1. society
2. work
3. unions

DECEMBER
HOW
TO PROMOTE
COOPERA
WITHIN
CONFLICTING
AND DIVIDED
SOCIETIES
1993
TION
?
Some thoughts about the transformation
of industrial relations in Europe
Robert BaYER
CEPREMAP, CNRS, EHESS
142, Rue du Chevaleret 75013 PARIS
Tél. : (1) 40 77 84 12 -FAX:
(1) 44 24 38 57
Contribution
to the Conference
on "Convergence
and Divergence
in Economic
Growth and Technical Change:
Maastricht
Revisited, MERIT, University
of
Limburg,
December
10-12,
1992
HOW TO PROMOTE COOPERATION WITHIN CONFLICTING AND DIVIDED
SOCIETIES? Some thoughts
about the transformation
of industrial
relations
in Europe
Robert BaYER
ABSTRACT
The paper tries to explain why and how can be triggered
the transition
from one adversarial
labour regime to a more cooperative
one, since such a
change does not seem self-fulfilling.
First, a survey of the interpretations
by
game theory of the emergence
of cooperation
among capitalists
and workers is
provided,
considering
bath coordination
games and prisoner dilemma problems.
Second, a taxonomy
for the various methods for overcoming
the hysteresis
of
prevailing
social norms is provided.
Third, these methods are checked
against
the empirical
evidence
concerning
the European
countries
now experiencing
cooperation
and a minimum
trust.
A
major concern
for future,
multiple
interactions
and intertemporal
bargaining,
reciprocity
more than altruism
are
shawn to be important and the se features often need to be embedded into a
coherent
set of institutions.
COMMENT FAVORISER LA COOPERATION DANS DES SOCIETES
CONFLICTUELLES? Quelques
réflexions
sur la transformation
des
relations
professionnelles
en Europe
Robert BaYER
RESUME
L'article
vise
à expliquer
pourquoi
et comment
favoriser
une
transition
de
relations
professionnelles
conflictuelles
à d'autres
plus
coopératives,
car une telle transformation
ne présente pas d'automaticité.
Sont
mobilisés
les enseignements
de la théorie
des jeux répétés,
aussi bien de
coordination
pure que de type dilemme du prisonier,
puis proposées
diverses
méthodes
pour surmonter
l'hystérésis
inhérente
aux normes sociales.
Ces
résultats
théoriques
sont confrontés
à l'expérience
des pays européens
au
cours des années quatre-vingts.
Il ressort que la prise en compte
du futur, la
multiplication
dans le temps des sphères de négociation,
la réciprocité
plus que
l'altruisme
conduisent
en général à la viabilité de la coopération,
d'autant
plus
facilement
que
ces
principes
sont
insérés
dans
un réseau
cohérent
d'institutions.
Mots
clés:
Coopération
prisonier
répété
-Confiance
-Théorie
-Jeux
de coordination
-Dilemme
des Jeux -Relations
professionnelles
du
-
Europe -Post-Fordisme.
Keywords
J.E.L.
: Cooperation
-Trust
-Coordination
Dilemma
-Game
Theory
-Industrial
Fordism.
Classification:
C72 -074
-J50
-J53.
Games -Repeated
Relations
-Europe
Prisoner's
-Post-
HOW TO PROMOTE COOPERATION WITHIN CONFLICTING AND DIVIDED
SOCIETIES?
Some
thoughts
about
the transformation
of industrial
relations
in Europe
Robert BaYER
SUMMARY
1 -COOPERATION
AND
TRUST:
SYSTEMS?
1. Fordism
used to require
2.
3. The
Il
A REOUIREMENT
a limited
emerging
Golden
60'snewareproductive
gone
-THE
1.
Conflicting
DOUBLE
2.
Are
productive
labor
societies
PARADOX
cooperation
principles
experience
OF
TRUST
conflicts
principles,
necessarily
however
FOR
in
bad
perceived
for
PRODUCTIVE
in industrial
require
difficulties
NEW
economic
as
more
1
relations.
cooperation
implementing
the
..
new
1
4
5
8
8
necessary
performance?
12
III -DISTRUST
OR THE LIKELIHOOD
CONFIGURATION
1. A superior
2.
convention,
lN
INDUSTRIAL
based
Fordist
Defection
convention
is a
dominant
to contemporary
IV -HOW
v
GAME
1.
Enlarging
2.
Changing
4.
3.
5.
Change
Improving
Merge
-AN
the
industrial
scope
the
the the
for
payoffs
the
PD preferences
game
recognition
The
factors
From
Reciprocity
most
interactions
role
than
DILEMMA
blocked
prisoner's
by
14
past
dilemma
inherent
repeated
external
prisoner's
and
: a altruism
ability
more
solidaristic
competition
to
possibly
ANAL
of
values
State
andagents
YSIS
larger
?
games
game
DO
25
25
29
33
37
38
interventions..
: HOW
PERFORM
interactions:
public
FROM
dilemma
cooperative
of andeconomic reciprocity
general
15
19
and
ARGUMENTS
density
of
be
relations
COMPARATIVE
more
Gan
EMERGE ? SOME TEACHINGS
into
THEORETICAl
for
the
future
disciplinary
localized
in
future:
by
INTERNATIONAL
1.VARIOUS
Concern
2.
4.
3.
strategy
CAN COOPERATION
THEORY
OF A PRISONER'S
on RELATIONS
trust,
THE
discriminating
41
41
interventions
44
45
46
VI -COOPERATION
OUT OF CONFlICT...A
FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS
REFERENCES
NEGlECTED
AREA FOR
47
49
1
1 -COOPERATION
AND
TRUST:
A REOUIREMENT
FOR NEW PRODUCTIVE
SYSTEMS?
During
industrial
were
relations
supposed
even
the
if
and
conflicts
could
interrupt
to
time
of
industrialized
distrust
and political
of trust
modern
systems.
A previous
1), whereas
to these
challenges
have
principles,
which
the
the
been
to
Fordist
builds
conflicting
growth,
used to require
According
control
production
organizational
of
upon
more
(A.
agree
that
and flexibility
principles
were
and firms'
the
Finally,
the
analyses
relations
in
these
at the
management
of Table
emerging
for
and
alternative
1 (see section
and
derives
not
3).
a central
necessarily
in order
1
unbalances
disequilibria
search
were
is called
cooperation
central
standardized
expertise
By
to
an
implement
principles.
a limited
been
a
management
largely
part of the Table
cooperation
under
(M.
by the first column
triggered
industrial
to a long tradition
has
twelve
2).
these
of
sociologists
efficiency
describes
by the third
the new productive
Fordism
and
continuity
cooperation.
of
organization
(see section
perceived
paper
that
column
price,
shift has to be explained.
is summarized
second
are captured
whereas
successfully
workers'
work
in
technology
able to function
(C. SABEL (1992))
has argued
relations,
the
(1990b)),
in delivering
factor
at competitive
specialists
Such a paradigmatic
principles
present
argument:
obstacle
is prominent
research
industrial
more
key
and
voluntary
KREPS
scientists
(1991 )). The argument
associated
Thus,
stijl
were
limited
(D.
and
the manufacturing
(section
some
economists
(1992)),
productive
countries
and
a
Organization
time
(1992))
(R. BaYER
performance.
as
goods
GRANOVETTER
Gare of Fordist
considered
to deliver
nowadays
HATCHUEL
rarely
in order
dose
contrast,
was
economic
Advanced
significant
trust
to be sufficient
from
management.
60's,
of a quite
in industrial
in scientific
after
goods
restricted
WWII.
was
the
relations
management,
On one
result
area within
of
the
side,
issue
the
technical
large firms
: the
of
mass
:'THE
2
TABLE
1 : THE SHIFT TOWARD NEW PRODUCTIVE PRINCIPLES CALL FOR MORE
COOPERA TION AND TRUST
THE CHALLENGES
FORDISTPRINCIPLES
:
:
OF THE 70's
~1 : Global optimisation
Rationalisation
of
labour
is the main
target,
mechanisation
is the means
'C1 :
First
design
and then
manufacture
and organ1ze work process
C2 : Lags and large costs
'2
C3 :
Loosing
touch with
choosy
consumers,
failures
in launching
ne..; products
P3 :
Close and long lasting
ties
between producers
and users,
capture
learning
by using
effects
P4 :
High Quality
at reasonable costs,
via a zero
defect
obJective
at each
stage
of the production
process
: Indirect
Under-utilisation
of
eQuipment,
large
inventories
of work
of the whole
flows
in process
in passing
vation
to
production
and mediated
links
with
consumers
via
marketing
studies
and strategies:
:
PRINCIPLES OF A NEY MOOEL
AND 80's
,
:
from innoeffective
Low cost for
standardised
products
is the
first
objective,
Qualit y the second
one
C4 :
Ex-post
Quality
controls
cannot
prevent
a rising
defect
rate,
consumers
more select1ve
about
Quality
Mass production
for
stable
and rising
demands,
batch
production
for
unstable
demands:
CS :
~5 :
Even mass consumers
demand become uncertain
:
the fordist
production
process
appears
as rigia!C6:
Centralisation
of most
decisions
about
~roduc-,
tion
in q sp~cial
division
of a large
firm
Vertical
integration,
mit1gated
by c1rcles
of subcontractors
Sluggish
reaction
ters
to
local
1
C7 :
and unadeQuate
Qf h~ad
quarglobal
and
full
integraresearch,
deveand production
Insert
the market
into
the production
processl
in order
get fas~ responses
demanc
to
P6 :
Decentralization
as far
as possible
of production
decisions
within
smaller
and less hierarchical
units
P7 :
Net working
(and joint
ventures>,
as a method
for reaping
both specialisation
and coordination
gains
P8 :
long run and
subcontracting
cooperativei:
as far asi
possible,
promote
order
to
technical
shocks
Given radical
innovations.
even large
firms
can no more master
the
whole
techniques
needed
for
their
core business
Tentative
tion
of
lopment
productive
1
:
the 70's,
bankrupi
Facing
cyclical
demand~ ce : During
cies and/or
loss
of
subcontractors
are useo
comoetence
of subcontrac
as stabilizing
device.
tors,
now confronted
in order
to preserve
with
international
comlarge
firms'employment
J
in
Joint
innovations
petition
:
Divide
and specialize
at most productive
tasKs.
main source
of
productivity
increases
C9 :
Excessive
labour
division
mi~ht
turn
counterproductlve
: rising
control
and monitoring
costs
; built-in
rigidit y
:
Minimi~e
general
CIO:
New techical
ooportunities
(IT),
more competition
and uncertain
demands challenge
most of
the previous
very specialized
tasks
Hferarchfcal
control
and purely
ffnancfal
fncentfve~
to manufactu
re an fmQlicit
consent
ta po or job content
CIl:
Young
generations,better
educated
and with
rent
expectations,
Adversarial
industrial
relations
converge
towards
wage demands .
collective
agreemenf
codifya
provisiona1
armistice
C12: Firms emplo~ent
the
reQuired
education
and
on the job training
of
productlve
tasks A accor
ding
to the BABB GE'~
and TAYLOR's principles
12:
ject authoritarian
j~10:
mana-
might
be hurt
by the lack
of
CQoperation
and an exclusive
concern
for wage
bargaining
él ces
concession
not neA
contrari°
orovide
any
for
wage-
To recompose
production,
maintenance,
Quality
control
and some management tasks
might be more
efficient,
teçhnically
and econolDically
1
P11:
differe-
gement styles.
Too much
control
becomes counter-'
productive
cessarily
advantage
earners
P9 :
A new alliance
between a
minimal
general
education
and effective
on
the job training,
1"
order
to max1mizé
1ndivt
~
and collect1ve
competence
Human ressources
pol1c1es have to spur workers'competence
and
commitment
and work out
Qositive
support
for
firms
strategy
P12: An expl1c1t
and 10ryg
term
compromise
between
managers
and wage
earners
i~ needed
to reap
a
general
support
to th1s
model
: comm1tment
versus
good
working
conditions
and/or
job
tenure$
and/or
a fair
~haring
ofl
modernisation
dividends
3
professional
skills
management.
used
a tight
were
might
production
place
in the
only minor
floor
a voice
made
mechanisms
of
strict
unions
mainly
job
already
developed
it could
to
stimulating
living.
demands
1973.
distrust
such
in order
tasks.
been
in
to get the
got a say about
shop
managers
and
to need a revolution
as France
the
took
with
between
Quite
of
of management
and Italy)
(i.e. the exit strategy
States).
has
unions
process
Thus,
was supposed
ironically,
the
or was
via market
imposition
counter-strategy
ru les of the game
used
culture
that
or social
as
the
technical
benefits.
by
jack
change
: at the firms
but
level,
trust
exception
of large firms
which
a cohesive
mechanism.
