these sections includes a brief introduction to
the security community component in question, before investigating it by compiling the findings
from the preceding analytical chapters. The analyses of the three security components are then
combined in a discussion of the extent to which the relative security interdependence has increased
in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex with the altered perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine
crisis. This discussion includes considerations about the prevailing indications of indifference in the
Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. In combination, this analytical chapter will thereby answer the third and
final research question:
3. To what extent is the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex a security community?
6.1 Mutual Desecuritisation
Mutual desecuritisation is an important component of the security dynamics of a security
community as it denotes security dynamics in which the actors, i.e. states in this thesis, consider and
behave towards each other as friends (Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.57). As such it closely relates to the
notion of amity, but the process of desecuritisation specifically points to the way in which issues or
situations that emerge in the inter-state relations are dealt with in that they are neither formulated
nor responded to as security issues by any of the involved actors (Ibid., p.489). This is not to say
that challenges and competition are out of the question in a set of relations in which the involved
actors have mutually desecuritised each other. Rather it means that regardless of what the issues at
stake may be, they are not securitised. As such they are “dealt with as are normal political,
economic, environmental, and societal problems – not as matters of security, i.e., threats to survival
that mobilise extreme countermeasures”42 (Ibid., p.57).
The Nordic-Baltic security dynamics strongly demonstrate that mutual desecuritisation has taken
place between the seven states. This was evident even prior to the Ukraine crisis, as Chapter 4
42
Italics in original.
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established. The Nordic-Baltic security dynamics are highly amicable, as the seven states all
emphasise the perception of the Baltic Sea region (which includes the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex) as
peaceful and stable. Similarly, the relations to the other states in the subcomplex are described by
all with emphasis on the positive aspects of collaboration and good neighbourly relations in the
official formulations of the security and defence policies of the seven states respectively. Above all,
however, the role of NATO membership is crucial for establishing mutual desecuritisation in the
Nordic-Baltic security dynamics. The fact that five out of the seven Nordic-Baltic states are NATO
Allies constitutes a declared and institutionalised desecuritisation. Through their NATO
membership the national defence of the five states, respectively, are institutionally interconnected.
This is most clearly exemplified through the NATO Charter’s Article 5 on collective defence which
contains the declared responsibility of each state to defend the others. In this analytical context,
such responsibility is considered the utmost expression of desecuritisation as it represents the very
opposite to securitisation and would be difficult to imagine if securitisation processes still formed
part of the relations between the NATO member states. Instead NATO membership in itself
represents a mutual commitment by the five states to taking the opposite approach towards each
other than securitisation. Put in simpler terms, by having formally become allies, mutual
desecuritisation is deemed to have been the necessary prerequisite as well as its continued
reinforcement is the institutional consequence. Thereby mutual desecuritisation is structurally
ingrained in the security dynamics of the Nordic-Baltic NATO Allies as a direct consequence of
NATO membership. This is further indicated by official formulations in the security and defence
policies in which each of the NATO Allies reaffirm their commitment to the Alliance (e.g. Danish
Government, 2012, p. 2; Parliament of Estonia, 2010, p. 6). Alliance membership also plays a
noticeable role in identifying mutual desecuritisation in the specific context of Nordic-Baltic
security dynamics. Thus the five Nordic-Baltic NATO member states include the Alliance
affiliation as part of the official declarations towards each other signalling their mutual perceptions
of amity but also implying a preceding mutual desecuritisation, as stated previously.
