Idaho Statewide Assessment: How to Conduct a K-12 School Safety Review Guy Bliesner

Idaho Statewide Assessment:
How to Conduct a K-12 School
Safety Review
Guy Bliesner
Brian Armes
Who we are, and why that is
important in this study
• Idaho School Safety and Security Stakeholder Group
• Group findings
– See handout
• The educator’s perspective
– Operational understanding
– Assess first!
The Basics of Assessment
• The objective set of eyes
– You don’t know what you don’t know
– You don’t see the forest for the trees
– Ultimately, self assessment falls short
• Inter-rater reliability, a necessary component
• Match the measure!
– Define what you are trying to measure
– Match the assessment to what you are measuring!
• Assessment in operations
Idaho School Threat and Vulnerability Assessment
• Inclusion in the study by random lot and completely
• A 10% sample of the schools in Idaho (75 schools)
• A stratified sample - ½ of the sample schools from
Districts of < 4000
• 18 elementary, 9 middle level, 9 High School (types) in
each set
• No district allowed more than 1 school in each type
Idaho School Threat and Vulnerability Assessment
• A holistic instrument assessing a broad spectrum of
school safety and security indicators (465 specific touch
– based on the Texas School Safety Center’s Safety and
Security Audit.
– Compared written policy to observed procedure and
• Compressed time frame to allow for accurate
• Performed by a single two man team to ensure interrater reliability
Empirical Data
• A major (>80%) portion of the sample schools demonstrated serious
failings in communications abilities.
• 24 of the 74 schools assessed have a multi-hazard EOP. 13 have an
EOP that addresses the emergency response cycle (mitigation,
preparedness, response, recovery), and 18 schools have an EOP
that adheres to ICS and NIMS principles.
• Visitor policies show wide variance across the sample set. 12
schools in the sample required positive identification, and 27
required a visible, dated visitor’s pass be worn. 8 of the sample
schools required vendors/contractors/district staff to follow the
school visitor policy.
• In 74 schools operational procedures and practices diverged from
written policy
Empirical Data
• In 74 schools either building design, student load and/or
staffing levels have created one or more of the following
– Inadequate supervision of students in hallways,
stairwells, restrooms and common areas.
– Unmonitored entryways
– General lack of CPTED principles
• In 71 of 74 schools, entrance to the school was achieved
through other means than the designated main entrance.
Anecdotal Findings
• Cultural elements inhibit action
• A general lack of expertise in school safety &
– Schools are a platypus
• Overtasked personnel + lack of expertise =
status quo
• Disjointed responses
– Lack of comprehensive planning
– Lack of common emergency response and
The Bottom Line
• Assess!
• Use assessment to drive planning
– EOP, Communication Plan, Security Plan,
Mental Health Plan
• Planning drives policies
– Polices must become operational reality
• Planning drives purchasing
A failure to assess guarantees you will waste time, energy and money!
Who owns the problem?
Educators can not abdicate the responsibility!
In Loco Parentis
(in the place of the parent)
School Safety, Security and Risk Management
for Educators, by Educators
Brian Armes
(208) 521-1600
Guy Bliesner
(208) 201-1036
[email protected]
[email protected]