Quite
of cooperation
in
production
were
often
converted
Given the virtuous
circle
of Fordist
.but they
an unprecedented
some
had to be enforced,
democracy
some frustrations..
paradoxically,
automatization,
few
with the possible
out to launch
quite
leadership
the
social
compromise
of routinized
sinGe the
a transition
be argued
wage
this turned
penibility
and Japan),
corporate
into extra
general
have been fighting
and political
feature,
used to generate
1968
unions
the
leftist
capitalist
to block
a rather
accepting
and
for
insufficient
Finally,
general
processes
growth,
out
50's
in the US, and stijl more in the UK.
interventions
an essential
paradoxically
turned
demarcations
some
had
configuration
in the United
Of course,
rarely
new
opportunities
power,
was
this
by alternative
to limit firms'
by State
some
in countries
ru les and
Industrial
60's
via politics
for example
level.
in the
and organization,
unnecessary
floor
contraI
countries,
(Germany
strategy
shop
hierarchical
increases.
for the
was so high that such
with
and
wage
but their
exceptions
along
repairs
led to significant
were
compensation
management
workers
(i.e.
workers
maintenance,
at the
and usually
and consumption.
organization,
monetary
of work
challenged
50's:
conception,
mechanization
monitoring
but the challenge
mass
best
side,
industrialized
have
relationships,
production
to
often adversarial,
ln many
unions
limited
On the other
to deliver
relations
were
degree
growth,
of
and finally
distrust
for example
was
from
helpful
in
the ri se in standards
of
4
2. The Golden 60's are gone
This
which
pattern
was 50 successful
have been eroding
labor
relations
experienced
sectors,
and the
the previous
growth
a significant
and its quasi
disentangle
among
that
structural
regime.
slowing
for the whole
expia nations,
the
demise
about
organization,
a large rise in the cost of contrai,
a progressive
shift
quality,
ail these
Fordist
productive
A
the
international
institutional
earners
forms
and give
significant
to scale
goods,
but
buoyant
real
market
democratic
demands.
oligopolistic
along
major
with
financial
transformations
drastically
increases
crisis
deregulation
calls for new attitudes
key for competitiveness
production
capital
deepening,
and
unbalances
of
shift
the bargaining
to managers.
labor
have
(in many
to replace
wages
the survival
for the workers
of a firm,
and
redesign
power
Thus,
with
in the
first
away
a region
is part of a wider and far reaching change.
from
wage
show
up in
and by extension
increasing
to
a
Similarly,
the
rise
countries)
exception
is more at stake
previous
of standardized
due
objective
cooperation
an acute
most
and scale.
the
experienced
: more
more
changes
down,
have
of firms
principles,
For example,
of scope
: a
and unprecedented
mass production
curbed
limits
policy
if not ail industrialized
strategies.
conflicts
organizational
Ail these
regularities.
been
macroeconomic
economic
which
mix of economies
Consequently,
to
a part
differentiation
deregulation
a genuine
tended
capture
rising
configurations
any more from
countries,
jobs
changing
of many econometric
unions
difficult
about
genuine
and
do not result
wage
to the
shock,
technological
back the initiative
from
unemployment,
whereas
and
alterations
returns
labour
are
cil
environment,
of national
rate,
first
these
world
competition,
interest
about
has
manufacturing
probably
an excessive
contribute
economy
It is quite
protests
of the consumers
the
exacerbate
down
capital-
(Table 1).
after
unpredictible
these
for the
economy.
: the workers
simultaneously
system
do
breaking
real
factors
decade
disequilibria
rather
in the aspiration
trends,
the American
sinGe each
of the story
adverse
between
in productivity,
alternative
Fordist
triggered
stability
First of ail,
down
stagnation
it finally
of
of
and
social
drastic
decline,
of wage
earners'
than ever,
is now
which
perceived
a country.
as
But this
5
3. The emerging
new productive
After
agree
that
configuration
continue
management:
the
core
the blue collar
major
used to be restricted
human
brain
firms
to
the
which
to contrai
response
to
macroeconomic
supposes
much
more
internai
flexibility
market
benefit
will
anonymous
to the firms
benefit
tram the related
Clearly
from
present
instance,
job,
will
production
firms
of loyalty,
ability
and
the
which
is
correlatively
in such
much
quickly
the
happen
under
building
trust
Fordism
about
a training.
Again
knowledge
to variations
level
of
since
large
analysis
a
using
to think
of the firm.
that they
is thus
future
benefits.
If for
or loose
in volume
require
ln this
a
force
had the
expectations
if by jack
who
in the
new
operated.
and
The
composition
flexibility
new system,
contrary
of
Symmetrically,
is needed
muscle
their
upgrading
to competitors
than
1).
realized
new
skills
by
effects
Table
continuous
hurt the firms,
of workers'
change
work
in demand
of workers.
to use
train their
based
inventories
and
be laid-off
cooperation
inventories
may severely
to
expertise
sell their
which
of a governance
exchange
finally
to internally
disponibility
by a careful
will
ultimately
low
strikes
an implicit
cooperation
more
and a significant
and unexpected
they
global
product
share increases
by workers
and the technological
employees
to respond
duration
any
that
have not any incentive
not invested
system
efforts
perceive
refuse
methods
would
have
workers
or
Firstly,
and
are induced
or market
since
and they
and commitment
by doing
and if the workers
is concerned
concessions
the
they
trust
and creating
than to do the reverse.
instead
Learning
productivity
scientific
it is most interesting
labor
be
these
responsabilities
uncertainty
of
adjustments.
only when
era.
initiative
and equipments
the
quality
Fordist
For instance,
machines
of
are to be emphazied
now to assume
Secondly,
labor
principles
cali for more
collars.
now
has progressively
up grading
previous
have
and scolars
(1991 )). Of course,
founding
discontinuities
of
to white
system
(R. BaYER
the
performance
workers
many experts
unit cost while
principles
more cooperation.
of productive
reduce
of economic
require
and errors,
obey
Nevertheless,
optimization
the
to
constantly
new markets.
challenge
of trials
by the most successful
systems
tram
decades
a genuine
implemented
new
two
principles
to that
raie of buffers.
is a central
in work
frequent
used
to
Again
piece
of
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7
the
new
general
paradigm.
(1. Da COSTA,
of unions,
which
The
were
It does
mean
A. GARANTO
(1992))
argument
can
be extended
and incentives
to
about technology,
forces,
investigation
hierarchical
words,
authority
and
which
desirability
of Fordist
of external
trade
odds
could
were
of
products,
of competition
(Diagram
responses
to
pattern
3), specially
a larger
competition
Previously,
whereas
when
they
product
might be
many informations
might
counteract
partially
reputation
is needed.
these
A
careful
productive
systems
new
cnes
working
are
(Diagram
atmosphere
of
competition,
distrust
raie in stimulating
(1992)).
the
the
demands
variability
and
limited
raie
of wage
technical
the
configuration
of
demand,
ail these
and competitiveness,
many
in favor
of information
and not only price,
5ixties,
legitimacy
and possibly
80's,
when
triggered
the rather
growth
sophistication
upon quality
of growth
The
ln the
have
given
ln the
places,
1).
about
the related
orthodoxy.
trading
is at
the
fast
technologies,
a
factors
a
induce
at odds with the Fordist
1)
competition
turn
the type
any opportunistic
But quite ironically,
R. BOYER
A new virtuous
in
in
while preventing
cooperation
outbursts
methods.
previous
shift in the sources
fast
by the
play a positive
this
obsolescence
regime
via
and
a poor
and foreign
(5. BOWLE5,
with
fiercer
challenges
they have to exchange
trust
conf/ict
are replaced
conflicts,
change
unionization
this diagnosis.
methods
increases
but it clearly
cost reduction,
contracts
a minimum
ln other
labor
of
of the other major principles of the emerging
confirm
Fordist
end
to subcontractors.
demand and organization,
: even if sophisticated
disruptive
would
the
and qua lit y matter, the long run viability of subcontractors
essential to the large firm. Nowadays
behavior
necessary
used to rule under Fordism.
used as buffers
innovation
not
supposes
is such
circle
international
based
and
upon quality,
national
calls for a genuine
autonomy
some
that
form
of wage
of
markets
wage-labor
earners
cooperation.
even larger corporations
product
differentiation
emerges
nexus
(see Table
at the shop
This
but
is
floor
more
and nations...
and
this
new
1, column
level,
which
likely
if
the
have
lost
now
8
any significant
power
losing
shares
market
device in order to
This
cooperative
market.
(1992)).
stone
(M.
BaYER,
DOUBLE
J.P.
productive
cooperatively
detrimental
(1993)).
superior
quite
more,
however
point
results
term
of
of firms
Fordism.
Thus,
even the
the
performances
might weil
internai
about
the
emergence
of
(1978),
T. SANDLER
be one of the corner
is then
to investigate
in economic
abstract
(for
now
investigate
to
to
recognize
and
economic
Two
is it that
intriguing
difficulties
and social
more
details
see
the
empirical
the favorable
actors
sure that
answers
impact
to
behave
conflicts
will
R.
are
tentatively
since
would
more
lagging
of
the
implementing
the alternatives
quality
and
be to implement
economies
a lot of effort
in
the
new
as necessary.
productivity,
the legs competitive
deploy
litterature
and the
notion:
of view,
perceived
to a naïve vision,
in
goods
a large
more
issues.
According
should
get
workers
experience
therefore
and
Is it sufficient
difficult
societies
principles,
fairly
performance?
(1991 )), the self interest
Still
disciplining
hard to built.
It is time
firms,
to economic
a subtle
was
? From a practical
be given to these
productive
of
OF TRUST.
DURAND
convince
vast
The problem
and conversely
analysis
Conflicting
: the threat
experience
with
C. SCHELLING
system.
of such
PARADOX
to the
of public
Th.
usually
economies
is now that trust
previous
to
larger
supply
(1965),
of such a diagnosis.
trust,
circle
is a major
countries
to be added
wisdom
is easy to destroy
relevance
1.
OLSON
of emergence
The
growth
employment
smaller
than
upon the
of a competitive
trust
why
relations
Conventional
Il -THE
of
explain
size
action
virtuous
consequently
is an interpretation
the conditions
life,
a Fordist
elicit workers commitment.
might
of group
collective
and
industrial
This
impact
to initiate
should
in promoting
countries
most
to Fordism
flexibility
these
be the more
one form
would
advanced
(R.
BaYER
new principles.
challenged
or another
progressively
cnes.
deliver
An
and
of post
catch
international
up
9
comparison
suggests
generated
quite
: social
unequal
that the process
capabilities
to
implement
and they are somehow
From a methodological
with
a series
of international
of automatization,
in order
to
capturing
the
Sweden,
partial
United
ranking
complete
which
(from
implementation
varies
it delivers
trom
-1
of trust..
new
national
firms'
Germany.
new
principles)
case studies
organization,
formation
productive
describe
to + 1
five
hopefully
--to
of
a suggestive
to the manufacturing
about
but
and (West)
+ + to
principles
and wage
crude,
new
nor endogenously
productive
point of view,
to the
States,
related
policies
a rather
proximity
the
comparisons
training
deliver
is not that automatic,
have
Table
respectively
and
the nature
global
index
France,
Japan,
a flavour
of each
pure Fordism
and the
then
However provisional
and not so much surprising
for
2 gives
along
been synthetized
enlightening,
principles
are
the
synthetic
index,
such a picture might seem,
ranking
On the one hand, Japan, West Germany and to some extent Sweden
exhibit
impressive
processes.
quite
These
three
distinctive,
counteracted
institutions
since
Still
designing
the
more,
trajectories,
collar
policies
and/or
their
this
with
quality
has been
built
and is continuously
upon
current
strains
continuously
might
or flexible
economic
this
industrial
process
is
been
customized
be able to get such successes.
national,
a complex
sectoral
or firms
along
definite
of
production.
ln other
words,
and this
is not
feature
Still
more
Fordist
trust
has a positive
at ail a fatality
are a clear evidence
building.
been
set of
hybridation
But this
of trust
show
the
rejuvenated
model
has
and modernization
manufactured
helping
pattern
workers
the survival
at the
cooperation
has
blue
relations
bargaining
performances.
upon the Swedish
adjust
production
of
principles
impact
new
deskilling
partial
and
have
implementing
an industrialization
collective
a
and
followed
training
organizing
Consequently,
national
in
countries
by active
of craftmanship.
level.
abilities
about
not
: the
the need to
any
country
.
..
'PlI:
10
TABLE
2
: THE UNEQUAL ABILITY OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO CaPE WITH THE
NEW PRODUCTIVE PRINCIPLES : A LACK OF COOPERATION
?
cnMTRIES
PI
J»Nt
FRNa
PRlfClPW
..5T~
1 ;1Qb81
oott.tsatt~
E~le
~ev.'1.1ov
~~1sent :
: CaQlta1
anQ Inventorlesl
dlverst
1~ e~
and
1eatt~
P4 : Hign ~.11t~ at
law cost
PS : ~ctt"
1\ t)'
to
VWt'sadeMnd
1
design
-F.lrly
lw
E~~l.
: r.ll~
of th. _tll8eftt
..A
.~~~{r='lty
KEYFEATtME
1
~~
1
0
e
ln
,
l
0
;
Mnt
of
or leI"-
.SI;nlflCallt vI.
serwlcln;
.~I~t
;Cods
--Far
vlclnq
buk ,.t,..
cost or cust~lzed ;oods
: shDrt
the
car
Fo11qws tilt old
-0.1
wttl. .,~
8KCI#t t-
e~les
-ra,r!
E.~ e:10...
~st
non, or .~1p-
to
(),a11t~
~t
JCMS_tiR
~al1ty
,..latlv8
casts
or
tOods
and
hl;h
.E.lstlnq.
8Y~
Ir Mt ve,.~ fast
N{T
x~
8g
Dtr
ru
th,
rD le Of fa.er
na 1 ..,.kett
of J8Q&n.s.
sUl.