As for the two states which remain outside of the NATO alliance, a similar logic applies. Sweden
and Finland, respectively, also emphasise the perceived importance of their commitment to and
solidarity with the Alliance and highlight their close alignment with NATO through their close
cooperation as partners (Swedish Government 2009, p.20; Prime Minister’s Office Finland 2013,
p.60). More specifically related to the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex is their underscoring of solidarity
and kinship with their Nordic neighbours in particular. Thus, Sweden will not remain passive in the
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event of an armed attack on a Nordic state or an EU member state, according to its defence policy
(Swedish Government 2009, p.9). Although this declaration of solidarity is unilateral it nonetheless
indicates Sweden’s desecuritisation towards its Nordic and Baltic neighbours. NORDEFCO
furthermore demonstrates that the desecuritisation is mutual between the Nordic states. The defence
cooperation within NORDEFCO suggests mutual desecuritisation because, put simply, defence
cooperation would be difficult to imagine in a context of security dynamics in which the actors were
able to imagine each other as potential threats. A similar argument can be extended to include the
Baltic states as well. Although they are not members of NORDEFCO, their integration with
NORDEFCO which has been developing since 2011 reflects the increasing development of mutual
desecuritisation in Nordic-Baltic security dynamics (Winnerstig 2012, p.70). In sum, it should be
noted that all of the above is established prior to the Ukraine crisis. The analysis of the impact of the
perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis did not reveal any significant change in regards
to the mutual desecuritisation among the seven Nordic-Baltic states.
6.2 Conception of Shared Threats
The extent to which Russia makes up a common security issue and thereby indicates a conception
of common threats in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex raises an important question about what
qualifies as a conception of common threats: Does it involve establishing that a security issue is
perceived by all seven states or does it rather denote a security issue that is perceived to be common
to all seven states? These two different interpretations give rise to two different analyses.
On the one hand a conception of common threats can be interpreted as meaning that a security issue
is perceived by more than one state in the subcomplex. In that perspective, the answer is a clear
affirmation in that it was established beyond doubt in the second analytical chapter that Russia is
considered a security issue by all seven states. Moreover, Russia is perceived to have acted in a way
that can be characterised as confrontational and directly targeting each of the seven states. These
acts are highly relevant for the analysis because their interpretation by the Nordic-Baltic states is
connected to and feeds into the perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis. As such the
numerous Russian incursions into the airspace of the seven states; the alleged incursion into
Swedish territorial waters; the capture of the Estonian intelligence officer; not to mention the
boosting of capabilities and military snap drills towards its Western border are all perceived by the
seven states as Russian assertive and confrontational behaviour. This behaviour is perceived as
threatening by the seven Nordic-Baltic states – at least this is reflected in their respective practices.
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Thus, in terms of defence related developments the seven states demonstrate increased focus on
deterrence and reinforcing their sovereignty, e.g. by safeguarding Nordic-Baltic airspace. This does
not say much about what the Russian security issue is perceived to consist of. Notably it cannot be
established that Russia is formulated as a traditional military threat by the seven states, although the
security practices of the seven states, respectively, suggest that the security issue is responded to as
a matter of territorial and sovereign defence. However its involvement of Russia is a commonality
across the range of Nordic-Baltic states and as such Russia can clearly be identified as a common
security issue to the seven Nordic-Baltic states.
In another perspective a conception of shared threats can also denote a threat that is perceived to be
shared. This understanding is aligned with what Buzan and Wæver term ‘collective securitisation’
(Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.57), namely a security issue that is formulated as a threat to the
collective, which in this context translates into the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. In that case the
answer is less straightforward. For instance Lithuanian President Grybauskaite presents the Russian
threat to be directed at the territorial integrity of all of Europe. On the one hand, that naturally
involves the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex, but it does notably not refer to the Nordic-Baltic states
specifically. On the other hand, the fact that it does nonetheless involve the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex as forming part of the referent object can also be held as significant in and of itself and
as such Grybauskaite’s strong securitisation of Russia is here considered as a collective
securitisation. However, in terms of official formulations, such declarations are apparently not
repeated along similar lines by any other Nordic-Baltic states. Whereas the seven states are aligned
in condemning Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, and declaredly consider the European security
environment to be threatened because of it, the collective securitisation of Grybauskaite cannot be
established as shared across the formulations of the Nordic-Baltic states. For instance, in the annual
NORDEFCO report concluding Norway's chairmanship, Defence Minister Søreide writes that,
"2014 has been an eventful year for Nordic defense cooperation. Russia's annexation of the Crimea
and its intervention in eastern Ukraine has changed the European security landscape, with
implications also in our own Nordic region" (NORDEFCO 2015, p.3)
Søreide also states that "the Nordic nations are reconsidering their security policies and their
relationship with Russia" (Ibid.). She thereby indicates that the Russian behaviour in relation to the
Ukraine crisis has affected the Nordic region and the security policies of the Nordic states.
