Idaho Statewide Assessment: How to Conduct a K-12 School Safety Review Guy Bliesner Brian Armes EducatorsEyes Who we are, and why that is important in this study • Idaho School Safety and Security Stakeholder Group • Group findings – See handout • The educator’s perspective – Operational understanding – Assess first! The Basics of Assessment • The objective set of eyes – You don’t know what you don’t know – You don’t see the forest for the trees – Ultimately, self assessment falls short • Inter-rater reliability, a necessary component • Match the measure! – Define what you are trying to measure – Match the assessment to what you are measuring! • Assessment in operations ISTVA Idaho School Threat and Vulnerability Assessment • Inclusion in the study by random lot and completely voluntary • A 10% sample of the schools in Idaho (75 schools) • A stratified sample - ½ of the sample schools from Districts of < 4000 • 18 elementary, 9 middle level, 9 High School (types) in each set • No district allowed more than 1 school in each type ISTVA Idaho School Threat and Vulnerability Assessment • A holistic instrument assessing a broad spectrum of school safety and security indicators (465 specific touch points) – based on the Texas School Safety Center’s Safety and Security Audit. – Compared written policy to observed procedure and practice • Compressed time frame to allow for accurate comparison • Performed by a single two man team to ensure interrater reliability Empirical Data • A major (>80%) portion of the sample schools demonstrated serious failings in communications abilities. • 24 of the 74 schools assessed have a multi-hazard EOP. 13 have an EOP that addresses the emergency response cycle (mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery), and 18 schools have an EOP that adheres to ICS and NIMS principles. • Visitor policies show wide variance across the sample set. 12 schools in the sample required positive identification, and 27 required a visible, dated visitor’s pass be worn. 8 of the sample schools required vendors/contractors/district staff to follow the school visitor policy. • In 74 schools operational procedures and practices diverged from written policy Empirical Data • In 74 schools either building design, student load and/or staffing levels have created one or more of the following conditions: – Inadequate supervision of students in hallways, stairwells, restrooms and common areas. – Unmonitored entryways – General lack of CPTED principles • In 71 of 74 schools, entrance to the school was achieved through other means than the designated main entrance. Anecdotal Findings • Cultural elements inhibit action • A general lack of expertise in school safety & security – Schools are a platypus • Overtasked personnel + lack of expertise = status quo • Disjointed responses – Lack of comprehensive planning – Lack of common emergency response and commands The Bottom Line • Assess! • Use assessment to drive planning – EOP, Communication Plan, Security Plan, Mental Health Plan • Planning drives policies – Polices must become operational reality • Planning drives purchasing A failure to assess guarantees you will waste time, energy and money! Who owns the problem? Educators can not abdicate the responsibility! In Loco Parentis (in the place of the parent) School Safety, Security and Risk Management for Educators, by Educators Brian Armes (208) 521-1600 Guy Bliesner (208) 201-1036 educatorseyes.org [email protected] [email protected] CPTED!