.Exlstlrç
tcu1t 1"
~p e or syccess
0
RD
the sile
ec~l~
,-
by
Jao.ncSI, Il'a
~Ic
.Llalted~,
(or .~t~t
goods
b
dlst 1".,. 18,
tUcceeo.d
cr-câ,lct. .~
pr-cCISS
.Irt"CRTNlT
goodS tnQ,Scry
-1~adltl_llY
..Very
..LE.AOER Ra..[
Ex~ 1- "
short_r
tMlt
1.ggtngGrgentn-
tt~
~
P3 : us,rstntwraç
-[ffDrts
..s
t«l
Int~,..tt~
t
P2 : RD .nd p,.o~ct
r
-Hlndeed
bre.k eYen DOInt
autDUt ratto
dec11M
W[ST
,,~
lliITED STATES
SWEDEN
.A~oe.
the
.1~
r
.v1~
~Oc
1nQJst,.,.
P6 : P~ctt~
decent,.altzatton
17 , tio1"1
f
d'",
onta1
Ion
wori ne
'p8
:
coorand
L~-r"\In.
ratj~e
net
1rç
e.~I~
P9 : Rec~s't'~
Pnlc),Ictt~-
or
-Nat
_1ntenance-
proç,..-tng
(r
.Sl;nlrl~.nt
pon$,blllt7
Ex~1. , ~
~~rf:
t ,..the,. Ctn,..llz~
8II\I;e-
.Exlstll:o;.t
olantl.v.1 th.
-Used
0
-Ida
"nt
.Yes.t
r~l~
to be 1'9"-
btdd," byantt-
tMlst 1.vs. nov
t I,r
Hot tlca,.
.RQlr
o( profr,.
slcnal ~btlltr
subcontr8ctors
.Active
SIQlIF"ICAHT
field
={
ta hlererclltcal
barrten
PIO: :~e~lj~ud.~lon
DUO
tt.s
rr;1nlng
l
-Ratll,!"
ln
kl~ laQerl-
..Act
Ive rc1,
dlfflcult
.Exlsts,
Dr
--CI1e
l'est orpeI't ~ r-.nDOo-
tc .uthDrttn ret,..t-
tes
tOl;l
{Ol'
rIes
..[xcellRnt
snt"
C~ltll~
gmcni
ROJc,tl~
œ
and practlcal
1caml~
d nQ sktlls
f SU~y
tence and
co_l~t
x~
t'
s~
le_
0 the
cu1ture"
.I~rCIT.
~D~rs
P12: LC1"; te,.. c~ro.Ise
ove" job
ter-.jr'i
and'or
fins
good. nge
'-SY)ffiE:TJC JtŒX Ca) ,
-0,375
1
.ln
SUOQOrt
-.A
8g81nst t\lr"rlOYer
absenteta
tr-8dltlon
..At
1
18tlons. con
Incmtlve
\
the natl~al
level: c~~ls.
over a .. j ntalned
~.;I-(ul
~ lo1Mnt
0,54
Dr
,~er-s8r-t81r-.8nd
~ 1)' lar-;e
~1D)'8eS
0,80
Qrdfr ta rlotlt
~
Ir.
0
rol
.C1elr
'or
hl;h
and "dlla
skl11ed
WOf't,rs
f!nanct8
P'8r-;ln8llyextst 1"9 SIIDr-t ~
sl;nted
18cour
1
!
..Active
t 10(11
r-t 18t t~
-0,50
l.aresslonnlc
rlC;9C11,bout
MW
r
tC~I09l
'
VlqIS \ vor
~n~ on
C'Dlt.l-
1
0,50
1) Obtatned ~ 81gebratC811~ su-atng UD 811 the .plus.
.and
..tnus.
.and
dtvtdlng vtlh the ..KI8U8 scare (12 s 2)
en tnde.. b8t~8n
1 (tO8Q1ete support) end -1
(at the oPPOstt. Dr the nev 80681).
Sourc. .An
but ~t
V8r7 St~
fl nQ .!ld \log,..-
\lol"ken'~~.-
jh'1_1
,.."cr3ed
.~f;~
VWr7e.". OJe ..VERY
,.es.
for
* llled wners.
now-
sttl11x1sts
..LM~
r9r
ln the
IXOC-
la 1.." t
Df alcr~,1.ctroales
t~J
car InQlstry
subcontracttng
.Ye11-k~
rl~ts
if nat genen1
E~~le
: 1~8Ct
-E8ervlna.
but. ~t.
ve~ st.rong
-EHrv
caope-
~
1,1 but ~81o,,'s.
.St~tfJCN(f.
.T)'pfca1
c.ntra11.
~atlan ln larve
flrws
use or the rl~e nat1ona1 rwports and 8Ost or the rererencfS ouotfd b~ ~
tn Drdcr to ,.t
te.t.
1
11
On the other
of Fordist
inertia.
to science
and
quite
technology
goods
machines
in Germany
optimize
or Japan
the
to control
functioning
and American
corporation
firms,
same labelling
than
the opposition
hierarchical
the
reluctance
to cooperate
post Fordist
principles,
and the every
managers
confirms
self fulfilling
the
to
attributed
inherent
ARTHUR
and public
but
new
quite
between
electronized
United
States,
on the
(1990)).
the
contrary
Within
cuts
in Japan
insiders
trust
of labor
and "Us"
and
French
accross
the
or Germany,
and outsiders
is a barrier
day experience
firms
to the
behaviors,
the
of the firm.
diffusion
of both wage
(1988)),
propensity
to sue probably
cornes
precisely
with
a
the
long
restrict
first
when
of foreign
(D.
of
earners
and
according
with
to a
the area
of
where
competition
(1984)),
raie of financial
"
of trust,
trust
it is the
is not always
the
to
capital
in
the American
--,--
'
-
ël1U
and th us limit the
more
path
returns
grlevances
it is the
of
innovations
shaping
InaUSUlal
be
conception
in productive
and simultaneously
ln
totally
increasing
underinvestment
tradition
Gannat
very
NOBLE
trajectory
paradox
and
inertia
the
the leading
are interacting
Nevertheless,
pression
equipment
a possible
along
evolution.
manufacture,
and
Fordist
relations:
to any technological
strategies
Here
and French
industrial
infrastructures
1
strong
mass
are used to control
of opportunistic
the American
organization
dependency
driving
prevalence
adversarial
manufacturing
(B.
and
of
mechanism.
Of course,
scale
"They"
between
persistence
whereas
barriers,
is used to distinguish
finally
and the
(8. LAZONICK
between
the reliance
and
and the
and knowledge
examples
approach
the division
elsewhere
the workers,
commitment
to
the
Both in France
of equipments
according
explain
are good
controls,
pragmatic
by jack of trust,
devices.
their
of hierarchical
do
is sharper
as control
States and France
of a more
relation
Frequently
are supposed
Clearly,
instead
and execution
are used
United
the weight
industrial
principles.
conception
the
Traditionally,
adversarial
production
hand,
ë
scope
more
difficult
to
desirable.
Even
the
sufficient
to shift
unions
12
strategies
from vocal
responsabilities
to a tentative
2. Are labor conflicts
among
quasi
inexistence
Finland,
consequently
during
the
At the other
experience
80's,
3
:
are
diverse
UK and
of
performances?
with
benefits
is one of the
dose
growing
quite
Switzerland
litigation
a significant
has been a fast
The rest of this
configuration.
At one extreme,
poor economic
Finland
economies
whereas
management
performance?
end of the spectrum,
seemingly
not been bad performers
TABLE
3).
of strikes,
exhibit
of this surprising
European
(Table
of some
or even at the firm level.
bad for economic
various
propensity
our sample.
recently
have
the
to conflict
the
the acceptance
explanation
necessarily
De facto,
from
toward
at the shop f/oor level,
paper is devoted
respect
protests
lowest
Italy and
distrust.
Do
Not necessarily
economy
and
more
they
since
UK and
Italy
at ail.
HOW CONFLICTING
ARE THE VARIOUS
OECD COUNTRIES
?
* Days lost for 1 000 employers
Source:
But
Accross
with
Columns
a more
14 European
growth
systematic
countries,
and real wage.
still seem to be a weapon
causality
(1) and (2) A. FERN ER and R. HYMAN Eds. (1992),
Column (3) : N. CRAFTS (1992), p. 396.
is needed
the intensity
Ceteris
in obtaining
is an open question.
medium run strike activity
test
paribus,
and
of strikes
strikes
real wage
provided
increases.
A lot of investigations
is rather closely associated
by table
is positively
have
p. xiix
not hurt
correlated
growth
But the direction
suggest
with growth
4.
that
and
of
in the
and more
3
generally
the
macroeconomic
FERN ER, R. HYMAN
80's
due
external
to
trade
exceptional
cause.
rapid
in
(1992)).
direction
Nevertheless,
effect,
for workers
and
of
might
weil
that strike
macroeconomic
to strike,
be the
ESPINA
was
exploitation
Europe:
activity
Ed.
growing
of the
the
rise
consequence
real wage
variables
since they
(A.
Finland
the
Eastern
more complete
suggest
other
For example,
modernization
in Europe
unemployment
performances
(1991),
faster
has a positive
of
strikes,
of
rather
and
including
not its
growth
and rather
been kept constant.
in the
opportunity
of growth
equations
A.
Thus
and
significant
it is rational
get higher wages.
DISTRUST AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE:
MITIGATED
RESUl TS
TABLE
4 : STRIKES, GROWTH AND REAL WAGE INCREASES ARE STlll
POSITIVEl y CORRElA TED
14 European
countries,
1979-1989
-Correlation
matrix
(R2)
Strikes
density
86-90
1
0,29*
0,21
0,49 * *
0,25*
Data:
Computed tram the statistical
appendix tram A. FERNER, R. HYMAN (1992)
Method : linear regressions among variables. The correlation
indexed by * (confidence level 5 %) or * * (1 %).
Nevertheless,
adverse
slightly
consequences,
and
demands
are
of
increases.
underlying
even
to
correlated
poor
a lesser
industrial
extent
to strike
: the
activity
and similarly,
wage
economies.
Thus,
strikes
have
a more
associated
with
economic
boom
is stijl
improve
stagflationary
workers
and
but
they
their
logic
actually
deliver,
the
inflation
when
have
two
rate
since
is
workers'
is higher
ambiguous
to
when
unemployment
nominal
: closely
increases,
relations
concern
considered
possibly
power
positively
stijl
conflicting
usually
the
is significant
in more
impact
than
and growth,
they
the
possible,
bargaining
real
wage
14
There
stijl
prevailing,
productivity
and
real
implemented
most
oriented
growth
and
rather
shaky
information
finally
than
about
the
to macroeconomic
trom
tirms
Thus,
the
configuration,
the traded
confirmed
interesting
countries
by
because
and
more
interpretation
bargaining
for
fuel
larger
But on the other
were
be inverse:
and
an
shares,
of course
intermediate
-at least as captured
and price stability,
of a new
growth,
market
preliminary
relations
were
principles
would
4 suggests
industrial
regime
side,
and is still an efficient
economies
the
new
sophisticated
: cooperation
to some
and these
more
strikes
based
on
continue
to
device
for
bargaining
process.
Here
DISTRUST
OR
is an
be in an intermediate
principles
the sheltered
and trust
of conflict,
interesting
would
weapon
question
an
in lagging
and firms
stijl an efficient
theoretical
result
provide
not develop
earners
concern
If this
it would
would
by wage
might
sectors.
investigations,
of self interest
degree
would
productivity
not so much
the pursuit
still give a premium
a
new
enjoy
The
prevalence
contemporary
sectors
because
would
to employment
activity
the
regime
real wage increases.
possibly
good
contrary
by Table
adverse
possible
be
Fordist
then the conclusion
synthetised
it used to be in the 60's.
extracting
the
would
legs unemployment.
seem to be detrimental
are evidences
was
on
countries
On the one side,
by strikes-
respond
If
If the previous
conflicts
and operating,
cooperation
configuration.
paradox.
social
wage.
faster
trust
a second
distrust
and
completely
the
emerges
to
in the
be
now
investigated.
III
CONFIGURATION
agenda
of trust
noteworthy
authority
COLEMAN
(1990),
OF
A
PRISONER'S
is not at ail a new issue
to stress
of many disciplines.
sociology,
llKELlHOOD
DILEMMA
lN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The building
nevertheless
THE
For instance
and relations
Chapters
that
of trust
5 and 25).
this
question
in modern
is again
science
on top
and mathematical
have received
Similarly,
in social
on the
oriented
a lot of attention
some
historians
have
(J.S.
put
15
forward
the
role
of
emergence
of
when
interest
self
(1991)).
trust,
market
relations
becomes
Economic
under
reputation,
can overcome
highly
which
(1990a,b),
coordination
the
strong theoretical
and
and
or
the
private
same
J. ROBERTS
(1992)).
quite
to
a prisoner's
reasons explain
the
NORTH
and
tried
built for example
party
enforcer
Let us start
game
theory
dilemma,
why cooperation
(D.C.
issue
order,
in
encountered
force
of a third
central
ties,
difficulties
the
or absence
second
familly
exclusive
explored
a totally
the failure
configurations,
problem
driving
conditions
tradition
conversely
have
P. MILGROM,
simplified
from
and
theoreticians
investigate
KREPS
inherited
and
then
on
(D.M.
from
: first
to
two
a pure
show
that
is not a self implementing
convention.