However, the expression and implied Nordic concern over Russia is considerably more indirect than
Grybauskaite's declaration that Russia poses a military threat to the territorial integrity of all of the
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European states, including the Nordic-Baltic states. Similarly the Norwegian Prime Minister
Solberg's expression that Norway's key role is now to ensure "good surveillance in the North" is a
far cry from Grybauskaite's calling Russia a terrorist state that is willing to wage a real war against
all of its neighbours (Reuters 2014b; Washington Post 2014b). Similarly, Danish Foreign Minister
Lidegaard's statement that he could not imagine that Russia would dare to disturb the Baltic states
or any NATO member also stands in contrast to Grybauskaite's expressions (Reuters 2014b). With
Estonian President Ilves’ blatant dismissal of the scenario that Russia should launch an intervention
in Estonia similar to that in Ukraine as ‘crap’, apart from Grybauskaite the other Nordic-Baltic
states are thus intent on refraining from escalating concerns over Russia with inflammatory
statements – to the extent that they appear to downplay the Russian threat. Thus Grybauskaite's
threat perception is not shared by her Nordic-Baltic neighbours and a collective securitisation of
Russia as a traditional military threat cannot be established. This is all the more striking when
juxtaposed with the resurfacing of national defence issues including deterrence capabilities in the
political agendas of the individual Nordic-Baltic states which has been spurred by the Ukraine crisis
(Defense News 2014). While this cannot be held as evidence that Russia is considered a military
threat, it does nonetheless indicate that the Nordic-Baltic states are considering the need for
countering a threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is most clearly the case in the
states which border with Russia. Here the projection of military capabilities including in particular
the considerable increase in military snap drills towards the borders of the Nordic-Baltic states has
not gone unnoticed. Thus, Norway is boosting its military capabilities towards its Northern
territory, while Finland is taking unprecedented cooperative measures with the US and Sweden to
exercise its air defence. Estonia and Lithuania go even further by observing the need to stay vigilant
towards the Russian military activity near their respective borders because the Russian intervention
in Ukraine evolved from what appeared to be merely another snap exercise (Newsweek 2015).
Adhering to Buzan and Wæver’s observations, these actions are all indications that a securitisation
has taken place even though it is not formulated (see Section 2.3). This means that the actions and
measures taken by the Nordic-Baltic states towards boosting national defence and deterrence reflect
that Russia is indeed considered a military threat (Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.73). Thus, the
remarkably de-escalatory statements from the Nordic-Baltic states at large are inconsistent with the
measures which the Nordic-Baltic states are taking to be able to deter a potential Russian military
incursion. Again, it needs to be stated that it cannot be established from this investigation that the
Russian security issue is perceived to involve a traditional military threat – seeing as none but
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Grybauskaite has been found to express that – but it is nonetheless important to note that the
Nordic-Baltic states are apparently focusing on their ability to deter such a threat. In this light the
formulations which downplay the Russian threat can be explained as an attempt to de-escalate
tensions with Russia by the Nordic-Baltic state representatives. Such a strategy may also explain
why they apparently refrain from presenting Russia as a shared threat to the Nordic-Baltic states.
While the Russian military threat cannot be found to constitute a common security issue, certain
findings indicate that the Russian non-military security issue is perceived to be shared. Although a
collective securitisation presenting this threat as directed at the Nordic-Baltic states as a group has
not been found, there is an acknowledgment of the non-military threats faced by some states in the
subcomplex. Danish Foreign Minister Lidegaard observes that Russia is waging a hybrid warfare
which involves “(…) massive propaganda, provocations, stimulation of groups inside other
countries“ (Reuters 2014b). The referent object of the Russian non-military security issue is not
specified, nor does it indicate that Denmark is affected by this type of threat.