1. A superior
convention,
based on trust,
can be blocked
by the past fordist
convention.
Industrial
combine
bath
partially
relations
an interest
contradictory
let us decompose
closely
related
coordinate
from
are
to
quite
cooperation
interests
themselves
a low trust
economies.
and workers.
different
Will
it be easy
economic
to
model
to
sinGe
conflict
questions,
for
and high return
performance
even
economic
strategy,
they
due to
Just for simplicity
two
upon a high trust
and reduced
indeed
and a propensity
for firms
the issue into these
in actual
complex
sake,
if they
are
agents
to
if they
configuration?
start
Stijl more
1).
It might
behavior
which
behavior
in the
SCHOTTER
earners
low
be convenient
is agreed
payoff
economies
to
both
or firms
recurrent
Initially,
Gan be adopting
a convention
to by ail members
specific
(1981).
to define
a low trust,
partners.
convince
of a society
situation
in a rather
(of
conflicting
small
Imagine
that another
as "the
productivity
now
and which
a coordination
society,
that
convention
with
observation
in
specifies
game)"
both firms
equilibrium
the
regularity
A.
and wage
delivering
of
more cooperation
other
a
'"
16
INSERT 1 : PARETO
EFFICIENCY
WITHiN
SElFUlllNG
1 -THE
DEFINITION
A PURE COORDINATION
GAME
: NOT ANY
MECHANISM.
OF THE GAME.
Imagine the very simple coordination
game
PLAYER 2
PLA YER 1
Initially the players are coordinated upon the strategy A delivering then bath UA. A new
strategy
B emerges and is Pareto superior if UB > UA. Will the players spontaneously
converge
towards this new equilibrium ?
Il -AN EVOlUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGY.
ln order to translate this two persan game into a N-person game, it is convenient to
imagine that agents meet randomly and play a series of two persan coordination games. Let us assume
that at time t, p(t) agents play the strategy A ,(1 -p(t)) the strategy B .Then the pay-off of this
new gamme is :
(1)
U(A,p) = p. UA
0 ~ p~ 1
(2)
U(B,p) = (1 -p) .UB
The second hypothesis is specific to evolutionary games. Following J. MAYNARD-SMITH
(1982), imagine that agents change their strategies according to their relative pay-offs. This
learning process takes into acount only past strategies and not any forward looking strategy.
This departure tram complete rationality may express the cost for collecting and processing the
relevant strategies of the other quite numerous agents. Thus :
(3)
p(t + 1) -p(t) = G[U(A,p) -U(B,p)]
G(o) = 0 ; G'(.) > 0
Within such a model, an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is such that not any invading alternative
strategy will be able to change the prevailing equilibrium. It is clear that any marginal shift out of
strategy A will converges toward p = 1 , delivering a payoff UA, as far as p is superior to the
threshold value p *
(4)
p* = UB / UA + UB
ua
"'"
"""
"
""
"'"
'""
'"'"
""
'"
""
,
~~:::~~m
Stable
""""econd
,
i:'1
Equilibrium
-THE
""
1 Historical
Stable
!
~--
'fi
UA
.p
Equilibrium
* ~
1
p
i
1.
:.
1
LlKELY LOCK-IN INTO A PARETO INFERIOR SOLUTION.
Thus, the players will be stuck to the old and Pareto inefficient strategy A: the superior
strategy will be out of reach of any individual agent, taken in isolation. Only a large coalition, taking at
least a proportion (1 -p*) of total population would pro pei the equilibrium towards UB .
Even in the absence of any conflict of interest, an old convention, here defined as an ESS,
might block the emergence of a new one, however superior for everybody.
~
17
might
exist and be desirable
a larger
payoff.
agents
ln an individualistic
unable
actions,
to elaborate
will they
Evolutionary
when
for them,
applied
society
and fulfil
spontaneously
Stable
since once implemented,
any social
adopt
Strategy
(ESS)
to this coordination
composed
of independent
contract
this high trust
proposed
it would
binding
strategy
deliver
economic
their
individual
? The concept
by J. MAYNARD-SMITH
game suggests
a negative
of
(1982),
answer
(Insert
1 -
Il)
ln tact,
as most
deviants
promoting
the
basically
me et quasi
have
a low
number.
payoff
ln
Gannat
replaced
coordinate
multiple
situations
(1988))
this
exist
institutional
a private
inertia
or state
of interest
agency,
groups
BUCHANAN
(M.
(1975))
to a frequent
This is a possible
persist
in the
innovators
equilibria
highly
and
United
promoting
built
upon
simplified
workers,
equilibrium
and
ail
associated
there
the
with
Nevertheless
simplification
cooperation
model,
is stijl reinforced
the two players
path
trust
choice
and
jack
(B.
ARTHUR
Note
Given
of the members
bureaucrats
convention,
low trust
society-wide
is the
is not any conflict
firms
have
high
this
trust.
that
(J.M.
contrary
theory
why the Fordist
result
in
within
strategies
the
more
by now introducing
this
about
asymmetric
for
is
the
in this
managers
the
a
the
stable
since,
between
interest
Of course,
pessimism
striking
of interest
same
stijl
interactions,
might be blocked by the evolutionary
The
the
strategy.
implementation
this
be
strategists
(1992)).
behavior
of managing
their
up to which
returns
of the
will
cannot
superior
A. ORLEAN
those
they
consequently
dependency
its practical
strategy,
and extend
high
increasing
neither
and France.
trust
will
the
the opportunistic
(1965)),
cooperation
low
from
explanation
States
since
is an ESS and
toward
(R. BOYER,
in public
ott
and
sinGe the
with
are in charge
found
trust
to pass the threshold,
not derive
OLSON
argument
strategy,
converge
nor from
who
strategy
technologies
does
be worse
low
to be imitated
inefficiency,
as for conventions
the
strategists
ability
trust
finally
possible
for
the
other
will
trust
in order
will
equilibria,
low
low
by the
adopting
strategy,
loose
the
agents
as weil
trust
themselves
might
are initially
exclusively
words,
who le economic
Thus,
high
and thug
other
spontaneously
agents
superior
very
crude
emergence
interests
of
between
18
INSERT 2 :
THE lIKEllHOOD
1 -THE
DEFINITION
OF DEFECTION
lN A SINGLE SHOT PRISONER'S
DllEMMA
GAME
OF THE GAME
Following R. AXELROD (1984), let us assume that, the two players have simultaneously
to choose between two strategies : cooperate or defect. If bath players cooperate, bath do fairly weil
and get
R, the reward for mutual cooperation, for example 3 units. If one player cooperates but the
other defects, the defecting players get the temptation to defect T , while the cooperating player gets
the sucker 's payoff S (for example respectively 5 points and 0 point). If bath defect they get P ,the
punishment for mutual defection (here 1 point).
PLAYER
2
Whatever
the stategy
chosen
by the other player 1 any rational
player will defect,
sinGe this is a
dominant
strategy.
By symmetry 1 it is clear that the only Nash solution of the game will be (P, P) .This
solution
is Pareto inferior to the cooperative
strategy
(R,R) 1 and nevertheless,
the self interest of bath
rational
players
is to systematically
defect.
ProDosition
ln the absence of communication, trust and enforcement mechanism, for a one-shot
prisoner's dilemma game, individua/ self interest does not de/iver cooperation, which would be
desirable for bath players.
Il -PRISONER'S
DILEMMA IS FREOUENT lN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.
This configuration,
or closely related ones i.e. deadlock, chicken or assurance games,
seems to often observed in industrial relations and their relations to macroeconomic
activity. Here are
some examples. Note that the first figure is the payoff the row player, the second one of the column
players. The parentheses are no more needed.
1. Managers versus wage earners within the firm : conflict over wage and effort.
WORKERS
The dominant solution
combines low effort,
low wage, which is
Pareto inferior or to
the high effort, high
wage strategies
FIRM
2. Two craft or sectoral unions conflicting over relative wages
UNION 2
-
LOW WAGE
Law WAGE
HIGH WAGE
0,5
3,3
UNION
1
Both unions will
demand high wages
and finally both will
be hurt by inflation
and loss of compe-
HIGH WAGE
5,0
1,1*
.titiveness
3. During a recession. will firm and workers trade emDlovment stabilitv acainst wace moderation ?
WORKERS
ln a one shot game,
with Jack of trust, it is
rational for workers
to ask for wage
FIRM
increases and for
the firm cut jobs
19
2. Defection
contemporary
shared,
does
Of course,
tram
not
sucker's
bath
players
defect.
mutually
do
the
associated
trust
be
joint
example
if agents
unable
to
cooperation..
(see section
of the possible
in the long run : low commitment
segmented
unions
(investment
sector,
low wage
run erosion
raie
in
level
failed
has
THATCHER's
low
strategies...)
more
productivity
(M.
pact
BROWN
government
obtained
are unable
British
cooperative
of
and
incarne
(1992)).
Only
of the legal framework
the
of
configuration
game
relations
strategies,
from
in the
been
is
give
a
even
a myriad
strategies
exerting
policy
favor
the
detrimental
approach.
be
to coordinate
Pareto
of defection
without
bath
would
in
industrial
side have
is
by an evolutionary
the
investment
on the other
when
which
for qua lit y and productivity
competitiveness,
a
of cooperation
structure
of such
productive
promoting
of
the
abroad,
of national
bargaining
.unless
multiplication
to the
opportunistic
commitment
sustain
on one side,
cooperate.
as soon as the
by the,
or are selected
persistence
but
but inferior
configuration
agreed
infra).
of a prisoner's
and if simultaneously
is now
steadily
IV,
the
2, Part III).
if the agents
learn
nor
cooperation
emergence
superior
be
of cooperative
not emerge
is exploited
(Insert
pie to
players
is intermediate
previously
the
mutual
the other
equilibrium
Pareto
any
even
will
to
Nash
the
in
significantlymodified
firms
ta
bargaining
its distribution,
tram
spontaneous
is out of reach,
Thirdly,
they
only
of
then the form
will
agent
player
size
of defection
defection
the
the
whereas
to those
benevolent
Secondly,
not
cooperation.
process,
inherent
modern
the benevolence
benefit
by defecting
about
advantagous
or/and
dilemma
of
upon
may take
would
of the second
Firstly,
conflict
game
mutual
the
pessimism
reinforced.
enlarge
built on cooperation
with
when
feature
exploiting
are inferior
defection
The
the
partners
payoffs
associated
but rational,
good
remove
a convention
payoff,
might
strategies
cooperation
payoff
prisoner's
a second
the related
can earn higher
gains
introduce
cooperation
Basically,
Consequently,
stijl
to
of opportunistic
dilemma.
the
time
but this
strategists.
they
is
Of course,
likelihood
in most
industrial relations.
It
processes.
strategy
is a dominant
from
of
the
manufacturing
propelling
a long
any clear
disciplinary
Recurrently,
tentative
guidelines
external
regulating
at the
redesign
industrial
national
by
the
relations
20
INSERT 2 (follow 1)
4. A larae union versus a central bank : the possibility of a stagflationnist configuration.
UNION
CENTRAL
WAGE
MODERA TION
WAGE
INCREASES
ACTIVE POLICY
3,3
0,5
RESTRICTIVE
POLICY
5,0
BANK
j
1.1'
The economy will end
up in the unsatisfactory
Nash equilibrium with
stagflation: large wage
demands but high
employment due to the
restrictive policy of the
Central Bank
5. A larae firm and its subcontractors : the conflict over price and quality.
SUBCONTRACTOR
ln the absence of
trust and long term
ties, the equilibrium
will associate low
quality with low price
LARGE
FIRM
III -DEFECTION
IS AN EVOlUTIONARY
STABLE STRATEGY (ESS).
let us now suppose that the population considered is composed of two types of agents: a
fraction p(t) is cooperative, (1 -p(t)) defects systematically. For the initial and general game, the
expected payoffs of cooperation Uc and defection Ud are respectively :
Uc (t)
=
Ud (t)
=
p(t).
p(t)
R
+
(1 -ptt))
T
+
(1 -p(t))
s
.P
Given that for a PD game S < P < R < T , it is clear that whatever the proportion of cooperative
agents, the self-interest will command to defect systematically. Thus defection is an ESS for any
revision function of the strategy of the form :
dp 1 dt
=
F[Uc(t)
-Ud(t)]
=
F [p(t) (R -T)
+
(1 -p(t)
(5 -PI]
<0
<0
<0
with any increasing function F such that F(O) = 0 and F' > 0
/'
si /
-~--
-~---,-
~-
Note that Figure 1 exhibits the configuration associated to game 2, section II~S = -2
R=4;P=3.
; T = 6 ;
CONCLUSION
Even weakening the content of rationality to simply copying the best strategy observed in
the past shots does not give any chance to a cooperative solution in the prisoner's dilemma.
21
seems
to
have
perturbated,
if not totally
destabilized,
the
strategies
of joint
defection.
It remains
rather
or
quite
corresponding
in
impact
economies
(Insert
the
quality
nature
the
strategy
from
the firm
workers
would
deliver
have
finally
linking
order
and
do
is
consequently
spectrum
illustrate
performance
interest
of
would
of issues
the
firms
the
potentially
and
national
(H.
and work
effort.
hired for a
in minimizing
their
interests
of the labor
and
the
a
low
LEIBENSTEIN
firms'
trust
performances
dilemma,
thug
give
the
would
the
very
for the
adopt
payoff
Nash
agreement
better
incentive
lowest
will
explicit
be
design
the
bath
reduced
Any
Clearly,
asking
Thus,
and
changing
being find.
whereas
workers.
may
and/or
But ex post the
: to
market,
(1987)).
firms
effort
wages.
just to prevent
and
Once
be to ask for a cooperative
pay high
effort,
Similarly
this
are facing
then
tram
strategy
equilibrium.
and workers
objectives
commitment
to
managers
the ideal would
the state
emerge
overcome
contracts,
have
which
compensation
to
the
(PD) configuration
of a whole
compensation
opposite
and
will
spontaneous
economies
examples
the minimum
defection
equilibrium
in
of labor
with
loyalty
the
five
For them,
the
compatible
highest
least
workers
work.
wage
dilemma
be representative
about
of their
managers
modern
distrust
conflicts
wage,
prisoner's
2, part Il).
very
the following
At
of
that
in
could
relations.
devastating
fixed
frequent
deadlock
industrial
0 Given
to be proven
than
this
schemes
structure
in
of the
initial game.
0 If two
unions
the wage
are coexisting
of two
On the one hand,
its sector,
associated
whereas
categories
each
will
be a high
the
economy
of workers,
wage
demands
to foreign
in consumer
low employment
bargaining
prices
sector.
the
wages
in
increases
By symmetry,
the logical
equilibrium,
Finally
of
will emerge.
for high nominal
and coordinate,
competition.
the
configuration
in the second
negociate
and possibly
is submitted
in asking
of the moderation
do not jointly
inflation
independently
the same
union has interest
benefiting
to moderate
and if the unions
and organizing
outcome
specially
relative
wage
if
22
among
sectors
objectives
John
will
of the
Maynard
be observed
firms
their
products
are facing
The managers
productivity
quality
interest
and
equilibrium
exhibits
profit
employment.
down
in order
turn.
to convince
Thus
the
by
seems
to
adjustment
The
hard for firms
to
sustain
low
their
thug
jobs
may
propose
but
Again,
that
they
will
job
make
attitude
finally
the
performances
firms
dilemma
benefit
a cooperative
less intensity.
and delivers
prisoner's
to defect.
or tire ail the workers
to defend
Pareto
cooperation.
and consequently
announce
in
to respond
strategy
with
workers
underlying
deadlock
bath partners
will
Of course,
main
recognized
will induce
layoff
working
and
emerges.
in order
in order
defection
initial
ago
and this
to work
employed
the workers
joint
long
PD configuration
a cooperative
and
the
relations.
the self interest
in shirking
was
(1936),
earners
productivity
to
turn or need a structural
but will finally
concerning
and
down
a third
will announce
Symmetrically,
careers
industrial
everybody
redundant.
have
in British
be for wage
to keep
structure
Theory
a severe
would
.contrary
General
is not present,
more
This
and processes,
strategy
But if trust
constant..
players.
KEYNES
by promising
tram
two
recurrently
0 When
optimal
remain
Nash
for
tenure
not be fired
is altered
bath
and/or
in case
into
of
a distinct
configuration
0 Imagine
now
interactions
that the macroeconomic
between
central
bank.
wage
increases
likely
in a highly
central
from
the
price stability..
conflicting
environment.
business
any
equilibrium
finally
adopt
a
permissive
association.
Conversely,
demands
by announcing
may combine
to wage
high
inflation
or
increases
along
can
the
central
Nevertheless
bargain
bank
is not
that
a recession
the
policy 1
and extract
imagines
monetary
Consequently,
of the monetary policy, i.e. a configuration
both social partners.
outcome
monetary
restrictive
with
moderate
imagine
laxist
it could
a rather
inflation.
to combine
desirable
union
of the
and an independent
economy
The
wage
is the outcome
union
.but this
any nominal
accommodation
the inflexibility
and unique
with
will
wage
powerful
be ideal for the national
along
validating
discipline
without
It would
bank
therefore
a large
equilibrium
to
supply,
the final
triggered
Nash
by
which is worse for
in this case, the union might finally learn
23
tram
this
a more
bad experience
satisfactory
case in Western
European
0 Finally,
Germany
such
firm
From
combine
joint
cooperative
good
fair
prices,
or
quality
ifs
whereas
innovative
with
arm length
goods
minimum
fight
for
good
quality
products.
prevail
with
Thus,in
low price
advantage.
competitive
WIENERT
(1991 )).
not
and
significant
at ail
cooperation
is Quite
to any market
(1986),
(1989))
persist
in the
refuse
to
deliver
in
and
display
satisfactory
a large
outcome.
outcome.
finally
worst
sample
suggests
private
variety
The
that
of
however
or social
of
task
may
prevail,
this allows
to cape
a
with
CHESNAIS,
H.
of
inadequate
interests
which
modelling
devices
theory
is
(U. WITT
unsatisfactory,
contract.
of social
high
competitive
play a one shot
institutional
quality
PO's configurations
: a state
evolutionary
an
quite
deliver
relationships
ln turn
conflict
in
high
structural
BELL,
only
But
high
combination
F.
Furthermore,
any
to
(G.
the
by
pay
the subcontractors
evolutions
from
to
to
is usually
ability
that this configuration,
enforce
side,
configuration.
economies
the
a POis
respond
delivery.
confident
markets
that
accept
and a larger
to emerge
under what conditions
unsatisfactory
quality
modern
economy.
the
in other
into
in getting
i.e. a reduced
and more
in foreign
would
eager
game,
long run.. .as soon as the agents
societies
investigate
likely
suggests
design
more
if stable
demand
other
the
be desirable
the outcome
necessarily
quality,
caught
it would
has interest
on the
shot
but limited
exceptional
inherent
modern
a one
and poor
position
change
This
not
a high price-high
technical
are
are
On the contrary
one may observe
better
but
whereas
be
in time
and distrust,
been
suggests
would
just
to get
automatic.
corporation
and
the large firm
price,
prices
of view,
subcontractors
relations
On one side,
at the
the
dynamism
the opposite.
might
: the
to have
This
is far tram
point
in order
not necessarily
or Italy.
subcontractors
strategies
seems
(1992))...but
Greece
wide
its strategy
This
equilibrium
a society
goods,
economy
as Spain,
and
configuration.
outcome.
(W. STREECK
of a more satisfactory
a large
consequently
macroeconomic
countries,
emergence
and adjust
may
game
and
But precisely,
in order
would
they might overcome the prisoner's
to
be to
dilemma,
24
INSERT
1
-IT
3
IS NOT
: ENlARGING
SUFFICIENT
TO
THE SCOPE FOR FUTURE:
FOSTERING COOPERATION.
REPEAT
THE
PD lN ORDER
TO
A FIRST METHOD
INDUCE
RATIONAL
FOR
AGENTS
TO
COOPERATE.
Intuitively,
if the same players interact over and over through time, they might recognize
their joint interest in cooperation.
ln experimental games, this seems to be the case, even if the
number of runs is finite and known in advance (R. AXELROD (1984)).
But simple models do not confirm these empirical findings. Imagine a finitely repeated game.
Purely rational actors should not cooperate. They have to start from the final phase of the game and
decide their strategy : for each player, it is clear that her /his interest is to defect at the final stage. So
for the previous phase and so on. Thus, solving by backward induction the series of PD, it is optimal
to defect at the fast stage, and consequently to any prior node of the game (D. FUDENBERG, J.
TIROLE (1991), Ch. 3).
Il -IF
THE
CONDITIONAL
PD IS PLA YED INDEFINITEL Y AND IF THE DISCOUNT
RATE
COOPERATION
STRATEGY
MIGHT BE A Nash EOUILIBRIUM.
R
IS HIGH
ENOUGH,
A
Now the game is played indefinitely between two players, who now have three strategies,
1. Tit for Tat : Cooperate until the other player defects and then defect indefinitely.
2. Cooperate on every round, whatever the past strategy of the other player.
3. Defect on every round.
The general game defined by insert 2 has now another payoffs, which depends crucially
upon the discount rate r. If for example bath players are adopting a cooperative strategy, their total
payoffs will be
-
te = R +
rR
+
r2R
,... + ...,riR,...
l
=
(1 + ri) x R
j=O
te = R/1-r
The same method applied to ail the cases gives the following
configuration
An infinitely repeated PD : S < P < R < T
TIT FOR TAT
R/1-r
, R/1-r
R/1-r
, R/1-r
R/1-r , R/1-r
5 + P/1-r, T + P/1-r
e
d
Cooperate
, R/1-r
S/l-r
, T/l-r
T/1-r , 8/1-r
P/1-r
1 P/1-r
R/1-r
h
9
T + P/1-r , S + P/1-t
Three major conclusions
1. Defection
DEFECT
~
b
a
Tit for Tat
Defect
COOPERATE
emerge (T. SANDLER (1992))
at each period (cell il continues
ta be a Nash Equilibrium
the lack of cooperation
is still
possible.
2. Tit for Tat (cell a) is another Nash EQuilibrium if the rate of discount
compensate any one shot temptation by the other player to defect i.e. if :
R/1-r > T + P/1-r
> r > 1 -(R-P) / T
r
is large enaugh
ta
3. If the severity of the POis conflict of interest is relaxed into an assurance game (5 < P < T < R),
cooperation and tit-for-tat become Nash Equilibriua (ceffs a, b, d, e) : cooperation is more likely
along with defection (i).
25
IV
HOW
CAN
COOPERATION
EMERGE
? SOME TEACHINGS
FROM
GAME
THEORY,
SinGe the
(1950),
solutions
equilibrium
in order
countries
for
our
that
(and incidentally
1. Enlarging
the scope
sophisticated
intuitively,
better opportunities
On one
period
and
the previous
if the
players
discount
the
as
fûr
as
systematically
puzzling
if the
deadlock
is finite
induction
investigated
defect
is
side,
the
will
in reaction
did
and game theorists.
abilities
of
relations,
It
European
to present
a
of presentation
chapter
devoted
cooperation
?
dilemma
games.
to his
in PD relates
game bargaining
the
have
interest
gives
strategy
the
completion
in defecting
might
and
enough
become
first
one of
proposed
: the player
previous
for ail
indifinitely
a high
will
shots,
from the cooperative
is
at the
strategy
long run, i.e.
(1984)
ta any deviation
of
is repeated
of cooperation
during
date
be the optimal
for the
Tit-for-tat
sa
and
if the game
by R. AXELROD
player
TUCKER
a cooperative
of cooperation
this will
strategy
This
toward
(A.
to emerge (Insert 3).
game
On the other
50's
The order
prisoner's
each of them
by backward
other
in industrial
in his own
repeated
then a conditional
the
unequal
how to promote
concerns
experimentally
the
of the idea that a multiperiod
players,
equilibrium.
in the
are available.
have a significant
rate,
Nash
issue:
the
side,
periods.
explain
which
for cooperation
by the two
back
convergence
strategies
for future:
variants
the
by R. AXELROD's
our) central
Ouite
i.e.
results
adopted
puzzle
for by many economists
cooperative
of the main
is precisely
final
to promote
purpose,
to generate
survey
known
of this
have been searched
is interesting
brief
emergence
and
cooperate
but
will
strategy.
3.
26
INSERT 4 : CHANGING THE PAYOFF lN ORDER TO ATTENUATE
THE CONFLICT
OF INTERESTS : A SECOND PATH lN ORDER TO EllCIT COOPERATION
1 -IMMERGING
THE PO's GAME INTO A SERIES OF TWO-PERSON GAMES.
It is important to check the generality of a PD configuration and examine a broader category
of games, one-shot without
communication,
but which have in common the choice between
cooperation (C) and defection (D). One gets the following typology (G. TSEBELIS (1990) : 61-79).
PLAYER
s
1. Prisoner's
~
dilemma game
2. Deadlock game
P
R
1
1
T
1
S<P<R<T
S
R
1
1
S<R<P<T
Chicken game
2
P
T
Il
P
5
R
1
1
1
T
1
P<S<R<T
4. Assurance game
S
P
1
1
T
\
l"
R
1
S<P<T<R
Il
-THE
PD 18 ONLY GAME
WITH
A UNIQUE
EQUILIBRIUM
WHICH
18 NOT A PARETO
OPTIMUM.
Economists
and more generally social scientists
are interested
in Pareto optimum
configurations:
a player' s payoff cannot be improved without lowering another player' s payoff. This
is a minimalist criterium in order to gauge the efficiency of possible equilibria.
,. For a Prisoner's Dilemma. It has been shown that the only equilibrium (0,0) is not Pareto optimal,
as shown by the graph : players would have interest to play (C,C), since they would both gain, which
is not the case for (C,D) or symmetrically (D,C)
27
Tit for tat will
be a Nash equilibrium
compensate
defection
any
one
at any period
defection
is
Everything
depends
or chicken
possible
result
in the
games.
that in the case of extreme
small
and individually
cumulative
purpose,
it is not
emergence
for
Of course,
the
example
firms
of the
it can be in the interest
length
KREPS,
P.
uncertainty
reputation
is finite,
MILGROM,
about
cooperation.
be needed
No
manufacturing
J.
words,
to induce
doubt
systems
strategy
a behavior
and this
(see section
V).
and
feature
(for
small
not
stochastic
equilibrium.
even
if the
complete
may help
degree
(D.
the
in sustaining
of irrationality
to bath players.
interaction
present
of
if the
(1982)).Thus,
benefitial
repeated
and
of their
Stijl more,
example
is
WILSON
is largely
of the
groups
life
a cooperative
is finally
by the
in favor
finite
game.
of one player
or some
is a
interpretative
a tit for tat strategy
R.