In sum, in terms of official formulations, considerable differences are identified between the extent
to which the different states perceive their national security to be threatened by Russia. These
differences extend to the nature of the Russian security issue, with Russia as a non-military threat to
political stability forming the perception most widely shared across the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex.
That Russia also poses a traditional military threat is only formulated by the Lithuanian President.
Aside from Grybauskaite, the Nordic-Baltic states at large are intent on refraining from escalating
concerns over Russia as a military threat, including calling Russia a threat to the collective NordicBaltic states, although their practices suggest that the Russian threat is also countered with
traditional military means of deterrence. However, both in terms of formulations and even more so
through their practices, the Nordic-Baltic states show awareness that the Russian security issue is
directed at several states in the subcomplex. This is illustrated by the Danish Foreign Minister’s
acknowledgment of the threat of hybrid warfare faced by the Baltic states and to a lesser degree by
the Swedish and Finnish cooperation in exercising their respective air defence capabilities.
As for a formulated conception of shared threats the findings are thus rather inconclusive. However,
considered in compilation with the empirical findings regarding the security practices in the NordicBaltic subcomplex, a different picture is revealed. In order to be able to consider them in
combination, it first needs to be investigated whether or to what extent a shared response to threats
can be established. This is the endeavour of the next section.
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6.3 Shared Response to Threats
Compared to the difficulty of identifying a conception of shared threats above, establishing a shared
response to threats is considerably more straightforward. A shared response to threats is not
considered to entail that all of the seven states must necessarily respond jointly. Rather, a shared
response between some of the states within the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex is here understood to
qualify as indications of shared response to threats in the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics. Several
exercises under NATO auspices involving different constellations of the Nordic-Baltic states,
including the two non-NATO members corroborate the wide extent of collaboration aimed at
countering the Russian security issue. This cooperation consists first and foremost of ensuring the
sovereignty of the airspace of the respective states and deterring Russian incursions into these.
Important steps have also been identified as regards NORDEFCO with a view to increasing the
inclusion of and collaboration with the Baltic states. However, a shared response is also taken to
elements of the non-military dimension of the Russian security issue. In particular the so-called
information warfare (see Chapter 5) has given rise to enhanced cooperation to counter this threat,
which can be considered part of the conception of Russia as forming a non-military security issue.
As such this threat may not be perceived as shared by all of the Nordic-Baltic states but the shared
response indicates that it is at least acknowledged as a threat to some in the subcomplex, i.e. the
Baltic states. Even though Nordic-Baltic security cooperation predates the Ukraine crisis, it is
formulated as a priority in light of the Ukraine crisis. For instance, representatives of the Nordic
Council, the Baltic Assembly and the Nordic and Baltic members of the European Parliament met
in January 2015 to enhance cooperation to face ‘the information war that Russia is waging' (Nordic
Council 2015). Though this finding does not qualify as a formulated conception of shared threats by
the Nordic-Baltic states, it does however imply a shared acknowledgment that the threat is
perceived by some of the states. Moreover, the meeting substantiates the above argument that the
perceived Russian information warfare has given cooperation in this area enhanced priority among
the Nordic-Baltic states. It also underscores the shared perception that this threat, though not
necessarily directed at them all, is to be faced by the Nordic-Baltic states together. As such the
shared response to the Russian information warfare signifies a remarkable development in the
Nordic-Baltic subcomplex spurred by the perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis. The
wide extent of cooperation involving different constellations of Nordic-Baltic states in response to
the Russian security issue thus demonstrates that the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex contains a shared
response to threats. In combination this suggests that the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics have
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developed to involve a higher degree of security community elements due to the perceived need for
a shared response to the Russian security issue.