This
are quite
some
to the
information
which
continuous
Nevertheless,
to sustain
and
For
any
agent lives forever
unending
the
virtually
is outweighted
is unknown
imperfection
that
cooperation
game
that
games,
are sufficiently
argument
survive
to an
ROBERTS
the underlying
ln other
may
can sustain
provided
other
outcome.
period.
use this
of agents
effects
future
abstracto
play according
started.
for cooperation
not any economic
unions,
:
is
game allows
cooperation
to
highly
and
of completion
horizon
industrial
seems
and finally
Finally,
might
result
game
(Insert 4). The folk theorem
repeated
in every
of cooperation.
date
variable),
incurred
straitforward
constituents
possible
loss
But
the assurance
that the players
future
from
of
for example
to be an equilibrium
deviation
defect.
process
variety
and the reasons
totally
consequently
agents,
from
the
varies,
patience,
payoff
to
to the repeated
a significant
distant
of tit for tat strategy
player
to
of the game.
supposes
a rather
rational
: any advantage
but
for
cooperation
shows
similar
once
of interests
i.e. take into account
generalization
and
rational
rate is large enough
other
solution
conflict
Again,
the
to be another
holds
patient
feasible
by
on the first sequences
general
the degree
temptation
continue
always
This
when
shot
only if the discount
help
in contemporary
in
~~z~
!~~{:,-~-~-
28
.INSERT
~~~"::,
~--
4 : (Follow 1)
~-
~
2. ln a deadlock game, (0,0) is the outcome, which is the second preference for each player, but
which nevertheless
is Pareto optimal.
3. ln the Chicken game, two equilibria can be reached (C,D) and (D,C) and they are Pareto optima.
4. ln the Assurance game, two equilibria can be obtained (C,C) and (D,D) but the more desirable for
each player is a Pareto optimum.
It might be concluded that :
1. The POis is quite exceptional and theoretically should not be overwhelmingly frequent. Industrial
relations might be an exception (see Insert 2 -Il).
2. A POis game can be transformed into an assurance game by lowering the benefit tram defecting
while the other player cooperate (T) compared with the benefit of cooperation (R).
3. For example, aState regulation might impose to social partners to negociate and on the contrary
forbid or made costly defection.
4. Thus, a mix of private or public regulations can change the initial payoff and foster cooperation.
This seems to be rather frequent in industrial relations.
III
-COMPLETE
STRATEGIES
OR PARTIAL
(ESS) lN ASURANCE
COOPERATION
OR CHICKEN
MAY
BE SUSTAINED
Assume now that at any time t ,there is a proportion
of defecting strategies, which respectively earn:
1 -p(t)
U,,(t)
=
p(t)
R
+
(1 -p(t))
.S
Ud(t)
=
p(t)
T
+
(1 -p(t))
.P
AS
= F[UC(t)-Ud(t)]
Two cases are interesting
= F[p(R-T)
for our purpose.
STABLE
p(t) of cooperative strategies,
From one period to another, agents observe these relative payoffs
learning according to the following adjustment process :
dp/dt
EVOLUTIONARY
GAMES.
+ (1-p)),(S-P)]
and they are selected or
29
their
perception
course,
third
this
issue
will
to
configuration
with
bath
task
and this
:
how
the payoffs.
is equivalent
the
general
relations,
assurance
may
structure
with
cost
to admit
of defection
(1984)).
is
the
But of
that
a
or make
Finally
a broader
prisoner's
dilemma
then
cooperation
joint
cooperation
the second
one which
have finite
may
be challenged
distribution
of games.
more
frequent
of interacting
while
interests
the other
for
getting
If for
incompletness
cooperation
(R. J. AUMAN,
players
recall of past interactions
of other
be an equilibrium.
or
are
really
solutions,
most
existing
PD
extreme
It would
be
social
For example,
than
ln an
is an optimum.
exclusive.
and
in industrial
games,
(see previous
cooperates,
cooperation
instance
the rationality
irrationality
of
optima.
: it is the
are mutually
types
be
: bath are Pareto
might
while
Insert
2) :
be inferior
to
joint cooperation.
method
about
the
the four
of full rationality.
is a doubt
prefer
investigate
by defecting
associated
there
and
and cooperation
game
the gains obtained
by ~ ' or if they
defection
clearly
among
the same
Another
defecting
of POis Gan rightly
to
conflicts
hypothesis
at
change
(R. AXELROD
the other
self interest
economic
the payoff
cooperation
joint
players
generality
case in which
preserving
from
cooperating,
the
an empirical
game
and try to internalize
addressed
game,
the
i.e. somehow
(INSERT 4)
nevertheless
Thus,
be
one player
assurance
the same
intervene
the benefits
has
self interest,
is no more
party
apparent
of their
seems
to
players
ln
be
S. SORIN (1989)).
might
be
to
approximate
relax
full
(R. RADNER
the
optimum
(1986)
or if
(D. KREPS & Alii (1982)),
other
words,
required
for
some
the
degree
emergence
of
of
30
INSERT 4 (Follow 2)
A third equilibrium now exists, but it is unstable. The game will converge toward
cooperation if initially the population exhibits a sufficient propensity to cooperate. Thus, the same
game might end up in two different equilibrium according to the starting point. History matters :
cooperation might be past-dependent. Note that the defection equilibrium is not a Pareto optimum and
nevertheless it cannot be overcome if a self adjusting process. This corrects the optimism brought by
a purely static analysis (see Il -supra).
2. A chicken game : the ESS is a mix of cooperation and defection.
Since now P < S < R < T , the revision process is converging toward the intermediate
configuration p. = (P -SI / (R -T + P -SI
p
Hence the indeterminacy of the static model is removed. Finally the ESS combines in a fix
proportion bath defection and cooperation, and it does not depend anymore on the history of the
system: the final outcome is only related to the payoff matrix. The initial attitudes concerning
cooperation or defection do not play any raie.
CONCLUSION:
THE FATALITY
OF DEFECTION CAN BE PARTIALLY OVERCOME
i) by an outside penality to opportunism or subsidy to cooperation
ii) ln these new games, path dependency might exist and prevent cooperation (assurance game with
individualistic values) or not (assurance game with holistic values i.e. when agents take into account
the outcome for the group and not only themselves).
31
Anothe
MAYNARD
persan
avenue
SMIT
game
(1982)).
and
frequency
of def ctionnists
for a whole
popu ation.
informati
agents
have
assumes
th
the strateg
This
second
which
make
significant
depart
quite trac~able
An
(ESS) if not any invasion
equilibrium.
Unde
the
Nash
this
where
the
t of interests
strategy
are more
conventional
is totally
theory
tend
this
looking
to
last game.
processes
of
forward
which
approach
is
a
strategies,
but
it
stable
strategy
results.
to
an
pure
evolutionary
prisoner's
course
the game
dilemma
evolutionary
interesting
and
out of
(See
previous
for other
benefits
this
configuration,
stable
and ambiguous
is not so acute
random
exists
a
t reshold
between
into
equilibrium.
On th
equilibria.
a
matrix
highly
contrary,
of
payoffs,
individualistic
more holistic,
exhibits
cooperative
Thus,
play a raie in the type
s me
embedded
for
result
to the
emerges.
joint defection
framework
proportion
e a stable
ma
very
an interesting
an evolutionary
will
and attitudes
the
game,
theo y, the selection
cooperation
For
cost
the
the
games
defection
(Insert 4.111).
For an assurance
there
The
ail the
they
during
dynamic
but
equilibrium
game
interactions:
return
of
strategies,
Evolutionary
the
large
is a simple
looking
is able to remove
in the
is of
results
This
costs
past
study
rational,
by deviants
2), But the
out this
by the distribution
forward
the higher
correspond
Insert
confli
tram
to
fully
equilibrium
randomly
population.
information.
learn
respect,
N-
for collecting
possible.
will
into a
due to excessive
(and more realistic)
equilibrium
(J.
to global
allows
of
theory
pure micro-interactions
has delivered
re out
games
is inserted
once transformed
crude
cooperation
games
are selected
fully rational
simply
hY f otheSis
eventually
unique
tram
Secondly,
players
persan
the whole
n and computing
adopt
delivers
game,
to r Iy on a rather
that
agents
among
for shifting
by evolutionary
the two
two
pl y the related
method
relevant
Firstly,
: at each period,
population
powerful
has been proposed
the
some
a path
agents,
which
i.e. group
will
dependency
above
distribution
industrial
society
in
and joint cooperation
initial
of outcome
Whereas
will
which,
of beliefs
finally
emerge.
relations
nurture
oriented
a
systems
defection
economies
may
:
32
INSERT
5
: IMPROVING
THE RECOGNITION
PROMOTING
f--
l"
:..,"
i =
-1
ABILITIES
COOPERATION
Il
-1
0
L kalJI .1
1
i.e.
: A THIRD AVENUE
FOR
?
.1
1
1-1
t-1
t
t+1
k = ~
J-1
The problem IS now to assess under which conditions this localisation of interaction allows a group of
t cooperating agent to survive among the rest of defecting agents. It is sufficient to compute the
payoff for a cooperating agent at the periphery of the group Uc and compare it with his or (her)
immediate neighboor who is defecting.
Defectionists
D
~~
1
!-
1
0
-1
Applying
C
1
i=O
Cooperative agents
C
1
L kalJ-11 EIXli).X(j)
J-O
One gets for the cooperative
v j
1
1
t
t+1
Defectionists
0
1
1
1
U+(O) =
E being the payoff of PO's game
agent in O.
J=t-i
j >
D
the general formula
UO) =
For
t-1
C
W
L
ka J .R
+
I
J>I
ka! .S
Jst
-w
For
j <
1
U-(OI =
LkalJI.
S
Jz-1
The total payoff for the cooperating
agent located in 0 is
Uc(O)
+
=
(ka /1-a)
x
[(1 -at-1) R
(at + 1)5 ]
The immediate neighbour at the left, who is defecting gets the following pay off:
-œ
For
j <
-1
U-(-ll
=
LkalJ-11
x P
J--2
J-t.-1
For
j > 0
U+(-il
-L
.œ
\"" ka(JI x T
+
J-O
L\"" ka(J.II x P
J-t.
The total payoff for the defecting agent located in -1
Ud(-1) = (ka/1-a) x [(1-at-1) xT + (at + 1)xPJ
is
quite intuitively, let us assume that each agent at the periphery of the cooperating group will compare
the respective return of cooperating and defecting.
Ac(t,a) = Uc(O) -Ud(-1)
AC(t,a)
=
(1 -at-1) (R-T)
+
(1 + at) (5
P)
1)
33
trigger the emergence
for technologies
with
of a cooperative
increasing
outcome.
For social norms as weil as
to scale,
history
returns
matters
(8. ARTHUR
(1988)).
Similarly,
when
an evolutionary
unique
ESS,
defection
the
the
history
enough,
the
this configuration
in
: this
system
for
of solution
combines
strategists
of
solutions
concept
which
prone
static
a
fix
a chicken
is implemented.
proportion
new equilibrium
but
only
could
tram
explain
game
the
why
are transformed
One observes
cooperation
does
prone
not depend
relative
and
at ail tram
payoffs.
bath strategies
one
Interestingly
Gan coexist
within
the same economy.
Finally,
cooperation.
State
can
If the
impose
cooperative
payoff
joint
logical
between
dilemma
point
3. Improving
costs
upon
for instance
concerning
including
self interest
be
unions
defection
passing
training,
used
interact
and
on the
extreme
to
propritiate
contrary
yearly
the conditions
and costs
that
they
The final
might
of cooperation.
configuration..
subsidize
negociations,
jurisprudence,"..""
returns
and the emergence
order
via a PD configuration,
under
security,
and public
as a quite
in
laws enforcing
associations
bath private
appears
may
and the
and business
institutions
the conflict
prisoner's
extra
unions
matrix
intervention
managers
strategies,
strengthening
build
public
mitigate
After
.at least
from
ail,
a
of view"
the recognition
ability of economic agents.
ln the one shot game, the players are unable to diagnose
cooperation..
whether
34
INSERT
5
(Follow
Consequently the size of the cooperating group t
accordance with the following adjustment process.
dt / dr = F [AC(t,a)]
r : time
1)
will increase provided
that
AC(t,a) > 0 , in
F' > 0 F(O) = 0
(2)
t : size of the group at time C
Il -LOCALIZATION
CANNOT SalVE THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA.
If one specifies the configuration
of PD ;.e. 5 < P < R < T , it is clear from equation
(1) that the advantage is always ta defecting since R -T < o and (5 -P) < 0,
The cooperating group
is invaded
Localization
does not help in promoting
sile of the
cooperating group
and extending
cooperation
in a pure PD game.
A necessary condition is to find t and a such that
AC(t,a)
=
(1 -at-1) (R -T)
This can be found in the three following
+
(1 + at) (8 -P)
>
0
cases
1. An assurance game: S < P < T < R
Cooperation will prevail if :
(1 -at-1)
Provided that
P -S
/ (1 +
<
at)
R -T
=
fIa,t)
=
(P -S)
/ (R -TI
in order to get a solution to the related equation
(3)
35
It has
Pareto
that
inferior
a group
shown
previously
outcome
could
be replaced
of cooperative
accordance
(1992)).
been
with
Thus
population,
their
this
strategists
required
group
therefore
that
to
deliver
expanding
coordination
by a more satisfactory
were
ability
could
in a pure
able to select
cooperate
a higher
and sustaining
one,
the
that
a cooperative
a
provided
newcomers
(R. BOYER,
payoff
game
A.
the
in
ORLEAN
rest
of the
convention
(Insert
5. 111.1).
Unfortunately,
such
dilemma
: whatever
prisoner's
the frontier
game
of their
by exploiting
group,
their
cooperation
will
are the
respect,
this
argument
contemplates
modern
Note in passing
clearly
multi-person
size
temptation
returns
NORTH
than
but
defect
full
and
the difficulties
group,
to
of
of collective
also the
while
the
ratio
to costs
other
players
the
deadlock
cooperation,
the
by
for
large
initial
the
trust
via
returns
island
Under
action
(1982)
depend
cooperate
Gannat
be
has been
not just
gives
game
views
ln the
: in a
on the
PD,
higher
solved
of
(1984).
a N-person
to benefits.
this
abrasiveness
This theme
R. HARDIN
of
(1987)
by R. AXELROD
game toward
at
individualistic
5, Il).
the
a
agents",
by M. TAYLOR
more difficult.
echoes
prevail
tram
(Insert
prognosis
a two-person
(1990)
invaded
the vision
erosion
optimistic
benefit
population.
and make cooperation
game,
of the
the
that the shift tram
by D.C.
be
in line with
progressive
with
the
will
not
"holistic
Consequently,
and
within
is more
than
has an impact
surveyed
majority
the
values,
shrink
does
size of the
agents
to cooperate.
progressively
which
outcome
the initial
opportunistic
propensity
agents
who
an optimistic
if the
private
by
local
interactions.
But,
into
assurance
progressively
cooperation
viable
the
contemplated,
or
invade
is higher
emerging
games.
if the payoffs
chicken
the
games,
than
that
various
as
of defection
suppose
avenues
by mixing
localized
who le system,
cooperation
Other
of PD are transformed
for
the
definite
by third
cooperative
soon
average
5 -III).
conditions
of
Firstly
intervention
interactions
as the
(Insert
emergence
other strategies.
party
upon
may
return
of
Nevertheless,
a
the
payoffs
of
cooperation
can
be
agents
.may refuse
to
36
INSERT 5 (Follow 2)
a
2. The same condition
can be fulfilled for a chicken game i.e.
P < S < R < T
3. For a pure coordination game S = 0 , T = 0 and R > P
ThenAc(t,a)
= R -P -at-1 (R + aP)
The smaller
a, the more localized the interactions and the greater the possibility
cooperation. This is a generalization of R. BOYER and A. ORLEAN (1992).
of diffusion
of
37
play
against
developing
defectionnists
their
enforce
previous
(1989)).
others,
(1992)).
in such
TSEBELIS
more
Secondly,
stochastic
that
Thus the
about
but sufficiently
long,
Precisely,
schools,
which
that
one
families
person's
feelings
be more easily solved
interest
into
fulfiled.
Thus
(1987))
but if tao
which
This
will
strategy
Insert
many
results
bodies
strategy
to altruism
.Not
(M.
may complement
either
of
can
games
be
(G.
the
infinite
or
point to the direction
of
in order
diffused
to the benefit
altruism
helps
where
institutions
to teach
principles
Altruism
the
among
(i.e.
a society,
more
may be helpfull
put forward
since
it sustains
unrelented
(Insert
5 -Il)
only the former
leads to a more efficient
.This
always
agents,
equilibrium.
: a tit for
equilibrium
and dominated
to prefer
it penalize
of
(M. TAYLOR
defection
be a reason
fair since
not
by opportunistic
(1984)
if
conflict
if
for efficiency
will be invaded
of
6) ?
initial
a long run cooperative
would
being
satisfaction
likely,
by R. AXELROD
is more
equilibrium
the
to a general
cooperation
the fact
will the prisoner's
individual
is more
as
of action
weil
(Insert
in transforming
such
describes
by the
of cooperation
cooperation
economy
mainly
affected
back
3 -1), whereas
game
and
bring
better
of
a series
and interrelated
can be exploited
is strongly
is finally
one specific
high, naïve altruists
a defection
finally
ail,
some dose of altruism
argument
into
E.
out
cooperation
game
games
and
single gains.
be positively
satisfied)
games
finally
of
in
simultaneously
information
of the duration,
or mitigated
positive
more
other
repeated
is widely
intuitively,
are
the importance
might
dilemma
agents
during
to self interest.
If this
other
current
frequent
are designed
limited
sentiment
the
interest
HIRSHLEIFER
erosion
of articulated
After
another.
Ouite
insert
and
a public
the
the defection
negative
of preferences.
are not simply
(D.
have
: altruism and reciprocity.
these
churches,
may
density
argument
formation
prevent
they
(1993))
create
in ail the subsequent,
4. Change the preferences
the
ORLEAN
can
to
they
Thus,
defectionnists
they
order
Thirdly,
(1990)).
common
in
cost
A.
against
a manner
by a large
recognized.
(R. BOYER,
ostracism
interactions,
KANDORI
paid
memory
group
RASMUSEN
once
tat
(see
by
reciprocity
defection
but it
38
The argument
agent
values
negative
negatively
altruism
and negative
negative
with
made
case,
defection
severe
the
conflict
and
evokes
contrary
in some
turn
quite
a devastating
the
efficient
help
out detrimental
cooperative
want
of interest
strategy.
a rather
initial
unfriendly
ln a pure
egoïsm
strategy.
These
the differences
prisoner's
world
one
When
to maximize
of the
(i.e.
well-being).
is again a dominant
if agents
suggest
in the
to the
equilibrium.
enlargement
of
the
some
dilemma
"à la HOBBES"
naïve theories
emergence
efficiency
or even
third
scope
for
of trust,
of cooperation
allow
defection...which
Reciprocity,
will
party
the
is
(M.
the
it
development
finally
seem
altruism
but in others
ruin
enforcement
future
the PD game into a more cooperative
has to be explored.
has been modelled
its payoffs
played
a series
were
basically
the stylized
the
and
to
be
tacts
communities
Similarly,
do deploy
network
and
tram
long distance
of
initial
incentives,
much
more
game.
significantly,
any relations
historical
trade
a legal
one with
investigations
of trust
was helped
but does
the
trust
by kinship,
successfull
which
is based
(M.
This
(D. NORTH
some
enforcement
agents
another.
demonstration,
the
implying
that
has been emerging,
capitalism,
form
arguments,
rest of the world,
or more
of risky contracts
in modern
necessarily
the
of the theoretical
a very specific
not
tram
without
derived
enforcement
and larger
ln ail the previous
independent
games
when
the compliance
for trust.
isolation
for the clarity
(1991 )). For instance,
a basis
in total
of scattered
be satisfactory
not fit with
tight
some
an optimal
defection
systematic
A last avenue
about
enjoy
altruism
tools.
5. Merge
might
others
becomes
to what
cases,
might
that
in case of negative
(1987)).
might,
game
that
are overwhelming
Thus,
and
fact
are mixed,
agents:
more
TAYLOR
the
altruism
results
other
is still reinforced
as
business
on a closely
GRANOVETTER
(1992)).
From a more theoretical
closely
related
compatibility
one
with
and long
another,
fun viability
point of view,
in such
a way
the various
that
the
and not so much their
conventions
basic
issue
are
is their
Gloser proximity
to a
39
Pareto
optimum
interactions
between
multilayered,
work
(O. NORTH
the related
skills
This is specially
according
is not equivalent
evidence
and
power
multiperiod
and sustainability
This
play
games
Just
between
economic
plant
network.
to stick
level
network
recent
between
is quite
experience
different
spheres
games
pro
quo.
enlightening
pact
more cooperative
a good
the
Again,
games.
sinGe it
models.
ln order
G.
TSEBELIS
of assuming
that
are embedded
the
in
player
these
interactions
about
the possible
negociated
strategies
example
societies
it
emergence
(...) determines
relations,
modern
Of course,
for the
: "Instead
these
gives
of
qui
formai
a political
to adopt
to promote
for reasserting
in politics,
of games
instance,
may be an incentive
: spanish
that
of industrial
factors
For
results
games
organized,
by theoreticians,
quite sophisticated
to the theme
and political
of
explored
it shows
This
but a method
so on.
they are not the
of interdependent
of nested
the results
in order
key ingredients
surprising
the concept
of cooperation.
level
interaction
quite
Even if
arena...and
Nevertheless
are
benefits,
are recognized,
process
are the
in a vacuum,
order
payoff".
national
permanent
in already
de facto
(1992)).
the
earners
technologies.
concession
strategy,
horizon
understand
people
emergence
in a
new
rights
example,
welfare
bargaining
are absent.
defection
wage,
(W. STREECK
be modestly
has proposed
higher
of cooperation
for
and wage
independent,
of mutual
the me has only
to
layoffs,
social
in a myriad
(1990)
some
where
process
unions
another
of cooperation
a lot of complexity,
example
the payoff
relations
issues:
are formally
to say that conflicts
bargaining
reciprocity
for
degree
for a systematic
relative
of interacting
so in economies
some
firms,
and training,
impose
to a continuous
and maintain
scope
strategies
conflict
ln industrial
associations,
formation
bargaining
of a previous
brings
business
have a wide
duration,
(1990)).
(A.
of
at the
at the
such
ESPINA
an
Ed.
(1991)).
This
models
is a good transition
about
countries
exhibit
Secondly,
what
become
the
issues
under
one or another
about
the process
more cooperative
?
toward
review.
the teachings
Firstly,
of the factors
which
allowed
do
of ail these
the
put forward
quite
more
theoretical
cooperative
by game
conflicting
theory
societies
?
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41
v
AN
VARIOUS
THEORETICAl
ARGUMENTS
It is clear
such
few researches
their
results,
very
promising
the
COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL
section
preliminary
more
(A.E.
modest
of the likelihood
preliminary
THE
DO
indeed
assess the empirical
factual
researches
is much
assessment
counter
HOW
:
?
is very
try to carefully
legs to derive
era for future
PERFORM
an exercice
in game theory
stijl
present
that
ANAL YSIS
conclusions.
: to
propose
of the various
a
relevance
This
ROTH (1992)).
: only
could
of
be a
The objective
a very
of
crude
mechanisms
and
promoting
a
continuous cooperation, not devoid of conflicts
The empirical
researches
upon
material
the
has been collected
governance
transformations
of the capital
labor
(R. BOYER (1988)).
flexibility
labor relations
used in order to substantiate
C.
ESPING-ANDERSEN
(1990),
structures
(1990),
many
risky exercice
B.
(R.
of comparitive
BOYER
(1991)),
(R. BOYER (1990)),
Of course,
this
by a series
other
(C. LANE
BRUHNES
(1989),
or the issue of
sources
have
(1989),
J.O.
the
been
IRES (1992),
REYNAUD
& alii
G. ROGERS and W. STREECK (1992)).
1. Concern
for the future
A superficial
and density
look suggests
interactions,
and intertemporal
in order
explain
conflicting
to
relations
industrial
sectors
explaining
BaYER
innovation
rates.
the
of
rime
which
This
allows
factor
This
via learning
with
national
very
(Table
a strong
already
trajectories
same
by financing
feature
effects
which
taken
in terms
might
multiplicity
to be dealt
runs
the
between
factor
factors.
from
cooperative
5). Basically,
interaction
been
the
factors
to more
a large discount
had
horizon,
configurations,
and Japan
go along
discriminating
are the first
UK and US for example,
contrasted
(1991)).
that
bargaining
spectrum
Germany
industrial
interest
the
societies,
as contemporary
of interactions:
with
rather
ones,
such
less conflicting
the financial
or conversely
account
of
lower
and
real
as
important
in
of governance
modes
(R.
dynamism
of
explain
the
(T. MARMEFEL T (1992),
B.
i.e.
42
INSERT
6
: CHANGING
THE PREFERENCES
: AL TRUISM
ENHANCES
COOPERATION.
Following M. TAYLOR (1987)) suppose a one shot PD game (see Insert 2) whichis now
played by 2 agents who take into account not only their own payoffs, X, and X2, but a combination
of bath of them
1,2
= aX.
Uj
1
+ bX
1
1
J
This exhibits two polar cases
1. The pure egoïst has bi = 0 but ai > 0
2. The pure altruist features on the contrary
The initial
PO's game
bj >
0 and
(5 < P < R < T) is transformed
ai = 0
into
PLAYER 2
PLA YER 1
The transformed
only if
'Vi
game is a PD , with (D,D), the only equilibrium,
aS + b.T >
( a1 + b.1 )R
(aj+b;lP
>
ajT+bjS
(aj+bjIR
>
(aj+bjIP
1
and
1
One can derive the following
i.e.
ai >
ai
.e
and rather intuitive
into a chicken
bj(R -SI
>
altruism
bj >
0
results :
(ai>
or Assurance
1 (T -RI
bj(T -P) 1 (P-S)
aj +
1. ln case of egoism and positive
transformed
being superior to (C,C) if and
0
,
bi
>
0), the initial PD game can be
game. Thus, altruism
improves
the prospect
for
cooperation.
2. Pure altruism (ai = 0
3. Pure negative altruism
1 bj >
(ai
0) delivers
=0
1 bj <
cooperation
0) gives
as the equilibrium
defection
as the
strategy.
dominant
strategy
1 which
is now pareto optimal.