The demonstrations of the willingness and dedication of the seven states to taking a shared response
to the threats which are perceived as Russian aggression is also significant in relation to
determining to which extent the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics involve a conception of shared
threats. The shared response to threats involve the acknowledgment that at least some states in the
subcomplex perceive themselves to be under threat from Russia. Considered in this light, the
Danish participation in the enhanced NATO measure of the Baltic Air Policing mission, which was
requested by the Baltic states in light of the Ukraine crisis, is indicative of a clear Danish
acknowledgment of the threat which the Baltic states apparently perceive. In this relation it is
irrelevant whether Denmark perceives itself to be threatened, i.e. whether the security issue is
common. Nor does it matter here whether Denmark considers the Baltic states’ concerns over
Russia to be warranted. Instead, what is important is that Denmark assumes responsibility for
upholding the Baltic states’ sovereignty. This security practice is inherently indicative of a
conception of a shared threat although it is not formulated. This is substantiated by the perception
identified in the security and defence policies investigated in Chapter 4. Here the international
engagement of Nordic-Baltic states is explained as the means to ensuring their respective national
security (see Section 4.1). Thus, reinforcing and defending the security of the three Baltic states
makes up a means to ensuring the security of the four Nordic states, respectively.
As in the previous section, NATO's role can also be considered in this regard. In extension of the
previous findings it can be argued that a consequence of five of the investigated states being NATO
Allies is the at least nominal interlinking of security concerns. In this light, statements expressing
that the security concerns of a Baltic state are shared by a NATO Ally in the subcomplex are to be
expected and do not necessarily signify more than a nominal shared threat perception. Considered
from a different angle it does nonetheless demonstrate the acknowledgment that the Baltic states
perceive their security to be threatened by Russia – but does not indicate whether the Nordic states
consider their own security to be threatened. On a different note, it can be argued that it is largely
irrelevant whether a threat is perceived by the seven states as being directed at them all or, in
general terms, whether a NATO state shares the concerns of its Allies, because the state is obliged
to protect the other in either case. A similar argument can be extended to the four Nordic states
although to a lesser extent. Having agreed to the Nordic solidarity declaration in 2011 they have
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declared commitment to assisting each other in the event of "natural and man-made disasters, and
cyber- and terrorist attacks" (Nordic Foreign Ministers 2011). However, the declaration does not
refer directly to military attacks as a cause of solidarity which means that the Nordic solidarity
declaration cannot be considered on par with NATO's collective defence clause (Winnerstig 2012,
p.71).
Having examined the three security community components, the next sections will combine these
assessments to analyse to what extent the relative security interdependence has increased and
thereby transformed the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex into a security community.
6.4 A Nordic-Baltic Security Community in the Making?
Especially two findings with regards to NORDEFCO are significant indications that the perception
of Russia has spurred increased interdependence in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. On the one hand,
this rests on the finding that NORDEFCO increasingly seeks to integrate the Baltic states into the
otherwise Nordic defence structure. Importantly, however, this alone cannot be held as evidence of
the impact of the post-Ukraine perception of Russia because the development towards including the
Baltic states in NORDEFCO collaboration dates further back than the onset of the Ukraine crisis.
One the other hand, the integration of the Baltic states into NORDEFCO takes on a different
significance when considered in relation to the second finding, namely, the Swedish chairmanship
asking NORDEFCO for a report to elucidate the options for developing a Nordic-Baltic Battle
Group. This does not mean that such initiative will necessarily materialise, as was also noted in
Chapter 5. But the fact that such considerations are now articulated should not be dismissed as
insignificant on that account. On the contrary, this makes up a remarkable shift with potentially
considerable consequences for NORDEFCO’s raison d’être from operating with a clear and
exclusive logic of smart defence towards potentially assuming a role of collective defence. As such
this development suggests that Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation may be evolving towards
assuming a different role beyond being confined to resource sharing. Clearly it would be immensely
premature to interpret this as the first step towards developing a level of cooperation even remotely
resembling a Nordic-Baltic collective defence. At the same time, however, the proposal by the
current Swedish Chairmanship of NORDEFCO is too significant to go unnoticed as it testifies to
the willingness, at the least by Sweden, to increase shared response mechanisms. In this context,
although the result of the inquiry is still unknown, it signals a move towards stronger security
interdependence at the level of Nordic-Baltic cooperation as a whole. As such it constitutes a
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significant step towards transforming the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex into a security community as it
may eventually pave the way for a collective Nordic-Baltic defence.