4. Ego;sm and negative altruism
(ai>
0
, bj <
0) delivers defection as the solution,
CONC:LUSION : CHANGING THE PREFERENCES ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE INITIAL PD GAME
HAS TWO CONSEQUENCES.
1. Positive altruism
2. Negative altruism
makes more likely cooperation,
which might not be pareto optimal,
makes defection a pareto optimal strategy
43
LUNDV ALL (1992)
long term
strategies,
the organization
bath
the 60's,
cyclical
on the
from
opportunity
the
opened
Under
since
national,
of
allows
Furthermore,
correlated
recent
powers
business
with
into
today
of the
relations,
are more frequent
Mutatis
emergence
interactions.
and
in favor
is
is
size of the
games
of related
ln
bargains
advantage
upon
games.
France,
unions
"lois
could
are
ta
these
rarely
morrow.
bargainings
the
in a
loosely
which
AUROUX"
be
Stijl
do interact
of a cooperative
of argument
France
is not
and
the
approach
to
objectives
of the
than cooperation.
mutandis,
and
jack
and
the
divided
of
in
increase
level of most
ln spite
partners
routines
(1992)).
an
This
and
unrelated
national
governments
distrust
of
2).
bargaining.
level representatives
and
pro-
laws
spectrum
against
at the
local
bodies,
STREECK
a series
concession
dense
(W.
work
by social
in one of these
associations
the centralization
stratregies
industrial
the
a
and firms
the
Diagram
Germany
would
for a whole
sectoral
fragmented
trading
a defection
strategy
4 and
between
which
were
generally
Table
of social
which
and stijl
are
do
cooperation.
at
and multi-scope
contrast
just to
cooperation
rate has to be seized
for arrangements
regional,
and
(see
variety
Consequently,
between
organized
the
a large
countervailing
interactions
80's
were
into multiperiod
respect,
by a Tit-for-tat
system
firms
engage
the search
retaliated
the
about
a
games
bargaining
rate in the 60's,
induced
conflicts
by a low interest
this
pie to be shared.
more,
until
practices
real interest
contrary,
ln Germany,
organizing
into effective
automatically
order to continuously
striking.
and intertemporal
agents
This seems
is enlarged,
between
not
60's
of the future
to
concerning
3) : PD repeated
(1984).
this opportunity
have
contracts.
(Insert
chance
and
by R. AXELROD
low or even negative
general,
place...quite
argument
give a better
innovations
of labour
that the shadow
interactions
help in transforming
on banks
and process
and the nature
provided
Multiple
quite
in product
again the terminology
During
based
for the theoretical
cooperation
mention
systems
of the firms
nice confirmation
induce
: financial
stability
UK and US exhibit
of cooperation.
most of the factors
Highly
sophisticated
inhibiting
financial
markets
give
a premium
(US) and a structural
exit strategy
conflicts
managers
violent
relations.
blocking
management
2. Reciprocity
policy
which
of the German
driven
to
country
But
when
values,
the
reasons
of the collapse
be
resilient
of
repeated
might
which
open
opens
a concern
means
these
room
to deliver
solidaristic
new
of an
Consequently,
relations
ingredient
year
between
for distrust
contracts
in
is somehow
an adversarial
approach
configurations
hints
models
(Insert 3). The solidaristic
accross
skills and sectors)
to
technological
generations
concern
This
for distribution
Tit-for-tat
efficiency
of extra
and services
is one
OECD
of the
and
which
without
the
principles
of
has proven
to
accordance
One
incarnes.
and to a lesser
strategy
in
games.
for the weil being of others...
the goods
and
individualistic
this
relations
under
behaviors,
dilemma
for
among
more
.and
industrial
organized
opportunistic
prisoner's
be the
are
horizon.
success
group
adopted
looked
model.
the German
districts
an impressive
has been eroded..
of this impressive
to
have
wage
strategy,
be unrelentless
leadership
a nice
implemented
to an altruisitic
level should
has experienced
equilibrium
a multi-period
more
superiority
the
industrial
over
teachings
of three
at the national
on the contrary,
Italian
far
is another
years seems to belong
policy
the
cooperative
Quite
reciprocity,
continuous
and Swedish
of wages
cooperation
This
extend
prevalence
negociations.
may induce
theoretical
recent
for and implemented.
countries.
the
earners
more than solidaristic values.
until the very
this
distance
of wage
issues.
(i.e. the low dispersion
according
few
mobility
induce
during
the bargaining
of the previous
in Sweden
usually
are
qui pro quo and
A comparison
confirmation
there
the social
a continuous
; a large
expressed
sinGe
Finally,
termism
of unions
of the voice
and workers:
industrial
most
weakness
instead
Gan be
to short
of
the
quality
By contrast,
necessarily
are the material
with
the
reasons
of
improvements,
altruism
only
supplying
the
counterpart
of
values.
Nevertheless,
why some countries
the distribution
of beliefs
facing the same issue,
and attitudes
may explain
finally give either a cooperative
45
solution
if solidarity
values
is sufficiently
are ruling.
explaning
factor
(1992)).
Some
with
Austria,
Sweden),
towards
a cooperative
density
international
could
this
researches
suggest
evolution
endowment
equilibrium.
organization
crisis,
the
two
from
in union densities
(G. CORNEO
values and attitudes
values
the
systems
pushed
has pushed
very old founding
relations
English
speaking
toward
process.
evolved
low unions
Facing
quite
principles.
(Germany,
industrial
in many
bargaining
have
that
individualistic
is a possible
On the contrary,
of
when
this
may have
of individualistic
loose
be an heritance
or defection
more conventional
initial
a long legacy
and
recent
for the diverging
ln countries
countries,
diffused,
the
differently
same
and
this
Values
are part of path
exhibit
the coexistence
dependency mechanisms.
Interestingly
of cooperation
against
a
and
areas
than
large
differ
tram
at a society
the
abstract
levels.
wide
Again,
first
cultural
of consent
significantly
groups.
defection
purely
manufacturing
rural
3. From localized
which
If the
example
designing
and
changes,
then a local
dilemma
If on the
then
assembling
convention
surprising
contrary,
more acute
conflicts
a
interventions.
that the resilience
coordination
issues
of
are
between
problems,
This
success
and stability
of the interactions
stable.
of interests
centralized
and institutionalize
Gan be evolutionaru
goods
ln
in a quite
at more
to
public
and Italy.
level
response
lasting
itself
in smaller
France
in
and
relations
and enforce.
mainly
products
the
express
enforced
do organize
suggest
concerns
should
at a national
public
instance,
industrial
between
is up to the nature
issue
Italy
to implement
districts
evidence
than large corporation,
efficiently
is expressed
is difficult
For
solidarity
some differences
comparisons
is a counter
firms
Third
Whereas
to general
this
cooperation.
is easier to contrai
strategy
actors.
districts.
again
is more
industrial
interactions
the
Italy.
reciprocity
economic
of
systems
For example,
solidarity
The international
explanation
of
reciprocity
in Italy,
of a local cooperative
expia nation
explain
whereas
of reciprocity,
and
Northern
the
national
strategies
cities,
level,
By contrast
many
may be easier in smaller
this could
country,
way,
principle
enough,
many
market
is a possible
Italian
generating
cali for collective
fast
for
industrial
a prisoner's
interventions,
46
the
implementation
associations
or
development
goods
of fuies
State.
The
expenditures,
are more
of the
game,
supply
of
provided
basically
vocational
the provision
adequately
and
legal
training,
of transportation
in societies
enforcement
research
and
sufficiently
by
other
and
collective
rich in institutions
and public interventions.
Thus
For instance,
a private
the Japanese
much
more
firms.
But the success
cooperation
of high wages,
induced
an adhesion
of asymmetric
spectrum
unions
and
diffusion
business
nexus
desperately
partners,
last case
sufficient
should
imposed
upon
vocational
ail these
of
factors
vocational
dominated
reminds
us that
to implement
4. The disciplinary
more
to a kind
training...
level
to cooperation
:
by a
: incentives
to
joint
organization
by
training,
help
the
French
the
into
State
has
really succeeding
among
weaker
by an omnipresent
public
interventions
are
largely
to
cooperation
without
organized
wide
of
of the stakes.
are embedding
By contrast,
loosely
the disease
interventions
social
State.
necessary
but
This
not
and trust
raie of competition.
to recall
exposed to foreign competition,
that
the
more
The defense
of national
less conflictual
opened
economies,
severely
have usually be induced, via possible dramatic
crises, to design and implement more cooperative
promoted
according
in labor
cooperation
It is interesting
(1982)).
area has
partners
associations
: the
depressed
at a society
social
in British
as in Japan
solve
of an inducement
tried to copy German
often
strategies,
informations,
are
in manufacturing
is not at the heights
strategies.
relations
of rather
be reformed
success
regulation.
used to prevail
not necessarily
of interdependent
industrial
than
of management
of new technologies,
a tight
since
the
sharing
does
example
of constraints
regularly,
relations
to management
which
to a public
in UK have succeeded
in the context
But this
is a good
equivalent
to the sa me configuration
job tenure
of workers
totally
labor
of the Japanese
Germany
negociate
in capital
relations,
the extrapolation
whole
transplants
cooperation.
industrial
is never
is not related
promise
British
order
industrial
prosperity
strategies
(J. KATZENSTEIN
in an ocean of competition,
has
relations and unions have been obliged to
47
take
into
account
the
Switzerland,
Austria,
continental
economies,
example
France,
domestic
economic
Sweden,
and
outcome
of
mechanims
firm,
impact
powerful
of cultural
logical
outcome
framework
turned
VI
of
into
such
imposed
size countries,
used
for
of the
to
REDONDa
will
allow
OUT OF CONFLlCT...A
their
attitudes,
might
with
just
be the
tradition.
due
within
large
tradition
NEGlECTED
is
out of the business
partially
mix between
as a
if conpetition
as the Japanese
cooperation
of this original
But
along
manufacture,
each
attitudes
of cooperation
society
but the
Within
shirking
to change
competition
a traditional
efficient
(1992)).
be driven
the emergence
of
is not an hazard
configuration.
firms
or accepted
be the consequence
this
will be induced
interplay
why
-COOPERATION
By contrast,
policy
be to diffuse
dilemma
workers
the
could
inefficient
an impressively
The
demands.
: the contrai
monetary
that
(F. VEGA
Consequently,
enlighten
competition.
would
job.
such a strategy
of
suggests
value
the more
and th us the unemployed
to get another
to this category.
or even medium
autonomy
to a prisoner's
strong,
of their
in wage bargaining.
modelling
sufficiently
do belong
to adopt
a relative
Evolutionary
response
consequences
such as US, Canada,
more room for manoeuvre
rational
social
Norway
had legs incentive
market
the
and
to
This
could
be
organized
corporations
and rationality.
AREA
FOR FURTHER
INVESTIGATIONS.
The present analyses deliver some provisional conclusions.
1. The current
the
shift
principles
concern
from
for trust
a Fordist
which
cali
for
in industrial
labor
more
regime
loyalty
relations
and firms'
and
may partially
organization
commitment
earners.
industrial relations may play some raie in such a lock-in.
derive
towards
from
the
from
new
wage-
48
3.
Some
game
theory
analyses
which
are
observed
overcome.
Enlarging
regulation,
promoting
recognition
abilities
in the
suggest
that
area
industrial
of
the concern
multiple
more
than
ail these
prisoner's
relations
are
taxing
defection
for the future,
reciprocity
of agents,
the
pure
altruism,
mechanisms
dilemma
not
easy
via State
improving
may explain
to
the
the viability
of cooperation.
4. These
factors
observed
among
markets
France
illustrates
markets,
5.
for,
inherent
sophisticated
civil wars,
what
process
and
world
conflicts
institutions
or major
which
are
contradictory
and
consequences.
The late Scandinavian
ironical
floor
currently
lagging
in
: cooperation
and quietly
Is not this
teaching
behind,
instances,
uncertain
democracy
indeed
than smoothly
ln many
large
model,
Japanese
designed
pushed
solidarity.
a purely
(impatient
firms,
State
financial
circumscribed
neo-institutionalists
The
day
they
process,
has more
is not as smooth
major
have
specially
been
devoid
the German
firms..
structural
designed
of
.all
these
been engineered
after
of most
emerging
work
as
crises,
are at the origin
as
not
are
to
via
for the
more
for competitiveness
conflict
?
a
unintended
councils,
the
examples
are
harsh conflicts
by social scientists.
a chance
in the search
and
turmoils
to
conditional
of cooperation.
suggest.
conceived
consent.
and
financial
The better
that
with
of cooperation
political
manufacture
shop
unions
theoreticians
nice formalizations
State
configuration
with the mergence
of emergence
patient
suggest
associated
States
between
may
run than
difficulties
game
currently
and thug cooperation.
long
The United
at odds
to
the
in the
configurations
and Germany,
to Sweden
bargaining
...) seem quite
looking
the
the
infrequent
contrary
of
efficient
cooperation.
Finally,
ln Japan
compared
is more
engineered
upon the contrasted
long run compromises
of Germany,
cooperation
light
OECD countries.
are helping
risilience
State
cast some
prone
societies,
49
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AU MAN R.J., SORIN S. (1989) Cooperation
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R. (1984) The Evolution
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R. (1988)
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R. (1991)
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