Although increased security interdependence cannot be established through an expressed
conception of shared threats, the actions undertaken by, for instance, Denmark to engage in
guarding the sovereign airspace of the Baltic states, and the expressed intention to jointly counter
'the information war from the East' (see Section 5.4) since the Ukraine crisis demonstrates that the
perception of Russia as a threat to the Baltic states is a concern that is shared by the Nordic-Baltic
states. This is seen in that it has prompted a shared response. Thus it is in prompting the
development of a shared response to the Russian threat that the perception of Russia has affected
the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics towards increased security interdependence. In this way the
perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis contributes to the development of a shared
conception of and shared response to threats. They make up important elements in the evolution of
the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex into a security community.
Since the Ukraine crisis Russia is perceived as a threat in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex. Increased
Russian military incursions into the Nordic-Baltic airspace and towards the borders and territorial
waters of the Nordic-Baltic states are perceived as matters of military defence by the Nordic-Baltic
states. It remains to be seen how or even whether this changed security environment will manifest
itself in the security and defence policies of the individual Nordic-Baltic states. However, the
changed perception of Russia as a threat has given rise to increased Nordic-Baltic security practices
involving territorial defence. This is observed at the national level of particularly those states which
share borders with Russia and suggests increased perceived concern over Russian military
capabilities and activity in the vicinity – or at least it reflects the perceived need to be able to deter
threats in these areas to a higher degree than before the Ukraine crisis. But the perception of Russia
as forming a security issue has also affected the relative interdependence between the Nordic-Baltic
states by giving rise to increased defence collaboration between the Nordic states and the Baltic
states through NORDEFCO. While such integration has also been developing prior to the
emergence of Russia as a perceived threat in relation to the Ukraine crisis, the measures to enhance
cooperation between NORDEFCO and the Baltic states make up a significant shift compared to the
role and significance assigned to Nordic-Baltic cooperation in the official security and defence
policies of the seven states (see Section 4.7). Thus, while the seven states were also seen to
emphasise the widespread desecuritisation and amity in the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to
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the Ukraine crisis, these findings indicate that the perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine
crisis has promoted the development of cooperative security practices in the existing relations
between the Nordic-Baltic states. Considered jointly the analysis of the three security community
components in the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics suggests that the Russian security issue which
emerged in relation to the crisis in Ukraine has promoted the development of a Nordic-Baltic
security community. Though a conception of shared threats cannot be established, the security
practices indicate progress towards a shared response to the perceived Russian security issue.
Alongside the already established widespread mutual desecuritisation, the progressing shared
response to the perceived threat of Russia demonstrates that the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex can to a
large extent be considered a security community. Whether it will eventually develop into a fullyfledged security community, and how much interdependence is required for it to qualify as such is,
as stated, beyond the scope and objective of this thesis (see Section 2.3.3). However, the finding of
this analysis is that the perceived Russian security issue has increased the degree to which the
Nordic-Baltic subcomplex forms a security community by adding the shared response to a security
issue that is to a large extent perceived as common to the widespread mutual desecuritisation in the
security dynamics.
6.5 Prevailing Elements of Indifference in the Nordic-Baltic Security Dynamics
Alongside the findings pointing towards increased security interdependence, elements of
indifference also persist in the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics. The most notable in this regard are
the institutional differences which continue to inhibit security integration in the Nordic-Baltic
subcomplex. The continued status of Sweden and Finland as non-NATO members reflects their
respective positions as declaredly non-aligned which continues to shape their overall foreign policy
orientations. This self-imposed limitation extends to inhibiting the further development of
cooperation within NORDEFCO and the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex and thereby also poses an
inherent obstacle to increasing Nordic-Baltic security interdependence to the extent that it may
evolve into a security community. This reflection needs to be taken into account in the reflections
about the Swedish and Finnish participation in the air exercise over Estonia in October 2014. This
event, which has otherwise been seen as indicative of increased security interdependence through
the development of a shared response to threats is thus cast in a different light when considered in
relation to the non-alignment policies of the two states. These policies also shape the stance of the
two states, respectively, in regards to bilateral cooperation. Thus, both Sweden and Finland
emphasise that neither the Danish-Swedish nor the Swedish-Finnish defence collaborations
79
launched since the Ukraine crisis reflect an alteration of their foreign policy orientation as nonaligned states (see Section 5.5). In a similar vein the decisive steps taken by Finland to halt the
bilateral talks with Russia about defence-industrial cooperation cannot be taken as signalling much
more than a considerable shift towards enmity in its relation with Russia. As was also noted in
Chapter 5 Finland remains wary of alienating Russia which can also be seen in connection with its
policy of non-alignment.
Notably, however, the analysis has not found indications that the relative indifference in the NordicBaltic security dynamics has increased as a result of the perception of Russia in relation to the
Ukraine crisis. Rather, the perception of Russia as a threat in relation to the Ukraine crisis has
affected the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics by shifting the relative interdependence and
indifference further towards interdependence by drawing attention from all seven states onto a
security issue which they have in common and to which the Nordic-Baltic states respond through
collaboration.
80
Chapter 7 - Conclusion
The objective of this thesis is to answer the problem formulation:
How has the perception of Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis affected the Nordic-Baltic
security dynamics?
The first part of the analysis examined Nordic-Baltic security dynamics prior to the Ukraine crisis.
According to their official security and defence policies, the Nordic-Baltic states share the
perception that the international security environment is complex. Moreover, the threat of a military
attack is not perceived to be imminent by the Nordic-Baltic states although they note that such a
threat cannot be ruled out altogether. The threat perceptions of the three Baltic states differ from the
Nordic by their focus on internal security issues. The seven states prioritise regional stability and
deepened defence cooperation in terms of official formulations but also through practical
engagement in NORDEFCO. The perceptions and practices of the seven states thus demonstrate
that the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics are characterised by amity and desecuritisation.
Prior to the Ukraine crisis Russia features in the official threat perceptions of the Nordic-Baltic
states but is not articulated as a threat. After the Ukraine crisis, however, this has changed. The
second part of the analysis found that the Baltic states perceive Russia as a common security issue.
While Lithuania formulates Russia as constituting a security issue with a military dimension, Latvia
portrays the Russian security issue as involving non-military means of influence. The shared
response of the Baltic states to countering the non-military dimension of the Russian threat indicates
the perception that the Russian threat is common to the three Baltic states. The responses of the
Nordic states to Russia's military activity in the subcomplex demonstrate that they also perceive of
Russia as a security issue. Furthermore, NORDEFCO articulates the perception that Russia
constitutes a common security issue for the Nordic-Baltic states. The seven states have enhanced
Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation by expanding exercises and missions in the subcomplex, and the
Nordic-Baltic states thereby respond jointly to the Russian security issue. Thus, even though the
Russian security issue is not formulated as a common security issue by each of the seven states, the
practices of the Nordic-Baltic states demonstrate a shared perception of the Russian threat. Thereby
Russia is to a large extent perceived as a common security issue after the Ukraine crisis.
The final part of the analysis investigated the extent to which the subcomplex is a security
community after the Ukraine crisis. Therefore the analysis examined the three components which
81
make up a security community; mutual desecuritisation, a conception of shared threats, and a shared
response to these threats. Compiling the previous analytical findings, this part of the analysis
showed that the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics contain mutual desecuritisation. A formulated
conception of shared threats could not be found. However, when considered in relation to the clear
indications that the Russian security issue is met with shared responses by the Nordic-Baltic states,
a conception of shared threats is implied. Based on the three security community components the
security interdependence between the Nordic-Baltic states has thereby increased and the NordicBaltic subcomplex has moved further towards becoming a security community. Elements of
indifference prevail in the subcomplex, but the relative indifference has not increased after the
Ukraine crisis.
It can thus be concluded that the perception of Russia as a threat in the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex in
relation to the Ukraine crisis has affected the Nordic-Baltic security dynamics by increasing the
relative security interdependence and enhanced the extent to which the Nordic-Baltic subcomplex
constitutes a security community.
82
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